Appeal

As a rue, a party who does not appea from the decson may not
obtan any affrmatve reef from the appeate court other than what
he has obtaned from the ower trbuna, f any, whose decson s
brought up on appea. Due process prevents the grant of addtona
awards to partes who dd not appea. As an excepton, he may assgn
an error where the purpose s to mantan the |udgment on other
grounds, but he cannot seek modfcaton or reversa of the |udgment
or affrmatve reef uness he has aso appeaed or fed a separate
petton. (AKLAN COLLEGE, INC. vs. PERPETUO ENERO, ARLYN
CASTIGADOR, NUENA SERMON and |OCELYN ZOLINA, G.R. No. 178309,
|anuary 27, 2009)
Lkewse, by avang of a wrong or napproprate mode of appea,
the petton merts an outrght dsmssa pursuant to Crcuar No. 2-
90 whch provdes that, "an appea taken to ether Supreme Court
or the Court of Appeas by the wrong or napproprate mode sha
be dsmssed."( HAN|IN HEAVY INDUSTRIES AND CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY LTD. (FORMERLY HAN|IN ENGINEERING AND
CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD.) v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.
No. 167938, February 19, 2009)
At the outset, t must be stated that pettoners adopted the
wrong mode of remedy n brngng the case before ths Court. It s
we-setted that the proper recourse of an aggreved party to assa
the decson of the Court of Appeas s to fe a petton for revew on
certorar under Rue 45 of the Rues of Court. The Rues precudes
recourse to the speca cv acton of certorar f appea, by way of a
petton for revew s avaabe, as the remedes of appea and certorar
are mutuay excusve and not aternatve or successve. (TACLOBAN
FAR EAST MARKETING CORPORATION and FRANCISCO Y. ROMUALDEZ
v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, G.R. No. 182320, September 11, 2009)
Tme and agan, t has been hed that the rght to appea s not a
consttutona rght, but a mere statutory prvege. Hence, partes who
seek to ava themseves of t must compy wth the statutes or rues
aowng t. To reterate, perfecton of an appea n the manner and
wthn the perod permtted by aw s mandatory and |ursdctona. The
requrements for perfectng an appea must, as a rue, be strcty
foowed. Such requrements are consdered ndspensabe
nterdctons aganst needess deays and are necessary for the ordery
dscharge of the |udca busness. Faure to perfect the appea
renders the |udgment of the court fna and executory. |ust as a osng
!
party has the prvege to fe an appea wthn the prescrbed perod, so
does the wnner aso have the correatve rght to en|oy the fnaty of
the decson. Thus, the proprety of the monetary awards of the Labor
Arbter s aready bndng upon ths Court, much more wth the Court of
Appeas. (ANDREW |AMES MCBURNIE v. EULALIO GANZON, EGI-
MANAGERS,INC. and E. GANZON, INC. G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117,
G.R. Nos. 186984-85, September 18, 2009)
From the mmedatey quoted pronouncement of the Court n 5y,
pettoners mere fng of the Moton for Reducton of Bond dd not
suffce to perfect hs appea. As correcty found by the appeate
court, pettoner fed a Moton for Reducton of Bond dated |une 24,
1999 (whch was receved by the appeate court on |une 28, 1999)
aegng fnanca constrants wthout showng "substanta compance
wth the Rues" or demonstratng a wngness to abde by the |R|ues
by postng a parta bond." That pettoner questoned the computaton
of the monetary award - bass of the computaton of the amount of
appea bond dd not excuse t from postng a bond n a reasonabe
amount or what t beeved to be the correct amount. (THE HERITAGE
HOTEL MANILA v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RUFINO
C. RANON II, AND ISMAEL C. VILLA, G.R. Nos. 180478-79, September
3, 2009)
Certiorari
Respondent may have a pont n assertng that n ths case a
Rue 65 petton s a wrong mode of appea, as ndeed the wrt of
certorar s an extraordnary remedy, and certorar |ursdcton s not
to be equated wth appeate |ursdcton. Nevertheess, t s setted,
as a genera proposton, that the avaabty of an appea does not
forecose recourse to the extraordnary remedes, such as certiorari
and prohbton, where appea s not adequate or equay benefca,
speedy and suffcent, as where the orders of the tra court were
ssued n excess of or wthout |ursdcton, or there s need to prompty
reeve the aggreved party from the n|urous effects of the acts of an
nferor court or trbuna, e.g., the court has authorzed executon of the
|udgment. Ths Court has even recognzed that a recourse to
certorar s proper not ony where there s a cear deprvaton of
pettoners fundamenta rght to due process, but so aso where other
speca crcumstances warrant mmedate and more drect acton.
(PEOPLES BROADCASTING(BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.) vs. THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and |ANDELEON |UEZAN, G.R.
No. 179652, May 8, 2009)
Strict Application of the Rules
"
As to the other ground cted by prvate respondents counse,
suffce t to say that t was a bare aegaton unsubstantated by any
proof or affdavt of mert. Besdes, they coud have fed the petton on
tme wth a moton to be aowed to tgate in forma pauperis. Whe
soca |ustce requres that the aw ook tendery on the dsadvantaged
sectors of socety, nether the rch nor the poor has a cense to
dsregard rues of procedure. The fundamenta rue of human reatons
en|ons everyone, regardess of standng n fe, to duy observe
procedura rues as an aspect of actng wth |ustce, gvng everyone hs
due and observng honesty and good fath. For ndeed, whe
techncates shoud not unduy hamper our quest for |ustce, ordery
procedure s essenta to the success of that quest to whch a courts
are devoted. (LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION v. ARIES C. CAALAM and
GERALDINE ESGUERRA, G.R. No. 185220, |uy 27, 2009)
Date of Filing
In ths case, pettoner avaed of the servces of LBC, a prvate
carrer, to dever ts notce of appea to the NLRC. Had pettoner sent
ts notce of appea by regstered ma, the date of mang woud have
been deemed the date of fng wth the NLRC. But pettoner, for
reasons of ts own, chose to send ts notce of appea through a prvate
etter-forwardng agency. Therefore, the date of actua recept by the
NLRC of the notce of appea, and not the date of devery to LBC, s
deemed to be the date of the fng of the notce of appea. Snce the
NLRC receved pettoners notce of appea on 26 February 2001, the
appea was ceary fed out of tme. Pettoner had thus ost ts rght to
appea from the decson of the Labor Arbter and the NLRC shoud
have dsmssed ts notce of appea. (CHARTER CHEMICAL AND
COATING CORPORATION vs. HERBERT TAN and AMALIA SONSING, G.R.
No. 163891, May 21, 2009)
Delayed Filing
We agree wth the Court of Appeas that snce no ntent to deay
the admnstraton of |ustce coud be attrbuted to Gunmapang, a one
day deay does not |ustfy the appeas dena. More mportanty, the
Court of Appeas decared that Gunmapangs appea, on ts face,
appears to be mpressed wth mert. The consttutona mandate to
accord fu protecton to abor and to safeguard the empoyees means
of vehood shoud be gven proper attenton and sancton. A greater
n|ustce may occur f sad appea s not gven due course than f the
regementary perod to appea were strcty foowed. In ths case, we
are ncned to excuse the one day deay n order to fuy sette the
merts of the case. Ths s n ne wth our pocy to encourage fu
#
ad|udcaton of the merts of an appea. (REPUBLIC CEMENT
CORPORATION v. PETER I. GUINMAPANG, G.R. No. 168910, August 24,
2009)
Appeal Bond
At the tme of the fng of the surety bond by P|I on |anuary 2,
2003, PPAC was st an accredted bondng company. Thus, t was
but proper to honor the appea bond ssued by a bondng company
duy accredted by ths Court at the tme of ts ssuance. The
subsequent revocaton of the authorty of a bondng company
shoud not pre|udce partes who reed on ts authorty. The
revocaton of authorty of a bondng company s prospectve n
appcaton. (CESARIO L. DEL ROSARIO v. PHILIPPINE |OURNALISTS,
INC., G.R. No. 181516, August 19, 2009)
Whe the bond may be reduced upon moton by the empoyer,
ths s sub|ect to the condtons that (1) the moton to reduce the bond
sha be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable
amount n reaton to the monetary award s posted by the appeant,
otherwse the fng of the moton to reduce bond sha not stop the
runnng of the perod to perfect an appea. The quafcaton effectvey
requres that uness the NLRC grants the reducton of the cash bond
wthn the 10 day regementary perod, the employer is still
expected to post the cash or surety bond securing the !"## $
amount within the said 10-day period. If the NLRC does
eventuay grant the moton for reducton after the regementary
perod has eapsed, the correct reef woud be to reduce the cash or
surety bond aready posted by the empoyer wthn the 10-day perod.
(ANDREW |AMES MCBURNIE v. EULALIO GANZON, EGI-MANAGERS,INC.
and E. GANZON, INC. G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117, G.R. Nos. 186984-
85, September 18, 2009)
In addton, whe the bond requrement on appeas nvovng a
monetary award has been reaxed n certan cases, ths can ony be
done where there was substanta compance wth the Rues; or where
the appeants, at the very east, exhbted wngness to pay by
postng a parta bond. ( LOLITA A. LOPEZ, ET. a., vs. OUEZON CITY
SPORTS CLUB, INC.,G.R. No. 164032, |anuary 19, 2009)
The decsons, awards or orders of the Labor Arbter are fna and
executory uness appeaed to the NLRC by any partes wthn ten (10)
caendar days from recept thereof, wth proof of payment of the
requred appea fee accompaned by a memorandum of appea. And
where, as here, the |udgment nvoves monetary award, an appea
$
therefrom by the empoyer may be "perfected ony upon the postng of
a cash or surety bond." A mere notce of appea wthout compyng
wth the other requstes mentoned does not stop the runnng of the
perod for perfectng an appea as n fact no moton for extenson of
sad perod s aowed. (WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and
SCANDIC SHIPMANAGEMENT LIMITED v. ERIBERTO S. BULTRON, G.R.
No. 185261, October 2, 2009)
The purpose of an appea bond s to ensure, durng the perod of
appea, aganst any occurrence that woud defeat or dmnsh recovery
by the aggreved empoyees under the |udgment f subsequenty
affrmed. The Deed of Assgnment n the nstant case, ke a cash or
surety bond, serves the same purpose. Frst, the Deed of Assgnment
consttutes not |ust a parta amount, but rather the entre award n the
appeaed Order. Second, t s cear from the Deed of Assgnment that
the entre amount s under the fu contro of the bank, and not of
pettoner, and s n fact payabe to the DOLE Regona Offce, to be
wthdrawn by the same offce after t had ssued a wrt of executon.
For a ntents and purposes, the Deed of Assgnment n tandem wth
the Letter Agreement and Cash Voucher s as good as cash. Thrd, the
Court fnds that the executon of the Deed of Assgnment, the Letter
Agreement and the Cash Voucher were made n good fath, and
consttuted cear manfestaton of pettoners wngness to pay the
|udgment amount. (PEOPLES BROADCASTING(BOMBO RADYO PHILS.,
INC.) vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and
|ANDELEON |UEZAN, G.R. No. 179652, May 8, 2009)

Attorney's Fees
Fnay, the Court overrues the deeton by the NLRC of the Labor
Arbters award for attorneys fees to pettoner. Pettoner s evdenty
entted to attorneys fees, snce h3e was compeed to tgate to
protect hs nterest by reason of un|ustfed and unawfu termnaton of
hs empoyment by respondents CCBP and Tagubao. (ERWIN H. REYES
v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 180551,
February 10, 2009)
Consderng that Atty. Go successfuy represented hs cent, t s
ony proper that he shoud receve adequate compensaton for hs
efforts. Even as we agree wth the reducton of the award of attorney's
fees by the CA, the fact that a awyer pays a vta roe n the
admnstraton of |ustce emphaszes the need to secure to hm hs
honorarum awfuy earned as a means to preserve the decorum and
respectabty of the ega professon. A awyer s as much entted to
|udca protecton aganst n|ustce or mposton of fraud on the part of
%
hs cent as the cent s aganst abuse on the part of hs counse. The
duty of the court s not aone to ensure that a awyer acts n a proper
and awfu manner, but aso to see that a awyer s pad hs |ust fees.
Wth hs capta consstng of hs brans and wth hs sk acqured at
tremendous cost not ony n money but n expendture of tme and
energy, he s entted to the protecton of any |udca trbuna aganst
any attempt on the part of hs cent to escape payment of hs |ust
compensaton. It woud be ronc f after puttng forth the best n hm to
secure |ustce for hs cent, he hmsef woud not get hs due.
(EVANGELINA MASMUD (as substtute companant for ALEXANDER |.
MASMUD) v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No.
183385, February 13, 2009)
Moreover, n cases for recovery of wages, the award of attorney's
fees s proper and there need not be any showng that the empoyer
acted macousy or n bad fath when t wthhed the wages. There
need ony be a showng that the awfu wages were not pad
accordngy. (BARON REPUBLIC THEATRICAL V. NORMITA P. PERALTA et
a, G.R. No. 170525, October 2, 2009)
In the case at bar, we fnd that the fght attendants were
represented by respondent unon whch, n turn, engaged the servces
of ts own counse. The fght attendants had a common cause of
acton. Whe the work performed by respondents counse was by no
means smpe, seeng as t spanned the whoe tgaton from the Labor
Arbter stage a the way to ths Court, nevertheess, the ssues
nvoved n ths case are smpe, and the ega strateges, theores and
arguments advanced were common for a the affected crew members.
Hence, t may not be reasonabe to award sad counse an amount
equvaent to 10% of a monetary awards to be receved by each
ndvdua fght attendant. Based on the ength of tme that ths case
has been tgated, however, we fnd that the amount of P2,000,000.00
s reasonabe as attorneys fees. Ths amount shoud ncude a
expenses of tgaton that were ncurred by respondent unon. (FLIGHT
ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
(FASAP), v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,PATRIA CHIONG and COURT OF
APPEALS,G.R. No. 178083, October 2, 2009)
The cam for attorneys fees s granted foowng Artce 2208 of
the New Cv Code whch aows ts recovery n actons for recovery of
wages of aborers and actons for ndemnty under the empoyer's
abty aws. The same fees are aso recoverabe when the
defendant's act or omsson has compeed the pantff to ncur
expenses to protect hs nterest as n the present case foowng the
refusa by respondent to sette hs cams. Pursuant to prevang
|ursprudence, pettoner s entted to attorneys fees of ten percent
&
(10%) of the monetary award. (LEOPOLDO ABANTE v. K|GS FLEET
MANAGEMENT MANILA G.R. No. 182430, December 4, 2009)
Backwages
One of the natura consequences of a fndng that an empoyee
has been egay dsmssed s the payment of backwages
correspondng to the perod from hs dsmssa up to actua
renstatement. The statutory ntent of ths matter s ceary
dscernbe. The payment of backwages aows the empoyee to
recover from the empoyer that whch he has ost by way of wages as a
resut of hs dsmssa. Logcay, t must be computed from the date of
pettoners ega dsmssa up to the tme of actua renstatement.
There can be no gap or nterrupton, est we defeat the very reason of
the aw n grantng the same. That pettoner dd not mmedatey fe
hs Compant shoud not affect or dmnsh hs rght to backwages, for
t s a rght ceary granted to hm by aw -- shoud he be found to have
been egay dsmssed -- and for as ong as hs cause of acton has not
been barred by prescrpton. (ERWIN H. REYES v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 180551, February 10, 2009)
He never bothered to redeem hs cense at the soonest possbe
tme when there was no showng that he was unawfuy prevented by
respondent from dong so. Thus, pettoner shoud not be pad for the
tme he was not workng. The Court has hed that where the faure of
empoyees to work was not due to the empoyer's faut, the burden of
economc oss suffered by the empoyees shoud not be shfted to the
empoyer. Each party must bear hs own oss. It woud be unfar to
aow pettoner to recover somethng he has not earned and coud not
have earned, snce he coud not dscharge hs work as a drver wthout
hs drver's cense. Respondent shoud be exempted from the burden
of payng backwages. (BERNARDINO V. NAVARRO v. P.V. PA|ARILLO
LINER, INC., G.R. No. 164681, Apr 24, 2009)
Burden of Proof
In termnaton cases, the empoyer bears the burden of provng
that the dsmssa of the empoyee s for a |ust or an authorzed cause.
Faure to dspose of the burden woud mpy that the dsmssa s not
awfu, and that the empoyee s entted to renstatement, back wages
and accrung benefts. Moreover, dsmssed empoyees are not
requred to prove ther nnocence of the empoyers accusatons
aganst them. (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION AND WILLIAM L. FRIEND, |R., G.R. No.
153983, May 26, 2009)
'
As a genera rue, one who peads payment has the burden of
provng t. Even where the empoyee must aege nonpayment, the
genera rue s that the burden rests on the empoyer to prove
payment, rather than on the empoyee to prove nonpayment. The
reason for the rue s that the pertnent personne fes, payros,
records, remttances and other smar documents - whch w show
that overtme, dfferentas, servce ncentve eave and other cams of
workers have been pad - are not n the possesson of the empoyee
but n the custody and absoute contro of the empoyer. Snce n the
case at bar pettoner company has not shown any proof of payment of
the correct amount of saary, hoday pay and 13
th
month pay, we
affrm the award of Madragas monetary cams. (MANTLE TRADING
SERVICES, INCORPORATED AND/OR BOBBY DEL ROSARIO v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PABLO S. MADRIAGA,G.R. No.
166705,|uy 28,2009)
Respectng the ssue of ega dsmssa, the Court apprecates
no evdence that pettoner was dsmssed. What t fnds s that
pettoner unateray stopped reportng for work before fng a
compant for ega dsmssa, based on hs beef that Guermo and
Bergona had spread rumors that hs transactons on behaf of BAYER
woud no onger be honored as of Apr 30, 2002. Ths beef remans
|ust that - t s unsubstantated. Whe n cases of ega dsmssa, the
empoyer bears the burden of provng that the dsmssa s for a vad
or authorzed cause, the empoyee must frst estabsh by substanta
evdence the fact of dsmssa. (RAMY GALLEGO v. BAYER
PHILIPPINES, INC., DANPIN GUILLERMO, PRODUCT IMAGE MARKETING,
INC., and EDGARDO BERGONIA, G.R. No. 179807, |uy 31, 2009)
The burden of provng the vadty of retrenchment s on the
pettoner. Evdence does not suffcenty estabsh that pettoner had
ncurred osses that woud |ustfy retrenchment to prevent further
osses. The Comparatve Income Statement for the year 1996 and for
the months of February to |une 1997 whch pettoner submtted dd
not concusvey show that pettoner had suffered fnanca osses. In
fact, records show that from |anuary to |uy 1997, pettoner hred a
tota of 114 new empoyees assgned n the pettoner's stores ocated
n the dfferent paces of the country. (EMCOR INCORPORATED v. MA.
LOURDES D. SIENES, G.R. No. 152101, September 8, 2009)
It s we-setted that n termnaton cases, the burden of proof
rests upon the empoyer to show that the dsmssa was for a |ust and
vad cause and faure to dscharge the same woud mean that the
dsmssa s not |ustfed and therefore ega. Hence, n argung that
Sabuao abandoned hs work, t s ncumbent upon the pettoners to
prove: (1) that the empoyee faed to report for work or had been
(
absent wthout vad or |ustfabe reason; and (2) that there must have
been a cear ntenton to sever the empoyer-empoyee reatonshp as
manfested by some overt acts. Ceary, |ursprudence dctates that
the burden of proof to show that there was un|ustfed refusa to go
back to work rests on the empoyer. (TACLOBAN FAR EAST MARKETING
CORPORATION and FRANCISCO Y. ROMUALDEZ v. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 182320,
September 11, 2009)
Cause of Action
The Secretary of Labor and Empoyment dsmssed the frst
petton as t was fed outsde the 60-day freedom perod. At that tme
therefore, the unon has no cause of acton snce they are not yet
egay aowed to chaenge openy and formay the status of SMCGC-
SUPER as the excusve barganng representatve of the barganng
unt. Such dsmssa, however, has no bearng n the nstant case snce
the thrd petton for certfcaton eecton was fed we wthn the 60-
day freedom perod. Otherwse stated, there s no dentty of causes of
acton to speak of snce n the frst petton, the unon has no cause of
acton whe n the thrd, a cause of acton aready exsts for the unon
as they are now egay aowed to chaenge the status of SMCGC-
SUPER as excusve barganng representatve. (CHRIS GARMENTS
CORPORATION vs HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS and CHRIS
GARMENTS WORKERS UNION-PTGWO LOCAL CHAPTER No. 832, G.R.
No. 167426, |anuary 12, 2009)
Circumvention of the Law
Notaby, prvate respondents purported empoyment wth
MANRED commenced ony n 1996, way after she was hred by the
pettoner as extra beverage attendant on Apr 24, 1995. There s thus
much credence n the prvate respondents cam that the servce
agreement executed between the pettoner and MANRED s a mere
poy to crcumvent the aw on empoyment, n partcuar that whch
pertans on reguarzaton. (MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP vs
COURT OF APPEALS, SHERYL OABEL AND MANILA RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT CORP., G.R. No. 149660, |anuary 20, 2009)
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
If the terms of a CBA are cear and have no doubt upon the
ntenton of the contractng partes, as n the heren questoned
provson, the tera meanng thereof sha preva. That s setted. As
such, the day-pad empoyees must be pad ther reguar saares on
)
the hodays whch are so decared by the natona government,
regardess of whether they fa on rest days.
Hoday pay s a egsated beneft enacted as part of the
Consttutona mperatve that the State sha afford protecton to abor.
Its purpose s not merey "to prevent dmnuton of the monthy ncome
of the workers on account of work nterruptons. In other words,
athough the worker s forced to take a rest, he earns what he shoud
earn, that s, hs hoday pay." (Emphass and underscorng supped)
(RFM CORPORATION-FLOUR DIVISION and SFI FEEDS DIVISION v.
KASAPIAN NG MANGGA-GAWANG PINAGKAISA-RFM (KAMPI-NAFLU-
KMU) and SANDIGAN AT UGNAYAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PINAGKAISA-
SFI (SUMAPI-NAFLU-KMU), G.R. No. 162324, February 4, 2009)
Company Policy
As respondents credtaby expaned, and as admtted by
pettoner hersef, respondents have standng poces that an
empoyee must be snge at the tme of empoyment and must be
wng to be assgned to any of ts branches n the country.
Pettoners contenton that upon gettng marred, she no onger bound
hersef to be assgned to any of respondents branches n the country
s preposterous. |ust because an empoyee gets marred does not
mean she can aready renege on a commtment she wngy made at
the tme of her empoyment partcuary f such commtment does not
appear to be unreasonabe, nconvenent, or pre|udca to her.
Respondents camed that trave tme from the Bacood Cty Branch to
the Ioo Cty Branch w ony take about an hour by boat and that they
were even wng to defray pettoners transportaton and odgng
expenses. Pettoner never dsputed these matters. There s no
showng ether that pettoners transfer was ony beng used by
respondents to camoufage a snster scheme of management to rd
tsef of an undesrabe worker n the person of pettoner. (AILEEN G.
HERIDA v. F & C PAWNSHOP and |EWELRY STORE/MARCELINO
FLORETE, |R., G.R. No. 172601, Apr 16, 2009)
Computation of Award
Fnay, on the ncrease n the computaton of the monetary
award to respondents, the decson of the Labor Arbter specfed that
for purposes of puttng up a bond shoud pettoner appea, the
backwages were computed ony for a certan perod. Otherwse, the
actual backwages to be paid to respondents are computed from the
date of dsmssa unt the fnaty of the decson. In addton, because
pettoner contnues to refuse and accord reguar status to respondents
and to pay them ther correspondng wages even after the apse of two
!*
(2) years from the fnaty of the Labor Arbters decson, the Labor
Arbter correcty ncuded that n ts order of executon. Thus, the Labor
Arbters order of executon smpy covered the correct computaton of
wages and other payments en|oyed by pettoners reguar empoyees.
(PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v. RIZALINA RAUT,
LEILA EMNACE and GINA CAPISTRANO, G.R. No. 174209, August 25,
2009)
Ths Court notes that the NLRC awarded backwages, 13
th
month
pay, and servce ncentve eave pay from |uy 10, 2005 to |anuary 23,
2007 ony. It s evdent that these shoud not be mted to sad perod.
These shoud be computed from the date of her ega dsmssa unt
ths decson attans fnaty. Though Boanos dd not appea the
computaton of the NLRCs award as affrmed by the Court of Appeas,
we are not barred from orderng ts modfcaton. Ths Court s mbued
wth suffcent authorty and dscreton to revew matters, not
otherwse assgned as errors on appea, f t fnds that ther
consderaton s necessary n arrvng at a compete and |ust resouton
of the case or to serve the nterests of |ustce or to avod dspensng
pecemea |ustce. Besdes, substantve rghts ke the award of
backwages, 13
th
month pay and servce ncentve eave pay resutng
from ega dsmssa must not be pre|udced by a rgd and technca
appcaton of the rues. The computaton of the award for backwages
and other benefts from the tme the compensaton was wthhed up to
the tme of actua renstatement s a mere ega consequence of the
fndng that respondent was egay dsmssed by pettoners. (HENLIN
PANAY COMPANY v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION , G.R.
No. 180718, October 23, 2009)
Conclusiveness of ]udgment
Third. The matter of empoyer-empoyee reatonshp has been
resoved wth fnaty by the Secretary of Labor and Empoyment n the
Resouton dated December 27, 2002. Snce pettoner dd not appea
ths factua fndng, then, t may be consdered as the fna resouton of
such ssue. To reterate, "concusveness of |udgment" has the effect
of precuson of ssues. (CHRIS GARMENTS CORPORATION vs HON.
PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS and CHRIS GARMENTS WORKERS UNION-
PTGWO LOCAL CHAPTER No. 832, G.R. No. 167426, |anuary 12, 2009)
Contingent Fee
Contngent fee contracts are sub|ect to the supervson and cose
scrutny of the court n order that cents may be protected from
un|ust charges. The amount of contngent fees agreed upon by the
partes s sub|ect to the stpuaton that counse w be pad for hs
!!
ega servces ony f the sut or tgaton prospers. A much hgher
compensaton s aowed as contngent fees because of the rsk that
the awyer may get nothng f the sut fas. The Court fnds nothng
ega n the contngent fee contract between Atty. Go and
Evangenas husband. The CA commtted no error of aw when t
awarded the attorneys fees of Atty. Go and aowed hm to receve
an equvaent of 39% of the monetary award. (EVANGELINA
MASMUD (as substtute companant for ALEXANDER |. MASMUD) v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 183385,
February 13, 2009)
Contract of Adhesion
In addton, the empoyment agreement may be kened nto a
contract of adheson consderng that t s pettoner who nssts that
there exsted an express perod of one year from Apr 1, 2002 to
March 31, 2003, usng as proof ts own copy of the agreement. Whe
contracts of adheson are vad and bndng, n cases of doubt whch
w cause a great mbaance of rghts aganst one of the partes, the
contract sha be construed aganst the party who drafted the same.
Hence, n ths case, where the very empoyment of respondent s at
stake, the doubt as to the perod of empoyment must be construed n
her favor. (MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS LEARNING CENTER and MRS.
VIOLETA T. CARINO v. ADELAIDA . MANALO, G.R. No. 178835, February
13, 2009)
Contract of Employment
Snce respondent was aready a reguar empoyee months before
the executon of the Empoyment wth a Fxed Perod contract, ts
executon was merey a poy on SMCs part to deprve respondent of
hs tenura securty. Hence, no vad fxed-term contract was executed.
The empoyment status of a person s defned and prescrbed by aw
and not by what the partes say t shoud be. Equay mportant to
consder s that a contract of empoyment s mpressed wth pubc
nterest such that abor contracts must yed to the common good.
Provsons of appcabe statutes are deemed wrtten nto the contract,
and the partes are not at berty to nsuate themseves and ther
reatonshps from the mpact of abor aws and reguatons by smpy
contractng wth each other. (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. EDUARDO
L. TEODOSIO, G.R. No. 163033, October 2, 2009)
Corporate Rehabilitation
Gven these premses, t s not dffcut to understand why
actons for cams aganst the ang enterprse have to be suspended.
!"
It then becomes easy to accept the hypothess that the date when the
cam arose, or when the acton s fed, s of no moment. As ong as the
corporaton s under a management commttee or a rehabtaton
recever, a actons for cams aganst t --- for money or otherwse ---
must yed to the greater mperatve of corporate rehabtaton,
exceptng ony, as aready mentoned, cams for payment of
obgatons ncurred by the corporaton n the ordnary course of
busness. Enforcement of wrts of executon ssued by |udca or quas-
|udca trbunas, snce such wrts emanate from "actons for cams,"
must, kewse, be suspended. (MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.
v. VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., G.R. No. 167768, Apr 17, 2009)
Damages
Pettoner's reance on Viernes v. National Labor Relations
Commission to support ts cam for the reducton of the award of
nomna damages s mspaced. The factua crcumstances are
dfferent. Viernes s an ega dsmssa case, snce there was no
authorzed cause for the dsmssa of the empoyees; and the empoyer
was ordered to pay backwages ncusve of aowances and other
benefts, computed from the tme the compensaton was wthhed up
to the actua renstatement. In addton, snce the dsmssa was done
wthout due process, the nomna damages awarded was ony
P2,590.00 equvaent to one-month saary of the empoyee. In ths
case, the dsmssa was vad, as t was due to an authorzed cause, but
wthout the observance of procedura due process, and the ony award
gven was nomna damages. (CELEBES |APAN FOODS CORPORATION
V. SUSAN YERMO G.R. No. 175855 October 2, 2009)
In prevous cases where mora damages and attorneys fees
were awarded, the manner of termnaton was done n a humatng
and nsutng manner, such as n the case of Balayan Colleges v.
National Labor Relations Commission where the empoyer posted
copes of ts etters of termnaton to the teachers nsde the schoo
campus and t aso furnshed copes to the town mayor and Parsh
Prest of ther communty for the purpose of magnng the teachers
reputaton. So aso n the case of Chiang Kai Shek School v. Court
of Appeals, ths Court awarded mora damages to a teacher who was
faty, and wthout warnng or a forma notce, tod that she was
dsmssed. (M+W ZANDER PHILIPPINES, INC. and ROLF WILTSCHEK v.
TRINIDAD M. ENRIOUEZ, G.R. No. 169173, |une 5, 2009)
Disability Benefits
Under paragraph 20.1.5 of the partes CBA, t s stpuated that
"|a| seafarer whose dsabty s assessed at 50% or more under the
!#
POEA Empoyment Contract sha x x x be regarded as permanenty
unft for further sea servce n any capacty and entted to 100%
compensaton, i.e., x x x US$60,000.00 for ratngs." Pettoners
dsabty ratng beng 68.66%, he s entted to a 100% dsabty
compensaton of US$60,000, as correcty found by the Labor Arbter
and the NLRC. So Philimare, lnc./Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. v.
5uganob, enghtens, thus:
Apropos the approprate dsabty benefts that
respondent s entted to, we fnd that Suganob s entted
to Grade 1 dsabty benefts whch corresponds to tota
and permanent dsabty. . .
x x x To be entitled to Grade 1 disability
benefits, the employee's disability must not only be
total but also permanent.
Permanent disability is the inability of a worker
to perform his job for more than 120 days,
regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any
of his body. Ceary, Suganobs dsabty s permanent
snce he was unabe to work from the tme he was
medcay repatrated on September 17, 2001 up to the
tme the compant was fed on Apr 25, 2002, or more
than 7 months. Moreover, f n fact Suganob s cear and ft
to work on October 29, 2001, he woud have been taken
back by pettoners to contnue hs work as a Chef Cook,
but he was not. His disability is undoubtedly
permanent.
Total disability, on the other hand, does not
mean absolute helplessness. In dsabty
compensaton, t s not the n|ury whch s compensated,
but rather the ncapacty to work resutng n the
mparment of ones earnng capacty. Tota dsabty does
not requre that the empoyee be absoutey dsabed, or
totay parayzed. What is necessary is that the injury
must be such that the employee cannot pursue his
usual work and earn therefrom. Both the company-
desgnated physcan and Suganobs physcan found that
Suganob s unfit to continue his duties as a Chief
Cook since his illness prevented him from continuing
his duties as such. Due to hs ness, he can no onger
perform work whch s part of hs day routne as Chef
Cook ke ftng heavy oads of frozen meat, fsh, water,
etc. when preparng meas for the crew members. Hence,
Suganob's disability is also total. (Emphass supped)
!$
(|OELSON O. ILORETA v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE
CARRIERS, INC., G.R. NO. 183908, December 4, 2009)
As wth a other knds of worker, the terms and condtons of a
seafarers empoyment s governed by the provsons of the contract
he sgns at the tme he s hred. But unke that of others, deemed
wrtten n the seafarers contract s a set of standard provsons set and
mpemented by the POEA, caed the 5tandard Terms and Conditions
Coverning the Employment of Filipino 5eafarers on 8oard Ocean-Coing
Vessels, whch are consdered to be the mnmum requrements
acceptabe to the government for the empoyment of Fpno seafarers
on board foregn ocean-gong vesses. Thus, the ssue of whether
pettoner Nsda can egay demand and cam dsabty benefts from
respondents Sea Serve and ADAMS for an ness suffered s best
addressed by the provsons of hs POEA-SEC, whch ncorporated the
5tandard Terms and Conditions Coverning the Employment of Filipino
5eafarers on 8oard Ocean-Coing Vessels. When pettoner Nsda was
empoyed on 7 August 2001, t was the 2000 Amended 5tandard
Terms and Conditions Coverning the Employment of Filipino 5eafarers
on 8oard Ocean-Coing Vessels (herenafter referred to smpy as
Amended 5tandard Terms and Conditions for brevty) that apped and
were deemed wrtten n or appended to hs POEA-SEC. (CARLOS N.
NISDA v. SEA SERVE MARITIME AGENCY and KHALIFA A. ALGOSAIBI
DIVING AND MARINE SERVICES, G. R. No. 179177, |uy 23, 2009)
Gven a seafarers enttement to permanent dsabty benefts
when he s unabe to work for more than 120 days, the faure of the
company-desgnated physcan to pronounce pettoner ft to work
wthn the 120-day perod enttes hm to permanent tota dsabty
beneft n the amount of US$60,000.00. (LEOPOLDO ABANTE v. K|GS
FLEET MANAGEMENT MANILA G.R. No. 182430, December 4, 2009)
Dismissal
In the present case, we sgnfcanty note that pettoner, after
fng her expanaton n response to the empoyers |uy 1, 1997 memo,
never asked for any carfcatory hearng durng the pant-eve
proceedngs. She aso had ampe opportunty to expan her sde vis--
vis the prncpa charge aganst her - her nvovement n the ncdent
of |une 30, 1997 . It s a matter of record that the pettoner ost no
tme n submttng the requred expanaton, as she submtted t on the
very same day that the memo was served on her. The expanaton, n
Fpno, narrated among others the ndfferent and dscrmnatory
treatment she had been recevng from the group of No Echavez,
whch she aso tod her husband who got mad. Taken together wth
the testmones of other wtnesses who gave ther statements on how
!%
the pettoner encouraged her husband to attack Echavez (a of whch
were duy and seasonaby dscosed), the pettoner cannot cam that
the respondent company dd not gve her ampe opportunty to be
heard. A tod, we are convnced that the respondent company acted
based on a vad cause for dsmssa and observed the requred
procedures n so actng. (ROSARIO A. GATUS v. OUALITY HOUSE, INC.
and CHRISTOPHER CHUA, G.R. No. 156766, Apr 16, 2009)
Constructive Dismissal
Case aw hods that constructve dsmssa occurs when there s
cessaton of work because contnued empoyment s rendered
mpossbe, unreasonabe or unkey; when there s a demoton n rank
or dmnuton n pay or both; or when a cear dscrmnaton,
nsensbty, or dsdan by an empoyer becomes unbearabe to the
empoyee. Respondents sudden, arbtrary and unfounded adopton of
the two-day work scheme whch greaty reduced pettoners saares
renders t abe for constructve dsmssa. (FE LA ROSA et. a., v.
AMBASSADOR HOTEL,G.R. No. 177059, March 13, 2009)
What thus surfaces s that pettoner was constructvey dsmssed. No
actua dsmssa mght have occurred n the sense that pettoner was
not served wth a notce of termnaton, but there was constructve
dsmssa, pettoner havng been paced n a poston where contnued
empoyment was rendered mpossbe and unreasonabe by the
crcumstances ndcated above. (ODILON L. MARTINEZ v. B&B FISH
BROKER/NORBERTO M. LUCINARIO, G.R. No. 179985, September 18,
2009)
Tme and agan we have rued that n constructve dsmssa
cases, the empoyer has the burden of provng that the transfer of an
empoyee s for |ust and vad grounds, such as genune busness
necessty. The empoyer must demonstrate that the transfer s not
unreasonabe, nconvenent, or pre|udca to the empoyee and that
the transfer does not nvove a demoton n rank or a dmnuton of
saary and other benefts. If the empoyer fas to overcome ths burden
of proof, the empoyees transfer s tantamount to unawfu
constructve dsmssa. (MERCK SHARP AND DOHME (PHILIPPINES) v.
|ONAR P. ROBLES, et a., G.R. No. 176506, November 25, 2009)
These dscrmnatory acts were cacuated to make pettoner fee
that he s no onger wecome nor needed n respondent company -
short of sendng hm an actua notce of termnaton. We, therefore,
hod that respondent constructvey dsmssed pettoner from the
servce. (RAMON B. FORMANTES v. DUNCAN PHARMACEUTICALS,
PHILS., INC., G.R. No. 170661, December 4, 2009)
!&
In the present case, the pettoners ceased verbay
communcatng wth the respondent and gvng hm work assgnment
after suspectng that he had forged purchase recepts. Under ths
stuaton, the respondent was forced to eave the pettoners
compound wth hs famy and to transfer to a nearby pace. Thus, the
respondents act of eavng the pettoners premses was n reaty not
hs choce but a stuaton the pettoners created. (CRC AGRICULTURAL
TRADING and ROLANDO B. CATINDIG v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, G.R. No. 177664, December 23, 2009)
Dismissal of Managerial Employees
In vew of the ack of proper nvestgaton nto the charges
aganst respondent, pettoners faed to show that they have a |ust
cause for termnatng hs empoyment. Respondents aeged
nfractons amount to nothng more than bare accusatons and
unatera concusons that do not provde ega |ustfcaton for hs
termnaton from empoyment. Athough pettoners have wder
attude of dscreton n termnatng respondent, who was a managera
empoyee, t s nonetheess setted that confdenta and managera
empoyees cannot be arbtrary dsmssed at any tme, and wthout
cause as reasonably established in an appropriate investigation. Such
empoyees, too, are entted to securty of tenure, far standards of
empoyment and the protecton of abor aws. Managera empoyees,
no ess than rank-and-fe aborers are entted to due process. (CASA
CEBUANA INCORPORADA and ANGELA FIGUEROA PAULIN v. IRENEO P.
LEUTERIO, G.R. No. 176040, September 4, 2009)
Dismissal due to Union Security Clauses
Nonetheess, whe We uphod dsmssa pursuant to a unon
securty cause, the same s not wthout a condton or restrcton. For
to aow ts untrammeed enforcement woud encourage arbtrary
dsmssa and abuse by the empoyer, to the detrment of the
empoyees. Thus, to safeguard the rghts of the empoyees, We have
sad tme and agan that dsmssas pursuant to unon securty causes
are vad and ega, sub|ect ony to the requrement of due process,
that s, notce and hearng pror to dsmssa. In ke manner, We
emphaszed that the enforcement of unon securty causes s
authorzed by aw, provded such enforcement s not characterzed by
arbtrarness, and aways wth due process. (Hermngdo Inguo and
Zenada Bergante v. Frst Phppne Scaes, Inc. and/or Amparo
Pocarpo, Manager, G.R. No. 165407, |une 5, 2009)
Dismissal of Union Officer
!'
Note that the verb "partcpates" s preceded by the adverb
"knowngy." Ths refects the ntent of the egsature to requre
"knowedge" as a condton sine qua non before a unon offcer can be
dsmssed from empoyment for partcpatng n an ega strke. The
provson s worded n such a way as to make t very dffcut for
empoyers to crcumvent the aw by arbtrary dsmssng empoyees n
the guse of exercsng management prerogatve. Ths s but one
aspect of the States consttutona and statutory mandate to protect
the rghts of empoyees to sef-organzaton. (CLUB FILIPINO, INC.
and ATTY. ROBERTO F. DE LEON v. ben|amn bautsta, et. a., G.R. No.
168406, |uy 13, 2009)
lllegal Dismissal
Wth the fndng that Interserve was engaged n prohbted abor-
ony contractng, pettoner sha be deemed the true empoyer of
respondents. As reguar empoyees of pettoner, respondents cannot
be dsmssed except for |ust or authorzed causes, none of whch were
aeged or proven to exst n ths case, the ony defense of pettoner
aganst the charge of ega dsmssa beng that respondents were not
ts empoyees. Records aso faed to show that pettoner afforded
respondents the twn requrements of procedura due process, i.e.,
notce and hearng, pror to ther dsmssa. Respondents were not
served notces nformng them of the partcuar acts for whch ther
dsmssa was sought. Nor were they requred to gve ther sde
regardng the charges made aganst them. Certany, the respondents
dsmssa was not carred out n accordance wth aw and, therefore,
ega. (COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC v. ALAN M. AGITO, et a.,
G.R. No. 179546, February 13, 2009)
As the empoyer, pettoner has the burden of provng that the
dsmssa of pettoner was for a cause aowed under the aw and that
pettoner was afforded procedura due process. Pettoner faed to
dscharge ths burden. Indeed, t faed to show any vad or authorzed
cause under the Labor Code whch aowed t to termnate the servces
of ndvdua respondents. Nether dd pettoner show that ndvdua
respondents were gven ampe opportunty to contest the egaty of
ther dsmssa. No notce of such mpendng termnaton was ever
gven to them. Indvdua respondents were defntey dened due
process. Havng faed to estabsh compance wth the requrements
on termnaton of empoyment under the Labor Code, the dsmssa of
ndvdua respondents was tanted wth egaty. (ILIGAN CEMENT
CORPORATION v. ILIASCOR EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION -
SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR (IEWU-SPFL), AND ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, et. a, G.R. No. 158956, Apr 24, 2009)
!(
In ths case, we fnd no overt act on the part of pettoner that he
was ready to sever hs empoyment tes. The aeged resgnaton was
actuay premsed by respondents ony on the fng of the compant for
separaton pay, but ths aone s not suffcent proof that pettoner
ntended to resgn from the company. What strongy negates the cam
of resgnaton s the fact that pettoner fed the amended compant
for ega dsmssa mmedatey after he was not aowed to report for
work on |une 3, 2000. Resgnaton s nconsstent wth the fng of the
compant for ega dsmssa. It woud have been ogca for
pettoner to resgn and then fe a compant for ega dsmssa ater
on. If pettoner was determned to resgn, as respondents posted, he
woud not have commenced the acton for ega dsmssa.
Undenaby, pettoner was unceremonousy dsmssed n ths case.
(BALTAZAR L. PAYNO v. ORIZON TRADING CORP. / ORATA TRADING
and FLORDELIZA LEGASPI, G.R. No. 175345, August 19, 2009)
Therefore, ths Court fnds no reason to dsturb ts fndng that
the retrenchment of the fght attendants was egay executed. As
hed n the Decson sought to be reconsdered, PAL faed to observe
the procedure and requrements for a vad retrenchment. Assumng
that PAL was ndeed sufferng fnanca osses, the requste proof
therefor was not presented before the NLRC whch was the proper
forum. More mportanty, the manner of the retrenchment was not n
accordance wth the procedure requred by aw. Hence, the
retrenchment of the fght attendants amounted to ega dsmssa.
Consequenty, the fght attendants affected are entted to the reefs
provded by aw, whch ncude backwages and renstatement or
separaton pay, as the case may be. (FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND
STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FASAP), v. PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, INC.,PATRIA CHIONG and COURT OF APPEALS,G.R. No.
178083, October 2, 2009)
Ceary, Boanoss case s one of ega dsmssa. Frst, there s
no |ust or authorzed cause for pettoners to termnate her
empoyment. Her aeged act of dshonesty of "passng out" food for
free was not proven. Nether was there ncompetence on her part
when some food tems were not punched n the cash regster as she
was not the casher mannng t when the food tems were ordered. In
fact, the other casher even owned up to sad mstake. Second,
Boanos was not afforded due process by pettoners before she was
dsmssed. A day after the ncdent, she was verbay dsmssed from
her empoyment wthout beng gven the chance to be heard and
defend hersef. (HENLIN PANAY COMPANY v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION , G.R. No. 180718, October 23, 2009)
!)
In fne, as pettoners faed to ndubtaby prove that
respondents were guty of drug use n contraventon of ts drug-free
workpace pocy amountng to serous msconduct, respondents are
deemed to have been egay dsmssed. (PLANTATION BAY RESORT
and SPA v. ROMEL S. DUBRICO, et a., G.R. No. 182216, December 4,
2009)
Docket Fees
Anent pettoner's cam regardng respondent's faure to pay the
fu amount of docket fees at the tme of the fng of the petton wth
the CA, we fnd that t s estopped from questonng the |ursdcton of
the CA on ths ground, because such ssue had never been rased n
any of the peadngs fed before the CA. Notaby, the CA ssued a
mnute resouton dated |une 7, 1999 requrng respondent to remt the
amount of P510.00 to compete the docket and other fees.
Respondent comped, but due to nadvertence, the amount remtted
acked the amount of P10.00, thus, the CA n a Resouton dated
November 22, 1999, consdered the appea abandoned pursuant to
Secton 1(c), Rue 50 of the 1997 Rues of Court. Upon respondent's
moton for reconsderaton, the appea was renstated on February 22,
2000. Pettoner was copy-furnshed a the resoutons ssued by the
CA, but pettoner never rased the ssue of ncompete payment of
docket fees. In fact, such ssue was ony rased for the frst tme n ts
Repy fed wth us. (EMCOR INCORPORATED v. MA. LOURDES D.
SIENES, G.R. No. 152101, September 8, 2009)
Doctrine of Strained Relationship
To protect the empoyees securty of tenure, the Court has
emphaszed that the doctrne of "straned reatons" shoud be strcty
apped so as not to deprve an egay dsmssed empoyee of hs rght
to renstatement. Every abor dspute amost aways resuts n
"straned reatons," and the phrase cannot be gven an overarchng
nterpretaton; otherwse, an un|usty dsmssed empoyee can never
be renstated. The assumpton of straned reatons was aready
debunked by the fact that as eary as March 2006 pettoner returned
to work for respondent CCBP, wthout any antagonsm havng been
reported thus far by any of the partes. Nether can we sustan the
NLRCs concuson that pettoners poston s confdenta n nature.
Recept of proceeds from saes of respondent CCBPs products does
not make pettoner a confdenta empoyee. A confdenta empoyee
s one who (1) asssts or acts n a confdenta capacty, n regard to (2)
"*
persons who formuate, determne, and effectuate management
poces specfcay n the fed of abor reatons. Very, pettoners
|ob as a saesman does not fa under ths quafcaton. (ERWIN H.
REYES v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 180551,
February 10, 2009)
In the present case, renstatement s no onger feasbe because
of the straned reatons between the pettoners and the respondent.
Tme and agan, ths Court has recognzed that straned reatons
between the empoyer and empoyee s an excepton to the rue
requrng actua renstatement for egay dsmssed empoyees for the
practca reason that the aready exstng antagonsm w ony fester
and deterorate, and w ony worsen wth possbe adverse effects on
the partes, f we sha compe renstatement; thus, the use of a vabe
substtute that protects the nterests of both partes whe ensurng
that the aw s respected. (CRC AGRICULTURAL TRADING and
ROLANDO B. CATINDIG v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
G.R. No. 177664, December 23, 2009)
In concuson, t bears to stress that t s human nature that some
hostty w nevtaby arse between partes as a resut of tgaton,
but the same does not aways consttute straned reatons n the
absence of proof or expanaton that such ndeed exsts. (REYNALDO
G. CABIGTING v. SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC, G.R. No. 167706,
November 5, 2009)
Downsizing Scheme
Ths, n turn, gves rse to another queston: Does the
mpementaton of the downszng scheme precude pettoner from
avang the servces of contractua and agency-hred empoyees?
In Asian Alcohol Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission,

we answered n the negatve. We sad:
In any event, we have hed that an empoyers good fath n
mpementng a redundancy program s not necessary destroyed by
avament of the servces of an ndependent contractor to repace the
servces of the termnated empoyees. We have prevousy rued that
the reducton of the number of workers n a company made necessary
by the ntroducton of the servces of an ndependent contractor s
|ustfed when the atter s undertaken n order to effectuate more
economc and effcent methods of producton. In the case at bar,
prvate respondent faed to proffer any proof that the management
acted n a macous or arbtrary manner n engagng the servces of an
ndependent contractor to operate the Laura wes. Absent such proof,
"!
the Court has no bass to nterfere wth the bona fide decson of
management to effect more economc and effcent methods of
producton.
Wth pettoners downszng scheme beng vad, and the
avament of contractua and agency-hred empoyees ega, the strke
staged by offcers and members of respondent Unon s, perforce,
ega. (HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (HEPI), owner of
Hyatt Regency Mana, v. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT-
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT AND
ALLIED INDUSTRIES (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN), G.R. No. 165756, |une 5,
2009)
Due Process
It s we setted that the basc requrement of notce and hearng n
termnaton cases s for the empoyer to nform the empoyee of the
specfc charges aganst hm and to hear hs sde and defenses.
Ths does not, however, mean a fu adversara proceedng. The
partes may be heard through peadngs, wrtten expanatons,
poston papers, memorandum or ora argument. In a of these
nstances, the empoyer pays an actve roe by provdng the
empoyee wth the opportunty to present hs sde and answer the
charges n substanta compance wth due process.( ROMEO N.
VENTURA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, GENUINO ICE CO., INC., and HECTOR GENUINO, G.R.
No. 182570, |anuary 27, 2009)
In the dsmssa of empoyees, t has been consstenty hed that
the twn requrements of notce and hearng are essenta eements
of due process. Artce 277 (b) of the Labor Code and Secton 2,
Rue XXIII, Book V of the Rues Impementng the Labor Code
requre the empoyer to furnsh the empoyee wth two wrtten
notces, to wt: (1) a wrtten notce served on the empoyee
specfyng the ground or grounds for termnaton, and gvng to sad
empoyee reasonabe opportunty wthn whch to expan hs sde;
and (2) a wrtten notce of termnaton served on the empoyee
ndcatng that upon due consderaton of a the crcumstances,
grounds have been estabshed to |ustfy hs termnaton. The frst
notce whch may be consdered as the proper charge, serves to
apprse the empoyee of the partcuar acts or omssons for whch
hs dsmssa s sought. The second notce on the other hand seeks
to nform the empoyee of the empoyers decson to dsmss hm.
Wth regard to the requrement of a hearng, t shoud be stressed
""
that the essence of due process es smpy n an opportunty to be
heard, and not that an actua hearng shoud aways and
ndspensaby be hed. (PHILIPPINE PASAY CHUNG HUA ACADEMY
and EMILIO CHING v. SERVANDO L. EDPAN, G.R. No. 168876,
SERVANDO L. EDPAN v. PHILIPPINE PASAY CHUNG HUA ACADEMY
and EMILIO CHING)
Nonetheess, Secton 2(d), Rue I of the Impementng Rues of
Book VI of the Labor Code shoud not be taken to mean that hodng an
actua hearng or conference s a condton sine qua non for compance
wth the due process requrement n termnaton of empoyment. The
test for the far procedure guaranteed under Artce 277(b) cannot be
whether there has been a forma pretermnaton confrontaton between
the empoyer and the empoyee. The "ampe opportunty to be heard"
standard s nether synonymous nor smar to a forma hearng. To
confne the empoyees rght to be heard to a sotary form narrows
down that rght. It deprves hm of other equay effectve forms of
adducng evdence n hs defense. Certany, such an excusvst and
absoutst nterpretaton s overy restrctve. The very nature of due
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally
applicable to every imaginable situation." (FELIX B. PEREZ and
AMANTE G. DORIA vs. PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
COMPANY and |OSE LUIS SANTIAGO, G.R. No. 152048, Apr 7, 2009)
Aso, to effectvey dsmss an empoyee for abandonment, the
empoyer must compy wth the due process requrement of sendng
notces to the empoyee. In 8rahm lndustries, lnc. v. NLRC, we rued
that ths requrement s not a mere formaty that may be dspensed
wth at w. Its dsregard s a matter of serous concern snce t
consttutes a safeguard of the hghest order n response to mans
nnate sense of |ustce. Pettoner was not abe to send the necessary
notce requrement to Eeonor. Pettoners beated cam that t was
not abe to send the notce of nfracton pror to the fng of the ega
dsmssa case cannot smpy unacceptabe. Based on the foregong,
Eeonor dd not abandon her work. (SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, INC. (NOW SODACO AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION)
AND/OR MALONE PACOUIAO AND VICTOR A. CONSUN|I, v. SERGIO L.
GAMO, et. a., G.R. No. 171814, May 8, 2009)
The case of Agabon v. NLRC, et al. appes to the case at bar.
In Agabon, the dsmssa was found by the Court to be based on a |ust
cause because the empoyee abandoned hs work. But t aso found
that the empoyer dd not foow the notce requrement demanded by
due process. It rued that ths voaton of due process on the part of
the empoyer dd not nufy the dsmssa, or render t ega, or
neffectua. Nonetheess, the empoyer was ordered to ndemnfy the
"#
empoyee for the voaton of hs rght to due process. It further hed
that the penaty shoud be n the nature of ndemnfcaton, n the form
of nomna damages and shoud depend on the facts of each case,
takng nto speca consderaton the gravty of the due process
voaton of the empoyer. The amount of such damages s addressed
to the sound dscreton of the court, consderng the reevant
crcumstances. Thus, n Agabon, the Court ordered the empoyer to
pay the empoyee nomna damages n the amount of P30,000.00.
(MANTLE TRADING SERVICES, INCORPORATED AND/OR BOBBY DEL
ROSARIO v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PABLO S.
MADRIAGA,G.R. No. 166705,|uy 28,2009)
Had Metros cause for termnatng Aman rested on a |ust or
authorzed cause yet faed to observe procedura requrements, then
Metro w ony be abe for nomna damages worth P30,000. However,
such s not the case here. We hod that Amans dsmssa not ony faed
to observe procedura requrements, t aso acked an authorzed cause.
Artce 279 of the Labor Code mandates that the empoyee who s egay
dsmssed and not gven due process s entted to renstatement wthout
oss of senorty rghts and other prveges and fu backwages, ncusve of
aowances, and other benefts or ther monetary equvaent computed
from the tme the compensaton was not pad up to the tme of actua
renstatement. (METRO CONSTRUCTION, INC. V. ROGELIO AMAN, G.R. No.
168324, October 12, 2009)
In the present case, |ose, |r. was not gven any wrtten notce about
hs dsmssa. However, the proprety of |ose, |r.s dsmssa s not affected
by the ack of wrtten notces. When the dsmssa s for |ust cause, the
ack of due process does not render the dsmssa neffectua but merey
gves rse to the payment of P30,000 n nomna damages. (BERNARDO B.
|OSE, |R. v. MICHAELMAR PHILS., INC., G.R. No. 169606, November 27,
2009)
In cases of abandonment of work, the ground aeged by
respondents, notce sha be served at the workers ast known address.
Here, no such notce was served to pettoner. Hence, for breach of the
due process requrements, respondents sha aso be abe n the
amount of P30,000 as ndemnty n the form of nomna damages.
(CONCEPCION FAELDONIA v. TONG YAK GROCERIES,|AYME GO and
MERLITA GO,G.R. No. 182499, October 2, 2009)
The pettoners ceary faed to compy wth the two-notce
requrement. Nothng n the records shows that the pettoners ever
sent the respondent a wrtten notce nformng hm of the ground for
whch hs dsmssa was sought. It does not aso appear that the
pettoners hed a hearng where the respondent was gven the
"$
opportunty to answer the charges of abandonment. Nether dd the
pettoners send a wrtten notce to the respondent nformng the atter
that hs servce had been termnated and the reasons for the
termnaton of empoyment. Under these facts, the respondents
dsmssa was ega. (CRC AGRICULTURAL TRADING and ROLANDO B.
CATINDIG v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No.
177664, December 23, 2009)
Employer-Employee Relationship
In order to determne the exstence of an empoyer-empoyee
reatonshp, the Court has frequenty apped the four-fod test: (1) the
seecton and engagement of the empoyee; (2) the payment of wages;
(3) the power of dsmssa; and (4) the power to contro the empoyees
conduct, or the so caed "contro test," whch s consdered the most
mportant eement. From the tme they were hred by pettoner
corporaton up to the tme that they were reassgned to work under
Gamos supervson, ther status as pettoner corporatons empoyees
dd not cease. Lkewse, payment of ther wages was merey coursed
through Gamo. As to the most determnatve test-the power of
contro, t s suffcent that the power to contro the manner of dong
the work exsts, t does not requre the actua exercse of such power.
In ths case, t was n the exercse of ts power of contro when
pettoner corporaton transferred the copra workers from ther
prevous assgnments to work as copraceros. It was aso n the
exercse of the same power that pettoner corporaton put Gamo n
charge of the copra workers athough under a dfferent payment
scheme. Thus, t s cear that an empoyer-empoyee reatonshp has
exsted between pettoner corporaton and respondents snce the
begnnng and such reatonshp dd not cease despte ther
reassgnments and the change of payment scheme. (SOUTH DAVAO
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC. (NOW SODACO AGRICULTURAL
CORPORATION) AND/OR MALONE PACOUIAO AND VICTOR A. CONSUN|I,
v. SERGIO L. GAMO, et. a., G.R. No. 171814, May 8, 2009)
What s more, respondent PDMC enroed pettoner Gomez wth
the Soca Securty System, the Medcare, and the Pag-Ibg Fund. It
even ssued certfcatons dated October 10, 2008, statng that Gomez
was a permanent empoyee and that the company had remtted
combned contrbutons durng her tenure. The company aso made
her a member of the PDMCs savngs and provdent pan and ts
retrement pan. It grouped her wth the managers covered by the
companys group hosptazaton nsurance. Lkewse, she underwent
reguar empoyee performance apprasas, purchased stocks through
the empoyee stock opton pan, and was entted to vacaton and
"%
emergency eaves. PDMC even wthhed taxes on her saary and
decared her as an empoyee n the offca Bureau of Interna Revenue
forms. These are a indicia of an empoyer-empoyee reatonshp
whch respondent PDMC faed to refute. (GLORIA V. GOMEZ v. PNOC
DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 174044,
November 27, 2009)
Control Test
In the case at bench, both the Labor Arbter and the NLRC were
one n ther concuson that respondents were not ndependent
contractors, but empoyees of pettoner. In determnng the exstence
of an empoyer-empoyee reatonshp between the partes, both the
Labor Arbter and the NLRC examned and weghed the crcumstances
aganst the four-fod test whch has the foowng eements: (1) the
power to hre, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the power to dsmss, and
(4) the power to contro the empoyees conduct, or the so-caed
"contro test." Of the four, the power of contro s the most mportant
eement. More mportanty, the contro test merey cas for the
exstence of the rght to contro, and not necessary the exercse
thereof. (DEALCO FARMS, INC., vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (5
th
DIVISION), G.R. No. 153192 |anuary 30, 2009)
In ths regard, t has not escaped the notce of the Court that the
operatons of the hote tsef do not cease wth the end of each event
or functon and that there s an ever present need for ndvduas to
perform certan tasks necessary n the pettoners busness. Thus,
athough the tasks themseves may vary, the need for suffcent
manpower to carry them out does not. In any event, as borne out by
the fndngs of the NLRC, the pettoner determnes the nature of the
tasks to be performed by the prvate respondent, n the process
exercsng contro. (MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP vs COURT
OF APPEALS, SHERYL OABEL AND MANILA RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
CORP., G.R. No. 149660, |anuary 20, 2009)
Contrary to pettoners contenton, the varous offce drectves
ssued by Shangr-as offcers do not mpy that t s Shangr-as
management and not respondent doctor who exercses contro over
them or that Shangr-a has contro over how the doctor and the nurses
perform ther work. The etter addressed to respondent doctor dated
February 7, 2003 from a certan Tata L. Reyes gvng nstructons
regardng the repenshment of emergency kts s, at most,
admnstratve n nature, reated as t s to safety matters; whe the
etter dated May 17, 2004 from Shangr-as Assstant Fnanca
Controer, Lotot Dagat, forbddng the cnc from recevng cash
payments from the resorts guests s a matter of fnanca pocy n
"&
order to ensure proper sharng of the proceeds, consderng that
Shangr-a and respondent doctor share n the guests payments for
medca servces rendered. In fne, as Shangr-a does not contro how
the work shoud be performed by pettoners, t s not pettoners
empoyer. (|EROMIE D. ESCASINAS and EVAN RIGOR SINGCO v.
SHANGRI-LAS MACTAN ISLAND RESORT and DR. |ESSICA |.R. PEPITO,
G.R. No. 178827, March 4, 2009)
To reterate, whe respondent and SSCP no onger had any ega
reatonshp wth the termnaton of the Agreement, pettoners
remaned at ther post securng the premses of respondent whe
recevng ther saares, aegedy from SSCP. Ceary, such a stuaton
makes no sense, and the denas proffered by respondent do not shed
any ght to the stuaton. It s but reasonabe to concude that, wth the
behest and, presumaby, drectve of respondent, pettoners contnued
wth ther servces. Evdenty, such are indicia of contro that
respondent exercsed over pettoners. (RAUL G. LOCSIN and EDDIE B.
TOMAOUIN v. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, G.R.
No. 185251, October 2, 2009)
Equity
Whe the Court commserates wth the pght of Trazona, who
has recenty manfested that she has snce been sufferng from her
poor heath condton, the Court cannot grant her pea for the award of
fnanca benefts based soey on ths unfortunate crcumstance. For
a ts conceded mert, equty s avaabe ony n the absence of aw
and not as ts repacement. Equty as an exceptona extenuatng
crcumstance does not favor, nor may t be used to reward, the
ndoent or the wrongdoer, for that matter. Ths Court w not aow a
party, n the guse of equty, to beneft from ts own faut. (MA.
WENELITA S. TIRAZONA, vs. PHILIPPINE EDS TECHNO- SERVICE INC.
(PET INC.) AND/OR KEN KUBOTA, MAMORU ONO and |UNICHI HIROSE,
G.R. No. 169712, |anuary 20, 2009)
Estoppel
Estoppe, an equtabe prncpe rooted on natura |ustce,
prevents a person from re|ectng hs prevous acts and representatons
to the pre|udce of others who have reed on them. Ths prncpe of
aw appes to corporatons as we. The PDMC n ths case s estopped
from camng that despte a the appearances of reguar empoyment
that t weaved around pettoner Gomezs poston t must have
techncay hred her ony as a corporate offcer. The board and ts
offcers made her stay on and work wth the company for years under
the beef that she hed a reguar managera poston. (GLORIA V.
"'
GOMEZ v. PNOC DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 174044, November 27, 2009)
Evidence
It may be true that the NBI agents affdavt dd not drecty
mpcate pettoners n the scheme. However, ther co-empoyees
Gmena, Wesh and Derupe, who had persona knowedge of
pettoners actvtes, narrated n ther affdavts the nature, dates and
tme of ther (pettoners) partcpaton. Pettoners dd not refute
these sworn statements. Nether dd they expan why ther former
coeagues woud un|usty and fasey testfy aganst them even f they
had the opportunty to defend themseves durng the admnstratve
nvestgatons conducted by respondent. These peces of evdence,
when taken together, consttuted substanta evdence to prove
pettoners cupabty. It s of no moment that they were acqutted n
the crmna case. Pettoners nfractons were wfu and serous, thus
ther dsmssa was proper under the crcumstances. (RENITA DEL
ROSARIO, et a., v. MAKATI CINEMA SOUARE CORPORATION, G.R. No.
170014, |uy 3, 2009)
It s common practce for companes to provde dentfcaton
cards to ndvduas not ony as a securty measure, but more
mportanty to dentfy the bearers thereof as bona fide empoyees of
the frm or nsttuton that ssued them. The provson of company-
ssued dentfcaton cards and unforms to respondents, asde from
ther ncuson n MCIs summary payro, ndubtaby consttutes
substanta evdence suffcent to support ony one concuson: that
respondents were ndeed empoyees of MCI. (MASONIC CONTRACTOR,
INC. v. MAGDALENA MAD|OS , et a., G.R. No. 185094, November 25,
2009)
Proof of Mailing
In ths case and n ke manner, whe a postmasters certfcaton s
usuay suffcent proof of mang, ts evdentary vaue must be
dfferentated from the stuaton presenty before us where the
postmasters certfcaton is intended to prove that the post office had
committed a mistake in placing the date of receipt on the registry
return card. In other words, the Postmasters certfcaton s offered to
overcome the presumpton that the Maate Post Offce reguary
performed ts offca dutes when the regstry return card was fed up
by the recpent of the abor arbters decson wth November 21, 1999
as the date of recept. We fnd t sgnfcant that both the pettoner and
"(
the postmasters certfcaton faed to show that the Maate Post Offce
commtted an nadvertence n handng the regstry return card so that
a correctve certfcaton from the Postmaster was necessary. In the
absence of such |ustfcaton for the certfcaton, we are compeed to
deny t of any evdentary vaue for the purpose t was submtted.
(EUREKA PERSONNEL & MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v. EDUARDO
VALENCIA, G.R. No. 159358, |uy 15, 2009)
Execution
We woud ke to stress the setted rue that the power of the
court n executng |udgments extends ony to propertes
unquestonaby beongng to the |udgment debtor aone. To be
sure, one mans goods sha not be sod for another mans debts. A
sherff s not authorzed to attach or evy on property not beongng
to the |udgment debtor, and even ncurs abty f he wrongfuy
eves upon the property of a thrd person. (PANTRANCO
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA-PTGWO) and PANTRANCO
RETRENCHED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PANREA) v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), G.R. No. 170689, G.R. No.
170705)
Finality of Factual Findings
The we-entrenched rue s that factua fndngs of admnstratve
or quas-|udca bodes, whch are deemed to have acqured expertse
n matters wthn ther respectve |ursdctons, are generay accorded
not ony respect but even fnaty, and bnd the Court when supported
by substanta evdence. Secton 5, Rue 133 defnes substanta
evdence as "that amount of reevant evdence whch a reasonabe
mnd mght accept as adequate to |ustfy a concuson." (DEALCO
FARMS, INC., vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5
th
DIVISION), G.R. No. 153192 |anuary 30, 2009)
Lasty, n ts assaed decson, the CA affrmed the rung of the
NLRC and adopted as ts own the atter's factua fndngs. Long-
estabshed s the doctrne that fndngs of fact of quas-|udca
bodes ke the NLRC are accorded respect, even fnaty, f
supported by substanta evdence. When passed upon and uphed
by the CA, they are bndng and concusve upon the Supreme
Court and w not normay be dsturbed. Though ths doctrne s
not wthout exceptons, the Court fnds that none are appcabe to
the present case. ROMEO N. VENTURA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, GENUINO ICE CO., INC.,
and HECTOR GENUINO, G.R. No. 182570, |anuary 27, 2009)
")
Exception
The appeate court predcated ts reversa of the NLRC decson
that pettoners were egay dsmssed on pettoners supposed
abandonment of ther |obs, and |ustfed the work rotaton/reducton
scheme adopted by respondent as a vad exercse of management
prerogatve n ght of respondents busness osses. (FE LA ROSA et.
a., v. AMBASSADOR HOTEL,G.R. No. 177059, March 13, 2009)
The ssue of the reasonabeness of attorney's fees s a queston
of fact. We-setted s the rue that concusons and fndngs of fact of
the CA are entted to great weght on appea and w not be dsturbed
except for strong and cogent reasons whch are absent n the case at
bench. The fndngs of the CA, whch are supported by substanta
evdence, are amost beyond the power of revew by the Supreme
Court. (EVANGELINA MASMUD (as substtute companant for
ALEXANDER |. MASMUD) v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
G.R. No. 183385, February 13, 2009)
Pettoner's argument that the CA erred and abused ts dscreton
n reversng the fndngs of the Labor Arbter and the NLRC, as t s the
court's pocy of non-nterference n the exercse of the ad|udcatory
functons of the admnstratve bodes, s devod of mert. We agree
wth pettoner that factua fndngs of quas-|udca and admnstratve
bodes are accorded great respect and even fnaty by the courts.
However, ths rue s not absoute. When there s a showng that the
factua fndngs of admnstratve bodes were arrved at arbtrary or n
dsregard of the evdence on record, they may be examned by the
courts. The CA can grant the petton for certiorari f t fnds that the
NLRC, n ts assaed decson or resouton, made a factua fndng not
supported by substanta evdence. It s wthn the |ursdcton of the
CA, whose |ursdcton over abor cases has been expanded to revew
the fndngs of the NLRC. In R & E Transport, lnc. v. Latag, we hed:
The power of the CA to revew NLRC decsons va a Rue 65
petton s now a setted ssue. As eary as St. Martn Funera Homes v.
NLRC, we have defntvey rued that the proper remedy to ask for the
revew of a decson of the NLRC s a speca cv acton for certiorari
under Rue 65 of the Rues of Court, and that such petton shoud be
fed wth the CA n strct observance of the doctrne on the herarchy
of courts. Moreover, t has aready been expaned that under Secton 9
of Batas Pambansa (BP) 129, as amended by Repubc Act 7902, the
CA - pursuant to the exercse of ts orgna |ursdcton over pettons
for certiorari - was specfcay gven the power to pass upon the
evdence, f and when necessary, to resove factua ssues.(EMCOR
#*
INCORPORATED v. MA. LOURDES D. SIENES, G.R. No. 152101,
September 8, 2009)
Forum Shopping
On the part of Mr. Gumarang, knowng fuy we that he was no
onger the representatve of the NCTEA, why dd he not nform both the
Court of Appeas and the Supreme Court of such fact when he fed the
pettons? Instead, he camed to be the duy authorzed
representatve of the NCTEA whch he was not. Hs omsson and
msrepresentaton are cear ndcatons of bad fath of whch ths Court
does not approve. He shoud have known that by ncudng NCTEA as
pettoner and sgnng as ts representatve, he shoud have had the
authorty to do so. Ths, he dd not possess. When he aone sgned on
hs behaf and that of the NCTEA, not once but twce, he fagranty
voated the rue on the fng of a certfcate of non-forum shoppng.
(NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
vs. NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC., G.R. No. 152923, |anuary 19,
2009)
Wthout the requred authorty from the NCTEA, Mr. Gumarang
cannot represent the NCTEA. As expaned above, f there are severa
pettoners, the faure of one to sgn the certfcate of non-forum
shoppng s a defcency whch s a ground for the dsmssa of the
petton. In the case before us, there beng two pettoners - NCTEA
and Mr. Gumarang - both of them shoud sgn the certfcate aganst
forum shoppng. Snce there was ony one sgnatory, the requrement
on the fng of the certfcate aganst forum shoppng has not been
comped wth. As n the Court of Appeas, Mr. Gumarang faed to
show why the duy authorzed representatve of the NCTEA was unabe
to sgn the certfcaton, and to convnce ths Court that the outrght
dsmssa of the petton woud defeat the admnstraton of |ustce.
(NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
vs. NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC., G.R. No. 152923, |anuary 19,
2009)
Fuentebella and Rolling Hills Memorial Park v. Castro, on the
requrement of a certfcaton aganst forum shoppng, expans:
The reason for ths s that the prncpa party has
actua knowedge whether a petton has prevousy been
fed nvovng the same case or substantay the same
ssues. If, for any reason, the prncpa party cannot sgn
the petton, the one sgnng on hs behaf must have
been duy authorzed.
#!
. . . Where the pettoner s a corporaton, the
certfcaton aganst forum shoppng shoud be sgned by
ts duy authorzed drector or representatve .|I|f the
rea party-n-nterest s a corporate body, an offcer of
the corporaton can sgn the certfcaton aganst forum
shoppng as ong as he s authorzed by a resouton of
ts board of drectors.

x x x x
A certfcaton without the proper authorization s
defectve and consttutes a vad cause for the dsmssa
of the petton. (Ctatons omtted; emphass, tacs and
underscorng supped)
Pettoners dscourse on reaxaton of technca rues of
procedure n the nterest of substanta |ustce does not mpress.
Whe there have been nstances when the Court dspensed wth
techncates on the bass of speca crcumstances or compeng
reasons, there s no such crcumstance or reason n the present case
whch warrants the bera appcaton of technca rues. (EAGLE
STAR SECURITY SERVICES, INC. v. BONIFACIO L. MIRANDO, G.R. No.
179512, |uy 30, 2009)
Grave Abuse of Discretion
The Regona Drector fuy reed on the sef-servng aegatons
of respondent and msnterpreted the documents presented as
evdence by respondent. To make matters worse, DOLE dened
pettoners appea based soey on pettoners aeged faure to fe a
cash or surety bond, wthout any dscusson on the merts of the case.
Snce the petton for certorar before the Court of Appeas sought the
reversa of the two aforesad orders, the appeate court necessary
had to examne the evdence anew to determne whether the
concusons of the DOLE were supported by the evdence presented. It
appears, however, that the Court of Appeas dd not even revew the
assaed orders and focused nstead on a genera dscusson of due
process and the |ursdcton of the Regona Drector. Had the
appeate court truy revewed the records of the case, t woud have
seen that there exsted vad and suffcent grounds for fndng grave
abuse of dscreton on the part of the DOLE Secretary as we the
Regona Drector. In rung and actng as t dd, the Court fnds that
the Court of Appeas may be propery sub|ected to ts certorar
|ursdcton. After a, ths Court has prevousy rued that the
extraordnary wrt of certorar w e f t s satsfactory
#"
estabshed that the trbuna had acted caprcousy and whmscay n
tota dsregard of evdence matera to or even decsve of the
controversy. (PEOPLES BROADCASTING(BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.)
vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and
|ANDELEON |UEZAN, G.R. No. 179652, May 8, 2009)
Hearing
A hearng means that a party shoud be gven a chance to
adduce hs evdence to support hs sde of the case and that the
evdence shoud be taken nto account n the ad|udcaton of the
controversy. To be heard" does not mean verbal argumentation alone
inasmuch as one may be heard just as effectively through written
explanations, submissions or pleadings. Therefore, whe the phrase
"ampe opportunty to be heard" may n fact ncude an actua hearng,
t s not mted to a forma hearng ony. In other words, the exstence
of an actua, forma "tra-type" hearng, athough preferred, s not
absoutey necessary to satsfy the empoyees rght to be heard.
(FELIX B. PEREZ and AMANTE G. DORIA vs. PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND
TELEPHONE COMPANY and |OSE LUIS SANTIAGO, G.R. No. 152048, Apr
7, 2009)
Dialogue not Tantamount to Hearing

Pocarpo's aegatons are sef-servng. Except for her cam as
stated n the respondent's Poston Paper, nowhere from the records
can We fnd that Bergante and Inguo were accorded the opportunty
to present evdence n support of ther defenses. Pocarpo reed
heavy on the "Petsyon" of FPSILU. She faed to convnce Us that
durng the daogue, she was abe to ascertan the vadty of the
charges mentoned n the "Petsyon." In her fute attempt to prove
compance wth the procedura requrement, she reterated that the
ob|ectve of the daogue was to provde the empoyees "the
opportunty to receve the act of grace of FPSI by gvng them an
amount equvaent to one-haf () month of ther saary for every year
of servce." We are not convnced. We cannot even consder the
demand and counter-offer for the payment of the empoyees as an
amcabe settement between the partes because what took pace was
merey a dscusson ony of the amount whch the empoyees are
wng to accept and the amount whch the respondents are wng to
gve. Such non-compance s aso corroborated by Bergante and
Inguo n ther peadngs denouncng ther un|ustfed dsmssa. In
fne, We hod that the daogue s not tantamount to the hearng or
conference prescrbed by aw. (Hermngdo Inguo and Zenada
##
Bergante v. Frst Phppne Scaes, Inc. and/or Amparo Pocarpo,
Manager, G.R. No. 165407, |une 5, 2009
lnchoate Right
Agan, the contenton s bereft of mert. Whe PNB has an
apparent nterest n Mega Prmes assets beng the credtor of the
atter for a substanta amount, ts nterest remans nchoate and has
not yet rpened nto a present substanta nterest, whch woud gve t
the standng to mantan an acton nvovng the sub|ect propertes. As
apty observed by the Labor Arbter, PNB ony has an nchoate rght to
the propertes of Mega Prme n case the atter woud not be abe to
pay ts ndebtedness. Ths s especay true n the nstant case, as the
debt beng camed by PNB s secured by the accessory contract of
pedge of the entre stockhodngs of Mega Prme to PNB-Madecor.
(PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA-PTGWO) and
PANTRANCO RETRENCHED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PANREA) v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), G.R. No. 170689,
G.R. No. 170705)
lndependent Contractor
The exstence of an ndependent and permssbe contractor
reatonshp s generay estabshed by consderng the foowng
determnants: whether the contractor s carryng on an ndependent
busness; the nature and extent of the work; the sk requred; the
term and duraton of the reatonshp; the rght to assgn the
performance of a specfed pece of work; the contro and supervson
of the work to another; the empoyer's power wth respect to the
hrng, frng and payment of the contractor's workers; the contro of
the premses; the duty to suppy the premses, toos, appances,
materas and abor; and the mode, manner and terms of payment.
(|EROMIE D. ESCASINAS and EVAN RIGOR SINGCO v. SHANGRI-LAS
In sum, there exsted no empoyer-empoyee reatonshp
between the partes. De Raedt s an ndependent contractor, who was
engaged by SGV to render servces to SGVs cent TMI, and utmatey
to DA on the CECAP pro|ect, regardng matters n the fed of her
speca knowedge and tranng for a specfc perod of tme. Unke an
ordnary empoyee, De Raedt receved retaner fees and benefts such
as housng and subsstence aowances and medca nsurance. De
Raedts servces coud be termnated on the ground of end of contract
between the DA and TMI, and not on grounds under abor aws.
Though the end of the contract between the DA and TMI was not the
#$
ground for the wthdrawa of De Raedt from the CECAP, De Raedt was
dsengaged from the pro|ect upon the nstructon of SGVs cent, TMI.
Most mportant of a, SGV dd not exercse contro over the means and
methods by whch De Raedt performed her dutes as Socoogst. SGV
dd mpose rues on De Raedt, but these were necessary to ensure
SGVs fathfu compance wth the terms and condtons of the Sub-
Consutancy Agreement t entered nto wth TMI. (SYCIP, GORRES,
VELAYO & COMPANY, v. CAROL DE RAEDT, G.R. No. 161366, |une 16,
2009)
lnsubordination
Asde from the fndngs of sexua abuse, pettoner s aso guty
of nsubordnaton. Records show that after fng a case for
constructve dsmssa on Apr 13, 1994 aganst the respondent,
pettoner contnued workng and performng hs functons wth the
respondent company unt hs termnaton on May 19, 1994. However,
despte recept of the varous notces sent by respondent to hm to
report to the offce and to submt wrtten expanatons reatve to hs
faure to foow nstructons, the records of the case are bereft of
showng that he fed any wrtten expanaton to any of these notces.
Hs contnued faure to carry out the reasonabe ora or wrtten
nstructons of hs supervsor s punshabe by nsubordnaton, whch s
provded under Rue IV.5.a of the Operatona Instructon OI-A-AP25,
Work Rues. Whe pettoner cannot be fauted n beevng that
respondent constructvey dsmssed hm from work, he was st,
strcty speakng, respondent's empoyee when he receved the wrtten
notces. As an empoyee, he shoud have at east responded thereto,
as nstructed. (RAMON B. FORMANTES v. DUNCAN PHARMACEUTICALS,
PHILS., INC., G.R. No. 170661, December 4, 2009)
lnterpretation of Doubt
We re|ect pettoners sef-servng contenton. Havng faed to
substantate ts aegaton on the reatonshp between the partes, we
stck to the setted rue n controverses between a aborer and hs
master that doubts reasonaby arsng from the evdence shoud be
resoved n the formers favor. The pocy s refected n no ess than
the Consttuton, Labor Code and Cv Code. (DEALCO FARMS, INC., vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5
th
DIVISION), G.R. No.
153192 |anuary 30, 2009)
The reatons between capta and abor are so mpressed wth
pubc nterest, and nether sha act oppressvey aganst the other, or
mpar the nterest or convenence of the pubc. In case of doubt, a
#%
abor egsaton and a abor contracts sha be construed n favor of
the safety and decent vng for the aborer. (BECMEN SERVICE
EXPORTER v. SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for and n
behaf ofther daughter, |asmn G. Cuaresma), WHITE FALCON
SERVICES, INC. and |AIME ORTIZ (Presdent,Whte Facon Servces, Inc.)
AND PROMOTION, INC.,G.R. Nos. 182978-79, G.R. Nos. 184298-99,
Apr 7, 2009)
]ob contracting or Subcontracting
Permssbe |ob contractng or subcontractng refers to an
arrangement whereby a prncpa agrees to farm out wth a contractor
or subcontractor the performance of a specfc |ob, work, or servce
wthn a defnte or predetermned perod, regardess of whether such
|ob, work or, servce s to be performed or competed wthn or
outsde the premses of the prncpa. Under ths arrangement, the
foowng condtons must be met: (a) the contractor carres on a
dstnct and ndependent busness and undertakes the contract work
on hs account under hs own responsbty accordng to hs own
manner and method, free from the contro and drecton of hs
empoyer or prncpa n a matters connected wth the performance
of hs work except as to the resuts thereof; (b) the contractor has
substanta capta or nvestment; and (c) the agreement between
the prncpa and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractua
empoyees enttement to a abor and occupatona safety and
heath standards, free exercse of the rght to sef-organzaton,
securty of tenure, and soca wefare benefts. (RAMY GALLEGO v.
BAYER PHILIPPINES, INC., DANPIN GUILLERMO, PRODUCT IMAGE
MARKETING, INC., and EDGARDO BERGONIA, G.R. No. 179807, |uy
31, 2009)
]oint Venture
To the Court, the Contract between the Cooperatve and DFI, far
from beng a |ob contractng arrangement, s n essence a busness
partnershp that partakes of the nature of a |ont venture. The rues on
|ob contractng are, therefore, napposte. The Court may not ater the
ntenton of the contractng partes as geaned from ther stpuatons
wthout voatng the autonomy of contracts prncpe under Artce
1306 of the Cv Code whch gves the contractng partes the utmost
beraty and freedom to estabsh such stpuatons, causes, terms
and condtons as they may deem convenent, provded they are not
contrary to aw, moras, good custom, pubc order or pubc pocy.
(OLDARICO S. TRAVENO, et a v. BOBONGON BANANA GROWERS
#&
MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, TIMOG AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION,
DIAMOND FARMS, INC., and DOLE ASIA PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 164205,
September 3, 2009)
]udgment
We dsfavor deay n the enforcement of the abor arbters
decson. Once a |udgment becomes fna and executory, the prevang
party shoud not be dened the fruts of hs vctory by some subterfuge
devsed by the osng party. Fna and executory |udgments can nether
be amended nor atered except for correcton of cerca errors, even f
the purpose s to correct erroneous concusons of fact or of aw. Tra
and executon proceedngs consttute one whoe acton or sut such
that a case n whch executon has been ssued s regarded as st
pendng so that a proceedngs n the executon are proceedngs n the
sut. (C-E CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS, G.R. No. 180188, March 25, 2009)
]urisdiction
It s a setted rue that |ursdcton over the sub|ect matter s
conferred by aw. The determnaton of the rghts of a drector and
corporate offcer dsmssed from hs empoyment as we as the
correspondng abty of a corporaton, f any, s an ntra-corporate
dspute sub|ect to the |ursdcton of the reguar courts. Thus, the
appeate court correcty rued that t s not the NLRC but the reguar
courts whch have |ursdcton over the present case. (LESLIE OKOL v.
SLIMMERS WORLD INTERNATIONAL, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATIONS, INC.,
G.R. No. 160146, December 11, 2009)
n sum, when the labor arbiter proceeded with the consolidated cases
despite the SEC suspension order, he exceeded his jurisdiction to hear
and decide illegal dismissal cases and the CA correctly reversed his June
16, 2004 order. (GNA M. TANGCO, et al, v. UNWDE SALES
WAREHOUSE CLUB, NC., G.R. No. 168697, December 14, 2009)
lntra-Corporate Dispute
Atty. Garca tres to deny he s an offcer of ETPI. Not beng a
corporate offcer, he argues that the Labor Arbter has |ursdcton over
the case. One of the corporate offcers provded for n the by-aws of
ETPI s the Vce-Presdent. It can be gathered from Atty. Garcas
compant-affdavt that he was Vce Presdent for Busness Support
Servces and Human Resource Departments of ETPI when hs
#'
empoyment was termnated effectve 16 Apr 2000 . It s therefore
cear from the by-aws and from Atty. Garca hmsef that he s a
corporate offcer. One who s ncuded n the by-aws of a corporaton
n ts roster of corporate offcers s an offcer of sad corporaton and
not a mere empoyee. Beng a corporate offcer, hs remova s
deemed to be an ntra-corporate dspute cognzabe by the SEC and
not by the Labor Arbter. (ATTY. VIRGILIO R. GARCIA v. EASTERN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC. and ATTY. SALVADOR C.
HIZON, G.R. No. 173115, EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
PHILIPPINES, INC. and ATTY. SALVADOR C. HIZON v. ATTY. VIRGILIO R.
GARCIA, G.R. Nos. 173163-64, Apr 16, 2009)
Demarcation line Between DOLE's Prerogative
and NLRC's ]urisdiction
It can be assumed that the DOLE n the exercse of ts vstora
and enforcement power somehow has to make a determnaton of the
exstence of an empoyer-empoyee reatonshp. Such prerogatva
determnaton, however, cannot be coextensve wth the vstora and
enforcement power tsef. Indeed, such determnaton s merey
premnary, ncdenta and coatera to the DOLEs prmary functon of
enforcng abor standards provsons. The determnaton of the
exstence of empoyer-empoyee reatonshp s st prmary odged
wth the NLRC. Ths s the meanng of the cause "n cases where the
reatonshp of empoyer-empoyee st exsts" n Art. 128(b).
(PEOPLES BROADCASTING(BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.) vs. THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and |ANDELEON |UEZAN, G.R.
No. 179652, May 8, 2009)
In sum, respondent contested the fndngs of the abor nspector
durng and after the nspecton and rased ssues the resouton of
whch necesstated the examnaton of evdentary matters not
verfabe n the norma course of nspecton. Hence, the Regona
Drector was dvested of |ursdcton and shoud have endorsed the
case to the approprate Arbtraton Branch of the NLRC. Consderng,
however, that an ega dsmssa case had been fed by pettoners
wheren the exstence or absence of an empoyer-empoyee
reatonshp was aso rased, the CA correcty rued that such
endorsement was no onger necessary. (VICTOR METEORO, et a v.
CREATIVE CREATURES, INC., G.R. No. 171275, |uy 13, 2009)
Labor-only Contractor
#(
In sum, Interserve dd not have substanta capta or nvestment
n the form of toos, equpment, machneres, and work premses; and
respondents, ts supposed empoyees, performed work whch was
drecty reated to the prncpa busness of pettoner. It s, thus,
evdent that Interserve fas under the defnton of a "abor-ony"
contractor, under Artce 106 of the Labor Code; as we as Secton 5()
of the Rues Impementng Artces 106-109 of the Labor Code, as
amended. (COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC v. ALAN M. AGITO, et
a., G.R. No. 179546, February 13, 2009)
In a abor-ony contract, there are three partes nvoved: (1) the
"abor-ony" contractor; (2) the empoyee who s ostensby under the
empoy of the "abor-ony" contractor; and (3) the prncpa who s
deemed the rea empoyer. Under ths scheme, the "labor-only"
contractor is the agent of the principal. Here, Veda s the "abor-
ony" contractor; ndvdua respondents are the empoyees and
pettoner s the prncpa. The aw makes the prncpa responsbe to
the empoyees of the "abor-ony contractor" as f the prncpa tsef
drecty hred or empoyed the empoyees. (ILIGAN CEMENT
CORPORATION v. ILIASCOR EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION -
SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR (IEWU-SPFL), AND ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, et. a, G.R. No. 158956, Apr 24, 2009)
Length of Service
Athough hs neary two decades of servce mght generay be
consdered for some form of fnanca assstance to shed hm from the
effects of hs termnaton, Tomadas acts refect a regrettabe ack of
concern for hs empoyer. If ength of servce |ustfes the mtgaton of
the penaty of dsmssa, then ths Court woud be awardng dsoyaty,
dstortng n the process the meanng of soca |ustce and undermnng
the efforts of abor to ceanse ts ranks of undesrabes.
(EDUARDO M.
TOMADA, SR. v. RFM CORPORATION-BAKERY FLOUR DIVISION and
|OSE MARIA CONCEPCION III, G.R. No. 163270, September 11, 2009)
Liability of Corporate Officers
However, Artce 212(e) of the Labor Code, by tsef, does not
make a corporate offcer personay abe for the debts of the
corporaton because Secton 31 of the Corporaton Code s st the
governng aw on persona abty of offcers for the debts of the
corporaton. Secton 31 of the Corporaton Code provdes:
#)
Liability of directors, trustees or officers. - Drectors or
trustees who wfuy and knowngy vote for or assent to
patenty unawfu acts of the corporaton or who are guty of
gross neggence or bad fath n drectng the affars of the
corporaton or acqure any persona or pecunary nterest n
confct wth ther duty as such drectors, or trustees sha be
abe |onty and severay for a damages resutng therefrom
suffered by the corporaton, ts stockhoders or members and
other persons. x x x
There was no showng of Davd wngy and knowngy votng for
or assentng to patenty unawfu acts of the corporaton, or that Davd
was guty of gross neggence or bad fath. (ARMANDO DAVID v.
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNION and MARIVELES APPAREL
CORPORATION, G.R. Nos. 148263 and 148271-72, Apr 21, 2009)
Liability of General Manager
Lasty, we come to the ssue of whether Wtschek, as the
Genera Manager, shoud be personay abe together wth M+W
Zander. We agree wth pettoners that he shoud not be made
personay abe. The genera manager of a corporaton shoud not be
made personay answerabe for the payment of an egay dsmssed
empoyee's monetary cams arsng from the dsmssa uness he had
acted macousy or n bad fath n termnatng the servces of the
empoyee. The empoyer corporaton has a separate and dstnct
personaty from ts offcers who merey act as ts agents. (M+W
ZANDER PHILIPPINES, INC. and ROLF WILTSCHEK v. TRINIDAD M.
ENRIOUEZ, G.R. No. 169173, |une 5, 2009)
Liability of Recruitment Agencies and Foreign-Based Employer
Prvate empoyment agences are hed |onty and severay abe
wth the foregn-based empoyer for any voaton of the recrutment
agreement or contract of empoyment. Ths |ont and sodary abty
mposed by aw aganst recrutment agences and foregn empoyers s
meant to assure the aggreved worker of mmedate and suffcent
payment of what s due hm. If the recrutment/pacement agency s a
|urdca beng, the corporate offcers and drectors and partners as the
case may be, sha themseves be |onty and sodary abe wth the
corporaton or partnershp for the aforesad cams and damages.
(BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER v. SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA
CUARESMA (for and n behaf ofther daughter, |asmn G. Cuaresma),
$*
WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and |AIME ORTIZ (Presdent,Whte
Facon Servces, Inc.) AND PROMOTION, INC.,G.R. Nos. 182978-79, G.R.
Nos. 184298-99, Apr 7, 2009)
Management Prerogative
As apty cted by the CA:
The genera rue s that the characterzaton by an empoyer of
an empoyees servces as no onger necessary or sustanabe s an
exercse of busness |udgment on the part of the empoyer. The
wsdom or soundness of such a characterzaton or decson s not, as a
genera rue, sub|ect to dscretonary revew on the part of the Labor
Arbter, the NLRC and the CA. Such characterzaton may, however, be
re|ected f the same s found to be n voaton of the aw or s arbtrary
or macous.
We fnd no voatons of aw n the respondents actons aganst
the pettoner, nor was the respondent arbtrary or nfuenced by
mace n termnatng the pettoners empoyment for redundancy. Ths
ground for termnaton s a egtmate exercse of management
prerogatve uness attended to by arbtrarness or by the faure to
foow statutory requrements. No arbtrarness or any voatons took
pace n the present case. (MIRIAM B. ELLECCION VDA. DE LECCIONES
v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NNA PHILIPPINES CO.,
INC. and MS. KIMI KIMUR A, G.R. No. 184735, September 17, 2009)
Transfer
In ths case, we fnd no reason to dsturb the concuson of the
Court of Appeas that there was no constructve dsmssa.
Reassgnments made by management pendng nvestgaton of
voatons of company poces and procedures aegedy commtted by
an empoyee fa wthn the ambt of management prerogatve. The
decson of Ouantum Foods to transfer Endco pendng nvestgaton
was a vad exercse of management prerogatve to dscpne ts
empoyees. The transfer, whe ncdenta to the charges aganst
Endco, was not meant as a penaty, but rather as a preventve
measure to avod further oss of saes and the destructon of Ouantum
Foods mage and goodw. It was not desgned to be the cumnaton
of the then on-gong admnstratve nvestgaton aganst Endco.
(ARNULFO O. ENDICO vs. OUANTUM FOODS DISTRIBUTION CENTER,
G.R. No. 161615, |anuary 30, 2009)
ATIs transfer of Bsmark IVs base from Mana to Bataan was,
contrary to Aguanzas assertons, a vad exercse of management
$!
prerogatve. The transfer of empoyees has been tradtonay among
the acts dentfed as a management prerogatve sub|ect ony to
mtatons found n aw, coectve barganng agreement, and genera
prncpes of far pay and |ustce. Even as the aw s soctous of the
wefare of empoyees, t must aso protect the rght of an empoyer to
exercse what are ceary management prerogatves. The free w of
management to conduct ts own busness affars to acheve ts purpose
cannot be dened. (GUALBERTO AGUANZA v. ASIAN TERMINAL, INC.,
KEITH |AMES, RICHARD BARCLAY, and ATTY. RODOLFO CORVITE, G.R.
No. 163505, August 14, 2009)
Money Claims
An empoyee shoud be compensated for the work he has
rendered n accordance wth the mnmum wage, and must be
appropratey remunerated when he was suffered to work on a reguar
hoday durng the tme he was empoyed by the pettoner company.
As regards the 13
th
month pay, an empoyee who was termnated at
any tme before the tme for payment of the 13
th
month pay s entted
to ths monetary beneft n proporton to the ength of tme he worked
durng the year, reckoned from the tme he started workng durng the
caendar year up to the tme of hs termnaton from the servce.
(MANTLE TRADING SERVICES, INCORPORATED AND/OR BOBBY DEL
ROSARIO v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PABLO S.
MADRIAGA,G.R. No. 166705,|uy 28,2009)
Motion for Reconsideration
In ths case, the Decson dated |anuary 18, 2005 of the
Secretary of Labor and Empoyment was receved by pettoner on
|anuary 25, 2005. It woud have become fna and executory on
February 4, 2005, the tenth day from pettoners recept of the
decson. However, pettoner fed a petton for certorar wth the
Court of Appeas on even date. Ceary, pettoner avaed of the proper
remedy snce Department Order No. 40-03 expcty prohbts the fng
of a moton for reconsderaton. Such moton becomes dspensabe
and not at a necessary. (CHRIS GARMENTS CORPORATION vs HON.
PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS and CHRIS GARMENTS WORKERS UNION-
PTGWO LOCAL CHAPTER No. 832, G.R. No. 167426, |anuary 12, 2009)
NLRC Rules of Procedure
Reinstatement Compliance Report
The new NLRC Rues of Procedure, whch took effect on |anuary
7, 2006, now requre the empoyer to submt a report of compance
$"
wthn 10 caendar days from recept of the Labor Arbters decson,
dsobedence to whch ceary denotes a refusa to renstate. The
empoyee need not fe a moton for the ssuance of the wrt of
executon snce the Labor Arbter sha thereafter motu proprio ssue
the wrt. Wth the new rues n pace, there s hardy any dffcuty n
determnng the empoyers ntransgence n mmedatey compyng
wth the order. (|UANITO A. GARCIA and ALBERTO |. DUMAGO vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., G.R. No. 164856, |anuary 20, 2009)
Liberal Application of the Rules of Procedure
The Court s unmpressed. The gravty of Marats nfracton
demands the reaxaton of strct rues of procedure. Strct rues of
procedure may be set asde to serve the demands of substanta
|ustce. Labor cases must be decded accordng to |ustce, equty, and
the substanta merts of the controversy. In Azul v. 8anco Filipino
5avings and Mortgage 8ank, the Court hed:
The serousness of pettoners nfracton demanded the settng
asde of strct rues of procedure as to aow the determnaton on the
merts of whether he was awfuy dsmssed. As hed by the Court, the
appcaton of technca rues of procedure may be reaxed to serve the
demands of substanta |ustce, partcuary n abor cases, because
they must be decded accordng to |ustce and equty and the
substanta merts of the controversy.
There s substanta evdence showng that there was vad
cause for the bank to dsmss pettoners empoyment for oss of trust
and confdence. Pettoner was a bank accountant, whch s a poston
of trust and confdence. The amount nvoved s sgnfcant, amost
P4.5 mon. (ESTER B. MARALIT v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, G.R.
No. 163788, August 24, 2009)
Notice of Change of Address
PALs argument that ts chaotc stuaton due to ts rehabtaton
rendered the fng of a notce of change of address mpractca does
not mert consderaton. Snce movng out from ts offce at Aed Bank
Center, where the NLRC decson was sent, PAL occuped four dfferent
offce addresses. Yet these offce addresses coud be found n the
same budng, the PAL Center Budng n Makat Cty. PAL merey
moved from one foor to another. To our mnd, t woud have been
more prudent had PAL nformed the NLRC that t has moved from one
foor to another rather than aowed ts od address at Aed Bank
Center to reman as ts offca address. To rue n favor of PAL
consderng the crcumstances n the nstant case woud negate the
$#
purpose of the rues on competeness of servce and the notce of
change of address, whch s to pace the date of recept of peadngs,
|udgments and processes beyond the power of the party beng served
to determne at hs peasure. (PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v. HEIRS OF
BERNARDIN |. ZAMORA, G.R. No. 164267, G.R. No. 166996)
Overseas Employment Contracts
Respondents servce award for the sxth contract s equvaent
ony to haf-months pay pus the proportonate amount for the
addtona nne days of servce he rendered after one year.
Respondents empoyment contracts expressy stated that hs
empoyment ended upon hs departure from work. Each year he
departed from work and successvey new contracts were executed
before he reported for work anew. Hs servce was not cumuatve.
Pertnenty, n 8rent 5chool, lnc. v. Zamora, we sad that "a fxed term
s an essenta and natura appurtenance" of overseas empoyment
contracts, as n ths case. We aso sad n that case that under
Amercan aw, "|w|here a contract specfes the perod of ts duraton, t
termnates on the expraton of such perod. A contract of empoyment
for a defnte perod termnates by ts own terms at the end of such
perod." As t s, Artce 72 of the Saud Labor Law s aso of smar
mport. It reads:
A abor contract concuded for a specfed perod sha
termnate upon the expry of ts term. If both partes contnue
to enforce the contract, thereafter, t sha be consdered
renewed for an unspecfed perod. (LWV CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION v. MARCELO B. DUPO, C.R. No. J72342, |uy
13, 2009
In Placewell lnternational 5ervices Corporation v. Camote, we
hed that the subsequenty executed sde agreement of an overseas
contract worker wth the foregn empoyer s vod, smpy because t s
aganst our exstng aws, moras and pubc pocy. The subsequent
agreement cannot supersede the terms of the standard empoyment
contract approved by the POEA. Repubc Act No. 8042, commony
known as the Mgrant Workers Act of 1995, expressy prohbts the
substtuton or ateraton, to the pre|udce of the worker, of
empoyment contracts aready approved and verfed by the
Department of Labor and Empoyment (DOLE) from the tme of the
actua sgnng thereof by the partes up to and ncudng the perod of
the expraton of the same, wthout the approva of DOLE. Snce the
second empoyment contract pettoner Nsda sgned wth respondent
ADAMS was vod for not havng been sanctoned by the POEA, then
pettoner Nsdas empoyment wth respondent ADAMS was st
$$
governed by hs POEA-SEC unt hs repatraton to the Phppnes on
17 |uy 2002. (CARLOS N. NISDA v. SEA SERVE MARITIME AGENCY and
KHALIFA A. ALGOSAIBI DIVING AND MARINE SERVICES, G. R. No.
179177, |uy 23, 2009)
Payment of Wages Pending Appeal
In other words, a dsmssed empoyee whose case was favoraby
decded by the Labor Arbter s entted to receve wages pendng
appea upon renstatement, whch s mmedatey executory. Uness
there s a restranng order, t s mnstera upon the Labor Arbter to
mpement the order of renstatement and t s mandatory on the
empoyer to compy therewth. (|UANITO A. GARCIA and ALBERTO |.
DUMAGO vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., G.R. No. 164856, |anuary 20,
2009)
Prescriptive Period for lllegal Dismissal
The aw fxes the perod of tme wthn whch pettoner coud
seek remedy for hs ega dsmssa and for as ong as he fed hs
Compant wthn the prescrptve perod, he sha be entted to the fu
protecton of hs rght to backwages. In ega dsmssa cases, the
empoyee concerned s gven a perod of four years from the tme of
hs ega dsmssa wthn whch to nsttute the compant. Ths s
based on Artce 1146 of the New Cv Code whch states that actons
based upon an n|ury to the rghts of the pantff must be brought
wthn four years. The four-year prescrptve perod sha commence to
run ony upon the accrua of a cause of acton of the worker. Here,
pettoner was dsmssed from servce on 15 September 2001. He fed
hs compant for ega dsmssa on 14 |une 2004. Ceary, then, the
nstant case was fed wthn the prescrptve perod. (ERWIN H. REYES
v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 180551,
February 10, 2009)
Prescriptive Period for Money Claims
In the present case, the earest ncdent covered by Artce 1155
s the extra|udca demand whch came on |anuary 7, 1995 . As the CA
correcty computed, the perod for prescrpton started to run on
|anuary 15, 1993 , and was nterrupted on |anuary 7, 1995 . UNILAB
ony answered the pettoners |anuary 7, 1995 etter on February 26,
1996 , wth a categorca dena of the pettoners demand; the runnng
of the prescrpton perod re-started on the date of ths dena, but
agan stopped agan on August 9, 1996 , when the compant before
the NLRC was fed. Addng a the runnng perods yeds a tota of ess
$%
than three (3) years; hence, the pettoner seasonaby fed her
monetary cam when she fed her compant before the NLRC.
(|ANUARIA A. RIVERA v. UNITED LABORATORIES, INC.,G.R. No. 155639
Apr 22, 2009)
Money Claims - OFWs
In Cadalin v. POEAs Administrator, we hed that Artce 291
covers a money cams from empoyer-empoyee reatonshp and s
broader n scope than cams arsng from a specfc aw. It s not
mted to money cams recoverabe under the Labor Code, but appes
aso to cams of overseas contract workers. The foowng rung n
Cadalin v. POEAs Administrator s nstructve:
Frst to be determned s whether t s the Bahran
aw on prescrpton of acton based on the Amr Decree No.
23 of 1976 or a Phppne aw on prescrpton that sha be
the governng aw.
Artce 156 of the Amr Decree No. 23 of 1976
provdes:
"A cam arsng out of a contract of empoyment
sha not be actonabe after the apse of one year from the
date of the expry of the contract" x x x.
As a genera rue, a foregn procedura aw w not be
apped n the forum. Procedura matters, such as servce
of process, |onder of actons, perod and requstes for
appea, and so forth, are governed by the aws of the
forum. Ths s true even f the acton s based upon a
foregn substantve aw (Restatement of the Confct of
Laws, Sec. 685; Saonga, Prvate Internatona Law, 131
|1979|).
A aw on prescrpton of actons s sui generis n
Confct of Laws n the sense that t may be vewed ether
as procedura or substantve, dependng on the
characterzaton gven such a aw.
x x x x
However, the characterzaton of a statute nto a
procedura or substantve aw becomes rreevant when the
country of the forum has a "borrowng statute." Sad
statute has the practca effect of treatng the foregn
$&
statute of mtaton as one of substance (Goodrch, Confct
of Laws, 152-153 |1938|). A "borrowng statute" drects
the state of the forum to appy the foregn statute of
mtatons to the pendng cams based on a foregn aw
(Sege, Confcts, 183 |1975|). Whe there are severa
knds of "borrowng statutes," one form provdes that an
acton barred by the aws of the pace where t accrued,
w not be enforced n the forum even though the oca
statute has not run aganst t (Goodrch and Scoes, Confct
of Laws, 152-153 |1938|). Secton 48 of our Code of Cv
Procedure s of ths knd. Sad Secton provdes:
"If by the aws of the state or country where the
cause of acton arose, the acton s barred, t s aso barred
n the Phppne Isands."
Secton 48 has not been repeaed or amended by the
Cv Code of the Phppnes. Artce 2270 of sad Code
repeaed ony those provsons of the Code of Cv
Procedure as to whch were nconsstent wth t. There s
no provson n the Cv Code of the Phppnes, whch s
nconsstent wth or contradctory to Secton 48 of the Code
of Cv Procedure (Paras, Phppne Confct of Laws, 104
|7
th
ed.|).
In the ght of the 1987 Consttuton, however,
Secton 48 |of the Code of Cv Procedure| cannot be
enforced ex proprio vigore nsofar as t ordans the
appcaton n ths |ursdcton of |Artce| 156 of the Amr
Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum w not enforce any foregn
cam obnoxous to the forums pubc pocy x x x. To
enforce the one-year prescrptve perod of the Amr Decree
No. 23 of 1976 as regards the cams n queston woud
contravene the pubc pocy on the protecton to abor.
x x x x
Thus, n our consdered vew, respondents compant was fed we
wthn the three-year prescrptve perod under Artce 291 of our
Labor Code. Ths pont, however, has aready been mooted by our
fndng that respondents servce award had been pad, abet the
payro termed such payment as severance pay. (LWV
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. MARCELO B. DUPO, G.R. No.
172342, |uy 13, 2009)
Probationary Employee
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A probatonary empoyee or probatoner s one who s on tra for
an empoyer, durng whch the atter determnes whether or not he s
quafed for permanent empoyment. The probatonary empoyment s
ntended to afford the empoyer an opportunty to observe the ftness
of a probatonary empoyee whe at work, and to ascertan whether he
w become an effcent and productve empoyee. Whe the empoyer
observes the ftness, proprety and effcency of a probatoner to
ascertan whether he s quafed for permanent empoyment, the
probatoner, on the other hand, seeks to prove to the empoyer that he
has the quafcatons to meet the reasonabe standards for permanent
empoyment. Thus, the word probationary, as used to descrbe the
perod of empoyment, mpes the purpose of the term or perod, not
ts ength. (MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS LEARNING CENTER and MRS.
VIOLETA T. CARINO v. ADELAIDA . MANALO, G.R. No. 178835, February
13, 2009 )
Probationary Employment for Academic Personnel
For "academc personne" n prvate schoos, coeges and
unverstes, probatonary empoyment s governed by Secton 92 of
the 1992 Manua of Reguatons for Prvate Schoos (Manua), whch
reads:
Secton 92. Probationary Period. - Sub|ect n a
nstances to compance wth the Department and schoo
requrements, the probatonary perod for academc
personne sha not be more than three (3) consecutve
years of satsfactory servce for those n the eementary
and secondary eves, sx (6) consecutve reguar
semesters of satsfactory servce for those n the tertary
eve, and nne (9) consecutve trmesters of satsfactory
servce for those n the tertary eve where coegate
courses are offered on a trmester bass.
(MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS LEARNING CENTER and MRS. VIOLETA T.
CARINO v. ADELAIDA . MANALO, G.R. No. 178835, February 13, 2009 )
Security of Tenure of Probationary Employees
As above dscussed, probatonary empoyees en|oy securty of
tenure durng the term of ther probatonary empoyment such that
they may ony be termnated for cause as provded for by aw, or f at
the end of the probatonary perod, the empoyee faed to meet the
$(
reasonabe standards set by the empoyer at the tme of the
empoyees engagement. Undenaby, respondent was hred as a
probatonary teacher and, as such, t was ncumbent upon pettoner to
show by competent evdence that she dd not meet the standards set
by the schoo. Ths requrement, pettoner faed to dscharge. To
note, the termnaton of respondent was effected by that etter statng
that she was beng reeved from empoyment because the schoo
authortes aegedy decded, as a cost-cuttng measure, that the
poston of "Prncpa" was to be aboshed. Nowhere n that etter was
respondent nformed that her performance as a schoo teacher was
ess than satsfactory. (MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS LEARNING CENTER
and MRS. VIOLETA T. CARINO v. ADELAIDA . MANALO, G.R. No. 178835,
February 13, 2009 )
Termination of Probationary Employee
Under Artce 281 of the Labor Code, a probatonary empoyee
can be egay dsmssed ether: (1) for a |ust cause; or (2) when he fas
to quafy as a reguar empoyee n accordance wth the reasonabe
standards made known to hm by the empoyer at the start of the
empoyment. Nonetheess, the power of the empoyer to termnate the
servces of an empoyee on probaton s not wthout mtatons. Frst,
ths power must be exercsed n accordance wth the specfc
requrements of the contract. Second, the dssatsfacton on the part
of the empoyer must be rea and n good fath, not fegned so as to
crcumvent the contract or the aw. Thrd, there must be no unawfu
dscrmnaton n the dsmssa. In termnaton cases, the burden of
provng |ust or vad cause for dsmssng an empoyee rests on the
empoyer. (DAVAO CONTRACTORS DEVELOPMENT COOPERATIVE
(DACODECO) v. MARILYN A. PASAWA,G.R. No. 172174,|uy 9, 2009)
Project Employee
Whe respondent performed tasks that were ceary vta,
necessary and ndspensabe to the usua busness or trade of Acate,
respondent was not contnuousy rehred by Acate after the cessaton
of every pro|ect. Records show that respondent was hred by Acate
from 1988 to 1995 for three pro|ects, namey the PLDT X-5 pro|ect, the
PLDT X-4 IOT pro|ect and the PLDT 1342 pro|ect. On 30 Apr 1988,
upon the expraton of respondents contract for the PLDT X-4 IOT
pro|ect, Acate dd not rehre respondent unt 1 February 1991, or
after a lapse of 33 months, for the PLDT 1342 pro|ect. Acates
contnuous rehrng of respondent n varous capactes from February
1991 to December 1995 was done entrey wthn the framework of one
and the same pro|ect - the PLDT 1342 pro|ect. Ths dd not make
respondent a reguar empoyee of Acate as respondent was not
$)
contnuousy rehred after the cessaton of a pro|ect. Respondent
remaned a pro|ect empoyee of Acate workng on the PLDT 1342
pro|ect. (ALCATEL PHILIPPINES, INC., v. RENE R. RELOS, G.R. No.
164315, |uy 3, 2009)
Protection to Labor
Whether empoyed ocay or overseas, a Fpno workers en|oy
the protectve mante of Phppne abor and soca egsaton, contract
stpuatons to the contrary notwthstandng. Ths pronouncement s n
keepng wth the basc pubc pocy of the State to afford protecton to
abor, promote fu empoyment, ensure equa work opportuntes
regardess of sex, race or creed, and reguate the reatons between
workers and empoyers. Ths rung s kewse rendered mperatve by
Artce 17 of the Cv Code whch states that aws whch have for ther
ob|ect pubc order, pubc pocy and good customs sha not be
rendered neffectve by aws or |udgments promugated, or by
determnatons or conventons agreed upon n a foregn country.
(BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER v. SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA
CUARESMA (for and n behaf ofther daughter, ]asmin G. Cuaresma),
WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and |AIME ORTIZ (Presdent,Whte
Facon Servces, Inc.) AND PROMOTION, INC.,G.R. Nos. 182978-79, G.R.
Nos. 184298-99, Apr 7, 2009)
Thus, as hed n that case, "the rght of an empoyee to be
nformed of the charges aganst hm and to reasonabe opportunty to
present hs sde n a controversy wth ether the company or hs own
Unon s not wped away by a Unon Securty Cause or a Unon Shop
Cause n a coectve barganng agreement. An empoyee s entted
to be protected not ony from a company whch dsregards hs rghts
but aso from hs own Unon, the eadershp of whch coud yed to the
temptaton of swft and arbtrary expuson from membershp and mere
dsmssa from hs |ob." (HERMINIGILDO INGUILLO AND ZENAIDA
BERGANTE V. FIRST PHILIPPINE SCALES, INC. and/or AMPARO
POLICARPIO, MANAGER, G.R. No. 165407, |une 5, 2009)
uestion of Law } Fact
There s a queston of aw f the ssue rased s capabe of beng
resoved wthout need of revewng the probatve vaue of the
evdence. The resouton of the ssue must rest soey on what the aw
provdes on a gven set of crcumstances. Once t s cear that the
ssue nvtes a revew of the evdence presented, the queston posed s
one of fact. If the query requres a re-evauaton of the credbty of
wtnesses, or the exstence or reevance of surroundng crcumstances
and ther reaton to one another, the ssue n that query s factua.
%*
(GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPAS
vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. (GENERAL SANTOS CITY), THE
COURT OF APPEALS and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, G.R. No. 178647)
uitclaim
However, wth respect to the second batch of qutcams sgned
by 85 of the remanng 160 empoyees who were termnated foowng
Hyatts permanent cosure, we hod that these are vad and bndng
undertakngs. The sad documents ndcate that the amount receved
by each of the empoyees represents a reasonabe settement of ther
monetary cams aganst pettoner and were even sgned n the
presence of a DOLE representatve. A qutcam, wth cear and
unambguous contents and executed for a vad consderaton receved
n fu by the empoyee who sgned the same, cannot be ater
nvadated because ts sgnatory cams that he was pressured nto
sgnng t on account of hs dre fnanca need. When t s shown that
the person executng the waver dd so vountary, wth fu
understandng of what he was dong, and the consderaton for the
qutcam s credbe and reasonabe, the transacton must be
recognzed as a vad and bndng undertakng. (HOTEL ENTERPRISES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (HEPI), owner of Hyatt Regency Mana, v.
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT-NATIONAL UNION OF
WORKERS IN THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES
(SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN), G.R. No. 165756, |une 5, 2009)
To excuse pettoners from compyng wth the terms of ther
wavers, they must ocate ther case wthn any of three narrow
grounds: (1) the empoyer used fraud or decet n obtanng the
wavers; (2) the consderaton the empoyer pad s ncredbe and
unreasonabe; or (3) the terms of the waver are contrary to aw, pubc
order, pubc pocy, moras or good customs or pre|udca to a thrd
person wth a rght recognzed by aw. The precedng dscusson on the
vountarness of pettoners retrement from servce effectvey
removes these grounds beyond pettoners argumentatve reach.
Accordngy, pettoners, by the terms of ther wavers, are barred from
fng ths sut. (ARSENIO F. OUEVEDO, et a., v. BENGUET ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE,INCORPORATED (BENECO) and GERARDO P. VERZOSA,
G.R. No. 168927, September 11, 2009)
lnvalid uitclaims
Sgnfcanty, the Manfestatons fed by pettoner wth respect to the
qutcams executed by members of respondent Unon state that 34 of
the 48 empoyees termnated on account of the downszng program
%!
have aready executed qutcams on varous dates. We, however, take
|udca notce that 33 of these qutcams faed to ndcate the
amounts receved by the termnated empoyees. Because of ths,
pettoner eaves us no choce but to nvadate and set asde these
qutcams. However, the actua amount receved by the empoyees
upon sgnng the sad documents sha be deducted from whatever
remanng amount s due them to avod doube recovery of separaton
pay and other monetary benefts. We hereby order the Labor Arbter to
effect the necessary computaton on ths matter. (HOTEL ENTERPRISES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (HEPI), owner of Hyatt Regency Mana, v.
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT-NATIONAL UNION OF
WORKERS IN THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES
(SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN), G.R. No. 165756, |une 5, 2009)
Aso, SMC cannot take refuge n the Recept and Reease
document sgned by the respondent. Generay, deeds of reease,
wavers, or qutcams cannot bar empoyees from demandng benefts
to whch they are egay entted or from contestng the egaty of ther
dsmssa, snce qutcams are ooked upon wth dsfavor and are
frowned upon as contrary to pubc pocy. Where, however, the person
makng the waver has done so vountary, wth a fu understandng
thereof, and the consderaton for the qutcam s credbe and
reasonabe, the transacton must be recognzed as a vad and bndng
undertakng. The burden of provng that the qutcam or waver was
vountary entered nto rests on the empoyer. (SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION v. EDUARDO L. TEODOSIO, G.R. No. 163033, October 2,
2009)
Real Party in lnterest
To quafy a person to be a rea party n nterest n whose name
an acton must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present rea
hoder of the rght sought to be enforced. "Interest" wthn the
meanng of the rue means matera nterest, an nterest n essence to
be affected by the |udgment as dstngushed from mere nterest n the
queston nvoved, or a mere ncdenta nterest. By rea nterest s
meant a present substanta nterest, as dstngushed from a mere
expentancy or a future, contngent, subordnate or consequenta
nterest. (NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION vs. NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC., G.R. No. 152923,
|anuary 19, 2009)
It has been repeatedy stated that the Pantranco propertes whch
were the sub|ect of executon sae were owned by Macrs and ater,
the PNB-Madecor. They were never owned by PNEI or PNB.
Foowng our earer dscusson on the separate personates of the
%"
dfferent corporatons nvoved n the nstant case, the ony entty
whch has the rght and nterest to queston the executon sae and
the eventua rght to annu the same, f any, s PNB-Madecor or ts
successor-n-nterest. Setted s the rue that proceedngs n court
must be nsttuted by the rea party n nterest. (PANTRANCO
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA-PTGWO) and PANTRANCO
RETRENCHED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PANREA) v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), G.R. No. 170689, G.R. No.
170705)
Re-computation of Awards
Furthermore, the CA suffcenty expaned the need to ncrease
the award of 13
th
month pay and SIL pay. It modfed the award after
fndng that the computaton of the amount gven by the NLRC n ts
Decson dated March 25, 2002 does not conform to the dsmssed
empoyees empoyment hstory. The CA apty expaned, viz.:
A cursory readng of the assaed Decson of the
NLRC dated March 25, 2002 ready reveas that the abor
trbuna awarded prvate respondents ther unpad 13
th
Month Pay and Servce Incentve Leave (SIL) Pay wthout
regard to ther empoyment hstory wth the pettoner.
There was even no expanaton or adequate showng on
the face of the questoned |udgment why the award of the
unpad 13
th
Month and SIL Pay dffers from one prvate
respondent to another. Ths Court, therefore, after
determnng that ndeed the pettoner had not pad the
prvate respondents these speca benefts for the whoe
perod of ther empoyment therewth, modfed the award
by panstakngy basng t to each of the dsmssed
empoyees empoyment hstory wth pettoner.
x x x x
The procedura apse on the part of the NLRC n ths
case n fang to take nto account the number of years
when the prvate respondents dd not receve ther 13
th
Month and SIL Pay cannot defeat ther rght to receve
these benefts as granted under substantve aw. Ths
Court smpy coud not uphod an erroneous computaton of
the sad unpad benefts. Hence, t had to re-compute, and
as a consequence, ncreased t.
%#
(AKLAN COLLEGE, INC. vs. PERPETUO ENERO, ARLYN CASTIGADOR,
NUENA SERMON and |OCELYN ZOLINA, G.R. No. 178309, |anuary 27,
2009)
Recruitment Agency
As the Court prevousy observed, the Contract of Servces
between Interserve and pettoner dd not dentfy the work needed to
be performed and the fna resut requred to be accompshed.
Instead, the Contract specfed the type of workers Interserve must
provde pettoner ("Route Hepers, Saesmen, Drvers, Cercas,
Encoders & PD") and ther quafcatons (technca/vocatona course
graduates, physcay ft, of good mora character, and have not been
convcted of any crme). The Contract aso states that, "to carry out
the undertakngs specfed n the mmedatey precedng paragraph,
the CONTRACTOR sha empoy the necessary personne," thus,
acknowedgng that Interserve dd not yet have n ts empoy the
personne needed by pettoner and woud st pck out such personne
based on the crtera provded by pettoner. In other words, Interserve
dd not obgate tsef to perform an dentfabe |ob, work, or servce for
pettoner, but merey bound tsef to provde the atter wth specfc
types of empoyees. These contractua provsons strongy ndcated
that Interserve was merey a recrutng and manpower agency
provdng pettoner wth workers performng tasks drecty reated to
the atters prncpa busness. (COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC v.
ALAN M. AGITO, et a., G.R. No. 179546, February 13, 2009)
Refusal to Return to Work
Therefore, the compant for ega dsmssa fed by respondents
was premature, snce even after the expraton of ther suspenson
perod, they refused, despte due notce, to report to work. In fact, n
ther Memorandum of Appea, respondents admtted havng receved
pettoners return-to-work memorandum whch, however, became
fute because they hasty fed the compant for ega dsmssa.
(INDUSTRIAL & TRANSPORT EOUIPMENT, INC. RAYMOND |ARINA, vs.
TOMAS TUGADE and CRESENCIO TUGADE, G.R. No. 158539, |anuary
15, 2009)
Regular Employment
Undoubtedy, respondents were reguar empoyees of pettoner
wth respect to the escort or "comboy" actvty for whch they had
%$
been engaged snce 1993 and 1994, respectvey, wthout regard to
contnuty or brokenness of the servce. (DEALCO FARMS, INC., vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5
th
DIVISION), G.R. No.
153192 |anuary 30, 2009)!
Thus, there are two knds of reguar empoyees, namey: (1)
those who are engaged to perform actvtes whch are usuay
necessary or desrabe n the usua busness or trade of the empoyer;
and (2) those who have rendered at east one year of servce, whether
contnuous or broken, wth respect to the actvty n whch they are
empoyed. Smpy stated, reguar empoyees are cassfed nto (1)
reguar empoyees - by nature of work and (2) reguar empoyees - by
years of servce. The former refers to those empoyees who perform a
partcuar actvty whch s necessary or desrabe n the usua busness
or trade of the empoyer, regardess of ther ength of servce; whe
the atter refers to those empoyees who have been performng the
|ob, regardess of the nature thereof, for at east a year. If the
empoyee has been performng the |ob for at east one year, even f the
performance s not contnuous or merey ntermttent, the aw deems
the repeated and contnung need for ts performance as suffcent
evdence of the necessty, f not ndspensabty, of that actvty to the
busness. (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. EDUARDO L. TEODOSIO, G.R.
No. 163033, October 2, 2009)
Reinstatement
The sprt of the rue on renstatement pendng appea anmates
the proceedngs once the Labor Arbter ssues the decson contanng
an order of renstatement. The mmedacy of ts executon needs no
further eaboraton. Renstatement pendng appea necesstates ts
mmedate executon durng the pendency of the appea, f the aw s to
serve ts nobe purpose. At the same tme, any attempt on the part of
the empoyer to evade or deay ts executon, as observed n
Panuncillo and as what actuay transpred n limberly, Composite, Air
Philippines, and Roquero, shoud not be countenanced.
After the abor arbters decson s reversed by a hgher trbuna,
the empoyee may be barred from coectng the accrued wages, f t s
shown that the deay n enforcng the renstatement pendng appea
was wthout faut on the part of the empoyer. (|UANITO A. GARCIA and
ALBERTO |. DUMAGO vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., G.R. No. 164856,
|anuary 20, 2009)
Reinstatement during Corporate Rehabilitation
%%
Case aw recognzes that uness there s a restranng order, the
mpementaton of the order of renstatement s mnstera and
mandatory. Ths n|uncton or suspenson of cams by egsatve fat
partakes of the nature of a restranng order that consttutes a ega
|ustfcaton for respondents non-compance wth the renstatement
order. Respondents faure to exercse the aternatve optons of
actua renstatement and payro renstatement was thus |ustfed.
Such beng the case, respondents obgaton to pay the saares
pendng appea, as the norma effect of the non-exercse of the
optons, dd not attach. (|UANITO A. GARCIA and ALBERTO |. DUMAGO
vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., G.R. No. 164856, |anuary 20, 2009)
Republic Act No. 8042
Fifth Paragraph of Section 10; Unconstitutional
The argument of the Soctor Genera, that the actua purpose of
the sub|ect cause of mtng the enttement of OFWs to ther three-
month saary n case of ega dsmssa, s to gve them a better
chance of gettng hred by foregn empoyers. Ths s pan specuaton.
As earer dscussed, there s nothng n the text of the aw or the
records of the deberatons eadng to ts enactment or the peadngs
of respondent that woud ndcate that there s an exstng
governmenta purpose for the sub|ect cause, or even |ust a pretext of
one.
The sub|ect cause does not state or mpy any defntve
governmenta purpose; and t s for that precse reason that the cause
voates not |ust pettoner's rght to equa protecton, but aso her rght
to substantvedue process under Secton 1, Artce III of the
Consttuton. (ANTONIO M. SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME
SERVICES,INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC., G.R. No. 167614,
March 24, 2009)
Retirement Coverage
A twst n Rveras case s that she contnued workng beyond the
compusory separaton from servce that resuted from her retrement.
Whether she coud or coud not resume workng wth the company s,
as a rue, a consensua matter for the partes to agree upon, mted
ony by company poces and the appcabe terms of the retrement
%&
pan. To be sure, there s no mtaton by aw that barred her from
contnung her work wth UNILAB; even the above-quoted
Impementng Rues, n settng the retrement age at 60, deferred to
the partes agreement. Her empoyment terms under ths renewed
empoyment are based on what she and the company agreed upon.
Whether these terms ncuded renewed coverage n the retrement
pan s an evdentary gap that coud have been concusvey shown by
evdence of deductons of contrbutons to the pan after 1988. Two
ndcators, however, te us that no such coverage took pace. The frst
s that the terms of the retrement pan, before and after ts 1992
amendment, contnued to excude those who have rendered 30 years
of servce or have reached 60 years of age. Therefore, the pan coud
not have covered her. The second s the absence of evdence of, or of
any demand for, any rembursement of what Rvera woud have pad
as contrbutons to the pan had her coverage and deductons
contnued after 1988. Thus, we concude that her renewed servce dd
not have the beneft of any retrement pan coverage. (|ANUARIA A.
RIVERA v. UNITED LABORATORIES, INC.,G.R. No. 155639 Apr 22,
2009)
Seafarer
Death Benefits
The genera rue s that the empoyer s abe to pay the hers of
the deceased seafarer for death benefts once t s estabshed that he
ded durng the effectvty of hs empoyment contract. However, the
empoyer may be exempted from abty f he can successfuy prove
that the seafarers death was caused by an n|ury drecty attrbutabe
to hs deberate or wfu act. In sum, respondents enttement to any
death benefts depends on whether the evdence of the pettoners
suffces to prove that the deceased commtted sucde; the burden of
proof rests on hs empoyer. (GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES
CORP. and IMC SHIPPING CO., PTE. LTD. v. LEONILA SURIGAO for
Hersef and In Behaf of Her Mnor Chdren,Namey KAYE ANGELI and
MIRIAM,Both Surnamed SURIGAO G.R. No. 183646)
Post-Employment Medical Examination
But even assumng that pettoner was repatrated for medca
reasons, he faed to submt hmsef to the company-desgnated doctor
n accordance wth the post-empoyment medca examnaton
requrement under the above-quoted paragraph 3 of Secton 20(B) of
the POEA Standard Empoyment Contract. Faure to compy wth ths
requrement whch s a sine qua non bars the fng of cam for
dsabty benefts. (DIONISIO M. MUSNIT v. SEA STAR SHIPPING
CORPORATION , G.R. No. 182623, December 4, 2009)
%'
Security Guard
"Temporary off-detail"
Petitioner's citation of Article 286 of the Labor Code
reading:
ART. 286. When employment not deemed
terminated. + The bona fide suspenson of the operaton of
a busness or undertakng for a perod not exceedng sx
(6) months, or the fufment by the empoyee of a mtary
or cvc duty sha not termnate empoyment. In a such
cases, the empoyer sha renstate the empoyee to hs
former poston wthout oss of senorty rghts f he
ndcates hs desre to resume hs work not ater than one
(1) month from the resumpton of operatons of hs
empoyer or from hs reef from the mtary or cvc duty.
(Emphass n the orgna; underscorng supped)
s mspaced. Philippine lndustrial 5ecurity Agency v. Dapiton
teaches:
We stress that Artce 286 appes ony when there s a
bonafide suspension of the employers operation of a
business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6)
months. In such a case, there s no termnaton of
empoyment but ony a temporary dspacement of
empoyees, abet the dspacement shoud not exceed sx
(6) months. The paramount consderaton shoud be the
dre exgency of the busness of the empoyer that compes
t to put some of ts empoyees temporary out of work. In
securty servces, the temporary "off-deta" of guards
takes pace when the securty agencys cents decde not
to renew ther contracts wth the securty agency, resutng
n a stuaton where the avaabe posts under ts exstng
contracts are ess than the number of guards n ts roster.
(Underscorng supped)
In the present case, there s no showng that there was ack of
avaabe posts at pettoners cents or that there was a request
from the cent-bank, where respondent was ast posted and whch
%(
contnued to hre pettoners servces, to repace respondent wth
another. Pettoner suddeny prevented hm from reportng on hs
tour of duty at the bank on December 15, 2001 and had not
thereafter asked hm to report for duty. (EAGLE STAR SECURITY
SERVICES, INC. v. BONIFACIO L. MIRANDO, G.R. No. 179512, |uy 30,
2009)
Separate Corporate Personality
Assumng, for the sake of argument, that PNB may be hed abe
for the debts of PNEI, pettoners st cannot proceed aganst the
Pantranco propertes, the same beng owned by PNB-Madecor,
notwthstandng the fact that PNB-Madecor was a subsdary of
PNB. The genera rue remans that PNB-Madecor has a personaty
separate and dstnct from PNB. The mere fact that a corporaton
owns a of the stocks of another corporaton, taken aone, s not
suffcent to |ustfy ther beng treated as one entty. If used to
perform egtmate functons, a subsdarys separate exstence
sha be respected, and the abty of the parent corporaton as
we as the subsdary w be confned to those arsng n ther
respectve busnesses. (PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(PEA-PTGWO) and PANTRANCO RETRENCHED EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (PANREA) v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC), G.R. No. 170689, G.R. No. 170705)
Separation Pay
Snce pettoner was not fautess n regard to the offenses mputed
aganst her, we hod that the award of separaton pay ony, wthout
backwages, s proper. (ELIZABETH D. PALTENG v. UNITED
COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, G.R. No. 172199, February 27, 2009)
We thus fnd the dsmssa to be ega. Consequenty,
respondent s entted to renstatement wthout oss of senorty rghts
and other prveges, and to fu backwages, ncusve of aowances,
and other benefts or ther monetary equvaent, computed from the
tme of the wthhodng of the empoyee's compensaton up to the tme
of actua renstatement. If renstatement s not possbe due to the
straned reatons between the empoyer and the empoyee, separaton
pay shoud nstead be pad the empoyee equvaent to one month
saary for every year of servce, computed from the tme of
engagement up to the fnaty of ths decson. (M+W ZANDER
PHILIPPINES, INC. and ROLF WILTSCHEK v. TRINIDAD M. ENRIOUEZ,
G.R. No. 169173, |une 5, 2009)
%)
Artce 279 of the Labor Code provdes that "|a|n empoyee who
s un|usty dsmssed from work sha be entted to renstatement
wthout oss of senorty rghts and other prveges and to hs fu
backwages, ncusve of aowances, and to hs other benefts or ther
monetary equvaent computed from the tme hs compensaton was
wthhed from hm up to the tme of hs actua renstatement." Snce,
n the present case, renstatement s no onger practcabe or feasbe,
separaton pay may be awarded n eu of renstatement. Moreover,
the awards of separaton pay and backwages are not mutuay
excusve and both may be gven to Taguao and Serrano.
The norma consequences of a fndng that an empoyee has
been egay dsmssed are, frsty, that the empoyee becomes
entted to renstatement to hs former poston wthout oss of senorty
rghts and, secondy, the payment of backwages correspondng to the
perod from hs ega dsmssa up to actua renstatement. The
statutory ntent on ths matter s ceary dscernbe. Renstatement
restores the empoyee who was un|usty dsmssed to the poston from
whch he was removed, that s, to hs status quo ante dsmssa, whe
the grant of backwages aows the same empoyee to recover from the
empoyer that whch he had ost by way of wages as a resut of hs
dsmssa. These twn remedes -renstatement and payment of
backwages - make the dsmssed empoyee whoe who can then ook
forward to contnued empoyment. Thus do these two remedes gve
meanng and substance to the consttutona rght of abor to securty
of tenure. The two forms of reef are dstnct and separate, one from
the other. Though the grant of renstatement commony carres wth t
an award of backwages, the napproprateness or non-avaabty of
one does not carry wth t the napproprateness or non-avaabty of
the other. x x x As the term suggests, separaton pay s the amount
that an empoyee receves at the tme of hs severance from the
servce and x x x s desgned to provde the empoyee wth "the
wherewtha durng the perod that he s ookng for another
empoyment." In the nstant case, the grant of separaton pay was a
substtute for mmedate and contnued re-empoyment wth the
prvate respondent Bank. The grant of separaton pay dd not redress
the n|ury that s ntended to be reeved by the second remedy of
backwages, that s, the oss of earnngs that woud have accrued to the
dsmssed empoyee durng the perod between dsmssa and
renstatement. Put a tte dfferenty, payment of backwages s a form
of reef that restores the ncome that was ost by reason of unawfu
dsmssa; separaton pay, n contrast, s orented towards the
mmedate future, the transtona perod the dsmssed empoyee must
undergo before ocatng a repacement |ob. x x x The grant of
separaton pay was a proper substtute ony for renstatement; t coud
not be an adequate substtute both for renstatement and for
&*
backwages. (Emphass added) (NISSAN NORTH EDSA BALINTAWAK,
OUEZON CITY v. ANGELITO SERRANO, |R. and EDWIN TAGULAO, G.R.
No. 162538, |une 4, 2009)
Above a, the ntenton to sever the empoyer-empoyee
reatonshp was not duy estabshed by respondents. The pror
submsson of a medca certfcate that pettoner s ft to resume work
negates the cam of respondents that the former demanded for
separaton pay on account of her fang heath. Certany, pettoner
cannot demand for separaton benefts on the ground of ness whe at
the same tme presentng a certfcaton that she s ft to work.
Respondents coud have dened pettoners demand at that nstance
and ordered her to return to work had t not been ther ntenton to
sever pettoner from ther empoy. Hence, we fnd the aegaton that
pettoner presented hersef for work but was refused by respondents
more credbe. (CONCEPCION FAELDONIA v. TONG YAK
GROCERIES,|AYME GO and MERLITA GO,G.R. No. 182499, October 2,
2009)
Snce Dust Hote s expcty mandated by the afore-quoted
statutory provson to pay ts empoyees and management ther
respectve shares n the servce charges coected, the hote cannot
cam that payment thereof to ts 82 empoyees consttute substanta
compance wth the payment of ECOLA under WO No. 9. Undoubtedy,
the hote empoyees rght to ther shares n the servce charges
coected by Dust Hote s dstnct and separate from ther rght to
ECOLA; gratfcaton by the hote of one does not resut n the
satsfacton of the other. (PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC., DUSIT HOTEL
NIKKO-MANILA v. NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL,
RESTAURANT, AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF)- DUSIT
HOTEL NIKKO CHAPTER, G.R. No. 181972, August 25, 2009)

Social ]ustice
The Court s not unmndfu of the equay mportant rght of
respondent as empoyer under the Consttuton to be protected n ts
property and nterest. The partcuar crcumstances attendant n ths
case, however, convnce the Court that the supreme penaty of
dsmssa upon pettoner s not |ustfed. The aw regards the workers
wth compasson. Even where a worker has commtted an nfracton of
company rues and reguatons, a penaty ess puntve than dsmssa
may suffce. Ths s not ony because of the aw's concern for the
workngman. There s, n addton, hs famy to consder.
Unempoyment brngs untod hardshps and sorrows on those
&!
dependent upon the wage-earner. (ABELARDO P. ABEL v. PHILEX
MINING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 178976, |uy 31, 2009)
Whe the Court commserates wth pettoners on ther oss of
empoyment, especay now that the Cooperatve s no onger a gong
concern, t cannot smpy, by defaut, hod the Cooperatves co-
respondents abe for ther cams wthout any factua and ega
|ustfcaton therefor. The soca |ustce pocy of abor aws and the
Consttuton s not meant to be oppressve of capta. (OLDARICO S.
TRAVENO, et a v. BOBONGON BANANA GROWERS MULTI-PURPOSE
COOPERATIVE, TIMOG AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION, DIAMOND
FARMS, INC., and DOLE ASIA PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 164205,
September 3, 2009)
In the present case, respondent had been empoyed wth the
pettoner for amost tweve (12) years. On February 13, 1996, he
suffered from a "fractured eft transverse process of fourth umbar
vertebra," whe ther vesse was at the port of Yokohama, |apan. After
consutng a doctor, he was requred to rest for a month. When he was
repatrated to Mana and examned by a company doctor, he was
decared ft to contnue hs work. When he reported for work, pettoner
refused to empoy hm despte the assurance of ts personne manager.
Respondent patenty wated for more than one year to embark on the
vesse as 2
rd
Engneer, but the poston was not gven to hm, as t was
occuped by another person known to one of the stockhoders.
Consequenty, for havng been deprved of contnued empoyment wth
pettoner's vesse, respondent opted to appy for optona retrement.
In addton, records show that respondent's seaman's book, as duy
noted and sgned by the captan of the vesse was marked Very
Cood," and recommended for hire." Moreover, respondent had no
derogatory record on fe over hs ong years of servce wth the
pettoner.
Consderng a of the foregong and n ne wth Eastern, the ends
of soca and compassonate |ustce woud be served best f respondent
w be gven some equtabe reef. Thus, the award of P100,000.00 to
respondent as fnanca assstance s deemed equtabe under the
crcumstances.( EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC V. FERRER D. ANTONIO
G.R. No. 171587, October 13, 2009)
Pettoners bare nvocaton of "the nterest of substanta |ustce"
does not e." Ony under exceptonay mertorous cases may a
reaxaton from an otherwse strngent rue be aowed "to reeve a
tgant of an n|ustce not commensurate wth the degree of
thoughtessness n not compyng wth the procedure prescrbed"- the
exstence of whch pettoners faed to demonstrate. (WALLEM
&"
MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and SCANDIC SHIPMANAGEMENT LIMITED v.
ERIBERTO S. BULTRON, G.R. No. 185261, October 2, 2009)
Strike
lllegal Strike
The use of unawfu means n the course of a strke renders such
strke ega. Therefore, pursuant to the prncpe of concusveness of
|udgment, the March 9, 1998 strke was ipso facto ega. The fng of a
petton to decare the strke ega was thus unnecessary. (|ACKBILT
INDUSTRIES, INC.v. |ACKBILT EMPLOYEESWORKERS UNION-NAFLU-
KMU,G.R. Nos. 171618-19, March 20, 2009)
Dinopol and Lustria Decision
There s no confct between the Dinopol and the Lustria
decsons. Whe both rungs nvove the same partes and same
ssues, there s a dstncton between the remedes sought by the
partes n these two cases. In the Dinopol decson, t was OCSC whch
fed a petton to decare the egaty of the 12 August 1997 strke by
the unon. The consequence of the decaraton of an ega strke s
termnaton from empoyment, whch the Labor Arbter dd so rue n
sad case. However, not a unon members were termnated. In fact,
ony a few unon offcers were vady dsmssed n accordance wth
Artce 264 of the Labor Code. Coroary, the other unon members
who had merey partcpated n the strke but had not commtted any
ega acts were not dsmssed from empoyment. Hence, the NLRC
erred n decarng the empoyment status of a empoyees as havng
been ost or forfeted by vrtue of the Dinopol decson.
On the other hand, the Lustria decson nvoved the unfar abor
practces aeged by the unon wth partcuarty. In sad case, Labor
Arbter Lustra sded wth the Unon and found OCSC guty of such
practces. As a consequence, the affected empoyees were granted
backwages and separaton pay. The grant of backwages and
separaton pay however was not premsed on the decaraton of the
egaty of the strke but on the fndng that these affected empoyees
were constructvey dsmssed from work, as evdenced by the ayoffs
effected by the company. As expaned n the Lustria decson:
Consderng that the temporary ay-off of sted
empoyees effected by the respondents on 16 August 1997
was wthout documentary evdence to determne ts
vadty, t s our consdered vew and we so hod that sad
empoyees were constructvey dsmssed wthout |ust or
&#
authorzed cause and observance of due process. Ths
opnon fnds support from the hard and cod fact of
absence of pror notce, report wth the regona offce of
the Department of Labor and Empoyment havng
|ursdcton over the area and they reman under ay-off
status of empoyment. In concuson, they are entted to
backwages and separaton pay n eu of renstatement as
prayed.
Ceary, there are two separate decsons ssued by two dfferent
abor arbters nvovng the same partes and nterests. Consderng
that the remedes sought by the partes n each case dffer, these two
rungs may co-exst. (LOLITA A. LOPEZ, ET. a., vs. OUEZON CITY
SPORTS CLUB, INC.,G.R. No. 164032, |anuary 19, 2009)
Substitution of Parties
Fnay, as to the prayer of the counse of Mr. Gumarang to aow
the atter to be substtuted by hs wfe, and by hs former co-empoyees
whom he had aegedy represented before the Regona Arbtraton
Branch of the NLRC, we grant the same nsofar as the wfe s
concerned, she beng hs her, but not as to the other co-empoyees.
We cannot aow pettoner Gumarangs co-empoyees to take hs pace
because, f we do, we woud be aowng them to become partes to the
nstant petton when they are not. It woud have been dfferent f they
presented evdence showng that they had authorzed Mr. Gumarang to
fe the petton on ther behaf before ths Court and even before the
Court of Appeas. Ths, they had not done. (NORTHEASTERN
COLLEGE TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs.
NORTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC., G.R. No. 152923, |anuary 19, 2009)
Suspension
Thus, the CA and the NLRC correcty observed that the worst that
respondent commtted was an nadvertent nfracton. For that, the
extreme penaty of dsmssa mposed on hm by pettoners was
grossy dsproportonate. Takng nto account the managera poston
he hed and the pror warnng ssued to hm for fang to communcate
wth hs superors, the penaty commensurate to the voaton he
commtted shoud be suspenson for three months. The perod of hs
suspenson s to be deducted from the perod for whch he s entted to
backwages as awarded by the NLRC and affrmed by the CA. (GULF
AIR, |ASSIM HINDRI ABDULLAH and RESTY AREVALO v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO |.C. REYES, G.R. No.
159687, Apr 24, 2009)
&$
Teachers
Employment Status
The common practce s for the empoyer and the teacher to
enter nto a contract, effectve for one schoo year. At the end of the
schoo year, the empoyer has the opton not to renew the contract,
partcuary consderng the teachers performance. If the contract s
not renewed, the empoyment reatonshp termnates. If the contract
s renewed, usuay for another schoo year, the probatonary
empoyment contnues. Agan, at the end of that perod, the partes
may opt to renew or not to renew the contract. If renewed, ths second
renewa of the contract for another schoo year woud then be the ast
year - snce t woud be the thrd schoo year - of probatonary
empoyment. At the end of ths thrd year, the empoyer may now
decde whether to extend a permanent appontment to the empoyee,
prmary on the bass of the empoyee havng met the reasonabe
standards of competence and effcency set by the empoyer. For the
entre duraton of ths three-year perod, the teacher remans under
probaton. Upon the expraton of hs contract of empoyment, beng
smpy on probaton, he cannot automatcay cam securty of tenure
and compe the empoyer to renew hs empoyment contract. It s
when the yeary contract s renewed for the thrd tme that Secton 93
of the Manua becomes operatve, and the teacher then s entted to
reguar or permanent empoyment status. (MAGIS YOUNG
ACHIEVERS LEARNING CENTER and MRS. VIOLETA T. CARINO v.
ADELAIDA MANALO, G.R. No. 178835, February 13, 2009 )
Probationary Period for Teachers
Thus, n ght of our rung of Espiritu 5anto Parochial 5chool v.
NLRC that, n the absence of an express perod of probaton for prvate
schoo teachers, the three-year probatonary perod provded by the
Manua of Reguatons for Prvate Schoos must appy kewse to the
case of respondent. In other words, absent any concrete and
competent proof that her performance as a teacher was unsatsfactory
from her hrng on Apr 18, 2002 up to March 31, 2003, respondent s
entted to contnue her three-year perod of probatonary perod, such
that from March 31, 2003, her probatonary empoyment s deemed
renewed for the foowng two schoo years. (MAGIS YOUNG
ACHIEVERS LEARNING CENTER and MRS. VIOLETA T. CARINO v.
ADELAIDA . MANALO, G.R. No. 178835, February 13, 2009 )
Termination of Employment
&%
]ust
Causes
Neglect of Duty}Abandonment
Hence, we fnd t hard to beeve that he w |ust abandon hs |ob
after pettoners gave hm a chance to contnue workng for them. We
uphod the foowng fndngs of the Court of Appeas that respondent
dd not abandon hs |ob:
In the case at bar, the charge of abandonment s
beed by the foowng crcumstances: First, the hgh
mprobabty of prvate respondent to ntentonay
abandon hs work consderng that he had aready served a
penaty of suspenson for hs nfractons and voatons as
we as the pettoners tact condonaton of the nfractons
he commtted, by permttng hm to go back to work and
by askng hm to execute a promssory note. It s
ncongruent to human nature, that after havng roned
thngs out wth hs empoyer, an empoyee woud |ust not
report for work for no apparent reason. 5econdly, there
was no proof that pettoner sent prvate respondent a
notce of termnaton on the ground of abandonment, f
ndeed t s true that he reay faed to go back to work.
Secton 2, Rue XVI, Book V, Rues and reguatons
mpementng the Labor Code provdes that any empoyer
who seeks to dsmss a worker sha furnsh hm a wrtten
notce statng the partcuar act or omsson consttutng
the ground for hs dsmssa. In cases of abandonment of
work, the notce sha be served at the workers ast known
address (lcawat vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
334 SCRA 75, 81 |2000|). For ths reason, We are
constraned to gve credence to prvate respondents
asserton that he attempted to report back to work but he
was |ust asked to eave as he was consdered termnated.
And lastly, prvate respondents fng of a case for ega
dsmssa wth the abor arbter negates abandonment. As
hed by the Supreme Court, a charge of abandonment s
totay nconsstent wth the mmedate fng of a compant
for ega dsmssa, more so when t ncudes a prayer for
renstatement (Clobe Telecom, lnc. vs Florendo-Flores, 390
SCRA 201, 2002|sc|-203 |2002|). (BC CABLE MASTER
SYSTEM AND/OR EVELYN CINENSE vs. MARCIAL BALUYOT,
G.R. No. 172670,|anuary 20, 2009)

&&
In the nstant case, respondent was nformed by no ess than hs
mmedate superor, the chef cook and by hs brother that he was
beng termnated. Lke the Court of Appeas, the Court fnds no reason
why these two woud gve respondent the fase mpresson that he was
beng dsmssed, and n turn, the Court, ke the appeate court agan,
s ncned to beeve that they were gven pror nstructon, or they at
east had pror knowedge of the termnaton. Moreover, as prevousy
dscussed, the charge of abandonment does not square wth the fact
that a week after respondents aeged dsmssa, he fed a compant
wth the NLRC. (HARBORVIEW RESTAURANT v. REYNALDO LABRO, G.R.
No. 168273, Apr 30, 2009)
To consttute abandonment, there must be cear proof of
deberate and un|ustfed ntent to sever the empoyer-empoyee
reatonshp. Ceary, the operatve act s st the empoyees utmate
act of puttng an end to hs empoyment. However, an empoyee who
takes steps to protest her ayoff cannot be sad to have abandoned her
work because a charge of abandonment s totay nconsstent wth the
mmedate fng of a compant for ega dsmssa, more so when t
ncudes a prayer for renstatement. When Eeonor fed the ega
dsmssa compant, t totay negated pettoners theory of
abandonment. (SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC. (NOW
SODACO AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION) AND/OR MALONE PACOUIAO
AND VICTOR A. CONSUN|I, v. SERGIO L. GAMO, et. a., G.R. No. 171814,
May 8, 2009)
In pettoners case, despte the drectve cum caveat of CASI for
them to report back for work wthn two days from recept thereof, they
faed to compy therewth. After three years, as refected above, they
offered to return to work. Ther ntenton to sever the empoyer-
empoyee reatonshp wth CASI s manfested, however, by the ength
of tme they refused to return to work, for they had, n the nterm,
been ookng for other |obs. (MIGUEL A. PILAPIL, et a. v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 178229 October 23, 2009)
Respondents faed to dscharge ths burden. Mere absence of
pettoner s not suffcent to estabsh the aegaton of abandonment.
The proonged absence of pettoner was not wthout |ustfabe reason
because t was estabshed that her faure to report for work was due
to the n|ury she suffered n the course of her empoyment and wth
suffcent notce to respondents. Pettoner aso presented hersef for
work on the date stated n the medca certfcate whch stated that she
s ft to resume work. (CONCEPCION FAELDONIA v. TONG YAK
GROCERIES,|AYME GO and MERLITA GO,G.R. No. 182499, October 2,
2009)

&'
Furthermore, the Court agrees wth respondents when they
argued n ther petton fed wth the CA that f an empoyee's am s to
secure the benefts due hm from hs empoyer, abandonment woud
surey be an ogca and mpractca recourse, especay for smpe
aborers such as respondent Aguar. Consderng the dffcut tmes n
whch our country s n t s ogca and even sucda for an empoyee
ke Aguar to abandon hs work, knowng fuy we of the wdespread
unempoyment and underempoyment probems as we as the
dffcuty of ookng for a means of vehood, smpy because hs
empoyer re|ected hs demand for saary ncrease. Under the gven
facts, no bass n reason exsts for the pettoners' theory that Aguar
abandoned hs |ob. (BARON REPUBLIC THEATRICAL V. NORMITA P.
PERALTA et a, G.R. No. 170525, October 2, 2009)
Gross Negligence
An empoyer cannot egay be compeed to contnue wth the
empoyment of a person admttedy guty of gross neggence n the
performance of hs dutes. Ths hods true specay f the empoyees
contnued tenure s patenty nmca to the empoyers nterest. What
happened was not a smpe case of oversght and coud not be
attrbuted to a smpe apse of |udgment. No amount of good ntent, or
prevous conscentous performance of duty, can assuage the damage
Mateo caused LBC when he faed to exercse the requste degree of
dgence requred of hm under the crcumstances.( LBC EXPRESS -
METRO MANILA, INC. and LORENZO A. NINO v. |AMES MATEO, G.R. No.
168215, |une 9, 2009)
To warrant remova from servce, the neggence shoud not
merey be gross but aso habtua. Gross neggence mpes a want or
absence of or faure to exercse even sght care or dgence, or the
entre absence of care. It evnces a thoughtess dsregard of
consequences wthout exertng any effort to avod them. Habtua
negect mpes repeated faure to perform one's dutes for a perod of
tme, dependng upon the crcumstances. The snge or soated act of
neggence does not consttute a |ust cause for the dsmssa of the
empoyee. (ABELARDO P. ABEL v. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION, G.R.
No. 178976, |uy 31, 2009)
Serious Misconduct
PNB may rghtfuy termnate Marats servces for a |ust cause,
ncudng serous msconduct. Serous msconduct s mproper conduct,
a transgresson of some estabshed and defnte rue of acton, a
forbdden act, or a derecton of duty. Havng been dsmssed for a
|ust cause, Marat s not entted to her retrement benefts. (ESTER B.
&(
MARALIT v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, G.R. No. 163788, August 24,
2009)
By seepng on the |ob and eavng hs work area wthout pror
authorzaton, Tomada dd not merey dsregard company rues.
Tomada, n effect, ssued an open nvtaton for others to voate those
same company rues. Indeed, consderng the presence of tranees n
the budng and Tomadas acts, Tomada faed to ve up to hs
companys reasonabe expectatons. Tomadas offenses cannot be
excused upon a pea of beng a "frst offense," or have not resuted n
pre|udce to the company n any way. No empoyer may ratonay be
expected to contnue n empoyment a person whose ack of moras,
respect and oyaty to hs empoyer, regard for hs empoyers rues,
and apprecaton of the dgnty and responsbty of hs offce, has so
pany and competey been bared. (EDUARDO M. TOMADA, SR. v.
RFM CORPORATION-BAKERY FLOUR DIVISION and |OSE MARIA
CONCEPCION III, G.R. No. 163270, September 11, 2009)
Moreover, the pecuar nature of Espaderos poston aggravates
her msconduct. Msconduct has been defned as mproper or wrong
conduct; the transgresson of some estabshed or defnte rue of
acton, a forbdden act, a derecton of duty, wfu n character, and
mpes wrongfu ntent and not mere error n |udgment. The
msconduct, to be serous, must be of such a grave character and not
merey trva or unmportant. To consttute |ust cause for termnaton,
t must be n connecton wth the empoyees work. Wth the degree of
trust expected of Espadero, such nfracton can hardy be cassfed as
one that s trva or unmportant. Her faure to prompty report the
ncdent refects a cavaer regard for the responsbty requred of her
n the dscharge of the dutes of her poston. (EATS-CETERA FOOD
SERVICES OUTLET and/or SERAFIN RAMIREZ v. MYRNA B. LETRAN and
MARY GRACE ESPADERO, G.R. No. 179507, October 2, 2009)
An empoyee who fas to account for and dever the funds
entrusted to hm s abe for msappropratng the same and s
consequenty guty of serous msconduct. Pettoner therefore vady
dsmssed respondent.( SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC.
v. EDUARDO PINERA G.R. No. 188742, October 13, 2009)
! Simple Misconduct
Based on the foregong, we consder respondents offense to be
a smpe msconduct whch does not mert termnaton of hs
empoyment. The penaty of dsmssa from servce s not
commensurate to respondents offense. Athough pettoner, as an
&)
empoyer, has the rght to dscpne ts errng empoyees, exercse of
such rght shoud be tempered wth compasson and understandng.
The magntude of the nfracton commtted by an empoyee must be
weghed and equated wth the penaty prescrbed and must be
commensurate thereto, n vew of the gravty of the penaty of
dsmssa or termnaton from the servce. The empoyer shoud bear n
mnd that n termnaton cases, what s at stake s not smpy the
empoyees |ob or poston but hs very vehood. (PHlLlPPlNE LONG
DlSTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v. lNOCENClO B. BERBANO,
]R., G.R. No. 165199, November 27, 2009)
Loss of Trust and Confidence
Pettoner, n hs Poston Paper fed before the LA and n hs 5agot
na 5inumpaang 5alaysay, averred that sometme n August 2004,
Ado nformed hm of the ega actvtes n the company
premses. But ths fact was not refected n hs Parta Audt Report;
nstead, pettoner made t appear theren that t was upon the
ntatve of Le|os that he dscovered the ega actvtes ony on
October 28, 2004, after Le|os aready resgned from the company.
The bass for termnatng the empoyment of pettoner actuay
came from pettoner hmsef due to the substanta and
rreconcabe nconsstences n the narraton of facts n hs Audt
Report and hs 5agot na 5inumpaang 5alaysay fed before the
company, and hs peadngs before the ower trbunas and before
ths Court. In sum, t cannot be dened that he wthhed ths
nformaton from hs mmedate supervsor and from the company -
a cear breach of the trust and confdence the company had
reposed n hm as one of ts Audtors.( ROMEO N. VENTURA, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
GENUINO ICE CO., INC., and HECTOR GENUINO, G.R. No. 182570,
|anuary 27, 2009
Indeed, by obtanng an atered poce report and medca
certfcate, pettoners deberatey attempted to cover up the fact that
Saes was under the nfuence of quor at the tme the accdent took
pace. In so dong, they commtted acts nmca to respondents
nterests. They thus commtted a work-reated wfu breach of the
trust and confdence reposed n them. (ERIC DELA CRUZ and RAUL M.
LACUATA v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS. INC., G.R. No. 180465, |uy
31, 2009)
The amount msapproprated by pettoner Mancc s rreevant.
More than the resutng matera damage or pre|udce, t s pettoner
Manccs very act of msappropraton that s offensve to respondent
PELCO I. If taxes are the febood of the state, then, by anaogy, the
'*
payment coecton s the febood of the cooperatve. The coecton
provdes respondent PELCO I wth the fnanca resources to contnue
ts operatons. Respondent PELCO I cannot afford to contnue n ts
empoy dshonest b coectors.
By hs own admsson, pettoner Mancc commtted a breach of
the trust reposed n hm by hs empoyer, respondent PELCO I. Ths
consttutes vad cause for hs dsmssa from servce. (CHONA ESTACIO
and LEOPOLDO MANLICLIC v. PAMPANGA I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
INC., and LOLIANO E. ALLAS, G.R. No. 183196, August 19, 2009)
We are not unmndfu of the empoyers rght to dsmss an
empoyee based on fraud or wfu breach of trust. However, the oss
of confdence must be based not on an ordnary breach by the
empoyee of the trust reposed n hm by the empoyer, but, n the
anguage of Artce 282(c) of the Labor Code, on a wfu breach. A
breach s wfu f t s done ntentonay, knowngy and purposey,
wthout |ustfabe excuse, as dstngushed from an act done
careessy, thoughtessy, heedessy, or nadvertenty. It must rest on
substanta grounds and not on the empoyers arbtrarness, whms,
caprces or suspcon; otherwse, the empoyee woud eternay reman
at the mercy of the empoyer. It shoud be genune and not smuated;
nor shoud t appear as a mere afterthought to |ustfy an earer acton
taken n bad fath or as a subterfuge for causes that are mproper,
ega or un|ustfed. It has never been ntended to afford an occason
for abuse because of ts sub|ectve nature. There must, therefore, be
an actua breach of duty commtted by the empoyee, whch must be
estabshed by substanta evdence. In ths case, SLMC uttery faed
to estabsh the requrements prescrbed by aw and |ursprudence for
a vad dsmssa on the ground of breach of trust and confdence. (ST.
LUKES MEDICAL CENTER, INCORPORATED v. |ENNIFER LYNNE C.
FADRIGO, G.R. No. 185933, November 25, 2009)
Very, the actons of Trazona refected an obdurate character
that s arrogant, uncompromsng, and hoste. By mmedatey and
unreasonaby adoptng an adverse stance aganst PET, she sought to
mpose her w on the company and paced her own nterests above
those of her empoyer. Her motve for her actons was rendered even
more questonabe by her exorbtant and arbtrary demand for
P2,000,000.00 payabe wthn fve days from demand. Her atttude
towards her empoyer was ceary nconsstent wth her poston of trust
and confdence. Her poor character became even more evdent when
she read what was supposed to be a confdenta etter of the ega
counse of PET to PET offcers/drectors expressng hs ega opnon on
Trazonas admnstratve case. PET was, therefore, fuy |ustfed n
termnatng Trazonas empoyment for oss of trust and confdence.
'!
(MA. WENELITA S. TIRAZONA, vs. PHILIPPINE EDS TECHNO- SERVICE
INC. (PET INC.) AND/OR KEN KUBOTA, MAMORU ONO and |UNICHI
HIROSE, G.R. No. 169712, |anuary 20, 2009)
To recaptuate, the rght of an empoyer to dsmss an empoyee
on account of oss of trust and confdence must not be exercsed
whmscay. To countenance an arbtrary exercse of that prerogatve
s to negate the empoyees consttutona rght to securty of tenure.
In other words, the empoyer must ceary and convncngy prove by
substanta evdence the facts and ncdents upon whch oss of
confdence n the empoyee may be fary made to rest; otherwse, the
atters dsmssa w be rendered ega. (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND WILLIAM L.
FRIEND, |R., G.R. No. 153983, May 26, 2009)
Loss of confdence must not be ndscrmnatey used as a shed
by the empoyer aganst a cam that the dsmssa of an empoyee was
arbtrary. Loss of confdence as a |ust cause for termnaton of
empoyment s premsed on the fact that the empoyee concerned
hods a poston of responsbty or trust and confdence. He must be
nvested wth confdence on decate matters, such as custody handng
or care and protecton of the property and assets of the empoyer.
And, n order to consttute a |ust cause for dsmssa, the act
companed of must be work-reated and shows that the empoyee
concerned s unft to contnue to work for the empoyer. (ADAM B.
GARCIA v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND
DIVISION), LEGAZPI OIL COMPANY, INC., ROMEO F. MERCADO and GUS
ZULUAGA G.R. No. 172854, Apr 16, 2009)
Consderng the foregong, we fnd that respondents Aposto and
Opuenca were dsmssed by TIPI for a vad and |ust cause. The
reatonshp of empoyer and empoyee, specay where the empoyee
has access to the empoyers property, necessary nvoves trust and
confdence. Where the rues ad down by the empoyer to protect ts
property are voated by the very empoyee who s entrusted and
expected to foow and mpement the rues, the empoyee may be
vady dsmssed from servce. (TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL(PHILS.),
INC.FIRST DIVISION v. RAMON L. APOSTOL and BEN M. OPULENCIA,
G.R. No. 164423, |une 16, 2009)
As Arport Manager, respondent occupes a poston of such
extreme senstvty that the exstence of some bass or reasonabe
ground for hs nvovement n any rreguarty s enough to destroy the
trust and confdence whch pettoner Guf Ar had reposed n hm.
However, t s setted that for breach of trust to consttute a vad cause
for dsmssa, the same must be wfu. Ordnary breach of trust w not
'"
suffce. (GULF AIR, |ASSIM HINDRI ABDULLAH and RESTY AREVALO v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO |.C. REYES,
G.R. No. 159687, Apr 24, 2009)
The second requste s that there must be an act that woud
|ustfy the oss of trust and confdence. Loss of trust and confdence, to
be a vad cause for dsmssa, must be based on a wfu breach of
trust and founded on ceary estabshed facts. The bass for the
dsmssa must be ceary and convncngy estabshed but proof
beyond reasonabe doubt s not necessary. Respondents evdence
aganst pettoner fas to meet ths standard. Its one wtness, Lupega,
dd not support hs affdavt and testmony durng the company
nvestgaton wth any pece of evdence at a. No other empoyee
workng at respondents mne ste attested to the truth of any of hs
statements. Standng aone, Lupegas account of the subsdence area
anomay coud hardy be consdered substanta evdence. And whe
there s no concrete showng of any motve on the part of Lupega to
fasey accuse pettoner, that Lupega hmsef was under nvestgaton
when he mpcated pettoner n the subsdence area anomay makes
hs uncorroborated verson suspect. (ABELARDO P. ABEL v. PHILEX
MINING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 178976, |uy 31, 2009)
! Application of the Doctrine of Loss of Trust and
Confidence
Recent decsons of ths Court have dstngushed the treatment of
managera empoyees from that of the rank-and-fe personne, nsofar
as the appcaton of the doctrne of oss of trust and confdence s
concerned. Thus, wth respect to rank-and-fe personne, oss of trust
and confdence, as ground for vad dsmssa, requres proof of
nvovement n the aeged events n queston, and that mere
uncorroborated assertons and accusatons by the empoyer w not be
suffcent. But as regards a managera empoyee, the mere exstence
of a bass for beevng that such empoyee has breached the trust of
hs empoyer woud suffce for hs dsmssa. Hence, n the case of
managera empoyees, proof beyond reasonabe doubt s not requred.
It s suffcent that there s some bass for the empoyers oss of trust
and confdence, such as when the empoyer has reasonabe ground to
beeve that the empoyee concerned s responsbe for the purported
msconduct, and the nature of hs partcpaton theren renders hm
unworthy of the trust and confdence demanded of hs poston.
Nonetheess, the evdence must be substanta and must estabsh
ceary and convncngy the facts on whch the oss of confdence rests
and not on the empoyers arbtrarness, whms, and caprces or
suspcon. (TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL(PHILS.), INC.FIRST DIVISION v.
'#
RAMON L. APOSTOL and BEN M. OPULENCIA, G.R. No. 164423, |une 16,
2009)
! Positions of Trust
There are two casses of postons of trust. The first cass
conssts of managera empoyees. They are defned as those vested
wth the powers or prerogatves to ay down management poces and
to hre, transfer, suspend, ay-off, reca, dscharge, assgn or dscpne
empoyees or effectvey recommend such managera actons. The
second cass conssts of cashers, audtors, property custodans, etc.
They are defned as those who, n the norma and routne exercse of
ther functons, reguary hande sgnfcant amounts of money or
property. (ABELARDO P. ABEL v. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION, G.R.
No. 178976, |uy 31, 2009)
Authorized Causes
Retrenchment
The proper vew, therefore, s that the Sec. 1 crtera quafy the
factors of "senorty and needs of the company" n Sec. 5(c). Stated a
bt dfferenty, Sec. 5(c) shoud be understood n the ght of Sec. 1
whch, to stress, provdes senorty, effcency and atttude, |ob
knowedge and potenta, and attendance as among the factors that
shoud gude the company n choosng the empoyees to be ad-off or
kept. A other thngs beng equa, a company woud necessary need
to retan those who had rendered dedcated and hghy effcent servce
and whose knowedge, attendance, and potenta hew wth company
standards. Any other measure woud be senseess n the busness
vewpont. Accordngy, the mert ratng used by MMPC based on Sec.
5 n con|uncton wth and as quafed by the factors provded under
Sec. 1 s far and reasonabe, and, to be sure, we wthn the
contempaton of the partes CBA. In fact, Afredo, shorn of the
contenton that the mert ratng s aganst the CBA, has not shown any
arbtrarness on the part of MMPC n the evauaton, seecton, and
retrenchment of empoyees. (ALFREDO A. MENDROS, |R v. MITSUBISHI
MOTORS PHILS. CORPORATION (MMPC), G.R. No. 169780, February 16,
2009)
Records do not show any crteron adopted or used by pettoner
n dsmssng respondent. Respondent was termnated wthout
consderng her senorty. Retrenchment scheme wthout takng
senorty nto account rendered the retrenchment nvad. Whe
respondent was the thrd most senor empoyee among the 7
empoyees n pettoner's personne department, she was retrenched
'$
whe her other co-empoyees |unor than her were ether retaned n
the Personne Department or were transferred to other postons n the
company. There was no showng that respondent was offered to be
transferred to other postons.(EMCOR INCORPORATED v. MA. LOURDES
D. SIENES, G.R. No. 152101, September 8, 2009)
At a events, even f the comparatve report were to be
consdered, the Court s not persuaded on the necessty of resortng to
retrenchment to prevent or mnmze actua or mmnent busness
osses on the part of pettoner. For retrenchment shoud ony be
resorted to when other ess drastc means have been tred and found
to be nadequate. So Polymart Paper lndustries, lnc. v. NLRC nstructs:
. . . |E|ven f busness osses were ndeed suffcenty proven,
the empoyer must still prove that retrenchment was
resorted to only after less drastic measures such as
the reducton of both management and rank-and-fe
bonuses and saares, gong on reduced tme, mprovng
manufacturng effcency, reducton of marketng and
advertsng costs, faster coecton of customer accounts,
reducton of raw materas nvestment and others, have
been tried and found wanting. (Emphass supped)
In the case at bar, pettoner dd not adduce evdence to prove
that retrenchment was resorted to because other measures were
undertaken to abate actua or future busness osses but thus faed.
(BIO OUEST MARKETING INC. and/or |OSE L. CO v. EDMUND REY, G.R.
No. 181503,September 18, 2009)
Requirement for Retrenchment
For a vad termnaton due to retrenchment, the aw aso
requres that wrtten notces of the ntended retrenchment be served
by the empoyer on the worker and on the DOLE at east one month
before the actua date of the retrenchment. The purpose of ths
requrement s to gve empoyees tme to prepare for the eventua oss
of ther |obs, as we as to gve DOLE the opportunty to ascertan the
veracty of the aeged cause of termnaton. In ths case, pettoner
nssts that the payment of 30 days saary to respondents n pace of
notce was suffcent compance wth the 30-day notce rue. We
cannot agree. Nothng n the aw gves pettoner the opton to
substtute the requred pror wrtten notce wth payment of 30 days
'%
saary. Indeed, a |ob s more than the saary t carres. Payment of 30
days saary cannot compensate for the psychoogca effect or the
stgma of mmedatey fndng ones sef ad off from work. It cannot
be a fuy effectve substtute for the 30 days wrtten notce
requrement by aw, especay when, as n ths case, no notce was
gven to the DOLE. Even as the etters of vountary acceptance were
dated |uy 25, 1998, the notces of termnaton gven on |uy 23, 1998
were effectve the foowng day. In essence, respondents had aready
been dsmssed before they sgned the etters of vountary acceptance.
Ceary, pettoner deprved respondents of ther rght to statutory due
process. For ths, we affrm the appeate courts award of nomna
damages to respondents. But, consstent wth our rung n Agabon v.
National Labor Relations Commission, the amount of nomna damages
shoud be P30,000. We aso sustan the award of attorneys fees as t
s sanctoned by aw. (MOBILIA PRODUCTS, INC. v. ALAN G. DEMECILLO,
et a., G.R. No. 170669, February 4, 2009)
Losses
Third, t bears to state that the aforequoted Art. 283 of the Code
uses the phrase "retrenchment to prevent osses." The phrase
necessary mpes that retrenchment may be effected even n the
event ony of mmnent, mpendng, or expected osses. The empoyer
need not wat for substanta osses to materaze before exercsng
utmate and drastc opton to prevent such osses. In the case at
bench, MMPC was aready fnancay hemorrhagng before fnay
resortng to retrenchment. (ALFREDO A. MENDROS, |R v. MITSUBISHI
MOTORS PHILS. CORPORATION (MMPC), G.R. No. 169780, February 16,
2009)
However, apart from pettoners bare asserton of reduced
orders from |apan, the ony evdence t presented were the etters of
vountary acceptance of retrenchment, and wavers and qutcams
sgned by respondents. To our mnd, these were nsuffcent to show
that pettoner ndeed suffered busness osses so serous as to
necesstate the reducton of personne. We have constanty rued that
fnanca statements audted by ndependent externa audtors
consttute the norma method of proof of the proft and oss
performance of a company. Any ess exactng standard of proof woud
render too easy the abuse of ths ground for termnaton of servces of
empoyees. Pettoner submtted none. Further, et t be carfed that
our rung n lnternational Hardware, lnc. v. NLRC dd not dspense wth
the responsbty of the empoyer to substantate osses. It merey
exempts the atter from gvng notce of retrenchment to ts empoyees
and DOLE. (MOBILIA PRODUCTS, INC. v. ALAN G. DEMECILLO, et a.,
G.R. No. 170669, February 4, 2009)
'&
Unfair Labor Practice
Totality of the Conduct Doctrine
Then came the Lustria decson, ssued two (2) months ater,
fndng that OCSC had commtted unfar abor practces aganst the
unon and accordngy grantng backwages and separaton pay n favor
of 112 empoyees. The Lustria decson emanated from a compant for
unfar abor practce aganst OCSC. Cued from the unons peadngs
were the specfc acts commtted by OCSC, such as:
1.Insutng of the Unon Presdent as evdenced by
the Saaysay of Ma. Ceca Pangan;
2.Cuddng and treatng the mnorty unon wth
favor, such as payng ther saares/wages fuy and
ahead of the ncumbent unon and as f t were the
ncumbent barganng agents;
3.Dscouragng the members of the ncumbent unon
from contnung ther membershp wth the
ncumbent unon as evdenced by the Pnagsamang
Saaysay of Ramro Espnosa and Ronado O. Lm;
4.Brbng unon member and promsng promoton f
he w not |on the strke as evdenced by the
Saaysay of Bernard Deta;
5.Transferrng unon members to another |ob
descrpton;
6.Repacng them wth members of mnorty unon
evdenced by Lese Tamayos Saaysay;
7.Sub|ectng one unon member to a very tense
confrontaton n the Genera Managers Offce after
she commented durng the NCMB conference that
the 201 fe of the empoyees are ntact, resutng
to her beng taken to the hospta for nervous
breakdown; and
8.Requrng the unon members to submt another
nformaton sheet, and faure to do so woud mean
no payment of ther |une 16-30, 1997 saary.
Appyng the totaty of the conduct doctrne, Labor Arbter
Lustra hed that OCSC had commtted unfar abor practces. (LOLITA
A. LOPEZ, ET. a., vs. OUEZON CITY SPORTS CLUB, INC.,G.R. No.
164032, |anuary 19, 2009)
Unfar abor practce refers to "acts that voate the workers
rght to organze." The prohbted acts are reated to the workers rght
''
to sef-organzaton and to the observance of a CBA. Wthout that
eement, the acts, even f unfar, are not unfar abor practces.
(GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPAS
vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. (GENERAL SANTOS CITY), THE
COURT OF APPEALS and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, G.R. No. 178647)
Here, respondent Unon went on strke n the honest beef that
pettoner was commttng ULP after the atter decded to downsze ts
workforce contrary to the staffng/mannng standards adopted by both
partes under a CBA forged ony four (4) short months earer. The
beef was bostered when the management hred 100 contractua
workers to repace the 48 termnated reguar rank-and-fe empoyees
who were a Unon members. Indeed, those crcumstances showed
prima facie that the hote commtted ULP. Thus, even f techncay
there was no ega ground to stage a strke based on ULP, snce the
attendant crcumstances support the beef n good fath that
pettoners retrenchment scheme was structured to weaken the
barganng power of the Unon, the strke, by excepton, may be
consdered ega. (HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(HEPI), owner of Hyatt Regency Mana, v. SAMAHAN NG MGA
MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT-NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE
HOTEL AND RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (SAMASAH-
NUWHRAIN), G.R. No. 165756, |une 5, 2009)
Pettoners never substantated ther aegatons. In a smar
case, 5chering Employees Labor Union (5ELU) et al. v. 5chering Plough
Corporation, pettoner Sereneo, the presdent of SELU, charged
respondent wth ULP and ega dsmssa because she was n the
process of renegotatng the CBA wth respondent when she was
dsmssed on the ground of oss of trust and confdence. We sad:
Pettoners' accusaton of unon bustng s bereft of any proof. We
scanned the records very carefuy and faed to dscern any evdence
to sustan such charge.
In Tiu vs. NLRC, we hed:
. . . . It s the unon, therefore, who had the burden of proof to
present substanta evdence to support ts aegatons (of unfar abor
practces commtted by management).
xxx xxx xxx.
'(
. . ., but n the case at bar the facts and the evdence dd not
estabsh even at east a ratona bass why the unon woud wed a
strke based on aeged unfar abor practces t dd not even bother to
substantate durng the concaton proceedngs. It s not enough that
the unon beeved that the empoyer commtted acts of unfar abor
practce when the crcumstances ceary negate even a prma face
showng to warrant such a beef. (RENITA DEL ROSARIO, et a., v.
MAKATI CINEMA SOUARE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 170014, |uy 3,
2009)
Voluntary Resignation
Fnay, respondent cams that n ght of the opnon of the
physcan n Korea that he had "suspected schemc heart," pettoners
affrmed hs medca repatraton. As refected n the mmedatey
precedng paragraph, however, schemc heart dsease cannot deveop
n a short span of tme that respondent served as chef cook for
pettoners. In fact, as ndcated above, the Geneages Martme
Medca Centre doctor who treated respondent n May 2000 for abscess
n hs eft hand had noted respondents "|h|story of hypertenson for 3
years." Moreover, the Korean physcan dd not make any
recommendaton as to respondents b of heath for pettoners to
assume that he was ft for repatraton.
lN FlNE, respondents actons show that he vountary resgned.
(VIRGEN SHIPPING CORPORATION, CAPT. RENATO MORENTE &
ODYSSEY MARITIME PTE. LTD., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION v. |ESUS B. BARRAOUIO, G.R. No. 178127, Apr 16, 2009)
Work-related Disease
If we found n 5eagull 5hipmanagement that the dfferent
cmates and unpredctabe weather, as we as the stress of the |ob,
had a correaton wth the heart dsease of a seafarer workng as a
radoman on a vesse, then what more n the heart dsease of a
seafarer servng as a shp master, a poston nvovng more stran and
pressure? A Tug (boat) Master s prmary tasked to operate tug boats,
a powerfu marne vesse that meets arge shps out at sea and attach
a ne to gude/steer the same nto and out of berths. In operatng such
a powerfu vesse, a Tug Master requres not |ust a thorough
knowedge of the port envronment n whch he s operatng, but a hgh
eve of sk as we. In fact, n the case at bar, respondent ADAMS
recognzed how grueng pettoner Nsdas |ob was, accordng the
atter a month of pad vacaton every three months of straght servce.
Thus, more than a reasonabe connecton between the nature of
pettoner Nsdas |ob and hs Coronary Artery Dsease has been
')
estabshed. Pettoner Nsda was abe to suffcenty prove, by
substanta evdence, that hs Coronary Artery Dsease was work-
reated, gven the arduous nature of hs |ob that caused hs dsease or,
at east, aggravated any pre-exstng condton he mght have had.
Respondents Sea Serve and ADAMS, on the other hand, uttery faed
to refute the sad connecton. (CARLOS N. NISDA v. SEA SERVE
MARITIME AGENCY and KHALIFA A. ALGOSAIBI DIVING AND MARINE
SERVICES, G. R. No. 179177, |uy 23, 2009)
(*