Religion, Culture & Society (MOMD)

Critically compare the theories of religion expounded by any 2 of the following: Max Weber; Karl Marx; William James; Emile Durkheim; Sigmund Freud; Carl Jung.

MARX & DURKHEIM

Student ID: 908911

Word Count: 3,726

INTRODUCTION

Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim are often cited as the founding fathers of the social sciences. In their respective times they emphasised the social nature of man, and the effect of society on him justifying their study of society as they tried to pose alternatives to the abstract and individualistic view of man that had dominated before them since the enlightenment and Calvinism. They lived in times of mass scale industrialisation and witnessed mass social change that came as a result of this. Marx travelled around Europe agitating and preaching revolution, whereas Durkheim was totally committed to study made every effort to establish social science as a serious academic discipline. While Marx dealt with the relationship that common religious ideas and organised religions had with capitalism, Durkheim sought to understand how religion in a social-psychological sense affected the individual and society, and the relationship between the two. Yet they were both influenced by the idea that religion is a projection of man's hopes and desires, and were both atheists, so their works on religion are based on similar epistemological assumptions: And so their theories are comparable in a number of aspects. The first section of this essay shall briefly outline the theories of religion expounded by Marx and Durkheim, contextualising them within their theoretical predecessors, philosophical standpoints and changes in their ideas for the sake of thorough and profound critical comparison. So it follows that the second section shall critically compare different aspects of the theories of religion expounded by Marx and Durkheim, working through the key themes to outline similarities and differences. This essay will then conclude with a critical summary of the most important similarities and differences and suggestions for future analysis of their theories.

KARL MARX At university in 1835, Marx joined a discussion group of students and lecturers with radical religious and political leanings called the Doktorklub, more commonly known today as the 'Young Hegelians', who had a fascinated interest in Hegel's philosophy of history and his analysis of modern society. Marx and others were dissatisfied with Hegel's conservative, statist leanings but gave their own critical interpretations to his ideas particularly on the dialectic of history and concept of alienation. Marx's interpretation was that that the dialectic process of history applied not to ideas but material factors (which produced ideas), and that the same was true of alienation he would later call this 'dialectical materialism' as opposed to what he called Hegel's 'dialectical idealism'. It is questionable whether Marx really understood Hegel's theory of history, but much of Hegel's a priori assumptions form a hidden base of Marx's theory.

In perhaps an early indicator to his attitude to God and religion, he prefaced his doctoral dissertation on the philosophy of nature in 1841 with the Promethean motto In one word, I hate all the gods (Dupr, 2005). In 1842, when Marx became a communist, he became more attuned to Ludwig Feuerbach's ideas. Feuerbach, using Hegel's concept of alienation, asserted that man projects his own nature into religious ideas, alienating himself from his own nature. He said that God was the projection of man's strongest desires, and that the concept of eternal life was man's projection of his fear of death blinding him to his own mortality. Marx agreed with the idea of religion as alienation, but found Feuerbach's negation of social-economic factors leading to alienation problematic. After having written 'A Critisim of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' (in 1843), outlining most of his disagreements with Hegel and laying the groundwork for his 'dialectical materialism', he wrote an introduction to it (in 1844) as an essay which contained his theory of religion. It contains that phrase 'opiate of the people' often quoted as the summary of his views, so it would do it justice to quote the passage in full:
The foundation of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does not make man. Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to himself, or has already lost himself again. But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world. Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point dhonneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion. Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people. (Marx, Contribution)

Crucially, Marx has outlined here the dual function of religion. It provides a genuine treatment to the human from worldly suffering, but one that can never be an escape from worldly suffering, keeping man sedated: Like a medicine that provides relief but no cure. Later in the passage he states:
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo.

Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers on the chain not in order that man shall continue to bear that chain without fantasy or consolation, but so that he shall throw off the chain and pluck the living flower. The criticism of religion disillusions man, so that he will think, act, and fashion his reality like a man who has discarded his illusions and regained his senses, so that he will move around himself as his own true Sun. Religion is only the illusory Sun which revolves around man as long as he does not revolve around himself. (Marx, Contribution)

Here he is advocating atheism and criticism of religion as a political philosophy, believing it will awaken man to his real condition and lead to his emancipation, and the true realization of his essence. However, in spring 1845, Marx wrote his 'Theses on Feuerbach' in which it is not clear whether he is reacting against theoretical idealism, or merely criticising the 'idealism' of Feuerbach's ignorance of socio-economic factors:
VII: All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice. XI: The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it. (Marx, Theses)

This problematises his theory of religion as 'opiate', the problem is not that this is the inherent function of religion but that this is how it functions in reality. However, this work was not published until after Marx's death by Engels perhaps Marx did not yet want to make this public and as such it never became a part of traditional Marxist theory. Between 1845-46 Marx wrote 'The German Ideology', where he expounded his theory of history (Marxist dialectical materialism), and developed the concept of ideology. He said that capitalism had caused a division between mental and physical labour: Mental labour was dominated by the bourgeois class, and the proletariat were condemned to physical labour. He proposed that due the detachment of the bourgeoisie to the socio-economic basis of society, their theories became 'ideologies': theories that ignored the social conditioning of the ideas that founded them, yet presenting themselves as objective. In other words, bourgeois theory perpetuates capitalism by ignoring reference to the exploitation of the proletariat Marx believed his theory was true theory because it addressed this. On the development and future of religion, Marx believed that early human societies were primitive communist societies, and that when (for example, if a natural disaster struck the village) they experienced alienation from their environment, they came up with religious ideas to help them deal with this. Similarly Marx believed that once material inequalities set in to early human societies, those who suffered would become alienated and religious ideas would cure them of alienation but blind them to reality. To Marx, the development of religion was always subordinated to oppressive economic systems (culminating in capitalism) and the aims of their rulers. However it is crucial to

see that Marx did not see this as primarily due to the development of priestly classes that negotiated with the rulers for power and control. Although he recognised this reality, asserting that the development of religion was clerical conspiracy was more of an enlightenment philosophy (Marx's good friend Engels pointed out the stratification of the clergy, the higher being toned to bourgeois interests, the lower clergy sometimes lending their support to revolutionary peasant struggles); Marx identified the cause of religion's development as the alienation of the human essence. Marx feared that alienation from society would cause more intense and reactionary religion to cover for it stalling genuine class consciousness and the possibility of emancipation for the moment. He predicted, of course, that religion would wither away from human consciousness when humans emancipated themselves from capitalism, established communism and realised themselves.

DURKHEIM Towards the end of the 19th century, when Durkheim was rising through the academic rank and file, anthropology had already been established as a major discipline and was a major influence on Durkheim's thought by the time he came to establish his theory. Durkheim was a Cometan Positivist and a social realist (the epistemological perspective that social realities exist independently of the individual's perception of them). The thesis of Auguste Comte's sociological positivism with which Durkheim was most concerned was; that the study of society should be based on facts, that the only way to objective knowledge was by applying the scientific method of the natural sciences, and that the social sciences would only be truly scientific if free from philosophical and metaphysical speculations and abstractions (Morrison, p151). Durkheim's study from which he constructed his theory of religion was of aboriginal religion in Australia. Apart from this, his theory was also based on the work of anthropologists who had studied the aboriginal people and their religions. Durkheim sought to study what he believed was a 'simple' and functional religion, in order to find solutions for what he saw as the slow breakdown of social cohesion in Europe. At the beginning of his main book on religion, 'The Elementary forms of religious life', Durkheim outlines what he means and does not mean by searching for the origin(s) of religion: It is seen that we give a wholly relative sense to this word "origins," just as to the word "primitive." By it we do not mean an absolute beginning, but the most simple social condition that is actually known or that beyond which we cannot go at present. (Durkheim, footnote p8). He proposes that what should be searched for are the ever-present causes upon which the most essential forms of religious thought and practice depend. Now for the reasons which were just set forth, these causes are proportionately more easily observable as the societies where they are observed are less complicated. (Durkheim, p8). This was his justification for the aboriginal

communities in Australia being the ideal case-study, and concluded from his study of aboriginal religion that A religion so closely connected to a social system surpassing all others in simplicity may well be regarded as the most elementary religion we can possibly know. (Durkheim, p167,8) in other words; simple societies will have simple religions. He saw the development of religion as an evolutionary process; changing and/or becoming more complex in order to meet the needs of society. He believed all religion started with totemism; where expressions of a society's values are eulogised and sanctified. He identified the division between sacred and profane (which he emphasised, is not the same as good and evil) as the defining characteristic of any religion. He also concluded that religious sentiment is reinforced by 'collective effervescence', a euphoric feeling of solidarity that is felt at collective gatherings (whether explicitly religious or not). Durkheim described the phenomenon of societal disunity as 'anomie', and noted that increasing nonreligiousness paralleled this increasing anomie. Durkheim believed this happened because religion no longer catered for people's needs in a society that was radically and rapidly changing and he feared that this would lead to breakdown (and identified it as a social cause of suicide), and proposed a constructed 'civil religion' as a solution to this. It should be noted that Durkheim was inspired by the ideals of France's Third Republic, and he feared what other ideas could take the place of these Republican values in anomie, a vacuum or mass uncertainty of belief in society. Durkheim proposed 'civil religion' because to him civil religion was a dynamic of social life itself, and so it would only be logical to study how it functions and fill the gaps with ideals that would bring French society together.

CRITICAL COMPARISON

Durkheim's seeking of a simple religion in the aboriginal societies of Australia is profoundly problematic. For one, he assures his readers that he will not use his study of them to draw baseless conclusions on religion in the West in the following manner: they are rudimentary and gross; we cannot make of them a sort of model which later religions only have to reproduce. (Durkheim, p8). And yet despite this supremacist dismissal, this was his only actual study of religion, so it is inevitable that his views on religion in general were based on a study on totemic aboriginal religion. With all due respect to the aboriginal religions, it is certain that Christianity and Islam (the two major world religions) never began as totemic religions; in their local origins they were a reaction against corruption of Jewish priests and totemic clan-polytheism respectively. To be fair to Durkheim though, he was one of the first to propose the idea of common forms of

religious practice being shared by all the world's religions, and among the non-religious. Marx's view of the origin of religion makes more sense of the transition from polytheism/totemism to monotheistic faith: Over the course of time, religious stories covering for various types of alienation from the environment become numerous and contradicting, causing clan societies to become alienated from their previous religious practices requiring new and reformed beliefs. However this view is still problematic: For example, there is very little indication that most of Arabian society in the time of Muhammad felt alienated from Arabian polytheism; there was no collective effort by Arabian tribes to construct this 'new' religion (while it is accepted by Muslims that Islam was new to the Arabians, they emphasise that Islam is a return to the old and true religion); indeed there was many clans who renounced Islam after the death of the prophet leading to the apostasy wars. Do we eulogise and sanctify everything that we find to be good in our lives; or do we only do this when we feel alienated from the world around us searching for the soul of soulless conditions (Marx, A Contribution to Hegels Philosophy of Right - Introduction) It seems that Marx identifies the causal origins of religious sentiment, yet he fails to see how this plays out on his own belief in socialism (although there is evidence that later in his life he attempted to break away from his own idealism); whereas Durkheim identifies how cultures (such as football) can become religious, yet fails to identify alienation as a cause due to his regrettable view of the aboriginal peoples as living in blissful ignorance of modernity. Both views are grounded in a presupposition of social evolution that dissuades one from taking them seriously. Already by having explained a mere part of these men's theories we have had to introduce errors in their epistemology and methodology, and the effect of eurocentrism on their theories, particularly a failure to understand Islam; and indeed these are recurring themes throughout this comparison of their work.

For Marx, religion keeps man sedated, by declaring his own nature to be other than his, and this is alienation. For Durkheim, it brings society together, and anomie poses a risk to this. Both thinkers have faults in their theory, and this inevitably comes from their theoretical-philosophical standpoints. Durkheim was a pro-establishment functionalist, he saw no problem with the structure of society and he was not a structuralist in the Marxist sense, as he spoke of social relations and of social facts (phenomenon that are not bound by individuals in society and influence their behaviour sounds like social structure). Marx was an essentialist, religion was alienation. And by religion Marx meant the religions, leaving no room for Durkheims concepts such as civil religion or organic solidarity. Ironic, as Marxist theory in general could be described as a constructed civil religion, channelling organic solidarity into Marxist conclusions. Indeed Feuerbach, who so influenced Marx, made God into man releasing his potentialities. Yet man wanting to be God is a

religious pursuit. It is also ironic that Marx never thought of his theory as an ideology, in the same sense he described the German ideology. Marx showed evidence of potentially breaking out of his own idealism, yet he never applied this to his theory of religion perhaps the equation of religion with alienation was too powerful, and to taint it with doubt would not advance the cause of political atheism for the sake of waking the proletariat up to their material condition. However, undeniably the idea that religion can and does keep people sedated is fairly well grounded. Were it not for Marxs essentialism, the possibility of religion as opiate could be applied to Durkheims concept of religion: Opening up the possibility of understanding how secular nationalisms, for example, can keep people sedated and obedient. On the other hand, Durkheim must be critisised for failing to see that religion as a protesting expression of a solidarity founded upon class difference.

Durkheim was describing with the term 'anomie' what Marx spoke of as alienation, only their concerns were reverse; due to the pro-establishment functionalism of Durkheim and Marx's structuralist conflict theory. For Durkheim, the worry was about the disorder it could cause in society, and what would fill the vacuum in the abscense of wholesome religion, whether organic or mechanical. For Marx, religion was what people turned to as a result of alienation. Durkheim was right to be concerned luckily he didn't live to see the rise and results of politically fascist civil religion in Germany in the form of Nazi ideology. And even today, in secularised European countries, we can observe people finding collective effervescence and other aspects of religiousness in sports, television shows, clubs, gigs, and still of course in the differing nationalisms to be found in Europe, whether the secular state ideology of France or the attachment to England displayed by the English Defence League. In a sense, one could say that Durkheim was right in that people are finding 'new totems'. However a minority religion in Europe today defies all of this; the Muslim community. Durkheim's theory alone cannot explain how these urban Muslim minorities believe and practice similarily to, and feel bonded to, Muslim societies living in what is effectively natural anarchy with an agriculture based economy. Durkheim studied collective effervescence and solidarity as localised phenomena, but not as universal ideals/commands.

Fortunately for Marx's prediction, humankind has not yet emancipated itself from capitalism. Nevertheless, attempts to reach communism resulted in the establishment of socialist states in the age of capitalism. Marxist ideology as developed by Lenin became, unquestionably, the state dogma in the USSR, and because Marx advocated atheism in order to destroy capitalism these states were also committed to atheism as a political philosophy. However the USSR became what many socialists (whether Marxist or non-Marxist) would describe as a 'defunct workers state'. With the

continuing existence of a capitalist world economy, and the attempts by the capitalist powers to defeat socialism, the USSR went through the totalitarian repression (of religion and society) by Stalin in order to compete with capitalism, and eventually became 'state-capitalist', and collapsed. Russia then saw a resurgence of Orthodox Christianity as the sphere of religion was liberalised. Marxists point out that this only confirms Marx's thought and that the Russian revolution was premature, as the revolution had been defeated elsewhere in the world. Is this to be celebrated or a cause of concern? Unfortunately, the reductionism of Marxist analysis seems self-confirming. Take the case of the Islamist Revolution in Iran, one of the most important anti-imperialist powers in the world today, and in real terms not too different from Bolvarian Socialism in Venezuela. Is this dismissed as merely another historical aberration? The essentialist idealism of Marxist dogma prevents it from engaging with Islamism as it understands itself, and it's forever yet unfulfilled prophecy of communism justifies the negation of all defunct workers states and religious revolutions (or revolutionary interpretations of religions) as invalid, rather than re-assessing itself.

CONCLUSION Both theories of religion had useful concepts to offer, but both Marx and Durkheim were too tied up in theoretical rigidity. While Marx bucked against the idea that he himself had fell into materialist idealism, Durkheim was too caught up in the idea of his own objectivity, as if his conscience could render itself conscious to itself. Only the work of the radical poststructuralists can save the theories concepts from being lost. Marx is to be commended more for his critique of capitalism, rather than his almost identical critique of religion which ignored that religion is not just a structure, but a property of social relations. He allows no place for God in his theory, because it is an ideology. Durkheim on the other hand did not present us with an ideology and had concepts about the function of religion to offer, which if separated from the dominating assumptions of his times which coloured his reading of them, are of benefit to theists and non-theists alike in understanding religious behaviour.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Dupr, L. Marx, Karl in; Encyclopedia of Religion, Ed. Lindsay Jones. Vol. 8. 2nd ed. Macmillan Reference (Detroit, USA). p5745 Durkheim, E. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, George Allen & Unwin Ltd (London). Marx, K. A Contribution to the Critique of Hegels Philosophy of Right (introduction), Ed. Joseph OMalley, Cambridge University Press, 1970. (accessed on web: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm) Marx, K. Theses on Feuerbach in; Marx/Engels Selected Works, Vol. 1. Progress Publishers (Moscow) 1969, p13-15. (accessed on web: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm) Marx, K. A Contribution to the Critique of political Economy, Progress Publishers (Moscow), 1977. (accessed on web: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-poleconomy/preface.htm) Morrison, K. Marx, Durkheim, Weber: formations of modern social thought, 2nd edition. SAGE publishers (London). p151