Shame and the Social Bond: A Sociological Theory Author(s): Thomas J. Scheff Source: Sociological Theory, Vol.

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Shame and the Social Bond: A Sociological Theory*

THOMAS J. SCHEFF

University of California at Santa Barbara

Emotion has long been recognized in sociology as crucially important,but most references to it are generalized and vague. In this essay, I nominlate shame, specifically, as the premiiersocial emotioin.First I review the individualized treatmentof shame in psychoanalysis and psychology, and the absence of social context. ThenI consider the contributions to the social dimensions of shameeby six sociologists (Georg Silnmmel, Charles Cooley, Norbert Elias, Richard Sennett, Helen Lynd,Erving Goffmian) and a
(Helen Lewis). I show that Cooley and Lvnd, particularly, psychologist/psvchoanalyst iiade contributions to a theory of shcameand the social bond. Lewis's idea that shame arises fromi threats to the bond integrates the contributions of all six sociologists, and points towardcfuture research on emotion, conflict, and alienation/lintegration.

Many sociological theoristshave at least implied that emotions are a powerful force in the structureand change of societies. Although Weber didn't refer to emotions directly, he emphasized values, which are emotionally charged beliefs, as the foundation of social structure.Durkheimwas more explicit about the role of emotions; especially in his later works, he strongly implicatedemotions and collective sentimentsin the creation of social solidarity through moral community: "What holds a society together-the "glue" of solidarity-and [Marx implied that] what mobilizes conflict-the energy of mobilized groups-are emotions"(Collins 1990). G. H. Mead implied thatemotion was an important ingredientof his social psychology, and Parsons promotedit to one of the components of social action in his AGIL scheme (Parsons and Shils 1951). Even Marx and Engels, who intended a purely structuraltheory, implicated emotions in class tensions and in the solidarityof rebellious classes. However, the classic formulationshave not led to any theoretical or empiricalpay-off. One reason is that they concernedemotions in general, a rarefied abstraction,ratherthan specific emotions. WHY SPECIFICEMOTIONSARE NECESSARYFOR THEORYAND RESEARCH Our knowledge of emotions is not generalized, but particular.For example, we know a great deal about anger.No doubt some of what we think we know may not be the case, but much of what we know is probablyaccurateor at least accurateenough to often enable us to understand each other.About angerwe know or believe we know sources from which it arises, differentforms and gradationsit can take, and some of the outcomes thatit can lead to. We also have similar kinds of knowledge and beliefs about other primaryemotions, such as fear, grief, shame, contempt, disgust, love, and joy. Our knowledge about emotions held in common allows us to communicatewith each other on this topic and restrainsflights of fancy. Although the differentemotions may have several underlying similarities, what is more obvious is the great differences in origins,
'Direct correspondenceto Thomas J. Scheff, Professor Emeritus,Dept. of Sociology, University of California at Santa Barbara,Santa Barbara,CA 93105. Tel.: (805) 893-3510; Fax: (805) 893-3324; Web: http://www. soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/scheff/ Sociological Theory 18:1 March 2000 ? Amlericanl AvenueNW, Washington, 20005-4701 DC Sociological Association. 1307 New York

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appearance,and trajectories.It is for this reason that general statementsaboutemotions in the abstracthave so little meaning. Some of what Durkheim,Mead, and Parsonssaid about emotions might appearplausible when appliedto one emotion, say angeror fear, but not to most of the others. The sources, appearance,and consequences of anger and fear are so different as to forbid lumping them together. Treatingall emotions together under a single heading amounts to a kind of dismissal. A currentparallel can be found in rationalchoice theory, which divides behavior into the rational and the nonrational.In this theory, attention is given only to rational behavior, and, as in classical theory, the nonrational, the irrational, and emotional behavior are simply dismissed. In any case, even the theorists who dealt with emotions explicitlyDurkheim, Mead, and Parsons-did not develop concepts of emotion, investigate their actual occurrence in real life, nor collect data that might bear on propositions about the role of emotions in human conduct. Their discussions of emotion, therefore, have not borne fruit. The researcherswhose work I review here took the step of investigating a specific and thereforeconcrete emotion, althoughthey did not always emphasize the name of the emotion. Sennettand Cobb, for example, in the Hidden Injuriesof Class (1973), made no move to develop a concept of shame, and named it infrequently,but their findings and many of their interpretationsclearly imply it. As it turns out, the act of explicitly naming and defining is an importantpart of investigation. Before turningto these authors,however, I review the treatmentof shame by psychoanalytic authors, in order to show the problem that the sociologists and Lewis solved. SHAME IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY The treatmentof shame in most psychoanalytic writing is problematicbecause it leaves out the social matrix. Like most psychological theory, Freud's formulations concern emotions in isolated individuals and ignore the social context. Such individualistic formulations give rise to what might be called the inside/outside problem: If one ignores the context in which emotions arise, it will inevitably be difficult to understandtheir place in human behavior. Freud's solution to the inside/outside problem was to ignore the outside. Although in his laterwork Freudalso ignored shame, it had an importantrole in his first book. In Studies on Hysteria (1895), Freudand Breuerstatedearly on (p. 40) that hysteria is caused by hidden affects, and named the emotion of shame as one of these affects. Near the end of the book, this idea is urgedmore strongly:"[Theideas thatwere being repressed] were all of a distressingnature,calculatedto arousethe affects of shame, self-reproachand of psychical pain and the feeling of being harmed"(p. 313). Note that all of the affects mentioned can be considered to be shame derivatives or cognates: Self-reproach is a specific shame cognate; the feeling of being harmed (as in or rejection)somewhatbroader;and the abstractphrase"psychicalpain,"like "hurt" "emotional arousal,"can be applied to any emotion. In this passage and several others, shame is given a central role in the causation of psychopathology.Freud and Breuer also proposed that shame is the inhibiting emotion that leads to repression, therefore giving it a central role in the development and maintenanceof psychopathology.The idea that it is shame thatcauses repressionwould also give shame the leading role in the causationof all mental illness, not just hysteria, if Freudhad stayed with it. However, in 1905, with the publicationof The Interpretationof Dreams, Freudpermanently renounced his earlier formulation in favor of drive theory, especially the sexual drive. In Freud'sthinking, shame was replaced by anxiety and guilt, the appropriate emo-

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tions for responsibleadults,especially male adults.By this time, Freudhad become biased about shame. He thoughtthatit was regressive emotion, seen only in children,women, and savages. Since 1905, shame has been largely ignored in orthodox formulations.Although several psychoanalystsmade crucially importantcontributionsto shame knowledge, these contributionshelped make them marginalto psychoanalysis. Shame also goes unnamed and/or undefinedeven in these marginalanalysts;Alfred Adler, KarenHomey, Abraham Kardiner,and Erik Ericksonprovide examples. Adler's formulationof the core position of prestige seeking in humanbehavior and his concept of the inferioritycomplex are clearly shame-based.To make the search for prestige and honor a centralhumanmotive is to focus on the pride/shame axis, as Cooley did. Similarly,the concept of an inferioritycomplex can be seen as a formulationaboutchronic low self-esteem, or to put it more bluntly,chronic shame. YetAdler never used the concept of shame to integratethe various dimensions of his work, as he might have. His theory of personality was that children deprived of love at key periods in their development would become adults with either a drive for power or an inferioritycomplex. This can be restated succinctly in terms of a theory of shame and the social bond: childrenwithoutthe requisite secure bonds will likely become adults whose affects are predominatelybypassed (drive for power) or overt shame (inferioritycomplex) (Lewis 1971). Like Adler, Homey (1950) didn't name the emotion of shame. Her theoryof personality was based on what she called "the pride system." However, most of her central propositions imply that pride and shame are the keys to understanding both neurotic and normal behavior. Her concept of the "vindictive personality" seems to nominate shame/anger sequences as the emotional basis for vengeful behavior. Kardinerwas an anthropologist who applied psychoanalytic ideas to his studies of
small traditional societies. In The Individual and His Society: The Psychodynamics of

PrimitiveSocial Organization(1939), he offered an extensive analysis of the role of shame in four traditionalsocieties. Unlike Adler and Horney, he named the emotion of shame clearly, and stated directly, like Freud and Breuer,that shame is the emotion that leads to humanmotive. repression.Like Adler,he also gave prominenceto prestigeas a fundamental Going further than Adler or Freud, he named shame as the principal component of the super-ego, that is, of conscience. Erikson also named shame directly in his analysis of the relationshipbetween shame and guilt (1950). In his investigation of these emotions, he proposed, again contra Freud, that shame was the most fundamentalemotion and that it had a vital role in the developmental stages throughwhich all childrenmust pass. (His analysis was an importantsource for Helen Lynd's work on shame, to be discussed below.) Like most theorists who discuss shame, neither Kardinernor Eriksontried to define it. The work on shame by these four analysts was not recognized by the psychoanalytic establishment.Adler and Horney were excluded for their deviationism.Although neither Kardinernor Erikson were excluded, there was no response to their contributions on shame, with the exception of Lynd to Erikson. It is also of interest that among the disciples of Adler and of Horney there was also no response to their work on shame. Although there has been a reawakeningof interest in shame by currentpsychoanalysts, still only a small minority are involved. Even in this group, converting from drive theory to shame language is a struggle:The work of Melvin Lansky (1992, 1995) preserves drive theory; Andrew Morrison (1989) has translateddrive theoretic formulationsinto shame dynamics, trying to bridge the two worlds; and Francis Broucek (1991) has rebelled against drive theory,but doesn't attempta social formulationof shame. Only Helen Lewis (1971) has succeeded in throwing off drive theory, recasting shame in social terms (I returnto her work below).

THEORY SHAME AND THE SOCIAL BOND: A SOCIOLOGICAL PIONEERSIN THE STUDY OF SHAME SOCIOLOGICAL

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Five of the six sociologists I review acted somewhat independentlyof each other and of other researcherson emotion. In the cases of Elias and Sennett, their discovery of shame seems forced upon them by their data. Certainly Elias's work on shame thresholds in the history of four European cultures appears to arise from nowhere. Neither Simmel nor Cooley defines what he means by shame. Goffmanpartiallydeveloped a conceptualization of embarrassment. Only Lynd was self-conscious about shame as a concept. Her book on shame was contemporaneouswith Goffman's first writings on embarrassment.She cited his article on face-work, and realized that its main point was that face-work meant avoidand shame. ing embarrassment Lewis was both a researchpsychologist and a psychoanalyst.In her empirical work on shame (1971), she was more influenced by the work of Lynd than by the scatteredpsychoanalytic literatureon shame. She also was sophisticated in formulating a concept of shame, and in using systematic methods to study it. Sennett's work involved slight outside influence. He approvinglycited the Lynd book on shame in The Hidden Injuries of Class (1973), and a chapter on shame in his book Authority (1980) cites the English translationof Elias's The Civilizing Process (1978). As I will suggest, shame is a central thread in The Hidden Injuries, Sennett's first approachto the topic, even though there is no concept of shame in that book. The reverse is true in the case of Elias; the concept of shame is central to The Civilizing Process but goes undergroundin The Germans (1996), although it tacitly forms the central core of the book. I will refer below to the parallels and connections between Elias's and Sennett's work.
Georg Simmel: Shame and Fashion

Shame plays a significant part in only one of Simmel's essays, the one on fashion (1904).1 His analysis of the origins of fashion clearly states thatthe emotion of shame is it's source. People want variationand change, he argued,but they also anticipateshame if they stray from the behavior and appearanceof others. Fashion is the solution to this problem, since one can change along with others, avoiding being isolated, and thereforeshame (p. 553). Simmel's idea aboutfashion implies conformityin thoughtand behavioramong one group in a society, the fashionable ones, and distance from another,those who do not follow fashion, relating shame to the dynamics of alienation. There is a quality to Simmel's treatmentof shame thatis somewhatdifficult to describe, but needs description, since it characterizes most of the other sociological treatments reviewed here. Simmel's use of shame is casual and unselfconscious. His analysis of the shame component in fashion occurs in a single long paragraph.Shame is not mentioned before or after this paragraph.He doesn't conceptualize shame or define it, seeming to assume that the readerwill automaticallyknow the meaning of the term. Similar problems are prominentin Cooley and Elias, and, somewhatless flagrantly,in Sennett and Goffman. Lynd and Lewis are exceptions, since they both attemptedto define shame and locate it with respect to other emotions.
Charles Cooley: Shame and the Looking-Glass Self

Cooley (1922), like Simmel, was direct in naming shame. For Cooley, shame and pride both arose from self-monitoring, the process that was at the center of his social psy'I am indebted to EduardoBericat for calling this essay to my attention.

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chology. To be sure, in his discussion of what he called the "self-sentiments,"pride and shame are mentioned as only two of other possible emotions. But his concept of "the looking-glass self," which implies the social nature of the self, refers directly and exclusively, at the level of emotions, to pride and shame. Cooley saw self-monitoring in terms of three steps: "A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearanceto the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance,and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification" (1922:184). In this passage he restrictsself-feelings to the two which he seems to think are the most to significant, pride and shame (considering "mortification" be a shame variant).To make sure we understandthis point, he mentions shame three more times in the passage that follows:

The comparisonwith a looking glass hardly suggests the second element, the imagined judgment, which is quite essential. The thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanicalreflection of ourselves, but an imputedsentiment,the imagined effect of this reflection upon another'smind. This is evident from the fact that the characterand weight of thatother,in whose mind we see ourselves, makes all the difference with our feeling. We are ashamed to seem evasive in the presence of a man, cowardly in the presence of a brave one, gross in the eyes of a straightforward refined one and so on. We always imagine, and in imagining share,the judgments of the other mind. A man will boast to one person of an action-say some sharptransaction in trade-which he would be ashamed to own to another.(Cooley 1922:18485, emphasis added) Although Cooley is explicit in suggesting that pride and shame are social emotions, he made no attempt to define either. Instead he used the vernacularwords as if they were However, his analysis of self-monitoringsuggests that pride and shame self-explanatory.2 are the basic social emotions. At this point intellectual history takes a somewhat surprising turn.Elaboratingon Cooley's idea of self-monitoring,G. H. Mead and John Dewey based their entire social psychology upon the process of role taking, the ability of humans to continuously monitor themselves from the point of view of others. Yet neither Mead nor Dewey mentions what was so obvious to Cooley, that social monitoringusually gives rise to feelings of prideor shame. Mead and Dewey treatrole taking,theirbasic building block of human behavior, as an entirely cognitive process; neither has anything to say about pride or shame.3 Cooley's formulation of the social basis of shame in self-monitoring can be used to amend Mead's social psychology. Perhaps the combined Mead/Cooley formulationcan solve the inside-outside problem that plagues psychoanalytic and other psychological approachesto shame, as I suggest below.
2To give just one example of the ensuing confusion over not defining emotions such as pride: In English and other Europeanlanguages, the word pride used without qualification usually has an inflection of arrogantpride or hubris("Pridegoeth before the fall.") In currentusage, in orderto refer to the kind of pride implied in Cooley's analysis, the opposite of shame, one must add a qualifier like justified or genuine. Using undefined emotion words is an invitation to the Tower of Babel. until quite recently, other readers of Cooley have also ignored the central role in human ex3Furthermore, perience he gave to pride and shame. The "looking-glass self" is by far the best known of Cooley's formulations. Particularly puzzling is the obliviousness of current symbolic interaction to Cooley's presentation of shame.

THEORY SHAME AND THE SOCIAL BOND: A SOCIOLOGICAL Norbert Elias: Shame in the Civilizing Process 4

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In his first book, Elias undertook a historical analysis of what he calls the "civilizing process." He traced changes in the development of personality and social norms from the onset of modern civilization to the present. Like Weber,he gave great prominence to the developmentof rationality.Unlike Weber,he gave equal prominenceto emotional change, particularlyto changes in the threshold of shame: "No less characteristicof a civilizing process than 'rationalization'is the peculiar molding of the drive economy that we call 'shame' and 'repugnance'or' embarrassment"'(1982:292). Using excerpts from advice manuals over a very long historical span, the last five centuries, he outlined a theory of modernity.By examining advice concerning etiquette, especially abouttable manners,body functions, sexuality, and anger,he suggests thata key aspect of modernityinvolved a veritableexplosion of shame. Although he uses somewhat different terminology, Elias's central thesis is closely related to my own (Scheff 1990). I point to whatI considerthe alienatingconsequencesof modernity:decreasingshamethresholds at the time of the break-upof ruralcommunities, and decreasing acknowledgmentof shame, which also may have had powerful consequences on levels of awareness and self-control. I will cite only one of many advice excerpts used by Elias. He first presents a lengthy advice book, TheEducationof Girls (von Raumer1857), excerptfrom a nineteenth-century that advises mothershow to answer sexual questions. In response to the question "Where do babies come from?"von Raumersuggests "Childrenshould be left as long as possible in the belief that an angel brings the mother her little children. ... If the issue comes up again, the child is to be sternly warned: 'It is not good for you to know such a thing, and you should take care not to listen to anything said about it."' Von Raumerconcludes this passage with advice that both shames the mother and advises her to shame the daughter: "A truly well-brought-upgirl will from then on feel shame at hearing things of this kind spoken of." This advice is puzzling: Why does von Raumeroffer the mother such absurdadvice? Why does the motherfollow his advice (as most did, and still do)? Why does the daughter follow her mother's advice (as most did, and still do)? Modern feminist theory might respond to the first question that von Raumer's advice arises from his position of power: he sought to continue male supremacyby advising the mother to act in a way that is consonant with the role of women as subordinateto that of men. That is, he was promulgatingthe woman's role as Kirche, Kueche, Kinder (church, kitchen, children). Keeping women ignorantof sexuality and reproductionwould help to continue this system. This formulationis probablypart of a complete answer, but it does not attend to why mothers and daughters submit to ignorance and shame. Elias's formulationprovides an answer to all three questions, without contradictingthe feminist answer. Each of these persons, the man and the two hypothetical readers, the mother and the daughter,is too embarrassedabout sexuality to think clearly about it. It could be true that von Raumer's advice is part of his male chauvinist position, and also true that he is too embarrassedto think about the meaning of his advice. Elias's study suggests a way of understandingthe social transmission of a taboo on shame. The adult, the authorvon Raumerin this case, is not only ashamedof sex, but he is ashamedof being ashamed, and probablyashamedof the shame that he will arouse in his
4The argumentconcerning shame and civilization is developed furtherin Chapter 1 of Scheff and Retzinger (1991).

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reader.The mother responding to von Raumer's text, in turn, will probably react in a similar way, being ashamed,and being ashamedof being ashamed,and being ashamedof causing furthershame in the daughter.Von Raumer's advice is part of a social system in which attemptsat civilized delicacy result in an endless chain reactionof unacknowledged shame. The chain reaction is both within persons and between them, three spirals-one spiral within each party, and one between them. (The spiral idea integrates social and psychological processes, and suggests a solution to the usual separation of inside and outside, as I suggest at the end of this article.) Elias showed that there was much less shame about mannersand emotions in the first partof the period he studiedthantherewas in the nineteenthcentury,and therefore,I infer, far fewer shame loops. In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, a change began occurringin advice on manners.What was earliersaid openly and directly begins to be only hinted at, or left unsaid entirely.Moreover,open justifications are offered less and less. One is mannerlybecause it is the right thing to do. Any decent person will be courteous; the intimation is that bad manners are not only wrong but also unspeakable, the beginning of repression. The change that Elias depicts is gradualbut relentless; by a continuing succession of small decrements, etiquette books fall silent about the reliance of manners, style, and By identity on respect, honor, and pride, and avoidance of shame and embarrassment. the end of the eighteenth century,the social basis of decorumand decency had become virtually unspeakable.Unlike Freudor anyone else, Elias documents,step by step, the sequence of events that led to the repressionof emotions in moderncivilization. By the nineteenthcentury,Elias proposes, mannersare no longer inculcatedby way of adult-to-adultverbal discourse, in which justifications are offered. Socialization shifts from slow and conscious changes by adults over centuries to swift and silent indoctrination of childrenin theirearliest years. No justification is offered to most children;courtesy has become absolute. Moreover, any really decent person would not have to be told, as suggested in the text interpretedabove. In modernsocieties, socialization of most children automatically inculcates and represses shame. Although Elias's analysis of the changing shame thresholdin Europeanhistory seems important,it is the last time thathe explicitly refers to this process; none of extraordinarily his many subsequentworks returnsto an explicit analysis of shame.
Richard Sennett: Is Shame the Hidden Injury of Class?

The narrativein The Hidden Injuriesof Class (Sennett and Cobb 1973) is developed from of quoted excerpts of interviews, and the authors'brief, low-level interpretations the meanof these quotes. They do not devise a conceptual scheme or a systematic method for ings analyzing their interviews and observations;for this reason, readersare requiredto devise their own conceptual scheme, as I do below. in The book is based on participant-observation communities, schools, clubs, and bars, and 150 interviews with white working-class males, mostly of Italian or Jewish background,in Boston for one year beginning in July of 1969 (1973:40-41). in The hiddeninjuriesthatSennettand Cobb discoveredmight be paraphrased this way: first, the working-classmen felt that,because of their class and occupationalposition, they were not accordedthe respect that they should have gotten from others, particularlyfrom their teachers, bosses, and even from their own children. Second, a more subtle injury: these men also felt, in some ways, that their class and occupationalposition was at least partly their own fault. Sennett and Cobb imply that social class is responsible for both injuries.They believe thatthese workingmen did not get the respect they deservedbecause

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of their social class, and thatthe lack of self-respect is also the fault of class, ratherthanthe men's own fault. Sennett and Cobb argue that in American society, respect is largely based on one's individual achievement, the extent that one's accomplishmentsgive one a unique identity that stands out from the mass of others. The role of public schools in the development of abilities forms a central part of their argument.Their informantslacked self-respect, the authorsthought, because the schooling of working-class boys did not develop their individual talents in a way that would allow them to stand out from the mass as adults. In the language of the sociology of emotions, they carry a burden of feelings of rejection and inadequacy,which is to say chronic low self-esteem (shame). Sennett, who did the participant-observation of the study,reportedmost fully on a part particulargrammarschool, "WatsonSchool," that he observed. He suggested that "teachers act on their expectations of the children in such a way as to make the expectations become reality"(1973:81). One of his observationsconcerns a second-gradeclass. In this class there were two children,Fred and Vincent, whose "clothes were pressed and seemed better kept" than the other children's clothes. "In a class of mostly dark Italian children, these were the fairest skinned. From the outset the teacher singled out these two children .... To them he spoke with a special warmth in his voice. He never praised them openly .. . but a message that they were different, and better, was spontaneously con-

veyed" (ibid.). Sennett and Cobb hold thatteacherssingle out for attentionand praise only a very small percentageof the students,usually those who are either talentedor middle class or closest in actions and appearanceto middle class. This praise and attentionallows the singled-out students to develop their potential for achievement. The large majorityof the boys, however, are ignored and, in subtle ways, rejected:"[B]y the time the childrenareten or eleven the split between the many and the few who are expected 'to make something of themselves' is out in the open .... [The mass of] boys in class act as though they were serving time, as though schoolwork and classes had become something to wait out, a blank space in their lives they hope to survive" (ibid.:82-83). Thus, education, ratherthan becoming a source of personal and cultural growth, provides only shame and rejection. For the majorityof students in public schools, surviving the days and years of large classes means runninga gauntletof shame and embarrassment every day. These students learn by the second or third grade that is better to be silent in class than to risk ridicule or the humiliation of a wrong answer. Even students with the right answers must deal with having the wrong accent, clothing, or physical appearance. For most students, schooling is a vale of shame.
Helen Lynd: Shame and Identity

During her lifetime, Lynd was a widely known sociologist. With her sociologist husband, Robert, she publishedthe first Americancommunity studies, Middletownand Middletown in Transition.But Lynd was also profoundlyinterestedin developing an interdisciplinary
approach to social science. In her study On Shame and the Search for Identity (1958), she

dealt equally with both the social and psychological sides of shame. She clearly namedthe emotion of shame and its cognates, and located her study within previous scholarship, especially psychoanalyticstudies. But Lyndalso modified andextendedthe study of shame by developing a concept, and by integratingits social and psychological components. Lynd's approachto shame is much more analytical and self-conscious than that of the other sociologists reviewed here, who treatedshame as a vernacularword, ratherthan as a concept. For them, shame sprang out of their data, unavoidably. But Lynd encounters

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shame deliberately,as partof her explorationof identity.First she explains her discomfort with mainstreamapproachesand domains in the social sciences: [T]echniques for the study of human nature were never so abundant;there were never so many people engaged in using them. If understanding identity ... could of be discovered by such means, [the problemof identity] would be assuredof solution. But since every way of seeing is also a way of not seeing, the very multiplicationof categories and the very precision of techniques may ... act as barriers.... Certain pervasive experiences, not easily labeled, may slip throughthe categories altogether,or if given a location and a name, may be circumscribedin such a way
that their essential character is lost.... Among such experiences are ... shame,

anxiety, joy, love, sense of honor, wonder, curiosity, longing, sense of pride, selfrespect. Of these, only anxiety has been the subject of extensive specialized study. (1958:16) Note that Lynd's list contains three topics besides shame that are closely related to shame: sense of honor, sense of pride, and self-respect. The large-scale, cross-cultural study of emotions by Paul Ekman(Ekman, Ellsworth, and Friesen 1972) is a good example of what she is sayingaboutshameslippingthroughthe techniquenet altogether. Although shame is obviously a central emotion in all cultures and historical eras, Ekman and his co-workers left it out completely, as have many other studentsof emotion. Lynd explains that shame (and its cognates and related emotions) is left out because it is more deeply hidden, but at the same time so pervasive in human affairs as to be like water for fish. She makes this point in many ways, particularlyby carefully distinguishing shame from guilt. She notes that guilt is usually extremely specific and thereforeclose to the surface; it involves specific acts done or not done. Guilt is about what one did, shame is about the self, what one is. Guilt also involves feeling that the ego is strong and intact: one is powerful enough to injureanother,and one is also powerful enough to make amends. By contrast, shame feels like weakness and dissolution of the self, even for the wish that the self would disappear.Guilt is a highly individualistemotion, reaffirmingthe centrality of the isolated person; shame is a social emotion, reaffirmingthe emotional interdependency of persons. One point thatLyndmakes is profoundlyimportantfor a social theory of shame and the bond-sharing one's shame with anothercan strengthenthe relationship:"The very fact that shame is an isolating experience also means that if one can find ways of sharing and communicatingit this communicationcan bring about particularcloseness with other persons" (1958:66). In anotherplace, Lynd goes on to connect the process of risking the communicationof shame with the kind of role-takingthat Cooley and Mead had described:"[C]ommunicating shame can be an experience of ... entering into the mind and feelings of another person"(ibid.:249). Lynd's idea aboutthe effects of communicatingand not communicating shame was pivotal for Lewis's ( 1971) concepts of acknowledgedand unacknowledged shame, and their relationshipto the state of the social bond, as outlined below. Erving Goffman:Embarrassmentand Shame in EverydayLife Goffman advancedthe idea of the centralityof shame in social relations more than any of the other sociologists reviewed here. Although shame goes largely unnamedin his early

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is work on presentationof self, embarrassment and avoidance of embarrassment the central thread.Goffman's Everypersonis always desperately worried about his image in the eyes of the other,trying to presenthimself with his best foot forwardto avoid shame. This work elaborates, and indeed, fleshes out, Cooley's abstractidea of the way in which the looking-glass self leads directly to pride or shame, giving the idea roots in the reader's imagination. InteractionRitual (1967) made two furthercontributionsto shame studies. First, in his study of face-work, Goffman gives the crucial model of "face"as the avoidance of embarThis is an advance,because it offers rassment,and losing face as sufferingembarrassment. observable markers for empirical studies of face; otherwise the idea is only an readily Goffman's second contributionto the study of shame was made in ambiguous metaphor.5 a concise essay on the role of embarrassment social interaction.Unlike any of the other in shame pioneers in sociology, he begins the essay with an attemptat definition: An individual may recognize extreme embarrassment others and even in himself in the objective signs of emotional disturbance:blushing, fumbling, stuttering,an by unusually low- or high-pitched voice, quavering speech or breaking of the voice, sweating, blanching, blinking, tremor of the hand, hesitating or vacillating movement, absentmindedness,and malapropisms.As MarkBaldwin remarkedabout shyness, there may be "a lowering of the eyes, bowing of the head, putting of hands behind the back, nervous fingering of the clothing or twisting of the fingers together and stammering,with some incoherence of idea as expressed in speech." There are also symptoms of a subjective kind: constrictionof the diaphragm,a feeling of wobbliness, consciousness of strainedand unnatural gestures, a dazed sensation, dryness of the mouth, and tenseness of the muscles. (1967:p. 97) This sets the stage for an operationaldefinition of shame that can be used in systematic research.But it also foretells a limitation of the whole essay, since the definition is behavioral and physiological, ratherthan concerning inner experience. The part that Goffman refers to as "subjective"is entirely physiological. He makes no attempt to include the ideation of embarrassment. Framinghis analysis in what he thought of as a Durkheimian, Goffman therefore omitted most of the feelings and thoughts purely sociological mode, His solution to the inside/outside problem was to ignore experienced in embarrassment. most of inner experience, just as Freudignored most of outside events. However, Goffman affirms Cooley's point on the centrality of the emotions of shame and pride in normal,everyday social relationships.In Goffman's language: "One assumes that embarrassment a normalpart of normalsocial life, the individual becoming uneasy is not because he is personally maladjustedbut ratherbecause he is not. . . embarrassment is not an irrational impulse breaking through social prescribed behavior, but part of this orderly behavior itself" (1967:109, 111). Even Goffman'spartialdefinition of the state of embarrassment representsan advance. One of the most serious limitationsof currentcontributionsto the sociology of emotions is the lack of definitions of the emotions under discussion. Much like Cooley, Elias, and
5The importanceof this idea is recognized, all too briefly, at the beginning of Brown and Levinson's (1987) study of politeness behavior, where the authors define politeness as the maintenance of face, and, following Goffman, state that maintainingface involves avoiding embarrassment 61). Oddly, however, embarrassment (p. is seldom referredto in the rest of the book; none of the empiricalstudies uses it as a concept, and it is mentioned since it is one type of shame, has a slippery quality,even for those infrequentlyand in passing. Embarrassment, authorswho don't completely ignore it, its usual fate.

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Sennett, Kemper(1978) offers no definitions of emotions, assuming that they go without saying. Hochschild (1983) attemptsto conceptualizevariousemotions in anAppendix, but doesn't go so far as to give concrete definitions of emotional states. Only in Retzinger (1991, 1995) can conceptual and operational definitions of the emotions of shame and anger be found. Like Sennett and Elias, Goffman namedthe emotion of shame infrequently.In his early work on presentationand self and on face-work, embarrassment avoidance of embarand rassment is the central thread, but goes largely unnamed. When he does clearly name in embarrassment his essay on this affect, he carefully avoids a complete analysis, which would include both its social and its psychological sides. Although only implicitly, he seems to separateembarrassment from shame, as if they did not belong to the same family of emotions. In his studies of stigma and asylums, shame again is a key element, but he mentions it only in passing.
Helen Lewis: Discovery of Unacknowledged Shame and Its Social Implications

Lewis was a research psychologist and a psychoanalyst who published many systematic studies in psychology. Like Elias and Sennett, her discovery of shame seemed forced upon her by her data. Her book on shame (1971) was based on an analysis of verbatim transcripts of hundredsof psychotherapysessions. She encounteredshame because she used a systematic method for identifying emotions in verbal transcripts,the Gottschalk-Glesermethod (Gottschalk,Winget, and Gleser 1969; Gottschalk 1995). This method involves use of long lists of key words that are correlated with specific emotions, such as anger, grief, fear, anxiety, and shame. Lewis found that anger, fear, grief, and anxiety cues showed up from time to time in for some of the transcripts; was unprepared the massive frequencyof shame cues. The she findings from her study most relevant to this article are: 1. Prevalence. Lewis found a high frequency of shame markersin all the sessions, far outrankingmarkersof all other emotions combined. This finding alone suggests that shame was a dominantforce in the sessions she analyzed. 2. Lack of awareness; two forms. Lewis noted that although shame markerswere frequentin all of the sessions, patient or therapistalmost never referredto shame or its near cognates. Even the relatively mild word embarrassmentwas seldom used. Lewis identified a specific context in which shame markersoccurred:situations in which the patient seemed to feel distant from, rejected, criticized, or exposed by the therapistgenerateda cloud of shame markers.This context fits the Mead/Cooley proposition that shame arises from seeing one's self negatively from the point of view of the other. However, the patients showed two different, seemingly opposite, responses in the shame context. In one, the patient seemed to be suffering psychological pain, but failed to identify it as shame. Lewis called this form overt, undifferentiated shame. In a second kind of response, the patient seemed not to be in pain, revealing an emotionalresponse only by rapid,obsessional speech on topics that seemed somewhatremovedfrom the dialogue. Lewis called this second responsebypassed shame. Identifying or calling shame by its right name seems to be an important aspect of understandingand managing it. Lewis found manyepisodes of shame 3. Shame, angerandconflict. In her transcripts, that extended over long periods of time. Since emotions are commonly understood to be brief signals (a few seconds) that alert us for action, the existence of

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long-lasting emotions is something of a puzzle. Lewis's solution may be of great interest in the social sciences, since it provides an emotional basis for longstanding hostility, withdrawal,or alienation. She arguedthat her subjects often seemed to have emotional reactions to their emotions, and that this loop may be extended indefinitely. She called these reactions "feeling traps." The trap that arose most frequently in her data involved shame and anger. A patient interpretsan expression by the therapist as hostile, rejecting, or critical, and responds with shame or embarrassment.However, the patient instantaneouslymasks the shame with anger, then is ashamed of being angry.Apparentlyeach emotion in the sequence is brief, but the loop can go on and on. This proposal suggests a new source of protractedconflict and alienation, one hinted at in Simmel's treatmentof conflict. Although Lewis didn't discuss other kinds of spirals, there is one that may be as importantas the shame/anger loop. If one is ashamed of being ashamed, it is possible to enter into a shame/shame loop thatleads to silence and withdrawal,as already suggested in the discussion of Elias's work above. 4. Shame and the social bond. Finally, Lewis interpretedher findings in explicitly social terms. She proposed that shame arises when there is a threatto the social bond, which was the case in all of the shame episodes she discovered in the transcripts.Every person, she argued,fears social disconnection,being adriftfrom understandingand being understoodby the other. Lewis's solutionto the outside/inside problemparallelsand advancesthe Mead/ Cooley definition of the social context of shame. She proposed that shame is a bodily and/or mentalresponseto the threatof disconnectionfromthe other.Shame, she argued,can occur in response to threatsto the bond from the other,but it can also occur in response to actions in the "innertheatre,"in the interiormonologue in which we see ourselves from the point of view of others. Her reasoning fits Cooley's formulationof shame dynamics, and also Mead's (1934) more general framework:the self is a social construction,a process constructedfrom both external and internal social interaction,in role-playing and role-taking. Lewis's formulationsalso suggest a correctionto the sociologists' analysis of shame. PerhapsGoffman's analysis of the harriedEverypersondesperately seeking to maintainface may be somewhatovergeneralized.Most of Goffman'sexamples of persons presentingself in everyday life seem to be either bypassing shame or experiencing it only in its overt, undifferentiatedform, to use Lewis's terminology. This formulationsuggests that Goffman's people have insecure bonds, to the extent that they are unable to acknowledge and therefore dispel shame. His to analysis might be most appropriate persons alienated from self and/or others. Sennett and Cobb's workmen seem only to experience shame in its Similarly, overt/undifferentiatedform, again suggesting alienation. Similar reasoning may also apply to Simmel's fashion seekers. Like Goffman and Sennett, Simmel may be considering only the alienated. NAMING AND UNNAMING SHAME Lewis's analysis of unacknowledgedshame has implications for this review of the sociological exploration of shame. Although Elias made it clear in The Civilizing Process that shame analysis is a key element in his argument,it is much less clear in his study (with
Scotson), The Established and the Outsiders (1965). Shame was not the central concern,

but it is indirectly present in the idea that outsiders are stigmatized. In his study of the

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Germans(1996), thoughagain not made explicit, shameplays a much largerrole. Although the word shame and its variants (embarrassment,humiliation, low self-esteem, lack of self-confidence, etc.) occur repeatedly,Elias does not make explicit that shame is a key concept, as he did in The CivilizingProcess. (In a word count from a file of the manuscript of The Germans,I found more thanfive hundredreferencesto shame and its cognates.) For reasons that are not immediatelyobvious, in the later two books shame was demoted from a central issue to its common cognates. Elias's argumentwas that the Germans,both as persons and as nation, historically have been unable to respond to humiliation in any way other than fighting. His argumentis similar to my analysis of the humiliated fury that arose during the period of the three Franco-Germanwars, 1870-1945 (Scheff 1994).6 I proposed that because of the French defeat in 1871, unacknowledgedshame was a key element on the French side leading to the FirstWorldWar,and, following their defeat in 1918, on the Germanside leading to the Second World War.Like Elias, I propose unacknowledged shame as one source of protractedconflict. Following his success in analyzing shame in The Civilizing Process, why did Elias not develop a technical conception of shame,just as he moved towarda technical conception of interdependence?There is no sure way to answer this question, but one possibility concerns the response of the audience to that book. There was virtually none. The only mention I have been able to find is by Sennett (1980), who recognized the applicabilityof Elias's shame analysis to the problem of social control. Sennett argued that shame and social-economic dependence are intertwined (pp. 45-49), and that shame plays a central role as a tool of discipline of workersby management(pp. 92-97). Although shame was the key injury in Sennett and Cobb's earlier study, The Hidden Injuries of Class (1973), the authorsdid not conceptualize it as such. Although they refer approvinglyto Lynd's (1958) book on shame (p. 127), their study of working-classmen is couched largely in the men's own vernacular.These men spoke of feeling that it was their fault that they had not gotten ahead, that there must be something wrong with them. The phrase "lack of self-respect" occurs frequently,if not universally, in the men's litany of complaintsaboutthemselves. Sennett and Cobb did not classify these various responses as shame clues (Retzinger 1991, 1995). Insteadthey used the same codewords the men did, to continue to hide the alreadyhidden injury. Apparentlythe publication of The Civilizing Process in English (1978), with its open conceptualization of shame as a key component of the civilizing process, encouraged Sennett to point to shame directly and openly in Authority(1980). However, just as there was virtually no response to Elias's shame analysis, there was also none to Sennett's. Just as Elias failed to develop a technical concept of shame, this emotion disappearedfrom Sennett's later work. It might not be stretching a point to conclude that both Elias and Sennett were shamed into silence by the silence of their audiences. Just as shame goes unacknowledged in most social interaction, it is also unacknowledged, and for similar reasons, in social science. SHAME AS THE SOCIALEMOTION Drawing upon the work of the pioneers reviewed here, it is possible to take furthersteps toward defining shame. By shame I mean a large family of emotions that includes many humiliation,and relatedfeelings such cognates and variants,most notablyembarrassment, as shyness that involve reactions to rejection or feelings of failure or inadequacy.What
6I was unawareof this similarity until after I had published my book.

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unites all these cognates is that they involve the feeling of a threatto the social bond. That is, I use a sociological definition of shame, ratherthan the more common psychological one (perception of a discrepancy between ideal and actual self). If one postulates that shame is generated by a threat to the bond, no matter how slight, then a wide range of cognates and variants follow: not only embarrassment,shyness, and modesty, but also feelings of rejection or failure, and heightened self-consciousness of any kind. Note that my definition will usually subsume the psychological one, since most ideals are social, ratherthan individual. If, as proposed here, shame is a result of threatto the bond, shame would be the most social of the basic emotions. Fear is a signal of danger to the body, anger a signal of frustration,and so on. The sources of fear and anger,unlike shame, are not uniquely social. Grief also has a social origin, since it signals the loss of a bond. But bond loss is not a frequent event. Shame on the other hand, following Goffman, since it involves even a slight threat to the bond, is pervasive in virtually all social interaction. I propose that shame is the emotion that Durkheim should have named as the social emotion. As Goffman's work suggests, all human beings are extremely sensitive to the exact amount of deference they are accorded.Even slight discrepanciesgenerateshame or embarrassment. As Darwin (1872) noted, the discrepancycan even be in the positive direction;too much deference can generate the embarrassment heightened self-consciousness. of for social control is a positive variant,a sense of shame. That is, Especially important shame figures in most social interactionbecause althoughmembersmay only occasionally feel shame, they are constantly anticipatingit, as Goffman implied. Goffman's treatment continually,but only implicitly, points to the slightness of threatsto the bond that lead to anticipationof shame or embarrassment. My use of the term shame is much broaderthan its vernacularuse. In common parlance, shame is a negative, crisis emotion closely connected with disgrace. But this is much too narrowif we expect shame to be generatedby even the slightest threatto the bond. Because Simmel, Cooley, Elias, Goffman, and Sennett used only the vernacularword, when they named the emotion of shame at all, there is considerable confusion in interpretingtheir work today. CONCLUSION An obvious question arises from my description of the zigzag progress of shame studies given above. What gives rise to the slipperiness of the concept of shame?Why did Elias, Sennett, Goffman, and others make fundamentalcontributionsto shame knowledge, yet fail to explicitly name and define the emotion they studied as shame, or ignore it in their laterwork?Why did Mead and Dewey ignore the obvious importanceof shame in Cooley? Why did Brown and Levinson recognize the importanceof Goffman's concept of face as the avoidanceof embarrassment, fail to utilize it in theirempiricalstudies?My descripbut tion of the history of shame studies by psychoanalysts suggests many similar questions, particularlyFreud'searly discovery of shame and his later disavowal. My explanation derives from Elias's idea of the advance of the shame threshold, and Lewis's work on unacknowledgedshame. Elias's response to his data led him to an analysis of the underlyingprocess in our civilization that was too advancedfor his audience. In Westernsocieties, Elias pointed out, the thresholdfor shame has been decreasingfor hundreds of years, but at the same time awareness of this emotion has been declining. As his own analysis could have predicted,in our era the level of awarenessof shame is so low that only those trainedto detect unacknowledgedshame could understandthe point that Elias was making. Because Retzinger and I were guided by Lewis's (1971) work, we were

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responsive to Elias's shame analysis. Withinpsychology andpsychoanalysis,Lewis's work is widely acclaimed but seldom used. The developmentof a concept of shame, which includes both analyticaland operational definitions, is crucially importantfor the scientific study of shame. It would appearthat subjects' testimony about shame states, and indeed the presence or absence of any other emotion, may not be valid. Perhapsmost emotional states are disavowed or exaggerated. Following Lewis, it would appearthatmost shame states are not experiencedin consciousness, but are either unconscious or misnamed (bypassed or overt, undifferentiatedshame, in Lewis's [1971] terminology). For this reason studies that rely on testimony of subjects, ratherthan analysis of their behavior and their discourse, are apt to leave out most shame. It is also not clear that subjects'reportsof their own shame and that of others are accurate. Studies are needed to test the validity of subjective reports of shame. In my view, such a test would mean validating standardizedshame measures against analysis of discourse. To continue to develop, the sociology and psychology of emotions should follow up the leads offered by the authorsreviewed here. If we could agree upon a method for studying shame that would be reliable and valid, we might start by testing the key hypotheses on collective shame Elias stated:shame is increasingin modernsocieties, but at the same time awarenessof shameis decreasing.Anotherhypothesis, following Sennettand Cobb, is that members of the working and lower classes are shamed by their status. One directionthat a sociology of emotions might take concerns the dynamics of racial, gender, ethnic, and class relationships.In her chapter"Honorand Shame,"Howard(1995) proposes that women and blacks are likely to be ashamedof themselves. She suggests that they are dishonored,that their status is consistently derogated.To coordinatetheir actions in a white, male-dominatedsociety, women and blacks must take the role of white males, which leads to seeing themselves as they are seen. She supportsthis idea by pointing to the amount of "self-mutilation"that women and blacks undergo in attempting to fit themselves into the male or white ideal. She argues that women's sustained attempts to be slenderandhave small waists, to the point of self-starvation,suggest shamein these women. Similarly, she proposes that hair straighteningand the high status of light skin among blacks has the same implication. Howard's analysis of shame and honor in race and gender relationsis suggestive, but is only a first step. If her formulationis accurate,it would mean that there is an emotional/ relational structurethat sustains the dominationof white males, in additionto legal, political, and economic bases. In order to test this idea, however, shame would need to be investigated so that its presence or absence in women and blacks could be documented. Retzinger's theory of conflict (1991) and my applicationof it to collective conflict (Scheff 1994) suggest that protractedand intense hatred,resentment,and envy are all productsof unacknowledged shame. Research on gender, race, ethnic, and class emotional tensions and alienation could be inspired by this idea. As indicated at the beginning of this article, the classic sociologists believed that emotions are crucially involved in the structureand change of whole societies. The authors reviewed here suggest that shame is the premiersocial emotion. Lynd'swork, particularly, suggests how acknowledgementof shame can strengthenbonds, and by implication, lack of acknowledgmentcan create alienation. Lewis's work furtherand in much more detail suggests how shame/anger loops can create perpetualhostility and alienation.Acknowledged shame, it seems, could be the glue that holds relationships and societies together, and unacknowledgedshame the force that tears them apart.Since we are now in a position to clearly define shame as a working concept, perhapsthe time has come to begin systematic empirical studies of the effect of individual and collective shame on social solidarity and alienation.

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