Mind, Language and Reality Philosophical Papers, Volume 2 HILARY PUTNAM Poe of Poy, Hard ier CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS“he Pt ula, Trapt Set Camb C22 TR Ved Roe ‘The ahh lng Cambs C12 ANU, Ul King, SO Won 2th Suey New York NY To Usa 10 and Ran Oategh Melb 1, As © Camb Unie re 1975 “Thisok in inh. Suc ry actin a {She poe leon elves pete "eto an at my ae ace with ssc wrnen parmica of Came Uta Ps Fis pies 17s Fist pont ean 1979 gn a, 992,19, Pradhan Sta Acs Libary Gongs Catal came 7516 Contents Volume 2 Inroducton Language aad philosophy The analyte and the syathetic a true stron corzespod to reality? Some inscs inthe teary af graromar "The innaeness hypothesis and explanatory models in Tingisis 6 How nottotalk about meaning 7. Review of The conep of person 3 Tesemantics possible? 19, Therefuttion of conventionaism o_ Reply to Gerald Massey 1 Explanation and reference 12, Themeaing of meaning’ 15, Language ad eality 14 Philosophy and oue ment ie 15 Dreaming and “depth gama 16. Brana and behavior 17, Other minds 1H Minds and machioes tg. Robots: machines of ati erated ie? 29 The mental fe f some machines 4 The naire of mental sates 22 Logical poss andthe philosophy of mind Bibingrephy Indes 38 P Bs er ay 2 19 13 12 196 as mm ar 4 35 we ye - “ as 456To my Mother For over hundred years, one of the dominant tendencies in the phi- lowiphy of scence has Been verGestinie: that i the docteine that to know the meaning of «scenic proposition (or of any proposition, cording to most velictioniets tt know what would be evidence for that proposition, Historical, veiationom has been closely ‘connected with positivism: that in at least erigially, the view tht all that science relly does ito describe eguaries in human experience. "Taken together, thse views seem clove to ideaiom. However, many sventethscenuryverfcaonist have wanted to epiace the reference toexperencin the olde formulations ofthese doctrines with ference to “observe thing’ and “observable propertin’ According to this more recent view, selentic statements about the coor of lowers or the “ating habit of bere ae to be taken at face vale ae referring to lowers tut eats; but scientife statements about such “anoluerabes” a8 ‘lectzons are not to be taken ae refering to electrons, but rather 3 feferng tometer readings and the observable results of cloud chamber ‘xperiments. I isnot surprising that philosophers who tok thi tack found themseves in a certain degree of sympathy with psychological ‘behavior. Justa» they wanted to “reduce” statements about such unobeerrables as eectront to statements about “public observa uch st meter readings to they wanted to reduce eatements about phenomena which, whatever their private status, were publicly une Ubvervable, sich ae person's sesttions or emotions, 9 statements ‘Shout auch public observables as bodily behavior, "At this pat, they found therclves in 2 certain bind, On the one hand, the doctrine tat tak about sensations or emtions emp el about a peron’s havior i 90 implausible that amet no pilosoper Ine been ale to mintin it, ra est to mina for Lng. On ‘ther han, ifthe intuition behind recent verificatoin igh and © Iinow the mesnig of 2 statement isto know what would be publ evidence for tthe it seems ai dhere has tobe somthing right abou behaviorist. And wo philosophers tied to develop a philosophy to th eee ~ pies that would sy tht ‘nave behaviors’ ws ie thot that evertlse there wa some kind of semantic oe ogi