Heirs of Rosendo Sevilla Florencio vs.

Heirs of Teresa Sevilla de Leon FACTS: Teresa Sevilla de Leon, owned a residential lot with an area of 828 square meters located in San Miguel, Bulacan. In the 1960s, De Leon allowed the spouses Rosendo and Consuelo Florencio to construct a house on the said property and stay therein without any rentals therefor. In November 1978, De Leon, then already a widow, died intestate. In deference to her wishes, her heirs allowed Rosendo Florencio to continue staying in the property. In March 1995, Florencio died intestate, but his heirs, the respondents, remained in the property. On April 26, 1995, the heirs of De Leon, through counsel, sent a letter to the heirs of Florencio, demanding that they vacate the property within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof. The latter refused and failed to vacate the property. De Leon's heirs contends the following: a). Defendants possession of the premises was merely on the tolerance of the late Teresa de Leon. b). The alleged Deed of Donation does not exist, is patently a falsified document and can never be the source of any right whatsoever. At their very first answer to the complaint, Florencio's heirs contend that the plaintiffs had no cause of action against them, as Teresa de Leon had executed a Deed of Donation on October 1, 1976 over the said parcel of land in favor of their predecessor, Rosendo Florencio. The latter accepted the donation, as shown by his signature above his typewritten name on page one of the deed. Florencio's heirs argue further that: a). Defendants do not have only a better right of possession over the questioned parcel of land and they do not have only the absolute and lawful possession of the same but they have the absolute and lawful ownership of the same not only against the plaintiffs but against the whole world. b). Defendants are entitled to their counterclaim. ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners, as heirs of Rosendo Florencio, who appears to be the donee under the unregistered Deed of Donation, have a better right to the physical or material possession of the property over the respondents, the heirs of Teresa de Leon, the registered owner of the property. HELD: The petition has no merit. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment the donor is made aware of the acceptance by the donee, provided that the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charge imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It must be made in the same deed or in a separate public document, and the donees acceptance must come to the knowledge of the donor. In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it must be made in a public document. Registration of the deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds or in the Assessors Office is not necessary for it to be considered valid and official. Registration does not vest title; it is merely evidence of such title over a particular parcel of land. The necessity of registration comes into play only when the rights of third persons are affected. Furthermore, the heirs are bound by the deed of contracts executed by their predecessors-in-interest.

Espino vs. Vicente FACTS: The crux of the controversy in this case arose from the execution by Emerenciana and Marcelina Espino on January 9, 1997 of a document, denominated as "Pagkakaloob," purportedly donating two lots to respondent

Emma Vicente, the wife of Ricardo Vicente, nephew of Emerenciana. It appears that sometime in December 1996, Emma convinced Marcelina and Emerenciana that she could facilitate the registration and titling in their name of the house and lot where they are staying. Emma allegedly asked Emerenciana and Marcelina who are both illliterate to sign a document to be used in titling the property in their name. Subsequently, Emerenciana and Marcelina learned that the document they signed was a Deed of Donation or a "Pagkakaloob," of the house and lot in favor of Emma, including the 20 square-meter portion that was earlier sold to Marissa. As a consequence, when Emma filed an application for free patent with the DENRPENRO Office of Malolos, Bulacan on January 13, 1997, Marissa delos Santos filed an opposition with the DENR-PENRO and the Register of Deeds. On the other hand, Emerenciana and Marcelina executed a Deed of Revocation of Donation or "Kasulatan ng Pagpapawalang Bisa sa Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob". Petitioners then filed a petition for annulment of patent/title and reconveyance of real property with damages with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan dated April 14, 1997. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but when the respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court reversed the decision. ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the lower courts decision and concluding that the assailed deed of donation enjoys the legal presumption of due execution and validity. HELD: The petition is impressed with merit. A DONATION is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or a right in favour of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential.

Consent in contracts presupposed the following requisites: (1) It should be intelligent, or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. The parties' intention must be clear and that attendance of vice of consent, like in any other contract, renders the donation voidable. It is evident that fraud attended the act of respondent Emma when she procured the signatures of Marcelino and Emerciana. There is fraud when through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induces into a contract which without them, he would have agreed to. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.

Heirs of Juan and Felipe Bonsato vs. CA FACTS: On the first day of December, 1949, Domingo Bonsato, then already a widower, had been induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations (Exhibits 1 and 2) in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively, transferring to them several parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 5652, 12049, and 12052, situated in the municipalities of Mabini and Burgos, Province of Pangasinan, both donations having been duly accepted in the same act and documents. Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the requisite formalities. The defendants, Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely

without the use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the dismissal of the case and for damages in the sum of P2,000. The lower court ruled that the deeds of donation were executed by the donor while the latter was of sound mind, without pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of donation inter vivos without any condition making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor; but as the properties donated were presumptively conjugal, having been acquired during the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations were only valid as to an undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land described therein. In the Court of Appeals, majority of the justices declared that the aforesaid donations to be null and void, because they were donations mortis causa and were executed without the testamentary formalities prescribed by law, and ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato to surrender the possession of the properties in litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants. Two justices, however, dissented, claiming that the said donations should be considered as donations inter vivos. HELD: Strictly speaking, the issue is whether the documents in question embody valid donations, or else legacies void for failure to observe the formalities of wills (testaments). Despite the widespread use of the term "donations mortis causa," it is well-established at present that the Civil Code of 1889, in its Art. 620, broke away from the Roman Law tradition, and followed the French doctrine that no one may both donate and retain ("donner at retenir ne vaut"), by merging the erstwhile donations mortis causa with the testamentary dispositions, thus suppressing said donations as an independent legal concept. ART. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of disposals of property by will and shall be governed by the rules established for testamentary successions.

Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics: (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633); (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, G. R. L-4326, November 18, 1952); (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation, Exhibits 1 and 2, executed by the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or produce, a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be "irrevocable", a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New Civil Code, Art. 828).

Maglasang vs. Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan FACTS:

On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation (sic) Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering one-half () portion of the former's house and lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu. Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, bestowing upon petitioners Nicolas, Merly S. Cabatingan and Estela C. Maglasang for two parcels of land. One of the provisions in the deeds are as follows: "That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect." When Conchita died in May 9, 1995, and upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents filed an action to annul the said four (4) deeds of donation. Respondents allege that petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa. Petitioners deny respondents' allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused the preparation of the instruments. The lower court ruled in favor of the respondents, while the ISSUE: Whether the donations to the petitioners are donations mortis causa or inter vivos. HELD: Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as these were made by the late

Conchita Cabatingan "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" for the donee, and there is nothing in the deeds which indicate that the donations were made in consideration of Cabatingan's death. Petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit. In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the Acceptance and Attestation clauses of the Deed of Donation. That the donations were made "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" does not qualify the donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason. Petition denied.

Apolinaria Austria-Magat vs. CA

FACTS: On December 17, 1975, Basilisa Comerciante, mother of petitioner and one of respondents, furnished a Deed of Donation to donate her house and lot to her four children (petitioner and respondent included), provided that the funeral expenses will be deducted from the total value of the lot before it is to be divided among the children. The children signed to the same deed in acceptance to the donation. That same day, they also signed into a notarized document stating that the property and the document pertaining to the same will be under the custody of the original owner (Comerciante) for as long as she lives. On February 6, 1979, Comerciante executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same house and lot in favor of the petitioner, prompting the respondents to file an action against the petitioner for the annulment of the deed of sale on September 21, 1983. The lower court ruled in favor of the respondent (petitioner herein), but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court decision. CONTENTIONS: Trial Court: (1) The donation is a donation mortis causa based on the provision on the deed of donation that it would take effect upon the death of the donor. (2) The provision stating that the donor reserved the right to revoke the donation is a feature of a donation mortis causa which must comply with the formalities of a will (3) Inasmuch as the donation did not follow the formalities pertaining to wills, the same is void and produced no effect whatsoever. Hence, the sale by the donor of the said property was valid since she remained to be the absolute owner thereof during the time of the said transaction. CA: A provision in the deed of donation in question providing for the irrevocability of the donation is a characteristic of a donation inter vivos. By those words, the donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the house and lot in question. The right to dispose of a property is a right essential to full ownership. Hence, ownership of the house and lot was already with the donees even during the donors lifetime. HELD:

We affirm the appellate courts decision. In Cuevas v. Cuevas, we ruled that when the deed of donation provides that the donor will not dispose or take away the property donated (thus making the donation irrevocable), he in effect is making a donation inter vivos. He parts away with his naked title but maintains beneficial ownership while he lives. It remains to be a donation inter vivos despite an express provision that the donor continues to be in possession and enjoyment of the donated property while he is alive. In the Bonsato case, we held that: What is most significant [in determining the type of donation] is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be irrevocable, a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation. Appellate Court decision affirmed.

Sumipat vs. Banga FACTS: On January 5, 1983, Lauro Sumipat executed a document denominated "DEED OF ABSOLUTE TRANSFER AND/OR QUITCLAIM OVER REAL PROPERTIES" (the assailed document) in favor of his illegitimate children (defendants-appellees) covering the three parcels of land (the properties). On the document appears the signature of his wife Placida which indicates that she gave her marital consent thereto. That time, Lauro was already very sick and bedridden; that upon defendantappellee Lydias request, their neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of Lauro Sumipat whereupon Lydia guided his (Lauro Sumipats) hand in affixing his signature on the assailed document which she had brought; that Lydia thereafter left but later returned on the same day and requested Lauros unlettered wife Placida to sign on the assailed document, as she did in haste, even without the latter getting a

responsive answer to her query on what it was all about. After Lauro Sumipats death on January 30, 1984, his wife Placida and defendants-appellees jointly administered the properties 50% of the produce of which went to plaintiff-appellant. As plaintiff-appellants share in the produce of the properties dwindled until she no longer received any and learning that the titles to the properties in question were already transferred/made in favor of the defendants-appellees, she filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles, contracts, partition, recovery of ownership now the subject of the present appeal. Defendant-appellee Lydia disclaims participation in the execution of the assailed document, she claiming to have acquired knowledge of its existence only on January 10, 1983 or five days after its execution when Lauro Sumipat gave the same to her. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendantappellees, because it found that the subject properties are conjugal having been acquired during the marriage of Lauro Sumipat and Placida Tabotabo (Placida). However, because Placida failed to question the genuineness and due execution of the deed and even admitted having affixed her signature thereon, the trial court declared that the entirety of the subject properties, and not just Lauro Sumipats conjugal share, were validly transferred to the defendants, the petitioners herein. On appeal, the appellate court held that since Placida was unlettered, the appellees, the petitioners herein, as the parties interested in enforcing the deed, have the burden of proving that the terms thereof were fully explained to her. This they failed to do. ISSUE: Whether the questioned deed by its terms or under the surrounding circumstances has validly transferred title to the disputed properties to the petitioners. HELD: Art. 749 of the Civil Code states that:

"In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor. If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments." Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.20 In this case, the donees acceptance of the donation is not manifested either in the deed itself or in a separate document. Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation is patently void.

Apolonia Ocampo vs. Fidela Ocampo FACTS: Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander-Ocampo have ten children, including the petitioners and respondents to this case. In the celebration of their marriage, they acquired several properties, all of which are owned in common by their children. However, the residential/commercial lot in Nabua, Camarines Sur is ostensibly owned by Fidela Ocampo, although the latter

acknowledges that the same is co-owned by her and her siblings. Aside from the first complaint that they have filed before the trial court, petitioners also filed a supplemental complaint where they allege that Fidela Ocampo cancelled the first TCT of the lot in Nabua and issued a new one in the form of Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in favor of Belen Ocampo-Barrito and her spouse Vicente Barrito. Both the donor of the donee are notoriously aware that the lot is still under dispute in the petitioners' first complaint, nevertheless, the two still pursued the donation. Petitioners also allege that the transfer of ownership from Fidela to Belen, daughter of another defendant Felicidad, is tainted with fraud, actual and deliberate, to deprive plaintiffs of their legitimate share therein, knowing as they do that the same are a co-ownership of the original parties plaintiffs and defendants herein. Defendants, on the other hand, allege that Fidela has been the absolute owner of the property since 1949, and that its title is free from all encumbrances and adverse claims. In 1984, Fidela conveyed the property to Belen via a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos and since September 13, 1987, Belen has been the absolute owner of the same property. In its decision, the Appellate Court said that other than the Acknowledgment of Coownership executed by Respondent Fidela Ocampo, no documentary evidence was offered to establish petitioners claim of co-ownership. It also said that respondents were able to give clear proof of their ownership of the property: the Transfer Certificate of Title and the corresponding Tax Declaration in the name of Fidela, and later of Belen Ocampo-Barrito. ISSUE: Where a deed of donation inter vivos entered in bad faith deprives the heirs of their hereditary shares, is said deed valid? HELD: The Petition has no merit.

Belen presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed on January 13, 1984, between herself as donee and Fidela as donor. This act shows the immediate source of the formers claim of sole ownership of the property. A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title to the property from the donor to the donee. Petitioners stubbornly rely on the Acknowledgement of Coownership allegedly executed by Fidela in favor of her siblings. What they overlook is the fact that at the time of the execution of the Acknowledgement -- assuming that its authenticity and due execution were proven -the property had already been donated to Belen. The Deed of Donation, which is the prior document, is clearly inconsistent with the document relied upon by petitioners. We agree with the RTCs ratiocination: "On the claim of plaintiffs that defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo herself made a written acknowledgement for her co-ownership over all the properties disputed with plaintiffs in this case, the same cannot be considered as a declaration against Fidelas interest since the alleged acknowledgement was written and executed on 24 December 1985 when she was no longer the owner of the property as the year previous, on 13 January 1984, she had already donated all her properties to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, so that, in effect, she had no more properties with which she can have an interest to declare against."

Eugenio Cagaoan vs. Felix Cagaoan FACTS: On November 3, 1915, Gregorio Cagaoan executed a deed of gift of four parcels of land situated in the municipality of Tayug, Province of Pangasinan, in favor of his son Felix Cagaoan and on October 26, 1918, he executed a similar deed in favor of his other son Eugenio Cagaoan for a parcel of land which, apparently, is the same as that described as parcel No. 4 in the deed of gift executed in favor of Felix. Both of

the deeds of gift are free from formal defects and were duly accepted by the donees. Eugenio was able to take possession of the donation he received, but he was not able to register the same. On the other hand, Felix was able to register his part. HELD: The case seems to use to be analogous to one where the same real property has been sold by the same vendor to two difference vendees. In such cases, under article 1473 of the Civil Code, the property goes to the vendee who first records his title in the registry of property. If the sale is not recorded by either vendee, the property goes to the one who first takes possession of its in good, faith, and in the absence of both record and possession, to the one who present oldest title, provided there is good faith. (It follows the rule of double sales.)

from the Palace and substantially improving the appearance of the locality. Barretto brought the action to recover possession of the land on account of the failure of the city to comply with the conditions of the donation. HELD: Although a formal conveyance of the property appears to have never been made, yet the taking possession of the land by the city upon the terms contained in the offer and acceptance give effect to the latter. The whole negotiation must be taken into consideration in order to determine what was in the minds of the parties at the time. The plaintiff's proposition was unmistakable. If the city designed to reject any part of it while accepting the rest, such rejection should have been in express terms. Not only do we fail to find any such rejection, but in the letter of June 19 there appears to be in its concluding words an express recognition of the terms imposed, when it is provided that the deed of cession shall be drawn "with the restrictions indicated by you." This is a reference to the restrictions in the letter of the plaintiff and operates of necessity as an acceptance of them.

Barretto vs. City of Manila FACTS: Enrique Ma. Barretto donates his lot in front of Malacanang Palace to the City of Manila, on the condition that "no structures shall be erected upon the land and that it will not be devoted to any purpose other than the beautifying of the vicinity, and for this purpose the city should acquire such of the adjoining land as may be necessary to form with mine a public square with gardens and walks." The Ayuntamiento and the Corregimiento of the City declared its acceptance over Barretto's offer, both requesting for its documents and necessary deeds of conveyance. Barretto thereafter sent to the Ayuntamiento the necessary documents, and until the month of February, 1903, appears to have had the idea that a formal transfer of the plot had been executed by him; in fact, it had not been. However, the city entered into possession of the land, building a railing separating it from the adjoining property, and ever since that time the ground has been used as part of the public street, increasing the width thereof opposite the exit

Moreo-Lentfer vs. Wolff FACTS: On March 6, 1992, petitioners and respondent engaged the notarial services of Atty. Rodrigo C. Dimayacyac for: (1) the sale of a beach house owned by petitioner Cross in Sabang, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, and (2) the assignment of Cross' contract of lease on the land where the house stood. The sale of the beach house and the assignment of the lease right would be in the name of petitioner Victoria Moreo-Lentfer, but the total consideration of 220,000 Deutschmarks (DM) would be paid by respondent Hans Jurgen Wolff. A promissory note was executed by said respondent in favor of petitioner Cross.

According to respondent, however, the Lentfer spouses were his confidants who held in trust for him, a time deposit account in the amount of DM 200,0004 at Solid Bank Corporation. Apprised of his interest to own a house along a beach, the Lentfer couple urged him to buy petitioner Cross' beach house and lease rights in Puerto Galera. Respondent agreed and through a bank-to-bank transaction, he paid Cross the amount of DM 221,7005 as total consideration for the sale and assignment of the lease rights. However, Cross, Moreo-Lentfer and Atty. Dimayacyac surreptitiously executed a deed of sale whereby the beach house was made to appear as sold to Moreo-Lentfer for only P100,000. The assignment of the lease right was likewise made in favor of Moreo-Lentfer. Upon learning of this, respondent filed a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. R-4219 with the lower court for annulment of sale and reconveyance of property with damages and prayer for a writ of attachment. The lower court dismissed the respondent's complaint, but the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision. HELD: Petitioner Moreo-Lentfer's claim of either cash or property donation rings hollow. A donation is a simple act of liberality where a person gives freely of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.16 But when a large amount of money is involved, equivalent to P3,297,800, based on the exchange rate in the year 1992, we are constrained to take the petitioners' claim of liberality of the donor with more than a grain of salt. Petitioners could not brush aside the fact that a donation must comply with the mandatory formal requirements set forth by law for its validity. Since the subject of donation is the purchase money, Art. 748 of the New Civil Code is applicable. Accordingly, the donation of money equivalent to P3,297,800 as well as its acceptance should have been in writing. It was not. Hence, the donation is invalid for noncompliance with the formal requisites prescribed by law.

Petition denied.

Seventh Day Adventist Conference Church of Southern Philippines vs. Northeastern Mindanao Mission of Seventh Day Adventist FACTS: Spouses Felix Cosio and Felisa Cuysona donate a parcel of land to South Philippine [Union] Mission of Seventh Day Adventist Church, and was received by Liberato Rayos, an elder of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, on behalf of the donee. However, twenty years later, the spouses sold the same land to the Seventh Day Adventist Church of Northeastern Mindanao Mission. Claiming to be the alleged donees successorsin-interest, petitioners asserted ownership over the property. This was opposed by respondents who argued that at the time of the donation, SPUM-SDA Bayugan could not legally be a donee because, not having been incorporated yet, it had no juridical personality. Neither were petitioners members of the local church then, hence, the donation could not have been made particularly to them. ISSUE: Should the Seventh Day Adventist Church of Northeastern Mindanao Mission's ownership of the lot be upheld? HELD: We answer in the affirmative. Donation is undeniably one of the modes of acquiring ownership of real property. Likewise, ownership of a property may be transferred by tradition as a consequence of a sale. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another person who accepts it. The donation could not have been made in favor of an entity yet inexistent at the time it was made. Nor could it have been accepted as there was yet no one to accept it.

The deed of donation was not in favor of any informal group of SDA members but a supposed SPUM-SDA Bayugan (the local church) which, at the time, had neither juridical personality nor capacity to accept such gift. (With questions regarding de facto corporation and law of sales.) Petition Denied.

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner, while the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the donation inter vivos is valid HELD: The trial court found the donation of the land void because Fermina was not the owner thereof, considering that it was inherited by Sixto from his parents. Thus, the land was not part of the conjugal property of the spouses Sixto and Fermina Calicdan, because under the Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable when Sixto died in 1941, the surviving spouse had a right of usufruct only over the estate of the deceased spouse. Consequently, respondent, who derived his rights from Fermina, only acquired the right of usufruct as it was the only right which the latter could convey. After a review of the evidence on record, we find that the Court of Appeals ruling that the donation was valid was not supported by convincing proof. Respondent himself admitted during the cross examination that he had no personal knowledge of whether Sixto Calicdan in fact purchased the subject land from Felomino Bautista. In People v. Guittap, we held that: Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as "evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others." The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing. In Sanvicente v. People, we held that when evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight for being patently hearsay. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as evidence.

Calicdan vs. Cendaa FACTS: On August 25, 1947, Fermina Calicdan executed a deed of donation inter vivos whereby she conveyed the land to respondent Silverio Cendaa,4 who immediately entered into possession of the land, built a fence around the land and constructed a two-storey residential house thereon sometime in 1949, where he resided until his death in 1998. On June 29, 1992, petitioner, through her legal guardian Guadalupe Castillo, filed a complaint for "Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages" against the respondent, alleging that the donation was void; that respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the land; and that she merely tolerated respondents possession of the land as well as the construction of his house thereon. In his "Answer with Motion to Dismiss", respondent alleged, by way of affirmative defenses, that the land was donated to him by Fermina in 1947; and that he had been publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely in possession of the land for a period of 45 years. Moreover, he argued that the complaint was barred by prior judgment in the special proceedings for the "Inventory of Properties of Incompetent Soledad Calicdan", where the court decreed the exclusion of the land from the inventory of properties of the petitioner.

The Court of Appeals thus erred in ruling based on respondents bare hearsay testimony as evidence of the donation made by Fermina.

by respondent before the notary public in the same instrument of donation. The title to the property, however, remained in the name of Dr. Felipe C. Roque, and it was only transferred to and in the name of respondent sixteen years later, or on 11 May 1994. The trial court dismissed the complaint of the respondent, explaining that "(o)rdinarily, a deed of donation need not be registered in order to be valid between the parties. Registration, however, is important in binding third persons. Thus, when Felipe Roque entered into a leased contract with defendant corporation, plaintiff Efren Roque (could) no longer assert the unregistered deed of donation and say that his father, Felipe, was no longer the owner of the subject property at the time the lease on the subject property was agreed upon." On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, explaining that petitioner was not a lessee in good faith having had prior knowledge of the donation in favor of respondent, and that such actual knowledge had the effect of registration insofar as petitioner was concerned. HELD: The existence, albeit unregistered, of the donation in favor of respondent is undisputed. The trial court and the appellate court have not erred in holding that the non-registration of a deed of donation does not affect its validity. As being itself a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee.3 In donations of immovable property, the law requires for its validity that it should be contained in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.4 The Civil Code provides, however, that "titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds) shall not prejudice third persons."5 It is enough, between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, that the donation be made in a public document but, in order to bind third persons, the

Shoppers' Paradise Realty and Development Corporation vs. Roque FACTS: On 23 December 1993, petitioner Shoppers Paradise Realty & Development Corporation, represented by its president, Veredigno Atienza, entered into a twenty-five year lease with Dr. Felipe C. Roque, now deceased, over a parcel of land. Simultaneously, petitioner and Dr. Roque likewise entered into a memorandum of agreement for the construction, development and operation of a commercial building complex on the property. Conformably with the agreement, petitioner issued a check for another P250,000.00 "downpayment" to Dr. Roque. The contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, both notarized, were to be annotated on TCT No. 30591 within sixty (60) days from 23 December 1993 or until 23 February 1994. The annotations, however, were never made because of the untimely demise of Dr. Felipe C. Roque. The death of Dr. Roque on 10 February 1994 constrained petitioner to deal with respondent Efren P. Roque, one of the surviving children of the late Dr. Roque, but the negotiations broke down due to some disagreements. Respondent then filed a case for annulment of the contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Efren P. Roque alleged that he had long been the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of a deed of donation inter vivos executed in his favor by his parents, Dr. Felipe Roque and Elisa Roque, on 26 December 1978, and that the late Dr. Felipe Roque had no authority to enter into the assailed agreements with petitioner. The donation was made in a public instrument duly acknowledged by the donor-spouses before a notary public and duly accepted on the same day

donation must be registered in the registry of Property (Registry of Land Titles and Deeds).6 Consistently, Section 50 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), as so amended by Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), states: "SECTION 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner.- An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. "The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies." Petition denied.

National High School building on a parcel of land it acquired from Alejandro Feliciano. The school site was about 2 kilometers away from the land donated by the spouses Dulay. In a letter to the DECS Secretary dated August 19, 1994, the spouses Dulay requested that the property be returned to them considering that the land was never used since 1981, or a period of more than 13 years. On August 28, 1994, the Barangay Council of Rizal, Santiago City issued Resolution No. 397 recognizing the right of the donors to redeem the subject parcel of land because of the DECS failure to utilize it for the intended purpose. It further resolved that the Rizal National High School no longer needed the donated land "considering its distance from the main campus and [the] failure to utilize the property for a long period of time." On August 31, 1997, the heirs of Dulay, Sr., herein respondents, filed a complaint for the revocation of the deed of donation and cancellation of the title, alleging that (1) there was a condition in the deed of donation: that the DECS, as donee, utilize the subject property for school purposes, that is, the construction of a building to house the Rizal National High School, (2) the DECS did not fulfill the condition and that the land remained idle up to the present, and (3) the donation inter vivos was inofficious, since the late Rufino Dulay, Sr. donated more than what he could give by will. Petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed the following defenses: (a) the DECS complied with said condition because the land was being used by the school as its technology and home economics laboratory; (b) the donation was not inofficious for the donors were the owners of five other parcels of land, all located at Rizal, Santiago City; (c) the DECS acquired the disputed property by virtue of purchase made on December 8, 1997 by the barangay of Rizal, Santiago City in the amount of P18,000.00 as certified by its former Barangay Captain, Jesus San Juan;11 and (d) the action of the respondents had prescribed. The OSG also claimed that students planted a portion of the land with rice, mahogany seedlings, and fruit-

Secretary of Education vs. Heirs of Dulay, Sr. FACTS: On August 3, 1981, the spouses Rufino Dulay, Sr. and Ignacia Vicente Dulay executed a deed of donation over a 10,000-square-meter portion of their property in favor of the Ministry of Education and Culture. The property was subdivided. On April 13, 1983, a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of the Ministry of Education and Culture, represented by Laurencio C. Ramel, the Superintendent of Schools of Isabela. However, the property was not used for school purposes and remained idle. Sometime in 1988, the DECS, through its Secretary, started construction of the Rizal

bearing trees; the produce would then be sold and the proceeds used for the construction of a school building on the subject property. ISSUE: (1) Whether or nor the DECS had complied with the condition imposed on the the deed of donation. (2) Whether the respondents' right to seek the revocation of the deed of donation is already barred by prescription and laches. HELD: The contention of petitioners has no merit. As gleaned from the CA decision, petitioners failed to prove that the donated property was used for school purposes as indicated in the deed of donation: We find it difficult to sustain that the defendantappellants have complied with the condition of donation. It is not amiss to state that other than the bare allegation of the defendant-appellants, there is nothing in the records that could concretely prove that the condition of donation has been complied with by the defendantappellants. In the same breadth, the planting of palay on the land donated can hardly be considered and could not have been the "school purposes" referred to and intended by the donors when they had donated the land in question. Also, the posture of the defendant-appellants that the land donated is being used as technology and home economics laboratory of the Rizal National High School is far from being the truth considering that not only is the said school located two kilometers away from the land donated but also there was not even a single classroom built on the land donated that would reasonably indicate that, indeed, classes have been conducted therein. These observations, together with the unrebutted ocular inspection report made by the trial court which revealed that the land donated remains idle and without any improvement thereon for more than a decade since the time of the donation, give Us no other alternative but to conclude that the defendant-appellants have, indeed, failed to comply with what is incumbent upon them in the deed of donation.

The right to seek the revocation of donation had not yet prescribed when respondents filed their complaint Anent the second issue, we reject the contention of the OSG that respondents cause of action is already barred by prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, or four years from the non-compliance with the condition in the deed of donation. Since such failure to comply with the condition of utilizing the property for school purposes became manifest sometime in 1988 when the DECS utilized another property for the construction of the school building, the fouryear prescriptive period did not commence on such date. Petitioner was given more than enough time to comply with the condition, and it cannot be allowed to use this fact to its advantage. It must be stressed that the donation is onerous because the DECS, as donee, was burdened with the obligation to utilize the land donated for school purposes. Under Article 733 of the New Civil Code, a donation with an onerous cause is essentially a contract and is thus governed by the rules on contract.