Navales v.

Abaya Facts: Under the Information dated 1 August 2003 filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, the Department of Justice (DOJ) charged 321 of those soldiers who took part in the Oakwood Incident with violation of Article 134-A (coup detat) of the Revised Penal Code. Among those charged were 1Lt. Navales, et al. (GR 162318) and those who are subject of the petition for habeas corpus Capt. Reaso, et al. (GR 162341). The case, entitled People v. Capt. Milo Maestrecampo, et al., was docketed as Criminal Case 03-2784 and raffled to Branch 61 presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza. On 12 September 2003, several (243 in number) of the accused in Criminal Case 03-2784 filed with the RTC (Branch 61) an Omnibus Motion praying that the trial court: (1) assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military tribunal in accordance with Republic Act 7055; and (2) order the prosecution to present evidence to establish probable cause against 316 of the 321 accused and, should the prosecution fail to do so, dismiss the case as against the 316 other accused. While the said motion was pending resolution, the DOJ issued the Resolution dated 20 October 2003 finding probable cause for coup detat against only 31 of the original 321 accused and dismissing the charges against the other 290 for insufficiency of evidence. Thus, upon the instance of the prosecution, the RTC (Branch 61), in its Order dated 14 November 2003, admitted the Amended Information dated 30 October 2003 charging only 31 of the original accused with the crime of coup detat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code. Further, the said Order expressly stated that the case against the other 290 accused, including Lt. Navales, et al. and those who are subject of the petition for habeas corpus, Capt. Reaso, et al., was dismissed. In another Order dated 18 November 2003, the RTC (Branch 61) issued commitment orders against those 31 accused charged under the Amended Information and set their arraignment. Meanwhile, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., who were earlier dropped as accused in Criminal Case 03-2784, were charged before the General Court-Martial with violations of the Articles of War (AW), particularly: AW 67 (Mutiny), AW 97 (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman), AW 63 (Disrespect to the President, the Secretary of Defense, etc.) and AW 64 (Disrespect Towards Superior Officer). On the other hand, Capt. Maestrecampo and the 30 others who remained charged under the Amended Information were not included in the charge sheets for violations of the Articles of War. Thereafter, Criminal Case 03-2784 was consolidated with Criminal Case 03-2678, entitled People v. Ramon Cardenas, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC of Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel. On 11 February 2004, acting on the earlier Omnibus Motion filed by the 243 of the original accused under the Information dated 1 August 2003, the RTC (Branch 148) issued an Order, declaring the omnibus motion moot and academic, and the charges before the court-martial against the accused (those included in the Order of 18 November 2003) as well as those former accused (those included in the Order of 14 November 2003) as not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup detat. In the Notice of Hearing dated 1 March 2004, the General Court-Martial set on 16 March 2004 the arraignment/trial of those charged with violations of the Articles of War in connection with the 27 July 2003 Oakwood Incident. The present petitions for prohibition and for habeas corpus were then filed with the Supreme Court. Acting on the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order in the petition for prohibition in GR 162318, the Supreme Court, in the Resolution dated 16 March 2004, directed

the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the filing of the petition. Issue: The sole issue that needs to be resolved is whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus. Held: No. Insofar as those whose case against them was dismissed, there was nothing else left to resolve after the Omnibus Motion was considered moot and academic. Indeed, as they were no longer parties to the case, no further relief could be granted to them. 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. could be properly considered as strangers to the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-2784. And in the same manner that strangers to a case are not 20 bound by any judgment rendered by the court, any rulings made by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 are no longer binding on 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. The RTC (Branch 148) itself recognized this as it made the statement, quoted earlier, that in view of the Order of Judge Barza dated November 14, 2003 dismissing the case against aforesaid accused, the Court, therefore, can no longer assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military courts and this Court cannot undo nor reverse the Order of November 14, 2003 of Judge Barza there being no motion filed by the prosecution to 21 reconsider the order or by any of the accused. Thus, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., who are no longer charged with coup detat, cannot find solace in the declaration of the RTC (Branch 148) that the charges filed before the General CourtMartial against them were not service-connected. The same is a superfluity and cannot be given effect for having been made by the RTC (Branch 148) without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The writs of prohibition (G.R. No. 162318) and habeas corpus (G.R. No. 162341) prayed for by the petitioners must perforce fail. As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has 33 jurisdiction to do so. Further, the writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been 34 charged before any court or quasi-judicial body. The term court necessarily includes the General Court-Martial. These rules apply to Capt. Reaso, et al., as they are under detention pursuant to the Commitment Order dated August 2, 2003 issued by respondent Chief 35 of Staff of the AFP pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War. On the other hand, the office of the writ of prohibition is to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested 36 As earlier discussed, the General Court-Martial has by law. jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. under Rep. Act No. 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to prevent it from exercising its jurisdiction. Tinitigan v. Tinitigan Two petitions are herein filed to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 1, 1976 in CA-G.R. No. 05387- SP docketed as L-45418 and L-45574 respectively, affirming the order of respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig, Branch II in Civil Case No. 21277 dated September 29, 1975. On March 25, 1975, petitioners Pentel Merchandising Co., Inc. (Pentel for short) and Teofista Payumo Tinitigan (Payuran for short) entered into a contract of lease of a residential house whereby for a term of four years Payumo shall lease to Pentel the premises at 205 Loring St., Pasay City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15923, at a rental of P1,500.00 per month with option to buy the same within the term of the lease for P350,000.00 [pp. 13-16, rec]. On April 22, 1975, Payumo and her three children, Efren, Elsa, and Severino Jr., all surnamed Tinitigan, leased to United Electronics Corporation a factory building together with the portion of land on which it is erected covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 160998 situated in Banwag, Paraaque, Rizal (pp. 17-20, rec., L-45418).

In both transactions, the consent of Severino Tinitigan Sr. (Tinitigan for short), husband of Payumo and private responded herein, was not secured. Consequently, on May 22, 1975, Severino Tinitigan Sr., as conjugal partner and shareholder of Molave Development Corporation which is a family corporation filed a complaint captioned "Annulment of Ownership and Contract of witness Pre-Injunction" in the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig, 7th Judicial District (pp. 23-27, rec.). This case docketed Civil Case No. 21277 and which was assigned to Branch II presided by the Honorable Judge Pedro C. Navarro principally sought to annul the contract of lease executed by Payumo in favor of United Electronics Corporation The property involved in this contract is entirely different from that leased to Pentel with option to buy. The complaint, however, was later amended with leave of court granted by order of August 20, 1975, to include in the prayer the following: ... 2. to restrain the defendant-relatives of the plaintiff from encumbering or disposing properties in the name of the Molave Development Corporation or those in the name of Severino Tinitigan Sr. and Teofista Payuran; ... In the same order, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II enjoined petitioner from doing any "act to dispose, mortgage or otherwise encumber the properties described in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint" and set the case for hearing on the issuance of a preliminary injunction on September 5, 1975. Paragraphs 7 and 8 pertain to the factory building and the land on which it is erected covered by TCT No. 160998 (p. 151, rec.). At the hearing of the preliminary injunction the issue of the contract of lease of lot covered by TCT 160998 which was the main object of the complaint was settled amicably. Severino Tinitigan Sr., however, on September 17, 1975, filed a motion seeking judicial approval of sale of a two-storey residential house and a lot which are conjugal properties located at 205 Loring St., Pasay City, covered by TCT No. 15923 (pp. 28-34, rec.). The house is tenanted by Quintin Lim Eng Seng (Quintin Lim for short) who is President and General Manager of Pentel. Tinitigan contends that the proposed sale of the property for P300,000.00 to Quintin who was given priority right to purchase, was necessary to pay outstanding conjugal obligations that were overdue in the amount of P256,137.79 and to forestall the foreclosure of mortgaged conjugal property. Earlier, the same property had been leased by Payumo to Pentel with an option to buy for P350,000.00. On September 29, 1975, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II issued an order granting Tinitigan "authority to sell the house and lot at No. 205 Loring St., Pasay City covered by TCT No. 15923 in favor of Quintin Lim, if he is a Filipino citizen, for P300,000.00" (pp. 35-37, rec.,). An urgent motion for reconsideration was filed by Payumo and children alleging among others that the sale would result in substantial and tremendous losses because the property sought to be sold is a suitable condominium and/or hotel site and would, therefore, command a higher price (pp. 56-57, rec.). On October 9, 1975, merely two days after the motion for reconsideration of the September 29, 1975 order was filed in the CFI of Rizal, Branch II, the wife Payumo filed against her husband Tinitigan a complaint for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership, docketed as Civil Case No. 4459-P before Branch XXVIII of the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City presided by the Honorable Judge Enrique A. Agana (pp. 17-21, rec.). On October 29, 1975, the Pasay Court after noting that "the parties had agreed to the continuation of the administration of said conjugal properties by plaintiff (wife) Teofista P. Tinitigan," appointed her administrative of the conjugal properties. On January 5, 1977, a petition for review docketed as L-45418 was filed with this Court by Payumo and her three children praying for the

issuance of a writ of certiorari directed to the Court of Appeals, and commanding it to send to this Court for review and determination the records and proceedings of Civil Case No. 21277 assigned to the CFI of Rizal in Pasig, Branch II, presided by respondent Judge Navarro. The main allegations of the petition are: lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court since it did not have judicial authority to authorize the sale of the conjugal property in Civil Case No. 21277 considering that the complaint in the said case referred to other properties to the exclusion of the one authorized to be sold; and abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal since the order authorizing the sale of the Loring property was not merely interlocutory but one that was final and appealable. On February 15, 1976, another petition was filed with this Court, this time by Pentel and Payuran, against respondents Court of Appeals. Honorable Pedro C. Navarro, Chiu Chin Siong and Severino Tinitigan Sr. The petition, docketed as L-45574, seeks to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 05387-SP dated June 1, 1976 and order of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 21277 dated September 29, 1975 on the ground that the said decision and order are void. Secondly, petitioners contend that the questioned order is void because respondent Judge had not acquired jurisdiction over the premises and could not grant Tinitigan Sr. authority to sell them. They would seem to capitalize on the fact that the complaint in Civil Case No. 21277 particularly mentioned only the lot covered by TCT No. 160998 leased to United Electronics Corporation. Petitioners failed to note, however, that in the amended complaint, respondents prayed among others "to restrain the defendant-relatives of the plaintiff from encumbering or disposing properties in the name of the Molave Development Corporation or those in the name of Severino Tinitigan Sr, and Teofista Payuran." This, in effect, brings the Loring property by TCT No. 15923 within the jurisdiction of the court which issued the order. Certainly, a motion in relation thereto is but proper. Furthermore, it is worth repeating that the said motion to seek judicial approval of sale in lieu of marital consent amounts to compliance with legal requirement delineated in Article 166, supra. The issuance of the order dated September 29, 1975 was, henceforth, pursuant to a validly acquired jurisdiction, in keeping with a well-entrenched principle that "jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. It is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein - a matter that can be resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Nor may the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for, were we to be governed by such rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant. But it is necessary that jurisdiction be properly involved or called into activity by the firing of a petition, complaint or other appropriate pleading. Nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. None of the parties to the litigation can enlarge or diminish it or dictate when it shall be removed. That power is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change" (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1970 ed., pp. 3738).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In addition, records further disclose that the action for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership was filed almost right after the order of September 29, 1975 in Civil Case No. 21277 was issued. As can be gleaned from the facts, the filing of Civil Case No. 4459-P was apparently a tactical maneuver intended to frustrate the order of September 29, 1975 issued by respondent Judge Navarro granting Tinitigan Sr. authority to sell the Loring property. Aptly, however, the order of October 29, 1975 made the appointment of Payumo as administrative subject to the condition "that the disposition of the property located at Loring St., Pasay City shall be subeject to the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch II, Pasig, Rizal." There can be no clearer indication of the validity of the questioned order, as far as jurisdiction is concerned, than the latter court's own recognition of the jurisdiction priorly acquired by the court issuing it. The well-settled rule that "jurisdiction once acquired continues until the case is finally terminated" is hereby observed (Republic vs. Central Surety and Ins. Co., 25 SCRA 641[1968]). "The jurisdiction of a court depends upon the state of facts existing at

the time it is invoked, and if the jurisdiction once attaches to the person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of events, although they are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first innocence, will not operate to oust jurisdiction almdy attached" (Ramos vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 565, 583 [1971]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Consequently, there is no merit in the assertion of petitioner that it is the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City, Branch XXVIII which should have assumed jurisdiction over the disputed property upon the filing of the complaint for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership To permit this would result in the disregard of the order of September 29, 1975 issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Pasig, Branch II. Not even the court whose jurisdiction is being invoked sanctions this seeming attempt to contravene sound doctrines and long-standing principles.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Thirdly, petitioners question the validity of the order appellant proving the sale of the Loring property on the ground that the sale was expressly authorized in favor of Quintin Lim and not respondent Chiu. Obviously, this is but a collateral issue. It is noteworthy that the motion was filed in order to secure judicial approval of sale in lieu of marital consent as Payumo would not grant the same. The order, therefore, was not intended to vest Quintin Lim exclusive right to purchase the Loring property but rather it was intended to grant Tinitigan Sr. authorized to sell the same. To construe otherwise would defeat the purpose for which the motion was filed. The fact that Quintin Lim was favored as buyer is merely incidental, it having been made pursuant to the desire of respondent Tinitigan Sr. premised on the former's interest over the disputed property as tenant therein. Quintin Lim, however, did not manifest his ability and willingness to buy the property. He had practically every opportunity prior to the sale in favor of Chiu to exercise his pre-emptive right but he failed to exercise the same for one reason or another. The urgency of the need to settle pressing conjugal obligations prompted respondent Tinitigan Sr. to look for other buyers who could immediately pay for the property Chiu, to whom the property was subsequently offered, immediately paid the full amount of P315,000.00 upon the court's approval of the sale in his favor on March 3, 1976. This March 3, 1976 order is a reaffirmation of the order of September 29, 1975.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Fourthly, petitioners assail the validity of the order on purely circumstantial ground - that Pentel whose President and General Manager is Quintin Lim, had the option to buy the premises. While this may be so, petitioners seem to have neglected that the contract of lease between Payumo and Pentel with option to buy has been entered into in violation of Civil Code provisions. A close scrutiny of the facts would reveal that Payumo has contravened the law by encumbering the disputed property as well as other conjugal properties without her husband's consent. Article 172 of the new Civil Code provides that "the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by law." Granting arguendo that she is the administrative still her act of leasing the lots covered by TCT No. 15923 and TCT No. 160998 is unjustified, being violative of Article 388 of the new Civil Code which states that "the wife who is appellant pointed as an administrative of the husband's property cannot alienate or encumber the husband's property or that of the conjugal partnership without judicial authority." Consequently, Payuran's unauthorized transaction cannot be invoked as a source of right or valid defense. True, the contract may bind persons parties to the same but it cannot bind another not a party thereto, merely because he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof (Manila Port Service vs. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 1214, 1217). So goes the "res inter alios acta nobis nocet, nec prodest," which means that a transaction between two parties ought not to operate to the prejudice of a third person.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Finally, petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in denying Payuran's petition to enjoin or set aside the sale of the Loring property. This argument, however, is unsubstantiated. The facts as when as the evidence presented by both parties leave no other recourse for the respondent Court of Appeals except to apply the

pertinent legal provisions respecting the matter. Whether the order authorizing the sale of the Loring property is interlocutory or not, becomes of no moment in view of the conclusion aforesaid Abbain v. Chua March 12, 1958. Respondent-appellee Tongham Chua commenced 1 suit for "forcible entry and illegal, detainer" against petitionerappellant Hatib Abbain with the Justice of the Peace Court of Bongao, Sulu. Pertinent are Tongham Chua's averments therein that he is "the owner of a piece of land together with the improvements thereon mostly coconut trees" located in Maraning, Bongao, Sulu, which contains an area of four hectares more or less; that this land was donated to him by his father, Subing Chua, on January 16, 1952 and from that date up to the present time he has "assumed ownership" thereof, taken "possession of the land and paid the corresponding taxes due the government every year"; that "on January 16, 1952 and before this day [March 12, 1958], my tenant has been the herein defendant, and we have been always dividing the fruits or copra harvested therefrom on fifty-fifty basis. That I shall have 50% of the sale and the herein defendants gets 50% also"; that during the month of December, 1957, the defendant [herein petitioner] "by means of force, strategy and stealth unlawfully entered and still occupies the land in question after I have repeatedly demanded of him to vacate the premises due to his non-compliance of our agreement of [his] giving my share of the several harvests he made." February 27, 1959. Respondent Justice of the Peace Mariano Managula rendered judgment directing Hatib Abbain to vacate the premises and place Tongham Chua in possession of the plantation, with costs. This judgment was predicated upon the findings, after trial, that sometime before World War II, petitioner Hatib Abbain, because of financial hardship, sold for P225.00 to Subing Chua the coconut plantation, subject matter of the suit; that after the sale, Hatib Abbain became the tenant of Subing Chua, the harvests of the land divided on a 50-50 basis; that subsequently, on January 16, 1962, Subing Chua donated the plantation to his son, Tongham Chua, and Hatib Abbain, the same tenant of the father continued to be the tenant on the land; that the tenancy relationship was at the beginning harmonious and cordial, but that during the month of December, 1957, the tenant, Hatib Abbain, "got ambitious, and wanted to assume ownership of the plantation; that the said tenant desisted to give the share of his landlord of the harvests, hence, the plaintiff [respondent Tongham Chua] filed the present case on March 12, 1958." June 30, 1959. Hatib Abbain filed the present petition in the Court of First Instance of Sulu against respondent Tongham Chua and Judge Mariano Managula. The verified petition, with an affidavit of merits, sought "relief from judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court of Bongao and/or annulment of its decision in Civil Case No. 21 with 2 preliminary injunction." Petitioner there averred that: (1) the Justice of the Peace Court of Bongao did not have jurisdiction over said Civil Case 21 which is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations; and (2) because of "fraud, mistake or excusable negligence," he was deprived of a hearing in said Civil Case 21, and prevented from taking an appeal from the decision therein rendered. Respondent Tongham Chua traversed the averments of the petition. October 30, 1964. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Sulu issued the order now the subject of appeal. The court struck down petitioner's prayer for relief upon the finding that there was no fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which deprived defendant (petitioner) of a hearing because he was present at the trial and given opportunity to prepare his defense; and that neither was there evidence that defendant was prevented from taking an appeal therefrom. The court, moreover, noted that the petition for relief was filed more than four months after the oral promulgation of the decision on February 25, 1959. On the jurisdictional issue, the court ruled that "petitioner has not presented any proof or showing of landlord and tenant relationship between the parties" to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations, and that upon the allegations of the complaint in Civil Case No. 21, the case is "clearly one of ejectment."

As heretofore adverted to, Tongham Chua's complaint was filed on March 12, 1958 long after Republic Acts 1199, 1267 and 1409 were incorporated in our statute books. Well to remember then is that Tongham Chua's complaint positively avers that Hatib Abbain is his tenant on a 50-50 sharing basis of the harvest; and that he seeks ejectment of Hatib Abbain "due to his non-compliance of our agreement of [his] giving my share of the several harvests he made." The Justice of the Peace Court itself found, after hearing, that Hatib Abbain continued to be the tenant of Tongham Chua after the latter became, on January 16, 1952, owner of the plantation which he acquired from his father by virtue of a donation; and that Hatib Abbain refused to give "the share of his landlord of the harvest." If both the complaint and the inferior court's judgment have any meaning at all, it is that the Justice of the Peace Court had no jurisdiction over the case. Right at the outset, the complaint should have been rejected. Failing in this, the case should have been dismissed during the course of the trial, when it became all the more evident that a landlord-tenant relationship existed. The judge had no power to determine the case. Because, Tongham Chua's suit comes within the coverage of the statutory provision (Section 31, R.A. 1199) heretofore mentioned that "[a]ll cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the land-holder," shall be under the "original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to take cognizance of tenancy relations and disputes" and the broad sweep of Section 7, Republic Act 1267, which lodged with the Court of Agrarian Relations "original and exclusive jurisdiction . . . to consider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions, controversies or disputes involving all those relationships established by law which determine the varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the land." Jurisprudence has since stabilized the jurisdiction of the Court of 4 Agrarian Relations over cases of this nature. Such exclusive authority is not divested by a mere averment on the part of the tenant that he asserts ownership over the land, "since the law does not exclude from the jurisdiction" of the Court of Agrarian Relations, "cases in which a tenant claims ownership over the land given to him for cultivation by 5 the landlord." The judgment and proceedings of the Justice of the Peace Court are null and void. TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29) FACTS: On July 19, 1948 barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs. Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction. CA affirmed the appealed decision. In 1963, Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.

ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal.YES RATIO: SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse. : Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing - Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties - In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court The orders appealed from are affirmed. FRANCEL vs Sycip It is not disputed that [petitioner] filed an illegal detainer case against [respondent] docketed as Civil Case No. 1310 before the Municipal Trial Court [MTC] of Bacoor, Cavite, which was accordingly dismissed by the MTC (See answer, p. 28, record). The filing of the instant case is another blatant attempt by [petitioner] to circumvent the law. For it is well-settled that where a complaint arises from the failure of a buyer [of real property] on installment basis to pay based on a right to stop monthly amortizations under Presidential Decree No. 957, as in the case at bench, the determinative question is exclusively cognizable by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) (Francel Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 127 [1996]). The Facts 'x x x [I]n November, 1989, [petitioner] and [respondent] entered into a contract to sell a house and lot covered by TCT No. T-281788. Upon execution of the contract to sell, [respondent] made a down payment of P119,700.00, which was considered as monthly rentals at the rate of P2,686.00 per month. On March 16, 1990, the townhouse subject of the contract to sell was transferred in the name of [respondent] as evidenced by TCT No. T-281788. Despite the transfer of the title in the name of [respondent], the latter refused to pay the balance of P250,000.00. By applying the down payment ofP119,700.00 to defendant's monthly rental starting from December 1989, said amount has been reduced to nothing. Despite several demands made by [petitioner] to [respondent], including the demand dated December 12, 1991 made by [petitioner's ] counsel, the [respondent] refused to reconvey the subject property to [petitioner]. The [petitioner] suffered

actual damages in the form of repairs amounting to not less than P100,000.00 as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. x x x. 'The [respondent] filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but the court below denied the motion stating that the ground relied upon by [respondent did not appear to be] indubitable. 'Denying the material allegations of the complaint, the [respondent] again invoked the court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Further, there is a pending case between the same parties and involving the same townhouse before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board for unsound real estate business practices. Likewise, the [respondent] justified his refusal to pay the amortizations alleging that the [petitioner] sold and delivered to him a defective townhouse unit under Sec. 3 of Presidential Decree No. [957]. 'After trial, the court below dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.[5] Ruling of the Court of Appeals Agreeing with the trial court, the CA held that the case involved not just reconveyance and damages, but also a determination of the rights and obligations of the parties to a sale of real estate under PD 957; hence, the case fell exclusively under the jurisdiction of the HLURB. The appellate court observed that respondent and other buyers of the townhouses had notified petitioner of their intention to stop paying amortizations because of defective structures and materials used in the construction; they had in fact filed other cases, also before the HLURB, against petitioner for unsound real estate business practice. Noting that petitioner's illegal detainer case against respondent had been dismissed by the MTC, the appellate court concluded that the filing of the instant case was another blatant attempt to circumvent the law. Issues In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues A. Whether or not the lower court can dismiss, after full blown trial, Civil Case No. BCV-94-2 of the RTC, Imus, Cavite, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. B. Whether or not the lower court can dismiss this case in spite of the indisputable fact that respondent never secured HLURB authority or clearance to stop payment of monthly rentals.[7] The Court's Ruling The Petition lacks merit. First Issue: Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction Before going into the jurisdictional question, we must at the outset point out that, contrary to petitioner's assignment of errors, the trial court's Decision is not the proper subject of this Rule 45 Petition. Rather, it is the Decision of the CA that is up for review by this Court. This mistake in stating the issues could have been fatal to petitioner's case, had it not correctly restated them in its arguments and discussion.[8] That said, we now proceed to the main issues. Petitioner argues that the CA's affirmation of the trial court's dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering that a full-blown trial had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended.

The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has been used quite successfully in a number of cases to thwart dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,[9] in which this doctrine was espoused, held that a party may be barred from questioning a court's jurisdiction after being invoked to secure affirmative relief against its opponent. In fine, laches prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction from being raised for the first time on appeal by a litigant whose purpose is to annul everything done in a trial in which it has actively participted.[10] Laches is defined as the 'failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[11] The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the rule.[12]Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. [13] 'That Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez,[14] which we quote:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling inSibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the timehonored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.[15] Indeed, the general rule remains: a court's lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.[16] The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.[17] Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer.[18] From the very beginning, the present respondent has been challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court and asserting that the HLURB is the entity that has proper jurisdiction over the case. Consonant with Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, he had raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in his Motion to Dismiss. Even when the Motion was denied, he continuously invoked lack of jurisdiction in his Answer with affirmative defenses, his subsequent pleadings, and verbally during the trial. This consistent and continuing objection to the trial court's jurisdiction defeats petitioner's contention that raising other grounds in a Motion to Dismiss is considered a submission to the jurisdiction of the court.[19]

We stress that Rule 9 of the Rules of Court requires that all defenses and objections -- except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, bar by prior judgment and/or prescription -- must be pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in an answer; otherwise, they are deemed waived. [20] As to the excepted grounds, the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time 'when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those grounds exists.

In the present case, the trial court at first denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent, because the grounds he had relied upon did not appear to be indubitable. The ruling was made under the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which then provided that the court, 'after hearing x x x may deny or grant the motion or allow amendment of pleading, or may defer the hearing and determination of the motion until the trial if the ground alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable.[21] Moreover, the factual allegations of the Complaint[22] that petitioner filed below for reconveyance and damages sufficiently conformed to the jurisdictional requisites for the exercise of the MTC's authority. Thus, in accord with the procedures then prescribed, the court conducted trial to allow all arguments and evidence to surface.

The action here is not a simple action to collect on a promissory note; it is a complaint to collect amortization payments arising from or in connection with a sale of a subdivision lot under P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344, and accordingly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade and industry, and to hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices. Although the case involving Antonio Sarte is still pending resolution before the HLURB Arbiter, and there is as yet no order from the HLURB authorizing suspension of payments on account of the failure of plaintiff developer to make good its warranties, there is no question to Our mind that the matter of collecting amortizations for the sale of the subdivision lot is necessarily tied up to the complaint against the plaintiff and it affects the rights and correlative duties of the buyer of a subdivision lot as regulated by NHA pursuant to P.D. 957 as amended. It must accordingly fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the said Board, and We find that the motion to dismiss was properly granted on the ground that the regular court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint.[31] Petitioner's strategy, if allowed, would open a convenient gateway for a developer to subvert and preempt the rights of buyers by the mere expediency of filing an action against them before the regular courts, as in this case. Fortunately, the CA saw through the ruse. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the HLURB is not deprived of jurisdiction to hear and decide a case merely on the basis that it has been initiated by the developer and not by the buyer. Petitioner cites Ayala Corporation v. Ray Burton Development Corporation[32] and Fajardo Jr. v. Freedom to Build, Inc.,[33] which do not further its cause either. These cases pertain to deed restrictions and restrictive covenants in the sale of subdivision units; hence, they do not fall under any of the cases over which the HLURB exercises exclusive jurisdiction. Naturally, there was every reason for the courts in the said cases to assume and exercise their jurisdiction. Calimlim v. Ramirez Sometime in 1961, a judgment for a sum of money was rendered in favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation against a certain Manuel Magali by the Municipal Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 85136. After said judgment became final, a writ of execution was issued on July 31, 1961. The Notice of Levy made on September 21, 1961 on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9138 registered in the name of "Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim", specified that the said levy was only against "all rights, title, action, interest and participation of the defendant Manuel Magali over the parcel of land described in this title. " The Certificate of Sale executed by the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan on October 17, 1961 in favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation also stated that the sale referred only to the rights and interest of Manuel Magali over the land described in TCT No. 9138. Manuel Magali is one of the several children of Domingo Magali who had died in 1940 and herein petitioner Modesta Calimlim. However, when the Sheriff issued the final Deed of Sale on January 25, 1963, it was erroneously stated therein that the sale was with respect to "the parcel of land described in this title" (referring to TCT No. 9138) and not only over the rights and interest of Manuel Magali in the same. The execution of the said final Deed of Sale was annotated at the back of said title. On February 23, 1967, Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the said corporation. Not being the registered owner and the title not being in his possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply with the order of the Court directing him to surrender the said title. On June 20, 1967, Independent Mercantile Corporation filed an ex-parte petition to declare TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said petition was granted by the respondent Court and in its

Significantly, petitioner has previously sued respondent's brother and co-complainant before the HLURB over the same subdivision project. In Francel Realty v. Court of Appeals and Francisco Sycip,[23] petitioner's Complaint for unlawful detainer was premised on the failure of respondent's brother to pay monthly amortizations on the basis of his right to stop paying them under PD 957. In that case, the Court had ruled that the issue involved a 'determinative question x x x exclusively cognizable by the HLURB; that is, a 'determination of the rights and obligations of parties in a sale of real estate under P.D. 957.[24] Because an earlier Complaint had been filed by Sycip before the HLURB against Francel Realty Corporation for unsound real estate business practices, the Court dismissed petitioner's cause of action. The reason for the dismissal was that the Complaint should 'instead be filed as a counterclaim in [the] HLURB [case] in accordance with Rule 6, Section 6 of the Rules of Court x x x.[25] For the same reason, this Court has ruled that a suit to collect on a promissory note issued by a subdivision lot buyer involves the 'sales of lots in commercial subdivisions' ; and that jurisdiction over such case lies with the HLURB, not with the courts.[26] Further, the rules governing counterclaims[27] and the prohibition on the splitting of causes of action (grounded on the policy against a multiplicity of suits)[28] should effectively bar the Complaint for reconveyance and damages filed by petitioner. Its Complaint came at the heels of its unlawful detainer suit that had previously been dismissed by the MTC of Imus, Cavite, and of the litigation filed by respondent against Francel Realty before the HLURB. Petitioner avers that the present controversy is not cognizable by the HLURB, because it was filed by the developer rather than by the buyer, as provided under PD No. 1344.[29] Such pretension flies in the face of the ruling of the Court inFrancel Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals and Francisco Sycip,[30] which we quote: x x x. In the case of Estate Developers and Investors Corporation v. Antonio Sarte and Erlinda Sarte the developer filed a complaint to collect the balance of the price of a lot bought on installment basis, but its complaint was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction. It appealed the order to this Court. In dismissing the appeal, we held:

Order dated July 13, 1967, it directed the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the Independent Mercantile Corporation and the cancellation of TCT No. 9138. On November 21, 1967, petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo Magali, upon learning that her husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. An opposition to the said petition was filed by Independent Mercantile Corporation. After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the respondent Court issued an Order dated June 3, 1968 dismissing the petition. (Rollo, pp. 31-38.) The herein petitioners did not appeal the dismissal of the petition they filed in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. Instead, on January 11, 1971, they filed the complaint in Civil Case No. SCC-180 praying for the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been made with respect to the property, covered by TCT No. 9138. Named as defendant in said civil case was herein private respondent Francisco Ramos who claimed to have bought the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation on July 25, 1967. Private respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over the property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annotated on the title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners. Private respondent Francisco Ramos filed a Motion To Dismiss Civil Case No. SCC-180 on the ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations (Rollo. pp. 42-45). Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court, in its Order dated April 21, 1971, dismissed Civil Case No. SCC- 180 on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment. It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein petitioner in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior judgment against the filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180. In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. (2 Moran Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p. 364.) This essential element of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res judicata does not exist in the case presently considered. In the order of the respondent Judge dated September 29, 1971 denying the second motion for reconsideration, he cited the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, to uphold the view that the petitioners are deemed estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the respondent Court in having taken cognizance of the petition for cancellation of TCT No. 68568, they being the ones who invoked the jurisdiction of the said Court to grant the affirmative relief prayed for therein. We are of the opinion that the ruling laid down in Sibonghanoy may not be applied herein. Neither its factual backdrop nor the philosophy of the doctrine therein expounded fits the case at bar. A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it." The petitioners in the instant case may not be faulted with laches. When they learned that the title to the property owned by them had erroneously and illegally been cancelled and registered in the name of another entity or person who had no right to the same, they filed a petition to cancel the latter's title. It is unfortunate that in pursuing said remedy, their counsel had to invoke the authority of the respondent Court as a cadastral court, instead of its capacity as a court of general jurisdiction. Their petition to cancel the title in the name of Independent Mercantile Corporation was dismissed upon a finding by the respondent Court that the same was "without merit." No explanation was given for such dismissal nor why the petition lacked merit. There was no hearing, and the petition was resolved solely on the basis of memoranda filed by the parties which do not appear of record. It is even a possibility that such dismissal was in view of the realization of the respondent Court that, sitting as a cadastral court, it lacked the authority to entertain the petition involving as it does a highly controversial issue. Upon such petition being dismissed, the petitioners instituted Civil Case No. SCC-180 on January 1, 1971, or only two and one-half years after the dismissal of their petition in LRC Record No. 39492. Hence, we see no unreasonable delay in the assertion by the petitioners of their right to claim the property which rightfully belongs to them. They can hardly be presumed to have abandoned or waived such right by inaction within an unreasonable length of time or inexcusable negligence. In short, their filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180 which in itself is an implied non-acceptance of the validity of the proceedings had in LRC Record No. 39492 may not be deemed barred by estoppel by laches. It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the attendant circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The same thing is true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown, among others, that the representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter. (De Castro vs. Gineta, 27 SCRA 623.) The filing of an action or suit in a court that does not possess jurisdiction to entertain the same may not be presumed to be deliberate and intended to secure a ruling which could later be annulled if not favorable to the party who filed such suit or proceeding. Instituting such an action is not a one-sided affair. It can just as well be prejudicial to the one who filed the action or suit in the event that he obtains a favorable judgment therein which could also be attacked for having been rendered without jurisdiction. The determination of the correct jurisdiction of a court is not a simple matter. It can raise highly debatable issues of such importance that the highest tribunal of the land is given the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to entertain the same. The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action "whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter." (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court.) Should the court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same. (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code.)

The inequity of barring the petitioners from vindicating their right over their property in Civil Case No. SCC-180 is rendered more acute in the face of the undisputed fact that the property in question admittedly belonged to the petitioners, and that the title in the name of the private respondent was the result of an error committed by the Provincial Sheriff in issuing the deed of sale in the execution proceeding. The justness of the relief sought by herein petitioners may not be ignored or rendered futile by reason of a doctrine which is of highly doubtful applicability herein. Atuel v. Cpa, inc. FACTS: Emiliano Melgazo founded and organized Concepcion Progressive Association (CPA) in Hilongos, Leyte .as CPA president, Melgazo bought a parcel of land in behalf of the association. The property was later on converted into a wet market where agricultural, livestock and other farm products were sold. It also housed a cockpit and an area for various forms of amusement. The income generated from the property, mostly rentals from the wet market, was paid to CPA. When Emiliano Melgazo died, his son, petitioner Manuel Melgazo, succeeded him as CPA president and administrator of the property. On the other hand, petitioners Atwel and Pilpil were elected as CPA vice-president and treasurer, respectively. Other elected officers and members formed their own group and registered themselves in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as officers and members of respondent CPAI. But petitioners not listed as members. CPAI alleged that it was the owner of the property and petitioners, without authority, were collecting rentals from the wet market vendors. filed a case in the SEC for mandatory injunction which was transferred to Tacloban City RTC (RA 8799), a special commercial court. Petitioners contend that since the property was purchased using the money of petitioner Manuel Melgazo's father (the late Emiliano Melgazo), it belonged to the latter and it was preposterous and impossible for the CPAI to have acquired ownership over the property in 1968 when it was only in 1997 that it was incorporated and registered with the SEC special commercial court ruled that CPA to be one and the same as CPAI, CPA as the owner of poperty and not Melgazo- Court ruled in favour of CPAI Petitioners went to the CA and contested the jurisdiction of the special commercial court over the case. According to them, they were not CPAI members, hence the case did not involve an intra-corporate dispute between and among members so as to warrant the special commercial court's jurisdiction over it. CPAI, on the other hand, argued that petitioners were already in estoppel as they had participated actively in the court proceedings. - nonetheless held that petitioners were already barred from questioning the court's jurisdiction based on the doctrine of estoppel The court agreed [CPAI] that petitioners, after actively participating in the trial of the case, can no longer be allowed to impugn the jurisdiction of the court... CA affirmed decision. Peitioners appealed to SC. ISSUE: WON the petitioners are estopped from questioning jurisdiction after participating in the proceeding. NO RATIO: The SC agreed with the petitioners that estoppel cannot apply because a court's jurisdiction is conferred exclusively by the Constitution or by law, not by the parties' agreement or by estoppel. RA 8799 in 2000-the jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate controversies and other cases enumerated in Section 5 of PD 902-A was transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction

To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy to be heard and decided by the RTC, two elements must concur: (1) the status or relationship of the parties (intra-corporate or partnership relations) and the nature of the question that is subject of their controversy (intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation).

(2)

In the case at bar, these elements are not present. The records reveal that petitioners were never officers nor members of CPAI. CPAI itself admitted this in its pleadings. In fact, petitioners were the only remaining members of CPA which, obviously, was not the CPAI that was registered in the SEC. The issue in this case does not concern the regulation of CPAI (or even CPA). The determination as to who is the true owner of the disputed property entitled to the income generated therefrom is civil in nature and should be threshed out in a regular court - conflict among the parties here was outside the jurisdiction of the special commercial court The rule remains that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none over the cause of action or subject matter of the case. Unfortunately for CPAI, no exceptional circumstance appears in this case to warrant divergence from the rule. Jurisdiction by estoppel is not available here. Consequently, CPAI cannot be permitted to wrest from petitioners (as the remaining CPA officers) the administration of the disputed property until after the parties' rights are clearly adjudicated in the proper courts. It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party to the result of a suit or proceeding in a court with no jurisdiction. The decision of a tribunal not vested with the appropriate jurisdiction is null and void. The petition is GRANTED. Case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Manchester Development v. CA, 149 SCRA 562 (1987) Facts: This was originally a case of an action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for temporary restraining order. The damages were not specifically stated in the prayer but the body of the complaint assessed a P78.75M damages suffered by the petitioner. The amount of docket fees paid was only P410.00. The petitioner then amended the complaint and reduced the damages to P10M only. Issues: When Does an

does amended

a court complaint vest

acquire jurisdiction

in

jurisdiction? the court?

Ruling: The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. Facts: Body of the complaint specified amount of damages, but the prayer did not. Complaint was amended deleting all amounts. Only after court order did complainant specify the amount, but still only in the body, not in the prayer.

Held: In civil cases, all pleadings should specify in both the body and prayer the amount of damages sought. The court does not acquire

jurisdictions until the proper docket fee has been paid. Where an action is both for specific performance and damages, the docket fees must be based on the total damages sought to be recovered, even if it is not spelled out in the prayer. Where the prayer clearly shows that the action was one for damages, there can be no honest difference of opinion as to the amount of filing fees. Where payment was insufficient and there was no honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount of filing fees, the court never acquired jurisdiction over the original complaint. There was thus no complaint to amend. Docket fees must be based on the original, not amended complaint. A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Henceforth, the amount sought to be recovered should be stated both in the body of the complaint and in prayer.

additional

docket

fees

as

required.

Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. Facts: Sun insurance filed a case for the consignation of premiums on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. Meanwhile, the Respondent Manuel Tiong also filed a case against Sun Insurance for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, seeking the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation, and costs of suit, but the damages sought were not specifically stated in the prayer, although it may be inferred from the body of the complaint that it would amount to about P50M. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid. On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49. Issue: Whether or not the court acquires jurisdiction when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid? Ruling: Manchester ruling applies, with modification. Statutes regulating the procedure of courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and in that respect. The Court dismissed petitioners motion and ordered the Clerk of court to re-asses the docket fees. Personal Observation: The case is different in Manchester because the respondent herein has shown compliance by paying docket fees upon reassessment and has also paid the docket fees on its amended complaint increasing the claim for damages. Furthermore, there is no substantial evidence that the respondent has the intention of deliberately defraud the court or evaded the payment of docket fees Tacay v. Rtc These were 2 separate cases originally filed by Godofredo Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for recovery of possession (acciones publiciana) against 3 defendants, namely: Antonia Noel, Ponciano Panes, and Maximo Tacay. Pineda was the owner of 790 sqm land evidenced by TCT No. T46560. The previous owner of such land has allowed the 3 defendants

The SC in Manchester prohibited plaintiffs in civil cases from not specifying the amount of damages. Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989) 1) It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 2) Permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefore is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 3) If the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. There are some compulsory counterclaim that needs payment of docket fees, and some which does not. Facts of the Case: Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the consignation of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the Private Respondent (PR) files a complaint for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case against SIOL. In addition, PR also claims for damages, attorneys fees, litigation costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state the amount of damages sought although from the body of the complaint it can be inferred to be in amount of P 50 million. Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00 in docket fees.The complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for subsequent reassessments of the amount of damages sought as well as the corresponding docket fees. The respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. Issue: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent did not pay the correct or sufficient docket fees? Ruling: It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Same rule goes for permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings. In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the government of the docket fee due not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint. However, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the

to use or occupy the same by mere tolerance. Pineda, having himself the need to used the property, has demanded the defendants to vacate the property and pay reasonable rentals therefore, but such were refused. The complaint was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by each defendant alleging that it did not specify the amounts of actual, nominal, and exemplary damages, nor the assessed value of the property, that being bars the determination of the RTCs jurisdiction in deciding the case. The Motions to Dismiss were denied but the claims for damages in the complaint were expunged for failure to specify the amounts. Thus, the defendants filed a Joint Petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and temporary restraining order against the RTC. Issue: Whether or not the amount of damages claimed and the assessed value of the property are relevant in the determination of the courts jurisdiction in a case for recovery of possession of property? Decision: Determinative of the courts jurisdiction in a recovery of possession of property is the nature of the action (one of accion publicaina) and not the value of the property, it may be commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying claim for actual, nominal or exemplary damages and such action would fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. The court acquired jurisdiction upon the filing of the complaint and payment of the prescribed docket fees. Ayala corp. V. Madayag Private respondents filed against petitioners an action for specific performance with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower court has not acquired jurisdiction over the case as private respondents failed to pay the prescribed docket fee and to specify the amount of exemplary damages both in the body and prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint. The trial court denied the motion in an order dated April 5, 1989. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise denied in an order dated May 18, 1989. Hence this petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent paid only the total amount of P l,616.00 as docket fees instead of the amount of P13,061.35 based on the assessed value of the real properties involved as evidenced by its tax declaration. Further, petitioners contend that private respondents failed to specify the amount of exemplary damages sought both in the body and the prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals a similar case involving an action for specific performance with damages, this Court held that the docket fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library However, the contention of petitioners is that since the action concerns real estate, the assessed value thereof should be considered in computing the fees pursuant to Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Such rule cannot apply to this case which is an action for specific performance with damages although it is in relation to a transaction involving real estate. Pursuant to Manchester, the amount of the docket fees to be paid should be computed on the basis of the amount of damages stated in the complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Petitioners also allege that because of the failure of the private respondents to state the amount of exemplary damages being sought, the complaint must nevertheless be dismissed in accordance to Manchester. The trial court denied the motion stating that the determination of the exemplary damages is within the sound discretion of the court and that it would be unwarrantedly presumptuous on the part of the private respondents to fix the amount of exemplary
1

damages being prayed for. The trial court cited the subsequent case of 2 Sun Insurance vs. Judge Asuncion in support of its ruling.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance are as follows: 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but (also) the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable tune but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. Apparently, the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the above ruling of this Court wherein it is stated that "where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for the determination of the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment" by considering it to mean that where in the body and prayer of the complaint there is a prayer, say for exemplary or corrective damages, the amount of which is left to the discretion of the Court, there is no need to specify the amount being sought, and that any award thereafter shall constitute a lien on the judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the latest case Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, this Court had occasion to make the clarification that the phrase "awards of claims not specified in the pleading" refers only to "damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading . . . as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment." The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading, should be specified. While it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case, therefore, suffers from the material defect in failing to state the amount of exemplary damages prayed for.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As ruled in Tacay the trial court may either order said claim to be expunged from the record as it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same or on motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time, the amendment of the amended and supplemental complaint so as to state the precise amount of the exemplary damages sought and require the
3

payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive 4 period. chanrobles virtual law library Phil. First insurance case The issue, in the main, in the present case is whether respondent, Pyramid Logistics and Trucking Corporation (Pyramid), which filed on [1] November 7, 2001 a complaint, denominated as one for specific performance and damages, against petitioners Philippine First Insurance Company, Inc. (Philippine First) and Paramount General Insurance Corporation (Paramount) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-1609, paid the correct docket fee; if in the negative, whether the complaint should be dismissed or Pyramid can still be ordered to pay the fee. Pyramid was assessed P610 docket fee, apparently on the basis of the amount of P50,000 specified in the prayer representing attorney's [5] fees, which it duly paid. Pyramid later filed a 1 Amended Complaint containing minor [7] [8] changes in its body but bearing the same prayer. Branch 148 of the Makati RTC to which the complaint was raffled admitted the Amended [9] Complaint. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction, Pyramid not having paid the docket fees in full. To the [17] Motion to Dismiss Pyramid filed its Opposition, alleging that if there was a mistake in the assessment of the docket fees, the trial court was not precluded from acquiring jurisdiction over the complaint as "it has the authority to direct the mistaken party to complete the docket fees in the course of the proceedings. Indeed, Pyramid captioned its complaint as one for "specific performance and damages" even if it was, as the allegations in its body showed, seeking in the main the collection of its claims-sums of money representing losses the amount of which it, by its own admission, [46] "knew." And, indeed, it failed to specify in its prayer in the complaint the amount of its claims/damages. When Pyramid amended its complaint, it still did not specify, in its prayer, the amount of claims/damages it was seeking. Assuming arguendo that Pyramid has other claims the amounts of which are yet to be determined by the trial court, the rule established in Manchester which was embodied in this Court's Circular No. 7-88 issued on March 24, 1988, as modified by the Sun Insurance ruling, still applies. Consider this Court's pronouncement bearing on the [50] matter in Ayala Corporation v. Madayag: x x x x Apparently, the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the [Sun Insurance] ruling of this Court wherein it stated that "where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for the determination of the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment" by considering it to mean that where in the body and prayer of the complaint there is a prayer xxx the amount of which is left to the discretion of the Court, there is no need to specify the amount being sought, and that any award thereafter shall constitute a lien on the judgment. x x x While it is true that the determination of certain damages x x x is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) If respondent Pyramid's counsel had only been forthright in drafting the complaint and taking the cudgels for his client and the trial judge assiduous in applying Circular No. 7 vis a vis prevailing jurisprudence,
st [6]

the precious time of this Court, as well as of that of the appellate court, would not have been unnecessarily sapped. Ng Soon v. Alday Applying literally the ruling on docket fees enunciated in Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (L-75919, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 562), respondent Judge, on 11 August 1988, ordered (1) that petitioner's Complaint below (in Civil Case No. Q-52489), for reconstitution of a savings account, and payment of damages and attorney's fees, be expunged; and (2) that the case be dismissed. He also denied, on 21 October 1988, the reconsideration sought by petitioner of that Order. The aforementioned savings account was allegedly maintained with the China Banking Corporation (CBC) by Gan Bun Yaw, both of whom are respondents herein. Petitioner, Ng Soon, claims to be the latter's widow. For the filing of the above Complaint, petitioner paid the sum of P3,600.00 as docket fees. Respondent Billie Gan and the Bank, respectively, moved for the dismissal of the Complaint. Subsequently, respondent Gan, joined by the Bank, moved to expunge the said Complaint from the record for alleged non-payment of the required docket fees. 1. The doctrine laid down in the Manchester case was incorrectly applied by respondent Judge; and 2. Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the Complaint expunged from the record although petitioner had paid the necessary filing fees. During the pendency of this case, respondent Gan filed a Manifestation alleging, among others, that petitioner is an impostor and not the real Ng Soon, wife of Gan Bun Yaw, since the real Mrs. Gan Bun Yaw (Ng Soon) died on 29 July 1933, as shown by a Certificate issued on 27 April 1989 by, and bearing the seal of, the An Hai Municipal Government. This allegation was, however, denied by petitioner in her "Sur-rejoinder to Manifestation" filed on 12 August 1989, to which respondent Gan has countered with a Reply on 9 September 1989. We resolved to give due course to the Petition and dispensed with the submittal of Memoranda, the issues having been thoroughly threshed out by the parties. Upon the facts, the pleadings, and the law, we grant the Petition. It is true that Manchester laid down the rule that all Complaints should specify the amount of damages prayed for not only in the body of the complaint but also in the prayer; that said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case; and that any pleading that fails to comply with such requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall, otherwise, be expunged from the record. While it may be that the body of petitioner's Complaint below was silent as to the exact amount of moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees, the prayer did specify the amount of not less than P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and not less than P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. These amounts were definite enough and enabled the Clerk of Court of the lower Court to compute the docket fees payable. Similarly, the principal amount sought to be recovered as "missing money" was fixed at P900,000.00. The failure to state the rate of

interest demanded was not fatal not only because it is the Courts which ultimately fix the same, but also because Rule 141, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court, itemizing the filing fees, speaks of "the sum claimed, exclusive of interest." This clearly implies that the specification of the interest rate is not that indispensable. Factually, therefore, not everything was left to "guesswork" as respondent Judge has opined. The sums claimed were ascertainable, sufficient enough to allow a computation pursuant to Rule 141, section 5(a). Furthermore, contrary to the position taken by respondent Judge, the amounts claimed need not be initially stated with mathematical precision. The same Rule 141, section 5(a) (3rd paragraph), allows an appraisal "more or less." Thus: In case the value of the property or estate or the sum claimed is less or more in accordance with the appraisal of the court, the difference of fee shall be refunded or paid as the case may be. In other words, a final determination is still to be made by the Court, and the fees ultimately found to be payable will either be additionally paid by the party concerned or refunded to him, as the case may be. The above provision clearly allows an initial payment of the filing fees corresponding to the estimated amount of the claim subject to adjustment as to what later may be proved. Additionally, in the case of Sun Insurance Office Ltd., et al., vs. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion et al. (G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989), this Court had already relaxed the Manchester rule when it held, inter alia,: 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period (Italics ours). In respect of the questioned Identity of petitioner, this is properly a matter falling within the competence of the Court a quo, this Court not being a trier of facts. The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under R. A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, effective on January 1, 1992 and which repealed P. D. 1508, introduced substantial changes not only in the authority granted to the Lupong Tagapamayapa but also in the procedure to be observed in the settlement of disputes within the authority of the Lupon. In order that the laudable purpose of the law may not be subverted and its effectiveness undermined by indiscriminate, improper and/or premature issuance of certifications to file actions in court by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretaries, attested by the Lupon/Pangkat Chairmen, respectively, the following guidelines are hereby issued for the information of trial court judges in cases brought before them coming from the Barangays: I. All disputes are subject to Barangay conciliation pursuant to the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law [formerly P. D. 1508, repealed and now replaced by Secs. 399-422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, and Sec. 515, Title I, Book IV, R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991], and prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or any government offices, except in the following disputes:

[1] Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; [2] Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions; [3] Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities and municipalities, unless the parties thereto agree to submit their difference to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon; [4] Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or juridical entities, since only individuals shall be parties to Barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents [Sec. 1, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules]; [5] Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon; [6] Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one [1] year or a fine of over five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); [7] Offenses where there is no private offended party; [8] Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being committed or further continued, specifically the following:

[a] Criminal cases where accused is under police custody or detention [See Sec. 412 (b) (1), Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law]; [b] Petitions for habeas corpus by a person illegally deprived of his rightful custody over another or a person illegally deprived of or on acting in his behalf; [c] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support during the pendency of the action; and [d] Actions which may be barred by the Statute of Limitations.

[9] Any class of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice; [10] Where the dispute arises from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) [Secs. 46 & 47, R. A. 6657];

[11] Labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations [Montoya vs. Escayo, et al., 171 SCRA 442; Art. 226, Labor Code, as amended, which grants original and exclusive jurisdiction over conciliation and mediation of disputes, grievances or problems to certain offices of the Department of Labor and Employment]; [12] Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which may be filed directly in court [See Sanchez vs. Tupaz, 158 SCRA 459]. II. Under the provisions of R. A. 7160 on Katarungang Pambarangay conciliation, as implemented by the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Justice, the certification for filing a complaint in court or any government office shall be issued by Barangay authorities only upon compliance with the following requirements: [1] Issued by the Lupon Secretary and attested by the Lupon Chairman (Punong Barangay), certifying that a confrontation of the parties has taken place and that a conciliation settlement has been reached, but the same has been subsequently repudiated (Sec. 412, Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Sec. 2[h], Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules); [2] Issued by the Pangkat Secretary and attested by the Pangkat Chairman certifying that:

III. All complaints and/or informations filed or raffled to your sala/branch of the Regional Trial Court shall be carefully read and scrutinized to determine if there has been compliance with prior Barangay conciliation procedure under the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations as a pre-condition to judicial action, particularly whether the certification to file action attached to the records of the case comply with the requirements hereinabove enumerated in Par. II; IV. A case filed in court without compliance with prior Barangay conciliation which is a pre-condition for formal adjudication (Sec. 412 [a] of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law) may be dismissed upon motion of defendant/s, not for lack of jurisdiction of the court but for failure to state a cause of action or prematurity (Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470; Gonzales vs. CA, 151 SCRA 289), or the court may suspend proceedings upon petition of any party under Sec. 1, Rule 21 of the Rules of Court; and refer the case motu proprio to the appropriate Barangay authority applying by analogy Sec. 408 [g], 2nd par., of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law which reads as follows: "The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the Lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer case to the Lupon concerned for amicable settlement.

Small Claims SEC. 4. Applicability.The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall apply this Rule in all actions which are: (a) purely civil in nature where the claim or relief prayed for by the plaintiff is solely for payment or reimbursement of sum of money, and (b) the civil aspect of criminal actions, either filed before the institution of the criminal action, or reserved upon the filing of the criminal action in court, pursuant to Rule 111 of the Revised Rules Of Criminal Procedure. These claims or demands may be: (a) For money owed under any of the following: 1. Contract of Lease; 2. Contract of Loan; 3. Contract of Services; 4. Contract of Sale; or 5. Contract of Mortgage; (b) For damages arising from any of the following: 1. Fault or negligence; 2. Quasi-contract; or 3. Contract; (c) The enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an arbitration award involving a money claim covered by this Rule pursuant to Sec. 417 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. SEC. 5. Commencement of Small Claims Action.A small claims action is commenced by filing with the court an accomplished and verified Statement of Claim (Form 1-SCC) in duplicate, accompanied by a Certification of Non-forum Shopping (Form 1-A, SCC), and two (2) duly certified photocopies of the actionable document/s subject of the claim, as well as the affidavits of witnesses and other evidence to support the claim. No evidence shall be allowed during the hearing which was not attached to or submitted Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases 7 together with the Claim, unless good cause is shown for the admission of additional evidence. No formal pleading, other than the Statement of Claim described in this Rule, is necessary to initiate a small claims action

[a] a confrontation of the parties took place but no conciliation/settlement has been reached (Sec. 4[f], Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules); or [b] that no personal confrontation took place before the Pangkat through no fault of the complainant (Sec. 4[f], Rule III, Katarungang pambarangay Rules).

[3] Issued by the Punong Barangay as requested by the proper party on the ground of failure of settlement where the dispute involves members of the same indigenous cultural community, which shall be settled in accordance with the customs and traditions of that particular cultural community, or where one or more of the parties to the aforesaid dispute belong to the minority and the parties mutually agreed to submit their dispute to the indigenous system of amicable settlement, and there has been no settlement as certified by the datu or tribal leader or elder to the Punong Barangay of place of settlement (Secs. 1,4 & 5, Rule IX, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules); and [4] If mediation or conciliation efforts before the Punong Barangay proved unsuccessful, there having been no agreement to arbitrate (Sec. 410 [b], Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Sec. 1, c. (1), Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules), or where the respondent fails to appear at the mediation proceeding before the Punong Barangay (3rd par. Sec. 8, a, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules), the Punong Barangay shall not cause the issuance at this stage of a certification to file action, because it is now mandatory for him to constitute the Pangkat before whom mediation, conciliation, or arbitration proceedings shall be held.