WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM: RYANNE TURENHOUT / ALEX GEKKER / KALINA DANCHEVA LINDSY SZILVSI / BOB VAN DE VELDE / MAURICE

DE HAAN

 15 April 2011 www.networktheory.nl This is a special issue of the academic journal The Journal of Network Theory, part of the Master programme New Media & Digital Culture at the University of Utrecht. Chief editor: Marianne van den Boomen Guest editors: Alex Gekker, Kalina Dancheva, Lindsy Szilvsi, Ryanne Turenhout, Maurice de Haan and Bob van de Velde Front page global graphic by 5milli (Deviantart) Contributers: Alex Gekker, Kalina Dancheva, Lindsy Szilvsi, Ryanne Turenhout, Maurice de Haan and Bob van de Velde

contents

4 26 51 63 69 76

Regulating user-generated data on Facebook.

Ryanne Turenhout

This network thing called the Web

Bob van de Velde

15 37

Citizens of web 2.0: public sphere as cultural public

Lindsy Szilvsi

Legionnaires of Chaos Anon and Governments

Alex Gekker

Cookies and the mindset of control

Kalina Dancheva

Protocol - Alexander Galloway

Reviewed by Ryanne Turenhout

Transmetropolitan - Warren Ellis

Reviewed by Alex Gekker

66 72

Code version 2.0 - Lawerence Lessig

Reviewed by Kalina Dancheva

Bastard Culture! - Mirko Tobias Schaefer

Reviewed by Lindsy Szilvsi

Free style - The Listeners

Bob van de Velde

Abstract
This article situates itself within the free labour discourse (Scholz 2008; Terranova 2000) and investigates in what ways the business model of Facebook is inscribed into the technical design. Hereby revealing the ways in which user generated value is facilitated on Facebook. This article provides a nuanced look at the underlying mechanisms of Facebook and the various dynamics between the business model, users, platform owners and technical design. Keeping in mind the business model this article will take a descriptive approach and first explore the ways in which the user activities are regulated by means of the front-end technical design, the graphical user interface. Secondly the intelligence of the back-end will be explored, as this is also an important and often neglected part of facilitating value, this will be evaluated in terms of algorithm, data-retention, data mining, data-aggregation and the open graph protocol. Even though these two categories (front- and back-end) are used, it will become clear that this distinction is not always so easily made. This will lead up to the main argument that user activities are regulated in ways that have are invisible, which constitutes to the problematic aspect of the users having no control or insight into what happens with the user-generated data. Hereby it is not so much about the questions of personal privacy as these are often varying according to the cultural context. It is the power that is gained by the platform owners and the lack of control by the users that this constitutes. Keywords: Facebook, regulation, control, user-generated data, technical design

Regulating user-generated data on Facebook

Ryanne Turenhout
Facebook with currently more than 500 million users is one of the many examples of technology become increasingly important in modern life. Additionally it has a valuable database filled with data of the users (Vogelstein 2007) it is safe to say that the database of Facebook has become even bigger by now, this brings with it questions of privacy, commodification of user-generated data and as argued by Mark Andrejevic [t]he question is no longer just what information companies will collect about us, but how this information will be put to use, the ability to transfer it, sell it, conduct marketing experiments with it and base advertising appeals upon it (2009). Andrejevic expressed his concern for the way that user generated data is used, this article will built upon this notion and questions the ways in which control and regulation of user-generated data finds its way into the technical design of Facebook and how this constitutes to the exploitation of this data. This in line what Bernhard Rieder argued, [p]ower structures are not confined to the social realm; they also operate inside of technical artifacts and to decipher them, we need to look at these artifacts themselves (2005, 27). Therefore situating itself within the free-labour discourse, this is seen here as an emerging critique of the web 2.0 applications. Part of the critique within this discourse lies in the way that the labour of the web 2.0 platform users is used by the platform owners to profit or benefit from without compensating or acknowledging the immaterial labour provided by the users (Scholz 2010, Terranova 2004). The mechanisms of control of the user-generated data will be discussed in terms of the front-end and back-end intelligence, which is explored in terms of algorithm, data mining, data aggregation, and data-retention. The aim of this article therefore is not to ask whether the users care that their activities are being exploited, the aim is in bringing forth the ways in which user-generated value is facilitated by means of the technical design and the lack of control that the users have over the way that their data is used. As these are an often-neglected parts of the research done in the free labour discourse. Blurring lines between front-end and back-end algorithmic control On the level of the front-end graphical user interface the user activities are continuously being steered. On Facebook participation is built-in as part of the default design feature, the business model is inscribed into the design and shapes the user activities. As is shown in the recent discoveries made about the news feed

algorithm EdgeRank (Kincaid 2010). Here the line between the front-end and the back-end is becoming unclear. Regulation of user activities finds its way by which the algorithm decides which status update to show in the users news feed. Hereby links, videos and photos are given preferential treatment over normal status updates, which means that they are more likely to show up in the news feed (Weber 2010). This process can be seen as sociodigitization, as coined by Robert Latham and Saskia Sasse. Which means that Facebook can than be seen as an example for the explicit (socio-)digitization of social relations that were mediated quite differently in the past [] The network of family, friends, neighbors and colleagues [are] now recreated inside of the system (Rieder 2007). The news-feed algorithm becomes the social filter for the users of Facebook, when the visibly of an opinion becomes a question of algorithms? Meaning is deeply embedded in the non-discursive - in software itself (Rieder and Schfer 2008, 3). Not only is the algorithm a social filter but also is an important aspect of the backend of Facebook in the form of data mining of vast amount of user- generated data that are stored on the servers. Data mining is the process of exploration and analysis of a dataset, which is usually of a considerable size. This process is done in order to discover patterns, to extract relevant knowledge or to obtain meaningful recurring rules. When it comes to Facebook and their business model, data mining is used to make sense of user-generated data that is stored on the servers, to filter out the users interests, patterns so that the advertisements can be specified to the users interests. Some interesting developments have been made regarding the aspect of data mining. Two examples will be explored here. First, an experiment currently employed by Facebook, and secondly a recently implemented new advertisement system. With a focus group of proximally six million people, Facebook is currently experimenting with the data mining of real time conversations and status updates for advertisement purposes. Delivering targeted advertisements based on status updates is not something new but it has until now never been done on a real time basis. The algorithm behind this is continuously being adjusted and the advertisements targets audiences based on data collected over longer periods of time, this closely relates to the data retention as explained earlier (Slutsky 2011). This goes to show that [s]oftware is responsible for extending, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the role that technology plays in the everyday practices that make up modern life

(Rieder and Schfer 2008, 3). This service allows for the displaying of advertisements that are even more customized and specified to the users interest. The algorithm filters, structures, interpret, and visualizes information in an automatic fashion (Rieder and Schfer 2008, 2). Regulation of the users activities and their data here is in the form of the tailored advertisements, which are optimized for a maximum click-through rate. Another recent example of the further development of the advertisement algorithm based upon the users posts is the sponsored stories in which the algorithm pulls content out of the status update and uses this to place advertisements on their friends Facebook pages. This feature is designed to built brand buzz and works based upon the likes and check-ins by the users when they visit restaurants, websites, events, products and so forth. The data generated by users is hereby directly turned into advertisements and displayed on the pages of their friends (Segall 2011). An interesting development here is that it is not the advertiser that is controlling the content, it is about the users actions and therefore also their labour. Now even by posting a status update, in real-time the information and advertisement infrastructure is improved. It should be noted however, that these actions can also be turned against the system, by strategically placing a status update about the need for having a pizza while not actually being hungry and by this the user can get for instance a discount coupon. But this only plays into the hands of the advertisers and companies and increasing the click-through and conversion rate of the advertisements. This example shows the invisibility of the way that the business model is implemented into the front-end technical design, the graphical user interface. The advertisements dont even look like advertisements anymore; they are now basically just text links into the status update itself. Back-end: data retention On the level of the back-end, data retention plays an important role. Facebook has everything to gain by keeping users locked-in in a technical manner and keeping control over the user-generated data. The more data is stored, the more specific advertisements can be shown to users. Showing specific and tailored advertisements that fit right into the users interests and needs an important part of the business model, it is about the discovery of combinations of past behaviour, location, demographics, and temperament, that make individuals more likely to be influenced by a finely-pitched marketing appeal (Andrejevic 2009).

In a recent blogpost Mark Zuckerberg provided some insight into the data retention span. This blogpost said that a new feature has been implemented into Facebook, the ability to download everything you have every posted, including pictures, wall posts and so forth (Zuckerberg 2010). This is furthermore reflected in the privacy policy of Facebook [w]e save your profile information (connections, photos, etc.) in case you later decide to reactivate your account. Additionally, in the latest version of the terms of services it says [h]owever, you understand that removed content may persist in backup copies for a reasonable period of time. What happens with this data in the backup copies is not clear. Problematic about this is that the user-generated data entrusted into the hands of a private company and for which there is no certainty what the data is used for and who has access to this vast amount of data available on the servers. Which is something that Meijas found problematic as well, as was outlined in her article in which she argued that the social is becoming part of the corporately owned platforms, and that a discussion of the commodification of the social life and privatization of public space is missing. This private ownership shapes the dynamics on the platform and enables both the creation of new social spaces and the controlling and monitoring of these spaces through mechanisms facilitated by the architecture of the network itself (Meijas 2009, 606). How much control the user really has over what happens in the backend, the private ownership of their data or the option and certainty that everything is indeed deleted from the servers of Facebook is something that remains undervalued in the public discourse. Back-end: data aggregation and data flow Closely related to the data-retention is the way in which value is created through the aggregation of a large amount of people and their data into a single place (Scholz 2010). Aggregation here means the collection of data from the users, whether it is movies that they have liked when visiting other sites or a recipe that the users has liked. It is about compiling a complete profile of the users, their likes, dislikes, interests, political preferences, and so forth, this does not necessarily have to be confined to the Facebook site but data can also be aggregated from other sites, [t]he very density and intensity of our network interaction can be transformed into profitable spreadsheets. [] This all leads up to an expressive data portrait of each of the hundreds of millions of users of Facebook (Scholz 2010). This is demonstrated with the Open Graph Application Programming Interface (Open Graph

API) , which was introduced in 2010. With this API, any website can have the same functionalities as a Facebook page, which means that the users can like the website, or items on the website. To give an example, on the website imdb.com, if the user goes to a page for a movie, a Facebook like button can be seen on the right sidebar. If the users clicks on this button the movie will show up on the Facebook profile page under movies and a wall post has been made that the user likes this movie. This way the user-generated data is transferred from one site to another. This is an example of the many aspects of the Open Graph API, it also constitutes the customization of third party websites to the interests and Facebook profile information of the users. By providing an easy-to-use API for website owners, Facebook is making it even easier to aggregate as much data as possible about the users. This is something what Andrejevic calls virtual digital enclosure, every virtual move has the potentiality to leave behind a trace or record of itself. When we surf the Internet, browsers can gather information about the paths we take the sites weve visited and the click streams that take us from one site to the next (Andrejevic 2009). When products or items are purchased online, detailed accounts of the transactions are left. Entry into the digital enclosure brings with it the condition of surveillance or monitoring (Andrejevic 2009). As is also the case with the Open Graph API, if a user is not logged out of Facebook and goes to another site, which has the Open Graph API installed their movements are or could be being tracked. It is the creation of an interactive realm wherein every action, interaction, and transaction generates information about itself (Andrejevic 2009). This leads to the next problematic issue of control, the flow of user-generated data and the lack of control over this flow by the users themselves. As Bernhard Rieder described in his article Networked Control: Search Engines and the Symmetry of Confidence, search engines can no longer be seen as black-boxes because this implies that we still have a clear picture of the outside shape of the object; there still is an object and we know where it starts and where it ends, we can clearly identify input and output. Rather, they can be characterized as a black-foam. It is argued here that this can be said about Facebook as well. This in the sense that the backend of the platform, the lack of control by the users finds it way in the fact that it is not clear where the application ends and where the user-generated data flows and who is able exploit this data. The element of control on the side of Facebook further shows itself in the problem-

atic aspect that the users often cannot opt-out. The developments are forced upon the users without giving them an option to turn the new forms of advertisements off or control the way in which their data is used. The politics of Facebook are hereby implemented into the technical design of the privacy settings, where there is no option to opt-out of the advertisement models of new developments. Which is something that has been said about other developments made on Facebook. For instance the heavily critiqued launch of the Beacon program in 2007. In which products that were bought by users on the partner sites (of Facebook) were automatically shared with their friends on Facebook, a feature that was implemented without notifying the users and without the ability to opt-out (Singel 2008). After much critique this program was discontinued but it does goes to show that Facebook can implement a feature at will and has control over the user-generated data and data flow. Going beyond the privacy issues On Facebook, the free services that are being consumed by the users are only free on the surface. The labour that is provide, this also includes the instalment of the Open Graph API by webmasters, only constitutes to improving the infrastructure and advertisement of Facebook. Furthermore, the data entrusted upon the platform is completely in the hands of the platform owners. Hereby it is not so much about the questions of personal privacy as these are often varying according to the cultural context. It is the power that is gained by the platform owners and the lack of control by the users that this constitutes (Andrejevic 2002, 232). Furthermore it is the control of the information flow by the platform owners and the lack of control that the users have over this data flow. As outlined in this article, the technology plays an increasingly more important role in the regulation of user-generated data. The policies and public discourse are implemented into the algorithm, APIs, data retention, and the way in which usergenerated data is aggregated. And as was shown in the sponsored stories example, the way that advertisements are shown in the technical design of the status update occurs such a way that it doesnt even look like an actual advertisement anymore which further constitutes to the invisibility of the underlying mechanisms of Facebook. But as Facebook frames it in the popular discourse, the advertisement gives you the chance to connect to the companies and brands you like and learn more about their products and services (Sandberg 2010). This framing disguises what is

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actually going on in the back-end and the underlying mechanisms. Having discussed the problematic issue of the invisibility of the technology it is important to note that technology does not stand on its own. The regulation, control and exploitation of the user-generated data happen in conjunction with the privacy settings, the licenses, policies, the users activities and also the public discourse. This was already implied when discussing the technological aspects. Furthermore as Petersen noted [i]t is when the technological infrastructure and design of these sites is combined with capitalism that the architecture begins to oscillate between exploitation and participation. In this respect, Facebook can also be seen as a playground and a factory, which is something that was explored by Trebor Scholz, but his focus lies more on the digital labour and the problematic aspects thereof. Facebook as a platform can be seen as a playground in the sense that the users like to be on the platform and socialize with other users. However, this notion of a playground can also be viewed in the following manner. The technical design (backend and front-end), licenses and policies and the platform owners controlling the user-generated data, the users themselves, are all dynamically intertwined and are actors on the playground that is Facebook. This while the users occasionally leaving the playground to go to another website while their movements and therefore also their labour is being tracked by the underlying mechanisms of Facebook. The playground in this respect is the field on which the various actors dynamically interact with each other. Facebook can be seen as a factory in the sense that the actions of the users generate value for this platform and other companies as well. The labour actions have shifted to places where it doesnt look like labour anymore (Scholz 2010, 242). This article focused more on the facilitating of this labour by means of the technical design and brought forward the ways in which the underlying mechanisms of Facebook are regulating the user-generated data. And it is argued here that this happens in ways that have often become invisible for the users. Problematic about the invisibility of the underlying mechanisms is the lack of control that it constitutes, the uncertainty of what exactly is done with this data and what exactly is collected. As well as the way that the technology is steering the users activities, so that the data that is generated with their activities can be used for profit by the platform owners. The continuous development of the technology transforms the ability to aggregate the user-generated data. The technology has the ability to capture, ag-

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gregated and redistribute the data of the users. The owner of this data is often unaware of the storage and utilization and the detail of the profile that is created of the user (Sprck Jones 2003, 4-5). It is therefore important to continue doing research and the playground will certainly be an interesting field for further research into the various dynamic interactions between the actors at play.

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Notes
[1] User-generated data here is seen as filling in the profile information, a status update, or even accepting a friend request (i.e. creating friend connections), any action that improves the database infrastructure of Facebook. Not to be confused with User-generated content, which encompasses more than just data, it also entails uploading of photos and videos. [2] In a presentation on October 8, 2009, Jeff Rothschild stated that Facebook has 30,000 servers to support their operations. Since this presentation Facebook has expanded their user base even further but current figures remain unknown. [3] An Application Programming Interface is a set of calling conventions defining how a service is invoked through a software package (RFC 1208). It determines the way in which the application program is communicating with the operating system or database, it can therefore be seen as an intermediary between the application (from for instance third party company) and the database and infrastructure of Facebook.

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References
Andrejevic, Mark. 2002. The work of being watched: interactive media and the exploitation of self-disclosure. Critical studies in media communication, vol 19. no. 2, june p 230-248 Andrejevic, Mark. 2009. Privacy, exploitation, and the digital enclosure Amsterdam Law Forum 1.4 http://ojs.ubvu.vu.nl/alf/article/viewArticle/94/168 Clarke, Roger. 2009. Fundamentals of Information Systems. Roger Clarkes website http://www.rogerclarke.com/SOS/ISFundas.html Facebook. 2010. Terms of services. Facebook website, October 4. http://www.facebook.com/terms.php Facebook. 2010b. Privacy policy. Facebook website, October 22. http://www.facebook.com/policy.php Gandy, Oscar. 1993. The panoptic sort: a political economy of personal information. Boulder, CO: Westview. Kincaid, Jason. 2010. EdgeRank: The Secret Sauce That Makes Facebooks News Feed Tick. Techcrunch Blog, April 22. http://techcrunch.com/2010/04/22/facebook-edgerank/ Madrigal, Alexis. 2010. How the Facebook News Feed Algorithm Shapes Your Friendships The Atlantic. October 22. http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/10/how-the-facebooknews-feed-algorithm-shapes-your-friendships/64996/ Petersen, Sren Mrk. Loser generated content: from participation to exploitation. First Monday 13, no. 3 (March). http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/ index.php/fm/article/view/2141/1948 Rieder, Bernhard. 2007. Sociodigitization and Facebook The Politics of Systems, October 15. http://thepoliticsofsystems.net/2007/10/15/sociodigitization-and-facebook/ Rieder, Bernhard. 2005. Networked Control: Search Engines and the Symmetry of Confidence. International Review of Information Ethics, vol 3. (June) Rothschild, Jeff. 2009. CNS Lecture series. University of California, October 8. http://cns.ucsd.edu/lecturearchive09.shtml#Roth Scholz, Trebor. 2010. Facebook as playground and factory. Facebook and philosophy, what is on your mind? ed. D.E. Wittkower, 241-252. Chicago, Illinois: Open Court.

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Segall, Laurie. 2011. Facebooks sponsored stories turns your posts into ads. CNN, January 26. http://money.cnn.com/2011/01/26/technology/facebook_sponsored_stories/index.htm Singel, Ryan. 2008. Facebook Beacon Tracking Program Draws Privacy Lawsuit. Wired Magazine, August 14. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/08/facebook-beacon Slutsky, Irina. 2011. Facebook Test Mines Real-Time Conversations for Ad Targeting. Ad Age Digital, March 23. http://adage.com/article/digital/facebook-testmines-real-time-conversations-ad-targeting/149531 Sprck Jones, Karen. 2003. Privacy: Whats different now? Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 28(4), 287292. Tiziana Terranova, 2004. Network culture: Politics for the information age. London: Pluto Press. Vogelstein, Fred. 2007. The Facebook revolution LA Times, October 24. http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-op-vogelstein7oct07,0,6385994. story?coll=la-opinion-center Weber, Thomas E. 2010. Cracking the Facebook Code The daily beast. October 18. http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-10-18/the-facebooknews-feed-how-it-works-the-10-biggest-secrets/full/ Zimmer, Michael. 2008. Facebooks Zuckerberg on Increasing the Streams of Personal Information Online. Michael Zimmers blog, November 8. http://michaelzimmer.org/2008/11/08/facebooks-zuckerberg-on-increasingthe-streams-of-personal-information-online/ Zuckerberg, Mark. 2010. Giving you more control. The Facebook Blog, October 6. http://www.facebook.com/blog.php?post=434691727130

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Abstract
This article examines how Discourse Analysis can be used to understand the Web. The Web is conceptualized as a dynamic oligarchy of a variety of embedded networks which contain most users. Apart from having distinct embedded networks, the Web has also been conceptualized as a political field by various scholars. To explain the use of Discourse analysis, the method is first introduced. After this introduction, parallels are drawn which illustrate the way in which discourse analysis reflects the Webs infrastructure. Hereafter, Discourse Analysis is helps to combine the ontological claims of the web with the political claims of the web, thus providing a theory of how the Web as a political infrastructure composed of interacting layers works. Keywords: heterarchical networks, scale-free networks, web-politics, Discourse Analsys

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This Network thing called the Web

Bob van de Velde
Liberating, oppressing, bringing people together, keeping people apart, the Web is argued to change our life in profound and conflicting ways; how does the web change people? This article discusses the web to try and understand it as a channel of communication and change. This entails discussing the Web as a piece of infrastructure, a network of communicating nodes and a political space. But that is an analysis of what the Web is, not how the Web works. To elaborate on the working of the web, this article argues for the use of discourse analysis. To show this, this article draws parallels between discourse analysis conceptualization of social networks and the Web as an ontological thing, which argues for its fit as an epistemological tool for analysis. While going deeper down the rabbit hole we can see the interplay between the actor, the web and the discourse within and between the two. This article thus builds a discourse to describe the power-shaping discoursal practice of the web1. This Network thing called the Web A Network can be many things. The basic definition given by Van Dijk (2006, 24) makes networks out to be: a collection of links between elements of a unit(emphasis original). Especially Social Networks, i.e. networks between people, play a pivotal role in societies (Van Dijk 2006, 26). One of the most modern of these networks is the Web. Galloway explains the web is a layer of conversation contingent upon the working of more technical supportive layers (Galloway 2004). The supportive layers called protocols determine how information should be communicated, where it should go, how it should get there and whether it has successfully been communicated. This is done without reference to a specific entity or node in the network. The absence of functional differences in nodes makes this network a distributed network instead of a hierarchical or decentralized network. Additionally, the content of information communicated in this network is not considered by these protocols. As such, the supportive protocols which frame the web make it both distributed in regards to the communication process and neutral in respect to content (Galloway 2004, 46). In relation to the web, these protocols underpin the idea of the web as a zero-institution described by Dean (Dean 2003, 106). This concept entails a social institution without a normative claim, but which may contain normative claims.
1 Interestingly enough, Phillips and Jorgensen reject the structuralist metaphor of a fishing net, with set relations, and instead prefer the use of the internet as a model (2002, 11).

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If the web is considered to be a zero institution, there is no a priori normative difference between content providers. Such a difference would contradict the very concept of a zero institution. Still, Shirkey finds a de facto difference in traffic and attention for certain content providers (Shirkey 2006). This difference doesnt result from technical difference, such as data-usage or availability. Instead, the difference is normative, because it is grounded in the preferences of users (Shirkey 2006, 38). The difference in traffic, attention and income between content providers is so strong that roughly 20% of the providers generate 80% of the traffic, attention and income. Such a distribution isnt the result of non-egalitarian system, but of large and unconstrained choice (Shirkey 2006, 42). This means that although each node can in theory equally contribute to content, some nodes are in practice dominant as content providers. This non-equal distribution forms an emergent property of the Web. The landscape which results is quite different from a general rhizome structure. To illustrate this fact, Barabasi summarizes the results of empirical research concerning the Web: Researchers studying these huge samples have made some fascinating-discoveries. They have found that the Web is fragmented into continents and communities, limiting and determining our behavior in the online universe. (2002, 162) The fragments of the Web can be seen as embedded networks. Examples are social network sites (SNS) such as Myspace and Facebook, or forums and user-groups. These distinct provinces are dependent on the broader frame of the Web, but form platforms of communication distinct from the broader Web. As such they are networks within the Web, which draw users from the broader Web into their boundaries. When considering the unequal distribution of connections, such websites form nodes with a superior amount of traffic, attention and income. Within the context of the Web, this situation can be seen as an oligarchy, in which few providers connect (to) the majority of users of the Web, by drawing them into their bounded territories; thus forming what I call embedded networks (ENs) . Despite being central in terms of connections and closed in terms of internal rules and practices, these embedded networks are not fully stable. Torkjazi (2009, 6) writes: existing [social network sites] appear to be very vulnerable to the arrival of new fashions among users ... . Similairly, the underlying layer of the Web, the internet, can be used as a censorship tool. Such intervention from below can be seen in for instance China (Diamond 2010, 73). Combined, this means that ENs can be influence by the users within them and the internet underlying them. As such, the Web and the ENs therein are part of a heterarchie (Kontopoulos 1993, 55). This is a type of network within which layers are intertwined, and can influence each other, thus creating influ-

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ence from below, above and within a specific layer. More importantly, this argues for a dynamic oligarchy within the Web, rather than being dominated by a static set of ENs. Web-Politics So far, differences in the Web have been discussed in terms of connections, but not politics. Returning to Deans idea of the Web as a zero-institution, the Web is open to the introduction of values. For Dean, the Web as such equates to a country, which doesnt have a specific set of dominant values, but in which values are determined by the people within them (108). The Web in this respect becomes a space in which different values and beliefs meet. Friedland (2004) claims the Web as such is an important source of socialization: The model of the well-socialised individual capable of communicatively rational action is, in fact, poised between primary socialisation in the family and secondary socialisation in the world of institutions. The transformation of secondary institutions the schools, community associations, indeed the family into networked environments has created a secondary lifeworld in which the media itself becomes a major source of socialisation. Life online is more than a metaphor for those under 35 (and many over). It is a new form of life that influences core forms of intersubjective communication and sociation (2004, 23) Considering the Web as a source of socialization, many actors on the Web use it as a channel through which they can communicate their values. Such political use of the Web can be seen in the work of Marres. Marres describes Issue Networks and their use of various ICTs, such as the Web, to describe what she calls info-politics. Info-politics means using ICTs like the Web to format issues in specific ways, thus attempting to portray a specific position as favorable (2006, 15). Like the Web is not stable in regard to the most connected parties, neither is it in regard to which values dominate. Such a system is not democratic, i.e. working toward a shared opinion for the majority of the people. Instead, Dean argues such a system is a neo-democracy, in which conflicting positions struggle for (temporary) dominance (2003, 108). This struggle doesnt just focus on the beliefs of people, but the fundamental beliefs, identities and practices of individuals. This makes the Web a battleground of ideas, a strongly political space. Introducing Discourse Analysis To recap what has been said: The Web is not a whole of equally connected nodes, but a dynamic-oligarchy in which different ENs dominate communication with and

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between sub-sets of Web-users. Additionally, this dynamic-oligarchy called the Web is a political space, where struggles over beliefs identities and practices occur. But it is one thing to say that the Web is an unequal space of political struggle, it something else entirely to say how this works. Enter Laclau and Mouffes discourse analysis, an epistemological tool which provides a framework which explains how communication works as a politics. First its parallels with the Web as a thing are drawn out. This helps understand how the nature of the Web as a dynamic Polyarchy reflects the conceptualization of Discourse Analysis. Secondly, a synthesis is made which enables an analysis of the web as it works, rather than as what it is. Parallels A discourse can be many things, Phillips and Jorgensen (2002,11) argue signs () acquire their meaning by being different from other signs, but those signs from which they differ can change according to the context in which they are used. Ultimately, Laclou & Mouffes discourse theory supposes all societal formations are products of discursive processes (2002, 34). Discourse as such is a web which structures meaning. Laclau and Mouffe claim the meaning of signs which can be both words and behaviors is created by putting words and behavior, the signs, in relation to other signs. The process of making these connections is articulation, which is an act of forming the relations between signs. In these relations, a sign is transformed from a meaningless element to a meaningful moment. Which is a sign laden with meaning based on the constructed relations with other signs. In these relations, there are central moments around which other signs are ordered; these are called nodal points. Like an Embedded Network exists around a specific provider, a disourse exists around a nodal point. An example of a nodal point is ANT, which attributes a certain meaning to the element actor. In this case actor means a thing which acts on another thing, instituting change by itself (Latour 2005, 150-153). A competing nodal point would be theater , which attributes a different meaning to the element actor by tying it to elements such as person, part and script, thus making it a different moment. As the example shows, there are multiple nodal points competing over the meaning of specific elements. The meanings of an element not included in a discourse form the field of discursivity. These are all possible other meanings attributed to a certain element. Bringing these other meanings into a discourse, for instance by different ways of framing, creates conflict. This conflict over meaning is called politics, whereas meanings beyond dispute are called objective. Discourse as such creates a space in which values are made from otherwise neutral elements, which forms a process of socialization akin to that discussed by Fiedland (2005). If Discourse is considered to be an ordering tool which combines otherwise neutral el-

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ements, there seems to be no a priori difference between these elements. Still, in practice some elements, or discourses, are dominant. In these discourses, elements have attained closure, their meanings as a result of discourse are no longer challenged. These elements have become nodal points, thus ordering a discourse. As the example shows, multiple discourses can compete over the meaning of specific elements, like actor. But it is the nodal points like ANT or Theater which struggle over the element actor. This makes the nodal points around which these moments are ordered are more influential than other elements which have not attained the status of nodal points. This means that although each element can in theory equally contribute to meaning, some elements are in practice dominant as nodal points, just like all the nodes on the Web could equally contribute, but in practice dont. This non-equal status of elements forms an emergent property of discourses. The landscape which results is quite different from a general rhizome structure. Nodal points have conflicting articulations of specific elements. These articulations happen in a broader frame of signs which have not yet been articulated by these nodal points, the elements. This broader field is called the field of discursivity. This field is the other of a specific discourse. It contains both elements, but also competing discourses (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002, 27). Within the context of the field of discursivity, this situation can be seen as an oligarchy, in which few nodal points connect (to) the majority of signs; thus forming Discourses . Despite being central in terms of connections and closed in terms of internal meanings and values, these discourses are not fully stable. The competing discourses in the field of discursivity can challenge floating points which create another discourse, thus attempt to change it. This makes discourses incomplete structures in the same undecidable terrain never quite become completely structured( Phillips & Jorgensen 2002, 29). As such, the discourses within the broader frame of discursivity are never fully stable. More importantly, this argues for a dynamic oligarchy within the field of discursivity, rather than being dominated by a static set of discourses. This parallel shows the way in which Discourses are in the field of discursivity what ENs are within the Web. For theoretical purposes, this helps to understand how a shift in one is similar to a shift in the other. It also helps to show these networks are both dependent on hegemony, either in the more connected nodes or influential signs. In both systems, there is a struggle, but the next part will argue that the struggle in discourse can be used to understand the struggle within the Web. Discourse - politics Having established the nature of discourses as a parallel to the nature of the web,

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and the struggle over meaning, the question is how this struggle is in fact political. As has been discussed, there are multiple discourse within the field of discursivity which struggle over meaning. But the signs in discourse denote not only words and behavior, but also identity (41). As such, the subject of a discourse is fragmented, he or she can have different roles in different discourses. When a discourse is used between one actor and the other, there exists interpellation, which means individual is placed in a certain position by a discourse (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002, 40). A twitter user is interpelated as someone who needs to communicate small texts. A user thus exists as a subject of different discourses, which carry their own norms of behavior. This makes the user over-determined, he or she can be positioned in several different discourses. Some of these discourses can have conflicting positions, as it is hard to be a privacy advocate and Facebook user at the same time. The Discourses socialize because of the relations the put between positions and behavior. These relations can be both linked and oppositional; they determine what goes together and what excludes each other. But these discourses also play a central role in group-formation (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002, 43-44). This is a process of identification between a subject and a group signifier, for instance twitter-user. With this group identifier, which becomes a master signifier to the subject, there come meanings related to it by discourse. This includes the practice of frequent little texts, transparent updates etcetera. But a group identifier can also be linked to for instance green-peace sympathizer, leftwing-voter or anti-communist. The user in an EN is interpelated to certain behavior as part of that EN. Additionally, ENs provide channel of discourse in which discourse can struggle over the identity of users. Because of the heterarchical nature of the dynamic-oligarchy of the web, discourse politics function in at least three distinct ways: The interactions between users facilitated by ENs, ENs influence on user discourse, and the user-discourse influence on ENs. Discourse Analysis (DA) provides a method of analysis to see the working of these influences. ENs influence on Inter-user discourse Using the vocabulary of DA, discourses are networks forming political struggles over the meaning of words and behavior. These struggles happen in the acts of actors, in the process of articulation. More practically speaking inter-human network can be considered a stage in which the articulations of users introduce their discourse to the field of discursivity of other users. This communication of discourse influences the discourse-network within a user. In this way, DA provides a vocabulary to describe the way in which the words and behaviors of one user influence the meanings of another user, by talking about the interplay between the inter-user network and the under-

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lying discourse-networks. In short, the Discourse- User- Network Interplay (DUNI) describes the interaction between inter-actor communication through ENs effects on individual user meanings and behavior. Using DUNI, it is possible to describe in the detail how the position of central nodes serves as a position of power. Because of their many connections, their discourses can spread more easily throughout the network, thus changing the behavior of many other actors. This spreading of discourse can make objective moments political, for instance by introducing a competing discourse to the relation between a person and a brand or a government. As such, central nodes act upon other the possible actions of other actors. DA thus shows how the socialization and issue formation is generated through the ENs on the Web. ENs influence on inter-user-discourse Apart from facilitating inter-user discourse, ENs often engage in direct communication with their users. One way of doing this is through adverts. Examples of this are smart advertisements. These use the words of users, or sometimes even pictures of their friends to generate targeted ads. To understand how this works to change users, DA provides a valuable framework. Both methods of communication use moments from the discourse of the user to entice action. This is because using moments the user expresses by searching, and tying it to other actor, which pay for this service, by placing a literal link. As such, paying actors are positioned as additions to the user discourse. Instead of politicizing the users discourse, it is added to, thus expanding the discourse with elements which were previously devoid of meaning. Thus, the user is introduced to other actors by fitting the actors into the users discourse, a way of formatting this discourse. ENs effect on user-discourse A more stringent matter is the effect of ENs on user behavior. Longford (2005) argues that through web sites, like those which form ENs, change users behavior in order to harvest personal information. Once again, DA can provide a method of analysis for this behavioral change or lack thereof by looking at the way in which ENs contribute to individual discourse. Considering the user who is at first unwilling to yield to such a system. This user is confronted with a struggle between a discourse in which the action of trying to join, as a sign, is connected to diminished privacy. To accept this action, there should be an absence of a dominant discourse in which privacy is positively related to personal identity. If the user chooses not to join after being confronted by the dismissal of privacy in exchange for system use, this means the discourse which positively relates to privacy has attained hegemony at the expense of the discourse

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relating to access, and vice versa. Yet there also exists the possibility that the user doesnt value privacy, not even negatively. In this case, a DA analysis would point out that privacy is an element, not a moment for this user. This leads the user to carry out the action of joining the network without struggle. Only when a conflicting discourse from the field of discursivity introduces a different order in which privacy is valued, there will be no change in the practice of usage. This highlights the nature of change in behavior instituted through ENs. Their use entails the inclusion of practices in individual discourses. As such, ENs engage in the conduct of conduct, creating changes in behavior of their users. DA helps to show how ENs structure user conduct through restructuring discourse, and how introductions of new discourse may challenge such relations. User-discourse effects on ENs ENs like social network sites are contingent upon their use. As explained in the description of the Web as an infrastructure, ENs are part of the broader Web. Like Torkjazi (2005) argues, social network sites are an example of ENs which seem to have a life-cycle after which they are abandoned by their users and ultimately vanish. As was argued, this is what makes the oligarchy of the Web dynamic. DA can be used to explain how the users use of ENs can be changed. DA sees behavior as part of discourse. As such, practices of using particular ENs are part of a broader framework of meanings generated by the relational ordering of signs. Theoretically, this means that the use of for instance Myspace vis--vis Facebook is part of the identity of users. Hargittai (2008) sees that the choice of social network is correlated to ethnicity. This indicates an influence of identity on the practice of social network site usage. Should the discourse of users change, through a change in identity, or the relation between identity and the social network site, this could entail a shift in the practice of usage. When a different service enters the discourse of users by challenging the role of the previous social network site, this creates a politization of said moment. As such, discourse is the way in which users stick to or abandon certain ENs. But rather than analyzing them as the result of fads, DA provides a way to trace the restructuring of meaning as a cause for such changes. Conclusion This article introduced Discourse Analysis as a complementary theory to an analysis of the Web. Did it succeed? The conceptualization of discourses is similar to the Web. The groundwork is neutral and equal, but in practice used by dominant structures which are mutually differentiated. In both systems, these dominant structures are subject to change facilitated by their neutral groundwork. The added value of DA then

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lies in the way it describes the role of discourses as structures which include individual behavior. This helps to make the ways in which power acts throughout networks explicit. And from that analysis result paths of both user and EN control. Three levels of these processes where given as theoretical analyses of the political phenomena on the Web. These examples argue for the applicability of DA when analyzing the Web. Accepting this thesis implies doing, simply put, this article argues that DA should be empirically applied to gain insight into if and how discourses shape behavior. Perhaps more importantly, how this shaping generates and maintains ENs and how users are affected by these ENs. In short, what are the politics which create, maintain and empower the ENs.

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References
Barabsi, Albert-Lszl. 2002. Linked: The New Science of Networks, 143-178. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Perseus Publishing. Dean, Jodi. 2003. Why the Net Is Not a Public Sphere. Constellations 10, no. 1: 95112. Diamond, Larry. 2010. Journal of Democracy 21 (3) . 69-83. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Dijk, van, Jan. 2006. Networks: The Nervous System of Society. In The Network Society, 19-41. London: Sage Publications. Friedland, Lewis A., Hernando Rojas, and Thomas Hove. 2004. The Networked Public Sphere. Javnost - The Public 13, no. 4: 5-26. Galloway, Alexander R. 2004. Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization, 1-53. Cambridge, MA: MIT. Hargittai, Eszter. 2008. Whose Space? Differences Among Users and Non-Users of Social Network Sites. In Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 13. 276297. Jorgensen, Marianne and Louise Phillips. 2002. Laclau and Mouffes Discourse Theory in Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method 24-59 Londen: Sage Publications. Kontopoulos, Kariakos M. 1993. Logics of Social Structure. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. Latour, Bruno. 2005. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-NetworkTheory, 121-156. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Longford. Pedagogies of Digital Citizenship and the Politics of Code. Techn, 2005: 68-96. Marres, Noortje. 2006. Net-Work Is Format Work: Issue Networks and the Sites of Civil Society Politics. In Reformatting Politics: Information Technology and Global Civil Society, ed. Jon Anderson, Jodi Dean, and Geert Lovink, 3-17. New York: Routledge. Shirkey, Clay. 2006. Power Laws, Weblogs, and Inequality. In Reformatting Politics: Information Technology and Global Civil Society, ed. Jon Anderson, Jodi Dean, and Geert Lovink, 35-42. New York: Routledge. Torkjazi, Mojtaba, Reza Rejaie & Walter Willinger. 2009. Hot Today, Gone Tomorrow: On the Migration of MySpace Users. WOSN09, August 17, 2009, Barcelona, Spain

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Abstract
Habermass late theory of the public sphere is fundamentally about democracy and growing complexity. As new network forms arise how can Habermas fundamental theory of public sphere still be adapted? The new network forms that are recently under discussion are Web 2.0 platforms. Within Web 2.0 platforms, users demand a cultural freedom. The cause of calling for freedom is the emergence of a combination in socio-technological-political processes within Web 2.0 that situates the users as an issue network and turns users into something that is more like citizens. As the public sphere is not inherently public, this paper elaborates on the disabling and enabling factors of public sphere and how users turn into citizens within Web 2.0. Keywords: public sphere, Web 2.0, network, participatory culture, socio-political, socio-technology.

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Citizens of Web 2.0: Public sphere as cultural public

Lindsy Szilvsi
Introduction This sweetheart here, this little baby, looks like any ordinary machine, isnt that so? A mess of screws and buttons, a whole heap of plastic. Comes with new words too: RAMS and ROMS. Think thats what the machine is made of, do youthe hardware and the software and the mouse? Not a chance. The computer is made of you, lady. Its got you all inside it. (Time Magazine 1983) In 1983, Time Magazines cover demonstrated the personal computer as the Machine of the Year including the under title The Computer Moves In, which formed the introduction for the information society. The entering of a new phase where the creation, distribution, and manipulation of information becomes a significant cultural, political, and economic commodity. The reflection of commodity was argued by Jean-Franois Lyotard who stated that knowledge has become the principle force of production over the last few decades (Lyotard 1984, 5). Information technologies diffusion into society puts forward the visibility and accessibility of knowledge to the public. In other words: technology enters the lives and homes of common users as the microcomputer (Schfer 2011, 9). The notion of technology as part of everyday live was symbolized in 2007 by Time Magazines different version of Person of the Year. On the cover the common user became the person of the year describing the user is in control of the information age. Schfer refers to the emergence of a new global cultural practice (Schfer 2011, 9) that is derived from the shaping form of computer use, and calls this participatory culture1 (Schfer 2011). Major critiques of the concept information society argue that it creates a certain sense of romanticizing society by referring to something that is completely new. One of the critics is Frank Webster who argues that information society is a continuation of contemporary society and, therefore, it should not be seen as a radical transformation of society (Webster 2002).
1 The term participatory culture was first coined by Jenkins (1991, 2006a; 2006b, Jenkins et al. 2006). Schfer describes the term as the advocating of social progress through technological advancements, whereas power relations are reconfigured and related technologies are used for design and user appropriation, and this all derives socio-political dynamics (Schfer 2011).

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To return to Schfers reference of participatory culture and to follow Websters notion of societys continuation, the society itself is not transformed but the users have gained a new role. In the context of cultural practice, the users transform into active participants and acts within the production of media. In 2005, BBC News website2 covered the topic of digital age and the creativity by users, and asking them Are you a digital citizen? We want to hear about your digital life and how you use technology. The user as digital citizen is, for example, involved in the creation of blogs, the use of social network sites, and the posting of pictures and videos online. Digital citizenship is derived from developments of technologies and can collectively be called Web 2.0. Web 2.0 can be understood as a conceptual framework of distribution, interaction, and converging of media formats. Tim OReilly marks the outlined definition of Web 2.0 as a platform whereas the user controls and generates content, reconfiguring the position of the user as active producer (OReilly 2005). Digital citizenship reflects the social progress through technology, transforming users as active participants. Pierre Lvy nuances the degree of participation by the emergence of collective intelligence a meeting of minds on the Internet referring to the collaboration of individuals (Lvy 1997). In the context of media production, active participants generate, produce, publish, and distribute content that is provided by companies and institutions. Schfer states that user participation is an extension of the cultural industries (Schfer 2011, 11) involving a collaboration between users and companies. Wikipedia is an example of collective production, though it is often criticized in the issue of cultural freedom. According to Benkler, cultural freedom occupies a position that relates to both political freedom and individual autonomy, but is synonymous with neither (Benkler 2006, 274). The notion of participation holds several consequences for companies and politics, requiring a socio-political understanding of participation. Participation involves decisions and actions that are seen as legitimate to users but can be interpreted as not appropriate for politics and companies. According to Lvy (1997), and Schfer (2011), participation establishes power structures where users and politics, and users and companies, are complementing or opposing each other. The relation between users and politics, and users and companies, forms control and regulation of media production, and derives the discussion of democracy.
2 For the complete article see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/4678631.stm

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According to Lessig, who questions the political impact of new media, there is already the sense of antidemocraticy (Lessig 2000). In The Digital Revolution, the Informed Citizen, And The Culture of Democracy by Jenkins and Thorburn describe Pools framework of communication technologies and democracy envisioning a decentralized and participatory media environment where technologies of freedom will attempt to create control (Jenkins & Thorburn 2003). Habermass late theory of the public sphere is fundamentally about democracy and growing complexity. As participatory culture involves the active role of users within cultural production, the question is if Habermas fundamental theory of public sphere can still be adapted. An aspect that as being neglected and not prominently enough theorized is the quality of Web 2.0 platforms as public space (Schfer 2011). Web 2.0 platforms are something that is a public space, but somehow that is not. Within public space, users demand a cultural freedom but with the emergence of socio-political processes on Web 2.0 platforms users turn into citizens (Schfer 2011). The contemporary stress on participatory culture discusses two different sides: public spheres enlargement, and user surveillance commodification (Lister et al. 2009). The revision of public sphere by Web 2.0 is an important theme within scholarship and public net discourse, and is compared with Habermas fundamental theory of public sphere. New forms of electronically mediated discourse are taken into account in the discussion of democracy in the age of public sphere (Poster 1997). This article argues that participation within socio-political processes of Web 2.0 will transform the user into a citizen. In view of Habermas fundamental theory, and Schfers participatory culture this article will build upon the notion of public sphere within Web 2.0 in regarding what disables or enables public in terms of participation. Cult of Public Opinion Participation and public sphere are two closely related concepts, both depending on technology, economy, culture, and politics to lower the barrier of participation essentially for the creation of a public sphere. To demonstrate how participation can influence public sphere within Web 2.0 platforms, first Habermas conceptualization of public sphere will be discussed, and secondly, how participation within Web 2.0

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derives socio-political processes. Friedland et al. (2006) provide a revision of public sphere and refer to Habermas Between Facts and Norms (BFN) that gives a more recent concept of public sphere than in Habermas earlier work The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. In BFN Habermas describes public sphere as multiple publics toward increased fragmentation and privatization where political and economic systems increase in complexity and autonomy (Habermas 1992). Habermas definition of public sphere reflects the growing centrality of network, and according to Friedland et al. this centrality is caused by the existence of autopoietic dynamics within networks (Friedland et al. 2006). Autopoietic dynamics means that networks have a self-organized character. The self-organizing character of network governs the aspects of public sphere balancing between an open system and institutionally constrained. An open systems character is deliberation including self-regulation and communicative reflexivity, whereas a public sphere that is institutionally constrained involves mediated communication dominated by politics and elite discourse (Friedland et al. 2006). The involvement of mediated communication reflects the influence of politics that limits the public in public sphere. According to Mejias, the public is where opinion can be expressed freely and at the same time informs action (Mejias 2010, 606). The expression of opinions is freely and includes action in participatory culture as users produce, generate, and distribute information. Due to easy-to-use interfaces within Web 2.0 platforms every user can become a participant, which makes Web 2.0 platforms a space of inclusivity. Inclusivity is one of Habermas four aspects of democratic practice in conceptualizing public sphere. The other aspects are: equality, transparency, and rationality. Dean argues that the danger of inclusivity can be seen as disempowerment of intellectuals. In participatory culture every user can become a publisher of content regardless the value of authenticity and credibility. An example of intellectual disempowerment within a Web 2.0 platform is the online encyclopedia and open-source operating system Wikipedia. Wikipedia allows user to produce, edit, delete, and share information. A critic of online encyclopedia like Wikipedia is that posted items include errors, lack of expertise, plagiarism, and copyright infringement. Even there exists critics about Wikipedia, it constitutes as an extension of cultural industries required by user activities (Schfer 2011). Wikipedia demonstrates how technology advancements make social progress possible.

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The social progress through technological advancements within Web 2.0 describes the notion of socio-technological advances. Scholz, though, argues that Web 2.0 does not represent socio-technological advances but deflates the claim of users empowerment as intellectuals still define what enters and what not enters the public discourse (Scholz 2008). Noam Chomsky (2011) referred to the justification of power in the role of intellectuals on his conference of Responsibility And Integrity: The Dilemmas We Face on 15th of March 2011, as that intellectuals have the privilege and opportunity to narrow the public discourse. Web 2.0 as postmodern communication space perceives new structures of power and authority (Listers et al., 2009). As Web 2.0 blurs the boundaries of social, political, and ethical dimensions (Zimmer 2008), power structures of public discourse perform an important role for equality and visibility. Users become blind to the ideological meaning of technologies (Postman 1992) as the power and ubiquity of Web 2.0 rises. To gain users articulation and collective power, participation within Web 2.0 provides cultural expression in media practices (Jarret 2008). Web 2.0 enables technologies to empower disadvantaged users, providing the possibility for discussion and political debates wherein public opinions can take place. The communication process flow between political systems and users is described by Habermas as: public opinion generates influence; influence is transformed into communicative power through media channels; and communicative power is legislated into administrative power via democratic procedures (Habermas 1994). In other words, communicative power is persuasive communication created by users itself to influence the political system and corporations in form of participation, including public opinions and cultural expressions. Communicative power is the side of counter steering that involves the cooperation and mutual understanding of users, whereas administrative power forms the side of steering, which describe the activity of politics and companies to influence users cultural freedom (Friedland et al. 2006). In other words, communicative power involves the freely expression of users but at the same time it provokes reaction of politics and companies who struggle to control the users participation. The interplay between users as participants and the mediated communication dominated by political systems and corporations opens the discussion for sociopolitical processes in Web 2.0 platforms. Web 2.0 platforms enable technologies to

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empower disadvantaged users creating participatory culture, thereby establishing a place to form communicative power as an activity of resistance towards political systems and corporations. Senft suggests that participatory culture is a cult of public opinion (Senft 2000). Zuckerberg for President As participatory culture is a cult of public opinion, Web 2.0 platforms provide a place for public discourse, petitions, and civil acts. An example of public discourse and civil acts is the reaction to privacy settings within Web 2.0 platforms when the platforms settings are forced upon the users, and users start to show resistance in an old fashioned way such as boycotting or petition in order for the platform to change the rules. In this paragraph, Facebook as an example of a Web 2.0 platform that on the one hand encourages users to participate within the companys decisions but on the other hand creates this notion of governance. Facebook is like a public policy website demonstrated by a video of Facebooks CEO Mark Zuckerberg. In 2009 Mark Zuckerberg posted on the Facebooks page Facebook Governance Site a video requesting Facebook users to vote which documents3 should govern the Facebook site. Facebook users were asked to provide feedback on two new documents: the new Facebook Principles and the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities. A community that large and engaged needs a more open process and a voice in governance. Thats why a month ago, we announced a more transparent and democratic approach to governing the Facebook site. (Zuckerberg on Facebook Governance Site 2009) Zuckerbergs quote reflects openness of Facebook as a community where users can be part of, enhancing the feeling of participation and inclusivity, and the announcing of a transparent and democratic approach demonstrates Facebooks concept of visibility. The aspects inclusivity and visibility are two of the four aspects of Habermas democratic practice in conceptualizing public sphere, which are mentioned before but are not valid when it comes to the public of Web 2.0. Due to socio-political processes within Web 2.0 platforms, there is still the interplay between users communicative power and the mediated communication dominated
3 The changes made in the Privacy Policy documents after the voting can be seen at: http:// www.facebook.com/fbsitegovernance?v=app_4949752878

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by political systems and corporations. Criticism about the voting on Facebook reflects the existence of mediated communication by the corporation, claiming that participation is not entirely established. There was apparently a small catch within the voting process: For this vote and any future one, the results will be binding if at least 30 percent of active Facebook users at the time that the vote was announced participate. An active user is someone who has logged in to the site in the past 30 days. (Zuckerberg on Facebook Governance Site 2009) The idea of establishing thirty percent participation threshold is according to critics an unattainable fact. Privacy Internationals director Simon Davies argues that the voting is a fraud: If this is a genuine attempt to give users control then give them a genuine vote, not a symbolic one; otherwise, stop wasting everyones time.4 The attempt of Facebook to the concept of participation serves as a public interface between the company and its users, explaining companys decisions in a collaborative development (Schfer 2011). Interaction with participants engaged in companys decisions creates a socio-political process, whereby transparency appears to be a crucial aspect in the establishing of a culture of governance (Schfer 2011). The above mentioned quote and the related critics reflect sociopolitical consequences of user participation and how a corporation deals with it. In Bastard Culture! How User Participation Transforms Cultural Production Schfer makes a distinction between confrontation, implementation, and integration of participation. Facebooks voting is an example of implementing participation. Participation is put between brackets as it is not sure if Facebook neglected or really took the user activities into consideration. The video of Zuckerberg resembles a president talking to his population, where the population of Facebook is invited into a democratic action. Democratic action involves organized activities of user, which turns the user into citizens (Schfer 2011). As Web 2.0 platforms, such as the example of Facebook as demonstrated, interplay between users, and political systems and corporations exist in order to maintain participation in cultural industries and media practices. Dahlgren put
4 Found at: http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/facebooks_site_governance_vote_a_ massive_con.php

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emphasis on the importance of socio-cultural interaction, as that participation in political discourse forms a balance between political systems and civil society and is a precondition for democracy and creation of public sphere (Dahlgren 1995). Viva La Resistance! Conclusion As users demand a cultural freedom, the emergence of socio-political processes on these Web 2.0 platforms constitutes the user as citizen. The public sphere refers to the mutual understanding and cooperation between users when it comes to a save establishment of participatory culture. Public is alive and well, although it will never be quite the same as Habermas fundamental theory of public sphere. Due to technology advancements and Web 2.0 platforms, the public sphere is revised as a cultural public where power structures are reshaped by the blurring boundaries between social and political. The public sphere is threatened by power structures that attempt to control the participatory culture of users but at the same time users can accomplish change and resistance by communicative power. The four political norms of Habermas to conceptualize public sphere are partly adapted in the cultural public. The public is not formed by visibility but the existence of mutual understanding and cooperation between users, and the act of resistance combines the users together as public. Inclusivity will remain as technology advancements within Web 2.0 provide easy-to-use interfaces for each user to become a participant. The third political norm equality is still in need for discussion, as participation in this paper is not valued in different levels. The example of Wikipedia, though, demonstrates a blur between the posting of content by common users and intellectuals, where participation exists regardless the value of authenticity or credibility. The social-political processes within Web 2.0 platforms form interplay between users, and political systems and corporations where transparency of both groups is a crucial aspect to establish a culture of governance, and how user participation can be of extended value. In terms of participation, Web 2.0 platforms can be conceived as a playground where on the one hand cultural public tries to influence political systems and corporations by participation, and on the other hand political systems and corporations will confront, implement, or integrate this participation. A playground for the creation of cultural freedom, where participation is the activity of playing, cultural freedom is the accomplishment of the play, and power structures have to be defeated to be the ultimate winner.

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References
Benkler, Yochai. 2006. Cultural Freedom: A Culture Both Plastic and Critical. The Wealth Of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets And Freedom, 273-301. New Haven, CY: Yale University Press. Chomsky, Noam. 2011. Responsibility And Integrity: The Dilemmas We Face. Presented at the lecture for Social Responsibility Of The Artist. Utrecht University, Utrecht, March 15. Dahlgren, Peter. 1995. Television and the public sphere: Citizenship, Democracy, And The Media. London: Sage. Habermas, Jrgen. 1994. Three Normative Models Of Democracy. Constellations 1, no.1:1-10. Habermas, Jrgen. 1992. Further Reflections On The Public Sphere. Trans. T. Burger. C. Calhoun (Ed.). Habermas And The Public Sphere, 421-461. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Habermas, Jrgen. 1992/1996. Between Facts And Norms. Trans. W. Rehg. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Friedland, Lewis A., Thomas Hove, and Hernando Rojas. 2006. The Networked Public Sphere. Javnost The Public 13, no.4:5-26. Jarret, Kylie. 2008. Interactivity is Evil! A critical investigation of Web 2.0. First Monday 13, no. 3. (March). http://journals.uic.edu/fm/article/view/2140/1947 Jenkins, Henry. 1991. Textual poachers. Television fans and participatory culture. New York: Routledge. Jenkins, Henry. 2002. Interactive audiences? The collective intelligence of media fans. The new media book. Dan Harries (Ed.). London: BFI. http://web.mit. edu/21fms/www/faculty/henry3/collective%20intelligence.html Jenkins, Henry. 2006a. Fans, bloggers, and gamers: Exploring participatory culture. New York: NYU Press. Jenkins, Henry. 2006b. Convergence culture. Where old and new media collide. New York: NYU Press. Jenkins, Henry et al. 2006. Confronting the challenges of participatory culture: media education for the 21st century. MacArthur Foundation. http://www.digitallearning.macfound.org/atf/cf/% 7B7E45C7E0A3E0-4B89-AC9C-E807E1B0AE4E%7D/JENKINS_WHITE_PAPER.PDF Jenkins, Henry, and David Thorburn. 2003. Cambridge: MIT Press. Democracy and New Media.

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Lessig, Lawrence. 2000. Code and other laws of cyberspace. New York: Basic Books. Lvy, Pierre. 1997. Collective Intelligence: Mankinds Emerging World in Cyberspace. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books. Lister, Martin et al. 2009. New Media: A Critical Introduction. London: Routledge. Lyotard, Jean-Franois. 1984. The Postmodern Condition. Manchester. Manchester University Press. Neil Postman 1992. Technopoly: the surrender of culture to technology. New York: Knopf. OReilly, Tim. 2005. What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software. OReilly Net. http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/ what-is-web-20.html Poster, Mark. 1997. Cyberdemocracy: The Internet And The Public Sphere. Virtual Politics. Ed. David Holmes. California, CA: Sage, Thousand Oaks. Schfer, Mirko T. 2011. Bastard Culture! How User Participation Transforms Cultural Production. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Scholz, Trebor. 2008. Market Ideology and the Myths of Web 2.0. First Monday 13, no. 3. (March). http://journals.uic.edu/fm/article/view/2138/1945 Senft, Theresa. 2000. Baud girls and cargo cults. The World Wide Web and Contemporary Cultural Theory. Eds. A. Herman and T. Swiss. London: Routledge. Webster, Frank. 2002. Theories Of The Information Society. London: Routledge. Zimmer, Michael. 2008. Preface: Critical Perspectives on Web 2.0. First Monday 13, no. 3. (March). http://journals.uic.edu/fm/article/view/2137/1943

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Abstract
This paper aims to take a closer look at the issue of user control online, through the prism of anonymity and responsibility. It does so by examining the recent events which were part of operation payback, initiated by the online organization/collective/gathering Anonymous. In response to several companies perceived transgressions, Anonymous has commenced an attack on their public domain servers. In addition, they provided sympathetic web users with a free and easy to use DDoS tool to facilitate the attacks. This paper draws the distinction between Anonymous and hackers, and compares the relation of the two groups with the powers that be. The aim is to show how multitude of varying factors have led to increased resistance to Anonymous because they are not hackers, and how they in fact may contribute to limiting user control online rather than empower it. Keywords: Anonymous, online anonymity, hackers, user control, smart mobs, DDoS

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Legionnaires of Chaos: Anonymous and governmental oversight of the Internet. Alex Gekker
Anonymous is infinity divided by 0.= Syntax error. Encyclopedia Dramatica, Anonymous. Tracing Anonymous As the Internet gained dominance as a part of the everyday physical world, rather than an alternative to it, so did increase the governmental oversight of the online sphere. Rather than a disconnected cyber-space of disembodied personas, as portrayed in early days, the internet - and more so the web - becomes a crucial component of commerce, governance and media. Power structures around the world respond to this growing importance by reducing the tolerable margins of devious internet behavior. This is done via particular legislation and oversight implemented by governmental and regulatory structures. This paper aims to describe this phenomenon through a particular case study of the online collective/ gathering/ organization Anonymous. By using the methodology of Actor-Network Theory (from now on ANT) I will examine Anonymous and the influence they exert on user control online. The ANT perspective (Latour 1987; Latour 2008; Law 1992) argues that in order to understand modern society, a researcher must follow the work-nets of human and non-human actors (or rather, actants) through cultural-material artifacts. We can thus facilitate meanings by tracing and relating the different actors one to another. One must discard theoretical constructs (such as ideologies) which are invisible and thus irrelevant to the actors in the system. Thus it is possible to locate the underlying currents in the decision making processes of specific endeavors, and learn about the constructions of symbiotic human-technological relations in society. To analyze Anonymous from ANT methodology we must take into account the sociological and anthropological perspectives on the origins of the organization; their places of gathering and methods of communications (which both rely to a great extent on technical means); the current interplay of commercial, political and private actors that operate within the web; as well the specifics of recent changes in the attitudes toward cyberspace deviation from nation-states and corporations, as reflected in lobbying and the legislation following it. Another methodological note must be made here. ANT theory has originated in STS

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and organizational studies. The methodology was developed in laboratories, plants and offices, with strong anthropological overtones. It suggests participant observation as one of the main tools, or at least the ability to interview the actors in question in order to trace their action. It is more of a sociological field study that requires direct interaction with the objects of inquiry rather than an office analysis of data. Anonymous is problematic in the sense, that you have nothing to question, no field to enter for inquiry. As will be discussed further on, the group lacks formal representatives and membership. Furthermore, as recent inner chat logs of Anonymous operation have disclosed (Cook and Chen 2011), the members have fondness for purposely misleading anyone who try to gather insights from their gathering1. In my researched I followed a methodology described by Roversi (2008) in his study of hate groups of the net: inside observation of the openly available sections while applying analysis based on other sources and current political affairs. This paper will first offer a brief discussion of Hackers and their traditional role online, while suggesting that despite their public image, governments and corporations have in fact enjoyed a cordial relation with this sub-culture over the years. I will proceed to describe Anonymous first as a web collective and then as a quasi-political organization. I will show how despite their reputation, Anonymous dont constitute hackers in the traditional sense of the word, and how this fact underlines their relations with the authorities. I will proceed to discuss how the convergences of the offline world with the online, together with the discussed unique characteristics of Anonymous, position them as a threat in the eyes of governments worldwide. My aim is to show how multitude of varying factors have led to increased resistance to Anonymous because they are not hackers, and how they in fact may contribute to limiting user control online rather than empower it. Hacker culture Anonymous are not hackers. At least, thats how they think of themselves2, or the im1 In one instance, per a journalists request to gain access to inner circles of the group, members discuss amongst themselves the possibility of creating fake IRC channel with bogus code-words and displaying it to her. 2 There are several examples of how Anonymous dont consider themselves hackers, although some individuals and perhaps even leaders (as much as the term applies) within this collective, exhibit hacker characteristics. One is a press release (ANONYMOUS 2010) originated from the group which states: Anonymous is not a group of hackers. We are average Internet Citizens ourselves and our motivation is a collective sense of being fed up with all the minor and major injustices we witness every day. Another example comes from Encyclopedia Dramatica, one of the chief online collaborative forums associated with the group: Anonymous can be anyone from well-meaning college kids with highly idiosyncratic senses of humor trying to save people from Scientology, to devious nihilist hackers, to clever nerds, to thirteen year old boys who speak entirely in in-jokes on an endless quest for porn (Encyclo-

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age they try to project. While a detailed account of what Anonymous are will follow, we must also consider what they are not. It is easy to pin the characteristics of this collective as based in Hacker Culture, but that alone wouldnt help as do understand better the motivations. In Latourian terms, hacker culture is an intermediary rather than a mediator a collective term for motivations and practices of quite a large and diverse group. In order to understand what Anonymous are I will first trace down the origins and the meanings of the term, and then show how Anonymous fails to fit within this form. The Internet always had a place for libertarian individuals who used their technical skills to bend and break rules. Sociologist Manuel Castells (2001) argues that hackers are one of the pillars of modern web culture. Unlimited access to information, disdain for authority and the desire to prove intellectual capability are the paramount ideals that drive this unique sub culture. Yet hacker culture has originated before the web. Some of the Internets most popular applications, from email and to the web itself, were created by individuals following their curiosity and working in personal technological projects rather than on what they were supposed to (Castells 2001; Barabsi 2002). The culture is about discovery and innovation albeit not in the formal way. Technology researcher and critic Howard Rheingold, a central figure in one of the first counter-cultural digital bulletin boards, WELL (Whole Earth Lectronic Link, which predated the WWW by a couple of years) goes as far as to claim that those libertarian values are imbued in the technological understructure of the Internet. He quotes his WELL colleague and the founder of the Electronic Frontiers Foundation, John Gilmore, and explains that: The net interprets censorship as damage, and routes around it (Rheingold 2000, xxii). While technically inaccurate (censorship is difficult, but possible) these attitudes show how much the libertarianism of the hacker culture is perceived to be imbued in modern online life. Governments and corporation have tolerated this culture, because despite its informality and the tendency for insubordination, those talented tinkerers have generated real value. Castells (ibid) suggests that the predominant hacker culture that was spread in US and UK universities and similar facilities was largely responsible to the western technological advantage in the cold war. Soviet researchers, despite scientific excellence, were too stuck in political oversight and efficiency plans to commence the sporadic breakthroughs in computer sciences and electronics that characterized the west. Hackers were instrumental to the construction of the network society (van
pedia Dramatica)

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Dijk 2005) by providing the technological distributed networks that allowed CMC to substitute face to face communications in personal and business aspect, while bringing some of their own free spirited culture into those networks. But they were never counter-cultural in the literal sense of the word. Hackers are by definition more interested in the development and spread of technology rather than in its social context. By observing modern day Silicon Valley giants, which originated in the early days of the net, one can see how corporations were started, alliances were formed and positions of power accepted. As Wayner(2000) notes in his book on free software, hacker culture is primarily technological, rather than ideological. One does not stop being a hacker by starting a corporate job or getting elected to governmental positions. Notorious hackers can become board members of ICANN (Castells 2001, 32) or becoming the chief scientist for designing the next generation of internet for US government (Lanier). This distinction is important when well later consider members of Anonymous collective, who base their identity around the content the produce and consume, or around their political mobilization rather than around proficiency with technology. We Are Legion: Anonymous in the Making It is difficult to begin and describe how Anonymous came to be no less than to try and pinpoint what they are. They appear to have originated from several highly idiosyncratic web forums, IRC channels and websites, dedicated to web culture. The online venues associated with Anonymous are primarily 4chan.org image board forum (and especially, the /b/ random board of it) and Encyclopedia Dramatica, the online culture anti-thesis to Wikipedia, a wiki devoted to internet memes, provocative language and shocking images (Elliott 2008). Their ethos defies definitions such as group or organization. They claim to lack formal organization or leadership3.As a press release they issued stated: Anonymous is not a group, but rather an Internet gathering. Both Anonymous and the media that is covering it are aware of the perceived dissent between individuals in the gathering. This does not, however, mean that the command structure of Anonymous is failing for a simple reason: Anonymous has a very loose and decentralized command structure that operates on ideas rather than directives.(ANONYMOUS 2010, 1)
3 Leaked protocols of online meetings have later shown that this is not completely true, and some leadership is allocated (or assumed) for specific tasks. I will deliberate on this in the next part.

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Anonymous origins can be tracked down in the days before web 2.0 neo-liberalist culture (OReilly 2005; Jarrett 2008), when the web was still inhabited by mostly disembodied and nameless entities. Before Google suggested to individuals to open email under their own names, before Amazon connected ones shopping habits to his credit card account and before Facebook forbade the use of fake names in the creation of profiles, the code of conduct of the web perceived anonymity as norm. However, the anonymity of Anonymous is not akin the classic state of web 1.0, where it meant the ability to maintain consistent alias or persona without having to identify your credentials in physical space. As blogger and social media critic Jana Herwig (Forthcoming) notes in her account of 4chan4 (ibid): While conventional anonymity online meant that ones real name and identity were protected through the use of (unique and/or registered) nicknames, 4chan takes this one step further: Because no one can register, no one may claim a nickname for him or herself. This is an important observation. Anonymous is not rooted in ideology of anonymity per se but rather in one which promotes lack of identity. On 4chan, unlike social networking sites or forums, there are no permanent identities (true or otherwise), no social graphs for friends/ follower or feeds of content connected to your persona. Each post on the image board has a unique identifier, but this 9-digit code is the only reference possible on the website. Posts are deleted after a period of hours or days (depending on popularity) and no archival record remains on the site. Although users posting or replying to a thread might assume an alias in the process of composing, this is not required and is in fact discouraged. The effect is endless boards of images and text, coming from predominantly Anonymous (non-named) posters. As Galloway (2004) would note, this is an example of protocol shaping social interaction. Without a means to distinguish between the users on the board, the associated feeling is of a huge hive-mind communicating with itself; a single, yet heterogeneous organism, or perhaps a schizophrenic arguing with multiple personalities. This notion is indicated in Anonymous unofficial motto: we are legion. Taken from the New Testament, this quote references the submergences of multiple identities in one entity, existing as whole but disappearing when trying to pinpoint individuals.
4 Despite its idiosyncratic content, it attracts about 9.5 million unique users monthly (Herwig Forthcoming)

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Unlike the hacker culture previously discussed, Anon culture seeks no recognition, intellectual or otherwise. Anonymous is not a person, nor is it a group, movement or cause: Anonymous is a collective of people with too much time on their hands, a commune of human thought and useless imagery. A gathering of sheep and fools, assholes and trolls, and normal everyday netizens. An anonymous collective, left to its own devices, quickly builds its own society out of rage and hate As individuals, they can be intelligent, rational, emotional and empathetic. As a mass, a group, they are devoid of humanity and mercy. Never before in the history of humanity has there once been such a morass, a terrible network of the peer-pressure that forces people to become one, become evil. Welcome to the soulless mass of blunt immorality known only as the Internet (Encyclopedia Dramatica) Another aspect of Anonymous culture is its apparent nihilism. The main reason for the collective to set into action is lulz (Bair 2008) continuous search for entertainment through the pursuit of the awkward, bizarre and unconventional, often at the expense of others. Derived from the infamous web abbreviation for Laughing Out Loud, lulz are the reason for invading en mass another forum for relentless spam comments (trolling) or for launching a world-wide protest against scientology. The goal may be righteous or not, the targets may commit crimes against Anonymous or just be on the wrong server at the wrong time if it provides entertainment, it is worth doing. The last moment in anonymous culture worth exploring is the way meanings are generated through the inception of memes. Memes (Dawkins 1976) is the smallest unit of cultural information; it can be an idea, a fashion or an architectural style. Online the word came to represent a joke, a phenomenon or a catchphrase. Anonymous thrives on memes and 4chan is considered to be a central meme-factory for the rest of the web (Herwig Forthcoming). One such example is lolcats (pasting badly misspelled comments on top of animal pictures) which originated on the boards and became an internet phenomenon. Whats interesting about memes, especially in the early stages of their origination and insemination, is the fact they are truly evolve via natural selection. There is no democratic process, voting mechanisms or leaders who say what a meme is and what is not. In fact, since 4chan lacks archival memory and the only way to persevere content from

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the website is by copy-pasting and saving it onto individual hard drives, memes are prone to oblivion. Only by crossing a certain invisible threshold of acceptance, does a meme continue to leave. It is a unique process, which may reflect something of Jodi Deans (2003, 108) neodemocracies where consensus is achieved through struggle and contestation between opposing views. To sum up, Anonymous is not only anonymous, but also in many ways identity-less. Its ethos is somewhat nihilistic, including self-derogatory rhetoric and action based on fun factor rather than specific values or agendas (except, perhaps, the value of online anonymity). And lastly ideas, agendas and motivations compete within the gathering for dominance, and when one infects the critical mass of brains required, the collective as a whole decides to act upon it. This factor is crucial when discussing Anonymous as political mobilization. Politically Active First time Anonymous climbed from the (relative) obscurity of the internet and into the headlines was due to its involvement with the Church of Scientology. Enraged by the church / sects attempt to remove a leaked internal video, and interpreting it as a violation of the laws of the internet, Anonymous movement decides to fight back. The struggle includes both online hacktivism against Scientologys websites and offline demonstrations in which small masked groups of Anonymous members disrupt scientologists in hundreds locations around the globe5 (Anon. 2008; Elliott 2008; Bair 2008). The scope of this paper cannot cover the entire affair, and a detailed account can be read in any of aforementioned sources. The name that emerged for this anti-scientology campaign was Project Chanology, a portmanteau of scientology and 4chan. In the case of project Chanology one should note how the authorities treated those outbursts against Scientologists: mostly by ignoring them. Several demonstrations were dispersed, but generally local and state authorities declined to intervene in what appeared to be a conflict between two sub-cultures (Arnoldy 2008). Furthermore, scientologists fair game approach (Urban 2006) openly declared the intent to persecute those who oppose it via physical, juridicial and PR means. Anonymous masked activists protest left Scientologists without real names or faces to target. Operation Chanology, to take it from previously discussed perspective, was very Hackerish:
5 Anonymous modus operandi was in organizing quick, distributed, cell-based flash attacks, best described by Howard Rheingold concept of smart mobs (Rheingold 2002)

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creative, even if somewhat rogue, solution to a problem that cannot be tackled by other means, and which comes to pass in peripheral, non-crucial field. To put it bluntly: both Scientology and Anonymous were too far away from the mainstream interests for paying attention. This was not the case with Operation Payback. It began as anti copyright campaign targeted against organizations persecuting pro-piracy activists, but then was re-targeted as an online artillery support for Julian Assange and the Wikileaks organization (Correll 2010). Wikileaks, which released hundreds of thousands classified US documents online in the preceding month, was being classified as a criminal organization by the US and several European states. Following that, several large companies such as Amazon and Visa withdrew any dealings with Wikileaks and froze their account. Anonymous responded by a call tallying its supporters to avenge Assange6 by actively propagating Wikileaks cause and by participating in DDoS7 attacks on the offending companies. The attacks were carried out by a web and software based tool named LOIC which allowed anyone to join in the assault without previous technical skills (Pras et al. 2010). Later on, Anonymous has hacked the accounts of Internet security firm HBGarry and produced compromising emails in which the company supposedly planned cyber and smear attacks against Wikileaks (Cook and Chen 2011). In contrast to earlier operations, this time Anonymous targeted rather mainstream organizations and corporations. The distributed, meme-based decision making process proved to be effective in dealing with real-time current affairs situation. The development of technology has allowed everyone who wished to participate in cyber-attacks, eliminating the previously needed expertise-based hacker mantle. The reaction of authorities this time was strikingly different. Several activists were tracked and arrested (Cook and Chen 2011) and the US FBI began an investigation of the attacks (Sandoval 2010). In the next and final part, I will discuss the premises that lead to this change. Governments I would like to claim that the main reason for a change in the behavior of governments lies in the change of the webs role in modern society (Chadwick 2008). Web-based
6 The complete text of the message can be seen here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ File:Avenge_Assange_Anonymous.png 7 Distributed Denial of Service attacks are simple method for disrupting access to a specific website by bombarding it in server requests send from multiple computers, thus leaving the server unable to deal with incoming traffic.

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giants try to assault online anonymity to achieve better segmentation of their users and turn profits. To do so, they seek governmental support in order to preserve their property rights in the internet-based economy (Castells 2001, 181). This economy demands active participation of users in content generating and sharing platforms of web 2.0 (Scholz 2008). Anonymous and their activists demonstrate that this online participatory power can be used for disruption as well as for consumption. Recent legislation shows that both the US and the EU begin to take cyber-space quite seriously. Laws are being drafted to regulate cyber-security, cyber-crime and ones management of identity online. Over 50 pieces of legislation have been discussed by the US congress over the last two years (Hathaway 2010). Recent legislation includes acts like the Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act (Sen Lieberman 2011) which regulates the responsibility for ICT crimes and attacks in the US and proposes, among other things, a kill switch for the president that allows cutting access to the net infrastructure on massive scale. Another example is the Cyber Security and American Cyber Competitiveness Act (Sen Reid 2011) which also deals with the issues of privacy and regulates economic entities (albeit guarantying that no restrictions would be put on the ability of federal bureaus in accessing this information). Outside the US the situation is not different. The EU has commenced the creation European Network and Information Security Agency (EU 2004), which has been ratified slowly but surely in member countries, giving more and more power to governments over cyberspace. Russia is taking control of the digital world even more seriously. A recent example is a statement by the Russian Head of the FSS (the successor of the notorious KGB) in which he suggested to forbid inside Russia services which use internal encryption, such as Gmail, Hotmail and Skype (Faulconbridge 2011)8. Alt-Control It would be far too presumptuous to suggest that Anonymous alone are responsible for this trend in governmental legislation. But they are a very visible instance of a larger problem for the powers that be. As the web becomes further entangled with everyday practices of commerce and politics on the one hand, and average citizens gain disruptive collective powers and techonology (such as the LOIC DDoS tool) on the other governments rightfully fear loss of control from the hands of various smart
8 The papers scope is far too narrow to include all possible examples on Cyber legislation from recent years, and just the discussion of steps taken in more authoritative regimes (China in particular) may constitute a paper of its own. These examples are meant to show the increasingly active role governments try to assume in Cyberspace, as well as their attempt to expropriate the control over online life from private users and commercial entities.

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mobs. Their response is to try and return this control to themselves, buy limiting it on others. Unlike in the case of Hacker Culture, when the quirks of a handful of skilled mavericks could be tolerated in exchange for the potential benefits of their talents, Anonymous are not hackers. Though some of them without doubt display above average skills in computer and network systems, they do not seek personal recognition and their end goal is (anti)social upheaval rather than improvement of existing technology. They are, as they claim, a decentralized hive-mind structure. They are neither a group, nor organization nor cause. Self-proclaimed Gathering is indeed a fitting name. A better name, in van Dijks terms might simply be a network. Or, in ANT terms: they just refuse punctualization. Anonymous may see itself as operating for the greater good of the average user. But on the playground of modern web, their actions serve to emphasize how ordinary netizens have become the problem that hackers never were. The efforts perpetuated by Anonymous, especially under the chaotic, counter-cultural shroud they exhibit today, may in fact lead to the strengthening of online governmental control, rather than helping the fight to resist it.

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References
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Abstract
In the contemporary architecture of the Internet users can no longer live in perfect anonymity. Data is collected in log in forms where users consciously disclose their information, as well as by tracing mechanisms known as cookies. The visibility of the cookie depends on the specific governmental policies which determine the conditions under which it can act. In this paper, I will explore the cookie from the perspective of the actor-network theory and will examine the network of actors that it activates. Opening of the cookies black box aims to present a piece of the logic embedded in the contemporary internet architecture which currently exists in the United States. In this article I argue that the cookie is a carrier of market and political ideologies that aims to take the users out of the obscurity in order to get control over their personality. Keywords: contol, resistance, regulation, data protection, market interests

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Cookies and the mindset of control

Kalina Dancheva
Introduction In the XXI century, Western countries are enjoying a culture of freedom in Internet. We are now used to get free access, free music, and free software. This culture emerged after a period of Cold War and the dominating totalitarianism in Eastern Europe which marked the World with fear of governmental agents and spies, tracing state authorities and regular people. After the reformations, the Internet manifested that a new type of society is emerging. The new space of the Internet was promising freedom of regulations, authorities and interference of the users. The Internet of that time was caring the values of the freedom and as John Perry Barlow manifested, the Internet was the new home of Mind (Barlow 1996) where no external power allowed existing. But this architecture has changed. The new media lawyer Lawrence Lessig (Lessig 2006) argues that the original design of the Internet is now transformed and controlled by an invisible hand, pushed by government and commerce (Lessig 2006, 4). The potential for control lies in the architecture of the Internet. As the new media scholar Alexander Galloway (Galloway 2004) argues that the founding principle of the Net is control, rather than freedom and control has existed from the beginning (Galloway 2004, XV). But this type of control is different than the control opposed in the mid. twentieth century. it is released through openness, inclusion, universalism, and flexibility (Galloway 2004, 142). The internet offers the users both freedom and control of the users. According to the contemporary media scholar Wendy Chun (Chun 2006), now-a-days Internet allows us to experience not an absolute freedom but forms of freedom (Chun 2006, 3), deriving from the tools that forbid us to have the entire control over our actions. In this paper, I argue that this type of control was made possible through specific commercial and governmental interests that aim to take the users out of obscurity, and striving to gain control over their personality. In order to present this phenomenon, I will examine a small piece of data, passed between the actors on the playground - the http cookie. Method of analysis The analysis of the cookie will be based on the Actor-Network-Theory (ANT). While the social network analysis examines the patterns in the society by focusing on the relations between people or groups (Wellman and Marin 2010; Knox 2010), the ANT looks beyond the human interactions and emphasises the role of the non-humans as an essential part of the social structure (Latour 2005; Law 1992; Akrich 1994). The ANT scholars do not determine social actors in terms of humans or non-humans, material or symbolic, but they judge them on their capability to transform and to make

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a difference (Latour 2005, 154). In the ANT perspective the cookie is a technical device that has a script and an affordance (Latour 1994, 31), which are inscripted by designers and show the potential of artefact to act. The cookie is an actor, which can be described as a quasi-object (Latour 1993, 51) that travels within the network of relations. Although they are passed between the actors, quasi-objects are not intermediaries that only transport meaning but they are actors, or actants (ibid, 54), that can transform social relations. Moreover, exploring the cookie from actor-network theory perspective means to recognize the role of the hyphen because it deploy[s] actors as networks of mediations (Latour 2005, 136). In this sense, the cookie is a network itself which mobilizes a chain of different actors. In order to explore this network, we need to open the black box of the cookie and trace the actors that it activates. For the purposes of the paper, I will focus on the user control in the USA by following the actors: DoubleClick (advertising company), the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), and the Federal Trade Commission in the United States. By focusing on these actors, the article aims to reveal a piece of the logic embedded in design of the contemporary Internet playground and to explore how it defines the user control. HTTP Cookie These cookies arent tasty USA Today (2010) HTTP cookie or magic cookie is a programming term that refers to a piece of transaction state (connection) information left on the client before the HTTP transaction cycle is concluded (Berghel, 2001, 20). It is also described as an opaque identifier (Raymond 1996). Cookies were firstly introduced by the Netscape company as a tool for e-commerce that would facilitate the user when shopping online by saving the information of the selected items and creating a shopping cart (Hormozi 2005, 51). In this sense, the arrival of the cookies is connected to the commercialization of the Internet as they were primary designed for market purposes. The cookie functions as state management mechanism (Kristol 2001, 151) which allows a web site to identify and track users behaviour. The role of the cookie is to overcome the limitations of the basic protocol design, which by default is state-less (Lessig 2006, 47), meaning that if no additional applications take place, a web site cannot identify a user preceding the current request. The state information of the cookie includes URL addresses and when a request is made to these URLs, the browser will send this information to corresponding servers. The information, tracked by the cookie is stored on the users hard disk in the form of text files that contain name-value pairs (Brain 2000). The name of the pair as unique identification (ID) which is given to the cookie and it matches the same ID on the server. So when a user returns to the web site where he got the cookie

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from, the server recognizes the user and the data collected by the cookie is loaded in a database (McCarthy and Yates 2010, 233) located on the server. After the cookie is left on the users computer, it can then perform its main function to track data. The cookie is designed to retain variety of data such as IP address, shopping cart items, selected preferences, serial numbers, information left in registration forms, frequencies of contact with companies (McCarthy and Yates 2010). It can also collect user domain which is important because it can contain information about physical location and username (Chun 2006, 3). By connecting the users requests the cookie collects the information and stores their behaviour. Cookies possess several essential properties. They are encoded or encrypted (Berghel 2002, 24), meaning even if the users is aware of the cookies, one cannot understand its content. This content is only determined by the server and cannot be changed by the user. Cookies can record clickstream information (ibid) which traces browsing behaviour of the user on a particular web site but they can also be programmed to be shared by third-party Web hosts (ibid), known as third-party cookies. These types of cookies are attached to a loaded image, for instance a web banner, which is embedded in a web site. In this case the user not only can get a cookie from the web site, but can receive such from another domain name embedded in the image for which the user is not aware of. The third party cookies are used by predominantly by advertises. The effect of these cookie is that the users gets the cookie from the advertiser in a visited web site but if they visit another web site which contains advertising from the same server, the cookie ID matches the server ID and sends the information to the server. By this way, the server collects the information generated by the user in different web sites in large profile databases. Furthermore, the user cannot have the control over the destination of the cookie (cookie leakage) and cannot allow or forbid the cookie to store any desired or not desired type of information. Moreover, browsers can also receive cookies from sites which are not visited by the users without their knowledge. Finally, the cookie can be classified as session or persistent (ibid). Session cookies collect information until the particular users session takes place and disappear after that, while persistent cookies remain on the users hard drive with a set expiration date. To sum up, the properties of the cookies determine that users cannot modify the cookie, neither to understand what type of information it collects and where this information is stored. If the web site does not have an opt-in feature1 for cookies, the users will not be aware that their computers have cookies. In the case of third party cookies, the user can get these bits of data from an unvisited domain.
Opt-in mechanism informs the user about the use of cookies before it is sent to the browser and allows the user to allow or forbid the cookie.

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Cookies black box In this paper, I will explore the role of several actors on the U.S. market. Id like to argue that they illustrate the logic on which the cookie exists and dominate in the contemporary architecture of the Internet. Double Click Since the cookies were introduced as a tool, advertisers play a major role for their proliferation. Such a company is the online advertising network DoubleClick. The company was using third-party cookies since the early years after they were introduced by Netscape. For DoubleClick, cookies were enabling the market of behaviourally targeted advertising. The company used third-party cookies in order to segment their audience and to deliver more effective web ads, based on interests that the users were providing in the network of web sites which supported ads from DoubleClick. By 1998 the company was placing banners in highly traffic web site such as the Washington Post and the New York Daily News and it was reported to have collected about 100 million Internet profiles (Jason Williams 2000). As the techno-journalist Catherine Holahan says, advertisers have a sweet tooth for cookies (Holahan 2006). Targeted advertising was boosting the revenue of the company so that in 2000 it acquired the direct-marketing Abacus Direct for $1.7 billion (Jason Williams 2000) and established as a leader on the market. In this sense, we can state that cookies mindset is embedded with market driven logic as it serves as an engine for gaining shares and profit. However, the activities of the DoubleClick were also closely monitored and influenced by non-governmental and State actors. Electronic Privacy Information Center The use of cookies by commercial entities mobilizes non-governmental actors which monitor their activities in terms of privacy protection and alarm the society in case of violation. In the U.S. such an organization is the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) which is focused on monitoring issues regarding civil liberties and privacy protection. It aims to provide the control of the users information in the hands of the uses themselves. In 2000 EPIC examined the work of DoubleClick and it was the first to alarm the public about violating practices for data collection (Hormozi 2005, 51). EPIC filed a complaint in which it argued that the company was engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices (EPIC 2000, 1) that were creating detailed national marketing database (ibid, 1) without the knowledge and consent of the users. EPIC argued that despite the fact that DoubleClick described the opt-out2 practice of cookie in their web sites, users received the cookie from another web site and hence they were not familiar with the opt-out procedure. According to the Executive Direc-

A set of practices or methods by which a user can remove a cookie

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tor of EPIC, Marc Rotenburg, this complaint against DoubleClick is a critical test of the current state of privacy protection in the United States (Techno Journal 2000). The complaint provoked another actor, the Federal Trade Commission, to investigate the practices of DoubleClick and as a result, DoubleClick changed its cookie policy by explaining to the users how the company collected data and how they could opt-out (Hormozi 2005, 57). In this case, EPIC could influence a powerful business model and could defend the rights of the users. The case study also presents that resistance in the black box of the cookie exists through EPIC which strives to protect the rights of the consumers. However, we need to mention that this success happened in a specific governmental context. In the same year the U.S government issued the memorandum of Privacy Policies and Data Collection on Federal Web Sites which prohibited the use of cookie on governmental web sites. In the following years, EPIC continued to monitor commercial and governmental agents and to provoke a public debate when the use of cookie was violating the rights of the users. In 2009, EPIC revealed a contract between the U.S. government and Google which allowed Google and YouTube to place thirdparty cookies on the White House web sites (Hsu and Kang 2009). EPIC argued that this contracts shows that the government failed to protect the privacy rights of U.S. citizens (ibid). But at this time, the government had already taken a different course towards the use of cookies. In 2009 the Federal agency of the USA issued a Proposal for Revision of the Policy on Web Tracking Technologies for Federal Web Sites which revisited the ban over the use of cookies. It allowed Federal web sites to use single session and persistent cookies with the reason that they will provide better customer service (Federal Register 2009, 37062) and enhanced Web analytics (ibid). In this case, although EPIC invoked a public debate on the issue of privacy, their actions could not lead to a change in the State policy. In this case, the resistance in the network was overcome. This case shows that currently EPIC and other non-governmental organizations act in a political environment which tolerates and justifies the use of cookies as a legal tool for collecting data. Federal Trade Commission The case study of EPIC presented that the U.S. government itself acknowledges the use of cookies on Federal Web sites. But how was the resistance overcome? At this point, I claim that the policy of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) towards the business shapes the architecture of control over the U.S. users. The FTC is the U.S. agency for consumer protection. Its function towards cookies is to monitor their use by commercial entities. Currently, the FTC does not prescribe special guidelines about the use of cookies. The only strict instruction about the use of cookies regards Childrens Online Privacy Protection Act. According to this act, web sites are forbidden

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to collect any information about the children under 13 years old, including not only name or location but also hobbies, interests (FTC web site 2006) which the cookie can reveal by tracking the browsing activity of the kids. In the U.S. the business relies on self-regulation about the use of cookies. However, FTC has the right to investigate if the use of a cookie is included in the privacy policy of a web site and if it is not clearly indicated, the FTC can pursue action against the companies (McCarthy and Yates 2010, 234) as it did in the case of DoubleClick. FTC also monitors if the web site is violating the terms and conditions of its own privacy policy and if it does, the Commission considers it an unfair and deceptive trade practice and the web site will be a subject of litigation initiated by the Federal Trade Commission. On the question whether the business must provide a clear notice about the use of cookies, the FTC answers positively only when the cookie combine[s] the passively collected non-personal information with personal information (McCarthy and Yates 2010, 234). The respond of the Commission shows that it provides protection only when the collected data refers to personal information known in legal documents as personal identifiable information (PII). Regarding the personal identifiable information, the U.S. law does not have a single adopted definition but we can find such in the memorandum from the Executive Office of the President as well as in the Online Privacy Protection Act (OPPA), which is effective in the California State Law. According to the Memodandum, personal identifiable information is: Information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individuals identity, such as their name, social security number, biometric records, etc. alone, or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth, mothers maiden name, etc. (Exacutive Office of the President 2007) The OPPA is more precise in the definition and it describes PII as information which includes: (1) first and last name, (2) a home address (3) e-mail address, (4) telephone number, (5) social security number, (6) Any other identifier that permits the physical or online contacting of a specific individual, (7) Information concerning a user that the Web site or online service collects online from the user and maintains in personally identifiable form in combination with an identifier described in this subdivision. (OPPA, Internet Privacy Protection, Business and Professional Code Section 22575-22579) The collection of personal information in Internet falls under the strict principles of: (1) notice/awareness, (2)choice/consent, (3)access/participation, (4)integrity/security, and (5)enforcement/redress. For instance, the principle of notice requires that

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a web site to provide customers with a notification about the collection of data before any personal information is collected from them (FTC 2000). However, both definitions of personal identifiable information do not include information such as IP addresses or geolocation data which means that it is considered non-personal information. Thereby, the use of the cookies by web sites and ad agents is not required to be notified in advance, except in the cases in which it is combined with collecting of personal information. The personal information of individuals is regulated because in the in the U.S. law the term exists as referred to the issue of privacy, which is highly protected by variety of laws on online and offline privacy including: FTCs Fair Information Practice Principles, Online Privacy Protection Act (OPPA) as well as the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. Hence, the privacy of individuals is determined as protection only of PII and the tracing technology of the cookie does not violate the privacy of users. The current policy of the FTC provoked a new actor - the congresswoman Jackie Speier, who introduced change in the course of the government policy towards cookies in the House of Representatives in February 2011. The proposal, known as Do Not Track Me Online Act, includes the protection of online activities of individuals, defined as (1) the web sites and content, from such web sites accessed; (2) the date and hour of online access, (3) the computer and geolocation from which online information was accessed, (4) the means by which online information was accessed, such as a device, browser, or application (Sprier 2011). The goal of the Act is to direct the FTC in developing Do not track standards and regulations. At present, the Do Not Track Me Online Act is a Bill, meaning that it is a proposed law which will be monitored and evaluated by the U.S. government and in the future can be enforced as a law. But currently, the FTC allows web sites to transmit the information stored in the cookie directory only under the condition that the web site has noticed this in its privacy policy. Furthermore, the FTC does not regulate the use of third-party cookies which can be attached to a web site that requires personal information. In this case, the user decides to disclose personal information based on ones trust towards the web site and with agreement to the policies of this web site. But a third party cookie is sent without the knowledge and consent of the users and starts collecting the information which they reveal to the web site. The FTC also does not address issues such as the possibility of the user to choose the type of collected data nor the option of the user to see the kind of data that is stored. The current policy illustrates that the protection of uses data is matter of language and framing and an unclear definition mitigates the effectiveness of users protection. Conclusion

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By focusing on several actors in the particular market of the United States, the research revealed that the cookies design and affordance are embedded with commercial and political principles. Following Mirko Tobias Schfer on his notion of technologies, we can say that the cookie is an object with inscripted socio-political mindset (Schfer 2011, 12). The cookie is one of the tools that gave the former free home of the mind a memory on which users cannot impose their control. An opening of the cookies black box reveals a punctualized network (Law 1992) of heterogeneous actors and relations. In this network, resistance exists in the sensitive issues of privacy which EPIC raises in the public agenda in order to disrupt the network. But this resistance is predicted and the governments strategy to overcome it is to create principles of protection with unclear language which justify the use of cookies. According to Wendy Chun, technology has moved the paranoia prevailing in the twentieth century from the pathological to the logical (Chun 2006, 1). This logic is embedded in the design of U.S. Internet architecture. A possible change of the current policy is seen in the proposal of the congresswoman Jackie Speier but until it is adopted as a law, the use of cookies will continue to grow, driven by market and governmental forces. Up until now, the current architecture of the Internet in the U.S. is shaping a society of control (Deleuze 1992, 2) where the power over the individuals is exerted through invisible mechanisms. The cookie is indeed such an invisible tool, which does not allow the control of the individuals over their data. In the time when the everyday life of people takes place in the online and in the offline space, when geolocating networks are prevailing and users leave all kinds of data as part of their daily practice, the affordance of the cookie opens the potential that the individuals can become what the philosopher Gilles Deleuze called dividuals (Deleuze 1993, ibid, 3). In this sense, the U.S. Internet playground creates users, made of samples, data, markets, or banks (ibid, 3), personal and non-personal information.

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References
Akrich, Madeleine. 1994. The De-Scription of Technical Objects. Shaping Technology / Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change (Inside Technology). Campridge, MA: The MIT Press. Barlow, John Perry. 1996. https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html . Baumer, David L., Julia B. Earp and J.C. Poindexter. 2004. Internet Privacy Law: a Comparison Between the United States and the European Union. Computers and Security 23: 400-412. Bays, Hillary and Miranda Mowbray. 1999. Cookies, Gift-Giving and the Internet. First Monday 4, no. 11 (November) http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/ index.php/fm/article/view/700/610 Berghel, Hal. 2001. Caustic Cookies. Communications of the ACM 44, no. 5: 19-22. Berghel, Hal. 2002. Hijacking the Web. Communications of the ACM 45 no. 4: 2327. Chun, Wendy Hui Kyong. 2006. Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. David M. Kristol. 2001. HTTP Cookies: Standards, privacy, and politics. ACM Transactions on Internet Technology 1, no. 2: 151-198. Deleuze, Gilles. 1992. Postscript on the Societies of Control. October 59: 3-7. http:// www.n5m.org/n5m2/media/texts/deleuze.htm. e-marketer. 2008. E-marketer web site.http://www.emarketer.com/Article. aspx?R=1006384. EPIC. 2000. Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief. EPPIC web site. http://epic.org/privacy/internet/ftc/DCLK_complaint.pdf. Federal Register. 2009. Proposed Revision of the Policy on Web Tracking Technologies for Federal Web Sites. Cryptome web site. http://cryptome.org/0001/ omb072709.htm. Federal Trade Commissoin. 2006. How to Comply with the Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule. FTC web site. http://business.ftc.gov/documents/bus45-howcomply-childrens-online-privacy-protection-rule. Federal Trade Commission. 2010. FTC web site. http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm. Federal Trade Commission. 2000. FTC web site. Fair Information Practice Principles. http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm. Galloway, Alexander R. 2004. Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

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Holahan, Catherine. 2006. Taking Aim at Targeted Advertising. BusinessWeek, November 15, 2006. http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2006/ tc20061115_360862.htm. Hormozi, A. 2005. Cookies and Privacy. Information Systems Security 13, no. 6: 5159. Hsu, S. S., and Kang, C. 2009. U.S. Web-Tracking plan Stirs Privacy Fears. The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/10/AR2009081002743.html. Latour, Bruno. 2005. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-NetworkTheory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Latour, Bruno. 1994. On Technical Mediation-Philosophy, Sociology, Genealogy. Common Knowledge 3, no. 2: 29-64. Latour, Bruno. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. London, UK: Harvard University Press. Law, John. 1992. Notes on the Theory of the Actor Network: Ordering, Strategy and Heterogeneity. http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/sociology/papers/law-notes-on-ant. pdf. Lessig, Lawrence. 2006. Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace, Version 2.0. New York: Basic Books. McCarthy, Laura and Dave Yates. 2010. The Use of Cookies in Federal Agency Web Sites: Privacy and Record Keeping Issues. Government Information Quarterly 27, no. 3: 231-237. OPPA. 2004. Internet Privacy Requirements: Business and Professions Code Section. Leginfo Web Site. http://leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=bpc&gro up=22001-23000&file=22575-22579. Raymond, E. S. 1996. Magic Cookie. The New Hackers Dictionary. http://www.eps. mcgill.ca/jargon/html/entry/magic-cookie.html. Schfer, Mirko Tobias. 2011. Bastard Culture! How User Participation Transforms Cultural Production. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Spierer. 2011. Do Not Track Me Online Act. 2011. Jakie Spierer Official Web Site. http://speier.house.gov/uploads/Do%20Not%20Track%20Me%20Online%20Act. pdf. Shah, Rajiv C. and Jay P. Kesan. 2009. Recipes for Cookies: How Institutions Shape Communication Technologies. London: Sage Techno Journal. 2000. EPIC Files Complaint with FTC against DoubleClick. Techno Journal. http://www.techlawjournal.com/privacy/20000210.htm.

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USA Today. 2010. These Cookies Arent Tasty; You are Left hungry of Privacy. USA Today, August 9, 2010 http://usatodayeducate.com/wordpress/wp-content/files/ CS_Fall_2010_lesson5.pdf. Williams, Jason. 2000. Personalization vs. Privacy: The great Online Cookie Debate. Editor & Publisher 133 no.9: 2627. Williams, Jason. 2000. Will Cookies Crumble in Court?. Editor & Publisher 133 no.6: 2627.

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Protocol - Alexander Galloway

Reviewed by Ryanne Turenhout
Galloway opens his book by stating that, all three [distributed network, computer and protocol] come together to define a new apparatus of control that has achieved importance at the start of the new millennium (3). In this book Galloway explores how control exists after decentralization. This control, according to Galloway, manifests itself in the protocol, which can be defined as a management style and it gains its authority from another place, from technology itself and how people program it [] a type of controlling logic that operates outside institutional, governmental, and corporate power, although it has important ties to all three (121122). Galloway furthermore has a non-technical background, which could result in some interesting insights into protocological control (xxiv). Galloways argument of protocological control unfolds on a three-fold level. First Galloway explores the ways in which control exist after decentralization, secondly he explores the failures of protocol and lastly he ventures into the futures of protocol. Although the book clearly shows that Galloway has done extensive research and goes into great detail, there are some shortcomings in his book. In the first part Galloway assumes that we are now in an age of decentralization. This in light of the architecture of the Internet, [a] distributed architecture is precisely that which makes protocological/imperial control of the network so easy. In fact, the various Internet protocols mandate that control may only be derived from such a distributed architecture (25) However, it could be argued that the Internet is decentralized in nature and not distributed (Singel 2006). Or as Rushkoff argued, that it is centrally controlled and not decentralized (Rushkoff 2011). It depends on your point of view and which layer of control you want to address. Secondly, Galloway explores the failures of protocol, how it is not allowed to come to its full potential (120). It is the institutionalization that is contradictory, the bureaucratic nature of the institutions (who rely on decision making and rules) goes against the open nature of protocol. This part illustrates the contradictory nature of protocol, [it] is based on a contradiction between two opposing machines, one machine that radically distributes control into autonomous locales, and another that focuses control into rigidly defined hierarchies (142). Additionally, there are more contradictories in the protocol concept; this is visible throughout the book.

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The following citation captures part of the contradictory nature of protocol. The contradiction at the heart of protocol is that it has to standardize in order to liberate. It has to be fascistic and unilateral in order to be utopian. It contains, as Jameson wrote of mass culture before it, both the ability to imagine an unalienated social life and a window into the dystopian realities of that life. (95). Other contradictions are outlined in the first chapter in the discussion between the protocols TCP/IP and DNS, where one is distributed in nature and the other inherits hierarchy. These contradictions in the protocol concept make it all the more difficult to grasp or comprehend, which is something to be avoided when trying to make an argument or explain a concept. The third part of the book is about the futures of protocol. In which Galloway explores the ways in which resistances against protocol can manifests itself. Resistance always has to come from within protocol itself, I suggest then that to live in the age of protocol requires political tactics drawn from within the protocological sphere (151). This is a bit of a bold statement, which suggests that there is nothing outside protocol that can resist the protocol. Examples that Galloway gives of resistance within protocol are hacking, computer viruses and tactical media, among others. With the exception of the fourth chapter, Galloways book puts with the protocol concept too much emphasis on the technological aspects. As he himself disclaims because much research has been done on the level of law, Internet governance, state sovereignty, commercial power or the like (18). It is argued here that by doing so, Galloway creates a technocratic separation between technology on one hand and culture, society and politics on the other hand. It is argued here that culture and technology are intertwined (Schaefer and Rieder 2008, 3-11). Furthermore, as argued by Bruno Latour, responsibility must be shared among the various actants, and therefore cannot just be subscribed to a single actor (Latour 1999, 180). Galloway also states that protocol gets its authority from how people program it (121). Here Galloway omits, or does not acknowledge, that lawmakers can also be seen as code writers. They [lawmakers] determine what the defaults of the Inter-

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net will be; whether privacy will be protected; the degree to which anonymity will be allowed; the extent to which access will be guaranteed (Lessig 2006, 79). This relates to the previous argument made in this review with respect to the ActorNetwork Theory from Bruno Latour. Overall, this book and the concept of protocol is an extensive and important addition to the academic society, albeit too technocratic in form and contradictory in nature. The importance lies in that it tapes into a niche and relatively unexplored territory. The danger hereby lies in that it can become to specific or technical and purposely negates the important factors as outline in this review. However, it is refreshing that his outside view showed itself in the book. Galloway refrained himself from falling into too much technical jargon and used the works of Foucault, Deleuze and other philosophers to support his arguments. In that respect it is indeed interesting to have someone with a non-technical background attack such a technical research topic. References Galloway, Alexander R. 2004. Protocol, how control exists after decentralization. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Lessig, Lawrence. 2006. Code version 2.0. New York City: Basic books. Rushkoff, Douglas. 2011. Internet is easy prey for governments. CNN, February 5. http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-05/opinion/rushkoff.egypt.internet_1_internet-wikileaks-networks Schaefer, Mirko Tobias, and Bernhard Rieder. 2008. Beyond engineering. Software design as bridge over the culture/technology dichotomy. Philosophy and Design: From Engineering to Architecture, ed. P. E. Vermaas, P. Kroes, A. Light & S A. Moore, 152-164. Dordrecht: Springer. Singel, Ryan. 2006. They saved the Internets soul. Wired magazine, February 8. http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/02/70185

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Transmetropolitan - Warren Ellis and Darick Robertson

Reviewed by Alex Gekker
Youre dangerous with a phone. Remember what you did when you were alone with a phone in Prague? Remember how many people died? Mitchell Royce, newspaper editor. Transmetropolitan, issue 1, Summer of the Year. Welcome to the wondrous world of Tomorrow. Wait, did I say wondrous? I meant horrific. Corrupt politicians are manipulating the voters, media is too obsessed with ratings to promote real journalism and the sated middle class cares little about things outside the next immediate gratification. Wait, did I say tomorrow? It is important for scholars to study fiction. Writers, lacking the scrutiny of academic writing and peer review, have a surprising tendency to paint much better picture of society than professional academics. Literature is also a constant laboratory for generating ideas and concepts, which are later introduced to society. Few remember today that the popularity of the cyber- prefix, used in academia, business and politics have originated in science fiction writers William Gibson description of future virtual realms. Only time will tell whether Ellis and Robertson would supplement the language in a way the Gibson did. But one thing is sure: today, a decade after their comics series Transmetropolitan was concluded, their prognosis is frightening in its insights. Their creation paints a picture of a society in a truly post-industrial and post-modern state, where information is main commodity and the everyday citizen is relentlessly bombarded by commercial and political messages. I would like to concentrate on a specific issue prevalent through the books: lack of control. The plot is as follows. Spider Jerusalem, fabled journalist and columnist returns to the City a nameless, massive North American metropolis of the future -from a 5-year self imposed exile. He left the city because, as he so depressingly puts it, he couldnt get at the truth anymore (issue 1, 19) and therefore could not write anymore. Armed with a laptop, two assistants/ friends, and complete lack of restraint, he tries to paint us a picture of the bizarre futuristic world in which he leaves. In later stages, the story becomes rather political (with strong overtones of the first George W. Bush administration), and Spider is forced to flee from corrupt politician, eventually elected the president, and uncover his true face of a murderer, slaver and sadist. While the main plot is interesting by itself, it is the background that I wish to focus on. The City, brought to life by myriad minor details mentioned in text and in the rich detailed drawings, is heaven for consumerism. Basic products are available from nano-molecular makers, affordable to anyone with a decent income. The basic

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TV package includes over 2000 channels. Trained listeners prowl the streets of the City armed with best audio-video equipment, acting as live recording devices for the thousands of cultures that inhabit it. A new religion is invested every hour (issue 6, 7), to gather believers and evade taxes. In an issue devoted solely to television, Spider writes a column after spending the day exclusively in television watching. The talk show host invites the viewers to participate in the debate and mentions off-hand that calls are free but we will trace and tag your line for advertising purposes (issue 5, 13). For us this is a shocking statement. Today we still perceive gathering of personal information by commercial entities as negative. Laws are regulations are created in order to prevent such behavior. Ones phone number is a personal thing, and privacy concerns stop us from handing it out freely. But if we observe the trends in social media platforms, where participation is traded for personal data, we can see how the situation described by Ellis and Robertson is simply a logical conclusion. These are not social platforms that trace your information these are serious political talk-shows. At the end of the issue, the channel suggests to stand-by for block consumer incentive (issue 5, 20). Spiders assistant screams for him to shut his eyes, but as he just recently returned to the city, hes not aware of the danger. The television flashes and hes left with vague confusion and tiredness. Despite his assistance pledges, he goes to sleep but wakes up after having several disturbing, highly-commercial dreams. The assistant explains to him that he was just exposed to an add-bomb, a technique for product-placement directly into ones sub-consciousness, resulting in commercial ads occurring directly in dreams. Again, the proposition is grotesque for us, but when analyzing current trends, this again is but a reasonable development. Ellis and Robertson warn us of the inability to filter out commercial messages we already experience today: from subtle product placements in TV shows and to ubiquitous, location based ads that follow us around the city. The authors draw a coherent picture of future network society. Despite several breaks and already obvious anachronisms (separation between the print-audio-video aspects of media) the picture is troubling. A neo-Nazi group uses cheap G-Reader (a device to read off genetic information at distance) to detect a problematic gene in random teenager on the street, and beat him to death (issue 28, 6-12). Genetic information is considered nowadays the next big thing for companies. Opt-outs are becoming method of choice for consumer services. When your genetic markup is part of your available profile, the authors warn, opt-out may not be possible. Under the guise of nano-technology, genetic modifications and alien life forms, Transmetropolitan presents the dilemma we face today. The more technology inter-

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feres with our lives, while guided by a mix of commercial and political motivations, the more we become powerless to prevent or alter the cost we pay in the loss of control over what we share and with whom.

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Code version 2.0 - Lawerence Lessig

Reviewed by Kalina Dancheva
Today, the Internet has become the space where the everyday takes place. As the importance of the Internet in our society grows, it also provokes the analysis of modern philosophers. Scholars such as Jonathan Zittrain and Wendy Chun have given a raise to issues about the problematic future of the internet and the limited freedom of individuals. In this debate, the new media lawyer Lawrence Lessig expands the discussion in the perspective of regulation. In his book Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace, Version 2.0, he presents the problems that the U.S. government faces in finding the way to create effective regulation in Internet. Lessigs background as a co-founder of the copyright license Creative Commons reveals his views about the need for new type of laws which is a basic notion in his book. An interesting fact it that the book is a second edition, which was written in a Wiki page by the collaboration between Lessig and scholars and students from Stanford University (x). In the book, Lessig reveals the power of the Internet code to regulate. But behind the regulatory mechanisms that he presents, I argue that this book is more about human values and the way they exist and can be protected in the digital space. In the book Lessig states that depending on the design, the architecture of the Net can promote or put in risk certain values. He states that the code of the Internet will be the greatest threat to both liberal and libertarian ideals, as well as their greatest promise (6). For instance, in chapter six, he points out that the architecture of the cyber-community Counsel Connect (94) enabled the members to create valuable debates and relations. Lessig believes that initially, the Internet was against regulation and the values it preserved were values of freedom (309). However, in the first part of the book he states that a system of perfect control (6), driven by commercial and governmental powers is reshaping the original infrastructure. In several chapters he warns us that changes in the design put certain values at risk (198). He emphasizes on the values of intellectual property and addresses the need for new laws in the protection of the rights of the producers. Privacy is the other major value that Lessig argues that is threatened on the Internet. In part one, Lessig presents that now-a-days, commercial forces have created a variety of tractable mechanisms, such as IP traces and cookies. Via these mechanisms uses can not only be monitored, but can be used to boost the business of behavioural advertising. Lessig describes Googles policy of keeping searches and e-mails, the digital

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surveillance of the U.S. government and user profiling by advertisers. Jonathan Zittrain also supports Lessig in this concern by stating that we are living in an era of cheap technologies (Zirrtrain 2008, 2008). In part three Lessig expresses the concern that currently the U.S. government cannot effectively protect the values of its citizens. The book presents that the current laws are based on principles defined in the Bill of Rights where rights were relevant in protecting values the physical world but cannot cope with cases of interventions in the online space. Lessig also raises a potential problem for protecting the values due to the international dimensions of Internet which meet conflicting national values. He suggests that this duality (301) can be overcome by The Many Laws Rule which includes identifiable technologies. Contrary to Lessig, Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu argue that this duality is not a new phenomenon for lawmakers and developing international laws can be seen as the global solution (Goldsmith and Wu, 164). It is important to mention that Lessig raises questions about the appropriate way for protecting the values but moreover he proposes solutions. For the intellectual property rights this can be the Creative Commons licence, which allows the authors to define the scope of rights they permit. Lessig argues that the same government that decides to impose control without the consent of the users can also decide to provide the control in the hands of the users. Such a solution he sees in the development of an additional identification layer or what he calls a virtual wallet. This tool will benefit the users by providing them with the choice to reveal minimum information when such is required. However, Lessig does not elaborate on the question of how the collected information will be managed in order to ensure the protection of data and users privacy. In the last part of the book, Lessig suggests that the digital space will require governments to make the strategic decision of how to rule. I claim that this decision will illustrate their own values and principles wish will shape the architecture of the Internet. One way is through a closed code, which will make the regulation invisible (138). The other way is through open code, which possess the values of governing in transparency and it means that control exists, but the users are aware of it (151). Governing through open code is also what Lessig believes it is the right way to regulate in the contemporary world. In conclusion, Code is a book that teaches us on the importance of finding the right balance between governmental and user control. The drawback of the book is that it presents the reality in the United States but it does not reveal much about the way

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values are protected in other markets, such as the European Union. However, Code is a necessary book not only in the academic field of law but also in social-political and new-media studies. It is important because it reveals how the contemporary infrastructure of the New is being transformed and suggests possible solutions of how essential human values can be effectively protected in the digital space. References Goldsmith, Jack and Tim Wu. 2006. Who Controls the Internet? lllusions of Borderless World. New York, NY: Oxford University Press 2006. Zittrain, Jonathan. 2008. The Future of the Internet--And How to Stop It. Yale University Press.

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Bastard Culture! - Mirko Tobias Schfer

Reviewed by Lindsy Szilvsi
We encourage you to participate and make your voice heard. (Mark Zuckerberg on Facebook) The interplay between user participation and cultural industries is widely described by Schfer in his book Bastard Culture! How User Participation Transforms Cultural Production. Participants and media practices are blended together and forming the so called bastard culture. Facebook is one of the media practices that involve the enablement of technologies empowering passive consumers for active participation in Web 2.0. Facebook facilitates easy publishing and sharing of content. Zuckerbergs quotation on Facebook explains that participation is encouraged within Facebooks practices. These practices do not only refer to user-created content but also involves the further development with the use of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). APIs enable users to connect various applications and sources and use them for different purposes (106). Facebook offers a platform for a developing community that is interested in developing an application using an API1. Facebook [] as platform provider has successfully commodified user activities by implementing them into new business models, which again raises the issue of corporate control and ownership structures (Zimmer 2008). The example of Facebook is used by Schfer (2011) as a concept of user and software governance: it turns companies and users in something more similar to a society, where through various processes of interaction both sides try to balance their various interests in a sort of agreement (171). In the context of Web 2.0 users activities integrate into new business models. According to OReilly, Web 2.0 is perceived as architecture of participation (OReilly 2005), a term that clearly points to an understanding of participation generated by design options rather than community spirit (105). Schfer provides a rich analysis of participation and participatory culture, accumulating various theories and interesting case studies setting in the context of Web 2.0 as contemporary cultural practice of computer use. The term participatory culture was initially introduced by Jenkins to distinguish active user participation in online cultural production from an understanding of consumer culture
1
Facebook developers can be accessed at http://developers.facebook.com/

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where audiences consume corporate media text without actively shaping, altering, or distributing them (1991, 2006a, 2006b, Jenkins et al. 2006). Participatory culture is described by Schfer as a dynamic interaction between users, corporations, discourses, and technologies, and indicates how participation extends cultural industries in terms of co-creation and development of media practices. Cultural industries provide platforms for user-generated content; whereas the created content is used through the appropriation of the corporates design and goals. In this way, participatory culture represents a socio-political understanding of technology advancements where control is exercised, and participation has become a key concept to frame the emerging media practice, which is placed in a socio-technical ecosystem environment by Schfer. The importance of socio-technical ecosystem as an environment of participation is based on information technology that facilitates and cultivates the performance of a great number of users (18). In proving an analytical framework, Schfer refers to actor-network theory of Latour to cover the complexity of design and user activities as different constituents of participatory culture and that are intertwined within the system. Unlike other researches in the field of participatory culture, Schfer does not romanticize users participation: I argued extensively against the rosy picture of user participation, not only because it describes the phenomenon of participation insufficiently, but also because its illusionary rhetoric neglects the problems at hand and serves a self-incurred immaturity. Providing an analysis of the actor networks involved in shaping our cultural reality through patent laws, regulations, and technological design can contribute significantly to making socio-political dynamics public and comprehensible to a broader audience. (Schfer 2011, 173). The unfolding online cultural production by users has been enthusiastically argued but Schfer steps beyond the romantization of user participation and analyzes it in the context of accompanying popular and scholarly discourse, and the practices of design and appropriation. Revealing the actors within participatory culture, Schfer provides an analysis that does not create utopian or cultural pessimistic assumptions. His aim is to bring awareness to the flip-side of user participation, as a complex and dynamic process of power relations.

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The flip-side of user participation could have been collaborated more on media education, which is described by Jenkins et al. (2006) as the three concerns regarding participatory culture called participation gap, transparency problem, and ethics challenge. The first concern involves the inequalities of access to new media technologies and the opportunities for participation. The second concern describes the consequences of increased access to information that leads to an increasingly difficulty of interpretation. In other words, the facility and tools that are provided with technology does not necessarily make them easy to use or interpret. The last and third concern deals with the complex and diverse social online environment, and refers to the breakdown of traditional forms of professional training and socialization that might prepare young people for their increasingly public roles as media makers and community participants (Jenkins et al. 2006, 5). Jenkins et al. (2006) does not agree that the acquirement of tools and facilities for participation will be simultaneously by interacting with popular culture. They suggest the need for policy and pedagogical interventions. This is in contrast with Schfers argument that the easy-to-use interfaces make participation possible, and that users do acquire the facilities and tools for participation. Nonetheless, Schfers multidisciplinary theory forms an analytical approach to reveal socio-political factors and insisting on bringing a more critical scholarly approach toward participatory culture. References Jenkins, Henry. 1991. Textual Poachers. Television Fans And Participatory Culture. New York: Routledge. Jenkins, Henry. 2002. Interactive Audiences? The Collective Intelligence Of Media Fans. In The New Media Book. Dan Harries (Ed.). London: BFI. http://web.mit. edu/21fms/www/faculty/henry3/collective%20intelligence.html Jenkins, Henry. 2006a. Fans, Bloggers, And Gamers: Exploring Participatory Culture. New York: NYU Press. Jenkins, Henry. 2006b. Convergence Culture. Where Old And New Media Collide. New York: NYU Press.

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Jenkins, Henry et al. 2006. Confronting The Challenges Of Participatory Culture: Media Education for the 21st century. MacArthur Foundation. http://www.digitallearning.macfound.org/atf/cf/%7B7E45C7E0-A3E0-4B89-AC9C-E807E1B0AE4E%7D/ JENKINS_WHITE_PAPER.PDF OReilly, Tim. 2005. What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software. OReilly Net. http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-isweb-20.html Schfer, Mirko T. 2011. Bastard Culture! How User Participation Transforms Cultural Production. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Zimmer, Michael. 2008. The Externalities Of Search 2.0: The Emerging Privacy Threats When The Drive For The Perfect Search Engine Meets Web 2.0. First Monday 13,no.3.http://www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/ view/2136/1944

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Free style - The Listeners

Reviewed by Bob van de Velde
The Listeners Having come from off the grid, Zarathustra returns saddened by the sight of his brethren. Then he drew a breath and spoke to them: When I left the grid, it was small, and you were free. Now you spend your time in the playgrounds of others. These hosts who introduce you to each other, and whom tell you fun is free Yet you use their slides and swings, which speed things up, and bring things down. Like children here you find yourself in a playground. But up to down, front to back, an insight into the way these things exert control you lack1 Remember once from the freedom whence you came. Now the gates behind you are closed. Once creators you were, now your only lust is to consume, to undergo. With song and laughter, you have committed yourself to your hosts frame2 Amongst each other are you on this playground. Save for the host, no one here sets the bounds. And like a host, he chooses why and who to evict. Here you have no say in the rules, save but to quit. Whatever the hosts serve, you will eat. And so without knowing, you surrender the tracks of your feet3 Amongst you are those who attempt to resist. Who break their cage and shake their fists. But masked like some guy Fawkes4, they do not remember, all it did was provoke government, that fifth of November.5 And a master for a master, is a bad trade. Your resistance is futile, if you remain submitted to such saviors. It is a self-fulfilling fate. Being enthralled by new found transparency6, without the individual refusing to play comes no change. But even your host leaves you virtually7 uninhibited. So your incessant talk, and
1 See R. L. Turenhouts contribution to this journal 2 See L. Silvasis contribution to this journal 3 See K. Danchevas contribution to this journal 4 http://mouemagazine.wordpress.com/2008/07/21/alan-moore-mentions-anonymous-protests/ 5 See A. Gekkers contribution to this journal 6 Jodi Dean 2003, page 110: All sorts of horrible political processes are perfectly transparent today. The problem is that people dont seem to mind, that they are so enthralled by transparency that they have lost the will to fight (Look! The chemical corporation really is trying. . . Look! The government explained where the money went. . .). 7 Note the double meaning

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waltzes from one piece of playground to the other. In the plays you play, you mind is exhibited. Offered are many choices, many voices to be heard, and you can reproduce all kinds of words.8 The control lies in yourself9, but if as children you behave, CAN you control yourself? For through choices we create. And all which has been created is history10. And although our paths change, our trails do not. Which we see when remembered of something we forgot. Whether we try to go past infamy or fame, what has been can be as hard to change, as a name11 Our hosts have long ears, and penetrating gazes. From the steps we take, they recognize our faces12. A thousand mechanical homunculi tick in unison to serve our hosts13, acting as keepers of our secrets. You act as if though you lack control, but is not control of yourself you want. Your shudder in thought of those who have listened, but never keep your mouths shut. And you see only the listener to blame, as if you yourself did not participate in the hosts game. And also your hosts speak in split tongues. He promises not to kiss and tell14, Yet with the same breath, has left all intentions fall15. Yet we care not for his deceit, for the games you play there, seem perfectly free. And for protection from solitude and ennui, you dance your dances, and forget control so as to be free. Here the youth intervened, for he said: What beef you have with simple games? We youth need play, and for new contacts we aim! Thou shallow representation of our constitution, only serves to invite your retribution. Thou sees not how unlimited our appetites are, and how our dances and games carry far. This is but a fact of a nature of our souls, not something we should be made to control!
8 specific articulations reproduce, by fixing meaning in particular ways Jorgensen, Marianne and Louise Phillips. 2002: 29 9 Deleuze , Gilles. 1992. Postscript on the Societies of Control. October 59: 3-7. 10 On a web site, the site can track not only your purchases, but also the pages that you read, the ads that you click on, etc. How Internet Cookies Work by Marshall Brain2001 11 Eric Smidt: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/7951269/Young-will-have-tochange-names-to-escape-cyber-past-warns-Googles-Eric-Schmidt.html 12 For others, mysterious corporate cookies, allegedly capable of following our every move, or voracious packet sniffers epitomized the risk of going online. Wendy Hui Kyong Chun 2006 13 The servers used to store information about users http://www.pandia.com/sew/481-gartner. html 14 http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/05/facebooks-zuckeberg-admits-mistakespromises-privacy-fixes.ars 15 http://www.businessinsider.com/well-these-new-zuckerberg-ims-wont-help-facebooksprivacy-problems-2010-5

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Here Zarathustra raised his voice: A fool are you to reason so! Too weak are you for self control, thus scrutinize the host, a long eared host who runs the show. You seek only to bind him to your power, by setting limits on what should be remembered, in order to construct a Babel tower, where you hosts no longer understands your speech! Is it not wrong to limit another to be strong? To bind the memory of other, so you need not keep your tongue? I say you, you are a thing to be surpassed. Your illusion of innocence cannot last. You shelter yourself in shadows to avoid blame, and continue to participate for social fame! Cast of you masks and threads of illusionary civilization, as now they are stripped from you, resulting from willful participation! - Thus spoke Zarathustra, - So tweeted the youth

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