Government of Philippine Islands VS Monte de Piedad G. R. No.

L-9959 Facts: In 1863, the inhabitants of the Spanish dominions contributed funds for the relief of the damages done by an earthquake that hit the Philippine Islands. Part of the funds, $80,000 was turned over to Monte de Piedad, to be held at the disposal of a relief board. (italicized: copy paste) When the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands was empowered to bring suit against Monte de Piedad to recover the said amount , through Act 2019 passed by the Philippine Legislature effective on January 30 1912, Monte de Piedad refused to give the money back. The Court of First Instance sided with the plaintiff (Government of Philippine Islands) and ordered the return of of the $80, 000 in gold coin or the equivalent thereof. The defendant (Monte de Piedad) appealed and argued that there were errors ( ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS Ref: p. 730-731) with the decision of the court. Issue: Whether or not the decison of the Court sentencing the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros to reimburse/return the Philippine Government in the sum of eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) gold coin, or the equivalent thereof in the present legal tender currency in circulation, with legal interest thereon from February 28th, 1912, and the costs of this suit, should be overturned.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the previous court judgment being appealed was affimed, with costs agains the appelant. (NOTE: Please look for these in original text..paraphrase..haha)
It is further contended that the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to the Government, even considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty, or inn other words, the present Philippine Government cannot maintain this action for that reason. This contention, if true, "must result from settled principles of rigid law," as it cannot rest upon any title to the fund in the Monte de Piedad acquired prior to such change. While the obligation to return the $80,000 to the Spanish Government was still pending, war between the United States and Spain ensued. Under the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the Archipelago, known as the Philippine Islands, was ceded to the United States, the latter agreeing to pay Spain the sum of $20,000,000. Under the first paragraph of the eighth article, Spain relinquished to the United States "all buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belonged to the public domain, and as such belonged to the crown of Spain." As the $80,000 were not included therein, it is said that the right to recover this amount did not, therefore, pass to the present sovereign. This, in our opinion, does not follow as a necessary consequence, as the right to recover does not rest upon the proposition that the $80,000 must be "other immovable property" mentioned in article 8 of the treaty, but upon contractual obligations incurred before the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States. We will not inquire what effect his cession had upon the law of June 20, 1849, the royal decree of April 27, 1875, and the instructions promulgated on the latter date.
As to the question raised in the fourth assignment of error relating to the constitutionality of Act No. 2109, little need be said for the reason that we have just held that the present Philippine Government is the proper party to the action. The Act is only a manifestation on the part of the Philippine Government to exercise the power or right which it undoubtedly had. The Act is not, as contended by counsel, in conflict with the fifth section of the Act of Congress of

July 1, 1902, because it does not take property without due process of law. In fact, the defendant is not the owner of the $80,000, but holds it as a loan subject to the disposal of the central relief board. Therefor, there can be nothing in the Act which transcends the power of the Philippine Legislature. In support of the fifth assignment of error counsel for the defendant argue that as the Monte de Piedad declined to return the $80,000 when ordered to do so by the Department of Finance in June, 1893, the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed at the time this suit was instituted on May 3, 1912, citing and relying upon article 1961, 1964 and 1969 of the Civil Code. While on the other hand, the Attorney-General contends that the right of action had not prescribed (a) because the defense of prescription cannot be set up against the Philippine Government, (b) because the right of action to recover a deposit or trust funds does not prescribe, and (c) even if the defense of prescription could be interposed against the Government and if the action had, in fact, prescribed, the same was revived by Act No. 2109.

Ratio : 1. Parens patriae (state as guardian of the people) : It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither. Consequently, the plaintiff is not the proper party to bring the action." The earthquake fund was the result or the accumulation of a great number of small contributions. The names of the contributors do not appear in the record. Their whereabouts are unknown. They parted with the title to their respective contributions. The beneficiaries, consisting of the original sufferers and their heirs, could have been ascertained. They are quite numerous also. And no doubt a large number of the original sufferers have died, leaving various heirs. It would be impracticable for them to institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to recover the $80,000. The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to again assume control of the fund and devote it to the object for which it was originally destined. (Ref. P. 748)
2. Transfer of sovereignty (Ref: p. 742-745)

Repulic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124 Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang on January 22, 1987, calling for a genuine land reform program. There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and injured a number of people from both parties. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued A.O. 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and the military/police officers involved in the incident. Issue/s:

Whether or not the state has waived its immunity from suit. Held: The Supreme Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity from suit by the State. The mere recommendation of the commission shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate its respective claims. It does not necessarily mean that the State impliedly give its consent. Thus, the recommendation made by the Commission does not in any way attaches or binds the State to it. And so the petition was dismissed.
Ratio:

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., respondents. G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993 FACTS: The Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency (SSA) entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. On 13 September 1990, several guards of the SSA filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages, before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City, against the DA and SSA. The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding herein petitioner and jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money claims. A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the DA with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Cagayan de Oro against the decision of the Executive labor Arbiter. On 27 November 1991, the NLRC promulgated its assailed resolution, temporarily suspending the enforcement and execution of the judgments against petitioner for a period of two months, more or less, but not extending beyond the last quarter of the calendar year 1991 to enable the DA to source and raise funds to satisfy the judgment awards against it. Also, the NLRC orders the petitioner to post surety and supersedeas bond equivalent to at least to fifty (50%) percent of the total monetary award issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Supreme Court or by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental to answer for the satisfaction of the money claims in case of failure or default on the part of petitioner to satisfy the money claims. ISSUES: Whether or not the NLRC disregarded the rule on the non-suability of the State. HELD: The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State may not be sued without its consent," reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued

under any circumstances;" its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 27 November 1991, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution directed against the property of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the public respondents are hereby enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and implementing any and all writs of execution issued pursuant to the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against said petitioner.