ABBREVIATION

1) AC ……………………………………….….. Law Reports, Appeal Cases (Third Series)

2) AIR ……………………………………...…………………………….. All India Reporter
3) All. …………………………………………………………………………….. Allahabad
4) Anr. …………………………………………………………………………...…. Another
5) Bom. ………………………………………..……………………………………. Bombay
6) ch. ………………………………………………………...………………………. Chapter
7) Co. ………………………………………………….………………………….. Company
8) DLR …………………………………………………………..…. Dominion Law Reports
9) E.C.R. ………………………………………….………… European Commission Report
10) E.g. …………………………………………………………………………...…. Example
11) ICR. ……………………………………………………...……… Industrial Cases Reports
12) J. ……………...…………………………………………………………………… Justice
13) L Ed. ………………………...… United States Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers' Edition
14) Mad. ………………………………………..…………………………….……….. Madras
15) Ors. …………………………………………………………..…………………….. Others
16) p. …………………………………………………………...…………………….….. Page
17) Pat. ………………………………………………………………………………….. Patna
18) R. …………………………………………………………… The Reports in all the Courts
19) SC …………………………………………………………………..…….. Supreme Court
20) SCC ……………………………………………...………………… Supreme Court Cases
21) Sec. ………………………………………………………………………..……… Section
22) Supp …………………………………………………………………..…... Supplementary
23) v. …………………………………………………………………………………… versus
24) Vol. ………………………………………………………………………………. Volume
25) W.L.R. …………………………………………………………...…. Weekly Law Reports

1
 LIST OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

1) Steel Authority of India Limited v. S.T.O., (2008) 9 SCC 407

2) Union of India v. E. G. Nambudiri, AIR 1991 SC 1216
3) Glaxo Laboratories v. A. V. Venkateswaran, AIR 1959 Bom. 372
4) Mir Mohamed Bahauddin v. Mujee Bunnisa Begam, AIR 1952 Mad. 276
5) S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87
6) High School & I.E. Board v. Bagleshwar, AIR 1966 SC 875
7) Pradeep Singh v. Lucknow University, AIR 1983 All. 427
8) Kesava Mills Co. Ltd. and another vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1973 SC 389
9) Madhusudhan Paswan v. State, AIR 1989 Pat. 106
10) Ravi S Naik Sanjay Bandekar vs. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 1558
11) Som Datt Datta v. India, AIR 1969 SC 414
12) S.N. Mishra v. India, AIR 1980 SC 1984
13) Sardari Lal v. India, AIR 1987 SC 2016
14) Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala and others, AIR 1961 SC
1669
15) Bhagat Raja vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1967 SC 1606
16) M/s. Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar vs. State of U.P and others, AIR 1970 SC 1302
17) M/s. Woolcombers of India Ltd. vs. Woolcombers Workers Union and another, AIR 1973
SC 2758
18) Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India and another,
AIR 1976 SC 1785
19) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
20) Gurdial Singh Fijji vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1979) 2 SCC 368
21) Shri Swamiji of Shri Admar Mutt etc. etc. vs. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and
Charitable Endowments Dept. and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1
22) Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education vs. K.S.
Gandhi, (1991) 2 SCC 716
23) Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor and others, AIR 1974 SC 87

2
24) M.L. Jaggi vs. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Limited and others, (1996) 3 SCC 119
25) Chairman, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs. Jagdish Sharan Varshney &
Ors., (2009) 4 SCC 240
26) Sri Goutam Singha and others v. The Principal Secretary, Land & Land Reforms
Department Govt. of West Bengal & Ors., W.P.L.R.T. 44 of 2010
27) M/S Kranti Asso. Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors., (2010) 9 SCC 496
28) Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1968), [1968] AC 997
29) Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree, [1974] ICR 120 
30) R v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex parte Lonrho (1989), [1989] 1 W.L.R.
525
31) R v, Minister of Housing and Local Government exparte Chichester RDC, [1960] 1
W.L.R. 587
32) Pure Spring Co. Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1947] 1 DLR 501 
33) .D.R. Construction Ltd. And Rent Review Commission, [1983] 139 DLR 168
34) Re Yarmouth Housing Ltd. And Rent Review Commission, [1983] 139 DLR (3d) 544
35) Phelps Dodge Corporation v. National Labour Relations Board, [1940] 85 L Ed. 1271
36) Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, [1942] 87 L Ed. 626
37) Beus (5/67) [1968] E.C.R. 83
38) Germany v. Commission (24/62) [1963 E.C.R. 63
39) Meroni v. High Authority (9/56) [1958] E.C.R. 133
40) Wachauf v. Germany (5/88) [1989] E.C.R. 2609

3
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

This project aims to secure an understanding of the law relating to Reasoned Decision and its
scope in India. This is sought to be achieved by looking into past decisions of Indian Judiciary on
the matter and the existing statutes and their operations in other nations.

SCOPE OF THE PROJECT

The scope of the project is limited to the various case laws, precedents and observations made by
eminent jurist. The existence of Reasoned Decision in India has been examined in the light of
judicial treatment given to them in various pronouncements. Also, the Provisions relating to
Reasoned Decision in various foreign constitution and statutes has been dealt with the help of
judicial rulings.

MODE OF CITATION

A uniform mode of citation has been followed throughout the project.

SOURCES

Sources include basically books on Administrative law, case law reporters, and case law
journals.

4
 INTRODUCTION

"Reason is heart beat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity and without the same, it becomes
lifeless.”1
Transparency is a hallmark of any good administrative body and a trait cherished by a
democratic country like ours. The ongoing practice in all nations governed by rule of law and
constitutional governance is to give reasons for its decision and is the life blood of any judicial
action. But the most pertinent question is about the legal position when there are no statutory
obligations to give reasons. Does the principle of public law require that reasons should be given
for administrative action?
The principle of giving a reasoned decision has slowly taken its root as one of the principles of
natural justice. The doctrine of giving reasons has been incorporated in our judiciary in the Code
of Civil Procedure. But the same principle is yet to be codified in case of decisions given by
Administrative bodies and other such tribunals. The 14th Law Commission has recommended for
a statutory provision for giving reasons in judicial and quasi-judicial acts of Administration but
the Parliament is still to act on it. Also, it has been increasingly realized that for good governance
reasons need to be given and omission might lead to injustice.
Procedural laws ensure fair decision making. They do not contain any guarantee of fair laws or
fair rules. Unless the laws are fair and are fairly implemented, there cannot be justice in the true
sense. And procedural safeguards do not necessarily ensure a fair outcome. Thus, to safeguard
the interest of the concerned persons, the administrative tribunals and other similar bodies must
apply the principles incorporated in the principle of natural justice in a balanced way according
to the circumstances of each case. The considerable body of case law indicates that this is not
always easy or obvious. Also, the increasing burden on the already overinflated courts in India
can be considerably reduced if our tribunals give intelligible and adequate reasons for their
decisions. It may protect the courts from unjustified challenges, because those adversely affected
are more likely to accept a decision if they know why it has been taken.
A reasoned decision will not only reduce the burden of the court but also fulfill the reason for its
establishment i.e. imparting justice. A decision backed by reason is a reflection of application of
mind and reduces the possibility of mindless and arbitrary action by the administrative authority.

1
Steel Authority of India Limited v. S.T.O, (2008) 9 SCC 407

5
The principle of audi alteram partem is the basic concept of principle of natural justice which
means that every person must be given an opportunity to defend himself. Principles of ‘fair
hearing’ are recognized as being indispensable in all judicial proceedings. These are the
standards of fairness that must be followed when a judicial or administrative authority is
entrusted with the function of determining the rights and liabilities of parties in a lis before it.
The principle of natural justice has twin ingredients; firstly, the person who is likely to be
adversely affected by the action of the authorities should be given notice to show cause thereof
and granted an opportunity of hearing and secondly, the orders so passed by the authorities
should give reason for arriving at any conclusion showing proper application of mind. Violation
of either of them could in the given facts and circumstances of the case, vitiate the order itself.
Such rule being applicable to the administrative authorities certainly requires that the judgment
of the Court should meet with this requirement with higher degree of satisfaction. The order of
an administrative authority may not provide reasons like a judgment but the order must be
supported by the reasons of rationality.
The only requirement of this principle is that the order must entail a reason which should be
adequate and rational. If there is an error on the face of the decision but it is backed by reason, it
can be challenged and corrected by the appellate authority. The appellate authority, then on the
basis of the reasons given, will be able to adjudicate on the matter in a better manner than when
there were no reasons because he will be able to identify the lis and correct in a better manner. In
cases where the appellate authority is satisfied with the decision and reasons given by the
tribunal all it has to do is to state that it concurs with the decision of the tribunal while giving no
further reason. But where he comes to the conclusion that the tribunal has erred and gives a
contrary decision, they proper reasons need to be laid down.
The mandate of giving reasons or passing a reasoned order or giving a reasoned decision is not
only a part of natural justice but it is a safeguard against arbitrariness. When an adjudicator is
obliged to give his reasons for conclusions, it will make it necessary for him to consider the
matter carefully. The compulsion to give reasons introduces clarity in the order and minimizes
chances of irrelevant considerations from entering a decisional process. In fact, recording of
reasons ensures that the authority has applied its mind to the case and the reasons that compelled
the authority to take a decision in question are germane to the contents and scope of power

6
vested in the authority. Therefore, in the absence of a speaking order, Courts would not be able
to understand the application of mind to the facts and issues raised in the case

Giving reasons is also a self-disciplining exercise. Decisions are more likely to be correct if they
are carefully considered and properly articulated. Writing brings clarity and precision to thought.
Reasons also provide a check on arbitrary decision-making. They avoid allegations of
maladministration. There is also the factor that, in the absence of reasons, if all other known facts
and circumstances appear to point overwhelmingly in favor of a different decision, the court will
draw the inference that the decision-maker had no good reason for the decision.

7
 NEED TO GIVE REASONS

Reasons are the link between the order and mind of the maker. Any decision of the
administrative authority affecting the rights of the people without assigning any reason
tantamount to violation of principles of natural justice. The requirement of stating the reasons
cannot be under emphasized as its serves the following purpose: -
1. It ensures that the administrative authority will apply its mind and objectively look at the facts
and evidence of the case.
2. It ensures that all the relevant factors have been considered and that the irrelevant factors have
been left out.
3. It satisfies the aggrieved party in the sense that his view point’s have been examined and
considered prior to reaching a conclusion and not arbitrary in nature.
4. The appellate authorities and courts are in a better position to consider the appeals on the
question of law.
In Union of India v. E. G. Nambudiri 2, the court has stressed that “right to reason is an
indispensable part of a sound system of judicial review. Under our Constitution an administrative
decision is subject to judicial review if it affects the right of the citizen.”3
The High Court of Bombay in the case of Glaxo Laboratories v. A. V. Venkateswaran4 held
that, ‘when a law confers a right of appeal, the Legislature intends that that right should be an
effective right and that right can only be an effective right if the officer or the authority from
whose order an appeal lies gives reasons for his decision. It is only then that the appellate Court
can properly discharge its function.”5
5. To demonstrate good practice and compliance with International standards.
In short, reasons reveal the rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions
reached. However, mere recording of reasons serves no purpose unless the same are
communicated either orally or in writing to the parties. In fact mere communication of reasons
has no meaning unless the corrective machinery is in place.
REASONED DECISION IN INDIA
2
AIR 1991 SC 1216
3
Ibid, at 1219
4
AIR 1959 Bom. 372
5
Ibid, at 380

8
In 1952, Subba Rao J. as a pusine judge of the Madras High Court articulated:
“From the standpoint of fair name of the tribunals and also in the interest if the public, they
should be expected to give reasons when they set aside an order of an inferior tribunal. If
reasons for an order are given, there will be less scope for arbitrary exercise of powers and the
order ‘ex facie’ will indicate whether extraneous circumstances were taken into consideration by
the tribunal in passing the order. The public should not be deprives of this only safeguard,
unless the Legislature expressed otherwise. The order of a tribunal exercising judicial functions
should ex facie show reasons in a succinct form for setting aside the orders of the subordinate
tribunals.”6
While the common law rule that there is no general duty to give reasons still remains intact, in
India the situation is quite different. The courts in India have shown a great deal of activism. The
Principle of Natural Justice demands that the adjudicatory body give reasons for their decisions
have been incorporated in administrative law thereby making it obligatory for the administrative
authorities and tribunals to give reasons for their decisions. The courts have also imposed duty to
give reason by linking the provision the provision of reasons to fairness itself. The court will
consider the nature of the decision-maker, the context in which it operates and whether the
provision reason is required on the grounds of fairness.

Though there is no statutory provision in the Indian Constitution like the one in South Africa
(Chapter 2 of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa incorporate Bill of Rights and Article
33(2) provides that ‘everyone whose rights have been affected by administrative action has the
right to be given written reasons.’), the obligation to give reasons has been given a constitutional
sanction by the Supreme Court of India in its landmark decision in S.P. Gupta v. Union of
India.7In this case, the court deduced the citizen’s right to know and the right to obtain
information from the constitutional guarantee of free speech and from the concept of open
government inherent in a democratic system. Accordingly, it is the constitutional obligation of
the authorities and adjudicators to disclose reasons for their orders.
I. ADEQUATE REASON

6
Mir Mohamed Bahauddin v. Mujee Bunnisa Begam, AIR 1952 Mad. 276 at 280
7
1981 Supp SCC 87

9
The reasons should be recorded in proper spirit and mere pretence of it would not satisfy the
requirements of law.8A mere repetition of the statutory language in the order does not make the
order a reasoned one. A reason such as the “entire examination of the year 1982 is cancelled”
cannot be regarded as adequate. This statement only speaks about the punishment without stating
the reason or cause thereof.9
At times the courts show some flexibility in favour of an administrative order, depending upon
the facts, even though the reasons may be scrappy. The only requirement in these circumstances
is that the report should indicate application of mind by the concerned authority. In High School
& I.E. Board v. Bagleshwar10, it was held that that the enquiry committee did not write an
elaborate report but it did not mean that it did not consider all the relevant material before it
before coming to the conclusion that the student had used unfair means. The question of
sufficiency of reasons in a particular case remains uncertain. The nature and elaboration of
reasons depends upon the facts of the case. The Supreme Court has stated that it is not necessary
for the authority to “write out a judgment as courts of law are supposed to do. However, at least
“outline of process” of reasoning must be given. It seems that it will satisfy the requirement of
“giving reasons” if relevant reasons have been given for the order, though the authority has not
set out all the reasons or some of the reasons which were argued before the court have not been
expressly considered by the authority.11

II. NON SPEAKING ORDER

The expression `speaking order' was first coined by Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns in a rather
strange context. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the ambit of Writ of Certiorari, referred
to orders with errors on the face of the record and pointed out that an order with errors on its face
is a speaking order.12 Principle of speaking order it is the heart and soul of every judicial and
administrative order so that the party may know the reasons which otherwise comes under the
8
AIR 1990 SC 1984. Jain. Cases. Ch IX, Sec. G, 776
9
Pradeep Singh v. Lucknow University, AIR 1983 All. 427
10
AIR 1966 SC 875
11
Jain. Administrative Law. 372.
12
1878-97. Vol. 4 Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of the report; Kesava Mills Co. Ltd. and another vs. Union of India and
others, AIR 1973 SC 389

10
domain of right to reason. Under ordinary conditions, a non speaking order given by a tribunal
should be declared null and void as it violates the principle of natural justice and the
constitutional sanction laid down by the Supreme Court in various cases. But, it has been seen in
a few cases that the courts make compromise and avoid at time times to declare a non-speaking
order invalid. In case of Tripathi13, even when reasons were not stated, the Supreme Court
sustained the order of dismissal of an employee by a statutory corporation. The court instead
stated that the reason was implicit in the order.
Also, in the case of Ranganath v. Daulatrao14, the court refused to intervene where the authority
passed an order adversely affecting the individual on the ground that the matter did not involve
adjudication of facts but rested on the point of law about which there was no error according to
the court.15
But in Madhusudan16, the court taking a different view quashed a non-speaking order cancelling
the examination of a candidate.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Under Article 311(2) (b), when a person is being dismissed without an enquiry, reasons are to be
recorded by the disciplinary authority for not holding the inquiry. It has been held that of such
reasons are not recorded the order dispensing with the enquiry would be void. But the
communication of these reasons to the civil servant is not obligatory, though it is desirable to do
so with a view to avoiding an allegation that the reasons were concocted later on. 17 Asking for
reasons ensures that decisions are not just ipse dixit of the decision maker. It is in this context
that Article 14 of the Constitution must also be looked at because Article 14 has been interpreted
as a protection against arbitrary action. Right to information and right to be informed about a
reason of any decision is within the domain of Article 19(1) read with Article 21 of the

13
AIR 1984 SC 274
14
AIR 1975 SC 2146
15
Jain, Cases, p. 690
16
Madhusudhan Paswan v. State, AIR 1989 Pat. 106
17
Sardari Lal v. India, AIR 1987 SC 2016; Tulsiram Patel, Ch. IX, note 228

11
Constitution of Indian terms of the views expressed by the Apex Court in the case Ravi S Naik
Sanjay Bandekar vs. Union of India.18

IV. RELEVANT CASE LAWS

The Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court in the case of Som Datt Datta v. India19, took a
restrictive view. This case basically related to Army Act. Mr. Justice Ramaswami delivering the
judgment for the unanimous Constitution Bench held that “provisions of Sections 164 and 165 of
the Army Act do not require an order confirming proceedings of Court Martial to be supported
by reasons. Apart from any requirement imposed by the statute or statutory rule either expressly
or by necessary implication, there is no legal obligation that the statutory tribunal should give
reasons for its decision for its decision. There is also no general principle or any rule of natural
justice that a statutory tribunal should always and in every case give reasons in support of its
decision”
The Court held that an order confirming such proceedings does not become illegal if it does not
record reasons. Instead of confining itself to the present Act made a sweeping judgment
regarding giving decisions and somehow tried to introduce English Common Law position with
regards to giving of reason20 in India.
In a landmark case of S.N. Mishra v. India21, the Supreme Court asserted again the importance
of giving reason. It stated that “the requirement that the reasons be recorded should govern the
decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the
fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review.” But in the same case
the unanimous Constitution Bench speaking through Justice S.C. Agrawal confirmed its earlier
decision in Som Datt in para 47 at page 2000 of the report and held reasons are not required to be
recorded for an order confirming the finding and sentence recorded by the Court Martial.
Time and again, the need to give reasons has been emphasized by the Supreme Court. Reasoned
decision in India can be traced back to the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Shyam

18
AIR 1994 SC 1558.
19
AIR 1969 SC 414
20
Page 6
21
AIR 1980 SC 1984

12
Sunder Jhunjhunwala and others22where even though the decision was administrative in nature,
the Court insisted on the requirement of recording reason and further held that in exercising
appellate powers, the Central Government acted as a tribunal in exercising judicial powers of the
State and such exercise is subject to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court. Such powers, this
Court held, cannot be effectively exercised if reasons are not given by the Central Government in
support of the order.
In the case of Bhagat Raja vs. Union of India and others 23, the Constitution Bench of this Court
examined the question whether the Central Government was bound to pass a speaking order
while dismissing a revision and confirming the order of the State Government. The Court
insisted on reasons being given for the order when the State Government gives a number of
reasons some of which are good and some are not, and the Central Government merely endorses
the order.
In M/s. Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar vs. State of U.P and others 24, while dealing with U.P.
Sugar Dealers License Order under which the license was cancelled, the Supreme Court held that
such an order of cancellation is quasi-judicial and must be a speaking one. The Court further held
that merely giving an opportunity of hearing is not enough and further pointed out where the
order is subject to appeal, the necessity to record reason is even greater.
In M/s. Woolcombers of India Ltd. vs. Woolcombers Workers Union and another 25, the Court
while considering an award under Section 11 of Industrial Disputes Act insisted on the need of
giving reasons in support of conclusions in the Award. The Court held that the very requirement
of giving reason is to prevent unfairness or arbitrariness in reaching conclusions. The second
principle is based on the jurisprudential doctrine that justice should not only be done, it should
also appear to be done as well. The learned Judges said that a just but unreasoned conclusion
does not appear to be just to those who read the same.

In Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India and another 26,
the court held that the rule requiring reasons in support of a quasi- judicial order is as basic as
22
AIR 1961 SC 1669
23
AIR 1967 SC 1606
24
AIR 1970 SC 1302
25
AIR 1973 SC 2758
26
AIR 1976 SC 1785

13
following the principles of natural justice. And the rule must be observed in its proper spirit. A
mere pretence of compliance would not satisfy the requirement of law. One of the most
important decisions to come up in this principle of reasoned decision in India is probably
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India27. In this particular case, the authorities under section 10(5)
of the Passport Act need to record reasons and furnish a copy of the same to the concerned
individual but the reasons for impounding can be refused on the grounds that it was not in the
interest of the general public and the same was applied on her. The order was challenged in the
Supreme Court. The court looking at the reasons given by the authority ruled that the authority
cannot by itself be the final authority to determine the question of non-disclosure of reasons in
particular cases in public interest.

Bhagwati, J., stressed that “giving of reasons is a healthy check against abuse or misuse of
power as the order impounding the passport can be quashed if the reasons for doing so are
extraneous or irrelevant. The court would be very slow in accepting the claim of the passport
authority that it would not be in public interest to disclose the reasons. The authority would have
to satisfy the Court by placing relevant material giving reasons which would be “clearly and
indubitably” against the interest of the general public. If the court is not so satisfied it would
require the authority to disclose the reasons. Maneka thus represents the high watermark of
judicial insistence on adjudicatory authorities to give reasons for their decisions.”

In Gurdial Singh Fijji vs. State of Punjab and Ors. 28, this Court, dealing with a service matter,
relying on the ratio in Capoor29, held that "rubber-stamp reason" is not enough and virtually
quoted the observation in Capoor to the extent that reasons "are the links between the materials
on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions."

In a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Shri Swamiji of Shri Admar Mutt etc. etc. vs.
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Dept. and Ors., 30while
giving the majority judgment Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud referred to Broom's Legal

27
AIR 1978 SC 597
28
(1979) 2 SCC 368
29
Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor and others, AIR 1974 SC 87
30
AIR 1980 SC 1

14
Maxims31 "Ces-sante Ratione Legis Cessat Ipsa Lex.” The English version of the said principle
given by the Chief Justice is that "reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any
particular law ceases, so does the law itself."
In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education vs. K.S. Gandhi 32
and others, the Court held that even in domestic enquiry if the facts are not in dispute non-
recording of reason may not be violative of the principles of natural justice but where facts are
disputed necessarily the authority or the enquiry officer, on consideration of the materials on
record, should record reasons in support of the conclusion reached.
In the case of M.L. Jaggi vs. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Limited and others 33, the Court
dealt with an award under Section 7 of the Telegraph Act and held that since the said award
affects public interest, reasons must be recorded in the award.
In the case Chairman, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs. Jagdish Sharan
34
Varshney & Ors., the Court held that "reason must be given by the appellate or revisional
authority even when affirming the impugned decision".
The Supreme Court in its decision in Sri Goutam Singha and others v. The Principal Secretary,
Land & Land Reforms Department Govt. of West Bengal & Ors. 35 and M/S Kranti Asso. Pvt.
Ltd. & Anr. vs Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors .36, has again highlighted the importance of giving
reasons while passing a judgment / order by any judicial or quasi judicial body.

REASONED DECISION AND STATUTORY PROVISONS

A) REASONS: COMMON LAW

I. ENGLAND
31
Broom's Legal Maxims, 1939 Edition, p. 97
32
(1991) 2 SCC 716
33
(1996) 3 SCC 119
34
(2009) 4 SCC 240
35
W.P.L.R.T. 44 of 2010
36
(2010) 9 SCC 496

15
Common law owes to Franks Committee report for statutory implementation of duty to give
reasons.37 The recommendations given by the Franks Committee were enacted in the Tribunals
and Inquiry Act 195838, which requires the tribunals listed in the Act to give a statement, written
or oral, of the reasons for a decision, if requested by the individual and it also applies to
ministerial decision subsequent to statutory enquiries. Along with this Act, other primary and
secondary legislation imposes a duty to give reasons in specific conditions. 39 Where the Lord
Chancellor and the Secretary of State after consultation with Council of Tribunals, feel that
giving of reasons for certain decisions taken by tribunals and ministers is ‘unnecessary and
impractical’, an order may be made excluding the duty to give reasons in these cases.40
In Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1968)41 the House of Lords said that
an absence of reasons could raise an inference of no good reason opening the decision up to
judicial review. In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree 42 Sir John Donaldson, as
President of the National Industrial Relations Court, has observed that:
“Failure to give reasons amounts to a denial of justice.”
But, the limitations of this principle were rigorously stated by Lord Keith in R v. Secretary of
State for Trade and Industry ex parte Lonrho (1989)43 as follows:
“The absence of reasons for a decision where there is no duty to give them cannot of itself
provides any support for suggested irrationality of the decision. The only significance is that if
all other known facts and circumstances appear to point overwhelmingly in favour of a different
decision, the decision maker cannot complain if the court draws the inference that he has no
rational for his decision.”
But, it has been seen in England that there is a duty to give reason where a right of appeal is
provided. A reasoned decision is necessary to enable the person prejudicially affected by the
decision to know whether he has a ground of appeal; it will also assist the appellate court to

37
Craig, Paul. Administrative Law. Thomson, Sweet and Maxwell. 2008, 6th edition. p402
38
Tribunal and Inquiry Act, 1958, s. 12(1), repealed by the Tribunals and Inquiry Act, 1992, sec. 10
39
E.g. R v, Minister of Housing and Local Government exparte Chichester RDC, [1960] 1 W.L.R. 587
40
Act of 1971, section 12(6)
41
[1968] AC 997
42
[1974] ICR 120 
43
[1989] 1 W.L.R. 525

16
scrutinize effectively the decision for relevant error, without necessarily usurping the function of
the tribunal…” 44
Thus, we can see that in England, there is no automatic duty on the tribunal to give reasons; the
obligation to do so only arises when parties to the dispute demand reasons.

II. CANADA
Statutory Powers and Procedure Act, 1980 provides that "a tribunal shall give its final decision,
if any, in any proceedings in writing and shall give reasons in writing therefore if requested by a
party. This position existing in Canada is very much similar to that of England.
In Pure Spring Co. Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue 45 it was held that when a Minister
makes a determination in his discretion he is not required by law to give any reasons for such a
determination but in some recent decisions, however, the Courts have recognized that in certain
situations there would be an implied duty to state the reasons or grounds for a decision.46

III. AUSTRALIA

Section 13 of Commonwealth Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 enables a

person who is entitled to apply for review of the decision before the Federal Court to request the
decision-maker to furnish him with a statement in writing setting out the findings on material
questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based
and giving the reasons for the decision and on such a request being made the decision-maker has
to prepare the statement and furnish it to the persons who made the request as soon as practicable
and in any event within 28 days. The provisions of this Act are not applicable to the classes of
decisions mentioned in Schedule I to the Act. A similar duty to give reasons has also been
imposed by Sections 28 and 37 of the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act,
1975.

B) REASONS: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

44
De Smith, Woolf and Jowell, op cit, note 4, at 460
45
[1947] 1 DLR 501 
46
Re R.D.R. Construction Ltd. And Rent Review Commission [1983] 139 DLR 168; Re Yarmouth Housing Ltd. And
Rent Review Commission [1983] 139 DLR (3d) 544

17
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 prescribes for the basic procedural principles
which are to govern formal administrative procedures (Section 8(b)) to the effect that all
decisions shall indicate a statement of findings and conclusions as well as reasons or basis
therefore upon all the material issues of fact, law or discretion presented on the record. This
principle is also incorporated in section 557(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act
In Phelps Dodge Corporation v. National Labour Relations Board 47 the court has insisted upon
recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority on the premise that the
authority should give clear indication that it has exercised the discretion with which it has been
empowered because "administrative process will best be vindicated by clarity in its exercise.”
The said requirement of recording of reasons has also been justified in Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Chenery Corporation 48, on the basis that such a decision is subject to judicial
review and "the Courts cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are advised of the
considerations underlying the action under review" and that "the orderly functioning of the
process of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be
clearly disclosed and adequately sustained." 

C) REASONS: EUROPEAN COMMISSION

In EC law there is a duty to give reasons based on article 253 EC. Like the common law, even
under EC law the extent to which reasons have to be give depends upon the nature of the relevant
act and the context within which it was made. 49 This duty to give reasons is principally imposed
upon the community organs themselves, but it can be applied to national authorities where they
are acting as agents of the Community for the application of EC law.50

CONCLUSION

In practice, many tribunals are function in our country but very few of them have, however, been
able to inspire confidence in public. The tribunals have shown a singular lack of competence and
47
[1940] 85 L Ed. 1271
48
[1942] 87 L Ed. 626
49
Craig, n.202; Beus (5/67) [1968] E.C.R. 83; Germany v. Commission (24/62) [1963 E.C.R. 63; Meroni v. High
Authority (9/56) [1958] E.C.R. 133
50
Wachauf v. Germany (5/88) [1989] E.C.R. 2609

18
objectivity in determining disputes. Tribunals are supposed to serve as an alternative institution
to the High Court and hence they must prove themselves to be a competent and expert
mechanism with a judicial and objective approach and that can be done through giving a fair
hearing. Fair hearing has been bequeathed to the Indian legal system by the British system of
law. The basic import of the principle of fair hearing gives an opportunity to a person against
whom an adverse action is proposed to be taken so that he may have an opportunity to show
cause as why such an action should not be taken.
According to Megaw J. “the reasons should be proper, intelligible and adequate. The application
of the first two of these presents no problem. If the reasons given are improper they will reveal
some flaw in the decision-making process which will be open to challenge on some ground other
than the failure to give reasons. If the reasons given are unintelligible, this will be equivalent to
giving no reasons at all.”
Principle of speaking order is the heart and soul of every judicial and administrative order so that
the party may know the reasons. It is a fundamental principle of the administration of justice that
both parties should be heard before a decision to their rights is passed and equally fundamental
principle is that an authority must give reasons for its decision or order.
Principles of natural justice are peremptory norms of procedural fairness and the main objective
of these principles is to ensure that the rights of the parties are maintained. The lack of statutory
provisions somehow limits the scope of reasoned decision but the creativity shown by Indian
judiciary has ensured that it is now mandatory for administrative tribunals to adhere to the
principles of natural justice and give reasons for their decisions or face the consequence of
having their judgments quashed.
Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the
essence and is virtually a part of "due process".

BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
1. De, D J. Interpretation and enforcement of fundamental rights. Eastern Law house. New
Delhi. 2000.

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2. Democracy, human rights and the rule of law: essays in honour of Nani Palkhivala Iyer,
Venkat. Butterworths India. Delhi. 2000.
3. Hawke, Neil. Introduction to Administrative Law. Universal book traders. Delhi. 1993
4. Jain, M P. Treatise on administrative law, Vol. 1 (chapters I to XIX) / Wadhwa and 5)
Company. New Delhi. 2000.
5. Jain, M. P. Cases and materials on Indian administrative law. Vol. 1. Delhi. 2000
6. Wade, William. Forsyth, Christopher. Oxford University press.
7. De Smith. Woolf. Jowell. Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Mainwork and
Supplement. Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell. 6th Edition.
8. Broom. Broom's Legal Maxims. 1939 Edition.
9. Craig, Paul. Administrative Law. Thomson, Sweet and Maxwell. 2008, 6th edition.

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