political status by their religious Porter insists that “the organization that derive from group membership ety based on citizenship” (Porter | specific polyethnic, representation, or self-government rights, then virtually 1678 Ww every modem democracy recognizes some form of it. As Parekh notes, izenship today “is. a mu ‘concept than has been However, ‘are encouraged by the very terms of provides a shared experience another force for disui of increasing fing unity in the face ‘enship should be a forum where people mn good of all citizens 1 serious concern and px iberal theory. Recent nds throughout erm welfare dependency io Easter Burope, ‘who possess these qu: cessfully progressive) Many classic iberal democracy could be ‘made secure, even in the absence of an especially virtuous citizenry, by creating checks and balances. In al and procedural devices such as there is growing fear iberal democracies may be in se ' start with group representation rights. Generally speaking, the de- ‘mand for representation rights by disadvantaged groups is a demand for in Groups that feel e and the recog> Wt Kostas ry but needed an exempt vyarmulkes. Sucl to participate in and c bute to the larger communi hey were requesting could only be seen as p 2, no tegration. ‘Some demands for polyethnic rights take the form of withdra from the larger society, response (0 the demands of w/ tes, Quakers, and Ha groups have demanded the saa ed to the Amish, accepting waves of non-F tty through polyethnic immigrati people thought it untenable. ‘any reason for such fears t0 persist ty (Harles 1993). To be sure, be reformed so as,wins. Kean ‘chosen areas, in onder to rebut the charge of i 1994-68) Why have so many commentators failed to see the integrative impulse of polyethnic rights? In part itis prejudice against new immigrants, most of ‘whom are nonwhite and non-Christian. There seems to be a double standard tat work in many criticisms of polyethnic rights. While the special rights granted to white Jewish and Christian groups to withdraw from the larger society have at times been controversial, few people see these as serious threats to social unity or stability, and they have been, political culture for decades, But when accommodations were made for nonwhite, stian groups, people started complaining about the “wibalization” of society and the loss of a comm ry—even though these newer polyethnic rights are in fact primari is that much of the backlash against “multi- ‘or xenophobic fear of these new immigrant and Stasiulus 1992:378), Similarly, I think that fears about the fons between whites and blacks in the United States are often displaced in each case, nic revival provide an easier target than the dema yough the former in fact pose ntey. iberal assumptions about the relationship bet zenship and integration, BATCH experience of the working class. The worki y excluded group inio 4 comspon-national-culs ied that this model could apply to other historically excluded groups, ignoring their very different circumstances, Consider the work of T, H. Marshall, one of the most postwar theorists of citizenship. He believed that the working ind were cut off from the “common culture” and were dk be seen as “a comm possession and heritage” (Marsh class lines, with I that, combined with the lack of material resources, made for workers to take part in the broader cultur ntry. They had their own subcultures, of course, which were often highly developed, but ‘they were deprived of access to the national culture. Marshall was deeply concerned with this clusion of the wo exclusion than per se, However, because the cultural exclusion of the working class derived from their socioeconomic standing, the most effective way ion was through the pro- vision of material benefits, via the welfare state, Hence Marshall was on expanding ci {o education, health cate, and social security programs. And there is ov hese social rights have indeed served to promote the integra- ‘working class in var (othe national culture. ural aspect ofthe ex- ive function of citizenship rights. He be- lieved that the equal rights of citizenship would help promote national inte- _gration for previously excluded groups. These sights would generate “a direct ‘membership based on loyalty toa civilization which is integration of the working class cannot be generalized in this way. There are many forms of cultural exclusion, and they interact with common citizenship in different ways (Bar: balet 1988:93), ' theory of integration does not nec: ly distinct immigrants, or for various other groups excluded from full partcipat national cculture—such as blacks, women, religious minorities, gays, and Some members of these groups still fe In each of these cases, groups have been ex because of th sociocultural identity —the ‘groups are often mat of their cu essarily ensure Megration into a common culture, or develop a sense of shared loyalty to a common ci Like the worki ies), these groups are demanding inclusion into the dominant nat ture, But unlike theto feel accepted ity member nds, the basi simply that some groups are di ical unity, sel the integrative function of vantaged groups and pol mic rights for immigrant groups take the larger init. Demands They may aS primary, and the value and authority worth exploring this ‘groups demand special represen the larger po sy general authority of for granted. They assume, as John Raw polities! communits ‘early give Tise to sort of dualian Empite, for example, compromise between groups y ensured by the system of sel - and so became a nu rather than a separate, governing poople, Re hip is needed to deal a uggests that a strong sense of c: ties overarching sense of ident state, the state should promot , Basques, id comAttempts t0 pro- identities —for ex: states —have proven. inate the sense of distinct identity which tional societies. If anything, jes to a common identity have backfired, since they are norities as threats very existence, and so have resulted in even greater ‘or resentment (Whitaker 1992:152-53; Taylor 1992s:64). terature of the social construc that few if any national groups years have lated, despite often significant economi ‘centives and legal pressures t0 do so. As Anthony Smith pt Shed, me groups “agree yedeshook 1993:223). The sense of solidart ‘We seem caught in a Gord conclude that the is secession, According to Miller, where ni become so strong that what we ing side by side,” then ‘We ure now back at John Stuart Mill's argument eral democracy must be a nation: tional minori ‘i lish their own state i Perhaps we should be more willing to consider secession. We tend they mast secede and estab- at few people today condemn the sec 1905. In the Norwegian case, the ful, and the result was two he resources would make peaceful secession virtually impossible. In gen than possible states, and since we cam consciousness away, we need to find some What then are the possible sourees of differences: do not have a clear an- here are any obvious oF easy an-bers of a national minority cannot have both a strong ni 88 and a strong sense of patriotism and commitment to the larger polity he Swiss as being a federation of pe too many examples of countries where the insti- hhas not prevented civil strife mng-term stability used (© be taken for granted now seem rather ium). whose e precarious (for example, Bi What then are ? There are few discuss self-government have been more concerned to argu nota viable source of unity than to explain what should take One suggestion is th ‘Obviously the citizens of any modern dem ceptions of the good life, but they may share e¢ example, one government commission in Canada dev such values which Canadians shared: (1) a belief in eq (2) a belief in consultation and dialogue: nce; (4) suph (6) attachment to the natural envizonm peace, and nonviol hope is that focusing on these shared values will provide grounds for so unity in Canada. ‘This idea is also found, in a more philoso} cent liberal theorists. Rawls, for exampl ‘modern societies is a shared conception of wilered society is divided and h ue. To date, defenders of national that ass place, social unity depends on “shared. values,” do not share specific con wis, ship and secures the bonds of associ is true that there often are shared pol a that these values, by tional groups to stay togeth: (and probably is) a remarkable convergence of values between of Norway and Sweden, bat is this any reason for them to reunite? I do not think so. The hey share the same values does not, by itself, ex- plain whether it is better to have one state or two in that part of the world wn Cinzesso ie it 4 pronounced convergence in values be: witnessed a decline in support for Quebec secession over this period, yet sentiment has in fact grown fa Justice is not a strong reason to remain together, since the Québécois rightly assume that their own e could respect the same principles, The ndeed, this ref vergence of political values Western world, amongst both ‘majority nations and national minorities, In terms of . the Danes, Germans, Fre have probably never been as similar is has not had any appreciable impact on the desire ' (0 retain their national independence. Why then ss for shared values are not sul ‘groups share the same values or pi does not necessarily give them any strong reason to join (or remain) together, rather than rem io) two separate countries, The missing ingredi v. A shared conception of justice essarily gonerate a iy that will supersede rival national to share a country hrougho identity, ies. People decide who they ‘who they identify wi together, despite identity as Americans. Convers despite the presence of shared values, isthe lack of a shared Where does this shared identity come fro nswer is simple. Shared identi guage, and maybe religion, But these are precisely shared totic but culturally diverse count it he basis for a shared identity often seems to be pride in certain historical achievements (for ex- ‘ment and division between national groups, not a source of shared pride,Wi Ky sople and events which spark pride 9 generate a sense of betrayal amongst the national minority. Moreover, he reliance on history often requires a very selective, ev g of that history, Ernst Renan once claimed that natio ‘common ident lective memory of the pas Shared values and arity in a multination state, but itis doubeful How then can one cor contains two or more con jons? The great variance in historical, cultural, and political situations slates suggests that any generalized answer to this question Will probably be overstated* What is clear, I think, is that if there is viable way to promote a sense of solidarity and common purpose in a m volve aecomm ple from different national groups polity if they see it as the context wit ‘nurtured, rather than subordinated.* is is difficult e in a country which simply contains two aspiring history no doubt help sustain soli- that either is sufficient by i which their national identity is ations (Bel It gets much. tries which are national and indigenous groups, often of vastly ‘every part of the a theory of the members of these groups belong to the larger p For example, mber of an immigrant grou who are tolerant of each other's ifferences, belonging will not accommodate nat ‘country. According to a recent poll, 91 percent of the resid Rico think of themselves as Puerto Ricans first, and Americans second (Ri binstein 1993:88). They do see themselves as ‘oly because this does not require abandoning their prior identity as a d speaking people with their own separate po ‘States, for them, isa federation of peoples — with the right 10 govern Similarly, the i ie Qu rth Ce (tne 19:75), ortho, Coal etton that psa en other’ ah tobe ads soit cle i be bth pjetiic and sopsee Sole People nt ony munities, bu -mbers of a polyethnic and sity of approaches ea herself “as a bearer of ust nevertheless aecept belong in a very different way. communities.” And reciproe ‘on which a fnatton state can be built (Taylor 1991:76). What would hold such a mal an open id an object ight “find it excit- society founded on ake sacrifices to keep it together (Tay. lor 1991:76). This seems to bey the question, Why would citizens fi iting’ rather than wearying, given the endless nege cations it entails?” But Taylor is pointing in the ri “deep diversity” is unlikely to stay together unless people value deep di- id want 10 live in @ country with diverse forms of e not always sufficient. For ex A society founded on settled anglo- ding the Cree, Mo- rarely if ever ereates homogencous nation-states; and various indigenous peoples, in hawk, and Inuit Sece:184 Waa KsticKa eu for it, I-eitizens already have ther ethnic and national groups in the country, they will find the prospect of sustaining their deep diversity ins (othe value of c lar groups that cohabit it states do have this strong sense jon, This is obviously true of the Swiss. Canadians also ‘of Quebscers attach priority, in their sof-identify, to their status as Quebec citizens, compared with just under 30 percent who attach priority to Cana- 0 percent of Quebecers say they would be willing to ment of deep diversi help sustain that level of her multination states could try to tory, or the exci solidarity. But itis not clear how 5. Conciusion a very practical sal states, Liberal democracies require citizens to have a fairly high self-restraint and mutual solidarity. and iti a fair question whether ization of ethnic and national differences is compatible with these requirements. hat fears in this area are often oversta disadvantaged groups for polyethnic demands for inclusion, for f larger society. To view this as a thee ble, and often reflects an underlying ty will arise however We respond to self-government he devel cf, Heater 1990:285), 7, 244; Macedo 1990:138-39. This may account Mo surveys from the previous fifty “the current cohort knows less cares less, votes les, and i less186 WILL KywnucKa E-government, to the larger federation. be drawn upon, when other understand the nature of the Europea Con Habermas argues that European unity cannot be based on the shared cultures, and languages that characterized successful nation-states. Instead, European citizenship must be founded on a “postnationa” const patriotism based on shared principles of justice and democracy (Habermas 198 erten 1992; Ferry 1992), Others, however, argue that shared values are not a sulfcient basis for unity, and tha attention must also be paid (0 ssves of identity (Taylor 1992b:61-65; Smith 1993), the Canadian case, ( insist that Quebecers should pure by belong has to be pu icmp, andthe Consttion" In ‘Charge. Toronto: MeCieland ‘Oktawa: Supply and Services, ‘Connor, Wake. 1972, “Nation-Building or Nation Destroying World Po Cook, Ramsey. 1969, Freie Canadian Ni Feary. Jean Mare, 1992. 1992, Funan, Josh,188 Win. Kymuicia, 1, and Bris Czonship Pll Movkod, Taig, 1994. “Establishment, Mul ‘Quarterly 65, 0. 153-73 ‘Nomin, W,J, 1994 "Towards a Normative Theory of Feder Fro: Universi of Treat Pres Shanicageesiinioipienrat onal Design” Sola! Philosophy and ln Group Rights e Philosophy” Westport, Conn Greenwood of Euope?” Journal of Peace Toward a Postri YASEMIN Guestworkers in Westem nation-states... even without formal citizenship ‘orporated into various legal and organizational structures of Reflecting upon guestworker membership, analyze the ng structure and meaning of citizenship in the contemporary world. troduce @ new model of membership, the main thrust of which is that in- dividual rights, historically defined on the basis of nationality, are increas- ly codified into a different scheme that emphasizes universal personhood, | formalize the model by comparing it with the national model of citizenship ‘and specifying its distinctive elements. The articulation of this model sets the stage forthe further elaboration of dualitis in the rules of the pos ‘slobal system, witich, while insisting on the nation-state and its sovereig at the same time legitimate a new form of membership that transcends boundaries of the nation-state, GuesTWORKERS AND CITIZENSHIP: Otp Concerts, New ForMATIONS ‘The postwar eta is characterized by a reconfiguration of based on personhood, Historically, citizenship and its rights and privileges per 180N SHAFIR, EDITOR ™ iu Ne 3 (a University OF MINNESOTA PRESS * London