"Equality" and "liberty" are the two terms that describe our philosophical conception of justice. "Equality of opportunity" is seen as the absence of obstructions from the right to choose a career based on relevant differences between peoples. Since these differences are respected between individuals no particular norm is imposed and people are totally free in their right to liberty.
"Equality" and "liberty" are the two terms that describe our philosophical conception of justice. "Equality of opportunity" is seen as the absence of obstructions from the right to choose a career based on relevant differences between peoples. Since these differences are respected between individuals no particular norm is imposed and people are totally free in their right to liberty.
"Equality" and "liberty" are the two terms that describe our philosophical conception of justice. "Equality of opportunity" is seen as the absence of obstructions from the right to choose a career based on relevant differences between peoples. Since these differences are respected between individuals no particular norm is imposed and people are totally free in their right to liberty.
“LIBERTY " and =" EQUALITY "
A TWO PART INVENTION
Ogan Gurel
Adams I-31
Moral Reasoning 22
31 October 1983
David Steiner, T.F.Ogan Gurel
It would seem that "equality" and "liberty" are
the two terms that describe our philosophical conception
of justice. Questions such as "do people have a right
to free choice?" and "
re people to be considered as
equals?" underlie the study of each of these ideas
respectively. The more interesting question, however,
centers on whether people have a right to both liberty
and equality and whether these two rights can be
respected concurrently and without conflict. An answer
to this latter question is posed in an excerpt from
Free to Choose by Milton and Rose Friedman.
By first appraisal it appears as though the
right to liberty and full equality are conflicting
concepts; irreconcializble in a moral society.
Ronald Dworkin, in Taking Rights Seriously, sees it
as a "conflict between the demands of liberty and
equality," but he himself proposes a cure for this
dilemna. A sense of liberty based on personal
preferences as opposed to external preferences would
not conflict with equality. Essentially, in reconciling
the two, Dworkin modifies his conception of liberty
so that a form of liberty more confluent with equal
treatment among individuals can be considered.Ogan Gurel -- 2
The Friedmans also propose a reconciliation of
equality and liberty on the grounds that an equality
of opportunity is the only form of equal consideration
among peoples that is in concordance with the right
to liberty. The effort to harmonize liberty and
equality is thus exerted from the opposite tack in
which the concept of equality is rendered more
feasible in a libertarian society. Equality of
opportunity, then, is seen as the absence of obstructions
from the right to choose a career based on relevant
differences between peoples. Since these differences
are respected between individuals no particular norm
is imposed and people are totally free in their right
to liberty.
In particular, equality of opportunity is considered
by the Friedmans to be especially relevant in the
economic realm. The institutions of free enterprise,
competition, and laissez-faire government are all
seen to support the precepts of the equality of
opportunity. Furthermore, restricting the forms and
processes of these particular institutions is conceived
of as a more fundamental restriction on the equality
of opportunity. In this way, we can undoubtably
conclude that the Friedmans view can be seen as strongly
tilted to the Lockean ideal of libertarianism.Ogan Gurel
The equality of opportunity is contrasted with
the idea of an equality of outcome in which case the
benefits and burdens of society are accorded equally
between the members of that society, irrespective of
the differences that can be construed between them.
It is this form of equality that the Friedmans see as
diametrically opposed to liberty. In fact any efforts
to support such a form of equality result directly
(through governemnt intervention) in the comparable
reduction of liberties.
Specifically, two faults are pointed out in this
form of equality: Firstly, it is assumed that some
central authority must then determine the fairness and
distribution of outcome and secondly there would
subsequently be no incentive to work and produce in
such a system. Therefore a society based on the
equality of outcome can only be run through the use
of force or threat. The terror-based states of China,
Ruséia and Cambodia are seen as examples of how such
a principle of equality could go awry.
To justify this position, the Friedmans point
out that "unfairness" is a natural state in human
society. In light of the many manifest differences
between human beings it is thus considered infeasible
and, in fact, unjust if the government attempts to
rectify the vagaries of an arbitrary nature. Almost
as if to finalize this thought, the FriedmansOgan Gurel -- 4
pessimistically remark that "Life is not fair" and
compare its course with a chance game of baccarat.
Underlying the right to liberty and the equality
of opportunity is the unhidered right of free choice.
Without explictly saying so, the Friedman views this
restatement of the libertarian ethic as revealing the
key to the reconciliation of equality and liberty.
No doubt, we can oppose the libertarian view
by resorting to egalitarian arguments of liberty and
equality. It is here that we see that the Friedmans
first fault was in their attempt to include a bit of
liberal argument in their essay. In fact, in justifying
the equivalence of equality and liberty it is stated
that "
very individual should be regarded as an end
in himself." Shades of Kant notwithstanding, however,
during the course of the argument, the "unfairness of
life" and the rules of the game, so to speak, all
bespeak of winners gaining at the expense of losers.
These winners, of course, are people fated by their
talents to do well in society, while the losers,
besides being worse off, provide the relative standard
upon which to judge the winners. Indeed, in this
manner, people are used as the means to gain an
advantage in the game of life, and not as the ends
to which the Friedmans originally alluded to.
The egalitarian point of view would also argue
that the Friedmans take on too broad a conception ofogan Gurel -- 5
of the relevant differences between people. Neither
the inheritance of talent, the inheritance of money nor
the inheritance of good looking legs are seen as more
significant than the other differences between people.
Egalitarians would say that because people are to
be considered as ends in themselves and members of
humanity, no less, some differences are to be thought
of as irrelevant to the question of equality of outcome.
It is believed that some fundamental rights and needs
are excluded from the domain of free choice and must
be provided equally to all people. If, however, all
differences between people are to be respected, then
it is undoubtable that some basic human needs and rights
indigeneous to the human race as a whole will be unfulfilled
for a number of individuals.
The second major concern of the egalitarian
philosophy would be that Friedman takes on two narrow
a view of individual rights. In the true Lockean
philosophy, economic considerations are paramount in
questions of distributive justice. Not only are the
individual rights to be protected strictly confined
to those in relation to economic factors, but also
the establishment of procedural structures supporting
libertarianism seem to have generated their own rights
the obstruction of which is perhaps an even greater
offense than the obstruction of individual rights.Ogan Gurel -- 7
in shaping the differing nuances that people exhibit
in their talents and abilities.
If some of our differences are envirnmentally
determined, then why should we be compelled to persist
in an environment and culture that promotes differences?
Would we not be impelled to iron out those differences
and ensure equality with respect to those factors that
are externally deterministic and amenable to change by
us as a whole? Indeed, if we take the view that all
differences are determined by nature then we are not
required to equalize them as the Friedmans say but
rather are required to respect them in our right to free
choice. If however, we take the extreme view that all.
differences are determined by our environment and culture
then we are equally impelled to guarantee complete
equality of outcome as we are able to effect that
equality. Since the nature vs. nurture argument is not
completely resolved we are best advised in moral arguments
not to take the two extremist views presented above but
rather to take some middle ground that compromises between
the two. In light of this, the obvious conclusion is
raised that some equality of outcome is necessary despite
the overt differences between people and therefore, in
a number of respects, we must as a society ensure equality
in this form.
Finally, it appears as though the Friedmans are
confused in the application of the principle of the
equality of opportunity. Because people must be allowedogan Gurel -- 8
freedom of choice a just distribution of societies benefits
and burdens based on this free choice is considered
completely just. This is exactly the view taken by
Professor Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia in which
he says: "From each as they choose, to each as they
are chosen."
Thust people should receive benefits and burdens,
win or lose, according to decisions which they can be
held responsible for. However, in justifying their
objections to equality of outcome, the Friedmans'
stress the importance of the inviolability of the
differences between people. These differences are seen
to be beyond attempts by the government to ameliorate
or rectify. Yet, if we view these differences as also
beyond the control of individuals, manifestations of the
vagaries of nature as we pointed out earlier, then free
choice has no place in equality. We approach an almost
Calvinistic determinism in which we may uphold the
equality of opportunity but such an equality is merely
a farce and has no meaning. ‘The question is raised as
to how just is it to punish those whose differences, of
which they have no control, entail some lack of talent
with respect to others.
The Friedmans describe their ideal system as on in
which “people make their own choices +- and bear most of
the consequences of their decisions".| But according, to
the differences that we envision between people and the
idea of equality of opportunity, then| people must alsogan Gurel -- 9
bear the consequences of decisions beyond their free choice.
If all decisions were then externally determined, we
arrive at the same conclusion that the only form of
equality that makes sense is that of the equality of
outcome. Of course, our decisions are mediated on
grounds between that of totally free choice and no choice
and therefore we must consider equality as being partially
determined by equality of outcome. We should not punish
people for circumstances over which they have no control
and in these cases we can justify equality of outcome.
The conclusion I have reached then is arrived at by
a consensus of the above two arguments and the more
general arguments posed by egalitarianism. In short we
must consider some individual rights which lead to an
equality of outcome as inviolable and must also discount
some differences between people as irrelevant in discussions
of distributive justice. Furthermore, our differences,
because they are partially environmentally and culturally
determined should be equliazed in these cases and those
differences that are beyond our control should not be
construed to justify the conferrence of any benefits
and burdens of society.
Equality of outcome, then is as ubvious and reasonable
a conclusion that can be reached as is an equality of
opportunity. Whether this works in cooperation with
liberty is antoher matter for discussion.