Qgan Gurel 8 December 1983 Moral Reasoning 22 Paper # 2 D. Steiner CONTRACTS AND THE MURDER OF ROGER WHETMORE Contract theory is a natural framework for the effective expression of moral argument. In describing @ situation in moral terms, we cannot escape the fact that any understanding of the situation couched in a moral representation may, in fact, be quite removed from the underlying reality. Although our moral model may thus be detached in many ways from that which we wish to analyze, it nonetheless must be simple in application and fundamentally appealing to our moral intuitions. Contract theory presents us with a mode of thought which is simple enough so that its theoretical underpinnings do not encumber our moral thought, yet is complex enough to be readily accessible to our often vague and amorphous moral sensibilities For many moral philosophers, then, arguing a moral position from a contractarianOGAN BUREL, page 2 perspective is the method of choice; indeed the idea of contracts has been expanded in scope and degree to provide the foundation for a number of theories of justice and morality. Contracts are used in defence of the Speluncean explorers as a means of proving their innocence in the murder of Roger Whetmore. Both the ideas of an actual binding contract and a social contract are invoked in the argument that no moral or legal wrengness can be imputed from the act of killing and eating Whetmore in order to save the lives of all the others involved. 1 shall proceed in proving that the use of contracts in justifying such a result is wrong, and that, in fact the Speluncean explorers must be held guilty of their crime. In the first case, it can be argued that the murder of Whetmore was the due consequence of a contractual obligation to which all the explorers were equally cognizant of. Indeed, it is pointed out, that Whetmore, himself proposed the plan for the self sacrifice of one of them in order to insure the survival of the others. Furthermore, the fact that Whetmore backed out of the agreement prematurally yet still agreeing to the procedure of the self-sacrifice plan is not considered to invalidate the contract uponOGAN GUREL ~ page 3 which all of them had originally agreed. Finally, we can say that the circumstances of such a situation and ‘the extreme rigor of such a state of nature makes this contract a viable part of the little society that existed in that isolated cave. On account of these facts, the conclusion arises that the murder of Roger Whetmore was a morally justifiable act. With further reflection, it appears as though the use of contracts, however appealing it may be, is invalid. Therefore any moral judgements arising out of such a conception of contract will be severely unjust. Although it may be unjust or immoral to unilaterally break a contract, such a maxim does not preclude the unjustness or unfairness of the terms of a contract. We must examine, then, if this contract is fundamentally unfair and in so doing delve deeper into the nature of contracts. @n ideal contract approaches two ideals of fairness in its conception and terms. These two ideas are best summarized in Michael Sandel’s Liberalism and the Limits of Justice: “One is the ideal of autonomy, which sees a contracts as an act of will, whose morality consists inOGAN GUREL -~ page 4 oO s the voluntary character of the transaction. The other t ~~ is the ideal of reciprocity, which sees a contract as an < instrument of mutual benefit, whose morality depends on NS the underlying fairness of the exchange.” ga ya we From this perspective we immediately see the >, faults of this sacrificial contract the Speluncean ~S ~E Explorers entered inta.—First of all, it appears Ne xe obvious that no Xégitimate Sense of autonomy exists; Ws “4 -amsng any of @rs. From a Kantian e/ ot ‘ among the intense survival urges of the explorers. From \7 a utilitarian view, all sense of values (happiness or pleasure, for instance) are completel this little society. It is clear, the ne of these explorers entered freely into this contracts they were, on the contrary, coerced and threatened into it.—> Even the fact that Roger Whetmore initially proposed the contract does not justify it is his case for the threat or coercion does not originate solely in Roger Whetmore but rather in each one of the explorers. Thus the explorers cannot and do not enter inte such a contract freely and autonomously. Such a contract is fundamentally unjust. Pressing the terms of such an _unfair contract would in and of itself be an immoral bo lal neha ly b.) AM can leo!” On ~ mal tense. x 5 » Scheer heax awils we ‘4 Yeah whiey ‘Js dha w \ dele ~ se) Pa ng the murder of Whetmore as \\* ( a) OGAN GUREL -~ page 5 act and beyond conside: unjustified we must further condemn the explorers on \ we yn wt Oe Nee this account. Secondiy,/Ae can exanine this contract from the (a {8 "Gn contract must be unfair in its terms. No possibly more wv AW ov Sennen eee eee achieved than the imbalance in this contract. On one we Moe ane Mtesl eral nef cari nefecerter dah sefercientere y other we have the sustenance or giving of life. No possible reciprocal arrangement can be construed in this contract; not even the pretense of pure procedural justice in the form of a dice throw can exonerate this contract from this fact. In this sense, also, the contract remains unjustifiable. Social contract theory is the other farm of argument used to defend the explorers. The defense contends that the situation in the cave reflects a new state of nature and that under this state the laws of society do not hold and that in fact under the state of nature anew society with all the legitimacy of their old society from which they were temporarily detached. Under this state of nature, and then under this new society, the murder is considered to be justifiable. However, I feel that such an argument is a grossOGAN GUREL - page & misuse of the principles of social contract. There are three arguments supporting this contention. First of all, no case can be made that a state of nature actually exists in this cave. The state of nature is, of course, a philosophical conception that has been developed by a number of philosophers including John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Rawls. None of these philosophers would contend that a valid state of nature, one that is strong enough to give rise to a form of civil government or to principles of social justice, exists in the cave. For each of these philosophers, the state of nature is prepared in a very careful manner which takes into account the future moral implications of such a social contract. Rousseau points out that “common liberty is a consequence of man’s nature" and Locke considers the state of nature as a “state of perfect freedom." Rawls takes incredible pains to specity exactly what his conception of a proper state of nature, capable of supporting a moral argument, would look like. Rawls and all the other philosophers do this because any natural state is not necessarily a state of nature in the philosophical conception of the term. Obviously the situation in the cave does not constitute a valid state of nature. The explorers areOGAN GUREL not free to exercise their liberty, and are severely limited in their choices. A valid state of nature Zo ee ws conceivable future. I think that a state of human oo XO aes primitiveness is fundamentally mistaken for the state deer \ > of nature and that such a state of primitiveness wd ee cannot in any way justify the formation of a new social order, much less justify the murder of Roger Whetmore. The second objection centers around that fact that the state of nature as conceived by Rousseau and Rawls produces a lasting change in the human moral condition. @ social contract or principles of justice based on an original state of nature causes a fundamental change in man’s moral sensibilities which may not necessarily be wiped away by any situation which may resemble a state of nature. The very force of their arguments centers on the fact that such social contracts are of lasting permanence and that moral ideals are a result of such a social contract. Thus to say that a new state of nature provides a basis for the entire revamping of a moral structure seems to undermine the whole force of the social contract argument. If social contract is to vary over time and space then I feel that arguing from a contractarian perspective with this position is to defeat one’s own argument.OGAN GUREL ~~ page & ES i ae Finally, in terms of Lécke’s conception of the social contract. he points out that the state of nature "is not a state of 1jéence", and that no man has the "liberty to seoh nineette This is one expression of the idea that in a state of nature there is also a law of mature upon which the social contract is based. Even if we allow a state of nature to exist in this 509 violate this fundamental law of nature. To contend that the explorers were innocent of Wy nurder {8 ludicrous on this account. No law can > conceivably be devised that would justify such a crime © ner such a contract even under the conditions of a state of nature, which in fact does not exist in this The Speluncean explorers are guilty of the crime of murder. 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