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Power Tactics What power tactics do people use to translate power bases into specific action? That is,
what options do individuals have for influencing their bosses, coworkers, or employees? And are some
of these options, more effective than others? In this article, we outline popular tactical options and the
conditions under which one may be more effective than another. Some tactics are usually more
effective than others. Specific evidence indicates that rational persuasion, inspirational appeals, and
consultation tend to be the most effective. On the other hand pressure tends to frequently backfire and
is typically the least effective of few tactics. You can also increase your chance of success by using more
than one type of tactic at the same time or sequentially, as long as your choices are compatible. For
instance, using both ingratiation and legitimacy can lessen the negative reactions that might come from
the appearance of being “dictated to” by the boss.
But some influence tactics work better depending on the direction of influence. Studies have found that
rational persuasion is the only tactic that is effective across organizational levels. Inspirational appeals
works best as a downward influencing tactic with subordinates. When pressure works, it is almost
always to achieve downward influence. And the use of personal appeals and coalition are most effective
with lateral influence attempts.
In addition to the direction of influence, a number of other factors have found to affect which tactics
work best. These include the sequencing of tactics, a person’s skill in using the tactic, a person’s relative
power, the type of request and how the request is perceived, the culture of the organization, and
country-specific cultural factors. Preferred Power Tactics by Influence direction:
Upward influence:
1. Rational Persuasion
Downward influence:
1. Rational Persuasion
2. Inspirational Appeals
3. Pressure
4. Consultation
5. Ingratiation
6. Exchange
7. Legitimacy
Lateral influence:
1. Rational persuasion
2. Consultation
3. Ingratiation
4. Exchange
5. Legitimacy
6. Personal appeals
7. Coalitions
You are more likely to be effective if you begin with “softer” tactics that rely on personal power such as
personal and inspirational appeal, rational persuasion, and consultation. If these fail, you can move to
“harder” tactics which emphasize formal power and involve greater costs and risks such as exchange,
coalitions, and pressure. Interestingly, it has been found that using a single soft tactic is more effective
than a single hard tactic; and that combining two soft tactics, or a soft tactic and rational persuasion, is
more effective than any single tactic or a combination of hard tactics. Studies confirm a tactic is more
likely to be successful if the target perceives it to be a socially acceptable form of influence behavior, if
the target has sufficient attitudes about desirability if the request is used in a skillful way, if it is used for
a request that is legitimate and if it is consistent with the target person’s values and needs. Cultures
within organization differ markedly for example, some are warm relaxed and supportive; others are
formal and conservative. The organizational culture, in which a person works, therefore will have a
bearing on defining which tactics are considered appropriate. Some cultures encourage the use of
participation and consultation, some encourage reasons and still others rely on pressure. So, the
organization itself will influence which subset of power tactics is viewed as acceptable for use. Finally,
evidence indicates that people in different countries tend to prefer different power tactics. For instance,
a study comparing managers in the United States and China found that the Americans perceived reasons
to be most effective, whereas Chinese managers preferred tend to be consistent with the values in these
two countries. Reason is consistent with the preference of Americans for direct confrontation and the
use of rational persuasion to influence others and resolve differences. Similarly, coalition tactics are
consistent with the Chinese preference for using indirect approaches for difficult or controversial
requests.
I've just finished reading "Rules for Radicals" by Saul Alinsky. These tactics seem to be as applicable
today as they were in 1971, when he published the work.
# Power is not only what you have, but what the enemy thinks you have
# The major premise for tactics is the development of operations that will maintain a constant pressure
upon the opposition
# If you push a negative hard and deep enough it will break through into its counterside
2.
* After the september 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, entire airline industry in US faced devasting
lossess.
* South west airlines did not go for layoffs. But also posted profits in the same year.
* How????????????????
3. Points To ponder
* Leadership Styles
4. Leadership styles
* Determines the end and leaves the choice of means to his people.
Authoritative Style
5. Leadership style…
* No suggestions – no considerations
Autocratic Style
6. Leadership style…
Benevolent style
7. Leadership style…
* Aligning employees
Coaching style
8. Leadership style…
* Creates trust
Democratic Style
9.
10. Leadership style… Expert Style Manipulative Style Bureaucratic Style Participative Style
* Leader as an announcer
* Leader as a seller
* Leader as a clarifier
* Leader as a seeker
* Leader as a follower
* Leadership Styles
* Persuasion skills
* Motivational skills
* Leadership tactics
* Consider a situation where a company has to take an important decision about funding a
lucrative yet risky project. …..!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
* How do one ensures high level of enthusiasm and commitment during bad
times?????????................
* Desire to be great
* Motivating by caring
* How????
Take an example of US Marine Corps Who invested time and energy to cultivate strong values,
Encouraging to take up leadership positions Clarity between team and leader
* Motivational lectures, cash incentives, or memos etc … will it motivate all of them????
* Listening
* Questioning
* Communicating
* Mediation skills
27.
Evaluate your boss strength and weakness Evaluate your strength and weakness Build a relationship
& maintain it Communicate, utilize his time prudently
28. Model of effectiveness and influence Setting Agenda Building Network Implementing agenda
29. summary
* Persuasion skills
* Motivational skills
* Leadership tactics
This chapter will not by itself change your view or way of acquiring power and effectively
exercising influence. It does provide an opportunity to think differently about power,
politics and influence, and it can refocus your attention on organizational issues and
problems. For strategic leaders in most organizations the key to successfully
implementing organizational change and improving long term performance rests with
the leader's skill in knowing how to make power dynamics work for the organization,
instead of against it.
POWER IN ORGANIZATIONS
THE POLITICAL FRAME As discussed earlier, Bolman and Deal describe four "frames"
for viewing the world: structural, human resources, political, and symbolic. The political
frame is an excellent tool for examining the concept of organizational politics and makes
a number of assumptions about organizations and what motivates both their actions and
the actions of their decision makers.
The five propositions of the political frame do not attribute organizational politics to
negative, dysfunctional or aggrandizing behavior. They assert that organization
diversity, interdependence, resource scarcity, and power dynamics will inevitably
generate political forces, regardless of the players. Organizational politics cannot be
eliminated or fantasized away. Leaders, however, with a healthy power motive can learn
to understand and manage political processes.
Power and the ability to use it are essential to effective leadership. Strategic leaders
who are uncomfortable with either the presence of great power in others or its use by
themselves are probably going to fail their organizations at some point. The critical
issue is why the leader seeks power and how it is used. Some see power as a tool to
enhance their ability to facilitate the work of their organizations and groups. Others
value power for its own sake, and exercise power for the personal satisfaction it brings.
There can be good and bad in both cases. However, the leader who uses power in the
service of his/her organization is using power in the most constructive sense. The
leader who seeks power for its own sake and for personal satisfaction is at a level of
personal maturity that will compromise his/her ethical position, risk his/her organization's
effectiveness, and perhaps even jeopardize the long-term viability of the
organization(Jacobs 1996).
Power competition exists at two levels. Individuals compete for power within agencies
and organizations; agencies and organizations compete for power within the broader
governmental context. The mechanics of power competition are much the same. In both
cases, power accrues when an individual or an organization achieves control of a
scarce commodity that others need. And in both cases, the operations are essentially
political. Even when compelling physical force is the means, the mechanism is political.
The scarce commodity is the means of inflicting harm on others. So dictators, by hook
or by crook, gain a monopoly on the means for inflicting harm on others. During the
course of the Cold War, the massive build-up of armaments was aimed at maintaining a
"balance of forces" so as to prevent intimidation by either side. Even after Glasnost, the
level of armaments on both sides was carefully negotiated so as to preclude imbalance
that might tempt one side or the other toward risky moves.
So, the political process can be either destructive or constructive, depending on the
resource to be accumulated, the means by which the competitors seek to accumulate it,
and the value that accrues to all competitors by virtue of the competition. (Of
course, competition based on performance, if conducted at such an extreme that human
values or key norms governing competition are violated, may substantially hurt the
organization in the long term).
However, internal politics can also be detrimental in ways not readily apparent. Sub-
units within agencies may develop objectives and goals at odds with those of the
agency. For example, a given "desk" owes its stature in its own agency to the
constituency needs it serves. An extremely important constituency is the nation it
represents within its own agency and with which it deals. The "desk" therefore may find
it valuable to promote the needs of that constituency over the needs of the agency by
"selling" important positions or programs that benefit the constituency-thereby
unwittingly becoming co-opted and increasingly vulnerable to manipulation by that
constituency.
To increase their own influence, agencies in government and other organizations will
provide information, recommend options, and execute directives in ways that enhance
their own self interest. Jefferies illustrates with the decision to send a U-2
reconnaissance aircraft to overfly the Cuban missile sites. The decision to send the U-2
was actually made 10 days before the flight occurred, but the implementation was
delayed by the CIA-USAF struggle for the mission. The CIA defined the mission as
intelligence gathering and advanced the argument that it had a better U-2 than did the
USAF. The USAF was concerned that the pilot be in uniform to avoid repetition of the
Gary Powers crisis if the aircraft was shot down. (The total mission delay came from five
days to make the decision and five days to train an Air Force pilot to fly CIA U-2s.)
Because key leaders who form the centralized circle at the top of the policy making
apparatus have different viewpoints, particularly with something as uncertain as
strategic policy, they are obligated to fight for what they consider right. Thus, decision
making is not a unitary process, but also "a process of individuals in politics reacting to
their own perceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals" (Jefferies 1992).
Because the scope and scale are too great for one person to master, the president must
persuade in order to develop the consensus required for broad support of decision
outcomes. (Those who wind up executing must be product champions for these
decisions, or they are not likely to implement them.) The president is also open to
persuasion, because the various branches or agencies may also build power bases
outside government or outside the executive branch.
While our focus has been on establishing a legitimate context for understanding
organizational politics, a countervailing view to the political frame is the rational frame of
organizational decision making
THE RATIONAL FRAME. By definition, rational processes are different from political
processes. Rational decisions rest heavily on analytic process. An analytic process can
be defined as one in which there are agreed-upon methods for generating alternative
solutions to problems, and for assigning values to the benefits and costs expected from
each of the alternatives. And sophisticated computational methods are readily available
for calculating benefits/costs ratios once these values are assigned. The essence of
rational process is the belief that, "All good persons, given the same information, will
come to the same conclusion." Those seeking to employ the rational process to the
exclusion of political process thus seek open communication, perhaps through more
than just formal (vertical) organizational channels.
The rapid expansion of electronic mail systems that permits anyone in an organization
to address anyone else probably rests on a rationality premise-that transcending
organizational channels by allowing all members to address directly even the highest
official will give that official more complete information and thus enable higher quality
decisions. This is very difficult for some people to understand especially those with
narcissistic power needs and maturity issues. There is also a trust assumption: that
members can be trusted not to abuse the privilege and that high officials will not misuse
the information. A political process would view valuable information as a commodity to
be traded for influence (Jacobs).
There is another important difference between rational and political views of appropriate
operations both within and between organizations. The political frame does not depend
on trust between persons. In the preceding example, both trust assumptions would be
discounted as unrealistic. Trust in the probable future actions of coalition members is
based on perception of gain to be expected from not violating agreements on which a
coalition is based, for example. The intrinsic morality of being trustworthy is not
particularly useful as a concept.
The National Security Strategy apparatus exists to support the formulation of policy and
implementing strategy and thus presidential decision making. George writes insightfully
about both the demands of these processes, and obstacles to their effective operation-
particularly those attributable to bureaucratic politics. He comments that political
scientists of an earlier generation "were intrigued by the possibility that an overburdened
executive might be able to divide his overall responsibilities into a set of more
manageable subtasks to be assigned to specialized units of the organization. It was
hoped and expected that division of labor and specialization within the organization,
coupled with central direction and coordination, would enable the modern executive to
achieve the ideal of 'rationality' in policy making." He goes on to say that this hope has
not been realized because: Some problems of large scale are not amenable to
fragmentation.
As an example, the task of central coordination and direction of foreign policy making
has gotten steadily worse as the range, complexity, and scope of foreign policy
problems has increased. The distinction between foreign and domestic policy has also
eroded. George illustrates by noting that the deployment of US troops in Europe has
implications for defense posture (DOD), balance of payments (Treasury), and U.S.
relations with foreign nations (State). Such problems must be approached from a
broader, holistic viewpoint, and there must be interaction among representatives of
agencies with diverse viewpoints. This is prevented, however, by power competition
within organizations, and between organizations and agencies within the government.
As Jefferies puts it, individuals play politics within organizations, and organizations play
the political game within the broader context.
Rationalist guidelines for good policy making would include something like the following
(George): get all the information needed for incisive and valid diagnosis of the
proble/situation; identify all dimensions of value complexity so there can be balanced
consideration of value priorities; identify a broad range of alternatives, considering
uncertainties; take into account the policy implementation factor; and arrange for
feedback information. In a politicized structure, the dynamics of organizational politics
impacts all of these by giving a "win-lose" flavor to information-giving and position
advancement. Thus, mixing organizational politics with a rational decision making
process will likely lead to the following consequences:
Each actor acquires information on its own policy issues and not those of others,
thereby denying full, balanced information flow to the decision maker.
Its own parochial interests and goals shape each actor's participation in
identification and evaluation of policy options.
Oversimplification and rhetorical exaggeration distort policy debate (overstate
benefits of own position and risks of opponents' positions).
Actors use their own bargaining advantage to manipulate the flow of advice to
influence the executive's choice of policy.
Actors may arrange compromises (logrolling deals) among themselves to avoid
presidential decisions that might be damaging to their perceived interests,
thereby keeping policy issues from rising to the presidential level.
Actors may seek to avoid an area, in order to avoid responsibility for it.
Actors rely on policy routines and SOP that were previously developed, but which
may not be appropriate for novel problems.
Actors may be prevented from dealing incisively with foreign-policy issues by the
time, energy, and attention expended on internal politics.
A number of authors writing in Strivastva's Executive Power (1992) argue that power at
the strategic organization level is manifested and executed through three fundamental
elements: consensus, cooperation, and culture.
"An organization is high in consensus potential when it has the capacity to synthesize
the commitment of multiple constituencies and stakeholders in response to specific
challenges and aspirations." In this area, strategic leader power is derived from the
management of ideas, the management of agreement, and the management of group
and team decision making processes.
Jacobs' seminal work of general officer job requirements can be linked to the above
conceptual requirements for successfully acquiring and managing strategic leader
power potential. His study of the work environment of general officers provides a
context for looking at strategic performance requirements. He found three job demands
consistently reported by the survey respondents. They were long-term vision,
consensus building, and command team building.
Although the road to power is open to those who wish to travel it, not all will distinguish
themselves as master practitioners. What skills and attributes distinguish those strategic
leaders who use power effectively from those who do not?
High energy and physical endurance is the ability and motivation to work long
and often times grueling hours. Absent this attribute other skills and
characteristics may not be of much value.
Directing energy is the ability and skill to focus on a clear objective and to
subordinate other interests to that objective. Attention to small details embedded
in the objective is critical for getting things done.
Successfully reading the behavior of others is the ability and skill to understand
who are the key players, their positions and what strategy to follow in
communicating with and influencing them. Equally essential in using this skill is
correctly assessing their willingness or resistance to following the Strategic
Leader's direction.
Adaptability and flexibility is the ability and skill to modify one's behavior. This
skill requires the capacity to re-direct energy, abandon a course of action that is
not working, and manage emotional or ego concerns in the situation.
Motivation to engage and confront conflict is the ability and skill to deal with
conflict in order to get done what you want accomplished. The willingness to take
on the tough issues and challenges and execute a successful strategic decision
is a source of power in any organization.
Subordinating one's ego is the ability and skill to submerge one's ego for the
collective good of the team or organization. Possessing this attribute is related to
the characteristics of adaptability and flexibility. Depending on the situation and
players, by exercising discipline and restraint an opportunity may be present to
generate greater power and resources in a future scenario.
The skills and attributes identified in the ICAF Strategic Leader Development Inventory
are relevant not only to the work of strategic leaders but may contribute to the their
overall capacity to acquire and use power effectively. These skills and attributes are
grouped as conceptual skills and attributes and positive attributes.
Understanding the character of strategic leader power and the requisite personal
attributes and skills sets the stage for employing power effectively. We need to know
more than the conceptual elements that constitute power in organizations at the
strategic level. But, we need to know the strategies of how to use power effectively
and to get things done.
The acquisition and use of strategic leader power involves managing a sequential
process that is described below:
1. The first task is to decide what it is the leader is trying to achieve that
necessitates the use of power.
2. With the goal in mind, the leader must assess the patterns of dependence and
interdependence among the key players and determine to what extent he or she
will be successful in influencing their behavior. It is critical that the leader develop
power and influence when the key players have expressed a differing point of view. It is
important to remember there is more interdependence at the strategic level of the
organization where task accomplishment is more complex.
3. Getting things done means the leader should "draw" a political map of the terrain
that shows the relative power of the various players to fully understand the
patterns of dependence and interdependence. This involves mapping the critical
organization units and sub-units and assessing their power bases. This step is very
important because a leader needs to
determine how much power these units have to
leverage influence either in support or opposition to
their effort. For example, if a leader is proposing to
introduce a consensus team decision making
process in a joint interdependent environment, this
implementation decision could change power
relationships among the players. In this case, the
leader needs to know the opposing players and the depth of their power bases. This
move will likely require the mobilization of allies and the neutralization of resisters.
6. Recognizing the need for multiple power bases and developing them is not enough.
The strategic leader must have an arsenal of influence strategies and tactics that
convert power and influence into concrete and visible results. Research on
strategies and tactics for employing power effectively suggests the following range of
influence tactics: (Allen, 1979, Bennis and Nanus, 1985, Blau, 1964, Kotter, 1985, 1978,
Pfeffer, 1992, 1981, Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977)
This chapter has addressed what strategies and tactics are required for leading with
power at the highest organizational level. In a micro context, it is about managing
power, which translates as being personally effective in knowing how to get things done
and having the political will to do so. At a macro level, it means coping effectively with
the strategic environment and dealing with innovation and organizational change.
In a general sense power is lost because organizations change and leaders don't.
Organizational dynamics create complex conditions and different decision situations
that require innovative and creative approaches, new skill sets and new dependent and
interdependent relationships. Leaders who have learned to do things a specific way
become committed to predictable choices and decision actions. They remain bonded
and loyal to highly developed social networks and friendships, failing to recognize the
need for change, let alone allocating the political will to accomplish it. Ultimately, power
may be lost because of negative personal attributes that diminish a leader's capacity to
lead with power effectively. The SLDI identifies a number of negative attributes that
when linked to certain organizational dynamics will generate potential loss of power:
CONCLUSIONS
What are the key learning points in this chapter and what are the practical implications
for strategic leaders and decision makers. Pfeffer has described learning about power
most succinctly: "it is one thing to understand power--how to diagnose it, what are its
sources, what are the strategies and tactics for its use, and how it is lost. It is quite
another thing to use that knowledge in the world at large...In corporations, public
agencies, universities, and government, the problem is how to get things done, how to
move forward, how to solve the many problems facing organizations of all sizes and
types. Developing and exercising power require having both will and skill. It is the will
that often seems to be missing."
Practical Implications
1. POWER IS NOT AMERICA'S LAST DIRTY WORD. THE EXISTENCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS IS A REALITY TO MOST
ORGANIZATIONS AND SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIC LEADERS MUST BE GOOD POLITICIANS.
2. IN LARGE, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS WITH MORE CENTRALIZED CONTROL AND INSTITUTIONALIZED POWER, THE SKILLS
OF USING POWER AND INFLUENCE ARE CRITICAL TO GETTING CHANGE ACCOMPLISHED.
3. IT IS CRITICAL TO RECOGNIZE THAT IN ALMOST EVERY ORGANIZATION, THERE ARE CLUSTERS OF INTERESTS, AND
LEADERS NEED TO UNDERSTAND WHERE THEY ARE LOCATED AND WHAT ISSUES ARE OF CONCERN TO THEM.
4. LEADING AND MANAGING WITH POWER TAKES TIME, ENERGY AND EFFORT.
5. INNOVATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE ALMOST INEVITABLY THREATENS THE STATUS QUO. CONSEQUENTLY,
IMPLEMENTING NEW IDEAS REQUIRES DEVELOPING POLITICAL WILL AND THE SKILLFUL USE OF POWER AND INFLUENCE.
6. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE FREQUENTLY CREATES ORGANIZATIONAL ALIGNMENTS THAT CAUSE THOSE IN POWER TO
LOSE THAT POWER.
7. EMPLOYING POWER AND INFLUENCE TACTICS AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL IS MORE ABOUT METHOD AND PROCESS THAN
EXERCISING FORMAL AUTHORITY.
8. THE USE OF POWER GOES BEYOND EXERCISING FORMAL AUTHORITY. IT REQUIRES BUILDING AND MAINTAINING A
REPUTATION FOR BEING EFFECTIVE AND IT NECESSITATES THE SKILL IN GETTING THINGS DONE.
9. IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE ABLE TO RECOGNIZE AND ASSESS THE ORGANIZATION CONTEXT OF POWER IF IDEAS AND PLANS
ARE TO BE IMPLEMENTED EFFECTIVELY.
10. TO BE EFFECTIVE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS, IT IS CRITICAL TO KNOW HOW TO DEVELOP SOURCES OF POWER
AND HOW TO EMPLOY THAT POWER STRATEGICALLY AND TACTICALLY.
11. IT'S IMPORTANT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE MOST CRITICAL SOURCES OF POWER ARE PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES OR
LOCATION IN THE ORGANIZATION.
12. IN EVALUATING PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES AS EFFECTIVE SOURCES OF POWER, THE KEY QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER THEY
ARE ATTRACTIVE OR UNATTRACTIVE, BUT WHETHER THEY ARE USEFUL.
13. IT IS IMPORTANT TO HAVE MULTIPLE BASES OF POWER TO TRANSLATE INFLUENCE TACTICS INTO CONCRETE RESULTS.