9

RESIGNATION

We older represemauves o f that for which the name Frankfur t School

has established itself have recently had the reproach of resignation
levelled against us. We had , it is stated , developed elements of a critical
th eor y of society. but we wer e not prepared to draw the practical
conseq ue nces from this theo ry. We neither design ed programmes for
action nor did we suppo rt the action s of those wh o felt themselves
inspired by critical theory. I shall Sidestep the question whether this
demand can be mad e OI l all upon th eoreti cal think ers who always
remain to a certain degree sensitive and by no means unshakable
instruments. The task assigned suc h indi viduals within a soc iety c har-
acterized by the divisio n ofl abo ur might indeed be qu estionable; they
themselves might well be defo rm ed by it. But they have also been
formed by it. And there is 110 way in whi ch they can rep eal that wh ich
th ey have become merely through an act of their own will. I sho uld not
want to deny the impulse of subjective weakness inh erent in the con -
finement to theo ry. The ob jection raised against us can be stated
approximately in th ese wo rds; a perso n wh o in the present hour doubts
th e possibilit y of radical c hange in society and wh o for that reason
neither takes par t in no r recommends spectacular. violent action is
guilt y of resignation. He does not conside r th e vision of change wh ich
he o nce held capable of realization : indeed. he actua lly had no tru e
 R ESIGNA TI ON 199

desire to see it realized in the first place. In leaving conditions as they

are, he offers his tacit approval of th em.
Distance from praxis is disrep utable in the eyes of everyone. Anyone
who doe s not take immediate actio n and who is not willing to get his
hands dirty is the subject of suspicion; it is felt that his antipathy
toward such action was nOI legitimate, and furth er that his view has
even been disto rted by the privilege s he enjoys. Distrust o f those who
distru st praxis extends from those o n the opposite side, who rep eat the
old slogan , 'We've had eno ugh of talking ' all the way to the objective
spirit of advertisi ng, which propagates the picture it's called Leirblld or
'image as moti f ' - of the actively involved human being, no matter
whet her his activity lies in the realm of econ omi cs or athleti cs. One
sho uld take part . whoever restricts himself to thinking bur doe s not get
involved is weak, cowardly and virtuall y a traitor, This hostile cliche on
the intellectual is to be encountered with deep roots wit hin that branch
of the opposnton that is in turn reviled as intellectu al without any
awareness thereof on their part. Thin king activists answer; among the
things to be changed is that very separation of theory and praxis. Praxis
is essential if we are ever to be libera ted from the domination o f prac-
tical peopl e and practical ideals. The trou ble with this view is that it
results in the pro hib ition of thi nking. Very little is needed to turn the
resistance against repression repressively against those who - little as
they might wish to glorify their state of being - do not desert the
standpoint that they have com e to occupy. The often -evoked unity of
theory and praxis has a tendency to give way to the pred ominance of
praxis. Numero us views define theory itself as a form o f repre ssion - as
though praxis did not stand in a far more di rect relatio nsh ip to repr es-
sion, For Marx, the dogma of this unity was anim ated by the immanent
possibility of action which even then was no t 10 be realized. Today it is
rather the opposite situation that prevails. One clings to action because
of the imposstbtlnv of action . But Marx himself reve als a concealed
wound in this regard. He no doubt delivered the eleventh thesis on
Feue rbach in suc h an author itarian fashion because he was not at all
sure of it him self. In his youth he had demanded the 'ruthless criticism
of everything that exists' . Now he mocked criticism. But his famou s
joke about the Young Hegelians, his coinage 'critical criticism' , was a
dud and went up in sm oke as nothing but a tautol ogy . The for ced
200 T H E CUL TU RE I NDUST RY

precedence o f praxis brought the criticism which Marx himself prac-

tised to an irrational hall. In Russia and in the o rthodoxy of othe r
countries. the malicio us mocker y of critical criticism became the
instrument that permitted the status quo to establish itself in such
horrifying fashion , The only meaning that praxis retained was this:
increased production of the means of production . The only criticism
still tolerated was that people still were not wor king hard enough. This
demon strates how easily the subo rdination o f theory to praxis results
in the suppo rt of renewed repr ession.
Repressive intolerance toward a thought not immediately accom -
panied by instru ction s for action is founded in fear. Unmantpulared
th ought and the position that allows nothing to be deduced from this
though t must be feared because that w hich cann ot be admitted is
perfectly clear: this thought is right. An aged bo ur geois mechani sm
with which the men of the Enligh tenment of the eigh teent h cent ury
were very familiar displays itself anew bur unchanged: s uffering caused
by a negative co ndition - in this case by obstructed reality - turn s into
anger towa rd the person wh o expr esses it. Thought. enlig htenment
cons cious o f uself thr eatens to disenchant pseudo-reality within
whi ch. accordi ng to Haberma s' form ulation . activism moves. This
activism is tolerated only because it is viewed as pseudo-activity .
Pseudo -activity is allied with pseudo-reality in the deSign of a sub ject-
ive position : an activit y that overplays itself and fires itself up for the
sake of its own publi city with out admitting to wha t degree it serves as a
substitute for satisfaction . thus elevating itself to ail end in itself All
tho se behind bars are despondent in their desire to be released. In suc h
situations on e no longer thi nks o r thin ks onl y in fictive postulates.
Within abscluuzed praxis. unly reaction is possible and for this reason
the reaction is false. Only thinking co uld offer an escape. and then only
that thinking, the results of whi ch are not prescribed - as is so fre-
qu en tly the case in those discussion s in whi ch it is predetermined who
is right and wh ich therefore do not advance the cause - but rather
degenerate wit hout fail into tactics. Whe n the doors are barricaded . it
is doubly important that thought nor be iruerrupted.It is rather the task
of thought to analyse the reason s behind this situation and to draw the
conseque nces from these reasons . It is the respon sibility of though t not
10 accept th e situ ation as finite. jf there is any chance of changing the
 RESIGNATION 201

situ atio n, it is only through undiminished insight. The leap into praxis
will nOI cure thought from resignation as long as it is paid for with the
secret knowled ge that th is course is simply no t the right one.
Genera lly speakin g, pseudo-a ctivity is the attemp t to preserve
enclaves of imm ediacy in the midst o f a thoroughly mediated and
obd urate society. This process is rationali zed throu gh the acceptance
of any small change as one step on the long way towa rd total change.
The unfortunate mod el for pseud o-activity is the 'd o-it-you rself '
syndro me - activities that do that wh ich has long been done better
through the means of industr ial produ ction and wh ich arou se in
unfree individuals, hamp ered in their spo ntaneity. the confide nt
feeling that they are of central concern. The non sense of the 'do -it-
yourself' approa ch to the production of material good s and in the
making o f many repair s is eq ually obvious, However, it is not total. In
view o f the reduction o f so -called services - sometimes su perfluo us in
term s of techni cal standards measures taken by a private person fulfil
a semi-rational pur pose. In politics. however. the 'd o-it-you rself" atti-
tude is not of quite the same character. The society that confronts
human being s in suc h an im penetrable mann er is these humans
themselves. Confid ence in the limit ed action of small group s is
reminiscent of the spo ntaneity whi ch atrop hi es beneath th e encrusted
totalit y and without which this totalit y cann ot be transform ed into
something different . The administered world has a tendency to
strangle all spo ntane ity or at least to ch anne l it into pseudo- activity.
This. however, is not ach ieved so totally wi tho ut difficulty as the agents
of the administered world wou ld like to imagine. Nonetheless, spo n-
taneit y is not to be absolut ized - just as little as it is to be separated
from the objective situatio n and idoli zed in the same mann er as is the
administered world itself. Orherwtse the axe will break down the next
door in the hou se - a process wh ich never spares the carpe nter - and
th e riot squad will appear on the spo t. Political acts of violence can also
sink to the level of pseud o-activity, resulting in mere theatr e. It is
hardl y a wond er that the ideal of direct action and propaganda
glorifying the deed have been resurr ected, upon the heels of the will-
ing integration of for merly progre ssive organ izations that, in all lands
of the earth , manifest the chara cter of that against wh ich th ey were
once dir ected . Th is process . ho wever. has nor weakened the criticism of
202 T H E CUL TU RE I NDUST RY

anarchism, the return of whi ch is the return of a ghost. The impatience

toward theory manifested in this return does nothing to advance
th ought beyond itself. Theory falls beh ind the thought wh ich it forgets .
For the indiv idual . life is mad e easier through capitulation to the
collective wi th whi ch he ident ifies. He is spared the cognitio n of his
impoten ce; wit hin the circle of their own co mpany. the few beco me
man y. It is this act - no t unconfused thinking - wh ich is resignation .
No tran sparent relation prevails between the interests of the ego and
the collective to wh ich it assign s itself The ego must abrogat e itself. if tt
is to share in the predestinati on of the collective. Explicitly a remnant of
th e Kanuan categorical imperative rnanifesl5 itself: your signature is
req uired. The feeling of a new secur ity is purchased wit h the sacrifice
of autonomou s thin king. The consolation that thought withi n the con-
text o f co llective acuon is an improvem ent proves deceptive: thinking.
em ployed only as the tnsrrumen t of action. is blunted in the same
mann er as all instrumental reason. At the present moment . no higher
form of society is concre tely visible: for that reason, anything that
seems in easy reach is regressive. According to Freud, however. who-
ever regresses has not achie ved the goal of his dr ives. Objectively
viewed . reformation is renun ciation . even if it conside rs itself the
opposite and inn ocently propagates the pleasure principle.
In contrast, the uncompromi singly criti cal think er. wh o neith er
superscribes his co nscie nce nor permits himself to be terrorized into
action, is in truth the one who does not give up. Furthermore, thin king
is not the spiritual reproducti on o f that which exists. As long as think -
ing is not interrupted, it has a firm grasp upon possfbiln y. Its insatiable
quali ty. the resistance against pett y satiety, rejects the foolish wisdom
of resiguatlon . The Utopian impulse in thinking is all the Stro nger, the
less it objectifies itself as Utopi a - a furth er form of regression -
wh ereby it sabo tages its own realization. Ope n think ing points beyond
itself, For its part, such thinking takes a position as a figuration of praxis
which is mor e closely related to a prax is truly involved in change than
in a position of mere obedience for the sake of praxis. Beyond all
specialized and parti cular content . thinking is armally and above all the
for ce of resistance, alienated from resistance o nly with grea t effort . Th is
emphatic con cept of thinki ng is by no means secure; no secur ity is
granted it by existing condinons nor by the ends yet to be attained nor
 RESIGNATION 203
by any type of organized force. Whate ver was once thought. however,
can be sup pressed: it can be forgonen and can even vanish. But it
cannot be de nied that something of it surv ives. For th inking has the
mom entum of the gen eral. What has been cogently thought mu st be
thou ght in some other place and by othe r people. This confide nce
accom panies even the lon eliest and mos t im potent thou ght. W hoever
thin ks is with out anger in all cnticism;' thinking sublimates anger.
Because the thinking pcrson doe s not have to inflict anger upon him -
self, he furth erm o re has no desire to inflict it upon othe rs. The happi -
ness visible to the eye of a thinker is the happiness of mankind. The
universal tend ency toward suppression goes against thought as such .
Such thought is happ iness. even where unhappiness pr evails; thought
achi eves happiness in the expr ession of unhappiness. Wh oever refuses
to permit this thought to he taken from him has not resign ed .

NOTE
This sentence was recently used in DerSpiegel {1977. 4J as the head line
for a brief article on the relation s hip of the Frankfurt School to terror as recently
manifested in the German Federal Republic.