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COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139853
FACTS
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to decide on the case.
HELD
The SC has ruled in previous cases that the COMELEC, sitting en banc,
does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases
including pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance. This
power pertains to the divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the
Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first
instance is null and void. In the SC’s view, the authority to resolve
petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest, like
the questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division of the
COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc.
2. AQUINO vs. COMELEC
(248 SCRA 400)
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
Facts
During the canvass of the election return of Precinct No. 16A, counsel
for petitioner objected to the inclusion of the election return on the
ground that the same was allegedly prepared under duress, force or
intimidation, or was prepared by persons other than the Board of
Election Inspectors (BEI) concerned.
The MBC deferred the proclamation of the winning candidate for the
position of Municipal Mayor because it contended that the contested
election return from Precinct No. 16A would affect the result of the
election for the position. To speedily settle and put an end to the
controversy reconstitution of the MBC with new members, to, among
others, determine if the identity and integrity of the said ballot box and
the ballots contained therein were not violated; and, proceed to
recount the votes of the candidates affected and prepare a new
election return for the said precinct; and then canvass the said return
and proclaim the winning candidate/s; or
During the examination of the election return, the MBC found that the
integrity of the ballot box was violated as it was left unattended and
was never delivered to its proper custodian. The ballots were not also
placed in properly sealed or placed in enveloped prepared by Comelec.
Issues:
Ruling:
Facts:
Petitioner Trinidad won the May 1995 elections. Private respondent
Sunga filed a disqualification case against petitioner and asking the
COMELEC to proclaim him as the duly elected mayor. COMELEC
promulgated it decision on June 22, 1998, disqualifying Trinidad.
Petitioner filed a Motion For Reconsideration claiming that he was
deprived of due process. Petitioner was again proclaimed winner in the
May 1998 elections. On October 13, 1998 COMELEC denied petitioner’s
MR as well as annulling his proclamation as elected mayor.
Issues:
HELD
1. NO. Petitioner was able to file an Answer with Counter Petition and
Motion to Dismiss. He was also able to submit his counter-affidavit and
sworn statements of forty-eight witnesses. He was also given a chance
to explain in his Motion for Reconsideration. He was afforded an
opportunity to be heard, through his pleadings, therefore, there is no
denial of procedural due process.
Facts:
Issue:
WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:
(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to
R.A. 6645.
HELD:
(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special
election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after
the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the
giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will
render the election a nullity.
(2) There is no basis in the petitioners’ claim that the manner by which
the COMELEC conducted the special Senatorial election on May 14,
2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately
the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special
election. No such requirement exists in our election laws. What is
mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC “fix the
date of election,” if necessary, and state among others, the office/s to
be voted for.
6. Taule vs Santos
August 12, 1991
G. R. No. 90336
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of the resolutions of
respondent Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for
being null and void.
Facts:
Issues:
2. Yes. The Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under
Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of
the sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-
governor, elective members of the said sanggunian, etc. He acted
as the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan. As
presiding officer, he has an interest in the election of the officers
of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the
assembly. If said member assumes his place under questionable
circumstances, the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as
to their validity or legality. Therefore, respondent governor is a
proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the
officers of the FABC.
The election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and
void for not complying with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09.
DLG Circular No. 89-09 provides that “the incumbent FABC President or
the Vice-President shall preside over the reorganizational meeting,
there being a quorum.” It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC
President nor the Vice-President presided over the meeting and
elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of
Election Supervisors/Consultants. Therefore, there was a clear violation
of the said mandatory provision.
* Pending resolution, petitioner also filed a supplemental petition
alleging that public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his
memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio,
despite him being absent on said election. The Secretary of Local
Government has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet
the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of
barangay councils.
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
Issue:
Held:
Facts:
The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the Office of
Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as Independent this coming January 30,
1980 local election. He filed his certificate of candidacy with the
Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980 because of the
news in the Bulletin Today. The said news stated that the respondent
COMELEC issued a resolution for the extension of time for filing COC.
However, the President denied said resolution. Therefore, respondent
COMELEC informed the petitioner that his name might not be included
in the list of candidates for mayor because of the said incident. Thus,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Held:
This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition.
Having been filed beyond January 4, 1980, the certificate of candidacy
of the petitioner is void.
December 1, 2009
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for
issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their
certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions.
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
No. Sec. 4(a) of the COMELEC Resolution is null and void for being
violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad. Sec.
13(par. 3) of R.A. 9369 & Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code were
also declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use
of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to
wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. and
discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the
discharge of official duty would be motivated by political
considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is
also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the
electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or
inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be
attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. In
considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned
from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as
resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law
unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions
and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential
treatment. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should
be germane to the purposes of the law.
Facts:
Salcedo married Celiz, marriage contract issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Ajuy, Iloilo. Without his first marriage having been
dissolved, Salcedo married private respondent Cacao in a civil
ceremony. Two days later, Ermelita Cacao contracted another
marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre, marriage certificate filed with
the Office of the Civil Registrar.
Issue:
Whether or not the use by respondent of the surname “Salcedo” in her
certificate of candidacy constitutes material misrepresentation under
Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Held:
Facts:
Issues:
Held:
Facts:
Dissatisfied with the result, petitioner filed with the COMELEC on May
1998, a Petition to Declare Failure of Elections and/or For Annulment of
Elections, alleging that said election was replete with election offenses,
such as vote buying and flying voters. He also alleged that numerous
Election Returns pertaining to the position of Vice-Mayor in the City of
Parañaque appear to be altered, falsified or fabricated.
In fact, there were people arrested who admitted the said election
offenses. Therefore, the incidents were sufficient to declare a failure of
elections because it cannot be considered as the true will of the
people.
Thus, this petition for certiorari alleging that the respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for dismissing his petition motu propio without any basis
whatsoever and without giving him the benefit of a hearing.
Issues:
Held:
the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes;
the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or
after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
The instances being not present in the petition of Mr. Banaga, Jr. The
respondent COMELEC have no other recourse but to dismiss the
petition.
Issue:
Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-
Mayor.
Held:
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national
by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a
person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of
jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he
is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the
citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual
citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign
countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the
Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those
who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to
have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other
hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship
is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
Issue: Whether or not Talaga has served as Mayor of Lucena City for
three consecutive terms.
Held:
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served
three consecutive terms in an elective local office. He must also have
been elected to the same position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply.
In the case at bar, Talaga did not serve for 3 consecutive terms. For
nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his
mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
“If one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of
another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered
one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms
allowed”—this comment of Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Bernas
applies only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike
government officials, there is no recall election for members of
Congress.
Facts:
In the 2004 election, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) was
proclaimed the duly elected President of the Philippines. The
second-placer in the elections, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed an
election protest before the Electoral Tribunal. When the
Protestant died in the course of his medical treatment, his widow,
Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe a.k.a. Susan Roces filed a motion to
intervene as a substitute for deceased protestant FPJ. She claims
that there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for
her late husband to ascertain the true and genuine will of the
electorate in the interest of the Filipino people. The Protestee,
GMA asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the
proper party to replace the deceased protestant since a public
office is personal and not a property that passes on to the heirs.
Protestee also contends that under the Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, only the registered candidates who obtained
the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for the presidency may contest the
election of the president.
Issue:
May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died
during the pendency of the latter’s protest case?
Held:
Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President
of the Philippines who received the second or third highest
number of votes may contest the election of the President or the
Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition
with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty
(30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
An election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the
protestant or to the protestee, hence, substitution and
intervention is allowed but only by a real party in interest. Note
that Mrs. FPJ herself denies any claim to the office of President
but rather stresses that it is with the “paramount public interest”
in mind that she desires “to pursue the process” commenced by
her late husband. However, nobility of intention is not the point of
reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an
election protest. In such intervention, the interest which allows a
person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigation
and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor
will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this
protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit from
the outcome should it be determined that the declared president
did not truly get the highest number of votes.
17. ADIONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
FACTS:
It is unlawful:…
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election
propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or
stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or
billboards…
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and
stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or
publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD:
The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of
Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that "decals and
stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas
provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and
VOID. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on
"mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas
provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional
grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental
right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III).
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned
prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party.
The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his
preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree
with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and
as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as
to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a
privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so
loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the
privacy of one's living room or bedroom.) In consequence of this
prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would
be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
(The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation
but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of
justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally
convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
Eleven petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of
BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986
(snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the
Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the
President to continue holding office after the calling of the special
election.
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the
cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually
resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the
Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have
not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor
repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that
President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair
and honest.
ISSUE:
Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore
stop and prohibit the holding of the elections?
HELD:
The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the
issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the
election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the
required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not
issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political
question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned
constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the
President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the people in
their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no
issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the
way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the
incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.
20. Salva v. Makalintal
GR No. 132603
18 September 2000
FACTS:
ISSUES:
W/N the trial court had jurisdiction to enjoin the COMELEC from
IUmplementing Resolution No. 2987.
HELD:
YES. Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the
required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions but merely
as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said
resolution may not be deemed as a final order reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question
pertaining to the validity of said resolution may well be taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial
courts
The powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the COMELEC
may either be classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative and
sometimes ministerial in character