Savings clauses and the meaning of the phrase "acceptable in a democratic society" - a comparative study

Andre E A M Thomashauscn, Jin>t-!M~ lnstitute ,J_r F(lrri:(n ,wd Compat'arjpt' Lsn«, Uni~Irr.~r/y (~fS[lulh A .. tril:!l

The 1 lrn itarion issue

Dec lar ation s, c h.l rters 0 r ot h cr legal instrurnents purporting to Ie-gall}' protect and enforce human or fundamental and politica t T i gh ts, b a ve one cliffi cult y in COrnman: that of defjnin~ (i) the scope or the- reach of any particular human or fundarncntal eight, and (ii) the permissible limi tat ions -0 f Or encroach men ts L1 pon su ch a rig hi in the i ndi vid ua I cas ~ or under 5 peci a I ci rcu m ~ ta n res,

This problem is the one most crucial issue of the entire human or fundamental ri g h ~~ de- bate _ As su ch, it was recogni zed. bu t also rn i sunde rs rood, in S au rh A fri ca, in the Second report ~f ,Itt' Constitutional Commiuee oj the President'« Council LlH the adaptation of nmS"ti!l~tiotwl structures il"l South A tn'ca of December 1982:l

9_27.2 Even if agreement were to bereached on the- a ppr-oac h to the form ula rion I th eo form ula tion i tse If p resen ts a host of problems. for example, a ri~ht which is gu.:.rantccd may prejudice the righ ts of others. 1\ bso lu reo- freedom of speech W culd inc I u de the Un.3 cccp ta blc righ [ to dcfa rna lion, The ri gh t to in ~ viola bilit y of life woul d pre-judice the tight to impose (he death penalty. Eva y ri ght is therefore I irmted by

i. rc 41198:2 '75

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sornc other right Or obligarion, and (be precise- furm~d;'Hlon of Lrignt5' and 'limits" presents problems,

9.27.5 Even a concept such as LaU perSOns are equal before the [a w' presents problems because the law itself draws a distinction between, for example, the sc xes and person ~ of different ages (puberry, minority. the right to marry).

The passag e revea Is a tragic m isundcrs tandin g of h u man rights la Vi.' _ Qu i tc 0 bv iousl V" ~ and as. .il mar tcr of trite: I a W wOTld~widc, individual human rights are never absolute, To suggest that the fund amen ta 1 rig h t of I' cqua 1 trea tm eon [ before the law" would demand that minors not be dis. ringu ished from adu 1 t ~1 WOU td give this right an absurd interpretation C(lntrLl sensu, w hi eli is generall y prohi bited in Jaw and logic. "Equal treatment be-forethe lawn means no more and no less than tb at an things equal mo st be treated equall Y I and all things un cqu al must be

treated unequally. Or. to take the other exam pie :il rgued by the p resid en e s counell at the rime, freedom of speech can exist and opera re on I y to l he extent tha t it docs not interfere with other rights of the same tundarnenral nature. including the same ft'e'edorn 0 f s peech 0 for h [,:'1" persons, There are basically three rechniques to define the- scope of ,:my particular human or fu nda men ral ri gh t, an d to deterrn inc rhe permissible individual as well ;;JS spec iJ I lim i ra tions.

First, the interpretation method. which has its origins in Germ:ln constitutional l:a w. and which takes as ,1 point of de-parture ~ general presumption in {:lv-our of the maximum possible indi vidual freedom. Any limitation of a right must interfcre in the least possible mariner with the ~'_"TI cral presu m ption of fret'da rn, which is determined by J ppliration of rhr.: so-called principle of proportionality, which includes the balancing and best possible harmonisation of an y conflicting f u nda men t ill righ rs, ~

Secondly, the method of balancing rights ;J nd feci prorJ: I d u tie'S I which had its origi n in cast E uropc a n consti tu tional law ~ but has reccntlv been re-de-lim;d in the A [ric-an Charrc; on Human and Peoples' Rights.

Thirdly. the Angio-Atnc-ric:m semantic method, which provides for conditional limiraricn powers, the most popular being the power to limit a human or funds men till ti~ n t a 5 an d w hen <I neccsS':ilrY in J. dcrn ocr J ti c so ciet y" . J

W~ shall concentrate mainly on rhe latter method, which has also b·e~n propose-d with slight variations, by the Sourh Afri-

C'~ n La w Co m miss ion in its Work ing pap er 25_ Projea 58: Croup ~mi human rights.

Origin5 of the cla use j,i in a democratic society"

The condition "in ::l. democratic society" was introduced into human Tights law by the United NJtion~ General Asscrnbl y Res QI uti on on a Un i vers al Dec la ration 0 ( Human Rights of 10 December 1948, The res olu tion uses th eo con d irion "i n a democratic society" in its single provision which is applicable [Q <1.11 instances of a restriction of a human righr. Article 29 (2) reads:

2. ln the exercise- of his rjghni and freedoms. evervone s!-.:l11 be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law sole! y for the PU~QS:c of securing due recognition and respect (or rhc rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of rn orality. public order and the general weltare in ::l. democratic society,

The reference to a "democratic societv " had irs origin in '[he project of the A rneriran Law Institute which the United Scates of America :;1;[ the time rauscd Panarna to submit to the United Nations Commission of Human Rights, There is good reason to believe that the inrroduction of this particular clause also served 3 distinct ideological purpose, namely the attempt by the United States of America. w h ich a t the t [me was s [ron g I Y su pporred by France, ~ to monopolize the human rights issue and to turn it into .J post-war

2, See ~r:!'n"!'r:.llly: H('~~", Gnnld;:il~'r .it'S Vl"'ifo.1'~HI~.!rL'c!lt~ der R~ntJ"~-'fpIjMlk Ckut~djJ'lJrl,J 0 ':oll:l~) Pan ~ ratt 6; LO South Afriel: ~mjliJ j' Altl1rIJ.f')f Gf!jl'mi BLlrlllltJJ.HfH'r:.!~ 19jj...J. 1 SA L%W). Thornashsuscn "Hurn m rLgh ~ S i[l southern _A. frLO:: Oi" I Y-B4 SA q ~h? o.1.7iJ. et W'I} ,

J. See in plrticubr: D~ M.:!:!>trJI. Birks, [lolht, Cotler, Klusck .• Morel (I:'d~) T~ .. /JJ1ri,I.;rJi(lPr t'ljh'W1.:.1!-.! rl:~Ju~' iPr (CIpP1p.:lr.:lIl'~'( ((ltmiJwj'II,JPr~lln!L' (198G): Gilfibdldi "On the idr:!'l,)lo~Lnl conrcut of human riglm lnstruments:

The i.'.La.LI~e 'in a democraeic ~(lt:Ll:'ty" "in Buergenrhal (ed) C1l'm.."'llp(lm7J' mlu.·J m hJt~m.,Tli{1l1lil rl:w - p~a}'~ iJI JWI'l(lU r o] L(ljjjJ B Saim (l 9R4) ::!3 - 68; V e glr=-ri~ I. Valeur et Hgmfic:i1 ~Qll de l~ clause "dan 5 une w('ie-te d(-moct.t!i!.luc:" d:nn l~ CO It vention Europdenne des drcits de [' hom me .... ] "i6B HmtJtl.l.! /~ j,~hnJoum.'f! Rrvue d('j Droit« J~ 1 r H(lmmf ~ I i:l'.

4. VCji;lcm,.;If (It 219 et u~; G..l.db;.,IJi.or {il Jl et Jrq. each with fureber ~di.·l'et~,,~_

57

pro pa g~ n d a weapon. directed rn ainl y iI~aiHst the Soviet Union and its ames, The reference to J "democratic socierv" intended to establish the American model of democracy as the universal yardstick. Nevertheless, today we find that all inrcmational human rights conventions (except for the Afric[ln Charter on Peoples' and Human RighlS) and, indeed, an irn press i ve n L1 m be: r of national human rights provisions, including ehosc no w proposed by the So uth Afri can Law Commission, have been inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 0{1948_

The clause "in a d ernocra tic society" in in teznat] onal hUIl1an righu lnstrumenrs

EHropea.l"l CcmrJtntion jl)r rhe Protection oj Human Rights Iomd FundamrMtaJ Preedoms

The' European Convention fOT rhe Protection 0 f Human Rights and Fund a mental Freedoms of 4 Nov~mbcr 1 ~50 is a binding international treatv under which the European Court of Human Rights was set up in Scrassbourg, with the power to hear individual appeals of nationals of signatory states in most ins ranees of a human rights in frin ge-m en t. ~ Articles 8 (2), 9 (2), 10 (2) and 11 (2) of the- convention use the clause "in a democratic society ~l l P la ccd i mm edia tel y after the word "necessary", for example in article 9 (2) ehe provision reads:

Freedom to manifest one's religion Or beliefs shall be subject only to such [i mira t i ODS J S arc pn:~ cri bed by law an d are nccessa tv in ,1 democra tic societ y in the In teresr s 0 f public Siafety t etc,

The importa n t differen ce . when comPJ red w ith ~ rticle 29 (2) of th e U ni versa! declaration. is that the European Convention did not Opt for a general limitation cl ause, btl r l instead provided for the conditions of Iimitation of coach right indi viduall y, an d rha t rhe modifier ~I in a dern ocrazic society <! a ppe.:lrs to b e re 1 a ted to. the question of the necessity of lirnitation, rather than to the- dims. of a lirniration (pu b lie order, morals, etc),

International COIJt'.I1l1n( ON Civil and Politica! Rjght~

The International Covenant On Civil and Political Rights of 19 December 1966 is a universal international treaty now ratificd by 87 sovereign states. The Optional P rococo i to the Intern tion al Covenant On Civit and Political Rights of 16 December 1%6 which ~llows for the appeal of individual nationals of signatory states to the United Nations Human Rights Cornmitree (actin g as an inte-rn arion al court of la w) has been ra ti fj ed by 39 sta tes, 6 Article!": 14 (1L 21, and 22 (2) of the covenant allow for those restrictions. which "arc imposed in conformity with the law and w h i c h a rc nccess ary in a dent ocraeic society in the interests of national securiry or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health Or m ora I s Or the: prote crion of tb C' righ rs an d Creed oms of othe rs j,. (per art 21 on the: freedom of assembly}.

I~ is clear that the covenant followed the example of the European Convention. as did one: other most important regional hum illl righ ts con ven eion, n am ely rhe American Convention on Human Rights,

5. The con veni ion has been ra tj fl~ by 11 member states of the COli nnl o f Europe, and the j urisdicrion (.If [he rout! .. u wdl .... the "i~hl (1 f in di .... idual OiW.J.! bas been accepred ~y 2fio -sigf.lCl tu£'i St3t!:Q; 1 C"C" Ma..ri~ "Inccrnanonal insrru men rs relat ing co h:l~mOln r ilol,h( ~ - d;li~sifL.('~ t ion and cll.tn showing r,l[ inC'~ nons .J.!!; 1 j.l.nu.ary 1'98fl" l'9AA HRLJ 113 l:22. from the v Ji~t amount of literature on el .. e coriveurlon rel~rotncc= j~ only made to th-e easil y ;]II:c~~"i.ibk .,mJ fli.-l y rcccn [ VI,' or k by l-rowein _ Peuk ~". boirc'pLiilChl!!' M"'rrsdT("rYo!'.d!t.Ilt.!mll~tlrjC'H ~ Konr.t11 ~!t.r.r r 1"'::1'-135),

6, S,=,I:' Mane "j1 .-jr I 2~,

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.

. -1mfri('ml Com'{'~J/i(l11 tHJ Human R(f!llr.;,

Tb e A rncri ran Con \'('11 rion on H u rn an Rights; of 12 N ovcrnber 1%9 is an internationn] rreary of r~gional applicarion in South t\ mer ica, 'v here it h as been ra t i fred by twenty states, Under the convention, and s i milar to the proccd U res a pp I Y ing under the E u ro pean Con \~ enri 0 n .111 d the United Narions Covenant, the lurerAmerican Com mission On Human Rights wa s S("~ up. yrcs('"n ~ l y \v i l h j urisdirt [on in COUn ~ ries. :

Articles. 15. It (2), 22 (3). and 32 m akc provision for restrictions of fundament3l rights. "in conformitv with the 1:1w and ncces sarv in oJ de-In ocra ti c so ci et 'r' in th c i nte rest ~f nat ional s ccu ri t y, pub I i c ~.'1, terv or public order, or to protect public healrh or morals or the rights and freedom s of oth cr 5. II • (per art 13 0 nth c righr of asscm blv)

Examples of national human right!: provisions making usc of the cia use Uin a democratic society"

Th c cla use ~~ il1 a democra 6<: so ri t:'ty " is also used in many national j urisdictions in provisions restricting or allowing for restrictions of funriamenrul rights g liar an tee 5i, HO'II'I,'C ... ' cr, na eional leg j s latOrS have introduced some interesting variants, In Afric.1. basically all English speaking African countries have or at some stage had a constitution providing for .1 reference, in re-~pc-ct 0 f human rights, to such limitations as are "reasonably jusrifiable in a democratic societv".'

Tht' Canadian Charter of Ri~hts and Freed 0 m S which wa s: ena cted as part 1 0 f the C.1n~ d a Con stit U t ion Ac [ 1?82 (79) ~ provides. in section 1 for the following gc..ncr al rule- for lim ira tions:

L The Canadian Charter of Rights and F recdo In S g uarantccs the rights an d freedoms set out in ir subject onl Y (('I such reasonable limits prescribed by 1..1 W a S C,jj n he dcmonst ra b [y j u sti fied in ,1 fret" an d de In ocr J. ti c SOLic:~ y .

T here ;HC three i m po rtant q LI ;lEfi edt io ns • in rhis provision, of the original version of the clause "in a democratic socictv":

First that limitations must be: Jrmomlmhiy jusritied, se-condly that the re-fc-rt"TIcc is to a pa rt i cula r kind 0 f ~, d em ocrari c socic ~ v" , namely a jilt: mrd dr-morra/ir J()cidy, and. thirdly there is; the" additional requirement then limitations must be re(ulml~bl!' meaning rhat they must pas~ the test of re asoria bl cries s. which has :J. \'\'e II d efin cod meaning in constitutional law, and also li n ks up to the re s t of p roportion ali ty , which is the- prevailing method in Europe. in pa rticula r uncle r r he W C"~ t Germ an co ns t i r u rion.

In the uophuthatsw::m.3. constitution, the clause 'lin a democratic society" is used in sections 12 (0), IJ (2) 1 14 (::.)1 15 (2). 16 {2), Section 1 J {~) contains em important and unique qualification of the clause. by wav of oil n ex p lki t re fe renee to th C' "economic wellbeing of Bophuthatswana". Section 1 (1) contains .'3 further implied qualification by linking the: constitutional goal of "democracy" to .'311 equally binding goal of "an economy based on private' and com munal ownership ilnd free enter-

. ,.

pnse '.

On the other band. it is interesting to note thar the- Namibian bill of righh, r"v hi ch was en acted in 1 9S5 with t he L~tabl i sh men t of the now d efu n C'~ transitional government," did not contain ,:my I im i~ a t ;('111 p rov isions rnak j n g referen cc to what m,1Y b-e necessary, justifiable, or .iI cceptl bl e ill "a dcm cera r tC s ccictv" (whether "demonstrably" or nor),

(. Mme i1' dr 12 .....

Fi. See 101'" mst anrc A;L!;ud:L "Di~r.riminJ;IDJ'"f ~t.tltll10r:'l" provisions and futlll,urLl!'n.J.! n!J;hL:!> provisions IJ( the cnnstitutions of Botswaru, Lesotho and SW.ili!ililnd'· !117~ S,~LJ ~9~.

9. An[l~."I.ur~ l [(10 the Suuth WI,'H l\fricJ.l1 vgt~l.itn'e ,w~-l Executive .'flIlllh(Jrif:,( Procl.llm:lticm ]4j8~ {RW1, IlkEi) Gnv G:l.7C"nt' Vol 241) No 9790 ('If 17 Jun~ j~}H.5: M~ r.1m~ r("('t'ntly: r.:k~r\· ~.". bill of rl;c:ht:s. as .II normarsve m~(t~lm~nt: SOlldl We:s! Afrk.ri/N;JmibiJi ]4)75 - 19AA" ]lJ.!::8 ClL8A :!1~1 -J55.

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The reason ap pears to have been the concern that the cou rts migb t in rc[pn:;:t the condition "in a democratic society" to appl y to both the ri gh r in q uesti on au d the provi sion :I u thorizing its 11 m 1 tanon, witb the result that neither the' protection of the right nor the possibility of its limitation would be of any e-tTe.ct, since Namibia could not be considered :I "democraei c society ,. . At fi rst glllncc such <In interpretation might appcar absurd. but! bearin Ij in min d the co mmon -la w t radition of 1 iteral in eerpretation , i~ w ill no r Sl1 rprise t ha t ex act l y ehe S:;J me con cern led the Indian government to object, in ]9591 to the: cla use .. i n a dern ocraric society", w hich was then being cons idered (or inelusion in the International Covenant ern Civil and Political Rights. of 19 Decembel:' 1 %6. These were the words of th c r n dia 11 delegate at the tim e: III

. , . to reserve the: benefits of the provisi on of th e article tot h e citizens 'Of a democratic society would seem doubly unj u st to rhos ~ 1 i vin g under a to tali ta rian regi me who being ::.] rc.J d y deprivedot many rights, would be denied the: safeguards which :;!ill other human beings enjoyed.

In order to illust ra te th ~ opcrl don 0 f the clause "in a democratic socictv" in practire, I shall now focus on a f~w j udicial decisions ra ken from Canl d a. a firstworld coun t ry pa r ex ce] len cc, and fro m the multi-national jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights in Strassbourg, representing somewhat the E uropea n " mini m:11 consens LlS" 0 n hum an rights; an d. fin all y I one C:lSC from S wazila nd I an African cou n t ry ,

Case Law

CrmaJial1 ca.H."j

In a first cas-e, Re GiUrPH 4wd the QHern 137 DLR (3d) 6~7 (69I) the federal court simply stared:

t I), s.~~ G.uibJ.ldi C!t' ~lf ~ [] 11.

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Execution of the deportation order is prescri bed by 1 aw, The reas ana bleness of the right of a f rcc and d emocra ti c sra te to deport alien cr iminals is selfeviden tan d ~ therefore 1 demon stra bl v

justified. .

ln R ~I Sl'~ tham Inc 33 R F L (2d) 279 ttl e Ontario Supreme Court (court of appeal) decided on [he cons riturion ali (y of s ratutory provi sions under which the pu blic was excl uded fro m the hca ring of certain proceedings under the Juvenile Delinquen ts A ct. As a first a pproa cb the court ruled (290) that the onus of pro .... ring that an e Keept i on i s "demonstra b1y j us tj tied in a free and d em 0 crat i C S ociety II res ts On the part)' claiming the bent-tit of the exception or limitation. On the construerion of the yardsti ck d ause itsel f. ~ he court said (296):

W C' .:;J rc left, a t present, to a certain extent wandering in unexplored terrain in which we h a ve to set up our OW[] gui d cpos ts in interpreting the meaning and etfece of the words of's, 1 of the Charter. In determining the reasonableness of the limit in each part icu lar ca se I the cou rt rnus t exa min to bjecti V~ 1 y i ts :argued rat! on al basis in light of what the court understands to be reasonable in a free and democratic society .. _ r n determining w heth er the limit i~ justifi:.b1e. some help may be derived from considering the legislati ve a pp roaches; rak en in si mila r fie 1 ds by other acknowledged frcr and dcmocra tic societies. Prcsurna bl 'Y this m;JY also assist in determining whether the limit is a reasonable one. lr may betha t so me of the ri gh ts guaran tee d by the Charter do not have their counterpart in other free and democratic societies and On e is sen t back immediate I y to rhe facts of our own socierv, In anv event. I believe the cou rt must come back, ultimately, having derived what-

ever assi stance can be secured from the ex perien ce of other free an d democratic societies I to the facts of cur 0"'"'11 free and dem ocra tic societ y to an SiWLT rh e q ues tion whether the lim il i rnposed on th L particular guaran teed freedom has been demon stra bl y justificd as a reason able one I ha viug balan ccd tb C' percei ved purpose and 0 bj CC't i ves of the: ! irn iting legislation, in lign t of all relevant considerations, agains.t the frecdo m 0 r righ t alleged 1 y infringed_

The court men proceeded to examine the relev ~ n t similar I .. ws on ju ven i le del illqurn cy p roced ure in the U nited States. 0 f A rnerica ~ A us tralia, and Eng land. On the b asis of th C$~ findings the court final I y decided the iss ue with referen CC' to. the- 5PC"' i fie funda men tal rights pro vision s in the Ca n adian Charter (3U 1 ) ,

ln Re Pedero! Rt"pubir, of Germany fttld Ral~{'a 145 D L R (3d) 63~ the Ontario COli rr of A ppC'3 I u phd d an ~ xtra d ition order and found the relevant provisions of the Extr: ... dition Act not to be unconstitilt ional, J n dealing w ith the que'S ti on w h cth er these r ro visions Were oj d em 0 ns. ~ trahlv justified in a frcr and democratic socict y ", the cou rt (654-} refe-rred to R l' Southam Iw [supra}, stressing th;)t rights an d frC'cdo ms a re II C vc r a bso h . ree, and chen addressed the ques tion of executi ~ e discrer i trn (655):

In r he PiC:;;cn t appeal cou n scl for rb e a ppe llan t argued th at lea vin g the ul ti.m ate deter rni na t ion to the- M mister w herh er to ext radite Q r not gi ves a discretion to the executive which is J r b itrary and un rCJ son a b It:'.

The court found that such discretion was common to most exrrudition laws of other coun t ri cs and .a I so accepted by va rious international treaties on human rights:

It is: not neccssar y to turn to lengthy dictionarv defininons of the words 'deman st ra hi ~r j u sti 11 cd'. They ;3 re words of common understanding and USil~~ an d they pL1C e a sig n i fie an r b urdcn On

the proponents of the limiting legislation, When the rationale and purpose of the E xtradirion A ct and trea tv un der j r an: 1 coked at (h a ving in mind th at crime should not go un puni shed) I Canada's obligations to the international co mmunity consid ered and the history of such legisla tion in free and democratic societies examined. in our view ~ the burden of es ta blishin g tha ~ the limit imposed by the E;x:tradit:ion Act and the treaty on S 6( 1) of the Ch areer is ;,1 rcasona hIe one dernonstrab Iy justified in ~ free:: an d demo era tic society has been dis cb arged by t he respondents.

it is interesting to note that the Ontario High Court. in the fi rs t decision of the nutter (141 DLR (3d) 412 424) had exp:il.nd~d on ehe issue as fo llows:

Th e court must d ccide w ha t is a reasonable limit demonstrably justified in a free democratic :;;;ocicty by reference to Ca nad i an so cicry and by a p p ll~ cation of principles of political science. Cri teria bv w hie h rhesc values are to be assessed ; rc to be fou n d \,\,1 thin the Charter itself, which means tha.t the courts are en titled to loa kat til OSe societies in which, as a matter of common law, freedoms and democratic rj ghts similar to ~ hos.t' referred to in the Charter Jre enjoyed, , . Follo\ving the usual presumptive canon of construecion 0 f 1 egish t i" e val idiry cou rts sh ould be ex tremcl y hes it an t to stri ke down t hose laws (i. c _ 1.1 W 50 enacted by Parliament 'operating in • free and dem ocra ric society ') u n Iess ~ hey clea rI y violate the constitutional rights Jnd freedom s SLt 0 U t in the Chart er, and sh ou I d be Lq uall y rei u crant to cha raererize the limitation .'1.5: not justifiable in a free an d dcrn ocra tic socic ~ y unless it is obviously unreasonable.

Th i~ :I pp roach b;1:'\ s ince bee n fa YOU red in nUlHCHHJS Canadian C.1~e-SI which attach I ess an d less imporran ce to an y J bstrart or general standard 0 f a LL democratic :socie cy It. buts im ply accept tha r Canada is .i:I,

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free and democratic socict v , and th at the; d crnocra tic leg i tim 01' y 0 [' its lcgi sl ati vc organs results in J presumption thal any law corre-ctly enacted satisfies the "democratic society test", In effeet. the original intention of limiting the reach of human rights limitations by making them subiect tat he st and a rds of a dcrn OITa tic so·cicty has lost much of irs importance in Can adian ClSe law, In i ts place one (inds Jl1 increased focus on the provision. also in section 1 of the charter, that limits must be .... reasonable" I which the- Canad j an cou rts ha V~ t ilk en as a point 0 f depar tu rt' fo r the in t rod uct ion of a test -0 f proportionaliry, father similar to that developed by the W es I Gc rman Con sti tu ~ t1011.11 Cou rt, I L

Cases decided under the European Convention

The flilrrdyJide Ca~r (judgment or 29 April 1976T series A no 24 (1976)} dealt ..... -ith the lawfulness of certain restrictions on the distribution of:m offensive publication "in a democratic society". On the ma rter, I he court explained (2 t ):

The Commission's report and the subsec uen ( hea rings be fore the Co u rt in June 1976 brought to light dear-em differences of opi n i On 0 n a cru cia I pro b lern, na m el y. ho w to determine whether the actual 'restrictions" and "penalties" complained of by the applicant were 'nC,"CS5;1Y"V in a democratic soci ety', 'fa r the protc ct ion of mo ra Is. ' . . , , These observations apply t notably, to Article 10 (2). In particular, it is not possible to 5nJ in ehe domestic la w of the various Contracting States :,) unif orrn Eu rope3 n concept jon 0 f m 0 rals, T he v icw rak ell by t heir res pecri ve laws of the requirements of morals varies from time to time and frum pla. ... "'"t" to p la L;'C. cspccia II y in 0 ur era which is. characterised by .l rapid and En-reach ...

in g cv 01 utjon 0 f 0 pinions on the subjcct, .0. Y T"C:a son of their di re C~ and conrinuous contact with the:' vita] forces of their countries. State authorities are, in prin rip lei in J be rter position than t h L international judge to give an opinion on tb C' cxa ct COn ten tor these req\l i rcments as well as On the 'necessity' of a 'restriction' or 'penalty' intended to

meet them Consequently, Article

] U (2) leaves (0 the Contracting States a margin of appreciation. This margin is given both to the domestic legislator (' prescribed by I a w +) .1 n d to the bod it'S. judicia 1 am on gst ot hers. that are ca Iled

upon to interpret and il ppl y the la ws in force {E'~gd amI Others, judgment of S. June 1976, series A no 22, ~ 1-42, para

100; for Article S para 2. Dr Wildr. Oom.'\' (md Vt'rsyp! judgment of 1 H June 1971 t series A no 12. 45-46~ para ~3; and the- Goldl'r judgment of 21 Pcbruary 1 f.)75. series A nu 18, 21-22, para 45).

The a p p ro ach in the H andy:s,d{' (dSC" \\. hich has subsequenrl y been fiTmly established. reflects (he difficulty of tr)'ing to apply ::I. unifo rm ya rds ric k of I. what is riccc ss :iilry in a democratic society" where l w en l y differcn t ~ a lbei t all Eu ropca n, j u risd i C'tion ~ arc a ffected. r n the (' ase 0 f K lass Uudgmcnt of ] 8 November 1977. series A no 28 (]979)) .. German statute allowing for th t: secret SU rv eillance 0 f private telephone con versa tions to t he excl us ion of an y ri gh ts of ap peal 0 f the person s co ncerned was foun d (0 be "necessary in :J. de mocratic societ y" on l he foIl owi n g ~TQunds.:

48. . . . De m ocra tic so cictics now a d a II s find themselves threatened by high"ly so phis ricatrd form S 0 f espion age J n d t crroris rn, wi eh th e resul t that I he S ta tc must be: able, in order effectivclv to counter such thre a rS1 to undertake (he secret surveillanc e of s u bvers i vc de-

1], S\·C' for iW;.t.<lllCC JII Rot: RHWd lrtlU R.;:rJr~1' 11 Cf.:C (:'1<1) 2H9; in. R~ .~ffj'i,r .Empl"yrn' Itll~'~lj~,i~l~ul l"t.!j~lj!

L(lL~1 1IN .Jr1.d Hr~U'(l}' A1~rrJ o r _r..lm~ in,~' HN.lf N ,j i ;;i.lld ~W("l .p pi ic J.[lom. 4 DL R ( .. th), 231 JUG 31D: .:!Is.o:

I-[o:!!::!-; '·SoC(~\('I1l one: LI f the Canadian-Charter uf ri;..!; IHS ~ tI d frrt'"d(1 ms" i 11 DC' _1y1~~tTJ.l et ,7,1 II.!'U) "P (it J 14-17,

62

men ts 0 peril tin g wit run its juri sdiction. The Court h as. therefore to accept t hat the existence of some lcgi~htion gnnl:in g powers of secret s urveill an ce over the mail, post and telecommunications is? under exception ill condition s, necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national securirv and/or for the prevention of disorder or crime ... 49. As concerns the fixing of the COndi tions under w hi ch a sys tern of surveillance is to be opera ted. the Cou rt points out t ha t the do mesri c legisla ture en joys a certain disc ret i on . It 15 errtainl y not for the Court to su bsti tu te for the assessment of the national authcritics any ot h er assess men t of wha I: m 18 h t be th e best policy in this fie! d.

S U bscqucnr 1 y. the 11 ppro ach in the Klass j udgemen twas confi rrncd by t he Europ can COu rt ' s ru lin g on Engli sh legisla tio n and ad mi uist rat i vc rules On [he secret surveill ance of post and teleco m rnu nications (case of J1a 1 (J rl ~ 11 Un ired K fi1gdorn t j udgmen [_ of 2 August 1984, as rcpo rted in I Sl84 HRLJ 3] 9).

The Sunday Times case (judgment of 26 April 1979, series A no 30 (1979)) concerncd the English common law of contempt of court in the COntext of what is "necessary in a democratic society". The European court repeated irs. previous stance 011 the rna tt er and stressed:

61. Again. the Court cannot hold that the inj un C [ion was no t "ncccssa ry' sirnply because it could Or would not have been gran ted under a different legal sySteln.

It becomes clear that the real importance of the clau s e "in :.1 demo cratic S QC1ety" dcclin ed, once govem m en ts WCTC granted a rather wide oIoI-m.argin of idppredati on". which reflecs the court' 5 realisarion that it is impossible, even amongst the European nations, to enforce .i3 uni-

form standard of what should be a II demo cratic societ y ".

Swaziland

From AfriC3.i one particular case from Swaziland delivered under the kingdom's old constitution (until 1978), is of general interest. [n Ross ~ Spt1r.ur !) Master of the HigJI C{lurrJ acting judge of appeal Mr Roper ruled On the con s tirueion alit}' of certain discriminarory lcgisla cion: I ~

The Com titu lion contains no def nilion Or line of guidance- as to what is. to be considered ~Tc:::asonably justifiable in a democratic society' nor does it sa y who is to decide whether the law u nder con sidera tion SJ tis 6 ed the test Laid down. Presumably this would be l he function of the members of the legislature p:a::s:si.ng the law, or in case its validity were q U~ tioned, of the mem ben; of the co ur t cons idcrin g it. .. , As to what constitutes a. democratic society very little 1110r'C can be said than that the kernel of the democratic form of government is the consti ru tic nal ri gh t of the people to govern themselves . ,. I can find nothing to suggest that uniformity of legislarivc trca trn en! is a necess ary fcatu re 0 f dernocra tic pra cticc w h ere rhe State concerned co m prises classes or g roup ~ of pea ple living un de I:" differen t social or econorni C sy stem s , . .

The quotation may serve as an example of the temptation, for any court in a third world country which must apply the clau sc ~~ in a democr a tic societ y", not [0 look a.t any "first world" standards of "democracy", but rather, to take into acco unt the pa rticula r trad i rio n sand ci rcumstances of the country in which such _,;j clause is supposed [Q become operativc. D

t2. Ci~d.ll~ in Agudl (lP rir 29~,

ll. See, fot .U::'I<iLIKC", the debare on the .;:on~li~l.Jtion:.Lht~'. under ;;Ii bill of righc~, of rradmcnnl Africln furnB of corporal punishment, which would be "degrading" arror ding 10 "western" scaudards of a democratic sociery, b'lll m.;lY be perr~ctly a t:"-t.::~Pt.:l bl!!' in the oonrex t or an "AfriCln democratic "!i~ i~ry"~ V il.n Blerk. HTb~ Botswana Court of Ap"p~.;I]: A policy DL~"oLd.m~~?" ll}ti5 elLs .... J8S~39S.

63

The iute:t"pretation riddle of the clause ~I in a dell1ocratic:: so ciety'~ and the South Af l"ican LaW' Commission proposal

A~ mil}' already have become clear from t he quoted cases. ehere a re basi call y t h rcc pOS!i ib le i.n rerprerarion s of th e modifier clause "in a demo crane society". none of w h i ch em prod uce a sa eisfactory resu 1 t. 1" Fir:s r, j tis p ossible to interp ret the clause to introduce J. standard of legitimacy for the ends of a lirrritation, for example the aim of preserving public order must be ach ieved in sue h :-l m anne r as 1:0 preserve the kind of public order which is acceptl ble 0 r n ecessary in a democrat i c soc iet y . This; interpretation would easily cover far-reaching limitations. since it would d cp cud on - the- su bj c cri v CO assessrnc nt 0 f circu mstan CC':S 0 nly I what m ight be CQnsidercd nr-ccss:ary for ehe preservation of the ovcrrjd tng criteria of LL democra cy" , In effect, t his inrcrpreta tion rna y reduce human right::;. to the status of a mere instrurnen t ('I f dernocra cv.

A second and equally pO:'lsibh-: interpretation wo uJd a ppl y t be res t of 4~ de: m ocra ti c socie tv" to 1 egi ti mize the relat inn betw ccn" a limit ation and its purpose, In tni s l ine of rcasonin g, the ot herwise 0 bjccti vc relation between [he limitation of' a right (I nd its end, :1';; csta b 1 ish ed by the word "nece ss at y". sud den 1 '! beco mes a su bjeceive one, namely the relation in question would then he characterized not only by "necessity". but also by the- particular kind of .. neressir y ~~ de ri ved from th L refcrcn CC'" [Q "a democra tic sod ctv". Conseq ucn tI)', the m od i fier i. de m 0' rat i c sociery" would add the: criterion of political legitim acy to 'he t I:'S ~ 0 f .. necessa ry I~ • In te rm S 0 f th i s in ~crpr<:t:a tion. th e yard stick , ... -ould be to demand that each and every lim it at ion must be politi call y jus rificd in the opinion of the rnsjorjtv.

Thirdly, it is also possible to interpret the cl.1USL' to qualify the nature of any Iirnita-

14. See G .. r ibaldi rp dE:!tJ -4 L

IS-. SA l.aw Cornrrussson report .Jp as 471 -480.

64

tio n, na me 1 y ,1, ccrt iI i.n piece of lcglsL:a ti on rcstricti n g the frcc-do ITl 0 f speech is perruissible only if it i~ found to be inrrinsjcally :.1 "democratic" 111C:l~Ure.

However, this third interpretation , ... ariant, in parri cul a r, poin ts a r on e f 1,1 rt her crucial diffirulty~ What is democratic? That which the majority wants, or that which the majority would want if it had the necessary understanding and insight into what is in the public good? That whi ch serves some values which m J y be at the basis of the concept of democracy, or that which gives unmitigated effect to the w ishcs of the grc.:iI t cr 11 umber?

As everyone is aware, the possible meanings of "democracy" arc manifold and are also subject to a change in perceptions over a period of ri me" I t is my su bmission th at , for ~ he reasons IOi ho wn I the clause "~S necessary (or acceptable) in a democratic society" is sim ply a meaningless and inopcrs ti ve re ferencc w h j ch rna y be used to SCjVC near] y In y j rna gina b le purpose, including ~ court's TCfL1s;;Jl to ad m it to the true reasoning be h in d :.1 determ ined human ri g hrs j udg men r.

I n a ccordance with ch is I i not 0 f reasonin g. the insertion of th c references to ;;t "democratic society" in the bill of rights proposed by the South Afric~n Law Commission" could be dealt with rather briefly. However there arc some particular aspects which stil] require discussion" The propose d bill 0 f righ t s U5CS the' referCTI,,"c to "a de m ocra tic societ v" in two instances as a condition for ~he perrnissibili(y of Ol limitation of rights: First in article 7 by using the words "as may reasonably be acceptable in :a democratic state"; arid secondly, ill article 30 by W'l)' of a ~ncr:d clause applicable to all mdividual 1"ight~, which provides that limitations may be- imposed for various specified purposes, "but only in such measure and in such oJ rna nner as is a cccpt abl e in a dcrnocra ti c so cict y.' .

A I: first t he SoC ru an tic d i fferrnce bet ween LL dern 0 crat i.e srat e I~ in arricl C' 7 a t'l d "democratic society" in ::.I r rticlc 30 is somewhat unclear, I can find no explanation other than that the- difference in wording is accidental. J doubt thJ~ thecom In iss io n W as :l wa re of the interna tional dispute- surrounding the choice of eit he r wording; I bo ~ h .1 t the tim e wh i ch the U ru v ersal D cod ara t IOU of H u rna n Rights, and later the International Co ..... 'cnant on Civil and Political Rights were drafted, At rhc time, the Soviet Union and the communist group of states, advanced specifi" ideological reasons why they preferred the wording "in a demoen tic state" ins read of "i n a dcrn 0 era tic society". Essentially, the long dispute concern ed th e Marx i 50 t dnctri ne of state, which allows the attribution of the quality of "democratic" to a stare which rollows purportedly democratic aims in its pol ic y, even where it has never allowe-d any fair and fr-t"C' election to take place. It w .. s exactlv for this: reason that the western ccuntri .. :-s successfullv msistcd on the wordin g 01-1 de m ocrari C societ y", in stca d of "democratic state",

Th e secon d in rcrcstin g 1.,; aria n tint rcduced in the South A trican Law Commission's draft is rhat of the- use of the attribute "acceptable" instead of ehe cus-

II ,. H J •

tomary nCCCS5-.lrY. ere t te purpose I!!.

clear, namely to widen, considerably, the powers of lim i ta cion, Many th ings rna y be cons idered accepta b leo- which an; nat necessary.

Thirdly, whether mtcnded or not, the in ter a crion of the two 1i mit arion d a uses (in arts 7 and 3t\ respectively) is a problern ad c on c. Article 30 applies genera It y to an the ri g hts guaran teed ~ in dud i ng tb e right in a rticle 7, Does this mean that the Ii mit at! 011 cla use of a rtide 30 would override tile on e in a rticle 7? Moree ver ~ the wording of the two clauses dlffersl article 7 usin g the quail ficatio n ~. in :l democratic society" in res;pect of the ends of the limitation (c;ompl,llsory military or civ il service) ~ w hile article 30 relates to

the qualification "in .do democratic society" not to the- ends, but to the means of a limitation (the "measure" ~nd "manner" of the lim i ration m ust be "J ccepta bl e in a demur ratic soc let y ~~) ,

Finallv, the reference to a "democratic st a te ;n d / or 50 cietv" in the proposed te xt involves yct another specifically South African, and somewhat wider issue, which ma,. also be more serious. than the qucs t ions of J ctu al d ra fring, I t is. the question of what mayor must COme first: improved legal rights of the individual, or (he implementation of .10 American way of democracy.

As i c s rands, the prescn t p ['oPOSJ I has opted for rh I:' vi cw (" ha r d emo crac y is :J pre-condition for the legal protection of hu man TI g hts in Sou til A (rica. T he risk s uf this. approach are obvious: The danger that the human rights issue may become a n i~s ue 0 f pol. rry-po 11 eies j n a w h i te-onl y po wcr S tru ggle; and the dan t;t:'r th at by demanding democracy first, the chance to improve rhe individual's h:g.11 rights in the meantime will be forfcircd, while the un certain da te wh en ~~ demo era cy ~~ will win is still awaited.

In this; con text, it is cruci al to ta ke a m a re careful look at a new and increasingly im port.1 n t dcve lopm ent in j n tern ational human rights law, which is trying to move :'WJV from the old Amc:rican link, ing of one specific type of democracy wi t h the pro teet ion 0 f human ri ght:;:-

The limitation method of the Mrican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,

The best known artieula ti on of this n I:W direction can be fo und in ehe A frican Cha rrrr on Hu man and Peopl es' Ri gh ts of 1981, which came into force in 1986, ~,c pream ?le con tains th e followin g deOSl vc prov ISO:

. , . rhat it is hell ceforth esscntia 1 to PJ Y particular atten t i-on to the right to develop a nd that d vii and political righ ts cannot be dissocia ted fro m econo mic, social :md cultural rights in their con-

65

ceptl'on and in their: lInivert~nty and fh.·( the sa.t1s,cQ,c:tion of economic, sodal and cultu1,al rights is a gU3r3ntt~ for t~'c gnjoymel.i!l" ,0 f ei vi! a:nd po.1itic~ ],.tghrs.

Consl!~'tm~ with tms ~pproach, the :ch~f'" ter does not use the reference cbuse "in a dmloCJ"atic !Soci~tr~'; IusL'ead. 3l1:11cle 2' (2) prov.ides. tl:tat;;

. -The tights ~L-I~d fn:ed,eall1s of each 'illdi,~tdlU.al sJtall be liix«cised 'with due ]"e~, ,g~.rd reo the righ ts a f ol~her~i c:ol1f'ctiv,~ s~fi'ty~ m'Clrn.H'ty and common interest'.

A:p\3.r~ Ctom this clause, the implied Umit~ci.'ctns of the rigilts g lJar:lllb~c;d .appear 'to be' fl"Uc13'1. P.ractically every right finds a 'I:'clir~~d s;tatu_'~o.ry d,ury, The bal:a.[u;e be~!f\~n the two tn,ay hold the rui.5wer to the quest ml[' a b~tJir YMdsti~k f'or 11 mJ:tadOllS of htunan dg]us.,foT 'ex«mpll~~ the'

C0115,dtu.tionility of a statute prohlbi bog dt~ fi'ub]j~~;'ion or :rH~w~,pap~'!i~ .. Q11 a Stmday would have to be tested by reference 10 the optimum baj~Ul:ce' between the freed,em of spee1ch. (art 9)t on the one hand, ~~d ~h~ ')'t,'trnd~le e{ a,.rtide, '29. (1) th.at th~ mdivtd'lll,al ma,y. exer'~c dns o;ght only- subje~' te the d.U!:ty ~ 'eo .p:r;)e~1"ve and :strengtlien positiv'e Africa cuktJur,a.l V~lues in his relatlens 'with ot'her members of the ~ociet y, in the sp:idt of toiCf'anc'e! d.ialoguc ana eonsaltarion and, in general, to oo,ntribute 'EQ. the prom otion of 'to{l moral wen being of &0 ci ely ..

The A fi-ic;an Chart<t!t, bY' nee :m.akjn,~ the

..;Ii ..;iI "';'d .. , - :C::,_...;' .,.I..D L.

~erH!anU '!etll;O(;[f;acy lHl:!It , eeuin ee :1

mere r~U~tic pnJpo,s:JJ.l than that efthe .. :It!.lurh Afri~an Law COlnmis~iol1. It O~T'~ (:;~i.nly deserves fu:rther stu,dy, 'he-yond the m~-e 16 lines, of tel(t dedic;;ned 'EO. ir. in the 'b"ll!! cmnlnis:skl.ll~'S r"cport.