Metro Media Inc v. City of San Diego 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.ct. 2882

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101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 1
453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 16 ERC 1057, 69 L.Ed.2d 800, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,600
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
Justice Brennan filed an opinion, in which Justice

Blackmun joined, concurring in the judgment.
Supreme Court of the United States
METROMEDIA, INC., et al., Appellants, Justice Stevens dissented in part and filed opinion.
v.
CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al. Chief Justice Burger dissented and filed opinion.
No. 80-195.
Justice Rehnquist dissented and filed opinion.
Argued Feb. 25, 1981.
Opinion on remand, 32 Cal.3d 180, 185 Cal.Rptr.
Decided July 2, 1981.
260, 649 P.2d 902.
Billboard owners brought action to enjoin a city's
West Headnotes
enforcement of a billboard ordinance. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court, 26 Cal.3d 848, 164 Cal.Rptr. [1] Courts 106 107
510, 610 P.2d 407, reversed a judgment enjoining
enforcement. The Supreme Court noted probable 106 Courts
jurisdiction of appeal. The Supreme Court, Justice 106II Establishment, Organization, and Proced-
White, held that: (1) goals sought to be furthered by ure
the ordinance, i. e., traffic safety and appearance of 106II(K) Opinions
city, were substantial governmental goals, and or- 106k107 k. Operation and effect in gener-
dinance, which did not prohibit all billboards but al. Most Cited Cases
allowed onsite advertising and some other specific- Summary actions do not have same authority in the
ally exempted signs, was not broader then neces- United States Supreme Court as do decisions
sary; (2) judgments of local lawmakers and of many rendered after plenary consideration, and do not
reviewing courts that billboards are real and sub- present same justification for declining to recon-
stantial hazards to traffic safety are not unreason- sider prior decision as do decisions rendered after
able; (3) city could perceive billboards, by their argument and with full opinion.
very nature and wherever located and however con-
structed, as “esthetic harm”; and (4) in pursuing [2] Constitutional Law 92 1675
goals of esthetics and traffic safety, city could reas-
92 Constitutional Law
onably distinguish between onsite and offsite ad-
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
vertising on same property; but (5) absent any ex-
Press
planation why noncommercial billboards located in
92XVIII(E) Advertising and Signs
places where commercial billboards were permitted
92XVIII(E)5 Billboards
would be more threatening to safe driving or would
92k1675 k. In general. Most Cited
detract more from beauty of city, city could not by
Cases
ordinance choose to limit contents of billboards to
(Formerly 92k90.3, 92k90.1(1))
commercial messages; and (6) the ordinance insofar
as permitting various kinds of noncommercial signs Constitutional Law 92 4094
but not other noncommercial signs infringed upon
free speech rights. 92 Constitutional Law
92XXVII Due Process
Reversed and remanded. 92XXVII(G) Particular Issues and Applica-
tions
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 2
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
92XXVII(G)3 Property in General 414II(B) Particular Matters

92k4091 Zoning and Land Use 414k1111 k. Signs and billboards. Most
92k4094 k. Signs and billboards. Cited Cases
Most Cited Cases (Formerly 414k81)
(Formerly 92k274.1(2.1), 92k274.1(2)) City could perceive billboards, by their very nature
As with other media, government has legitimate in- and wherever located and however constructed, as
terests in controlling noncommunicative aspects of “esthetic harm.” U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1.
the billboard medium, but First and Fourteenth
Amendments foreclose similar interest in con- [6] Zoning and Planning 414 1111
trolling the communicative aspects. U.S.C.A.Const.
414 Zoning and Planning
Amends. 1, 14.
414II Validity of Zoning Regulations
[3] Constitutional Law 92 1675 414II(B) Particular Matters
414k1111 k. Signs and billboards. Most
92 Constitutional Law Cited Cases
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and (Formerly 414k81)
Press In pursuing goals of esthetics and traffic safety, city
92XVIII(E) Advertising and Signs could reasonably distinguish between onsite and
92XVIII(E)5 Billboards offsite advertising on same property, in view of fact
92k1675 k. In general. Most Cited that city could believe that offsite advertising
Cases presented more acute problem and that commercial
(Formerly 92k90.3, 92k90.1(1)) enterprise as well as interested public had stronger
Goals sought to be furthered by billboard-regulat- interest in identifying place of business and advert-
ing ordinance, i. e., traffic safety and appearance of ising products or services available there than in us-
city, were substantial governmental goals, and or- ing or leasing available space to advertise commer-
dinance, which did not prohibit all billboards but cial enterprises located elsewhere. U.S.C.A.Const.
allowed onsite advertising and some other specific- Amend. 1.
ally exempted signs, was not broader than neces-
sary. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1. [7] Constitutional Law 92 1675
[4] Highways 200 153.5 92 Constitutional Law

92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
200 Highways Press
200IX Regulation and Use for Travel 92XVIII(E) Advertising and Signs
200IX(A) Obstructions and Encroachments 92XVIII(E)5 Billboards
200k153.5 k. Billboards and highway 92k1675 k. In general. Most Cited
beautification in general. Most Cited Cases Cases
Judgments of local lawmakers and of many review- (Formerly 92k90.3, 92k90.1(1))
ing courts that billboards are real and substantial Absent any explanation why noncommercial bill-
hazards to traffic safety are not unreasonable. boards located in places where commercial bill-
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1. boards were permitted would be more threatening
to safe driving or would detract more from beauty
[5] Zoning and Planning 414 1111 of city, city could not by ordinance choose to limit
content of billboards to commercial messages. (Per
414 Zoning and Planning
Justice White with three Justices concurring, with
414II Validity of Zoning Regulations
two Justices concurring in the judgment and one

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 3
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
Justice concurring in part in the opinion but dissent- curring, two Justices concurring in the judgment
ing in part therefrom and from the judgment.) and one Justice concurring in part in the opinion
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1. but dissenting in part therefrom and from the judg-
ment.) U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 1, 5, 14.
[8] Constitutional Law 92 1675
[10] Federal Courts 170B 511.1
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and 170B Federal Courts
Press 170BVII Supreme Court
92XVIII(E) Advertising and Signs 170BVII(E) Review of Decisions of State
92XVIII(E)5 Billboards Courts
92k1675 k. In general. Most Cited 170Bk511 Scope and Extent of Review
Cases 170Bk511.1 k. In general. Most Cited
(Formerly 92k90.3, 92k90.1(1)) Cases
City may distinguish between relative value of dif- (Formerly 170Bk511)
ferent categories of commercial speech, but does Though United States Supreme Court found that
not have same range of choice in area of noncom- billboard ordinance was unconstitutional, it was re-
mercial speech to evaluate strength of, or distin- sponsibility of state court to determine meaning and
guish between, various communicative interests, application of severability clause of ordinance. (Per
and, as to noncommercial speech, city may not Justice White with three Justices concurring, two
choose appropriate subjects for public discourse, Justices concurring in the judgment and one Justice
and thus billboard ordinance, insofar as containing concurring in part in the opinion but dissenting in
exceptions that permitted various kinds of noncom- part therefrom and from the judgment.)
mercial signs, infringed upon constitutional rights FN*
of speech. (Per Justice White with three Justices **2883 Syllabus
concurring, two Justices concurring in the judgment
FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the
and one Justice concurring in part in the opinion
opinion of the Court but has been prepared
but dissenting in part therefrom and from the judg-
by the Reporter of Decisions for the con-
ment.) U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1.
venience of the reader. See United States v.
[9] Constitutional Law 92 4094 Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26
S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.
92XXVII Due Process *490 Appellee city of San Diego enacted an ordin-
92XXVII(G) Particular Issues and Applica- ance which imposes substantial prohibitions on the
tions erection of outdoor advertising displays within the
92XXVII(G)3 Property in General city. The stated purpose of the ordinance is “to
92k4091 Zoning and Land Use eliminate hazards to pedestrians and motorists
92k4094 k. Signs and billboards. brought about by distracting sign displays” and “to
Most Cited Cases preserve and improve the appearance of the City.”
(Formerly 92k274.1(2.1), 92k274.1(2)) The ordinance permits onsite commercial advert-
Where First Amendment interests and commercial ising (a sign advertising goods or services available
speech were not sufficient to prevent city from pro- on the property where the sign is located), but for-
hibiting offsite commercial advertisements, no dif- bids other commercial advertising and noncommer-
ferent result would be reached under due process cial advertising using fixed-structure signs, unless
clause. (Per Justice White with three Justices con- permitted by 1 of the ordinance's 12 specified ex-

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 4
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
ceptions, such as temporary political campaign (c) However, the city's general ban on signs carry-
signs. Appellants, companies that were engaged in ing noncommercial advertising is invalid under the
the outdoor advertising business in the city when First and Fourteenth Amendments. The fact that the
the ordinance was passed, brought suit in state city may value commercial messages relating to
court to enjoin enforcement of **2884 the ordin- onsite goods and services more than it values com-
ance. The trial court held that the ordinance was an mercial communications relating to offsite goods
unconstitutional exercise of the city's police power and services does not justify prohibiting an occu-
and an abridgment of appellants' First Amendment pant from displaying his own ideas or those of oth-
rights. The California Court of Appeal affirmed on ers. Furthermore, because under the ordinance's
the first ground alone, but the California Supreme specified exceptions some noncommercial mes-
Court reversed, holding, inter alia, that the ordin- sages may be conveyed on billboards throughout
ance was not facially invalid under the First the commercial and industrial zones, the city must
Amendment. allow billboards conveying other noncommercial
messages throughout those zones. The ordinance
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is re- cannot be characterized as a reasonable “time,
manded. Pp. 2887-2899; 2902-2909. place, and manner” restriction. Pp. 2895-2897.
26 Cal.3d 848, 164 Cal.Rptr. 510, 610 P.2d 407, re- (d) Government restrictions on protected speech are
versed and remanded. not permissible merely because the government
does not favor one side over another on a subject of
Justice WHITE, joined by Justice STEWART,
public controversy. Nor can a prohibition of all
Justice MARSHALL, and Justice POWELL, con-
messages carried by a particular mode of commu-
cluded that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its
nication be upheld merely because the prohibition
face. Pp. 2887-2899.
is rationally related to a nonspeech interest. Courts
(a) As with other media of communication, the gov- must protect First Amendment interests against le-
ernment has legitimate interests in controlling the gislative intrusion, rather than defer to merely ra-
noncommunicative aspects of billboards, but the tional legislative judgments in this area. Since the
First and Fourteenth Amendments foreclose similar city has concluded that its official interests are not
interests in controlling the communicative aspects as strong as private interests in onsite commercial
of billboards. Because regulation of the noncommu- advertising, it may not claim that those same offi-
nicative aspects of a medium often impinges to cial interests outweigh private interests in noncom-
some degree on the communicative aspects, the mercial communications. Pp. 2897-2899.
courts must reconcile the government's regulatory
Justice BRENNAN, joined by Justice BLACK-
interests with the individual's right to expression.
MUN, concluded that in practical effect the city's
Pp. 2889-2890.
ordinance constitutes a total ban on the use of bill-
(b) Insofar as it regulates commercial speech, the boards to communicate to the public messages of
ordinance meets the constitutional requirements of general applicability, whether commercial or non-
*491Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub- commercial, and that under the appropriate First
lic Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, Amendment analysis a city may totally ban bill-
65 L.Ed.2d 341. Improving traffic safety and the boards only if it can show that a sufficiently sub-
appearance of the city are substantial governmental stantial governmental interest is directly furthered
goals. The ordinance directly serves these goals and thereby and that any more narrowly drawn restric-
is no broader than necessary to accomplish such tion would promote less well the achievement of
ends. Pp. 2890-2895. that goal. Under this test, San Diego's ordinance is

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 5
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
FN2
invalid since (1) the city failed to produce evidence event, person, institution or business.”
demonstrating that billboards actually impair traffic
safety in San Diego, (2) the ordinance is not nar- FN1. San Diego Ordinance No. 10795
rowly drawn to accomplish the traffic safety goal, (New Series), enacted March 14, 1972.
**2885 and (3) the city failed to show that its asser- The general prohibition of the ordinance
ted interest in esthetics was sufficiently substantial reads as follows:
in its commercial and industrial areas. Nor would
“B. OFF-PREMISE OUTDOOR AD-
an ordinance totally banning commercial billboards
VERTISING DISPLAY SIGNS PRO-
but allowing noncommercial billboards be constitu-
HIBITED
tional, since *492 it would give city officials the
discretion to determine in the first instance whether “Only those outdoor advertising display
a proposed message is “commercial” or signs, hereinafter referred to as signs in
“noncommercial.” Pp. 2902-2909. this Division, which are either signs des-
Floyd Abrams, New York City, for appellants. ignating the name of the owner or occu-
pant of the premises upon which such
C. Alan Sumption, San Diego, Cal., for appellees.
signs are placed, or identifying such
premises; or signs advertising goods
*493 Justice WHITE announced the judgment of manufactured or produced or services
the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice rendered on the premises upon which
STEWART, Justice MARSHALL, and Justice such signs are placed shall be permitted.
POWELL joined. The following signs shall be prohibited:
This case involves the validity of an ordinance of “1. Any sign identifying a use, facility or
the city of San Diego, Cal., imposing substantial service which is not located on the
prohibitions on the erection of outdoor advertising premises.
displays within the city.
“2. Any sign identifying a product which
is not produced, sold or manufactured on
I the premises.
Stating that its purpose was “to eliminate hazards to “3. Any sign which advertises or other-
pedestrians and motorists brought about by distract- wise directs attention to a product, ser-
ing sign displays” and “to preserve and improve the vice or activity, event, person, institution
appearance of the City,” San Diego enacted an or- or business which may or may not be
dinance to prohibit “outdoor advertising display identified by a brand name and which
FN1
signs.” The California Supreme Court sub- occurs or is generally conducted, sold,
sequently defined the term “advertising display manufactured, produced or offered else-
sign” as “a rigidly assembled sign, display, or where than on the premises where such
device permanently affixed to the ground or per- sign is located.”
manently attached to a building or other inherently
permanent structure constituting, or used for the FN2. The California Supreme Court noted
display of, a commercial or other advertisement to that the ordinance as written might be in-
the public.” *49426 Cal.3d 848, 856, n. 2, 164 terpreted “to apply to signs of a character
Cal.Rptr. 510, 513, n. 2, 610 P.2d, 410, n. 2 (1980). very different from commercial billboards-
“Advertising display signs” include any sign that for example, to a picket sign announcing a
“directs attention to a product, service or activity, labor dispute or a small sign placed in

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 6
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
one's front yard proclaiming a political or or stored within the city, if not used for advertising
religious message.” 26 Cal.3d, at 856, n.2, purposes; commemorative historical plaques; reli-
164 Cal.Rptr., at 513, n.2, 610 P.2d, at gious symbols; signs within shopping malls; for
410, n.2. For this reason the court adopted sale and for lease signs; signs on public and com-
the narrowing definition (quoted in the mercial*495 vehicles; signs depicting time, tem-
text). That definition, however, focused on perature, and news; approved temporary, off-
the structure not the content of the bill- premises, subdivision directional signs; and
FN3
board: It excluded “picket signs” but not “[t]emporary political campaign signs.” Under
billboards used to convey a noncommercial this scheme, on-site commercial advertising is per-
message. Cf. State ex rel. Dept. of Trans- mitted,*496 but other commercial advertising and
portation v. Pile, 603 P.2d 337 (1979) noncommercial communications using fixed-
(Oklahoma Supreme Court construed a structure signs are everywhere forbidden unless
state statute prohibiting outdoor advert- permitted by one of the specified exceptions.
ising signs as not covering noncommercial
speech in order to avoid constitutional FN3. Section 101.0700(F) provides as fol-
problems). The court explicitly recognized lows:
this continuing burden on noncommercial
“The following types of signs shall be
speech: “The relatively few non-
exempt from the provisions of these reg-
commercial advertisers who would be re-
ulations:
stricted by the San Diego ordinance ... pos-
sess a great variety of alternative means of “1. Any sign erected and maintained pur-
communication.” 26 Cal.3d, at 869, 164 suant to and in discharge of any govern-
Cal.Rptr., at 521-522, 610 P.2d, at mental function or required by any law,
418-419. Furthermore, the city continues ordinance or governmental regulation.
to contend that the ordinance prohibits the
use of billboards to convey a noncommer- “2. Bench signs located at designated
cial message, unless that message falls public transit bus stops; provided,
within one of the specified exemptions however, that such signs shall have any
contained in the ordinance. Brief for Ap- necessary permits required by Sections
pellees 6. 62.0501 and 62.0502 of this Code.
The ordinance provides two kinds of exceptions to “3. Signs being manufactured, transpor-
the general prohibition: onsite signs and signs fall- ted and/or stored within the City limits
ing within 12 specified **2886 categories. Onsite of the city of San Diego shall be exempt;
signs are defined as those provided, however, that such signs are
not used, in any manner or form, for pur-
“designating the name of the owner or occupant poses of advertising at the place or
of the premises upon which such signs are places of manufacture or storage.
placed, or identifying such premises; or signs ad-
vertising goods manufactured or produced or ser- “4. Commemorative plaques of recog-
vices rendered on the premises upon which such nized historical societies and organiza-
signs are placed.” tions.
The specific categories exempted from the prohibi- “5. Religious symbols, legal holiday
tion include: government signs; signs located at decorations and identification emblems
public bus stops; signs manufactured, transported, of religious orders or historical societies.

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 7
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
“6. Signs located within malls, courts, and industrial purposes, most of them on property
arcades, porches, patios and similar leased by the owners to appellants for the purpose
areas where such signs are not visible of maintaining billboards. Each sign has a remain-
from any point on the boundary of the ing useful income-producing life of over 25 years,
premises. and each sign has a fair market value of between
$2,500 and $25,000. Space on the signs was made
“7. Signs designating the premises for available to “all comers” and the copy on each sign
sale, rent or lease; provided, however, FN4
changed regularly, usually monthly. The nature
that any such sign shall conform to all of the outdoor advertising business was described
regulations of the particular zone in by the parties as follows:
which it is located.
FN4. This account of appellants' busi-
“8. Public service signs limited to the nesses is taken from the joint stipulation of
depiction of time, temperature or news; facts entered into by the parties and filed
provided, however, that any such sign with their cross-motions for summary
shall conform to all regulations of the judgment in the California Superior Court.
particular zone in which it is located. See Joint Stipulation of Facts Nos. 12-20,
App. 44a-45a.
“9. Signs on vehicles regulated by the
City that provide public transportation “Outdoor advertising is customarily purchased on
including, but not limited to, buses and the basis of a presentation or campaign requiring
taxicabs. multiple exposure. Usually a large number of
signs in a variety of locations are utilized to com-
“10. Signs on licensed commercial
municate a particular advertiser's message. An
vehicles, including trailers; provided,
advertiser will generally purchase**2887 a
however, that such vehicles shall not be
‘showing’ which would involve the utilization of
utilized as parked or stationary outdoor
a specific number of signs advertising the same
display signs.
message in a variety of locations throughout a
FN5
“11. Temporary off-premise subdivision metropolitan area.”
directional signs if permitted by a condi-
FN5. Joint Stipulation of Facts No. 24,
tional use permit granted by the Zoning
App. 47a.
Administrator.
Although the purchasers of advertising space on ap-
“12. Temporary political campaign
pellants' signs usually seek to convey a commercial
signs, including their supporting struc-
message, their billboards have also been used to
tures, which are erected or maintained
convey a broad range of noncommercial political
for no longer than 90 days and which are
and social messages.
removed within 10 days after election to
which they pertain.” *497 Appellants brought suit in state court to enjoin
enforcement of the ordinance. After extensive dis-
Appellants are companies that were engaged in the
covery, the parties filed a stipulation of facts, in-
outdoor advertising business in San Diego at the
cluding:
time the ordinance was passed. Each owns a sub-
stantial number of outdoor advertising displays “2. If enforced as written, Ordinance No. 10795
(approximately 500 to 800) within the city. These will eliminate the outdoor advertising business in
signs are all located in areas zoned for commercial

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 8
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
the City of San Diego. FN6. Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v.

Hulse, 439 U.S. 808, 99 S.Ct. 66, 58
L.Ed.2d 101 (1978); Newman Signs, Inc. v.
“28. Outdoor advertising increases the sales of
Hjelle, 440 U.S. 901, 99 S.Ct. 1205, 59
products and produces numerous direct and indir-
L.Ed.2d 449 (1979); Lotze v. Washington,
ect benefits to the public. Valuable commercial,
444 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 257, 62 L.Ed.2d
political and social information is communicated
177 (1979).
to the public through the use of outdoor advert-
ising. Many businesses and politicians and other
persons rely upon outdoor advertising because II
other forms of advertising are insufficient, inap-
propriate and prohibitively expensive.” Joint Early cases in this Court sustaining regulation of
Stipulation of Facts Nos. 2, 28, App. 42a, 48a. and prohibitions aimed at billboards did not involve
First Amendment considerations. See Packer Corp.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 52 S.Ct. 273, 76 L.Ed. 643
court held that the ordinance was an unconstitution- (1932); St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis
al exercise of the city's police power and an abridg- , 249 U.S. 269, 39 S.Ct. 274, 63 L.Ed. 599 (1919);
ment of appellants' First Amendment rights. The Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S.
FN7
California Court of Appeal affirmed on the first 526, 37 S.Ct. 190, 61 L.Ed. 472 (1917). Since
ground alone and did not reach the First Amend- those decisions, we have not given plenary consid-
ment argument. Without questioning any of the eration to **2888 cases involving First Amendment
stipulated facts, including the fact that enforcement challenges to statutes or ordinances limiting the use
of the ordinance would “eliminate the outdoor ad- of billboards, preferring on several occasions sum-
vertising business in the City of San Diego,” the marily to affirm decisions sustaining state or local
California Supreme Court reversed. It held that the legislation directed at billboards.
two purposes of the ordinance were within the city's
legitimate interests and that the ordinance was “a FN7. These cases primarily involved due
proper application of municipal authority over zon- process and equal protection challenges to
ing and land use for the purpose of promoting the municipal regulations directed at bill-
public safety and welfare.” 26 Cal.3d, at 858, 164 boards. The plaintiffs claimed that their
Cal.Rptr., at 514, 610 P.2d, at 411 (footnote omit- method of advertising was improperly dis-
ted). The court rejected appellants' argument that tinguished from other methods that were
the ordinance was facially invalid under the First not similarly regulated and that the ordin-
Amendment. It relied on certain summary actions ances resulted in takings of property
of this Court, dismissing for want of a substantial without due process. The Court rejected
federal question appeals from several state-court these claims, holding that the regulation of
decisions sustaining governmental restrictions *498 billboards fell within the legitimate police
FN6 powers of local government.
on outdoor sign displays. Appellants sought re-
view in this Court, arguing that the ordinance was
Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 439 U.S.
facially invalid on First Amendment grounds and
808, 99 S.Ct. 66, 58 L.Ed.2d 101 (1978), involved a
that the city's threatened destruction of the outdoor
municipal ordinance that distinguished between off-
advertising business was prohibited by the Due Pro-
site and onsite billboard advertising, prohibiting the
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We
former and permitting the latter. We summarily dis-
noted probable jurisdiction. 449 U.S. 897, 101 S.Ct.
missed as not presenting a substantial federal ques-
265, 66 L.Ed.2d 127.
tion an appeal from a judgment sustaining the or-

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 9
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
dinance, thereby rejecting the submission, repeated a Washington prohibition on offsite signs. In that
in this case, that prohibiting*499 offsite commer- case, appellants erected, on their own property, bill-
cial advertising violates the First Amendment. The boards expressing their political and social views.
definition of “billboard,” however, was consider- Although billboards conveying information relating
ably narrower in Suffolk than it is here: “A sign to the commercial *500 use of the property would
which directs attention to a business, commodity, have been permitted, appellants' billboards were
service, entertainment, or attraction sold, offered or prohibited, and the state courts ordered their remov-
existing elsewhere than upon the same lot where al. We dismissed as not raising a substantial federal
such sign is displayed.” This definition did not question an appeal from a judgment rejecting the
sweep within its scope the broad range of noncom- First Amendment challenge to the statute.
mercial speech admittedly prohibited by the San
Diego ordinance. Furthermore, the Southampton, [1] Insofar as our holdings were pertinent, the Cali-
N.Y., ordinance, unlike that in San Diego, con- fornia Supreme Court was quite right in relying on
tained a provision permitting the establishment of our summary decisions as authority for sustaining
public information centers in which approved direc- the San Diego ordinance against First Amendment
tional signs for businesses could be located. This attack. Hicks v. Miranda, supra. As we have poin-
Court has repeatedly stated that although summary ted out, however, summary actions do not have the
dispositions are decisions on the merits, the de- same authority in this Court as do decisions
cisions extend only to “the precise issues presented rendered after plenary consideration, Illinois State
and necessarily decided by those actions.” Mandel Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440
v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176, 97 S.Ct. 2238, 2240, U.S. 173, 180-181, 99 S.Ct. 983, 988-989, 59
53 L.Ed.2d 199 (1977); see also Hicks v. Miranda, L.Ed.2d 230 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, supra, 415
422 U.S. 332, 345, n. 14, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2290, 45 U.S. at 671, 94 S.Ct. at 1359; see also Fusari v.
L.Ed.2d 223 (1975); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 392, 95 S.Ct. 533, 541, 42
651, 671, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1359, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975) (BURGER, C. J., concurring).
(1974). Insofar as the San Diego ordinance is chal- They do not present the same justification for de-
lenged on the ground that it prohibits noncommer- clining to reconsider a prior decision as do de-
cial speech, the Suffolk case does not directly sup- cisions rendered after argument and with full opin-
port the decision below. ion. “It is not at all unusual for the Court to find it
appropriate to give full **2889 consideration to a
The Court has summarily disposed of appeals from question that has been the subject of previous sum-
state-court decisions upholding state restrictions on mary action.” Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation,
billboards on several other occasions. Markham Ad- 439 U.S. 463, 477, n. 20, 99 S.Ct. 740, 749, n. 20,
vertising Co. v. Washington, 393 U.S. 316, 89 S.Ct. 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979); see also Tully v. Griffin,
553, 21 L.Ed.2d 512 (1969), and Newman Signs, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 74-75, 97 S.Ct. 219, 223-224, 50
Inc. v. Hjelle, 440 U.S. 901, 99 S.Ct. 1205, 59 L.Ed.2d 227 (1976); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Min-
L.Ed.2d 449 (1979), both involved the facial valid- ing Co., 428 U.S. 1, 14, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2891, 49
ity of state billboard prohibitions that extended only L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). Probable jurisdiction having
to certain designated roadways or to areas zoned for been noted to consider the constitutionality of the
certain uses. The statutes in both instances distin- San Diego ordinance, we proceed to do so.
guished between onsite commercial billboards and
offsite billboards within the protected areas. Our
III
most recent summary action was Lotze v. Washing-
ton, 444 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 257, 62 L.Ed.2d 177 This Court has often faced the problem of applying
(1979), which involved an “as applied” challenge to the broad principles of the First Amendment to

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 10
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
unique forums of expression. See, e. g., Consolid- munication, used to convey a broad range of differ-
FN9
ated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 ent kinds of messages. As Justice Clark noted
U.S. 530, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) in his dissent below:
(billing envelope inserts); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980) FN9. For a description of the history of the
(picketing in residential areas); Schaumburg v. Cit- use of outdoor advertising in this country
izens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 100 and the use of billboards within that his-
S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980) (door-to-door and tory, see F. Presbrey, The History and De-
on-street *501 solicitation); Greer v. Spock, 424 velopment of Advertising 497-511 (1929);
U.S. 828, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976) Tocker, Standardized Outdoor Advertising:
(Army bases); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, History, Economics and Self-Regulation,
422 U.S. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 in Outdoor Advertising: History and Regu-
(1975) (outdoor movie theaters); Lehman v. City of lation 11, 29 (J. Houck ed. 1969).
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 41
“The outdoor sign or symbol is a venerable me-
L.Ed.2d 770 (1974) (advertising space within city-
dium for expressing political, social and commer-
owned transit system). Even a cursory reading of
cial ideas. From the poster or ‘broadside’ to the
these opinions reveals that at times First Amend-
billboard, outdoor signs have placed a prominent
ment values must yield to other societal interests.
role throughout American history, rallying sup-
These cases support the cogency of Justice Jack-
port for political and social causes.” 26 Cal.3d, at
son's remark in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97,
888, 164 Cal.Rptr., at 533-534, 610 P.2d, at
69 S.Ct. 448, 458, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949): Each meth-
430-431.
od of communicating ideas is “a law unto itself”
*502 The record in this case indicates that be-
and that law must reflect the “differing natures, val-
FN8 sides the typical commercial uses, San Diego
ues, abuses and dangers” of each method. We
billboards have been used
deal here with the law of billboards.
“to publicize the ‘City in motion’ campaign of
FN8. The uniqueness of each medium of
the City of San Diego, to communicate messages
expression has been a frequent refrain:
from candidates for municipal, state and national
See, e. g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
offices, including candidates for judicial office,
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557, 95 S.Ct. 1239,
to propose marriage, to seek employment, to en-
1246, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975) (“Each medi-
courage the use of seat belts, to denounce the
um of expression ... must be assessed for
United Nations, to seek support for Prisoners of
First Amendment purposes by standards
War and Missing in Action, to promote the
suited to it, for each may present its own
United Crusade and a variety of other charitable
problems”); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
and socially-related endeavors and to provide dir-
438 U.S. 726, 748, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3040, 57 FN10
ections to the traveling public.”
L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978) (“We have long re-
cognized that each medium of expression
presents special First Amendment prob- FN10. Joint Stipulation of Facts No. 23,
lems”); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 App. 46a-47a.
U.S. 495, 503, 72 S.Ct. 777, 781, 96 L.Ed.
1098 (1952) (“Each method tends to But whatever its communicative function, the bill-
present its own peculiar problems”). board remains a “large, immobile,**2890 and per-
manent structure which like other structures is sub-
Billboards are a well-established medium of com- ject to ... regulation.” Id., at 870, 164 Cal.Rptr., at

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 11
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
522, 610 P.2d, at 419. Moreover, because it is de- erty and (2) those within one of the specified ex-
signed to stand out and apart from its surroundings, emptions to the general prohibition, such as tem-
the billboard creates a unique set of problems for porary political campaign signs. To determine if
land-use planning and development. any billboard is prohibited by the ordinance, one
must determine how it is constructed, where it is
[2] Billboards, then, like other media of communic- located, and what message it carries.
ation, combine communicative and noncommunic-
ative aspects. As with other media, the government Thus, under the ordinance (1) a sign advertising
has legitimate interests in controlling the noncom- goods or services available on the property where
municative aspects of the medium, Kovacs v. the sign is located is allowed; (2) a sign on a build-
Cooper, supra, but the First and Fourteenth ing or other property advertising goods or services
Amendments foreclose a similar interest in con- produced or offered elsewhere is barred; (3) non-
trolling the communicative aspects. Because regu- commercial advertising, unless within one of the
lation of the noncommunicative aspects of a medi- specific exceptions, is everywhere prohibited. The
um often impinges to some degree on the commu- occupant of property may advertise his own goods
nicative aspects, it has been necessary for the courts or services; he may not advertise the goods or ser-
to reconcile the government's regulatory interests vices of others, nor may he display most noncom-
with the individual's right to expression. “ ‘[A] mercial messages.
court may not escape the task of assessing the First
Amendment interest at stake and weighing it
IV
against the public interest allegedly served by the
regulation.’ ” Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willing- Appellants' principal submission is that enforce-
boro, 431 U.S. 85, 91, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 1617, 52 ment of the ordinance will eliminate the outdoor
L.Ed.2d 155 (1977), quoting *503Bigelow v. Vir- advertising business in San Diego and that the First
ginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 2234, 44 and Fourteenth Amendments *504 prohibit the
L.Ed.2d 600 (1975). Performance of this task re- elimination of this medium of communication. Ap-
quires a particularized inquiry into the nature of the pellants contend that the city may bar neither all
conflicting interests at stake here, beginning with a offsite commercial signs nor all noncommercial ad-
precise appraisal of the character of the ordinance vertisements and that even if it may bar the former,
as it affects communication. it may not bar the latter. Appellants may raise both
arguments in their own right because, although the
As construed by the California Supreme Court, the
bulk of their business consists of offsite signs car-
ordinance restricts the use of certain kinds of out-
rying commercial advertisements, their billboards
door signs. That restriction is defined in two ways:
also convey a substantial amount of noncommercial
first, by reference to the structural characteristics of FN11
advertising. Because **2891 our cases have
the sign; second, by reference to the content, or
consistently distinguished between the constitution-
message, of the sign. Thus, the regulation only ap-
al protection afforded commercial as *505 opposed
plies to a “permanent structure constituting, or used
to noncommercial speech, in evaluating appellants'
for the display of, a commercial or other advertise-
contention we consider separately the effect of the
ment to the public.” 26 Cal.3d, at 856, n. 2, 164
ordinance on commercial and noncommercial
Cal.Rptr., at 513, n. 2, 610 P.2d, at 410, n. 2. With-
speech.
in that class, the only permitted signs are those (1)
identifying the premises on which the sign is loc- FN11. The California Supreme Court sug-
ated, or its owner or occupant, or advertising the gested that appellants, owners of billboard
goods produced or services rendered on such prop- businesses, did not have standing to raise

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 12
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
the argument that billboards may, for some in the form of a solicitation to pay or
individuals or groups, be the only afford- contribute money, New York Times Co.
able method of communicating to a large v. Sullivan, supra; Cantwell v. Connecti-
audience. 26 Cal.3d, at 869, n. 14, 164 cut, 310 U.S. 296 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84
Cal.Rptr., at 522, n. 14, 610 P.2d, at 419, L.Ed. 1213] (1940). If commercial
n. 14. In so holding, the California court speech is to be distinguished, it ‘must be
seems to have confused the category of distinguished by its content.’ [ Virginia
“commercial speech” with the category of Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer
individuals who have a “commercial in- Council, 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48
terest” in protected speech. We have held L.Ed.2d 346] 425 U.S., at 761 [96 S.Ct.,
that the overbreadth doctrine, under which at 1825].”
a party whose own activities are unprotec-
ted may challenge a statute by showing See also Virginia Pharmacy Board v.
that it substantially abridges the First Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Amendment rights of parties not before the 425 U.S. 748, 761, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1825,
court, will not be applied in cases in- 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976).
volving “commercial speech.” Bates v.
The extension of First Amendment protections to
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 381,
purely commercial speech is a relatively recent de-
97 S.Ct. 2691, 2707, 53 L.Ed.2d 810
velopment in First Amendment jurisprudence. Prior
(1977). However, we have never held that
to 1975, purely commercial advertisements of ser-
one with a “commercial interest” in speech
vices or goods for sale were considered to be out-
also cannot challenge the facial validity of
side the protection of the First Amendment.
a statute on the grounds of its substantial
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct.
infringement of the First Amendment in-
920, 86 L.Ed. 1262 (1942). That construction of the
terests of others. Were it otherwise, news-
First Amendment was severely cut back in Bigelow
papers, radio stations, movie theaters and
v. Virginia, supra. In Virginia Pharmacy Board v.
producers-often those with the highest in-
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
terest and the largest stake in a First
96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976), we plainly
Amendment controversy-would not be able
held that speech proposing no more than a commer-
to challenge government limitations on
cial transaction enjoys a substantial degree of First
speech as substantially overbroad. As the
Amendment protection: A State may not com-
opinion in Bates observed, id., at 363, 97
pletely suppress the dissemination of truthful in-
S.Ct., at 2698-2699:
formation about an entirely lawful activity merely
“[O]ur cases long have protected speech because it is fearful of that information's effect
even though it is in the form of a paid upon its disseminators and its recipients. That de-
advertisement, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 cision, however, did not equate commercial and
U.S. 1 [96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659] noncommercial speech for First Amendment pur-
(1976); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, poses; indeed, it expressly indicated the contrary.
376 U.S. 254 [84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d See id., at 770-773, and n. 24, 96 S.Ct., at
686] (1964); in a form that is sold for 1830-1831. See also id., at 779-781, 96 S.Ct., at
FN12
profit, Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 1834-1835 (STEWART, J., concurring).
[80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205] (1959);
FN12. Justice STEWART'S comments in
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
Virginia Pharmacy Board are worth quot-
[63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292] (1943); or
ing here:

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 13
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
“The Court's determination that commer- den and regulated in situations where the latter
cial advertising of the kind at issue here could not be. Id., at 379-381, 383-384, 97 S.Ct., at
is not ‘wholly outside the protection of’ 2706-2708, 2708-2709. In Ohralik v. Ohio State
the First Amendment indicates by its Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d
very phrasing that there are important 444 (1978), the Court refused ot invalidate on First
differences between commercial price Amendment grounds a lawyer's suspension from
and product advertising, on the one practice for face-to-face solicitation of business for
hand, and ideological communication on pecuniary gain. In the course of doing so, we again
the other. Ideological expression, be it recognized the common-sense and legal distinction
oral, literary, pictorial, or theatrical, is between speech proposing a commercial transaction
integrally related to the exposition of and other varieties of speech:
thought-thought that may shape our con-
cepts of the whole universe of man. Al- “To require a parity of constitutional protection
though such expression may convey fac- for commercial and noncommercial speech alike
tual information relevant to social and could invite dilution, simply by a leveling pro-
individual decisionmaking, it is protec- cess, of the force of the Amendment's guarantee
ted by the Constitution, whether or not it with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather
contains factual representations and even than subject the First Amendment to such a devi-
if it includes inaccurate assertions of talization, we instead have afforded commercial
fact.... speech a limited measure of protection, commen-
surate with its subordinate position in the scale of
“Commercial price and product advert- First Amendment values, while allowing modes
ising differs markedly from ideological of regulation that might be impermissible in the
expression because it is confined to the realm of noncommercial expression.” Id., at 456,
promotion of specific goods or services. 98 S.Ct., at 1918.
The First Amendment protects the ad-
vertisement because of the ‘information In *507Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
of potential interest and value’ con- U.S. 50, 69, n. 32, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2452, 49 L.Ed.2d
veyed, rather than because of any direct 310 (1976), Justice STEVENS stated that the dif-
contribution to the interchange of ideas.” ference between commercial price and product ad-
Id., at 779-780, 96 S.Ct., at 1834-1835 vertising and ideological communication permits
(references and footnotes omitted). regulation of the former “that the First Amendment
would not tolerate with respect to the latter.” See
*506 Although the protection extended to commer- also Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431
cial speech has continued to develop, commercial U.S., at 91-92, 97 S.Ct., at 1617-1618, and Fried-
and noncommercial communications,**2892 in the man v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 8-10, 99 S.Ct. 887, 893,
context of the First Amendment, have been treated 59 L.Ed.2d 100 (1979).
differently. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.
350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977), held Finally, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
that advertising by attorneys may not be subjected Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct.
to blanket suppression and that the specific advert- 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), we held: “The Con-
isement at issue there was constitutionally protec- stitution ... accords a lesser protection to commer-
ted. However, we continue to observe the distinc- cial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed
tion between commercial and noncommercial expression. The protection available for a particular
speech, indicating that the former could be forbid- commercial expression turns on the nature both of
the expression and of the governmental interests

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 14
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
served by its regulation.” Id., at 562-563, 100 S.Ct., in seeking to meet its ends. Indeed, it has stopped
at 2349-2350 (citation omitted). We then adopted a short of fully accomplishing its ends: It has not pro-
four-part test for determinating the validity of gov- hibited all billboards, but allows onsite advertising
ernment restrictions on commercial speech as dis- and some other specifically exempted signs.
tinguished from more fully protected speech. (1)
The First Amendment protects commercial speech FN13. The California Supreme Court had
only if that speech concerns lawful activity and is held in Varney & Green v. Williams, 155
not misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected Cal. 318, 100 P. 867 (1909), that a muni-
commercial speech is valid only if it (2) seeks to cipal ordinance prohibiting all advertising
implement a substantial governmental interest, (3) billboards purely for esthetic reasons was
directly advances that interest, and (4) reaches no an unconstitutional exercise of municipal
further than necessary to accomplish the given ob- police power. The court specifically over-
jective. Id., at 563-566, 100 S.Ct., at 2350-2351. ruled Varney in upholding the San Diego
ordinance at issue here. California's current
Appellants agree that the proper approach to be position is in accord with that of most oth-
taken in determining the validity of the restrictions er jurisdictions. See n. 15, infra.
on commercial speech is that which was articulated
in Central Hudson, but assert that the San Diego or- [4] The more serious question, then, concerns the
dinance fails that test. We do not agree. third of the Central Hudson criteria: Does the or-
dinance “directly advance” governmental interests
[3] There can be little controversy over the applica- in traffic safety and in the appearance of the city? It
tion of the first, second, and fourth criteria. There is is asserted that the record is inadequate to show any
no suggestion that the commercial advertising at is- connection between billboards and traffic safety.
sue here involves unlawful activity or is mislead- The California Supreme Court noted the meager re-
ing. Nor can there be substantial doubt that the twin cord on this point but held “as a matter of law that
goals that the ordinance seeks to further-traffic an ordinance which eliminates billboards designed
safety and the appearance of the city-are substantial to be viewed from streets and highways reasonably
FN13
*508 governmental goals. It is far too late to relates to traffic safety.” 26 Cal.3d, at 859, 164
contend otherwise**2893 with respect to either Cal.Rptr., at 515, 610 P.2d, at 412. Noting that
traffic safety, Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New “[b]illboards are intended to, and undoubtedly do,
York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 divert a driver's attention from the roadway,” ibid.,
(1949), or esthetics, see Penn Central Transporta- and that *509 whether the “distracting effect con-
tion Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. tributes to traffic accidents invokes an issue of con-
2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978); Village of Belle Terre tinuing controversy,” ibid., the California Supreme
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d Court agreed with many other courts that a legislat-
797 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33, 75 ive judgment that billboards are traffic hazards is
S.Ct. 98, 102, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954). Similarly, we re- not manifestly unreasonable and should not be set
ject appellants' claim that the ordinance is broader aside. We likewise hesitate to disagree with the ac-
than necessary and, therefore, fails the fourth part cumulated, common-sense judgments of local law-
of the Central Hudson test. If the city has a suffi- makers and of the many reviewing courts that bill-
cient basis for believing that billboards are traffic boards are real and substantial hazards to traffic
FN14
hazards and are unattractive, then obviously the safety. There is nothing here to suggest that
most direct and perhaps the only effective approach these judgments are unreasonable. As we said in a
to solving the problems they create is to prohibit different context, Railway Express Agency, Inc. v.
them. The city has gone no further than necessary New York, supra, at 109, 69 S.Ct., at 465:

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 15
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
FN14. See E. B. Elliott Advertising Co. v. constructed, can be perceived as an “esthetic harm.”
FN15
Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141, San Diego, like many States and other muni-
1152 (CA 5 1970); Markham Advertising cipalities, has chosen to minimize the presence of
FN16
Co. v. Washington, 73 Wash.2d 405, such structures. Such esthetic judgments are
420-421, 439 P.2d 248, 258 (1968); New necessarily subjective, defying objective evalu-
York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley ation, and for that reason must be carefully scrutin-
Motor Court, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 151, ized to determine if they are only a public rational-
155-156, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640, 642, 176 ization of an impermissible purpose. But there is no
N.E.2d 566, 568 (1961); Ghaster Proper- claim in this case that San Diego has as an ulterior
ties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 438, motive the suppression of speech, and the judgment
200 N.E.2d 328, 337 (1964); Newman involved here is not so unusual as to raise suspi-
Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741, 757 cions in itself.
(N.D.1978); Lubbock Poster Co. v. City of
Lubbock, 569 S.W.2d 935, 939 FN15. See John Donnelly & Sons v. Camp-
(Tex.Civ.App.1978); State v. Lotze, 92 bell, supra, at 11-12; E. B. Elliott Advert-
Wash.2d 52, 59, 593 P.2d 811, 814 (1979); ising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County,
Inhabitants, Town of Boothbay v. National supra, at 1152; Newman Signs, Inc. v.
Advertising Co., 347 A.2d 419, 422 Hjelle, supra, at 757; Markham Advert-
(Me.1975); Stuckey's Stores, Inc. v. ising Co. v. Washington, supra, at
O'Cheskey, 93 N.M. 312, 321, 600 P.2d 422-423, 439 P.2d, at 259; Stuckey's
258, 267 (1979); In re Opinion of the Stores, Inc. v. O'Cheskey, supra, at 321,
Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 270, 169 A.2d 762, 600 P.2d, at 267; Suffolk Outdoor Advert-
764 (1961); General Outdoor Advertising ising Co. v. Hulse, 43 N.Y.2d 483, 489,
Co. v. Department of Public Works, 289 402 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370, 373 N.E.2d 263,
Mass. 149, 180-181, 193 N.E. 799, 265 (1977); John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v.
813-814 (1935). But see John Donnelly & Outdoor Advertising Bd., 369 Mass. 206,
Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 11 (C.A.1 219, 339 N.E.2d 709, 717 (1975); Crom-
1980); State ex rel. Dept. of Transporta- well v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 269, 279
tion v. Pile, 603 P.2d, at 343; Metromedia, N.Y.S.2d 22, 26, 225 N.E.2d 749, 753
Inc. v. City of Des Plaines, 26 Ill.App.3d (1967); State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50
942, 946, 326 N.E.2d 59, 62 (1975). Haw. 33, 35-36, 429 P.2d 825, 827 (1967);
United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 42
“We would be trespassing on one of the most in- N.J. 1, 6, 198 A.2d 447, 449 (1964); In re
tensely local and specialized of all municipal Opinion of the Justices, supra, at 270-271,
problems if we held that this regulation had no 169 A.2d, at 764. But see State ex rel.
relation to the traffic problem of New York City. Dept. of Transportation v. Pile, supra, at
It is the judgment of the local authorities that it 342; Sunad, Inc. v. Sarasota, 122 So.2d
does have such a relation. And nothing has been 611, 614-615 (Fla.1960).
advanced which shows that to be palpably false.”
FN16. The federal Highway Beautification
*510 [5] We reach a similar result with respect to Act of 1965, Pub.L. 89-285, 79 Stat. 1028,
the second asserted justification for the ordinance- as amended, 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1976 ed. and
advancement of the city's esthetic interests. It is not Supp.III), requires that States eliminate
speculative to recognize that billboards by their billboards from areas adjacent to certain
very nature,**2894 wherever located and however highways constructed with federal funds.

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 16
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
The Federal Government, also prohibits door Advertising Co. v. Hulse, supra;
billboards on federal lands. 43 CFR § Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, supra;
2921.0-6(a) (1980). Three States have en- Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, supra;
acted statewide bans on billboards. Maine, United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of
Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., Tit. 23, § 1901 et seq. Raritan, 11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362 (1952)
(1980); Hawaii, Haw.Rev.Stat. § 264-71 et (Brennan, J.); United Advertising Corp. v.
seq., § 445-111 et seq. (1976); Vermont, Metuchen, supra; Stuckey's Stores, Inc. v.
Vt.Stat.Ann., Tit. 10, § 488 et seq. (1973). O'Cheskey, supra.
[6] It is nevertheless argued that the city denigrates In the first place, whether onsite advertising is per-
its interest*511 in traffic safety and beauty and de- mitted or not, the prohibition of offsite advertising
feats its own case by permitting onsite advertising is directly related to the stated objectives of traffic
and other specified signs. Appellants question safety and esthetics. This is not altered by the fact
whether the distinction between onsite and offsite that the ordinance is underinclusive because it per-
advertising on the same property is justifiable in mits onsite advertising. Second, the city may be-
terms of either esthetics or traffic safety. The ordin- lieve that offsite advertising, with is periodically
ance permits the occupant of property to use bill- changing content, presents a more acute problem
boards located on that property to advertise goods than does onsite advertising. See Railway Express,
and services offered at that location; identical bill- 336 U.S., at 110, 69 S.Ct., at 465. *512 Third, San
boards, equally distracting and unattractive, that ad- Diego has obviously chosen to value one kind of
vertise goods or services available elsewhere are commercial**2895 speech-onsite advertising-more
prohibited even if permitting the latter would not than another kind of commercial speech-offsite ad-
multiply the number of billboards. Despite the ap- vertising. The ordinance reflects a decision by the
parent incongruity, this argument has been rejected, city that the former interest, but not the latter, is
at least implicitly, in all of the cases sustaining the stronger than the city's interests in traffic safety and
distinction between offsite and onsite commercial esthetics. The city has decided that in a limited in-
FN17
advertising. We agree with those cases and stance-onsite commercial advertising-its interests
with our own decisions in Suffolk Outdoor Advert- should yield. We do not reject that judgment. As we
ising Co. v. Hulse, 439 U.S. 808, 99 S.Ct. 66, 58 see it, the city could reasonably conclude that a
L.Ed.2d 101 (1978); Markham Advertising Co. v. commercial enterprise-as well as the interested pub-
Washington, 393 U.S. 316, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 lic-has a stronger interest in identifying its place of
L.Ed.2d 512 (1969); and Newman Signs, Inc. v. business and advertising the products or services
Hjelle, 440 U.S. 901, 99 S.Ct. 1205, 59 L.Ed.2d available there than it has in using or leasing its
449 (1979). available space for the purpose of advertising com-
mercial enterprises located elsewhere. See Railway
FN17. See Howard v. State Department of Express, supra, at 116, 69 S.Ct., at 468
Highways of Colorado, 478 F.2d 581 (JACKSON, J., concurring); Bradley v. Public Util-
(C.A.10 1973); John Donnelly & Sons v. ities Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92, 97, 53 S.Ct. 577, 579,
Campbell, supra; John Donnelly & Sons, 77 L.Ed. 1053 (1933). It does not follow from the
Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., supra; fact that the city has concluded that some commer-
Donnelly Advertising Corp. v. City of Bal- cial interests outweigh its municipal interests in this
timore, 279 Md. 660, 668, 370 A.2d 1127, context that it must give similar weight to all other
1132 (1977); Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. commercial advertising. Thus, offsite commercial
v. Berle, 43 N.Y.2d 468, 402 N.Y.S.2d billboards may be prohibited while onsite commer-
359, 373 N.E.2d 255 (1977); Suffolk Out- cial billboards are permitted.

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 17
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
The constitutional problem in this area requires res- cerning goods and services connected with a partic-
olution of the conflict between the city's land-use ular site is of greater value than the communication
FN18
interests and the commercial interests of those of noncommercial messages.
seeking to purvey goods and services within the
city. In light of the above analysis, we cannot con- FN18. In John Donnelly & Sons v. Camp-
clude that the city has drawn an ordinance broader bell, 639 F.2d 6 (1980), the Court of Ap-
than is necessary to meet its interests, or that it fails peals for the First Circuit considered a
directly to advance substantial government in- statewide limitation on billboards, which
terests. In sum, insofar as it regulates commercial similarly afforded a greater degree of pro-
speech the San Diego ordinance meets the constitu- tection to commercial than to noncommer-
tional requirements of Central Hudson, supra. cial messages. That court took a position
very similar to the one that we take today:
it sustained the regulation insofar as it re-
V stricted commercial advertising, but held
unconstitutional its more intrusive restric-
[7] It does not follow, however, that San Diego's
tions on noncommercial speech. The court
general ban on signs carrying noncommercial ad-
stated: “The law thus impacts more heavily
vertising is also valid *513 under the First and
on ideological than on commercial speech-
Fourteenth Amendments. The fact that the city may
a peculiar inversion of First Amendment
value commercial messages relating to onsite goods
values. The statute ... provides greater re-
and services more than it values commercial com-
strictions-and fewer alternatives, the other
munications relating to offsite goods and services
side of the coin-for ideological than for
does not justify prohibiting an occupant from dis-
commercial speech.... In short, the statute's
playing its own ideas or those of others.
impositions are both legally and practically
As indicated above, our recent commercial speech the most burdensome on ideological
cases have consistently accorded noncommercial speech, where they should be the least.”
speech a greater degree of protection than commer- 639 F.2d, at 15-16. Other courts, however,
cial speech. San Diego effectively inverts this judg- have failed to give adequate weight to the
ment, by affording a greater degree of protection to distinction between commercial and non-
commercial than to noncommercial speech. There commercial speech and to the higher level
is a broad exception for onsite commercial advert- of protection to be afforded the latter. See
isements, but there is no similar exception for non- Donnelly Advertising Corp. v. City of Bal-
commercial speech. The use of onsite billboards to timore, 279 Md. 660, 370 A.2d 1127
carry commercial messages related to the commer- (1977); State v. Lotze, 92 Wash.2d 52, 593
cial use of the premises is freely permitted, but the P.2d 811 (1979). To the extent that this de-
use of otherwise identical billboards to carry non- cision is not consistent with the conclusion
commercial messages is generally prohibited. The reached in Lotze, we overruled our prior
city does not explain how or why noncommercial summary approval of that decision in 444
billboards located in places where commercial bill- U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 257, 62 L.Ed.2d 177
boards are permitted would be more threatening to (1979).
safe driving or would detract more from the beauty
*514 **2896 Furthermore, the ordinance contains
of the city. Insofar as the city tolerates billboards at
exceptions that permit various kinds of noncom-
all, it cannot choose to limit their content to com-
mercial signs, whether on property where goods
mercial messages; the city may not conclude that
and services are offered or not, that would other-
the communication of commercial information con-

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 18
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
wise be within the general ban. A fixed sign may be cial and industrial zones, San Diego must similarly
used to identify any piece of property and its own- allow billboards conveying other noncommercial
FN20
er. Any piece of property may carry or display reli- messages throughout those zones.
gious symbols, commemorative plaques of recog-
nized historical societies and organizations, signs FN20. Because a total prohibition of out-
carrying news items or telling the time or temperat- door advertising is not before us, we do not
ure, signs erected in discharge of any governmental indicate whether such a ban would be con-
function, or temporary political campaign signs. sistent with the First Amendment. But see
FN19 Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 101
No other noncommercial or ideological signs
meeting the structural definition are permitted, re- S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981), on the
gardless of their effect on traffic safety or esthetics. constitutional problems created by a total
prohibition of a particular expressive for-
FN19. In this sense, this case presents the um, live entertainment in that case. Despite
opposite situation from that in Lehman v. Justice STEVENS' insistence to the con-
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 94 trary, post, at 2909, 2910, and 2913, n. 16,
S.Ct. 2714, 41 L.Ed.2d 770 (1974), and we do not imply that the ordinance is un-
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 96 S.Ct. constitutional because it “does not abridge
1211, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976). In both of enough speech.”
those cases a government agency had
chosen to prohibit from a certain forum Similarly, we need not reach any de-
speech relating to political campaigns, cision in this case as to the constitution-
while other kinds of speech were permit- ality of the federal Highway Beautifica-
ted. In both cases this Court upheld the tion Act of 1965. That Act, like the San
prohibition, but both cases turned on Diego ordinance, permits on-site com-
unique fact situations involving govern- mercial billboards in areas in which it
ment-created forums and have no applica- does not permit billboards with noncom-
tion here. mercial messages. 23 U.S.C. § 131(c)
(1976 ed., Supp.III). However, unlike
[8] Although the city may distinguish between the the San Diego ordinance, which prohib-
relative value of different categories of commercial its billboards conveying noncommercial
speech, the city does not have the same range of messages throughout the city, the federal
choice in the area of noncommercial speech to eval- law does not contain a total prohibition
uate the strength of, or distinguish between, various of such billboards in areas adjacent to
communicative interests. See Carey v. Brown, 447 the interstate and primary highway sys-
U.S., at 462, 100 S.Ct., at 2291; *515Police Dept. tems. As far as the Federal Government
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96, 92 S.Ct. is concerned, such billboards are permit-
2286, 2290, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). With respect to ted adjacent to the highways in areas
noncommercial speech, the city may not choose the zoned industrial or commercial under
appropriate subjects for public discourse: “To allow state law or in unzoned commercial or
a government the choice of permissible subjects for industrial areas. 23 U.S.C. § 131(d).
public debate would be to allow that government Regulation of billboards in those areas is
control over the search for political truth.” Consol- left primarily to the States. For this reas-
idated Edison Co., 447 U.S., at 538, 100 S.Ct., at on, the decision today does not determ-
2333. Because some noncommercial messages may ine the constitutionality of the federal
be conveyed on billboards throughout the commer- statute. Whether, in fact, the distinction

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 19
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
is constitutionally significant can only be ing the message that is conveyed by a ... sign....
determined on the basis of a record es- The alternatives, then, are far from satisfactory.”
tablishing the actual effect of the Act on Id., at 93, 97 S.Ct., at 1618.
billboards conveying noncommercial It is apparent as well that the ordinance distin-
messages. guishes in several ways between permissible and
impermissible signs at a particular location by
Finally, we reject appellees' suggestion that the or- reference to their content. *517 Whether or not
dinance may be appropriately characterized as a these distinctions are themselves constitutional,
reasonable “time, place, **2897 and manner” re- they take the regulation out of the domain of
striction. The ordinance does not generally*516 ban time, place, and manner restrictions. See Consol-
billboard advertising as an unacceptable “manner” idated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n,
of communicating information or ideas; rather, it supra.
permits various kinds of signs. Signs that are
banned are banned everywhere and at all times. We
have observed that time, place, and manner restric- VI
tions are permissible if “they are justified without
Despite the rhetorical hyperbole of THE CHIEF
reference to the content of the regulated speech, ...
JUSTICE's dissent, there is a considerable amount
serve a significant governmental interest, and ...
of common ground between the approach taken in
leave open ample alternative channels for commu-
this opinion and that suggested by his dissent. Both
nication of the information.” Virginia Pharmacy
recognize that each medium of communication cre-
Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
ates a unique set of First Amendment problems,
U.S., at 771, 96 S.Ct., at 1830. Here, it cannot be
both recognize that the city has a legitimate interest
assumed that “alternative channels” are available,
in regulating the noncommunicative aspects of a
for the parties stipulated to just the opposite: “Many
medium of expression, and both recognize that the
businesses and politicians and other persons rely
proper judicial role is to conduct “ ‘a careful in-
upon outdoor advertising because other forms of
quiry into the competing concerns of the State and
advertising are insufficient, inappropriate and pro-
FN21 the interests protected by the guarantee of free ex-
hibitively expensive.” A similar argument
pression.’ ” Post, at 2917. Our principal difference
was made with respect to a prohibition on real es-
with his dissent is that it gives so little weight to the
tate “For Sale” signs in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. FN22
latter half of this inquiry.
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52
L.Ed.2d 155 (1977), and what we said there is FN22. Justice STEVENS' suggested stand-
equally applicable here: ard seems to go even further than THE
CHIEF JUSTICE in ignoring the private
FN21. See Joint Stipulation of Facts No.
interests protected by the First Amend-
28, App. 48a.
ment. He suggests that regulation of
“Although in theory sellers remain free to employ speech is permissible so long as it is not
a number of different alternatives, in practice biased in favor of a particular position and
[certain products are] not marketed through leaf- leaves open “ample” means of communica-
lets, sound trucks, demonstrations, or the like. tion. Post, at 2915. Nowhere does he sug-
The options to which sellers realistically are re- gest that the strength or weakness of the
legated ... involved more cost and less autonomy government's interests is a factor in the
than ... signs[,] ... are less likely to reach persons analysis.
not deliberately seeking sales information[,] ...
The Chief Justice writes that
and may be less effective media for communicat-

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 20
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
“[a]lthough we must ensure that any regulation lenged restriction is in fact a time, place,
of speech ‘further[s] a sufficiently substantial and manner restriction-the same standard
government interest’ ... given a reasonable ap- of review would apply regardless of the
proach to a perceived problem, this Court's duty outcome of that inquiry. As we demon-
... is to determine whether the legislative ap- strated above, the San Diego ordinance is
proach is essentially neutral to the messages con- not such a restriction and there is, there-
veyed and leaves open other adequate means of fore, no excuse for applying a lower stand-
FN23
conveying those messages.” Post, at 2920. ard of First Amendment review to that or-
dinance.
FN23. THE CHIEF JUSTICE correctly *518 **2898 Despite his belief that this is “the es-
notes that traditional labels should not be sence of ... democracy,” this has never been the ap-
substituted for analysis and, therefore, he proach of this Court when a legislative judgment is
correctly rejects any simple classification challenged as an unconstitutional infringement of
of the San Diego ordinance as either a FN24
First Amendment rights.
“prohibition” or a “time, place, and manner
restriction.” These “labels” or FN24. Nor has this Court ever accepted the
“categories,” however, have played an im- view that it must defer to a legislative
portant role in this Court's analysis of First judgment that a particular medium of com-
Amendment problems in the past. The munication is “offensive” and “intrusive,”
standard THE CHIEF JUSTICE himself merely because “other means [of commu-
adopts appears to be based almost exclus- nication] are available.” Post, at 2920.
ively on prior discussions of time, place,
and manner restrictions. See Heffron v. In- By “essentially neutral,” THE CHIEF JUSTICE
ternational Society for Krishna Conscious- may mean either or both of two things. He may
ness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 101 S.Ct. 2559, mean that government restrictions on protected
69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981); Consolidated Edis- speech are permissible so long as the government
on Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. does not favor one side over another on a subject of
530, 535, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 2332, 65 public controversy. This concept of neutrality was
L.Ed.2d 319 (1980); California v. LaRue, specifically rejected by the Court last Term in Con-
409 U.S. 109, 117, n. 4, 93 S.Ct. 390, 396, solidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n,
n. 4, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972); Adderley v. 447 U.S., at 537, 100 S.Ct., at 2333. There, the
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Kovacs v. Court dismissed the Commission's contention that a
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 prohibition of all discussion, regardless of the view-
L.Ed. 513 (1949). But this Court has never point expressed, on controversial issues of public
held that the less strict standard of review policy does not *519 unconstitutionally suppress
applied to time, place, and manner restric- freedom of speech. “The First Amendment's hostil-
tions is appropriately used in every First ity to content-based regulation extends not only to
Amendment case, or that it is the most that restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to
the First Amendment requires of govern- prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.”
ment legislation which infringes on protec- Ibid. On the other hand, THE CHIEF JUSTICE
ted speech. If this were the case, there may mean by neutrality that government restric-
would be no need for the detailed inquiry tions on speech cannot favor certain communicative
this Court consistently pursues in order to contents over others. As a general rule, this, of
answer the question of whether a chal- course, is correct, see, e. g., Police Dept. of Chica-
go v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 21
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, misunderstands the significance of the city's extens-
100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980). The general ive exceptions to its billboard prohibition. He char-
rule, in fact, is applicable to the facts of this case: acterizes these exceptions as “essentially negli-
San Diego has chosen to favor certain kinds of mes- gible,” post, at 2920, and then opines that it borders
sages-such as onsite commercial advertising, and on the frivolous to suggest that in “allowing such
temporary political campaign advertisements-over signs but forbidding noncommercial billboards, the
others. Except to imply that the favored categories city has infringed freedom of speech.” Post, at
are for some reason de minimis in a constitutional 2922. That, of course, is not the nature of this argu-
sense, his dissent fails to explain why San Diego ment.
should not be held to have violated this concept of
First Amendment neutrality. There can be no question that a prohibition on the
erection of billboards infringes freedom of speech:
Taken literally THE CHIEF JUSTICE's approach The exceptions do not create the infringement,
would require reversal of the many cases striking rather the general prohibition does. But the excep-
down antisolicitation statutes on First Amendment tions to the general prohibition are of great signific-
grounds: In each of them the city would argue that ance in assessing the strength of the city's interest
preventing distribution of leaflets rationally in prohibiting billboards. We conclude that by al-
furthered the city's interest in limiting litter, applied lowing commercial establishments to use billboards
to all kinds of leaflets and hence did not violate the to advertise the products and services they offer,
principle of government neutrality, and left open al- the city necessarily has conceded that some com-
ternative means of communication. See, e. g., Mar- municative interests, e. g., onsite commercial ad-
tin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862, 87 vertising, are stronger than its competing interests
L.Ed. 1313 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. in esthetics and traffic safety. It has nevertheless
147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939). Despite the banned all noncommercial signs except those spe-
dissent's assertion to the contrary, however, it has cifically excepted.
been this Court's consistent position that democracy
stands on a stronger footing when courts protect THE CHIEF JUSTICE agrees that in allowing the
First Amendment interests against legislative intru- exceptions to the rule the city has balanced the
sion, rather than deferring to merely rational legis- competing interests, but he argues that we trans-
lative judgments in this area: gress the judicial role by independently reviewing
the relative values the city has assigned to various
**2899 “Mere legislative preferences or beliefs communicative interests. He seems to argue that al-
respecting matters of public convenience may though the Constitution affords a greater degree of
well support regulation directed at other personal protection to noncommercial than to commercial
activities, but be insufficient to justify such as di- speech, a legislature*521 need not make the same
minishes the exercise of rights so *520 vital to choices. Post, at 2923. This position makes little
the maintenance of democratic institutions. And sense even abstractly, and it surely is not consistent
so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task with our cases or with THE CHIEF JUSTICE's own
falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances argument that statutes challenged on First Amend-
and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons ment grounds must be evaluated in light of the
advanced in support of the regulation of the free unique facts and circumstances of the case. Govern-
enjoyment of the rights.” Id., at 161, 60 S.Ct., at mental interests are only revealed and given con-
151. crete force by the steps taken to meet those in-
terests. If the city has concluded that its official in-
Because THE CHIEF JUSTICE misconceives the terests are not as strong as private interests in com-
nature of the judicial function in this situation, he

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 22
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
mercial communications, may it nevertheless claim provisions cannot be applied”); Liggett Co.
that those same official interests outweigh private v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541, 53 S.Ct. 481,
interests in noncommercial communications? Our 487, 77 L.Ed. 929 (1933) (“The operation
answer, which is consistent with our cases, is in the of this [severability clause] consequent on
negative. our decision is a matter of state law. While
we have jurisdiction of the issue, we deem
it appropriate that we should leave the de-
VII
termination of the question to the state
[9][10] Because the San Diego ordinance reaches court”); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286,
too far into the realm of protected speech, we con- 291, 44 S.Ct. 323, 325, 68 L.Ed. 686 (“In
FN25 cases coming from the state courts, this
clude that it is unconstitutional on its face.
The judgment of the California Supreme Court is Court, in the absence of a controlling state
reversed, and the case is remanded to that court. decision may, in passing upon the claim
FN26 under the federal law, decide, also, the
question of severability. But it is not ob-
FN25. Appellants contend that the ordin- liged to do so. The situation may be such
ance will effectively eliminate their busi- as to make it appropriate to leave the de-
nesses and that this violates the Due Pro- termination of the question to the state
cess Clause. We do not know, however, court”). This rule is reflected in the differ-
what kind of ordinance, if any, San Diego ent approaches this Court has taken to stat-
will seek to enforce in place of that which utory construction of federal and state stat-
we invalidate today. In any case, any ques- utes infringing on protected speech. Com-
tion of unconstitutional “takings” aside, pare United States v. Thirty-seven Photo-
the Due Process Clause does not afford a graphs, 402 U.S. 363, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 28
greater degree of protection to appellants' L.Ed.2d 822 (1971), with Freedman v.
business than does the First Amendment. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 60, 85 S.Ct. 734,
Since we hold that the First Amendment 739, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965). Since our
interests in commercial speech are not suf- judgment is based essentially on the inclu-
ficient to prevent the city from prohibiting sion of noncommercial speech within the
offsite commercial advertisements, no dif- prohibitions of the ordinance, the Califor-
ferent result should be reached under the nia courts may sustain the ordinance by
Due Process Clause. limiting its reach to commercial speech,
assuming the ordinance is susceptible to
FN26. Although the ordinance contains a this treatment.
severability clause, determining the mean-
ing and application of that clause is prop- It is so ordered.
erly the responsibility of the state courts. **2900 Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice
See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, BLACKMUN joins, concurring in the judgment.
497, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 1126, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 Believing that “a total prohibition of outdoor ad-
(1965) (“The record suffices ... to permit vertising is not before us,” ante, at 2896, n. 20, the
this Court to hold that, without the benefit plurality does not decide *522 “whether such a ban
of limiting construction, the statutory pro- would be consistent with the First Amendment,”
visions on which the indictments are foun- ibid. Instead, it concludes that San Diego may ban
ded are void on their face; until an accept- all billboards containing commercial speech mes-
able limiting construction is obtained, the sages without violating the First Amendment,

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 23
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
thereby sending the signal to municipalities that bi- sage while the first message is moved to
furcated billboard regulations prohibiting commer- another sign. In this way, the same hand
cial messages but allowing noncommercial mes- painted message will be moved
sages would pass constitutional muster. Ante, at throughout a metropolitan area over a
2899, n. 25. I write separately because I believe this six-month or twelve-month period.”
case in effect presents the total ban question, and App. 47a.
because I believe the plurality's bifurcated approach
itself raises serious First Amendment problems and The ordinance does not apply to such
relies on a distinction between commercial and signs as “a picket sign announcing a
noncommercial speech unanticipated by our prior labor dispute or a small sign placed in
cases. one's front yard proclaiming a political
or religious message.” 26 Cal.3d 848,
856, n. 2, 164 Cal.Rptr. 510, 513, 610
I P.2d 407, 410, n. 2 (1980).
As construed by the California Supreme Court, a FN2. I will sometimes refer to billboards
billboard subject to San Diego's regulation is “a ri- containing commercial speech messages as
gidly assembled sign, *523 display, or device per- “commercial billboards,” and billboards
manently affixed to the ground or permanently at- containing noncommercial speech mes-
tached to a building or other inherently permanent sages as “noncommercial billboards.”
structure constituting, or used for the display of, a
commercial or other advertisement to the public.” “signs designating the name of the owner or oc-
26 Cal.3d 848, 856, n. 2, 164 Cal.Rptr. 510, 513, cupant of the premises upon which such signs are
610 P.2d 407, 410, n. 2 (1980), quoting Cal.Rev. & placed, or identifying such premises; or signs ad-
Tex.Code Ann. § 18090.2 (West Supp.1970-1980). vertising goods manufactured or produced or ser-
FN1
San Diego's billboard regulation bans all com- vices **2901 rendered on the premises upon
mercial and noncommercial billboard advertising which such signs are placed.” App. to Juris.
FN2
with a few limited exceptions. The largest of Statement 107a.
these exceptions is for on-premises identification Other exceptions permit signs for governmental
signs, defined as functions, signs on benches at bus stops, com-
memorative plaques for *524 historical sites, reli-
FN1. According to Joint Stipulation of gious symbol signs, for sale signs, time/
Facts No. 25 entered into by the parties for weather/news public service signs, and temporary
purposes of cross-motions for summary political campaign signs erected for no longer
judgment: than 90 days and removed within 10 days after
the election to which they pertain. Id., at
“Outdoor advertising is presented in two FN3
111a-112a; ante, at 2886, n. 3.
basic standardized forms. A ‘poster pan-
el’ is a 12-foot by 24-foot sign on which FN3. Additional exceptions include signs
a pre-printed message is posted, in manufactured, transported, or stored in San
sheets. A ‘painted bulletin’ is generally a Diego so long as they are not used for ad-
14-foot by 48-foot sign which contains a vertising purposes; signs located within
hand painted message. The message will areas where such signs are not visible from
remain in one place for a period of time, the boundary of the premises; signs on
usually a month, and will then be disas- vehicles such as buses and taxicabs; signs
sembled and replaced by another mes- on other licensed commercial vehicles; and

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 24
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
temporary off-premises subdivision direc- Cops”; “Support San Diego's No-Growth

tional signs. App. to Juris. Statement Policy[:] Spend Your Money in Los
111a-112a. Angeles!”; “Voluntary Integration. Better
Education By Choice”; “Support America's
First Environment Strike. Don't Buy
II
Shell!”; and “Get US out! of the United
Let me first state the common ground that I share Nations.”
with the plurality. The plurality and I agree that
Although there are alternative channels for commu-
billboards are a medium of communication warrant-
nication of messages appearing on billboards, such
ing First Amendment protection. The plurality ob-
as newspapers, television, and radio, these alternat-
serves that “[b]illboards are a well-established me-
ives have never dissuaded active and continued use
dium of communication, used to convey a broad
of billboards as a medium of expression and appear
range of different kinds of messages.” Ante, at
to be less satisfactory. See Linmark Associates, Inc.
2889. See generally Tocker, Standardized Outdoor
v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93, 97 S.Ct. 1614,
Advertising: History, Economics and Self-
1618, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977). Indeed the parties ex-
Regulation, in Outdoor Advertising: History and
pressly stipulated that “[m]any businesses and
Regulation 11, 11-56 (J. Houck ed. 1969); F. Pres-
politicians and other persons rely upon outdoor ad-
brey, The History and Development of Advertising
vertising because other forms of advertising are in-
497-511 (1929). As the parties have stipulated, bill-
sufficient, inappropriate and prohibitively expens-
boards in San Diego have been used
ive.” Joint Stipulation of Facts No. 28, App. 48a.
“to advertise national and local products, goods Justice Black said it well when he stated the First
and services, new products being introduced to Amendment's presumption that “all present instru-
the consuming public, to publicize the ‘City in ments of communication, as well as others that in-
Motion’ campaign of the City of San Diego, to ventive genius may bring into being, shall be free
communicate messages from candidates for mu- from governmental censorship or prohibition.” Ko-
nicipal, state and national offices, including can- vacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102, 69 S.Ct. 448,
didates for judicial office, to propose marriage, to 461, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
seek employment, to encourage the use of seat
Where the plurality and I disagree is in the charac-
belts, to denounce the United Nations, to seek
terization of the San Diego ordinance and thus in
support for Prisoners of War and Missing in Ac-
the appropriate analytical framework to apply. The
tion, to promote the United Crusade and a variety
plurality believes that the question of a total ban is
of other charitable and *525 socially-related en-
not presented in this case, ante, at 2896, n. 20, be-
deavors and to provide directions to the traveling
cause the ordinance contains exceptions to its gen-
public.” Joint Stipulation of Facts No. 23, App.
FN4 eral prohibition. In contrast, my **2902 view is that
46a-47a.
the practical effect of the San Diego ordinance is to
eliminate the billboard as an effective medium of
FN4. Perusal of the photographs of bill- communication for the *526 speaker who wants to
boards included in the appendix to the jur- express the sorts of messages described Joint Stipu-
isdictional statement filed in this Court relation of Facts No. 23, and that the exceptions do
veals the wide range of noncommercial not alter the overall character of the ban. Unlike the
messages communicated through bill- on-premises sign, the off-premises billboard “is,
boards, including the following: “Welcome generally speaking, made available to ‘all-comers',
to San Diego[:] Home of 1,100 Underpaid in a fashion similar to newspaper or broadcasting

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 25
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
advertising. It is a forum for the communication of plurality's. Instead of relying on the exceptions to
messages to the public.” Joint Stipulation of Facts the ban to invalidate the ordinance, I would apply
FN5
No. 22(c), App. 46a. Speakers in San Diego no the tests this Court has developed to analyze con-
longer have the opportunity to communicate their tent-neutral *527 prohibitions of particular media
FN6
messages of general applicability to the public of communication. Most recently, in Schad v.
through billboards. None of the exceptions provides Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68
a practical alternative for the general commercial or L.Ed.2d 671 (1981), this Court assessed “the sub-
noncommercial billboard advertiser. Indeed, unless stantiality of the governmental interests asserted”
the advertiser chooses to buy or lease premises in and “whether those interests could be served by
the city, or unless his message falls within one of means that would be less intrusive on activity pro-
the narrow exempted categories, he is foreclosed tected by the First Amendment,” in striking down
from announcing either commercial or noncommer- the borough's total ban on live commercial enter-
cial ideas through a billboard. tainment. Id., at 70, 101 S.Ct., at 2183. Schad
merely articulated an analysis applied in previous
FN5. Outdoor advertising traditionally has cases concerning total bans of media of expression.
been classified into two categories: For example, in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
“on-premises” and “off-premises.” One 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939), the Court struck
commentator describes: down total bans on handbill leafletting because
there were less restrictive alternatives to achieve
“The on-premise classification of out-
the goal of prevention of litter, in fact alternatives
door advertising is referred to as the sign
that did not infringe at all on that important First
industry, in that signs are custom-made
Amendment privilege. Id., at 162, 60 S.Ct., at 151.
and are manufactured by a sign contract-
In Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63
or on premises not owned, leased or con-
S.Ct. 862, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943), the Court invalid-
trolled by the sign contractor or his
ated a municipal ordinance that forbade persons
agent. Such signs are used primarily for
from engaging in the time-honored activity of door-
the purpose of identifying a business, its
to-door solicitation. See also Jamison v. Texas, 318
products or its services at the point of
U.S. 413, 416-417, 63 S.Ct. 669, 671-672, 87 L.Ed.
manufacture, distribution or sale, hence
869 (1943) (distribution of handbills); Hague v.
on-premise.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 518, 59 S.Ct. 954, 965, 83
“Off-premise advertising is an advert- L.Ed. 1423 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.)
ising service for others which erects and (distribution of pamphlets). See generally Ely, Le-
maintains outdoor advertising displays gislative and Administrative Motivation in Consti-
on premises owned, leased or controlled tutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205, 1335-1336 (1970).
by the producer of the advertising ser-
FN6. Different factors come into play
vice.” Tocker, Standardized Outdoor
when the challenged legislation is simply a
Advertising: History, Economics and
time, place, or manner regulation rather
Self-Regulation, in Outdoor Advertising:
than a total ban of a particular medium of
History and Regulation 11, 15, 18 (J.
expression.
Houck ed. 1969).
Of course, as the plurality notes, “[e]ach method of
The characterization of the San Diego regulation as
communicating ideas is ‘a law unto itself’ and that
a total ban of a medium of communication has
law must reflect the ‘differing natures, values, ab-
more than semantic implications, for it suggests a
uses and dangers'**2903 of each method.” Ante, at
First Amendment analysis quite different from the

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 26
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
2889, quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, supra, at 97, 69 Although it contains an exception for signs “not
S.Ct., at 458 (Jackson, J., concurring). Similarly, in visible from any point on the boundary of the
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. premises,” App. to Juris. *530 Statement 111a,
546, 557, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 1246, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 billboards not visible from the street but neverthe-
(1975), this Court observed: “Each medium of ex- less visible from the “boundary of the premises” are
pression, of course, must be assessed for First not exempted from the regulation's prohibition.
Amendment purposes by standards suited *528 to
it, for each may present its own problems.” It is ob- FN7. Not 1 of the 11 cases cited by the
vious that billboards do present their own unique plurality in its footnote 14 stands for the
problems: they are large immobile structures that proposition that reviewing courts have de-
depend on eye-catching visibility for their value. At termined that “billboards are real and sub-
the same time, the special problems associated with stantial hazards to traffic safety.” These 11
billboards are not of a different genus than those as- cases merely apply the minimal scrutiny
sociated with commercial live entertainment in the rational relationship test and the presump-
borough of Mount Ephraim, or with door-to-door tion of legislative validity to hold that it
literature distribution in the city of Struthers. In the would not be unreasonable or inconceiv-
case of billboards, I would hold that a city may able for a legislature or city government to
totally ban them if it can show that a sufficiently conclude that billboards are traffic hazards.
substantial governmental interest is directly For example, in New York State Thruway
furthered by the total ban, and that any more nar- Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 10
rowly drawn restriction, i. e., anything less than a N.Y.2d 151, 156, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640, 642,
total ban, would promote less well the achievement 176 N.E.2d 566, 568 (1961), the court
of that goal. held:
Applying that test to the instant case, I would inval- “There are some, perhaps, who may dis-
idate the San Diego ordinance. The city has failed pute whether billboards and other ad-
to provide adequate justification for its substantial vertising devices interfere with safe driv-
restriction on protected activity. See Schad v. ing and constitute a traffic hazard ..., but
Mount Ephraim, supra, at 72, 101 S.Ct., at 2184. mere disagreement may not cast doubt
First, although I have no quarrel with the substanti- on the statute's validity. Matters such as
ality of the city's interest in traffic safety, the city these are reserved for legislative judg-
has failed to come forward with evidence demon- ment, and the legislative determination,
strating that billboards actually impair traffic safety here expressly announced, will not be
in San Diego. Indeed, the joint stipulation of facts disturbed unless manifestly unreason-
is completely silent on this issue. Although the able.”
plurality hesitates “to disagree with the accumu-
Only 5 of the 11 cases even discuss the
lated, common-sense judgments of local lawmakers
First Amendment. See Stuckey's Stores,
and of the many reviewing courts that billboards
Inc. v. O'Cheskey, 93 N.M. 312, 600
are real and substantial hazards to traffic safety,”
P.2d 258 (1979), appeal dism'd, 446 U.S.
ante, at 2893, I would not be so quick to accept leg-
930, 100 S.Ct. 2145, 64 L.Ed.2d 783
al conclusions in other cases as an adequate substi-
(1980); State v. Lotze, 92 Wash.2d 52,
tute for evidence in this case that banning bill-
FN7 593 P.2d 811, appeal dism'd, 444 U.S.
boards directly furthers traffic safety.
921, 100 S.Ct. 257, 62 L.Ed.2d 177
Moreover, the ordinance is not *529 **2904 nar-
(1979); Lubbock Poster Co. v. City of
rowly drawn to accomplish the traffic safety goal.
Lubbock, 569 S.W.2d 935

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 27
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
(Tex.Civ.App.1978), cert. denied, 444 where their true motivation was aesthet-
U.S. 833, 100 S.Ct. 63, 62 L.Ed.2d 42 ics. As the Hawaii Supreme Court com-
(1979); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, mented in State v. Diamond Motors, Inc.
268 N.W.2d 741 (N.D.1978), appeal , 50 Haw. 33, 36, 429 P.2d 825, 827
dism'd, 440 U.S. 901, 99 S.Ct. 1205, 59 (1967), in upholding a comprehensive
L.Ed.2d 449 (1979); Markham Advert- sign ordinance:
ising Co. v. Washington, 73 Wash.2d
405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dism'd, “[The City's] answering brief admittedly
393 U.S. 316, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed.2d ‘does not extend to supporting the pro-
512 (1969). Therefore, when the plural- position that aesthetics alone is a proper
ity states that “[t]here is nothing here to objective for the exercise of the City's
suggest that these judgments are unreas- police power.’ Perhaps, the ‘weight of
onable,” ante, at 2893, it is really saying authority’ in other jurisdictions per-
that there is nothing unreasonable about suaded the City to present the more tra-
other courts finding that there is nothing ditional arguments because it felt that it
unreasonable about a legislative judg- was safer to do so. However, the brief of
ment. This is hardly a sufficient finding The Outdoor Circle as amicus curiae
under the heightened scrutiny appropri- presents, as we think, a more modern
ate for this case. It is not surprising that, and forthright position ....
of the three cases cited in the plurality's
“... We are mindful of the reasoning of
footnote 14 that declined to accept the
most courts that have upheld the validity
traffic safety rationale, two were decided
of ordinances regulating outdoor advert-
under heightened scrutiny.
ising and of the need felt by them to find
There is another reason why I would some basis in economics, health, safety,
hesitate to accept the purported judg- or even morality.... We do not feel so
ment of lawmakers that billboards are constrained.” (Footnote omitted.)
traffic hazards. Until recently, it was
See also C. Haar, Land-Use Planning
thought that aesthetics alone could never
403-408 (3d ed. 1976).
be a sufficient justification to support an
exercise of the police power, and that Second, I think that the city has failed to show that
aesthetics would have to be accompanied its asserted interest in aesthetics is sufficiently sub-
by a more traditional health, safety, mor- stantial in the commercial and industrial areas of
als, or welfare justification. Indeed, the San Diego. I do not doubt that “[i]t is within the
California Supreme Court decision be- power of the [city] to determine that the community
low explicitly repudiated the holding of should be beautiful,” Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
a prior case, Varney & Green v. Williams 26, 33, 75 S.Ct. 98, 102, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954), but
, 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867 (1909), that that power may not be exercised in contravention of
held aesthetics to be an insufficient pre- the First Amendment. This Court noted in Schad
dicate for police power action. 26 that “[t]he [city] has presented no evidence, and it
Cal.3d, at 860-861, 164 Cal.Rptr., at is not immediately apparent as a matter of experi-
516, 610 P.2d, at 413. Therefore, in the ence, that live entertainment poses problems ...
case of billboard regulations, many cities more significant than those associated with various
may have used the justification of traffic permitted uses; nor does it appear that the [city] has
safety in order to sustain ordinances arrived at a defensible conclusion that unusual

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 28
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
problems are presented by live entertainment.” 452 contain older but useful commercial establish-
U.S., at 73, 101 S.Ct., at 2185. Substitute the word ments.” Joint Stipulation of Facts No. 8, App.
“billboards” for the words “live entertainment,” and 43a.
that sentence would equally apply to this case. A billboard is not necessarily inconsistent with
oil storage tanks, blighted areas, or strip develop-
It is no doubt true that the appearance of certain ment. Of course, it is not for a court to impose its
areas of the city would be enhanced by the elimina- own notion of beauty on **2905 San Diego. But
tion of billboards, but “it is not immediately appar- before deferring to a city's judgment, a court
ent as a matter of experience” that their elimination must be convinced that the city is seriously and
in all other areas as well would *531 have more comprehensively addressing aesthetic concerns
than a negligible impact on aesthetics. See John with respect to its environment. Here, San Diego
Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 23 has failed to demonstrate a comprehensive co-
(C.A.1 1980) (Pettine, J., concurring in judgment), ordinated effort in its commercial and industrial
summarily aff'd, 453 U.S. 916, 101 S.Ct. 3151, 69 areas to address other obvious contributors to an
FN8
L.Ed.2d 999. The joint stipulation reveals that unattractive environment. In this sense the ordin-
ance is underinclusive. See Erznoznik v. City of
FN8. Judge Pettine comments on Maine's
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214, 95 S.Ct. 2268,
statewide ban:
2275, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975). Of course, this is
“Even assuming that a total ban on bill- not to say that the city must address all aesthetic
boards will produce some aesthetic gain problems at the same time, or none at all. Indeed,
in all highway areas, the quantum of im- from a planning point of view, attacking the
provement will obviously vary with the problem *532 incrementally and sequentially
site involved. In undeveloped areas, it may represent the most sensible solution. On the
may very well be that signs and bill- other hand, if billboards alone are banned and no
boards are the principal eyesores; here, further steps are contemplated or likely, the com-
the benefit will be great, for their remov- mitment of the city to improving its physical en-
al would return the landscape to its vironment is placed in doubt. By showing a com-
pristine beauty. In industrial and comprehensive commitment to making its physical
mercial areas, however, signs and bill- environment in commercial and industrial areas
FN9
boards are but one of countless types of more attractive, and by allowing only nar-
FN10
manmade intrusions on the natural land- rowly tailored exceptions, if any, San Diego
scape. Without denying that some per- could demonstrate*533 that its interest in **2906
ceptible change for the better would oc- creating an aesthetically pleasing environment is
cur even here, I question whether the genuine and substantial. This is a requirement
margin of improvement obtained in these where, as here, there is an infringement of im-
areas can really justify the state's de- portant constitutional consequence.
cision to virtually eradicate commercial
FN9. For example, Williamsburg, Va., re-
speech by sign and billboard.” 639 F.2d,
quires that any building newly constructed
at 23.
or altered in the city “shall have such
“[s]ome sections of the City of San Diego are design and character as not to detract from
scenic, some blighted, some containing strips of the value and general harmony of design of
vehicle related commercial uses, some contain buildings already existing in the surround-
new and attractive office buildings, some func- ing area in which the building is located or
tional industrial development and some areas is to be located.” Williamsburg City Code

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 29
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
§ 30-80 (1979). torists brought about by distracting sign

displays; to ensure that signing is used as
FN10. Appellants argue that the exceptions identification and not as advertisement;
to the total ban, such as for on-premises and to preserve and improve the appear-
signs, undercut the very goals of traffic ance of the City as a place in which to
safety and aesthetics that the city claims as live and work.
paramount, and therefore invalidate the
whole ordinance. Brief for Appellants “It is the intent of these regulations to
42-43. But obviously, a city can have spe- protect an important aspect of the eco-
cial goals the accomplishment of which nomic base of the City by preventing the
would conflict with the overall goals ad- destruction of the natural beauty and en-
dressed by the total billboard ban. It would vironment of the City, which is instru-
make little sense to say that a city has an mental in attracting nonresidents who
all-or-nothing proposition-either ban all come to visit, trade, vacation or attend
billboards or none at all. Because I con- conventions; to safeguard and enhance
clude that the San Diego ordinance imper- property values; to protect public and
missibly infringes First Amendment rights private investment in buildings and open
in that the city has failed to justify the or- spaces; and to protect the public health,
dinance sufficiently in light of substantial safety and general welfare.” App. to Jur-
governmental interests, I need not decide, is. Statement 106a-107a.
as the plurality does in Part V of its opin-
ion, whether the exceptions to the total ban To achieve these purposes, the ordinance
constitute independent grounds for invalid- effects a general ban on billboards, but
ating the regulation. However, if a city can with an exception for on-premises iden-
justify a total ban, I would allow an excep- tification signs. Of course, each on-
tion only if it directly furthers an interest premises sign detracts from achieving
that is at least as important as the interest the city's goals of traffic safety and aes-
underlying the total ban, if the exception is thetics, but contributes to the alternative
no broader than necessary to advance the goal of identification. In this way San
special goal, and if the exception is nar- Diego seeks to achieve the best com-
rowly drawn so as to impinge as little as promise between the goals of traffic
possible on the overall goal. To the extent safety and aesthetics on the one hand,
that exceptions rely on content-based dis- and convenience for the public on the
tinctions, they must be scrutinized with other.
special care.
San Diego has shown itself fully capable
The San Diego billboard ordinance is a of drafting narrow exceptions to the gen-
classic example of conflicting interests. eral ban. For example, the city has pro-
In its section entitled “Purpose and In- mulgated special regulations for sign
tent,” the ordinance states: control in the La Jolla sign control dis-
trict:
“It is the purpose of these regulations to
eliminate excessive and confusing sign “The Sign Control District is intended to
displays which do not relate to the maintain the unique, distinctive charac-
premises on which they are located; to ter and economic value of the La Jolla
eliminate hazards to pedestrians and mo- area in the City of San Diego and to reg-

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 30
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
ulate advertising of commercial entered. and Supp.III).

prises ....
“One sign shall be permitted on each lot III

or parcel of real estate, ... provided ... :
The plurality's treatment of the commercial-
“Such sign shall not exceed 5"‘ x 8"‘ in noncommercial distinction in this case is mistaken
size and no part of such sign shall extend in its factual analysis of the San Diego ordinance,
more than four feet above the surface of and departs from this Court's precedents. In Part IV
the ground upon which it is erected.” Id., of its opinion, the plurality concludes that the San
at 113a-115a. Diego ordinance is constitutional insofar as it regu-
lates commercial speech. Under its view, a city
My views in this case make it unneces- with merely a reasonable justification could pick
sary to decide the permissibility of the and choose between those commercial billboards it
on-premise exception, but it is not incon- would allow and those it would not, or could totally
FN12
ceivable that San Diego could incorpor- ban all commercial billboards. In Part V, *535
ate an exception to its overall ban to the plurality concludes, however, that the San
serve the identification interest without Diego ordinance as a whole is unconstitutional be-
violating the Constitution. I also do not cause, inter alia, it affords a greater degree of pro-
decide the validity of the other excep- tection to commercial than to noncommercial
tions to the San Diego regulation. speech:
I have little doubt that some jurisdictions will easily FN12. The plurality comments that “the
carry the burden of proving the substantiality of city could reasonably conclude that a com-
their interest in *534 aesthetics. For example, the mercial enterprise-as well as the interested
parties acknowledge that a historical community public-has a stronger interest in identifying
such as Williamsburg, Va. should be able to prove its place of business and advertising the
that its interest in aesthetics and historical authenti- products or services available there than it
city are sufficiently important that the First Amend- has in using or leasing its available space
ment value attached to billboards must yield. See for the purpose of advertising commercial
Tr. of Oral Arg., 22-25. And I would be surprised if enterprises located elsewhere.” Ante, at
the Federal Government had much trouble making 2894 (emphasis added). But Central Hud-
the argument that billboards could be entirely son Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
banned in Yellowstone National Park, where their Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65
very existence would so obviously be inconsistent L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), demands more than a
with the surrounding landscape. I express no view rational basis for preferring one kind of
on whether San Diego or other large urban areas commercial speech over another.
FN11
will be able to meet the burden. See Schad v. Moreover, this case does not present legis-
Mount Ephraim, supra, 452 U.S., at 77, 101 S.Ct., lation implicating the “common-sense dif-
at 2187 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). But San ferences” between commercial and non-
Diego failed to do so here, and for that reason I commercial speech that “ ‘suggest that a
would strike down its ordinance. different degree of protection is necessary
to insure that the flow of truthful and legit-
FN11. Likewise, I express no view on the imate commercial information is unim-
constitutionality of the Highway Beautific- paired.’ ” Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Will-
ation Act of 1965, 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1976 ingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98, 97 S.Ct. 1614,

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 31
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977), quoting Vir- barbershop could advertise haircuts, a political
ginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens campaign headquarters could advertise “Vote for
Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, Brown,” or “Vote for Proposition 13.”
771-772, n.24, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1830-1831,
48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976). There is no sug- More importantly, I cannot agree with the plural-
gestion that San Diego's billboard ordin- ity's view that an ordinance totally banning com-
ance is designed to deal with “false or mis- mercial billboards but allowing noncommercial
FN13
leading signs.” Linmark Associates, Inc. v. billboards would be constitutional. For me,
Willingboro, supra, at 98, 97 S.Ct., at 1621 such an ordinance raises First Amendment prob-
. lems at least as serious as those raised by a total
ban, for it gives city officials the right-before ap-
“The use of onsite billboards to carry commercial proving a billboard-to determine whether the pro-
messages related to the commercial use of the posed message is “commercial” or
premises is freely permitted, but the use of other- “noncommercial.” Of course the plurality is correct
wise identical billboards to carry noncommercial when it observes that “our cases have consistently
messages is generally prohibited.... Insofar as the distinguished between the constitutional protection
city tolerates billboards at all, it cannot choose to afforded commercial as opposed to noncommercial
limit their content to commercial messages; the speech,” ante, at 2891, but it errs in assuming that a
city may not conclude that the communication of governmental unit may be put in the position in the
commercial information concerning goods and first instance of deciding whether the proposed
services connected with a particular site is of speech is commercial or noncommercial. In indi-
greater value than the communication of noncom- vidual cases, this distinction is anything but clear.
mercial messages.” Ante, at 2895. Because making such determinations would entail a
substantial exercise of discretion by a city's offi-
The plurality apparently reads the onsite premises cials, it presents a real danger of curtailing *537
exception as limited solely to commercial**2907 noncommercial speech in the guise of regulating
speech. I find no such limitation in the ordinance. commercial speech.
As notedsupra, the onsite exception allows “signs
designating the name of the owner or occupant of FN13. Of course, as a matter of market-
the premises upon which such signs are placed, or place economics, such an ordinance may
identifying such premises; or signs advertising prove the undoing of all billboard advert-
goods manufactured or produced or services ising, both commercial and noncommer-
rendered on the premises upon which such signs are cial. It may well be that no company would
placed.” App. to Juris. Statement 107a. As I read be able to make a profit maintaining bill-
the ordinance, the content of the sign depends boards used solely for noncommercial
strictly on the identity of the owner or occupant of messages. Although the record does not in-
the premises. If the occupant is a commercial enter- dicate how much of appellants' income is
prise, the substance of a permissible identifying produced by noncommercial communicat-
sign would be *536 commercial. If the occupant is ors, it would not be unreasonable to as-
an enterprise usually associated with noncommer- sume that the bulk of their customers ad-
cial speech, the substance of the identifying sign vertise commercial messages. Therefore,
would be noncommercial. Just as a supermarket or noncommercial users may represent such a
barbershop could identify itself by name, so too small percentage of the billboard business
could a political campaign headquarters or a public that it would be impossible to stay in busi-
interest group. I would also presume that, if a ness based upon their patronage alone.

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 32
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
Therefore, the plurality's prescription may cial.” 334 U.S., at 564, 68 S.Ct., at 1152 (dissenting
represent a de facto ban on both commer- opinion).
cial and noncommercial billboards. This is
another reason to analyze this case as a According such wide discretion to city officials to
“total ban” case. control the free exercise of First Amendment rights
is precisely what *538 has consistently troubled
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. this Court in a long line of cases starting with Lov-
900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), the Court reviewed a ell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451, 58 S.Ct. 666, 668,
statute prohibiting solicitation of money by reli- 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938). See, e. g., Southeastern Pro-
gious groups unless such solicitation was approved motions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S., at 552-553, 95
in advance by the Secretary of the Public Welfare S.Ct., at 1243-1244 (theatrical performance in city-
Council. The statute provided in relevant part: owned auditorium); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,
394 U.S. 147, 150-153, 89 S.Ct. 935, 938-940, 22
“Upon application of any person in behalf of such L.Ed.2d 162 (1969) (picketing and parading); Staub
[solicitation], the secretary shall determine v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 321-325, 78 S.Ct.
whether such cause is a religious one ... and con- 277, 281-284, 2 L.Ed.2d 302 (1958) (solicitation);
forms to reasonable standards of efficiency and Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294, 71 S.Ct. 312,
integrity, and, if he shall so find, shall approve 315, 95 L.Ed. 280 (1951) (public meetings); Saia v.
the same and issue to the authority in charge a New York, supra, 334 U.S., at 560-562, 68 S.Ct., at
certificate to that effect.” Id., at 302, 60 S.Ct., at 1149-1151 (sound trucks); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
902. supra, 310 U.S., at 307, 60 S.Ct., at 904
(solicitation); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S., at
The Court held that conditioning the ability to soli-
163-164, 60 S.Ct., at 151-152 (handbills); Hague v.
cit on a license, “the grant of which rests in the ex-
CIO, 307 U.S., at 516, 59 S.Ct., at 964 (handbills).
ercise of a determination by state authority as to
See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden bur-
427 U.S. 50, 93, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2463, 49 L.Ed.2d
den upon the exercise of liberty protected by the
310 (1976) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); Hynes v.
Constitution.” Id., at 307, 60 S.Ct., at 904-905. Spe-
Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 617,
cifically rejecting the State's argument that arbitrary
96 S.Ct. 1755, 1759, 48 L.Ed.2d 243 (1976); Police
and capricious acts of a state officer would be sub-
Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
ject to judicial review, the Court observed:
97, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2291, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972).
“Upon [the state official's] decision as to the
The plurality's bifurcated approach, I fear, will gen-
nature of the cause, the right to solicit funds de-
erate billboard ordinances providing the grist for
pends.... [T]he availability of a judicial remedy
future additions to this list, for it creates discretion
for abuses in **2908 the system of licensing still
where none previously existed.
leaves that system one of previous restraint
which, in the field of free speech and press, we It is one thing for a court to classify in specific
have held inadmissible.” Id., at 306, 60 S.Ct., at cases whether commercial or noncommercial
904. speech is involved, but quite another-and for me
dispositively so-for a city to do so regularly for the
See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560, 68 S.Ct.
purpose of deciding what messages may be commu-
1148, 1149, 92 L.Ed. 1574 (1948). As Justice
nicated by way of billboards. Cities are equipped to
Frankfurter subsequently characterized Cantwell :
make traditional police power decisions, see Saia v.
“To determine whether a cause is, or is not,
New York, supra, 334 U.S., at 564-565, 68 S.Ct., at
‘religious' opens too wide a field of personal judg-
1151-1152 (FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting), not
ment to be left to the mere discretion of an offi-

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 33
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
decisions based on the content of speech. I would store-to-store disparities in drug prices, giving his
be unhappy to see city officials dealing with the own and those of a competitor as proof. We see
following series of billboards and deciding which little point in requiring him to do so, and little dif-
ones to permit: the first billboard contains the mes- ference if he does not.” Id., at 764-765, 96 S.Ct., at
sage “Visit Joe's Ice Cream Shoppe”; the second, 1827. Cf. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
“Joe's Ice Cream Shoppe uses only the highest 111, 63 S.Ct. 870, 874, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943). In
quality dairy products”; the third, “Because Joe Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822, 95 S.Ct.
thinks that dairy products are good for you, please 2222, 2232, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975), the Court ob-
shop at Joe's Shoppe”; and the fourth, “Joe says to served that the advertisement of abortion services
support dairy price supports; they mean lower placed by a New York clinic in a Virginia weekly
prices for you at his Shoppe.” Or how about some newspaper-although in part a commercial advertise-
San Diego Padres baseball fans-with no connection ment-was far more than that:
to *539 the team-who together rent a billboard and
communicate the message “Support the San Diego “Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement con-
Padres, a great baseball team.” May the city decide veyed information of potential interest and value
that a United Automobile Workers billboard with to a diverse audience-not only to readers possibly
the message “Be a patriot-do not buy Japanese- in need of the services offered, but also to those
manufactured cars” is “commercial” and therefore with a general curiosity*540 about, or genuine
forbid it? What if the same sign is placed by interest in, the subject matter or the law of anoth-
FN14 er State and its development, and to readers seek-
Chrysler?
ing reform in Virginia. The mere existence of the
FN14. These are not mere hypotheticals Women's Pavilion in New York City, with the
that can never occur. The Oil, Chemical possibility of its being typical of other organiza-
and Atomic Workers International Union, tions there, and the availability of the services
AFL-CIO, actually placed a billboard ad- offered, were not unnewsworthy.”
vertisement stating: “Support America's
First Environment Strike. Don't Buy “The line between ideological and nonideological
Shell!” App. to Juris. Statement; see n. 4, speech is impossible to draw with accuracy.” Leh-
supra. What if Exxon had placed the ad- man v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 319,
vertisement? Could Shell respond in kind? 94 S.Ct. 2714, 2725, 41 L.Ed.2d 770 (1974)
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting). I have no doubt that
I do not read our recent line of commercial cases as those who seek to convey commercial messages
authorizing this sort of regular and immediate line- will engage in the most imaginative of exercises to
drawing by governmental entities. If anything, our place themselves within the safe haven of noncom-
cases recognize the difficulty in making a determin- mercial speech, while at the same time conveying
ation that speech is either “commercial” or their commercial message. Encouraging such beha-
“noncommercial.” In **2909Virginia Pharmacy vior can only make the job of city officials-who
Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., already are inclined to ban billboards-that much
425 U.S. 748, 764, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1827, 48 L.Ed.2d more difficult and potentially intrusive upon legit-
346 (1976), after noting that “not all commercial imate noncommercial expression.
messages contain ... a very great public interest ele-
ment,” the Court suggested that “[t]here are few to Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the
which such an element, however, could not be ad- California Supreme Court upholding the San Diego
ded.” The Court continued: “Our pharmacist, for billboard ordinance.
example, could cast himself as a commentator on
Justice STEVENS, dissenting in part.

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 34
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
If enforced as written, the ordinance at issue in this gree of protection to commercial than to noncom-
case will eliminate the outdoor advertising business mercial speech.” Ante, at 2895. And, second, be-
FN1
in the city of San Diego. The principal question cause the ordinance excepts certain limited categor-
presented is, therefore, whether a city may prohibit ies of noncommercial signs from the prohibition,
this medium of communication. Instead of answer- the city is guilty of “choos[ing] the appropriate sub-
ing that question, the plurality focuses its attention jects for public discourse.” Ante, at 2896.
on the exceptions from the total ban and, somewhat
ironically, concludes that the ordinance is an un- FN3. The ordinance does not define the
constitutional abridgment of speech because it does term “outdoor advertising display signs.”
FN2 The California Supreme Court adopted the
not abridge enough speech.
following definition to avoid overbreadth
FN1. The parties so stipulated. See Joint problems:
Stipulation of Facts No. 2, App. 42a,
quoted in n. 8, infra. “ ‘[A] rigidly assembled sign, display, or
device permanently affixed to the ground
FN2. That is the effect of both Justice or permanently attached to a building or
WHITE's reaction to the exceptions from a other inherently permanent structure
total ban and Justice BRENNAN's concern constituting, or used for the display of, a
about the city's attempt to differentiate commercial or other advertisement to the
between commercial and noncommercial public.’ ” 26 Cal.3d 848, 856, n. 2, 164
messages, although both of their conclu- Cal.Rptr. 510, 513, n. 2, 610 P.2d 407,
sions purportedly rest on the character of 410, n. 2 (1980).
the abridgment rather than simply its
quantity. FN4. As a practical matter, the plurality
may well be approving a total ban on bill-
*541 The plurality first holds that a total prohibi- boards, or at least on offsite billboards. For
tion of the use of “outdoor advertising display it seems unlikely that the outdoor advert-
FN3
signs” for commercial messages, other than ising industry will be able to survive if its
those identifying or promoting a business located only customers are those persons and or-
on the same premises as the sign, is permissible. I ganizations who wish to use billboards to
agree with the conclusion that the constitutionality convey noncommercial messages. See ante
of this prohibition is not undercut by the distinction , at 2907, n. 13 (BRENNAN, J., concurring
**2910 San Diego has drawn between onsite and in judgment).
offsite commercial signs, see ante, at 2895
(plurality opinion), and I therefore join Parts I *542 Although it is possible that some future ap-
through IV of Justice WHITE's opinion. I do not, plications of the San Diego ordinance may violate
however, agree with the reasoning which leads the the First Amendment, I am satisfied that the ordin-
plurality to invalidate the ordinance because San ance survives the challenges that these appellants
Diego failed to include a total ban on the use of have standing to raise. Unlike the plurality, I do not
billboards for both commercial and noncommercial believe that this case requires us to decide any
messages. While leaving open the possibility that a question concerning the kind of signs a property
total ban on billboards would be permissible, see owner may display on his own premises. I do,
FN4 however, believe that it is necessary to confront the
ante, at 2896, n. 20, the plurality finds two
flaws in the ordinance. First, because the ordinance important question, reserved by the plurality,
permits commercial, but not noncommercial, use of whether a city may entirely ban one medium of
onsite signs, it improperly “afford[s] a greater de- communication. My affirmative answer to that

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 35
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
question leads me to the conclusion that the San advertises products or services sold or
Diego ordinance should be upheld; that conclusion made available by the owner of the sign.
is not affected by the content-neutral exceptions
that are the principal subject of the debate between “(c) The outdoor advertising sign is,
the plurality and THE CHIEF JUSTICE. generally speaking, made available to
‘all-comers', in a fashion similar to
newspaper or broadcasting advertising.
I It is a forum for the communication of
messages to the public.
Appellants are engaged in the outdoor advertising
business. The parties stipulated that there are critic- “(d) The copy of the outdoor advertising
al differences between that business and so-called sign changes, usually monthly. For ex-
FN5
“onsite” or business signs. *543 Outdoor ad- ample, a particular sign may advertise a
vertising is presented on large, standardized bill- local savings and loan association one
boards which display a variety of commercial and month, a candidate for mayor the next
noncommercial messages that change periodically. month, the San Diego Zoo the third
FN6
The only information in the record**2911 month, a new car the fourth month, and a
about onsite signs is that they “advertise businesses, union grievance the fifth month.” Joint
goods or services available on the property on Stipulation of Facts No. 22, App.
which the sign is located.” Joint Stipulation of 45a-46a.
Facts No. 22, App. 45a. There is no evidence that
any onsite signs in San Diego of the permanent The importance of the distinction
FN7
character covered by the ordinance have ever between the outdoor advertising business
been used for noncommercial messages. in which appellants are engaged and the
use of “onsite” signs is supported by the
FN5. The parties' stipulation described fact that the respective kinds of signs are
these differences: produced by different manufacturers.
See Justice BRENNAN's opinion con-
“There is a difference between the out-
curring in the judgment, ante, at 2902, n.
door advertising business and ‘on-site’
5.
or business signs. On-site signs advertise
businesses, goods or services available FN6. The physical characteristics of out-
on the property on which the sign is loc- door advertising signs were established by
ated. On the other hand, the outdoor ad- stipulation:
vertising businesses lease real property
and erect signs thereon which are made “Outdoor advertising is presented in two
available to national and local advert- basic standardized forms. A ‘poster pan-
isers for commercial, political and social el’ is a 12-foot by 24-foot sign on which
messages. Outdoor advertising is differ- a pre-printed message is posted, in
ent from on-site advertising in that: sheets. A ‘painted bulletin’ is generally a
14-foot by 48-foot sign which contains a
“(a) The outdoor advertising sign seldom hand painted message.” Joint Stipulation
advertises goods or services sold or of Facts No. 25, App. 47a.
made available on the premises on which
the sign is located. FN7. The California Supreme Court's nar-
rowing construction of the ordinance, see
“(b) The outdoor advertising sign seldom

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 36
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
n. 3, supra, makes it applicable only to ri- Valuable commercial, political and so-
gidly assembled permanent signs. For that cial information is communicated to the
reason, the plurality is able to state that it public through the use of outdoor advert-
deals only “with the law of billboards.” ising. Many businesses and politicians
Ante, at 2889. and other persons rely upon outdoor ad-
vertising because other forms of advert-
If the ordinance is enforced, two consequences are ising are insufficient, inappropriate and
predictable. Appellants' large and profitable out- prohibitively expensive.” Joint Stipula-
FN8
door advertising businesses will be destroyed. tion of Facts No. 28, App. 48a.
Moreover, many persons who *544 now rent bill-
boards to convey both commercial and noncommer- FN10. Nor is there any evidence that the
cial messages to the public will not have access to total elimination of the outdoor advertising
FN9
an equally effective means of communication. business will have any economic effect on
There is no evidence, however, that enforcement of manufacturers of onsite signs. See Justice
the ordinance will have any effect whatsoever upon BRENNAN's opinion concurring in the
any property owner's use of onsite advertising judgment, ante, at 2902, n. 5.
FN10
signs. Nor is there anything in the record to
suggest that the use of onsite signs has had any ef- Appellants, of course, have standing to challenge
fect on the outdoor advertising business or on any the ordinance because of its impact on their own
of the consumers of offsite billboard space. commercial operations. Because this challenge is
predicated in part on the First Amendment, I agree
FN8. The parties stipulated to the econom- with the plurality and Justice BRENNAN that they
ic effects of the ordinance: also have standing to argue that the ordinance is in-
valid because of its impact on their customers-the
“If enforced as written, Ordinance No. persons who use their billboards to communicate
10795 will eliminate the outdoor advert- with the public. See ante, at 2890-2891, n. 11
ising business in the City of San Diego. (plurality opinion). I do not agree, however, that
they have any standing to assert the purely hypo-
“Plaintiffs' outdoor advertising displays
thetical claims of property owners whose on-site
produce substantial gross annual income.
advertising is entirely unaffected by the application
“Enforcement of Ordinance No. 10795 of the ordinance at issue in this case.
will prevent plaintiffs from engaging in
*545 This case involves only the use of permanent
the outdoor advertising business in the
signs in areas zoned for commercial and industrial
City of San Diego and will cause FN11
purposes. It is conceivable that some public-
plaintiffs to suffer substantial monetary
spirited or eccentric businessman**2912 might
losses.” Joint Stipulation of Facts Nos. 2,
want to use a permanent sign on his commercial
26, 32, App. 42a, 48a, 49a.
property to display a noncommercial message. The
FN9. By stipulation, the parties agreed that record, however, discloses no such use in the past,
the San Diego ordinance will limit the abil- and it seems safe to assume that such uses in the fu-
ity of some billboard users to communicate ture will be at best infrequent. Rather than specu-
their messages to the public: late about hypothetical cases that may be presented
by property owners not now before the Court, I
“Outdoor advertising increases the sales would judge this ordinance on the basis of its effect
of products and produces numerous dir- on the outdoor advertising market and save for an-
ect and indirect benefits to the public. other day any questions concerning its possible ef-

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 37
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
fect in an entirely separate market. 305, 311-315 [26 L.Ed. 1044] (1882); Hatch v.
Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160-161 [27 S.Ct. 188,
FN11. Appellants each own between 500 190-191, 51 L.Ed. 415] (1907); Yazoo & M. V. R.
and 800 outdoor advertising displays in Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217,
San Diego. See Joint Stipulation of Facts 219-220 [33 S.Ct. 40, 41, 57 L.Ed. 193] (1912);
No. 13, App. 44a. All of their signs are United States v. Wurzbach, [280 U.S.], at 399 [50
located in areas zoned for commercial and S.Ct., at 169]; Carmichael v. Southern Coal &
industrial uses. Joint Stipulation of Facts Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 513 [57 S.Ct. 868, 874,
No. 20, App. 45a. 81 L.Ed. 1245] (1937); United States v. Raines,
362 U.S. 17 [80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524] (1960)
The California Supreme Court's narrow-
. A closely related principle is that constitutional
ing construction of the ordinance was
rights are personal and may not be asserted vi-
specifically intended to exclude from the
cariously. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
coverage of the ordinance signs very dif-
420, 429-430 [81 S.Ct. 1101, 1106-1107, 6
ferent from commercial billboards, such
L.Ed.2d 393] (1961). These principles rest on
as “a picket sign announcing a labor dis-
more than the fussiness of judges. They reflect
pute or a small sign placed in one's front
the conviction that under our constitutional sys-
yard proclaiming a political or religious
tem courts are not roving commissions assigned
message.” 26 Cal.3d, at 856, n. 2, 164
to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation's
Cal.Rptr., at 513, n. 2, 610 P.2d, at 410,
laws. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52 [91
n. 2.
S.Ct. 746, 754, 27 L.Ed.2d 669] (1971). Constitu-
The few situations in which constitutional rights tional judgments, as Mr. Chief Justice Marshall
may be asserted vicariously represent exceptions recognized, are justified only out of the necessity
from one of the Court's most fundamental prin- of adjudicating rights in particular cases between
FN12 the litigants brought before the Court:
ciples of constitutional adjudication. Our ex-
planation of that principle in Broadrick v. Ok-
“ ‘So if a law be in opposition to the constitu-
lahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-611, 93 S.Ct. 2908,
tion; if both the law and the constitution apply to
2915, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (footnote omitted), merits
a particular case, so that the court must either de-
emphasis and repetition:
cide that case conformably to the law, disregard-
FN12. See, e. g., McGowan v. Maryland, ing the constitution; or conformably to the consti-
366 U.S. 420, 429, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1106, 6 tution, disregarding the law; the court must de-
L.Ed.2d 393: “[T]he general rule is that ‘a termine which of these conflicting rules governs
litigant may only assert his own constitu- the case. This is of the very essence of judicial
tional rights or immunities' ....” duty.’ Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 178 [2
L.Ed. 60] (1803).
“Embedded in the traditional rules governing
constitutional adjudication is the principle that a “In the past, the Court has recognized some
person to whom a statute may constitutionally be limited exceptions to these principles, but only
applied will not be heard to challenge that statute because of the most ‘weighty countervailing
on the ground that it may conceivably be applied policies.’ United States v. Raines, 362 U.S., at
unconstitutionally to others, *546 in other situ- 22-23 [80 S.Ct., at 523-524].”
ations not before the Court. See, e. g., Austin v.
The most important exception to this standing doc-
The Aldermen, 7 Wall. 694, 698-699 [19 L.Ed.
trine permits some litigants to challenge on First
224] (1869); Supervisors v. Stanley, 105 U.S.
Amendment grounds laws that may validly be ap-

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 38
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
plied against them but *547 which may, because of the Court's refusal to apply the overbreadth
their unnecessarily broad reach, inhibit the protec- doctrine in that case, acknowledged that an
ted speech of third parties. That exception plays a overbreadth challenge should not be enter-
vital role in our First Amendment jurisprudence. tained in every case raising First Amend-
FN13
But it is nonetheless a limited**2913 excep- ment issues:
tion. Because “[a]pplication of the overbreadth doc-
trine ... is, manifestly, strong medicine,” it is em- “We have never held that a statute
ployed “sparingly and only as a last resort.” Broad- should be held invalid on its face merely
rick, 413 U.S., at 613, 93 S.Ct., at 2916. As the because it is possible to conceive of a
Court explained in Broadrick, the doctrine will be single impermissible application, and in
applied only if the overbreadth of a statute is sub- that sense a requirement of substantial
stantial in relation to its “plainly legitimate sweep”: overbreadth is already implicit in the
doctrine.” 413 U.S., at 630, 93 S.Ct., at
FN13. See, e. g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 2925 (BRENNAN, J., joined by STEW-
380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d ART and MARSHALL, JJ., dissenting).
22; Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92
S.Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408; Keyishian v. *548 In my judgment, the likelihood that the San
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. Diego ordinance will have a significant adverse im-
675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629; Shuttlesworth v. pact on the users of onsite signs is sufficiently spec-
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 935, ulative and remote that I would not attempt to adju-
22 L.Ed.2d 162. dicate the hypothetical claims of such parties on
this record. Surely the interests of such parties do
“Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may not necessarily parallel the interests of these appel-
FN15
deter protected speech to some unknown extent, lants. Moreover, changes in the provisions of
there comes a point where that effect-at best a the ordinance concerning onsite advertising would
prediction-cannot, with confidence, justify inval- not avoid the central question that is presented by
idating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a appellants' frontal attack on the application of the
State from enforcing the statute against conduct ordinance to their own businesses and to their cus-
FN16
that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. tomers. I believe the Court should decide that
Cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, question and put the hypothetical claims of onsite
174-175 [89 S.Ct. 961, 966-967, 22 L.Ed.2d 176] advertisers entirely to one side.
(1969). To put the matter another way, particu-
larly where conduct and not merely speech is in- FN15. Indeed, the parties stipulated that
volved, we believe that the overbreadth of a stat- onsite advertising differs in significant re-
ute must not only be real, but substantial as well, spects from the outdoor advertising busi-
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitim- ness in which appellants are engaged. See
ate sweep. It is our view that § 818 is not sub- n.5, supra.
stantially overbroad and that whatever over-
FN16. Ironically, today the plurality inval-
breadth may exist should be cured through case-
idates this ordinance-not because it is too
by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its
broad-but rather because it is not broad
sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.” Id., at
enough. It assumes for the purpose of de-
615-616, 93 S.Ct., at 2917-2918 (footnote omit-
FN14 cision that a repeal of all exceptions, in-
ted).
cluding the exception for onsite advert-
FN14. Even the dissenting Justices in ising, would cure the defects it finds in the
Broadrick, although they disagreed with present ordinance. See ante, at 2896, n.20.

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 39
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
However, because neither the appellants has prospered in San Diego, it is obvious
nor the onsite advertisers would derive any that this medium is more effective than
benefits from a repeal of the exception for others for some forms of communication.
onsite commercial signs, the plurality's re- See n.8, supra.
liance on the overbreadth doctrine to sup-
port vicarious standing in this case is curi- FN19. See nn.8, 9, supra.
ous indeed.
The unequivocal language of the First Amendment
prohibits any law “abridging the freedom of
II speech.” That language could surely be read to
foreclose any law reducing the quantity of commu-
Just as the regulation of an economic market may nication within a jurisdiction. I am convinced,
either enhance or curtail the free exchange of goods however, that such a reading would be incorrect.
FN17
and services, so may regulation of the com- My conviction is supported by a hypothetical ex-
munications market sometimes facilitate and some- ample, by the Court's prior cases, and by an ap-
times inhibit the exchange of information ideas, and praisal of the healthy character of the communica-
impressions. Procedural rules in a deliberative body tions market.
are designed to improve the quality of debate. Our
*549 cases upholding regulation of the time, place, Archaeologists use the term “graffiti” to describe
or manner of communication have been decided on informal inscriptions on tombs and ancient monu-
the **2914 implicit assumption that the net effect ments. The graffito was familiar in the culture of
of the regulation on free expression would not be Egypt and Greece, in the Italian decorative art of
adverse. In this case, however, that assumption can- the 15th century, and it survives today in some sub-
FN20
not be indulged. ways and on the walls of public buildings. It
is *550 an inexpensive means of communicating
FN17. Compare Chicago Board of Trade v. political, commercial, and frivolous messages to
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 38 S.Ct. 242, large numbers of people; some creators of graffiti
62 L.Ed. 683 with United States v. Trenton have no effective alternative means of publicly ex-
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 47 S.Ct. 377, pressing themselves. Nevertheless, I believe a com-
71 L.Ed. 700. munity has the right to decide that its interests in
protecting property from damaging trespasses and
The parties have stipulated, correctly in my view,
FN18 in securing beautiful surroundings outweigh the
that the net effect of the city's ban on bill-
countervailing interest in uninhibited expression by
boards will be a reduction in the total quantity of
means of words and pictures in public places. If the
communication in San Diego. If the ban is en-
First Amendment categorically protected the mar-
forced, some present users of billboards will not be
ketplace of ideas from any quantitative restraint, a
able to communicate in the future as effectively as
FN19 municipality could not outlaw graffiti.
they do now. This ordinance cannot, there-
fore, be sustained on the assumption that the re- FN20. See generally A. Read Classic
maining channels of communication will be just as American Graffiti (1977); R. Reisner,
effective for all persons as a communications mar- Graffiti: Two Thousand Years of Wall
ketplace which includes a thousand or more large Writing (1971); V. Pritchard, English Me-
billboards available for hire. dieval Graffiti (1967).
FN18. Because the record makes it clear Our prior decisions are not inconsistent with this
that the business of operating billboards proposition. Whether one interprets the Court's de-

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 40
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
cision in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. which adequately protect a community
448, 93 L.Ed. 513, as upholding a total ban on the from unreasonable use of public speak-
use of sound trucks, or merely a ban on the “loud ing devices without absolutely denying
and raucous” use of amplifiers, the case at least to the community's citizens all informa-
stands for the proposition that a municipality may tion that may be disseminated or re-
enforce a rule that curtails the effectiveness of a ceived through this new avenue for trade
FN21
particular means of communication. Even the in ideas. I would agree without reserva-
dissenting Justices in that case thought it obvious tion to the sentiment that ‘unrestrained
that “cities may restrict or absolutely ban the use of use throughout a municipality of all
amplifiers on busy streets in the business area.” Id., sound amplifying devices would be in-
at 104, 69 S.Ct., at 462 (Black, J., joined by tolerable.’ And of course cities may re-
FN22
Douglas and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting). Ko- strict or absolutely ban the use of ampli-
vacs, I believe,*551 forecloses any claim that a pro- fiers on busy streets in the business area.
hibition of billboards **2915 must fall simply be- A city ordinance that reasonably restricts
cause it has some limitating effect on the commu- the volume of sound, or the hours during
FN23
nications market. which an amplifer may be used, does
not, in my mind, infringe the constitu-
FN21. In his opinion announcing the judg- tionality protected area of free speech. It
ment of the Court, Justice Reed wrote: is because this ordinance does none of
these things, but is instead an absolute
“That more people may be more easily
prohibition of all uses of an amplifier on
and cheaply reached by sound trucks,
any streets of Trenton at any time that I
perhaps borrowed without cost from
must dissent.” Id., at 104, 69 S.Ct., at
some zealous supporter, is not enough to
462.
call forth constitutional protection for
what those charged with public welfare FN23. Our decisions invalidating ordin-
reasonably think is a nuisance when easy ances prohibiting or regulating door-
means of publicity are open.” 336 U.S., to-door solicitation and leafletting are not
at 88-89, 69 S.Ct., at 454. to the contrary. In those cases, the state in-
terests the ordinances purported to serve-
FN22. That excerpt from Justice Black's
for instance, the prevention of littering or
dissent is not, of course, sufficient evid-
fraud-were only indirectly furthered by the
ence to tell us whether or not he would
regulation of communicative activity. See,
have upheld a city's total ban on billboards.
e. g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
It does seem clear, however, that he did
162, 164, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151, 152, 84 L.Ed.
not adopt the absolute position that any re-
155; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
duction in the quantity of effective com-
141, 147-148, 63 S.Ct. 862, 865, 87 L.Ed.
munication is categorically prohibited by
1313; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
the First Amendment. The full paragraph
296, 306, 60 S.Ct. 900, 904, 84 L.Ed.
in which the quoted phrase appears reads:
1213; Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
“I am aware that the ‘blare’ of this new Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 636-639, 100
method of carrying ideas is susceptible S.Ct. 826, 834-836, 63 L.Ed.2d 73. In
of abuse and may under certain circum- many of the cases the ordinances provided
stances constitute an intolerable nuis- for a licensing scheme, rather than a
ance. But ordinances can be drawn blanket prohibition. The discretion thus

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 41
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
placed in the hands of municipal officials the entire city except its most unsightly sections, or
was found constitutionally offensive be- is citywide, it unquestionably will limit the quantity
cause of the risk of censorship. See, e. g., of communication. Moreover, the interests served
Schneider, supra, at 163-164, 60 S.Ct., at by the ban are equally legitimate and substantial in
151-152; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, all parts of the city. Those interests are both psy-
516, 59 S.Ct. 954, 964, 83 L.Ed. 1423 chological and economic. The character of the en-
(opinion of Roberts, J.); Lovell v. Griffin, vironment affects property values and the quality of
303 U.S. 444, 451-452, 58 S.Ct. 666, life not only for the suburban resident but equally
668-669, 82 L.Ed. 949; Cantwell, supra, at so for the individual who toils in a factory or in-
305-307, 60 S.Ct., at 904. In addition, be- vests his capital in industrial properties.
cause many of these cases involved the so-
licitation efforts of the Jehovah's Wit- Because the legitimacy of the interests supporting a
nesses, see, e. g., Lovell, supra, at 448, 58 city-wide zoning plan designed to improve the en-
S.Ct., at 667; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. tire municipality are beyond dispute, in my judg-
413, 413-414, 63 S.Ct. 669, 670, 87 L.Ed. ment the constitutionality of the prohibition of out-
869; Schneider, supra, at 158, 60 S.Ct., at door advertising involves two separate questions.
149; Martin, supra, at 142, 63 S.Ct., at First, is there any reason to believe that the regula-
862; Cantwell, supra, at 300, 60 S.Ct., at tion is biased in favor of one point of view or an-
901, the Court was properly sensitive to other, or that it is a subtle method of regulating the
the risk that the ordinances could be used controversial subjects that may be placed on the
to suppress unpopular viewpoints. agenda for public debate? Second, is it fair to con-
clude that the market which remains open for the
In this case, as the plurality acknow- communication of both popular and unpopular
ledges, the ban on billboards directly ideas is ample and not threatened with gradually in-
serves, and indeed is necessary to fur- creasing restraints?
ther, the city's legitimate interests in
traffic safety and aesthetics. See ante, at In this case, there is not even a hint of bias or cen-
2892-2894, 2894. San Diego's ordinance sorship in the city's actions. Nor **2916 is there
places no discretion in any municipal of- any reason to believe that the overall communica-
ficials, and there is no reason to suspect tions market in San Diego is inadequate.*553 In-
that the ordinance was designed or is be- deed, it may well be true in San Diego as in other
ing applied to suppress unpopular view- metropolitan areas that the volume of communica-
points. tion is excessive and that the public is presented
with too many words and pictures to recognize
*552 I therefore assume that some total prohibitions those that are most worthy of attention. In any
may be permissible. It seems to be accepted by all event, I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that
that a zoning regulation excluding billboards from nothing in this record suggests that the ordinance
residential neighborhoods is justified by the interest poses a threat to the interests protected by the First
in maintaining pleasant surroundings and enhancing Amendment.
property values. The same interests are at work in
commercial and industrial zones. Reasonable men
III
may assign different weights to the conflicting in-
terests, but in constitutional terms I believe the es- If one is persuaded, as I am, that a wholly impartial
sential inquiry is the same throughout the city. For FN24
total ban on billboards would be permissible,
whether the ban is limited to residential areas, to it is difficult to understand why the exceptions in

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 42
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
San Diego's ordinance present any additional threat To the extent that the exceptions relate to subject
FN25
to the interests protected by the First Amendment. matter at all, I can find no suggestion on the
The plurarity suggests that, because the exceptions face of the ordinance that San Diego is attempting
are based in part on the subject matter of noncom- to influence public opinion or to limit public debate
mercial speech, the city somehow is choosing the on particular issues. Except for the provision allow-
permissible subjects for public debate. See ante, at ing signs to be used for political campaign purposes
2896. While this suggestion is consistent with some for limited periods, see § 101.0700(F)(12), none of
of the broad dictum in Consolidated Edison Co. v. the exceptions even arguably relates to any contro-
Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 100 S.Ct. versial subject matter. As a whole they allow a
2326, 65 L.Ed.2d 319, it does not withstand analys- greater dissemination of information than could oc-
is in this case. cur under a total plan. Moreover, it was surely reas-
onable for the city to conclude that exceptions for
FN24. It seems fair to infer that Justice clocks, thermometers, historic plaques, and the like,
Douglas, who cast the deciding vote in would have a **2917 lesser impact on the appear-
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 ance of the city than the typical large billboards.
U.S. 298, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 41 L.Ed.2d 770,
would have approved of a prohibition on FN25. Most of the ordinance's 12 excep-
billboards. See his opinion concurring in tions, quoted ante, at 2886, n. 3 (opinion of
the judgment, id., at 306-308, 94 S.Ct., at WHITE, J.), are not based on the subject
2718-2719. After drawing an analogy matter of speech. Several exceptions can
between billboards and advertising on mu- be disregarded because they pertain to
nicipal vehicles, Justice Douglas noted: signs that are not within the coverage of
the ordinance at any rate, in light of the
“In my view the right of the commuters California Supreme Court's limiting con-
to be free from forced intrusions on their struction. See n. 3, supra. The exceptions
privacy precludes the city from trans- relating to vehicular signs fall into this cat-
forming its vehicles of public transporta- egory, see §§ 101.0700(F)(9), (10), as do
tion into forums for the dissemination of the exceptions for signs in transit and stor-
ideas upon this captive audience.” Id., at age, see § 101.0700(F)(3), and for tempor-
307, 94 S.Ct., at 2719. ary subdivision directional signs, see §
101.0700(F)(11). The exception for “for
The essential concern embodied in the First
sale” signs also appears to describe signs
Amendment is that government not impose its
not covered by the ordinance since such
viewpoint on the public or select the topics on
signs ordinarily are not “permanently af-
which public debate is permissible. The San Diego
fixed to the ground or permanently at-
ordinance simply does not implicate this concern.
tached to a building.” Of the remaining ex-
Although Consolidated Edison broadly identified
ceptions, two are based on the location,
regulations based on the subject matter of speech as
rather than content, of the signs, see §§
impermissible content-based regulations, essential
101.0700(F)(2), (6), and a third permits
First Amendment concerns *554 were implicated in
signs required by law or otherwise erected
that case because the government was attempting to
in discharge of governmental functions,
limit discussion of controversial topics, see id., at
see § 101.0700(F)(1). Thus, only four ex-
533, 100 S.Ct., at 2330, and thus was shaping the
ceptions are actually based in any way on
agenda for public debate. The neutral exceptions in
the subject matter of the signs at issue. See
the San Diego ordinance do not present this danger.
§§ 101.0700(F)(4), (5), (8), (12).

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 43
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
The exception for political campaign signs presents Relying on simplistic platitudes about content, sub-
a different question. For I must assume that these ject matter, and the dearth of other means to com-
signs may be *555 just as unsightly and hazardous municate, the *556 billboard industry attempts to
as other offsite billboards. Nevertheless, the fact escape the real and growing problems every muni-
that the community places a special value on allow- cipality faces in protecting safety and preserving
ing additional communication to occur during polit- the environment in an urban area. The Court's dis-
ical campaigns is surely consistent with the in- position of the serious issues involved exhibits in-
terests the First Amendment was designed to pro- sensitivity to the impact of these billboards on those
tect. Of course, if there were reason to believe that who must live with them and the delicacy of the le-
billboards were especially useful to one political gislative judgments involved in regulating them.
party or candidate, this exception would be suspect. American cities desiring to mitigate the dangers
But nothing of that sort is suggested by this record. mentioned must, as a matter of federal constitution-
In the aggregate, therefore, it seems to me that the al law, elect between two unsatisfactory options:
exceptions in this ordinance cause it to have a less (a) allowing all “noncommercial” signs, no matter
serious effect on the communications market than how many, how dangerous, or how damaging to the
would a total ban. environment; or (b) forbidding signs altogether. In-
deed, lurking in the recesses of today's opinions is a
In sum, I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that not-so-veiled threat that the second option, too,
nothing more than a rather doctrinaire application may soon be withdrawn. This is the long arm and
of broad statements that were made in other con- voracious appetite of federal power-this time judi-
texts may support a conclusion that this ordinance cial power-with a vengeance, reaching and absorb-
is unconstitutional because it includes a limited ing traditional concepts of local authority.
group of exceptions that neither separately nor in
the aggregate compromise “our zealous adherence
to the principle that the government may not tell the (1)
citizen what he may or may not say.” Young v.
This case presents the Court with its first occasion
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63, 96
to address the constitutionality of billboard regula-
S.Ct. 2440, 2448, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (opinion of
tion by local government. I fear that those joining
STEVENS, J.). None of the exceptions is even ar-
in today's disposition have become mesmerized
guably “conditioned upon the sovereign's agree-
with broad, but not controlling, language appearing
ment with what a speaker may intend to say.” Ibid.
in our prior opinions but now torn from its original
Accordingly, and for the reasons stated in greater
setting. They overlook a cogent admonition to
detail by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, I respectfully dis-
avoid
sent.
Chief Justice BURGER, dissenting. “mechanically apply[ing] the doctrines developed
Today the Court takes an extraordinary-even a in other contexts.... The unique situation presen-
bizarre-step by severely limiting the power of a city ted by this ordinance calls, as cases in this area so
to act on risks it perceives to traffic safety and the often do, for a careful inquiry into the competing
environment posed by large, permanent billboards. concerns of the State and the interests protected
Those joining the plurality opinion invalidate a by the guarantee of free expression.” Young v.
city's effort to minimize these traffic hazards and American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76,
eyesores simply because, in exercising rational le- 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2455, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976)
gislative judgment, it has chosen to permit a narrow (POWELL, J., concurring).
class of signs that serve special needs.
**2918 See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 44
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 134, 77, 97, 69 S.Ct. 448, 458, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949)
FN1
93 S.Ct. 2080, 2102, 36 L.Ed.2d 772 (1973) (Jackson, J., concurring). The uniqueness of
(STEWART, J., concurring). *558 the medium, the availability of alternative
means of communication, and the public interest
*557 It is not really relevant whether the San Diego the regulation serves are important factors to be
ordinance is viewed as a regulation regarding time, weighed; and the balance very well may shift when
place, and manner, or as a total prohibition on a attention is turned from one medium to another.
medium with some exceptions defined, in part, by Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Con-
content. Regardless of the label we give it, we are sciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69
discussing a very simple and basic question: the au- L.Ed.2d 298 (1981). Regulating newspapers, for ex-
thority of local government to protect its citizens' ample, is vastly different from regulating bill-
legitimate interests in traffic safety and the environ- boards.
ment by eliminating distracting and ugly structures
from its buildings and roadways, to define which FN1. For example, because of the limited
billboards actually pose that danger, and to decide spectrum available and the peculiar intrus-
whether, in certain instances, the public's need for iveness of the medium, broadcasting is
information outweighs the dangers perceived. The subject to limitations that would be intoler-
billboard industry's superficial sloganeering is no able if applied to other forms of commu-
substitute for analysis, and the plurality opinion and nication. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
the opinion concurring in the judgment adopt much U.S. 726, 748-749, 98 S.Ct. 3026,
of that approach uncritically. General constitutional 3039-3040, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978). Com-
principles indeed apply, but “each case ultimately pare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
must depend on its own specific facts ....” 395 U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 23 L.Ed.2d
Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 371 (1969), with Miami Herald Publishing
209, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 2272, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975). Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S.Ct.
2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974). For the same
reason, certain media may mix the form
(2)
with the substance of the communication
and the permissible range of regulation is
(a) correspondingly narrower than when the
message is completely separable from the
medium used to convey it.
As all those joining in today's disposition necessar-
ily recognize, “ ‘[e]ach medium of expression ... Some level of protection is generally afforded to
must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by the medium a speaker chooses, but as we have held
standards suited to it, for each may present its own just this past week in Heffron, “the First Amend-
problems.’ ” Ante, at 2889, n.8 (plurality opinion); ment does not guarantee the right to communicate
ante, at 2902 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judg- one's views at all times and places or in any manner
ment) (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., v. that may be desired.” Id., at 647, 101 S.Ct., at 2563
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 1245, 43 (emphasis added). Justice Black, speaking for the
L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)). Accord, California v. LaRue, Court in Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48, 87
409 U.S. 109, 117, 93 S.Ct. 390, 396, 34 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 242, 247, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966) (emphasis
342 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, added), “vigorously and forthrightly rejected” the
395 U.S. 367, 386, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1804 (1969); notion that “people who want to propagandize
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503, protests or views have a constitution right to do so
23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1952); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 45
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
whenever and however and wherever they please.” ciently important governmental interest in regu-
lating the nonspeech element can justify incident-
In Kovacs v. Cooper, supra, the Court upheld a mu- al limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”
nicipal ordinance that totally banned sound trucks
from a town's borders; other media were available. In the 1979 Term, we once again reaffirmed that re-
The Court had no difficulty distinguishing Saia v. strictions are valid if they “serve a significant gov-
New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 92 L.Ed. ernmental interest and leave ample alternative
1574 (1948), decided seven months earlier, **2919 channels for communication.” Consolidated Edison
where the Court had invalidated an ordinance re- Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535,
quiring a permit from the local police chief before 100 S.Ct. 2326, 2332, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980). The
using a sound truck. The danger seen in Saia was in Court has continued to apply this same standard al-
allowing a single government official to regulate a most literally to this day in Heffron v. International
medium of communication with the attendant risk Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., supra, at
that the decision would be based on the message, 647-648, 101 S.Ct., at 2564. Accord, Schad v.
not the medium. Id., at 560-561, 68 S.Ct., at Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-76, 101 S.Ct.
1149-1150. 2176, 2186, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981).
The ordinance in Kovacs, however, did not afford

that kind of potential for censorship and was held (b)
not to violate the First Amendment. *559336 U.S.,
San Diego adopted its ordinance to eradicate what
at 82-83, 69 S.Ct., at 451 (plurality opinion of
it perceives-and what it has a right to perceive-as
Reed, J.). Justice Frankfurter, concurring, expressed
ugly and dangerous eyesores thrust upon its cit-
this point more broadly:
izens. This was done *560 with two objectives in
“So long as a legislature does not prescribe what mind: the disfigurement of the surroundings and the
ideas may be noisily expressed and what may not elimination of the danger posed by these large, eye-
be, nor discriminate among those who would catching signs that divert the attention of motorists.
FN2
make inroads upon the public peace, it is not for The plurality acknowledges-as they must-that
us to supervise the limits the legislature may im- promoting traffic safety and preserving scenic
pose in safeguarding the steadily narrowing op- beauty “are substantial governmental goals.” Ante,
portunities for serenity and reflection.” Id., at 97, at 2892. See also ante, at 2903 (BRENNAN, J.,
69 S.Ct., at 458. concurring in judgment) (traffic safety). But, hav-
ing acknowledged the legitimacy of local govern-
Justice Jackson, also concurring separately, agreed mental authority, the plurality largely ignores it.
with this core proposition, writing that the Kovacs
type of regulation would not infringe freedoms of FN2. Congress, too, has recognized the
speech “unless such regulation or prohibition un- dangers to safety and the environment
dertakes to censor the contents of the broadcast- posed by billboards. The Highway Beauti-
ing.” Ibid. fication Act of 1965 provides in part:
Later, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court “The Congress hereby finds and declares
in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 that the erection and maintenance of out-
S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), observed: door advertising signs, displays, and
devices in areas adjacent to the Interstate
“[W]hen ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are System and the primary system should
combined in the same course of conduct, a suffi- be controlled in order to protect the pub-

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 46
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
lic investment in such highways, to pro- tional Society for Krishna Consciousness,
mote the safety and recreational value of Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 651, 101 S.Ct. 2559,
public travel, and to preserve natural 2565, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981).
beauty. ” 23 U.S.C. § 131(a) (emphasis
added). The means chosen to effectuate legitimate govern-
mental interests are not for this Court to select.
If San Diego, through its duly consti- “These are matters for the legislative judgment con-
tuted legislative body, may not guard trolled by public opinion.” Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
against the defacing of its environs and U.S., at 96-97, 69 S.Ct., at 458. (Frankfurter, J.,
the risks to the movement of traffic by concurring). The plurality ignores this Court's sem-
eliminating billboards, the authority of inal opinions in Kovacs by substituting its judgment
Congress to limit billboards adjacent to for that of city officials and disallowing a ban on
federally funded highways is called into one offensive and intrusive means of communica-
question as well. See ante, at 2896, n. 20 tion when other means are available. Although we
(plurality opinion); ante, at 2906, n. 11 must ensure that any regulation of speech
(BRENNAN, J., concurring in judg- “further[s] a sufficiently substantial government in-
ment). Surely, the legislative powers of a terest,” Schad v. Mount Ephraim, supra, at 68, 101
municipality over its own affairs cannot S.Ct., at 2183, given a reasonable approach to a
be less than those of the Congress of the perceived problem, this Court's duty is not to make
United States in its area of authority. the primary policy decisions but instead is to de-
termine whether the legislative approach is essen-
As the plurality also recognizes, ante, at tially neutral to the messages conveyed and leaves
2893-2894, the means the city has selected to ad- open other adequate means of conveying those
vance these goals are sensible and do **2920 not messages. This is the essence of both democracy
exceed what is necessary to eradicate the dangers and federalism, and we gravely damage both when
seen. When distraction of motorists is the perceived we undertake to throttle legislative discretion and
harm, the authorities reasonably can conclude that judgment at the “grass roots” of our system.
each billboard adds to the dangers in moving
traffic; obviously, the billboard industry does not
erect message carriers that do not catch the eye of (c)
FN3
the traveler. In addition, a legislative body
The plurality, in a remarkable ipse dixit, states that
reasonably can conclude that every large billboard
“[t]here can be no question that a prohibition on the
adversely *561 affects the environment, for each
erection of billboards infringes freedom of speech
destroys a unique perspective on the landscape and
FN4 ....” Ante, at 2899. Of course the city has restricted
adds to the visual pollution of the city. Pollu-
one form of communication, and this action implic-
tion is not limited to the air we breath and the water
ates the First Amendment. But to say the ordinance
we drink; it can equally offend the eye and the ear.
presents a First Amendment issue is not necessarily
FN3. The parties have stipulated that bill- to say that it constitutes a First Amendment viola-
boards come in “two basic standardized tion. *562 The plurality confuses the Amendment's
forms,” 12 ft. by 24 ft. and 14 ft. by 48 ft. coverage with the scope of its protection. See gen-
Joint Stipulation of Facts No. 25, App. erally Schauer, Categories and the First Amend-
47a. ment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 Vand.L.Rev. 265,
270, 275-276 (1981).
FN4. Indeed, streets themselves may be
places of tranquility. Heffron v. Interna- In the process of eradicating the perceived harms,

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 47
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
the ordinance here in no sense suppresses freedom equally large audience through a variety of other
of expression, either by discriminating among ideas media: newspapers, television, radio, magazines,
or topics or by suppressing discussion generally. direct mail, pamphlets, etc. True, these other meth-
San Diego has not attempted to suppress any partic- ods may not be so “eye-catching”-or so cheap-as
FN5
ular point of view or any category of messages; it billboards, but there has been no suggestion
has not censored any information; it has not banned that billboards heretofore have advanced any partic-
any thought. See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley ular viewpoint or issue disproportionately to advert-
, 408 U.S. 92, 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2290, 33 L.Ed.2d ising generally. Thus, the ideas billboard advert-
212 (1972). It has not “attempt[ed] to give one side isers have been presenting are not relatively disad-
of a debatable public question an advantage in ex- vantaged vis-à-vis the messages of those who here-
pressing its view to the people ....” First National tofore have chosen other methods of spreading their
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785, 98 views. See First National Bank v. Bellotti, supra, at
S.Ct. 1407, 1420, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (footnote 789, 98 S.Ct., at 1422. See also Martin v. City of
omitted). See Madison School District v. Wisconsin Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146, 63 S.Ct. 862, 864, 87
Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, L.Ed. 1313 (1943). It borders on the frivolous to
175-176, 97 S.Ct. 421, 426, 50 L.Ed.2d 376 (1976). suggest that the San Diego ordinance infringes on
There is no suggestion or danger that the city has freedom of expression, given the wide range of al-
permitted these narrow categories of signs but for- ternative means available.
bidden the vast majority “merely because public of-
ficials disapprove of the speaker's view.” Niemotko FN5. Before trial, the parties stipulated:
v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282, 71 S.Ct. 325, 333, “Many businesses and politicians and other
95 L.Ed. 267 (1951) (FRANKFURTER, J., concur- persons rely upon outdoor advertising be-
ring in result). Moreover, aside from a few **2921 cause other forms of advertising are insuf-
narrow and essentially negligible exceptions, see ficient, inappropriate and prohibitively ex-
infra, at 2922-2923, San Diego has not differenti- pensive.” Joint Stipulation of Facts No. 28,
ated with regard to topic. See Consolidated Edison App. 48a. This sweeping, conclusory, and
Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S., at rather vague generalization does nothing to
537-538, 100 S.Ct., at 2333; Carey v. Brown, 447 explain how other media are insufficient,
U.S. 455, 462, n. 6, 463, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 2291, n. 6, inappropriate, or too expensive. More im-
2291, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980); First National Bank portant, the stipulation does not suggest
v. Bellotti, supra, 435 U.S., at 784-785, 98 S.Ct., at that any particular point of view or issue
1420; Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, supra, will be suppressed by the elimination of
408 U.S., at 96, 92 S.Ct., at 2290. The city has not billboards.
undertaken to determine, paternalistically, “ ‘what
information is relevant to self-government.’ ” Gertz (3)
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339, 94 S.Ct.
2997, 3005, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (quoting Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79, 91 (a)
S.Ct. 1811, 1837, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971)
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting)). The plurality concludes that a city may constitu-
tionally exercise its police power by eliminating
The messages conveyed on San Diego billboards-
offsite commercial billboards; they reach this result
whether commercial, political, social, or religious-
by following our recent cases holding that commer-
are not inseparable from the billboards that carry
cial speech, while protected by the Constitution, re-
them. These same messages*563 can reach an
ceives less protection than “noncommercial”-i. e.,

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 48
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
political, religious, social-speech. See, e. g., Cent- not remotely endanger freedom of speech. Indeed,
ral Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service the plurality concludes that the distinctions among
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d commercial signs are valid. Ante, at 2895. More
341 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 generally, as stated supra, at 2920-2921, San Diego
U.S. 447, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978); has not preferred any viewpoint and, aside from
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 these limited exceptions, has not allowed some sub-
S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977). But as the plur- jects while forbidding others.
ality giveth, they also taketh away-and, in the pro-
cess take away virtually everything. Where the ordinance does differentiate among top-
ics, it simply allows such noncontroversial things as
*564 In a bizarre twist of logic, the plurality seems conventional *565 signs identifying a business en-
to hold that because San Diego has recognized the terprise, time-and-temperature signs, historical
hardships of its ordinance on certain special needs markers, and for sale signs. It borders-if not tres-
of citizens and, therefore, exempted a few narrowly passes-on the frivolous to suggest that, by allowing
defined classes of signs from the ordinance's scope- such signs but forbidding noncommercial bill-
for example, onsite signs identifying places of busi- boards, the city has infringed freedom of speech.
ness, time-and-temperature signs, commemorative This ignores what we recognized in Police Dept. of
and historic plaques-the ordinance violates the First Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S., at 98, 92 S.Ct., at
Amendment. From these dubious premises, the 2291, that “there may be sufficient regulatory in-
plurality has given every city, town, and village in terests justifying selective exclusions or distinc-
this country desiring to respond to the hazards tions....” For each exception, the city is either ac-
posed by billboards a choice as previously noted, knowledging the unique connection between the
between two equally unsatisfactory alternatives: medium and the message conveyed, see, e. g., Lin-
mark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85,
(a) banning all signs of any kind whatsoever, or 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977) (for sale
signs), or promoting a legitimate public interest in
(b) permitting all “noncommercial” signs, no
information. Similarly, in each instance, the city
matter how numerous, how large, how damaging
reasonably could conclude that the balance between
to the environment, or how dangerous to motor-
safety and aesthetic concerns on the one hand and
ists and pedestrians.
the need to communicate on the other has tipped the
FN6
**2922 Otherwise, the municipality must give up opposite way. More important, in no instance is
and do nothing in the face of an ever-increasing the exempted topic controversial; there can be no
menace to the urban environment. Indeed, the plur- rational debate over, for example, the time, the tem-
ality hints-and not too subtly-that the first option perature, the existence of an offer of sale, or the
might be withdrawn if any city attempts to invoke identity of a business establishment. The danger of
it. See, ante, at 2896, n. 20. This result is insensit- San Diego's setting the agenda of public discussion
ive to the needs of the modern urban dweller and is not simply de minimis ; it is nonexistent. The
devoid of valid constitutional foundations. plurality today trivializes genuine First Amendment
values by hinging its holding on the city's decision
to allow some signs while preventing others that
(b) constitute the vast majority of the genre.
The exceptions San Diego has provided-the pres- FN6. Indeed, the plurality acknowledges
ence of which is the plurality's sole ground for in- that a city may undertake this kind of bal-
validating the ordinance-are few in number, are ancing:
narrowly tailored to peculiar public needs, and do

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 49
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
“As we see it, the city could reasonably for becoming a means of suppressing a particular
conclude that a commercial enterprise-as point of view.” 452 U.S., at 649, 101 S.Ct., at 2564.
FN7
well as the interested public-has a
stronger interest in identifying its place
of business and advertising the products FN7. As Justice BRENNAN recognizes,
or services available there than it has in ante, at 2907-2909, the plurality's treat-
using or leasing its available space for ment of the ordinance may well create this
the purpose of advertising commercial very danger, for the plurality appears will-
enterprises located elsewhere.” Ante, at ing to allow municipal officials to determ-
2894-2895. ine what is and is not noncommercial
speech.
A city reasonably may decide that onsite
signs, by identifying the premises (even San Diego simply is exercising its police power to
if in the process of advertising), actually provide an environment of tranquility, safety, and
promote traffic safety. Prohibiting them as much residual beauty as a modern metropolitan
would require motorists to pay more at- area can achieve. A city's simultaneous recognition
tention to street numbers and less to of the need for certain exceptions permitting lim-
traffic. ited forms of communication, purely factual in
nature and neutral as to the speaker, should not
*566 Thus, despite the plurality's unique focus, we wholly deprive the city of its ability to address the
are not confronted with an ordinance like the one in balance of the problem. There is no threat here to
Saia v. New York, which vested in a single official- our “profound national commitment to the principle
the local police chief-an unlimited discretion to that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
grant or to deny licenses for sound trucks. robust, and wide-open ....” New York Times Co. v.
“Annoyance at ideas can be cloaked in annoyance Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 720, 11
at sound. The power of censorship inherent in this L.Ed.2d 686 (1964).
type of ordinance reveals its vice.” 334 U.S., at
562, 68 S.Ct., at 1150. Accord, Shuttlesworth v.
*567 (c)
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-151, 89 S.Ct. 935,
938, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969); Staub v. City of Baxley The fatal flaw in the plurality's logic comes when it
, 355 U.S. 313, 322-325, 78 S.Ct. 277, 282-284, 2 concludes that San Diego, by exempting on-site
L.Ed.2d 302 (1958); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, commercial signs, thereby has “afford[ed] a greater
451-452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 668-669, 82 L.Ed. 949 degree of protection to commercial than to noncom-
(1938). See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public mercial speech.” Ante, at 2895. The “greater degree
Service Comm'n, 447 U.S., at 546-548, 100 S.Ct., at of protection” our cases have given noncommercial
2338-2339 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). speech establishes a narrow range of constitution-
But here we have no allegation and no danger that ally permissible regulation. To say noncommercial
San Diego is using its billboard ordinance**2923 as speech receives a greater degree of constitutional
a mask for promoting or deterring any viewpoint or protection, however, does not mean that a legis-
issue of public debate. This ordinance, is precisely lature is forbidden to afford differing degrees of
the same sense as the regulation we upheld last statutory protection when the restrictions on each
week in Heffron v. International Society for formofspeech-commercialandnoncommercial-other-
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., “is not open to the wise pass constitutional muster under the standards
kind of arbitrary application that this Court has con- respectively applicable.
demned ... because such discretion has the potential

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 50
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
No case in this Court creates, as the plurality sug- balancing and content judgment with noncommer-
gests, a hierarchy of types of speech in which, if cial speech that is permitted with commercial
one type is actually protected through legislative speech is far more likely to run afoul of the First
FN9
judgment, the Constitution compels that that judg- Amendment.
ment be exercised in favor of all types ranking
higher on the list. When a city chooses to impose FN8. Indeed, in Lehman v. City of Shaker
looser restrictions in one area than it does in anoth- Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 41
er analogous area-even one in which the Constitu- L.Ed.2d 770 (1974), we upheld a municip-
tion more narrowly constrains legislative discre- al policy allowing commercial but not
tion-it neither undermines the constitutionality of political advertising on city buses. I cannot
its regulatory scheme nor renders its legislative agree with the plurality that Lehman “ha[s]
choices ipso facto irrational. A city does not no application here.” Ante, at 2896, n. 19.
thereby “conced [e] that some communicative in- Although Lehman dealt with limited space
terests ... are stronger than its competing interests in leased by the city and this case deals with
esthetics and traffic safety,” ante, at 2899; it has municipal regulation of privately leased
only declined, in one area, to exercise its powers to space, the constitutional principle is the
the full extent the Constitution permits. The Consti- same: a city may forgo the “lurking doubts
tution does not require any governmental entity to about favoritism” in granting space to
reach the limit of permissible regulation solely be- some, but necessarily not all, political ad-
cause it has chosen to do so in a related area. Cf. vertisers. 418 U.S., at 304, 94 S.Ct., at
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 2717 (plurality opinion of BLACKMUN,
75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955) (a J.). The same constitutional dangers do not
“legislature may select one phase of one field and arise in allocating space among commer-
apply a remedy there, neglecting the others”). The cial advertisers.
plurality today confuses the degree of constitutional
FN9. See n. 8, supra. If a city were to per-
protection-i. e., the strictness of the test applied-
mit onsite noncommercial billboards, one
with the outcome of legislative judgment.
can imagine a challenge based on the argu-
*568 By allowing communication of certain com- ment that this favors the views of persons
mercial ideas via billboards, but forbidding non- who can afford to own property in com-
commercial signs altogether, a city does not neces- mercial districts. See supra, at 2921. I in-
sarily place a greater “value” on commercial timate no view on whether I would accept
FN8 such an argument should that case ever
speech. In these situations, **2924 the city is
simply recognizing that it has greater latitude to arise.
distinguish among various forms of commercial
Thus, we may, consistent with the First Amend-
communication when the same distinctions would
ment, hold that a city may-and perhaps must-take
be impermissible if undertaken with regard to non-
an all-or-nothing approach with noncommercial
commercial speech. Indeed, when adequate altern-
speech yet remain free to adopt selective exceptions
ative channels of communication are readily avail-
for commercial speech, as long as the latter advance
able so that the message may be freely conveyed
legitimate governmental interests. Indeed,*569 it is
through other means, a city arguably is more faith-
precisely because “the city does not have the same
ful to the Constitution by treating all noncommer-
range of choice in the area of noncommercial
cial speech the same than by attempting to impose
speech to evaluate the strength of, or distinguish
the same classifications in noncommercial as it has
between, various communicative interests,” ante, at
in commercial areas. To undertake the same kind of
2896, that a city should be commended, not con-

101 S.Ct. 2882 Page 51
(Cite as: 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882)
demned, for treating all noncommercial speech the within a community, see Berman v. Parker, 348
same. U.S. 26, 32-33, 75 S.Ct. 98, 102-103, 99 L.Ed. 27
(1954), regardless of whether the particular com-
munity is “a historical community such as Willi-
(4)
amsburg' or one as unsightly as the older **2925
The Court today unleashes a novel principle, unne- parts of many of our major metropolitan areas.
cessary and, indeed, alien to First Amendment doc- Such areas should not be prevented from taking
trine announced in our earlier cases. As Justice steps to correct, as best they may, mistakes of their
STEVENS cogently observes, the plurality, predecessors. Nor do I believe that the limited ex-
“somewhat ironically, concludes that the ordinance ceptions contained in the San Diego ordinance are
is an unconstitutional abridgment of speech be- the types which render this statute unconstitutional.
cause it does not abridge enough speech.” Ante, at The closest one is the exception permitting bill-
2909 (emphasis added). The plurality gravely mis- boards during political campaigns, but I would treat
construes the commercial-noncommercial distinc- this as a virtually self-limiting exception which will
tion of earlier cases when it holds that the preferred have an effect on the aesthetics of the city only dur-
position of noncommercial speech compels a city to ing the periods immediately prior to a campaign. As
impose the same or greater limits on commercial as such, it seems to me a reasonable outlet, limited as
on noncommercial speech. The Court today leaves to time, for the free expression which the First and
the modern metropolis with a series of Hobson's Fourteenth Amendments were designed to protect.
choices and rejects basic concepts of federalism by
Unlike Justice BRENNAN, I do not think a city
denying to every community the important powers
should be put to the task of convincing a local
reserved to the people and the States by the Consti-
judge that the elimination of billboards would have
tution. This is indeed “an exercise of raw judicial
more than a negligible impact on aesthetics. Noth-
power,” Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222, 93 S.Ct.
ing in my experience on the bench has led me to be-
739, 763, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973) (WHITE, J., dis-
lieve that a judge is in any better position than a
senting), and is far removed from the high purposes
city or county commission to make decisions in an
of the First Amendment.
area such as aesthetics. Therefore, little can be
Justice REHNQUIST, dissenting.
gained in the area of constitutional law, and much
I agree substantially with the views expressed in the
lost in the process of democratic decisionmaking,
dissenting opinions of THE CHIEF JUSTICE and
by allowing individual judges in city after city to
Justice STEVENS and make only these two addi-
second-guess such legislative or administrative de-
tional observations: (1) In a case where city plan-
terminations.
ning commissions and zoning boards must regularly
confront constitutional claims of this sort, it is a U.S.Cal.,1981.
genuine misfortune to have the Court's treatment of Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego
the subject be a virtual Tower of Babel, from which 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 16 ERC 1057, 69
no definitive principles can be clearly drawn; and L.Ed.2d 800, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,600
(2) I regret even more *570 keenly my contribution
to this judicial clangor, but find that none of the END OF DOCUMENT
views expressed in the other opinions written in the
case come close enough to mine to warrant the ne-
cessary compromise to obtain a Court opinion.
In my view, the aesthetic justification alone is suffi-

cient to sustain a total prohibition of billboards

Metro Media Inc v. City of San Diego 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.ct. 2882

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Metro Media Inc v. City of San Diego 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.ct. 2882

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Date/Time of Request: Monday, August 23, 2010 13:33 Eastern

business law 2 http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=508&invol=520

Justice Brennan filed an opinion, in which Justice

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92XXVII(G)3 Property in General 414II(B) Particular Matters

[4] Highways 200 153.5 92 Constitutional Law

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the City of San Diego. FN6. Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v.

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temporary off-premises subdivision direc- Cops”; “Support San Diego's No-Growth

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§ 30-80 (1979). torists brought about by distracting sign

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ulate advertising of commercial enter- ed. and Supp.III).

“One sign shall be permitted on each lot III

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The ordinance in Kovacs, however, did not afford

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In my view, the aesthetic justification alone is suffi-

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