Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Preventive Action
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Enhancing U.S.
Preventive Action
Council Special Report No. 48
October 2009
Enhancing U.S.
Preventive Action
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Contents
Foreword vii
Acknowledgments ix
Acronyms xi
Endnotes 27
About the Authors 35
Advisory Committee 37
CPA Advisory Committee 38
CPA Mission Statement 39
Foreword
vii
viii Foreword
Richard N. Haass
President
Council on Foreign Relations
October 2009
Acknowledgments
This report was made possible by the generous assistance and advice
provided by many; we are grateful to them all. First, we thank CFR Pres-
ident Richard N. Haass and Director of Studies James M. Lindsay for
supporting this project and for providing helpful comments through-
out its development.
The time and expertise given by the members of the CSR advisory
committee, and in particular Lawrence Woocher, Tjip Walker, Freder-
ick S. Tipson, Stewart M. Patrick, Kara C. McDonald, Kathleen Kava-
lec, and Lyston A. Lea, were invaluable to the success of this project.
Cara L. Abercrombie, Cynthia Irmer, and government officials who
have requested not to be identified also provided feedback that greatly
contributed to the quality of the report.
Finally, we are grateful to Patricia Dorff and Lia Norton in Publica-
tions for their terrific editing support and to Lisa Shields, Anya Schme-
mann, and Melinda Brouwer in Communications and Marketing for
working to promote and distribute the report. We also appreciate the
contribution of Assistant Director of Studies Melanie Gervacio Lin
and Studies Administrator Kate Howell in guiding the CSR through
Studies, and the extraordinary logistical, research, and intellectual sup-
port of CPA Research Associates Elise Vaughan, Rebecca Friedman,
and Stephen Wittels, and Intern Dana Stern.
This publication was made possible by a grant from the Carnegie
Corporation of New York. CFR also expresses its thanks to the Robina
Foundation for its support for Dr. Zenko’s work on multilateral dimen-
sions of conflict prevention. The statements made and views expressed
herein are solely our own.
Paul B. Stares
Micah Zenko
ix
Acronyms
xi
xii Acronyms
3
4 Enhancing U.S. Preventive Action
Background
With the United States extracting itself from one immensely costly
war while simultaneously increasing its involvement in another, the
need to avoid additional military commitments is especially acute at
this time. Although estimates of the eventual price tag of the Iraq war
vary, direct costs to the American taxpayer are nearing three-quarters
of a trillion dollars. Eight years of fighting in Afghanistan has cost a
quarter of a trillion dollars and is now set to increase substantially,
perhaps for many years.9 The strain on equipment, personnel, and the
families of the servicemen and -women deployed overseas is enor-
mous. And, of course, the tragic human toll measured in many thou-
sands of Americans killed and maimed continues to grow, stretching
public tolerance of current deployments, not to mention potential
future ones, to the limit.10
The fiscal outlook for the United States reinforces the preventive
imperative. The United States faces an anticipated current accounts
deficit in excess of $9 trillion over the next decade as a result of an
ambitious domestic reform agenda coupled with a hugely expensive
effort to resuscitate the economy following the recent financial crisis.11
Although preventive action can involve significant investments, its rela-
tive cost-effectiveness compared to remedial measures is not in doubt.12
Besides the direct expenses associated with military stabilization and
reconstruction operations, a full audit of the cost imposed by mitigat-
ing the effects of conflict must also include foreign assistance expendi-
tures. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has disbursed
billions of dollars in disaster relief and humanitarian aid in response
to various foreign crises (not counting Iraq and Afghanistan).13 Huge
sums of prior investment and earlier foreign assistance have also been
written off in the process.
Important geostrategic incentives for preventive action are also reas-
serting themselves and could conceivably grow more pressing in the
twenty-first century. The end of the Cold War clearly lessened, if not
entirely removed, the primary U.S. motivation for managing localized
disputes and regional tensions, namely, to prevent them from being
exploited by America’s adversaries or, worse, escalating into a danger-
ous superpower confrontation. The U.S. interest in regional crisis man-
agement and conflict prevention subsequently became increasingly
6 Enhancing U.S. Preventive Action
driven by humanitarian concerns and then, after 9/11, by the fear that
terrorist groups would take advantage of internal instability and state
weakness to attack U.S. allies or the United States. Although these con-
cerns still remain, additional preventive imperatives are emerging (or in
some cases, reemerging) as a result of discernible global trends.
The rise of new regional and global powers such as Brazil, India, and
China increases the potential for competition, insecurity, and friction
that growing economic interdependence may not entirely ameliorate
and could even exacerbate. Localized disputes among them or between
them and lesser powers that are allowed to deteriorate or that escalate
inadvertently would likely have far-reaching repercussions. Besides the
heightened risk of a major regional clash, especially if nuclear-armed
powers are involved, international cooperation to tackle the leading
global challenges facing the planet such as climate change, weapons-
of-mass-destruction proliferation, and pandemic disease—all of which
require effective collective action—would almost certainly suffer,
perhaps fatally so. Recent and enduring tensions between Russia and
Georgia (and by extension NATO) and India and Pakistan, as well as the
still unfolding nuclear-related crises with North Korea and Iran—all of
which embroil the United States—are reminders of such risks.
Even when large powers are not directly involved in localized dis-
putes, the consequences can still be serious when they do flare up. Com-
plex political and economic couplings are an increasing feature of many
regions. This increases the collective incentive of regional actors to pro-
mote peace and stability, but also makes them more exposed when dis-
putes turn violent. West Africa and the Middle East are cases in point;
the ongoing violence in the Great Lakes region of Africa, as well as the
continuing spillover effects of the conflicts in Sudan and Somalia, are
further examples. Given that many commodities critical to the global
economy—such as oil, cobalt, tungsten, and tin—either come from or
transit through unstable regions, relatively small disruptions caused by
localized conflict can have significant systemic effects. Exposure to such
effects could grow if strategic resources become scarcer in future years.
This report uses the term preventive action to refer to three overlapping
types of activity: conflict risk reduction, crisis prevention, and crisis
mitigation.14
Obviously, there is no “one size fits all” formula for each of these
types of preventive action. The various measures have to be mixed and
matched according to the specific circumstances and guided by a simi-
larly tailored political strategy.
10
Assessing U.S. Preventive Action 11
CRISIS MITIGATION
STRATEGY
The first order of business is to design a clear and coherent strategy for
U.S. preventive action. Resources are finite and thus a national strat-
egy must proceed from a prioritization of potential threats. The United
States cannot treat every potential source of instability and conflict
as equally important. A clear and sensible hierarchy of concerns must
be developed to guide the level of attention and effort devoted to any
given problem. Responsibility for setting preventive priorities and
19
20 Enhancing U.S. Preventive Action
providing broad strategic guidance for U.S. policy should involve inter-
agency deliberation and be overseen by the national security adviser.
Accordingly:
War ning
RESOURCES
1. Remarks by Vice President Biden at 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy, Feb-
ruary 7, 2009.
2. Speech to the Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, May 25, 2009, http://www.acus.org/
event/nsa-james-jones-first-speech. In an interview with the Washington Post, Jones also
indicated his intent to build a “21st Century NSC,” one that can “look over the horizon
to see what’s coming at us” and deal with emerging threats “proactively.” See David
Ignatius, “National Security Facilitator,” Washington Post, April 30, 2009, p. A21.
3. Remarks by the president at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention, Phoenix,
August 17, 2009. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-
President-at-the-Veterans-of-Foreign-Wars-convention/.
4. See Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy,
United States Institute of Peace (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace
Press, 1996), pp. 5–6.
5. See various National Security Strategy documents.
6. Recent examples include the Georgia-Russia conflict in August 2008, the Kenya elec-
toral violence of December 2007–January 2008, the Israeli-Hezbollah war of August
2007, the genocide in Darfur beginning in 2003, as well as several dangerous crises in-
volving India and Pakistan over the last decade.
7. Defense Science Board, Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DOD (Washing-
ton, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, September 2005).
8. It should be noted that not all forms of political instability and conflict are necessarily
unwelcome. Indeed, it may be the only way that positive political and social develop-
ment is advanced. See USAID, “Fragile States Strategy,” January 2005, p. 5.
9. Walter Pincus, “Analysts Expect Long-Term Costly Campaign in Afghanistan,” Wash-
ington Post, August 9, 2009.
10. Jennifer Agiesta and Jon Cohen, “Public Opinion in U.S. Turns Against Afghan War,”
Washington Post, August 20, 2009.
11. Lori Montgomery, “Deficit Projected to Soar With New Program,” Washington Post,
August 26, 2009.
12. See Micheal E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance, The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and
Cure in the Global Arena (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999). For a recent
attempt to assess the costs of remedial approaches to managing conflict, see Andrew
Sweet and Natalie Ondiak, “The Cost of Reaction: The Long-Term Costs of Short-
Term Cures,” Center for American Progress, Washington, DC, July 2008.
13. USAID calculates that between 1994 and 2003, $5.2 billion in disaster assistance and
emergency food aid was spent in countries affected by conflict. See USAID, “Conflict
Mitigation and Management Policy,” April 2005, p. 2.
14. Stabilization and reconstruction can be viewed as another form of preventive action in
that, if done effectively, it can prevent the reignition of conflict.
27
28 Endnotes
15. See Lawrence Woocher, “Deconstructing ‘Political Will’: Explaining the Failure to Pre-
vent Deadly Conflict and Mass Atrocities,” Journal of Public and International Affairs,
vol. 12 (spring 2001), pp.179–206. See also remarks of J. Brian Atwood, USAID ad-
ministrator, “Conflict Prevention in Today’s World,” Georgetown University, Wash-
ington, DC (October 14, 1998), http://www.usaid.gov/press/spe_test/speeches/1998/
sp981014.
16. See http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_specialproducts.html.
17. See Janine Davidson, “Making Government Work: Pragmatic Priorities for Inter-
agency Coordination,” Orbis (summer 2009), p. 428.
18. Authorized by National Security Presidential Directive-60 (August 2009).
19. See Peter Feaver and William Imboden, “A Strategic Planning Cell on National Se-
curity at the White House,” in Daniel W. Drezner, ed., Avoiding Trivia: The Role of
Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press, 2009), pp. 108–9; and interviews with U.S. policymakers.
20. See Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report, “Stabilization and Recon-
struction: Actions Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities of
Future Operations,” Washington, DC (2007), p.15.
21. The Office of Transition Initiatives provides two- to three-year funding for peace-build-
ing and reconciliation efforts in conflict-prone and democratizing states. CMM leads
the conflict assessments conducted by USAID, produces tool kits on various themes
related to conflict prevention, and also funds short-term peace-building efforts.
22. The Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency directs, administers, and pro-
vides policy guidance for the International Military Education and Training program.
Annually, somewhere between 1,000 to 1,200 foreign officers at “national leadership
levels” participate, including, currently, thirty-seven from Pakistan. U.S. Department
of State and USAID, Joint Highlights of Performance, Budget, and Financial Informa-
tion: Fiscal Year 2007, undated, p. 15; and testimony of Vice Admiral James Winnefeld,
naval director of Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, before the House Armed
Services Committee, April 29, 2009; and testimony of Admiral Timothy Keating,
commander, U.S. Pacific Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
March 19, 2009.
23. The Millennium Challenge Account is managed by an independent U.S. government
corporation that provides competitive five-year grants to countries to reduce poverty
and stimulate economic growth. Over its first five years, the Millennium Challenge
Corporation has signed compacts with eighteen countries and awarded over $6.3
billion, with the top recipients being Tanzania, Morocco, Ghana, Mozambique, and
Burkina Faso. The MCC request for FY2010 is $1.43 billion. See Millennium Chal-
lenge Corporation, Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 2010, undated, pp. i,
25. The Global Health and Child Survival (GHCS) program funds child and maternal
health programs, immunizations, programs to prevent a range of infectious diseases,
and family planning activities. The FY2010 request for GHCS was for $7.6 billion,
up from $400 million from the previous fiscal year. U.S. Department of State, Con-
gressional Budget Justification, June 2009, p. 28. Both initiatives account in large part
for a significant shift in the geographical distribution of U.S. foreign aid to Africa and
South Asia in recent years. Between FY1998 and FY2008, the percentage of total U.S.
foreign assistance going to Africa more than doubled from 13 to 29 percent, while as-
sistance for South Asia has more than quadrupled from 4 to 17 percent. DOD Direc-
tive 3000.5, “Military Support for Stability, Security Transition, and Reconstruction
(SSTR) Operations,” (November 28, 2005). Such operations are to be conducted
“across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and
regions.” Shaping is distinct and prior to those activities that support operational—or
Endnotes 29
“kinetic”—military planning: Phase I: Deter, Phase II: Defend and Seize Initiative,
Phase III: Dominate, Phase IV: Stabilize, and Phase V: Enable Civil Authority. See
Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operational Planning, December 26, 2006.
24. Gordon Adams, “Rebalancing the National Security Toolkit,” slides prepared for
“U.S. Military: New President, New Outlook?” Knight Center for Specialized Jour-
nalism, University of Maryland, February 17, 2009, pp. 7–8.
25. DOD, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, Summary Justification, May 2009, pp. 2–32.
26. U.S. Joint Forces Command, Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordi-
nation Group, March 1, 2007, p. vi; and GAO, “Military Operations: Actions Needed to
Improve DOD’s Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning,”
May 2007, pp. 27–33.
27. The five categories of foreign policy objectives are peace and security, governing
justly and democratically, investing in people, economic growth, and humanitarian
assistance. Department of State, “Foreign Assistance Framework,” as of July 11, 2006.
See GAO, “Foreign Aid Reform: Comprehensive Strategy, Interagency Coordina-
tion, and Operational Improvements Would Bolster Current Efforts,” April 2009,
pp. 4–5.
28. Testimony of Lael Brainard, vice president and director, Global Economy and Devel-
opment Program, Brookings Institution, before the House Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs, April 23, 2008. GAO, “Foreign Aid Reform,” April 2009, p. 7.
29. The relevant portion of NSPD-44 states: “The United States has a significant stake in
enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions,
especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help
them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market
economies. The United States should work with other countries and organizations
to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively
when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic
practices, market economies, and the rule of law” (emphasis added).
30. Interviews with U.S. policymakers; see also Monty Marshall, “Fragility, Instability,
and the Failure of States,” Center for Preventive Action Working Paper, October
2008; and Liana Sun Wyler, “Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and
U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, updated August 28, 2008.
31. See Director of Central Intelligence’s Warning Committee, “Atrocities Watchlist,”
created May 1, 1999, http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs.asp?doc_no=0001381830.
32. Threats considered to be serious and imminent are reported through the CRITIC
system operated by the National Security Agency (NSA). The Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) also manages the Defense Indications and Warning (I&W) System that
includes separate regional I&W systems run by each of the U.S. COCOMs for their
area of responsibility. It too issues periodic “Warning Reports” on military and other
threats to U.S. forces around the world.
33. Interview with U.S. intelligence official.
34. Interviews with U.S. government officials. In fairness, however, to the intelligence
professionals who produce the watchlists, the intent was never to prioritize states at
risk according to specific criteria, itself a political judgment. Nor were they ever de-
signed to substitute for specialized country expertise. Rather, the goal was to provide
a regular and reasonably rigorous global compendium of countries at risk of instabil-
ity and conflict.
35. Interview with U.S. intelligence official.
36. The conflict prevention mission is also weak institutionally within S/CRS. Its Office
for Conflict Prevention was established within S/CRS and it has remained a small
(eleven-person) operation.
30 Endnotes
37. See Dane F. Smith Jr., “An Expanded Mandate for Peace Building: The State Depart-
ment Role in Peace Diplomacy, Reconstruction, and Stabilization,” Center for Strate-
gic & International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC (April 2009), pp. 35–36. These
include planning exercises for post-Castro Cuba, Haiti, Kosovo, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.
38. See Nora Bensahel, Olger Oliker, and Heather Peterson, “Improving Capacity for
Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” RAND (2009), pp. 37–38. See also
GAO Report, “Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Needed to Improve Gov-
ernmentwide Planning and Capabilities of Future Operations,” Washington, DC
(2007), p. 15.
39. “Principles of the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework,” approved July 15,
2008.
40. Dane F. Smith Jr., “Foreign Assistance for Peace: The U.S. Agency for International
Development,” CSIS, Washington DC (April 2009), pp. 15–16.
41. See Dane F. Smith Jr., “An Expanded Mandate for Peace Building,” p. 27.
42. See S/CRS Guiding Principles. To its credit, the small Conflict Prevention Office
within S/CRS has insisted that for countries to receive 1207 funds they must appear on
the Internal Instability Watchlists. The Intelligence and Warning Working Group will
also occasionally recommend use of 1207 funds in response to its own assessments.
43. Gordon Adams, “Stabilization and Reconstruction: DOD Funding,” slides prepared
for “Preventing and Rebuilding Failed States Amid Global Economic Crisis: What Are
Realistic Options for U.S. Policy?” Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, June 5, 2009;
Nina Serafino, “Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background
and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and Other Civil-
ian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities,” Congressional Research Service,
February 5, 2009, p. 15; and S/CRS, “1207 Funding: Facts and Information,” undated,
http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=495E.
44. DOD, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, Summary Justification, May 2009, pp. 1–13.
45. The most important being the President’s Daily Brief that is delivered personally each
morning to the president and a small coterie of his most senior advisers. A much wider
circle of government officials (as well as congressional oversight committees) also re-
ceive the World Intelligence Review—formerly known as the National Intelligence
Daily––that is produced by the CIA in coordination with the rest of the intelligence
committee. The DIA also produces each day a comparable but more DOD-oriented
Defense Intelligence Digest that is circulated throughout the executive branch and to
congressional intelligence committees. Complementing the more “top down” report-
ing, the principal cabinet officials also get daily intelligence briefings tailored to their
departmental mission that draw on more “bottom up” sources of information. The
secretary of state’s Morning Intelligence Summary is prepared by the Bureau of Intel-
ligence and Research and includes embassy reporting from U.S. missions around the
world. The briefing for the secretary of defense provided by the DIA will likewise draw
on defense attaché reporting as well as inputs from the Joint Staff and specifically its
intelligence branch (J2). The latter also puts out a Daily Report. Besides having access
to current intelligence from other sources, the director of the CIA’s daily briefing will
draw on his chief of station reports. Threats considered to be serious and imminent are
reported through the CRITIC system operated by the National Security Agency. The
DIA also manages the Defense Indications and Warning (I&W) System that includes
separate regional I&W systems run by each of the U.S. COCOMs for their area of
responsibility. It too issues periodic “Warning Reports” on military and other threats
to U.S. forces around the world.
46. GAO, “Stabilization and Reconstruction,” p. 7.
Endnotes 31
47. The NSC, chiefs of mission, and regional assistant secretaries of state may request ini-
tiation of the IMS for scenario planning. Ibid, p. 7.
48. Details of the IMS are drawn from Smith, “An Expanded Mandate for Peace Building,”
pp. 25–26.
49. See S/CRS, “Active Component, Civilian Reserve Corps,” http://www.crs.state.gov/
index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4F2H; and Nina Serafino, “Peace-
keeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions,” p. 15.
50. The CRC is funded through State’s Civilian Stabilization Initiative. For FY2010, $323
million was requested, with $137 million dedicated to the Active Component. See U.S.
Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, June 2009, p. 503.
51. This was established in 2003 by National Security Presidential Directive-26. Accord-
ing to a directive issued by the Office of the DNI, “the NIPF is the DNI’s sole mecha-
nism for establishing national intelligence priorities.” See Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI), “Roles and Responsibilities for the National Intelli-
gence Priorities Framework,” Intelligence Community Directive 204, September 13,
2007. The FBI has also adopted the NIPF for its own intelligence prioritization, and
FBI “intelligence requirements for collection are and must be based on and traceable
to the NIPF.” FBI, National Security Branch, “Frequently Asked Questions,” http://
www.fbi.gov/hq/nsb/nsb_faq.htm.
52. Interviews with intelligence officials; media roundtable with Dennis Blair, March 26,
2009; Gregory Treverton and C. Bryon Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence
Analysis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), pp. 6–7; and Walter Pincus, “Intelligence
Office Gives Progress Report,” Washington Post, April 14, 2006, p. A11.
53. ODNI, Analytic Transformation: Unleashing the Potential of a Community of Analysts,
September 1, 2008, p. 12.
54. Testimony of the Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, “DNI Authorities and Personnel Issues,” Febru-
ary 14, 2008; and McConnell remarks at the U.S. Geospatial Intelligence Foundation
GEOINT Symposium, October 30, 2008; and George Tenet, “Written Statement for
the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence Before the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,” March 24, 2004.
55. One former chair of the National Intelligence Council even referred to the NIPF as
having “little more than diplomatic or bureaucratic busy work.” See testimony of
Robert Hutchings, “The Director of National Intelligence’s 500 Day Plan,” Hearing
of the Intelligence Community Management Subcommittee of the House Intelligence
Committee, December 6, 2007.
56. Some of its elements were activated during the 2008 Russia-Georgia crisis.
57. See GAO, “Stabilization and Reconstruction,” p. 9; and Smith, “An Expanded Man-
date for Peace Building,” p. 26. Whether S/CRS has enough surge capacity to run the
secretariat is another question that has been raised. See Bensahel et al., “Improving
Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” p. 43.
58. See, for example, Gordon Adams, “Stabilizing U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction
Efforts Abroad,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (October 30, 2008).
59. These include:
U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund. Managed by the State Depart-
ment’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, it is a contingency fund that
the president can rapidly draw upon to respond to humanitarian crises. In the past
year it has been utilized to provide assistance to conflict victims and displaced persons
in Zimbabwe, Yemen, Gaza and the West Bank, Georgia, Somalia, Congo, Pakistan,
and Afghanistan. The FY2010 request is for $75 million, up from $40 million last fiscal
32 Endnotes
year, in order to fund recurring programs in the base request that were previously cov-
ered in supplemental appropriations.
Emergencies in the Diplomatic Counselor Services (EDCS). Managed by the secretary of
state, the EDCS account “is used to meet unforeseen emergency requirements in the
conduct of foreign affairs,” including: noncombatant evacuations of personnel and
U.S. citizens; natural disaster and terrorist incidents; paying rewards for information
on terrorism, narco-trafficking, and war crimes; and other authorized U.S. foreign
policy activities. A bipartisan report by The American Academy of Diplomacy and
the Stimson Center recently recommended that this account be increased fivefold to
focus on “more ‘in advance’ policy pursuits, geared more toward development of an-
ticipatory local partnerships and oriented more to crisis prevention, rather than crisis
response.” The FY2010 request for the EDCS Fund is for $10 million.
Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA). Managed by DOD’s De-
fense Security Cooperation Agency, the OHDACA account funds three programs
that are usually implemented at the request of regional combatant commanders: the
Humanitarian Assistance, Humanitarian Mine Action, and Foreign Disaster Relief
and Emergency Response. To assure that any unforeseen activities can be immedi-
ately implemented, each annual appropriation remains available for two years. The
FY2010 request is for $110 million, a 33 percent increase from the $83 million enacted
for FY2009.
Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund (CCIF). Managed by regional combatant com-
manders, the fund had historically been utilized for military education and training,
joint exercises, and contingencies. In the FY2007 National Defense Authorization
Act, Congress modified the program so it could be used to support “humanitarian and
civic assistance to include urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and recon-
struction assistance.” Reflecting its overlapping nature with existing DOD accounts,
according to the DOD budget justification, “CCIF is an authority similar to the Com-
mander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), which allows the Department to
provide funds for urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction
assistance, particularly in a foreign country where the armed forces are engaged in a
contingency operation.” The FY2010 request for the CCIF is $100 million.
For details see: DOD, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, Summary Justification, May 2009,
pp. 5–12; DOD Directive 7280.4, “Commander in Chiefs (CINC’s) Initiative Fund,”
October 26, 1993; P.L. 109–362, “John Warner National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2007,” section 902; DOD, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, Summary Jus-
tification, May 2009, pp. 1–14. CERP is a program confined to counterinsurgency op-
erations in Iraq and Afghanistan. See GAO, “Military Operations: Actions Needed to
Better Guide Project Selection for Commander’s Emergency Response Program and
Improve Oversight in Iraq,” June 23, 2008; and GAO, “Military Operations: Actions
Needed to Improve Oversight and Interagency Coordination for the Commander’s
Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan,” May 18, 2009.
60. The Rapid Response Fund has been proposed by USAID’s Office of Transition Ini-
tiatives to “respond quickly to unforeseen opportunities by focusing on development
requirements related to shoring up new and fragile democracies.” State and USAID
administrators envision the fund to be utilized only on an emergency basis when cur-
rent structures and programs are insufficient to quickly address unforeseen democ-
racy, health, and economic crises in the short term before they can be considered in the
regular budget process. Several members of Congress, however, are skeptical of the
Rapid Response Fund, with concerns about how it will differ from the Stabilization
Bridge Fund. See testimony of Alonzo Fulghum, acting administrator, chief operating
officer, USAID, before the Foreign Operations and Related Programs Subcommittee
Endnotes 33
of the House Appropriations Committee, May 20, 2009; and testimony of Jack Lew,
deputy secretary of state for management and resources, before the Foreign Opera-
tions and Related Programs Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee,
May 13, 2009. The FY2010 request for the fund is $76 million. The Stabilization Bridge
Fund is to be managed by S/CRS and “used to provide small grants or funding to
communities and organizations to provide services or opportunities that help stabi-
lize the situation, provide immediate security assistance to partner police forces, to
support urgently-needed demining, to create post-conflict community reconciliation
programs, and to support programs to reestablish or reform governance in post-crisis
situations.” The FY2010 request for the fund is $40 million and was placed within the
Economic Support Fund account. See Department of State, Congressional Budget Jus-
tification, Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2010, June 2009, p. 150.
61. See Richard Haass, “Supporting US Foreign Policy in the Post-9/11 World,” Stud-
ies in Intelligence, vol. 46, no. 3 (2002), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-
study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no3/article01.html.
For a similar argument but from the perspective of a former intelligence community
official, see Jack Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise Is Inevitable, What Role for
Analysis?” Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Paper, vol. 2,
no. 1 (January 2003).
62. Something comparable was prepared for the incoming Obama administration.
63. For an illustrative discussion of the general content of such plans, see “Preventing
Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers,” report of the genocide prevention task
force, chaired by Madeleine K. Albright and William S. Cohen, United States Institute
of Peace, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and American Academy of Di-
plomacy, Washington, DC (2008), pp. 65–68.
64. Consideration should also be given to changing the name of S/CRS to the State
Coordinator for Prevention, Stabilization, and Reconstruction in line with the new
NSC Directorate. A new Presidential Directive to replace NSPD-44 may be also be
desirable.
65. In addition, the DFA should consider fully implementing the Country Assistance
Strategy (CAS) tool that was attempted in pilot programs in ten countries for planning
their budget requests for FY2009. The CAS is intended to produce longer-term (five-
year) development strategies through a more transparent and interagency process.
About the Authors
Paul B. Stares is the General John W. Vessey senior fellow for con-
flict prevention and director of the Center for Preventive Action at the
Council on Foreign Relations. Besides overseeing a series of Coun-
cil Special Reports on potential sources of instability and strife, he is
currently working on a study assessing long-term conflict trends. Dr.
Stares recently led an expert working group on preventive diplomacy
for the genocide prevention task force co-chaired by Madeleine K.
Albright and William S. Cohen.
Prior to joining CFR, Stares was the vice president and director of
the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention at the United States
Institute of Peace. Stares worked as an associate director and senior
research scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Secu-
rity and Cooperation from 2000 to 2002, was a senior research fellow at
the Japan Institute of International Affairs and director of studies at the
Japan Center for International Exchange from 1996 to 2000, and was
a senior fellow and research associate in the foreign policy studies pro-
gram at the Brookings Institution from 1984 to 1996. He has also been
a NATO fellow and a scholar-in-residence at the MacArthur Founda-
tion’s Moscow office. Stares is the author of numerous books and arti-
cles, including Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea; Rethinking
the War on Terror: New Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Manage-
ment in the Post-9/11 World; The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey;
and Global Habit: The Drug Problem in a Borderless World. He received
his MA and PhD from the University of Lancaster, England.
Micah Zenko is a fellow for conflict prevention in the Center for Pre-
ventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. Previously, he
worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School in a number of
research positions, and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institu-
tion, Congressional Research Service, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear
35
36 About the Authors
Note: Council Special Reports reflect the judgments and recommendations of the author(s). They do not
necessarily represent the views of members of the advisory committee, whose involvement in no way
should be interpreted as an endorsement of the report by either themselves or the organizations with which
they are affiliated.
37
Center for Preventive Action
Advisory Committee
38
Mission Statement of the
Center for Preventive Action
The Center for Preventive Action (CPA) seeks to help prevent, defuse,
or resolve deadly conflicts around the world and to expand the body of
knowledge on conflict prevention. It does so by creating a forum in which
representatives of governments, international organizations, nongov-
ernmental organizations, corporations, and civil society can gather to
develop operational and timely strategies for promoting peace in specific
conflict situations. The center focuses on conflicts in countries or regions
that affect U.S. interests, but may be otherwise overlooked; where pre-
vention appears possible; and when the resources of the Council on For-
eign Relations can make a difference. The center does this by
39
Council Special Reports
Published by the Council on Foreign Relations
Sovereign Wealth and Sovereign Power: The Strategic Consequences of American Indebtedness
Brad W. Setser; CSR No. 37, September 2008
A Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies Report
40
Council Special Reports 41
After the Surge: The Case for U.S. Military Disengagement from Iraq
Steven N. Simon; CSR No. 23, February 2007
Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: U.S. Policy Toward Ethiopia and Eritrea
Terrence Lyons; CSR No. 21, December 2006
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Forgotten Intervention? What the United States Needs to Do in the Western Balkans
Amelia Branczik and William L. Nash; CSR No. 8, June 2005
A Center for Preventive Action Report
A New Beginning: Strategies for a More Fruitful Dialogue with the Muslim World
Craig Charney and Nicole Yakatan; CSR No. 7, May 2005
Power-Sharing in Iraq
David L. Phillips; CSR No. 6, April 2005
A Center for Preventive Action Report
Giving Meaning to “Never Again”: Seeking an Effective Response to the Crisis in Darfur
and Beyond
Cheryl O. Igiri and Princeton N. Lyman; CSR No. 5, September 2004
Freedom, Prosperity, and Security: The G8 Partnership with Africa: Sea Island 2004 and Beyond
J. Brian Atwood, Robert S. Browne, and Princeton N. Lyman; CSR No. 4, May 2004
Addressing the HIV/AIDS Pandemic: A U.S. Global AIDS Strategy for the Long Term
Daniel M. Fox and Princeton N. Lyman; CSR No. 3, May 2004
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