Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

Title Facts Issue/s Ruling Doctrine

Gerochi v. DOE RA 9136, otherwise known as
GR No. 159796 the Electric Power Industry
17 July 2007 Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA),
Nachura, J. which sought to impose a
universal charge on all end-users
of electricity for the purpose of
funding NAPOCOR’s projects,
was enacted and took effect in
2001.
Petitioners contest the
constitutionality of the EPIRA,
stating that the imposition of the
universal charge on all end-users
is oppressive and confiscatory
and amounts to taxation without
representation for not giving the
consumers a chance to be heard
and be represented.
W/N the universal charge is a NO. The assailed universal
tax. charge is not a tax, but an
exaction in the exercise of the
State’s police power. That public
welfare is promoted may be
gleaned from Sec. 2 of the
EPIRA, which enumerates the
policies of the State regarding
electrification. Moreover, the
Special Trust Fund feature of the
universal charge reasonably
serves and assures the attainment
and perpetuity of the purposes
for which the universal charge is
imposed (e.g. to ensure the
viability of the country’s electric
power industry), further boosting
the position that the same is an
exaction primarily in pursuit of
the State’s police objectives.
If generation of revenue is the
primary purpose and regulation is
merely incidental, the imposition
is a tax; but if regulation is the
primary purpose, the fact that
revenue is incidentally raised
does not make the imposition a
tax.
The taxing power may be used as
an implement of police power.
The theory behind the exercise of
the power to tax emanates from
necessity; without taxes,
government cannot fulfill its
mandate of promoting the
general welfare and well-being of
the people.

Chavez v. Romulo Pursuant to PGMA’s speech
GR No. 157036 stressing the need for a
9 June 2004 nationwide gun ban in all public
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. places, PNP Chief Ebdane issued
the “Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Ban on
the Carrying of Firearms Outside
of Residence.” It revoked all
existing Permits to Carry
Firearms Outside of Residence
(PTCFOR), subject to renewal.
Francisco Chavez, a licensed gun
owner to whom a PTCFOR has
been issued, requested the DILG
to reconsider the implementation
of the assailed Guidelines. His
request was denied. Thus, he
went to court to challenge the
constitutionality of the
W/N the revocation of the
PTCFORs pursuant to the
Guidelines is a violation of the
people’s right to property.
W/N the issuance of the assailed
Guidelines is a valid exercise of
police power.
NO. The right to bear arms is a A license authorizing a person to
mere statutory privilege, not a enjoy a certain privilege is
constitutional right. Being a mere neither a property nor property
statutory creation, the right to right.
bear arms cannot be considered
an inalienable or absolute right.
A license authorizing a person to
enjoy a certain privilege is
neither a property nor property
right.
YES. It is apparent from the
assailed Guidelines that the basis
for its issuance was the need for
peace and order in the society.
Undeniably, the motivating
factor in the issuance of the
Guidelines is the interest of the
public in general.

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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal

Guidelines.
PRC v. de Guzman 79 successful examinees of the
GR No. 144681 Physician Licensure
21 June 2004 Examination from Fatima
Tinga, J. College obtained unusual and
exceptionally high scores in the
two most difficult subjects of the
exam, which aroused the
suspicion of the Board of
Medicine. They had the results
surveyed by a statistician and
investigated by the NBI.
Subsequently, they adopted a
Resolution which withheld the
registration as physicians of the
Fatima examinees. After the
results of the investigation of the
NBI and the survey of Fr.
Nebres, the Board issued another
Resolution charging the said
examinees with immorality,
dishonest conduct, fraud, and
deceit.
W/N the Board has discretion to YES. The practice of medicine is The power to regulate the
hold in abeyance the a privilege, subject to exercise of a profession or
administration of the Hippocratic qualifications and pursuit of an occupation cannot
oath and the issuance of the disqualifications. It must appear be exercised by the State or its
certificates to successful board that the applicant has fully agents in an arbitrary, despotic,
examinees. complied with all the conditions or oppressive manner.
and requirements imposed by the
law and the licensing authority.
Should doubt taint or mar the
compliance as being less than
satisfactory, then the privilege
will not issue. Until the moral
and mental fitness of de Guzman,
et al. could be ascertained, the
Board has discretion to hold in
abeyance the administration of
the Hippocratic oath and the
issuance of the certificates to
them. The writ of mandamus
does not lie to compel
performance of an act which is
not duly authorized.

The Fatima examinees, on the

other hand, filed the special civil
action of mandamus against the
PRC so that they would be
allowed to take their physician’s
oath.
City of Manila v. Laguio Malate Tourist Development
GR No. 118127 Corporation (MTDC) owned a
12 April 2005 Victoria Court motel in the
Tinga, J. Ermita-Malate area, which was
being threatened to be closed
down by an Ordinance passed by
the City of Manila, which
prohibited the operation of any
business which adversely
affected the social and moral
welfare of the community in the
said area. The said ordinance
provided that these said
establishments were to be either
W/N the ordinance is an
oppressive exercise of police
power.
YES. Although the object of the An ordinance which permanently
ordinance was the promotion of restricts the use of property that it
the social and moral values of the cannot be used for any
community, the means employed reasonable purpose goes beyond
for the accomplishment thereof regulation and must be
were unreasonable and unduly recognized as a taking of the
oppressive. property without just
compensation.
The due process clause is a
limitation upon the exercise of
police power.
The police power granted to

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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
closed down, relocated, or
transformed into other
wholesome types of
establishments.
MTDC sought to have the
ordinance declared
unconstitutional. The Court
agreed with MTDC, and
enjoined the City of Manila from
implementing the ordinance.
MMDA v. Viron Transportation PGMA issued EO 179, which
GR No. 170656 provided for the establishment of
15 August 2007 a Mass Transport System for
Greater Manila. Pursuant to this
EO, the Metro Manila Council of
the MMDA cited the need to
remove the bus terminals located
along major thoroughfares of
Metro Manila.
Viron, and later Mencorp, both
provincial bus operators who had
bus terminals that were
threatened to be removed, filed
petitions alleging that the EO
should be declared
unconstitutional and illegal for
transgressing the possessory
rights of owners and operators of
public land transportation units
over their respective terminals.
W/N the EO is a valid exercise
of police power.
government units must always be
exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the
people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Individual
rights may be adversely affected
only to the extent that may fairly
be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or
public welfare.
Obiter: There are no pure places
where there are impure men. –
Justice Tinga
Nyahahaha. 
NO. As to the alleged Police power rests primarily with
confiscatory character of the EO, the legislature, but it may be
it need only be stated that the delegated.
respondents’ certificates of
public convenience confer no Measures calculated to promote
property right, and are mere the safety and convenience of the
licenses or privileges. As such, people using the thoroughfares
they must yield to legislation by the regulation of vehicular
safeguarding the people’s traffic present a proper subject
interest. However, although the for the exercise of police power.
authority of the President over
the implementation of the Project
cannot be questioned, the
designation of the MMDA as the
implementing agency for the
Project may not be sustained.
MMDA has no police power, let
alone legislative power. In light
of the administrative nature of its
powers and functions, the
MMDA is devoid of authority to
implement the Project as
envisioned by the EO; hence, it
could not have been validly
designated by the President to
undertake the Project. It follows
that the MMDA cannot validly
order the elimination of the
respondents’ terminals.
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Exec. Secretary v. Southwing
Heavy Industries
GR Nos. 164171-2, 168741
20 February 2006
Ynares-Santiago, J.
Lucero v. City Government of
Pasig
GR No. 132834
24 November 2006
Corona, J.
Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
EO 156 was issued by PGMA in
2002, prohibiting the importation
into the country of used motor
vehicles, subject to a few
exceptions. Article 2, Section 3.1
enumerates the vehicles
excluded/exempted from the
prohibition. Three separate
actions for declaratory relief
were filed before an Olongapo
RTC, asserting that Article 2,
Section 3.1 is unconstitutional
and illegal. The RTC granted all
the petitions and declared the EO
unconstitutional.
The brothers Lucero and one
Tenorio were granted lease
contracts to occupy stalls in the
public market if Pasig in 1983. In
1993, Pasig renovated its market
facilities and passed Municipal
Ordinance No. 56 which
mandated all stall occupants to
fill up and submit application
forms which would serve as their
lease contracts if approved.
W/N EO 156 is a valid exercise
of police power.
W/N the Luceros may claim a
vested right to the market stalls
they were occupying.
W/N the Municipal Ordinance
was a valid exercise of police
power.
EO 156 is VALID insofar as it For an administrative issuance to
applies to the Philippine territory be valid, it must comply with the
outside the presently fenced-in following:
former Subic because 1. Its promulgation must
1. Its promulgation is be authorized by the
actually authorized by legislature;
the legislature (Tariff 2. It must be promulgated
and Customs Code, in accordance with the
Omnibus Investment prescribed procedure;
Code, Safeguard 3. It must be within the
Measures Act); and scope of the authority
2. It is presumed that the given by the
EO duly complied with legislature; and
the procedures and 4. It must be reasonable.
limitations imposed by
law, absent any strong
evidence to the
contrary.
However, the proscription in the
importation of used motor
vehicles should be operative only
outside the Freeport and he
inclusion of said zone within the
ambit of prohibition is an invalid
modification of RA 7227 (Bases
Conversion and Development
Act of 1992). When the
application of an administrative
issuance modifies existing laws
or exceeds the intended scope,
the issuance becomes void, not
only for being ultra vires but
also for being unreasonable.
NO. The 1983 lease contracts did A public market is one dedicated
not give petitioners irrefutable to the service of the general
rights to the market stalls. They public and operated under
were mere grantees of a privilege government control and
to occupy and operate such supervision as a public utility.
booths. Hence, the operation of a public
market and its facilities is
YES. The operation of a market imbued with public interest.
stall by virtue of a license is
always subject to the police
power of a city government. An
application for this privilege may
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Apo Fruits Corp. v. CA
GR No. 164195
6 February 2007
Chico-Nazario, J.
Agan v. PIATCO
GR Nos. 155001, 155547, and
155661
21 January 2004
Puno, J.
Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
The Luceros and Tenorio,
however, refused to apply for a
new lease on their stalls. The
Pasig government filed a case for
ejectment against them.
The MTC ruled in favor of the
Luceros, but was reversed by the
RTC and the CA.
AFC and HPI owned agricultural
lands which they voluntarily
offered to sell to the government.
However, they did not agree to
the LBP’s valuation of the land,
stating that the valuations were
unreasonably low and inadequate
as just compensation for the
properties.
DAR then requested LBP to
deposit the amounts equivalent
to the LBP valuations in the
names of both AFC and HPI.
The latter both withdrew several
millions from the said accounts.
Thereafter, new TCTs over the
lands were issued in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines,
and CLOAs were subsequently
issued to farmer-beneficiaries.
AFC and HPI both filed
complaints for determination of
just compensation.
PIATCO won the bid for the
construction and development of
the NAIA IPT III under a build-
operate-transfer arrangement. A
Concession Agreement was then
entered into. Subsequently, the
ARCA and Supplement contracts
were entered into as well,
modifying the original terms of
the Concession Agreement.
W/N LBP may determine the
amount of just compensation.
If so, W/N it correctly
determined the value of the lands
in question.
W/N the temporary takeover
clause is constitutional.
be granted or refused for reasons
of public policy and sound public
administration.
NO. The valuation of property in
eminent domain is essentially a
judicial function which is vested
with the RTC acting as a Special
Agrarian Court.
NO. In the determination of just
compensation, all the facts as to
the condition of the property and
its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities,
may be shown and considered in
estimating its value.
NO. The section which provides
that PIATCO shall be entitled to
reasonable compensation for the
duration of the temporary
takeover by the government
clearly obligates the government
in the exercise of its police
power to compensate PIATCO
and this obligation is offensive to
the Constitution.
The determination of just
compensation is essentially a
judicial function.
The determination of just
compensation cannot be made to
the prejudice of the sellers or of
the government.
Requirements for a proper
exercise of eminent domain:
1. Public use
2. Just compensation
The police power of the State
cannot be negated by any party
nor should its exercise be a
source of obligation for the State.
Police power cannot be
diminished, let alone defeated by
any contract for its paramount
consideration is public welfare
and interest.
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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
Various petitions were filed to
annul the CA, ARCA, and the
Supplements; and to prohibit the
DOTC, and MIAA from
implementing them.
Southern Cross Cement v. Philcemcor filed a petition
Cement Manufacturers Assoc. seeking the imposition of
GR No. 158540 safeguard measures on gray
3 August 2005 Portland cement with the DTI.
Tinga, J. The DTI Secretary then issued a
provisional safeguard measure
and referred the petition to the
Tariff Commission.
After the Tariff Commission’s
investigation, it reported that
there was no need for definitive
safeguard measures. The DTI
Secretary then denied
Philcemcor’s petition but
expressed his opinion that he
disagreed with the Tariff
Commission’s findings.
Philcemcor challenged this
Decision in the CA. The CA
ruled that the DTI Secretary was
not bound by the Tariff
Commission’s report since it was
merely recommendatory. Based
on this decision, the DTI
Secretary then imposed a
definitive safeguard measure on
the importation of gray Portland
cement for 3 years.
Southern Cross challenges both
the CA and DTI Secretary
decisions.
ATO v. Gopuco Gopuco owned a parcel of land
GR No. 158563 which was subjected to
30 June 2005 expropriation proceedings for the
Chico-Nazario, J. purpose of the expansion of the
W/N the PIATCO Contracts
themselves are constitutional.
W/N the DTI Secretary is barred
from imposing a general
safeguard measure absent a
positive final determination
rendered by the Tariff
Commission.
When private land
expropriated for a particular
public use, and that particular
public use is abandoned, does the
NO. The PIATCO contracts run
afoul of the Constitution. This is
because the ARCA provides for
a direct government guaranty in
the form of taking over of the
loans of PIATCO should they
become due and unpaid.
YES. The DTI Secretary cannot
impose a general safeguard
measure without a positive final
determination rendered by the
Tariff Commission because it is
a constitutional limitation
imposed on the delegation of
legislative power to impose
tariffs and imposts to the
President. The authorization to
the President can be exercised
only within the specified limits
set in the law and is further
subject to limitations and
restrictions which Congress may
impose.
is IT DEPENDS. If the land is
expropriated for a particular
purpose, with the condition that
when that purpose is ended or
It is Congress, not the President,
which possesses inherent powers
to impose tariffs and imposts.
Without legislative authorization
through statute, the President has
no power, authority or right to
impose such safeguard measures
because taxation is inherently
legislative, not executive.
Section 28(2) Article VI of the
Constitution shields the
delegation of the taxing power to
the President by the Legislature
from constitutional infirmity, and
should be recognized as an
exceptional grant of legislative
power to the President, rather
than the affirmation of an
inherent executive power.
Eminent domain is generally
described as “the highest and
most exact idea of property
remaining in the government”
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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
Lahug Airport in Cebu.
Subsequently, the Mactan
International Airport commenced
operations, and Lahug Airport
was shut down. Gopuco sought
the reconveyance of his lot and
offered to pay for the value of his
former land. He maintained that
the original purpose for which
the property was expropriated
had ceased, and title to the
property should therefore revert
to him.
Palileo v. NIA The Palileos collectively own
GR No. 148574 three parcels of land, on certain
11 October 2005 portions of which NIA had built
Chico-Nazario, J. a canal in 1956, and an access
road in 1983. The canal appears
to have been expropriated by
virtue of a court order as early as
1958. However, it does not
appear whether payment of just
land so expropriated return to its
former owner?
W/N in cases of expropriation,
an “implied contract” that the
properties will be used only for
the public purpose for which
they were acquired.
W/N the Palileos could claim
compensation for the affected
portions of their property or
recover the said property from
NIA.
abandoned the property shall
return to its former owner, then
when the purpose is terminated
or abandoned the former owner
reacquires the property so
expropriated. On the other hand,
when land has been acquired for
public use in fee simple,
unconditionally, either by the
exercise of eminent domain or by
purchase, the former owner
retains no rights in the land, and
the public use may be abandoned
or the land may be devoted to a
different use, without any
impairment of the estate or title
acquired, or any reversion to the
former owner. In this case, the
terms of judgment regarding the
expropriation of the property
granted title in fee simple to the
Republic of the Philippines.
Therefore, no rights either
express or implied, have been
retained by Gopuco.
NO. In expropriation
proceedings, the condemnor
merely serves notice that it is
taking title and possession of the
property, and the defendant
asserts title or interest in the
property, not to prove a right to
possession, but to prove a right
to compensation for the taking.
Thus, no such contract exists.
NO. NIA has occupied, utilized,
and for all intents and purposes,
exercised dominion over the
property. Further, it is
undisputed that the access road
was taken for public use. Hence,
such taking even in the absence
of an order of expropriation or
memorandum of agreement, shall
that may be acquired for some
public purpose through a method
in the nature of a forced purchase
by the State. It is a right to
reassert dominion over property
within the State for public use or
to meet a public exigency and is
said to be an essential part of
governance even in its most
primitive form and thus
inseparable from sovereignty.
Notwithstanding the grant to
individuals, the eminent domain,
the highest and most exact idea
of property, remains in the
government, or in the aggregate
body of people in their sovereign
capacity; and they have the right
to resume the possession of the
property whenever the public
interest so requires it.
The unpaid landowner cannot
recover possession of property
taken for public use even while
no requisite expropriation
proceedings were first instituted.
The right of eminent domain is
usually understood to be an
ultimate right of the sovereign
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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 – Stef Macapagal
compensation had been made.
In 1994, NIA assessed the
Palileos an irrigation service fee.
Shortly thereafter, the Palileos
demanded reasonable rentals
from NIA for occupying their
property. When NIA refused to
pay, the Palileos sued for
recovery of possession, arguing
that there was no payment of just
compensation, nor was there
expropriation proceedings filed
with respect to the acquisition of
the property used as an access
road.
not entitle the owner to the power to appropriate any
recovery of possession but only property within its territorial
to just compensation, following sovereignty for a public purpose.
existing case law. However, with
respect to the claim of just
compensation, PD 552 has
barred their claims. With respect
to the irrigation canal, the action
accrued 18 years prior to the
PD’s approval. The PD provides
that actions for recovery of
compensation and damages
against NIA which have accrued
for 10 or more years prior to the
decree’s approval are deemed to
have prescribed and are barred
forever. As for the access road,
the action was commenced only
after 12 years. The PD also
provides that claims should be
taken within 5 years from the
time the property was taken.
Thus, the actions of the Palileos
have already prescribed. They
cannot recover just compensation
anymore.