are parystskdoo Jo uornnqunstpar pue uononpoidas amp su19Ao8 (9p09 “S'A Jo LI AMA) 488] 19134409 °s°7)(9z-20-6002)peBseuD - - sseyZ9Z00vELLE- 481UeD TUM + 21-56 :SeBed ‘epul| ‘yooie / ys\Gojowsysido se yneonoy :ojonay ‘e66L ()sz"A :oNss| :uOHeHD ‘Auonieg gem :aaM Sioipersues) ‘Axeiqry sepueg - ‘7 uesuemy ny 3 dnyoIq :squaw09 <4@ye pepaou iN OS*LL 92-10-0102 :paisanboy (1 [938] Aysuaatun uoysog ‘Aydosoyyd Jo ydeq / X908-L£00 NSSI) Foucault. De Birth of the Clie. p94. ‘Onthe asi of ts typeof mapping procedure, tore thaw one. ad pethaps indefinitely many. ‘comespunding systems could be etablsne, Inter words ton intra eations tha can he ime, then more than one suPwantive ronent could he given withthe nosesanily ea ‘ional isomorphic wructure. This problem could be substantially diminished if one claims tht ‘nly ctu, istorily exient dicursive stems, of systems of elif that eal Believes ‘actualy belive, are under analysis. Donald Davidson makes a elated point i arguing that bli aren in general woitary. and therefore that he obectom to corentism on he srounds ‘hat twill ead Believers into accepting Taiy-ale serous. Given Foweaul’s penchant! for "ease studies" of rel histoncal Uncoures ver more sotract theoretical clims about Kos edge, we might ec hi as making a Davidsonan kindof move Bere. But hen ight be aimed ‘hat this eaves bis alysis athe level of historical descrip rather than ws an epistemology ‘This ltr issue sal be discussed in Section Il. See Donald Davidson." Empirical Comet, rath aed tarpon. Emus Leone (New York Has lackel, FB), pp. SSL a 327. 23 Foucault, The Archaeology af Knowledge. p. AS 24 See Foucault, Power-Knomledge. 112 25 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge. 11S. 2% Foucault, “History of Systems of Though.” in Language, Counter Memory. Practice. e Donal! Bouchard, tans. Donald Bouchard and Shery Simin dthacs, NY." Cornell University Pres, 197), p. 198. 27 Foucault, “The Discourse vt Languaye" in The Archaologs of Kaowtedge, p. 225, 28 Jurgen Habermas, “What is Universal Pragmatics?” ia Cammunicaion and the Evolution of Society Boston: Beacon Press. 1979), pp. 1-68 29 Foucau, The Archacologs of Krondedgep 30 Foucask, The Archaeology of Knowledge. p 3 Reveal, The Archacnogy of Kwfedge. p15 32 Foucault The Archarology of Knontedge, 9. 16. 123B M % M rn 2 “4 6 6 ” 0 31 2 s ss se 3 sx 2 o 6s 6 12 LINDA ALCOFE Foucault The Archacology of Kneledge, p17 Foucault, The Archaeol of Knowledge, p17 Foucaul, The Archaeol of Knowledge, 182. Focal, Dh Birth of the Cini. p30, Feat, Dhe Birth of he Cite p18 Fuca, Phe Birth of he iii, 137 (My emphasis.) Foucault, Discipline and Panis, tans, Shela |New York Pancon, 1977). p19 Foveaul, Language, Counter Memory. Practice. p. 199, Few, The Archaeviogs of Krol. p39 See Foucault's "Afterword: The Subject and Powcr”n Micke Foucault: Beyond Structural land Hermenewies, 0d c (Chsipo- University of Chicago Press. 1983) pp. 208-226, Foucault, Lameuage, Courter Memory. Practice. p. 19 Foveaul, "The Discourse on Langue.” p. 218. Few, “Teuth and Power,” an PoweriKmomedge, p13 This nation ofthe word ws conceptually described inthe Husserian craton asthe realm of lived enpenence.” but Foucault dos ot ato te 0 the eealm of hun consciousness. For him to say that ath sa thing ofthis works to sy ha its a producto discursive formations rather than transcendent elit. and this does not cnt tht i ceated By humans or that i feist her experiential onscionsne, bu the "anonymous developments of discourses Foucault, "The Concer fr Trath” p. 257, (My emphasis) Foucault The Archuerloer af Knowledge, p. 3 Focal, The Archaeologs af Knowledge. pp 184186 See his intention “Pragati sd Phiowophy" in Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneap tls: University of Minnesita Pres. 2). pp xii-ali, Abs ge is Pith nd he Mirror of Natre Princeton: Panceton Univers Press, 1979) Foucault, The Archasologs of Krotedge, pp. 182-183 Foucault, The Archacolgs of Knowledge, p- 191. We may note with intrest that Foucault series the episteme a hit which the men ofa paricular period cannot escape. and wonder ‘wha this means fr his own work, Contrary to many of is commentators, {lo not believe that Fueaul meant to exept himsf fom hs consrait,oF postion Rims as working fom an terior plane unencumbered hy such limitations. Inthe interview ete Truth nd Power" in Power Knowledge. he speaks at some length about the changing nella lima m which he ‘worked und which allowed hm formulate the tease did. Seep. 109-133, especially p. 109-118 and 11S Foucault, "Teuth and Power.” PoweriKnowledge. p13 Fv, “Teak and Power.” Power Knowledge, p. 133 See Jacgion Kin, "What i Natrlized Epistemology?” rea tthe Justicaton in Bpistemal- ty conference, Brown University, November 1986 Foucault, “Therum Philosophicunt” in Philosophy, Poles, Caltur. pp. 177-178 Focal; “Truth and Power,” Power Knowledge. p. 133 Focal, “Power and Steps,” PowerKstedge,p- 14S, Foucault “Truth and Power." Power-Knonledge. p. 132 Fuel, Two Lectures.” Power Krvledge, pL Foucault, “Two Lectures." PoweriKrowledge. p. 8S. cau, “Two Lectures." PowerKrawledge,p.R6. My views on Gulting's postion ae included in my review of his Book in Philosophy amd Phenomenolopical Research, Deere "91, pp. 956-959. Fuca, The Archaeol of Knowledge, 8.192 Focal, “The Discourse on Language.” p. 218 Fat, “Two Lectures.” PowerKnmledge. p98 4 “THE PHILOSOPHICAL, FORUM Volume XXW, No. 2, Winter 1995, THE IRONY OF IT ERMANNO BENCIVENGA, In the first meditation, Descartes faces an embarrassing situation: Asi aid not remember other cccasions when Ihave been tricked by ently similar touts ‘while alep! As hiak about his more eartlly,fge plainly hatter ae never ny se gs ‘by means of which being awake canbe distinguished fom being alee. The res tot sgn 1 feel dazed, an this very feoing only reiores the notion tht my be asleep" (13) [Note two characteristics of this situation. First, Descartes"s embarrassment has a ‘number of empirical consequences (and manifestations). He feels dazed, is in a State of confusion, and (we may imagine) is also likely to be pragmatically quite ineffectual. Second, the embarrassment is caused (at least in part) by the em- Pirical presence of dreams: by the empirical fact that dreams occur in Descartes's, experience. There is also, of course, the additional fact that he is unable to tell dreams and waking life apart. And by working on this aspect of the situation he will eventually be able, in the sixth meditation, to resolve his embarrassment: "ow notice that there isa vas ference betwen [being asleep and being ake in that dreams ae never inked by memory with all the eer ations of ie 6 waking experiences as wile Tam awake, anyone wore sodden to appa fo me and hen dapat immediately as happens Jin ep. so that t could nt sce where he hal care fom or where he ad Boe to it wuld nt be unreasonable for me je tha he ws pnt a iso eae fay ra, rather than ‘real man. But when I dst see where things come from and where an when ty come to ‘me, and when can conncet my perepion of them wih the wtf the ret uf my he without 4 ra, tena te crn wh encoun thse thing a nt ase ato (61-62) = dhe He “notices"* that, as a matter of fact, dreams and waking life can be 1old apart And, of course, a conceptual argument has convinced him that facts will have to continue to be so favorable. His confidence is thus restored: he is back on his feet {nd can dismiss “as laughable” his former “exaggerated doubts” (61), Indoed. {is So confident now that some of his current Statements sound like exagger- 128