Radiation Exposure Case: Windscale Fire: UK-October

1957

Introduction
The Windscale fire of 10 October 1957 was the worst nuclear accident in

Great Britain's history

The fire took place in Unit 1 of the two-pile Windscale facility on the
northwest coast of England in Cumberland (now Sellafield, Cumbria).
The fire burned for three days and there was a release of radioactive
contamination that spread across the UK and Europe.
Of particular concern at the time was the radioactive isotope iodine-131,
which may lead to cancer of the thyroid, and it has been estimated that
the incident caused 240 additional cancer cases.

History of the Problem

After the Second World War, the British government embarked on a

programme to build nuclear weapons.

Skipping the lower-performance uranium-based weapons in favor of those
based on plutonium, a plutonium-breeding reactor system was designed
to produce this material, which is not found in nature.
The design was based on the graphite-moderated B Reactor built at the
Hanford Site, which was known to British physicists who had been
involved in the Manhattan Project during the war.
The reactors were built in a short time near the village of Seascale,
Cumberland. They were known as Windscale Pile 1 and Pile 2, housed in
large concrete buildings a few hundred feet apart.

 The first indication of an abnormal condition was provided by air

samplers about mile away. Radioactivity levels were 10 times than

normally found in the air, and sampling closer to the reactor building
confirmed radioactivity releases were occurring.
Inspection of the core indicated the fuel elements in approximately 150
channels were overheated.
After several hours of trying different methods to extinguish the fire, the
reactor core was flooded with water, and the plant cooled down.
The steps taken to save the reactor however, proved futile. The reactor was
completely ruined.

Contributing Factors
Factors contributing to the event were:
1. The inability to adequately monitor the core for damage
2. Use of uranium metal, rather than uranium dioxide, as fuel. The metal
has a lower melting point than the oxide.
3. Rather than re-tool or redesign to ensure proper and safe operation,
existing materials were pushed to limits in ways in which they were
never designed to be used.
4. The design of the reactors were dodgy, hence the ionizing radiation at
dangerous levels had been leaking for days.

Reactor Design
Two reactors for the production of plutonium had been hurriedly built in

the late 1940s/early 1950s. Both reactors were essentially blocks of graphite
with aluminum-clad rods of uranium, with other elements running
through the otherwise solid graphite.
Air was blown from one side over the graphite and with the rods to cool
them, while hot air was pulled out of the other end and vented through
large discharge stalks.
Filters, hastily added at the last minute at the urging of one prescient soul,
were placed at the top of each stack.

Population at Risk
The best efforts of the agencies in charge was the concern that milk within

the surrounding area my have been hazardously contaminated. Vegetable

sampling indicated the stalk filter had removed almost all of the
radioactive particulates, but permitted the radioactive gases to be
released. As a result, milk within a radius of 500km of the site was
destroyed for about a month.

The Aftermath
British leaders covered up the real cause of the accident and blamed it on

Windscales heroic workers. This was an effort to get their hands on the
nuclear weapons design by the U.S. officials.
Health wise, it was also a disaster. The Windscale release of iodine-131,
caesium-137 and xenon-133 are thought to have caused at least 200 cancer
cases.
In the aftermath of the accident, it was believed that an estimated 700
terabecquerels (20,000 curies) of radioactive materials had been dispersed
into the countryside. No effort was made to relocate or evacuate people
away from the surrounding areas

Findings
The following findings were made public after the accident by the Board

of Enquiry:
The primary factor for the cause of the accident was the second nuclear
heating applied too soon and too rapidly.
The steps taken by the operators in dealing with the accident was prompt,
efficient and displayed considerable devotion to duty.
That the measures adopted to deal with the accident were adequate as
there was no immediate damage to health of the public or plant workers;
but it queried technical and organizational deficiencies.

Conclusion
Today, the Windscale site has remained in the foray of discussion for a

period of fifty years, partly because of the heroics of a group of workers,

and also because the entire incident could have been avoided. The alleged
cover-up and the exhibition of incompetence by the government officials
makes it an interesting topic of discussion for anyone particular familiar
and interested in the topic. A lot still remains to be done in the place of
implementation of the strict liability provisions. The Windscale accident
also serves as a good evaluation tool for examining the progress made to
date in the area of safety and emergency responses.