Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DOI 10.1007/s12117-010-9096-7
EXCERPTS
David A. Shirk
Trans-Border Institute (TBI), Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies
University of San Diego
January 2010
http://www.justiceinmexico.org/resources/pdf/drug_violence.pdf
This is an excerpt from a 15-page report on violence related to criminal activity
by drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico. The report was prepared for the Justice
in Mexico Project (www.justiceinmexico.org) which is hosted by the Trans-Border
Institute at the University of San Diego. Endnotes appearing in the original
document have been transformed into footnotes and renumbered.
(...)
This report provides an overview of the trends found in available data on drugrelated killings in Mexico, and offers some brief observations about the causes of
violence and the effectiveness of recent efforts to combat organized crime.
These figures from PGR/SEDENAwere reported on January 5, 2010 and obtained by the Trans-Border Institute
from the news agency Imagen del Golfo (www.imagendelgolfo.com.mx). According to this article, there were
560 killings in 2006, 3,537 in 2007, 5,903 in 2008, and 7,742 in 2009. The same report indicates that there
were 195 females killed in 2008 and 425 in 2009; 535 police in 2008 and 470 in 2009; and 52 and 35 military
personnel in 2008 and 2009, respectively. Meanwhile, a recent El Universal article reports the same figure for
2009, but different figures for all previous years: 1,573 in 2005, 2,221 in 2006, 2,673 in 2007, and 5,630 in
2008. Esther Snchez, Aumenta nivel de violencia del narco, El Universal, January 1, 2010.
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In Mexico, a country of more than 100 million people, the odds of being killed in a drug-related
homicide in 2009 were one in 16,328; almost three times less likely than being killed in an automobile
accident in the United States (about one in 6,500). Bailey, Ronald. Dont Be Terrorized: Youre More
Likely to Die of a Car Accident, Drowning, Fire, or Murder. Reason.com (http://reason.com/archives/
2006/08/11/dont-be-terrorized).
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(...)
Overall, one thing that stands out about the evolution of drug-related violence in
recent years is the extent to which it has been driven by the splintering of and
competition among DTOs. As noted above, this competition was virtually nonexistent as Mexican DTOs began to take over smuggling routes from struggling
Columbian traffickers in the 1980s. Effectively, in the 1980s, Mexican DTOs
operated primarily under a single hierarchy, with significant protection from the
state. Many experts, therefore, speculate that the centralization of power and
pervasive corruption under the long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (1929
2000) contributed to the relative harmony and success of Mexican DTOs at this early
stage.
Today, however, Mexico enjoys much greater political pluralism, and has
experienced significant decentralization of power to state governors and mayors.
By and large, this has been a positive development, since the lack of democratic
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competition and the excessive centralization of power in Mexico for most of the 20th
century led to significant corruption and abuses. However, as a result of Mexicos
contemporary political situation, the dynamics among DTOs have changed in ways
that contribute to greater competition and violence.
Lacking a unified, overarching hierarchy of corrupt state officials to limit
competition, the organization of drug trafficking has become more fractionalized.
Competing organizations now vie for influence at both the national and sub-national
level, sometimes competing to corrupt officials in different agencies within the same
administration. As DTOs vie against each other they are rumored to have negotiated
various pacts and truces; however, these appear to be short-lived. With the added
effect of government counter-drug effortssometimes to the benefit of one DTO
over anotherthe end result is a much more chaotic and unpredictable pattern of
violent conflict among organized crime groups than Mexico has ever seen.
Final considerations
The ultimate question is whether the Mexican government has a strategy that can
achieve its frequently stated goal of breaking DTOs into smaller and more manageable
pieces. Thus far, its de facto strategy has included four components: (1) the direct
involvement of military personnel in combating organized crime groups; (2) the
sequential targeting of specific organizations for the dismantling of leadership
structures; (3) longterm investments and reforms intended to improve the integrity
and performance of domestic law enforcement institutions; and (4) the solicitation of
U.S. assistance in terms of intelligence, material support, and the southbound
interdiction of weapons and cash.
At least in the short term, this strategy appears to have had some success in
dismantling organized crime networks, and seems to indicate a sea change in
political will among Mexican government officials. Indeed, there have been
disruptions of the top leadership structures of virtually every major DTO except
for the Guzmn-Zambada organization. These efforts are in accordance with the
Caldern administrations explicit agenda to breakdown the operational structures of
organized crime, with the hope of turning a national security problem (i.e., DTOs
capable of corrupting and directly challenging the state) into a local public security
problem (i.e., disaggregated, essentially local criminal organizations). In the end,
government officials hope to achieve a result similar to that seen in Colombia, which
dismantled its major DTOs in the 1980s and 1990s.
(...)
Meanwhile, in Mexico and abroad, many have pointed to the on-going bloodshed
as a reason to re-think current strategies and approaches to the war on drugs. In
2009, several leading Latin American leaders, including former Mexican President
Ernesto Zedillo, spoke critically against the current policy emphasis on the
criminalization of drugs, and called for a new approach centered on harm
reduction through prevention and treatment. Along these lines, Mexico significantly
revised its minor drug possession laws in 2009 to specify the quantities for which a
person can be arrested by authorities. The measurewhich has been criticized for
effectively decriminalizing drugshas not yet taken full effect, but is intended to
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reduce street-level corruption and facilitate treatment for habitual drug users.
However, many in Mexico argue that, without changes in U.S. drug policy, efforts to
combat DTOs or to address Mexicos own growing domestic demand for drugs will
be futile.
Change may already be under way. The United States has shown increased
willingness to recognize its shared responsibility for drug-related violence in
Mexico, under both Presdient George Bush and President Barack Obama. Both
governments have pledged their support to help Mexicos counter-drug efforts
through direct assistancein the form of the three-year, $1.4 billion aid package
known as the Mrida Initiativeand U.S.-side efforts to crack down on the
southbound flow of weapons and the iron river of deadly firearms that supply
Mexican DTOs. Some additional support has been directed to drug use prevention
and treatment programs, though critics charge that much more support is needed in
these areas to have any significant effect on U.S. drug demand.
At the same time, as in Mexico, there appears to be an emerging discussion on
alternative approaches to managing illicit drug use in the United States. Over the last
few years, several U.S. states have decriminalized minor drug possession by
favoring fines over incarceration, and several states have legalized medical
marijuana consumption. In March 2009, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder signaled
that his office would no longer focus on prosecuting medical marijuana dispensaries
that are compliant with state law, despite federal prohibitions on all marijuana
consumption. Meanwhile, at the urging of Congressman Eliot Engle, an ardent
supporter of the Mrida Initiative, the lower chamber of the U.S. Congress approved
a new commission to evaluate U.S. domestic and international counter-drug
initiatives. The Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission Act (H.R. 2134)
was debated and passed by the House of Representatives on December 8, 2009, and
was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the next day.
Whether or not H.R. 2134 is approved, developments in Mexico in 2010 will no
doubt play a significant role in the ongoing debate over the effectiveness of current
U.S. drug policy. Given the extraordinary number of drug-related killings, 2009 was
a year of unprecedented, high-profile violence in Mexico. Since recent blows against
key DTOs may produce more turmoil over the ensuring months, the toll of drugrelated violence remains high at the start of the new decade. Such violence must be
taken in context, since drug-related killings are heavily concentrated in a few key
states and very few members of the general population are casualties of this
violence. However, the number of drug-related killings has clearly increased to
unacceptable levels and creates serious concerns for both Mexican policy makers
and citizens. While the problem of drug-related violence should not be exaggerated,
it must be addressed. Identifying the best pratices and strategies for both the short
and long term must be a top priority for both Mexico and the United States.