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June 7, 2016
Filed Under: ISIS,Radical Islam,Syria,The Middle East
74
Two years ago the Islamic States blitz assault across a swath of land as big as the United Kingdom led to the
establishment of the self-proclaimed Caliphate and fragmented both Syria and Iraq.
Today, the American-led and the Russian-led coalitions succeeded to contain the advance of the Islamic State in Syria
and Iraq because of several factors:
Attrition: Since August 2014, when the U.S.-led coalition initiated its air campaign against the IS, the coalition has
succeeded in eliminating thousands of Islamic ghters, but more important, it has struck and shaken the command and
control structure of the IS.
Manpower: Countries from where IS volunteers have been recruited have adopted new rules of conduct and restricted
the ow of volunteers to the IS. Aware that most of the ghters would come back to their native countries and become
dormant members of IS agent cells, these countries now closely monitor Sala st organizations.
Firepower inferiority: Unwilling to put boots on the ground, the U.S. and Russians chose to crush IS forces as well as
rebels from the air, targeting their equipment, logistics, leaders, and military formations.
Diminishing nancial support: When IS captured Mosul, it looted Mosuls central bank, absconding with $500 million. In
the last year, U.S. aircraft unleashed a new and effective nancial measure: blowing up the coffers of the Islamic State.
Two years ago the Islamic States blitz assault across a swath of land as big as the United Kingdom led to the
establishment of the self-proclaimed Caliphate and fragmented both Syria and Iraq. The recent defeats in icted on the
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Islamic radicals, however, have considerably shrunk the areas under IS control in both countries.
Indeed, under the pressure of the Syrian-Iranian-Russian-Hizbullah coalition on the one hand and the American-Western-Iraqi
and moderate-Arab coalition on the other, the Islamic State suffered enormous losses in manpower (according to the
French minister of defense, 20,000 IS ghters have been killed during the last year) and more signi cantly, the IS has lost an
estimated 40 percent of its territory, conquered only a few months earlier. The most symbolic loss was Palmyra, retaken by
Bashar Assads loyal forces with the active assistance of Russian air power and the infantry support of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps and Afghani paramilitary units.
Likewise, in Iraq, the regime scored a huge success in recapturing key cities that had fallen under the IS control such as
Ramadi and Beiji. Currently, the Iraqi regime is trying to reconquer a key Sunni city, Fallujah, north of Baghdad, while
continuing to prepare an assault on Mosul, Iraqs second-largest city. A Kurdish coalition, reportedly assisted by U.S. Special
Forces, is approaching the outskirts of Raqqa in Syria, the unof cial capital of the IS Caliphate.
Based on the latest advances of loyalist troops and militias both in Syria and Iraq, some fundamental questions arise: What
has changed today that did not exist two years ago? What were the factors that brought that change in fortune, and what
are the future prospects for the Islamic State? Are we witnessing the beginning of the end of the Islamic State, or is it a
prelude for a resurgence in a new geographic area such as the failed state of Libya or even in a torn state such as
Afghanistan?
Bearing in mind the Obama administrations policy of No boots on the ground, the two main anti-Islamic State coalitions
(one American-led, the other Russian-led) succeeded to contain the advance of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq due to the
following factors:
1. Attrition: Since August 2014 when the U.S.-led coalition initiated its air campaign against the IS the coalition has
succeeded in eliminating thousands of Islamic ghters, but more important, it has struck and shaken the command and
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control structure of the IS. Notorious eld commanders (such as Jihadi John, the butcher, of the western hostages) and
leaders of the Islamic state (red-haired Izzat Ibrahim) have been killed in the air campaign. Caliph Abu Bakr el-Baghdadi
might have also been seriously injured in the course of a drone attack.
The addition of the Russian task force was but another element in eroding the IS ability to withstand the growing
repower of its enemies. Due to the immense capabilities of U.S. and Russian intelligence, the self-proclaimed Caliph
and the different commanding of cers of his troops are constantly on the run knowing almost for certain that the
moment they reappear they become the favorite targets of Coalition airpower. Bearing in mind that part of the IS
commanding pyramid (according to some estimates up to 25 percent of the commanding of cers) were former of cers
of Saddam Husseins army, their disappearance has taken a severe toll on the control and command structure of the IS.
Their replacements suffer from lack of eld experience and military education. Finally, considering the different
assessments given by the Coalition spokesmen, it is believed that at least 20,000 IS ghters have been killed in the last
two years, a very heavy burden to carry.
2. Problems of manpower: The Islamic States ideology, territorial successes, and Western opposition were ingredients in
the melting pot that attracted thousands of volunteers who ocked from all over the globe to join the ranks of the IS and
other radical organizations. However, two years after the birth of the Caliphate, countries from where IS volunteers were
recruited have adopted new rules of conduct and restricted the ow of volunteers to the IS. Aware that most of the
ghters would come back to their native countries and become members of dormant IS agent cells, Western countries as
well as countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon now closely monitor the Sala st
organizations in their countries to prevent illegal acts and the departure of volunteers to the IS. Of late, Turkey has also
hardened its lenient attitude towards allowing volunteers to cross its borders to Syria and Iraq.
Finally, the bestial and barbaric videos spread via social media brought about a different reaction. While some recruits
were hypnotized by the cruelty of the IS, the majority opted not to identify with the goals of the IS and refrain from being
recruited by the IS professional networks. As a result, the Islamic State has been recruiting children and youngsters to its
ranks hoping to ll the void created by the death of thousands of its ghters and the impossibility of replacing them with
substantial fresh troops coming from abroad.
3. Firepower inferiority: When the IS took control of Mosul, it captured hundreds of Iraqi vehicles, military equipment, tanks,
APCs, self-propelled artillery, ground-to-ground missiles, and ammunition. The same applies to areas conquered by the IS
in Syria where most probably the IS also captured Syrian chemical ammunition that was not evacuated from areas where
the weapons were hidden. Even though the IS obtained several warplanes, they were obsolete and in no state to y.
This reality on the ground favored the IS as long as the coalitions (U.S. and Russian) did not intervene with their airpower.
Unwilling to put boots on the ground, the U.S. and Russians chose to crush IS forces and the rebels from the air,
targeting their equipment, logistics, leaders, and military formations. The choice was to pinpoint the strikes, sometimes
through the use of laser-pointing artillery of cers on the ground rather than using the strategy of carpet bombing,
making the process of elimination rather slow and sometimes ineffective. However, in the long run, the U.S. and Russian
effort worked. Having no adversary in the skies and no weapon systems capable of downing combat planes, after two
years the coalitions succeeded to reduce IS military power and to force it into retreat.
The IS had no answer to the air campaign since the aircraft ew and bombed from above the ceiling of performance of
its shoulder- red ground-to-air missiles. However, on the ground, the IS adopted impressive anti-personnel and vehicle
mining tactics and excelled in urban warfare in which a small number of combatants could withstand large regular army
formation. Instead of a viable air force, the IS used human bombers to penetrate the defenses of its enemies, a tactic
used in Kobane, Tikrit, Palmyra and dozens of other places. These tactics did not change the balance of forces on the
ground, and the IS kept ghting while in a position of inferiority, which in turn translated to the loss of territory it suffered
in recent months.
4. Diminishing nancial support: When IS captured Mosul, it looted Mosuls central bank. According to various reports, the
IS absconded with $500 million. There have also been reports of the IS sale of oil via Turkey and even selling directly to
the Assad regime. But air attacks on oil truck convoys have cut into IS earnings. IS obtained funds from traf cking stolen
antiquities, but efforts are made to block the sales. It seems that of late their principal income comes from monies raised
in private circles in the Gulf States that are insuf cient to maintain the structure of the state. Taxes imposed on IS
citizens, as well as nes imposed on non-Muslims, are another source of revenue, insuf cient as well, but they still allow
maintaining the basic infrastructure of the IS.
In the last year, however, U.S. aircraft unleashed a new and effective nancial measure: blowing up the Islamic States
coffers. In January 2016, the American-led coalition claimed to have destroyed nine depots where tens of millions of
dollars were stashed.
These controls on the ow of monies carried out by the United States are forcing the IS to nd alternatives. Without that
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money, the IS cannot recruit new ghters nor pay monthly salaries to its ghters and administration. The question
remains: how long can the IS sustain such a basic economy without pushing its citizens and ghters to despair and
desert.
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