REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE vs.

IAC
The Court does not agree.
There are two modes by which cases decided by the then Courts of First
Instance in their original jurisdiction may be reviewed: (1) an ordinary appeal
either to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals, or (2) an appeal on
certiorari to the Supreme Court. To the latter category belong cases in which
only errors or questions of law are involved. Each of these modes have
different procedural requirements.
As stated earlier, Realty originally filed a Petition for certiorari with this Court
docketed as G.R. No. L-56471 questioning the decision of the Vera Court, and
asking that it be allowed to appeal directly to this Court as it was raising only
questions of law. However, this Court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction for proper determination on the
merits of the appeal."
It may thus be observed that even this Court treated the petition first filed as
an appeal, and not as a special civil action for certiorari. After as, a petition
for review by certiorari is also a form of appeal. (People v. Resuello L-30165,
August 22, 1969, 69 SCRA 35).
This mode of appeal under Rule 42 is in the form and procedure outlined in
Rule 45 which, unlike ordinary appeals, does not require a notice of appeal, an
appeal bond and a record on appeal.
Thus it was error for the IAC to hold that the Decision of the Vera Court
"cannot be passed upon anymore in the Court of Appeals decision because
appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy." Precisely, petitioners
brought the case to this Court on appeal, albeit by way of certiorari.
Respondent Carpo cited authorities holding that certiorari is not a substitute
for appeal. Those cases are not in point. They refer to the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, and not to appeal by way of certiorari under Rule
45.
Similarly, the IAC Special Civil Cases Division erred in interpreting the
Resolution dated July 25, 1983 of the Second Special Cases Division (to which
the case was assigned after the reorganization under BP 129) as having
"erased or cancellation" the validity of the Decision of the Ninth Division. A
perusal of said Resolution shows that it merely made clarification about the

nature of the case and why it should be reassigned to the Civil Cases Division
of the IAC. There was not the slightest implication that it "erased or cancelled"
the validity of the Decision of the Ninth Division.
Even the IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division impliedly admitted the validity
of the Decision of the Ninth Division when it granted Carpo's motion for
reconsideration. It would have been incongruous to grant a motion to
reconsider a decision, reverse and set it aside, if in the first place it did not
have any validity. It would have been necessary only to decide its invalidity.
3. In the third assigned error, Petitioners contend that the Vera Court, and the
IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division, erred in upholding the validity of the
title in the name of Carpo and declaring null and void the titles in the names
of Realty and of QCDFC.
The basis of the complaint fired by Carpo, which was the same basis for the of
the Vera Court and the IAC Special Division, is that the Reyes Court had no
authority to issue the order of May 21, 1958 directing the issuance of a
decree of registration in favor of Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty, as
it was not sitting as a land registration court and also because the original
records of LRC Case No. 657, Record No. N-29882 were lost and/or destroyed
during World War II and were still pending reconstitution.
Under Act No. 496, Land Registration Act, (1902) as amended by Act No. 2347
(1914), jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title to and was
conferred upon the Courts of First Instance of the respective provinces in
which the land sought to be registered is situated.
Jurisdiction over land registration cases, as in ordinary actions, is acquired
upon the filing in court of the application for registration, and is retained up to
the end of the litigation. The issuance of a decree of registration is but a step
in the entire land registration process; and as such, does not constitute a
separate proceeding.
In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao Mayuga, father of
Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty, who originally filed on
June 24, 1927 a registration proceeding docketed as LRC Case No. 657, GLRO
Record No. N-29882 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to confirm his title
over parcels of land described as Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan Psu-47035. (Lots 2 and
3 the subject of the instant litigation among Carpo, RRealty and QCDFC.) Case
No. 657 was jointly tried with two other cases, LRC Case No. 976, GLRO
Record No. 43516 filed by Eduardo Guico and LRC Case No. 758, GLRO Record

No. 33721 filed by Florentino Baltazar, as the three cases involved Identical
parcels of land, and Identical applicants/oppositors.
On August 19, 1935 the CFI-Rizal acting as a land registration court issued a
consolidated decision on the three cases, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
On appeal, the above decision of the CFI was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
in its decision dated November 17, 1939. the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Por todas last consideraciones expuestas confirmamos la
decision apelada en cuanto adjudica a Estanislao Mayuga los
lotes, 1, 2 y 3 de such piano y que equivalent a lost lotes, 4, 5 y
6 del plano de Baltazar y 4 y 5 del plans de Guico.
xxx xxx xxx
Guico filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, but the petition
was dismissed and the Court of Appeals decision was affirmed (See Guico v.
San Pedro, 72 Phil. 415 [1941]).
Before he could secure a decree of registration in his name, Estanislao died.
On May 13, 1958 Dominador Mayuga, son of Estanislao, filed a petition with
the Reyes Court docketed as Case No. 2689 alleging that he was the only heir
of the deceased Estanislao Mayuga and praying for the issuance of a decree
of registration over the property adjudicated in favor of Estanislao. At this
point, it cannot be overemphasized that the petition filed by Dominador is
NOT a distinct and separate proceeding from, but a continuation of, the
original land registration proceedings initiated by Estanislao Mayuga,
Florentino Baltazar and Eduardo Guico. In the same vein, the Reyes Court, as
Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, was continuing in the exercise
of jurisdiction over the case, which jurisdiction was vested in the CFI-Rizal
upon filing of the original applications.
On May 21, 1958 the Reyes Court issued an order granting the petition of
Dominador Mayuga and directing the Commissioner of Land Registration to
issue a decree of registration over Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035,
substituting therein as registered owner Dominador Mayuga in liue of
Estanislao.

Respondent Carpo, however, contends, that since the records of LRC Case No.
657 were not properly reconstituted, then there was no pending land
registration case. And since the Reyes Court was acting without a pending
case, it was acting without jurisdiction. (Respondent Carpo's Memorandum,
pp, 2-8.)
He cites the case of Villegas v. Fernando (L-27347, April 29, 1969, 27 SCRA
1119) where this Court said that upon failure to reconstitute pursuant to law,
"the parties are deemed to have waived the effects of the decision rendered
in their favor and their only alternative is to file an action anew for the
registration in their names of the lots in question," citing the case of Ambat v.
Director of Lands, (92) Phil. 567 [1953]) and other cases. The basis of said
ruling is Section 29 of Act No. 3110, an Act to provide an adequate procedure
for the reconstitution of the records of pending judicial proceedings and
books, documents, and files of the office of the register of deeds, destroyed
by fire or other public calamities, and for other purposes.
However, the Ambat case, in so far as it ruled on the effect of failure to
reconstitute records on the status of the case in its entirety, was modified in
the case of Nacua v. de Beltran, (93) Phil. 595 [1953]). where this Court said:
(W)e are inclined to modify the ruling (in the Ambat case) in the
sense that Section 29 of Act No. 3110 should be applied only
where the records in the Court of First Instance as well as in the
appellate court were destroyed or lost and were not
reconstituted, but not where the records of the Court of First
Instance are intact and complete, and only the records in the
appellate court were lost or destroyed, and were not
reconstituted. One reason for this view is that section 29 of Act
3110 is found among the sections and provisions dealing with
the reconstitution of records in the Court of First Instance in
pending civil cases, special proceedings, cadastral cases and
criminal cases. A study of Act (No.) 3110 ... who show that there
are separate procedures for the reconstitution of records in the
Justice of the Peace Courts, from Sec. 48 to Sec. 53; for the
reconstitution of records in the Supreme Court, now including
the Court of Appeals, from Sec. 54 to Sec. 74; for the
reconstitution of records in the office of the Register of Deeds,
from Sec. 75 to Sec. 90 and for the reconstitution of destroyed
records in the Courts of First Instance, from Sec. 1 to Sec. 47,
under which sections, Sec. 29 is obviously comprehended.

The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace

records lost or destroyed so that said records may be complete
and court proceedings may continue from the point or stage
where said proceedings stopped due to the loss of the records.
The law contemplates different stages for purposes of
reconstitution. . . .
. . . (S)ection 4 covers the stage were a civil case was
pending trial in the Court of First Instance at the time the
record was destroyed or lost; section 6 evidently refers to
the stage where the case had been tried and decided but
was still pending in the Court of First Instance at the time the
record was destroyed or lost; section 6 covers the stage
where the case was pending in the Supreme Court (or Court
of Appeals) at the time the record was destroyed or lost. *
If the records up to a certain point or stage are lost and they are
not reconstituted, the parties and the court should go back to
the next preceding age where records are available, but not
beyond that; otherwise to ignore and go beyond the stage next
preceding would be voiding and unnecessarily ignoring
proceedings which are duly recorded and documented, to the
great prejudice not only of the parties and their witnesses, but
also of the court which must again perforce admit pleadings,
rule upon them and then try the case and decide it anew,-all of
these, when the records up to said point or stage are intact and
complete, and uncontroverted.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . (T)o require the parties to file their action anew and incur
the expenses and (suffer) the annoyance and vexation incident
to the filing of pleadings and the conduct of hearings, aside from
the possibility that some of the witnesses may have died or left
the jurisdiction, and also to require the court to again rule on
the pleadings and hear the witnesses and then decide the case,
when an along and all the time the record of the former
pleadings of the trial and evidence and decision are there and
are not disputed, all this would appear to be not exactly logical
or reasonable, or fair and just to the parties, including the trial
court which has not committed any negligence or fault at all.

The ruling in Nacua is more in keeping with the spirit and intention of the
reconstitution law. As stated therein, "Act 3110 was not promulgated to
penalize people for failure to observe or invoke its provisions. It contains no
penal sanction. It was enacted rather to aid and benefit litigants, so that when
court records are destroyed at any stage of judicial proceedings, instead of
instituting a new case and starting all over again, they may reconstitute the
records lost and continue the case. If they fail to ask for reconstitution, the
worst that can happen to them is that they lose the advantages provided by
the reconstitution law" (e.g. having the case at the stage when the records
were destroyed).
Applying the doctrine in the Nacua decision to LRC Case No. 657, the parties
thereto did not have to commence a new action but only had to go back to
the preceding stage where records are available. The land registration case
itself re. mained pending and the Court of First Instance of Rizal continued to
have jurisdiction over it.
The records were destroyed at that stage of the case when an that remained
to be done was the ministerial duty of the Land Registration Office to issue a
decree of registration (which would be the basis for the issuance of an
Original Certificate of Title) to implement a judgment which had become final
(See Government v. Abural, 39 Phil. 996 [1919] at 1002; Sta. Ana v. Menla,
111 Phil. 947 [1961], 1 SCRA 1294; Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. De Banuvar,
134 Phil. 257 [1968], 26 SCRA 316). There are however authentic copies of
the decisions of the CFI and the Court of Appeals adjudicating Lots 1, 2 and 3
of Plan Psu-47035 to Estanislao Mayuga. Moreover, there is an official report
of the decision of this Court affirming both the CFI and the CA decisions. A
final order of adjudication forms the basis for the issuance of a decree of
registration.
Considering that the Reyes court was actually in the exercise of its jurisdiction
as a land registration court when it issued the order directing the issuance of
a decree of registration, "substituting therein as registered owner Dominador
Mayuga, in hue of the original adjudicates, Estanislao Mayuga, based on the
affidavit of self-adjudication, subject to the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court," which order is in consonance with the ruling of this Court in
the Guico decision, and the decisions of the CFI-Rizal and the CA dated
August 19, 1935 and November 17, 1939, respectively, We uphold the validity
of said order and rule that Judge Vera was without jurisdiction to set it aside.
4. In upholding the title of Carpo as against those of Realty and QCDFC, the
Special Division also relied on Carpo's being an innocent purchaser for value.

Whether or not Carpo is an innocent purchaser for value was never raised as
an issue in the trial court. A perusal of the records of the case reveals that no
factual basis exists to support such a conclusion. Even Carpo himself cites no
factual proof of his being an innocent purchaser for value. He merely relies on
the presumption of good faith under Article 527 of the Civil Code.
It is settled that one is considered an innocent purchaser for value only if,
relying on the certificate of title, he bought the property from the registered
owner, "without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in,
such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
persons in the property." (Cui v. Henson, 51 Phil. 606 [1928], Fule v. De
Legare, 117 Phil. 367 [1963], 7 SCRA 351.) He is not required to explore
farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates. (Fule v. De
Legare supra.)
Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars, the original registered
owners, by virtue of a deed executed before Iluminada Figueroa, Notary Public
of Manila dated October 9, 1970. However, it was only later, on October 13,
1970, that the decree of registration in favor of the Baltazars was transcribed
in the Registration Book for the Province of Rizal and that an Original
Certificate of Title was issued. It was on the same day, October 13, 1970, that
the deed evidencing the sale between the Baltazars and Carpo was inscribed
in the Registry of Property, and the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled
as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 303961 in the name of Carpo was issued.
(Exhibit 12, Rollo pp. 270-273.)
Thus, at the time of sale there was as yet no Torrens title which Carpo could
have relied upon so that he may qualify as an innocent purchaser for value.
Not being a purchaser for value and in good faith, he is in no better position
than his predecessors-in-interest.
The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are heirs of Florentino
Baltazar, an oppositor in the original application filed by Estanislao Mayuga in
1927. As stated earlier, the CFI-Rizal confirmed the title of Estanislao to Lots
1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 "desestimando oposicion de Florentino Baltazar .
. . con respeto a dichos lotes . . ." As such successors of Florentino, they could
not pretend ignorance of the land registration proceedings over the disputed
parcels of land earlier initiated by Eduardo Guico, Florentino Baltazar and
Estanislao Mayuga, as when as the decisions rendered therein.

Moreover, it is not disputed that the title in the name of Dominador Mayuga,
from whom Realty derived its title, was issued in 1958, or twelve years before
the issuance of the title in the name of the Baltazars in 1970.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of
two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in
date prevails . . . . In successive registrations, where more than one certificate
is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person
claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and
that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of,
or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the
holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof . . . ." (Legarda and
Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915] at 595-596; Garcia V. CA, Nos. L-48971
and 49011, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380.)
TCT No. 20408 derived from OCT 1609, is therefore superior to TCT No.
303961 derived from OCT 8629.
5. For its part, respondent Quezon City Development and Financing
Corporation (QCDFC) alleges that it has been improperly impleaded as thirtyparty defendant inasmuch as Realty's alleged cause of action against it is
neither for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief in respect
of Carpo's claim against Realty. It likewise alleges that Realty had no cause of
action against it since the third party complaint did not allege that QCDFC
violated any legal right of Realty, QCDFC also assails the Vera Court decision
in that it declares QCDFC directly liable to Carpo and not to Realty.
In the first place, QCDFC did not appeal from the decision of the Vera Court,
nor from the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1982, nor
from the resolution of the IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division dated May 2,
1984 all of which voided QCDFCs title to the disputed property. Hence, said
decisions/resolution have become final and executory as regards QCDFC.
Moreover, even as this Court agrees with QCDFC that the third-party
complaint filed against it by Realty was procedurally defective in that the
relief being sought by the latter from the former is not in respect of Carpo's
claim, policy considerations and the factual circumstances of the case compel
this Court now to rule as well on QCDFC's claim to the disputed property. ** To
rule on QCDFC's claim now is to avoid multiplicity of suits and to put to rest
these conflicting claims over the property. After an, QCDFC was afforded fun
opportunity, and exercised its right, to prove its claim over the land. It
presented documentary as well as testimonial evidence. It was even

permitted to file a fourth-party complaint which, however, was dismissed

since it failed to prosecute its case.

SO ORDERED.

QCDFC derived its title from Carmelino Alvendia et. al., the original registered
owners. Original Certificate of Title No. 8931 in the name of Spouses
Carmelino Alvendia, et. al. was issued on July 27, 1971, or thirteen (13) years
after the issuance of Mayuga's title in 1958.
Since Realty is claiming under TCT No. 1609 which was issued earlier than
OCT No. 8931 from which QCDFC's title was derived, Realty's title must
prevail over that of QCDFC.

INOCENCIO LUCASAN vs. PDIC

WHICH IS LIKEWISE APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.[17]

6. During the pendency of this case, Petitioners filed a manifestation alleging

that the case at bar is closely connected with G.R. No. L-469953, Jose N.
Mayuga et. al. v. The Court of Appeals, Macondray Farms, Inc., Realty Sales
Enterprise, inc., et. al. and moved for consolidation of the two cases involving
as they do the same property. By Resolution of August 29, 1984, this Court
denied the motion for consolidation.

Lucasan posits that he has sufficient cause of action against PDIC;

thus, he chides the RTC for dismissing his complaint, and the CA for affirming
the dismissal. In support of his thesis, he cites Section 75 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree[18] and Cometa v.
Court of Appeals.[19]

In this connection, it must be emphasized that the action filed by Carpo

against Realty is in the nature of an action to remove clouds from title to real
property. By asserting its own title to the property in question and asking that
Carpo's title be declared null and void instead, and by filing the third-party
complaint against QCDFC, Realty was similarly asking the court to remove
clouds from its own title. Actions of such nature are governed by Articles 476
to 481, Quieting of Title, Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386), and Rule 64,
Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies, Rules of Court.

As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, Lucasans action was

one for quieting of title under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Essentially, he
sought the cancellation of the notice of embargo and the certificate of sale
annotated on TCT Nos. T-68115 and T-13816 claiming that the said
annotations beclouded the validity and efficacy of his title. The RTC, however,
dismissed his complaint for lack of cause of action which was affirmed by the
CA in its assailed Decision. Thus, the key issue for our consideration is
whether the dismissal of Lucasans complaint was proper.

Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly
speaking, in personam, but being against the person in respect of
the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem. (McDaniel v.
McElvy, 108 So. 820 [1926].) The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive
only between the parties. (Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil. 421 [1948]).
The ruling in this case is therefore without any prejudice to this Court's final
determination of G.R. No. L-46953.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of May 2,1984 of the Intermediate Appellate
Court and the Decision of January 20, 1981 of the CFI-Rizal Branch XXIII, are
SET ASIDE and the Decision of December 29, 1982 of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud
of doubt or uncertainty with respect to real property. The Civil Code
authorizes the said remedy in the following language:
ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title,
an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the
title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from
being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.

ART. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title

to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of
the action. He need not be in possession of said property.
To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, two (2) indispensable
requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud
on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facieappearance of validity or legal efficacy. [20] Stated differently, the plaintiff
must show that he has a legal or at least an equitable title over the real
property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or
efficacy.
Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case.
Admittedly, the subject parcels of land were levied upon by virtue of a
writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 12188. On May 13, 1981, a public
auction of the subject parcels of land was held and the lots were awarded to
PBC as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale in favor of PBC was issued on
the same day, and was registered and annotated on TCT Nos. T-68115 and T13816 as Entry No. 112552 on June 5, 1981.
Under the 1964 Rules of Court, which were in effect at that time, the
judgment debtor or redemptioner had the right to redeem the property from
PBC within twelve (12) months from the registration of the certificate of sale.
[21]
With the expiration of the twelve-month period of redemption and no
redemption having been made, as in this case, the judgment debtor or the
redemptioner lost whatever right he had over the land in question.[22]
Lucasan admitted that he failed to redeem the properties within the
redemption period, on account of his then limited financial situation. [23] It was
only in January 1997 or fifteen (15) years later that he manifested his desire
to reacquire the properties. Clearly thus, he had lost whatever right he had
over Lot Nos. 1500-A and 229-E.
The payment of loans made by Lucasan to PNB and RPB in 1997
cannot, in any way, operate to restore whatever rights he had over the
subject properties. Such payment only extinguished his loan obligations to the
mortgagee banks and the liens which Lucasan claimed were subsisting at the
time of the registration of the notice of embargo and certificate of sale.

Neither can Lucasan capitalize on PBCs failure to file a petition for

consolidation of ownership after the expiration of the redemption period. As
we explained in Calacala v. Republic:[24]
[P]etitioners' predecessors-in-interest lost whatever right they
had over [the] land in question from the very moment they
failed to redeem it during the 1-year period of redemption.
Certainly, the Republic's failure to execute the acts referred to
by the petitioners within ten (10) years from the registration of
the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way, operate to restore
whatever rights petitioners' predecessors-in-interest had over
the same. For sure, petitioners have yet to cite any provision of
law or rule of jurisprudence, and we are not aware of any, to the
effect that the failure of a buyer in a foreclosure sale to secure a
Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the property
thus acquired, within ten (10) years from the registration of the
Certificate of Sale will operate to bring ownership back to him
whose property has been previously foreclosed and sold.
xxxx
Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year
redemption period forecloses the obligor's right to redeem and
that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter
of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere
confirmation of the title that is already vested in the purchaser.
As this Court has said in Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et
al.:
Note must be taken of the fact that under the
Rules of Court the expiration of that one-year
period forecloses the owner's right to redeem, thus
making the sheriff's sale absolute. The issuance
thereafter of a final deed of sale becomes a
mere formality, an act merely confirmatory
of the title that is already in the purchaser
and constituting official evidence of that
fact. (Emphasis supplied.)

Certainly, Lucasan no longer possess any legal or equitable title to or interest

over the subject parcels of land; hence, he cannot validly maintain an action
for quieting of title.
Furthermore, Lucasan failed to demonstrate that the notice of embargo
and the certificate of sale are invalid or inoperative. In fact, he never put in
issue the validity of the levy on execution and of the certificate of sale duly
registered on June 5, 1981. It is clear, therefore, that the second requisite for
an action to quiet title is, likewise, absent.
Concededly, Lucasan can pursue all the legal and equitable remedies
to impeach or annul the execution sale prior to the issuance of a new
certificate of title in favor of PBC. Unfortunately, the remedy he had chosen
cannot prosper because he failed to satisfy the requisites provided for by law
for an action to quiet title. Hence, the RTC rightfully dismissed Lucasans
complaint.
Lucasan tries to find solace in our ruling in Cometa v. Court of Appeals. Sadly
for him, that case is not on all fours with his case, for it was not for quieting of
title but a petition for issuance of a writ of possession and cancellation of lis
pendens. Likewise, in Cometa the registered owner assailed the validity of the
levy and sale, which Lucasan failed to do.

Accordingly, the condition imposed by the PDIC for the re-acquisition of the
property cannot be considered unjust or unreasonable.
Verily, in several cases,[26] this Court allowed redemption even after the
lapse of the redemption period. But in those cases a valid tender was made
by
the
original
owners within
theredemption
period. Even
in Cometa, the redemption was allowed beyond the redemption period
because a valid tender of payment was made within the redemption
period. The same is not true in the case before us.
In fine, we find that the RTC correctly dismissed Lucasans complaint
for quieting of title. Thus, the CA committed no reversible error in sustaining
the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81518, are AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Undoubtedly, Lucasans right to redeem the subject properties had

elapsed on June 5, 1982. His offer to redeem the same in 1997 or long after
the expiration of the redemption period is not really one for redemption but
for repurchase. Thus, PBC and PDIC, its receiver and liquidator, are no longer
bound by the bid price. It is entirely within their discretion to set a higher
price. As we explained in De Robles v. Court of Appeals:[25]
The right to redeem becomes functus officio on the date
of its expiry, and its exercise after the period is not really one of
redemption but a repurchase. Distinction must be made
because redemption is by force of law; the purchaser at public
auction is bound to accept redemption. Repurchase however of
foreclosed property, after redemption period, imposes no such
obligation. After expiry, the purchaser may or may not re-sell
the property but no law will compel him to do so. And, he is not
bound by the bid price; it is entirely within his discretion to set a
higher price, for after all, the property already belongs to him as
owner.

THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR, et al. VS. ESTER L. SERVACIO, et al.,
The appeal lacks merit.
Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death,
the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the
same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the
surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership

property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from

the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six
month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or
encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the
terminated marriage shall be void.

Code. Upon Martas death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved,

Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent

marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a
mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall
govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.

liquidation following its liquidation. [16] The ensuing implied ordinary co-

Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code,
viz:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the
marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the
provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to
conjugal partnerships of gains already established
between spouses before the effectivity of this Code,
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided
in Article 256. (n) [emphasis supplied]

pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code,[15] and an implied ordinary coownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with
respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a
ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code,[17] to wit:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of
his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he
may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership. (399)

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of

Martas share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to
any specific portion of Martas share without an actual partition of the property
being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that
he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas share. [18] Nonetheless, a coowner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to

It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and

freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-

after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the rules found in

owners.[19] Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners

Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations

without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the

Between Husband And Wife) of the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the

rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making

conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be

the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share. [20] This result conforms to

made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.

the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be

recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut

Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains

ago, valeat quantum valere potest).[21]

must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. There
being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the

Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the

effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their property relation was

applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is without

properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the Civil

prejudice

to

vested

rights

already

acquired

in

accordance

with

the Civil Code or other laws. This provision gives another reason not to
declare the sale as entirely void. Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the
rights of Servacio who had already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and
Rito in the property subject of the sale.
In their separate comments,[22] the respondents aver that each of the
heirs had already received a certain allotted portion at the time of the sale,
and that Protacio, Sr. and Rito sold only the portions adjudicated to and
owned by them. However, they did not present any public document on the
allocation among her heirs, including themselves, of specific shares in Martas
estate. Neither did they aver that the conjugal properties had already been
liquidated and partitioned. Accordingly, pending a partition among the heirs
of Marta, the efficacy of the sale, and whether the extent of the property sold
adversely affected the interests of the petitioners might not yet be properly
decided with finality. The appropriate recourse to bring that about is to
commence an action for judicial partition, as instructed in Bailon-Casilao v.
Court of Appeals,[23] to wit:
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a coowner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the
entire property by one

co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is

not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-ownerseller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of
the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the
nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the
thing owned in common from the third person who substituted
the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the
DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in
the possession of the co-owners who possessed and
administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].

Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse

of co-owners in cases where their consent were not
secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a
sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the coowners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the
Revised Rules of Court. xxx[24]
In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the coheirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to
her. The following observations of Justice Paras are explanatory of this
result, viz:
xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged
really would pertain to the share of the surviving spouse, then
said transaction is valid. If it turns out that there really would be,
after liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the whole
transaction is null and void. But if it turns out that half of the
property thus alienated or mortgaged belongs to the husband as
his share in the conjugal partnership, and half should go to the
estate of the wife, then that corresponding to the husband is
valid, and that corresponding to the other is not. Since all these
can be determined only at the time the liquidation is over, it
follows logically that a disposal made by the surviving spouse is
not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale of
conjugal properties cannot be made by the surviving spouse
without the legal requirements. The sale is void as to the share
of the deceased spouse (except of course as to that portion of
the husbands share inherited by her as the surviving
spouse). The buyers of the property that could not be validly
sold become trustees of said portion for the benefit of the
husbands other heirs, the cestui que trust ent. Said heirs shall
not be barred by prescription or by laches (See Cuison, et al. v.
Fernandez, et al.,L-11764, Jan.31, 1959.)[25]
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari;
and AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
The petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

LEONOR CRUZ vs. TEOFILA CATAPANG

co-owner against the person who was given the consent to

construct a house on the co-owned property, we have held that a
co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive
use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. [18] In our view, a co-owner
cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the coowned property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the
property to his or her exclusive use.
Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide:

Petitioner prays in her petition that we effectively reverse the

Court of Appeals decision.
Simply put, the main issue before us is whether consent given
by a co-owner of a parcel of land to a person to construct a house
on the co-owned property warrants the dismissal of a forcible entry
case filed by another co-owner against that person.

Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned

in common, provided he does so in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not
to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the
other co-owners from using it according to their
rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed
by agreement, express or implied.

In
her
memorandum,[16] petitioner contends
that the consent and knowledge of co-owner Norma Maligaya
cannot defeat the action for forcible entry since it is a basic
principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual co-owner can
claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in
common until partition.

Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the

consent of the others, make alterations in the thing
owned in common, even though benefits for all would
result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the
consent by one or more of the co-owners is clearly
prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may
afford adequate relief.

On
the
other
hand,
respondent
in
her
memorandum[17] counters that the complaint for forcible entry
cannot prosper because her entry into the property was not through
strategy or stealth due to the consent of one of the co-owners. She
further argues that since Norma Maligaya is residing in the house she
built, the issue is not just possession de facto but also one
of possession de jure since it involves rights of co-owners to enjoy
the property.

Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in
common provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for
which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of
the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it
according to their rights. Giving consent to a third person to
construct a house on the co-owned property will injure the interest
of the co-ownership and prevent other co-owners from using the
property in accordance with their rights.

As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one co-owner

will warrant the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another

Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the

consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in

common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can,

without the consent of the other co-owners, validly consent to the
making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the
thing owned in common. Alterations include any act of strict dominion
or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has been held
implicitly to be an act of alteration.[19] The construction of a house on
the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an
alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no
consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to construct her
house on the co-owned property.

period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally

counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when
entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted
from the time the petitioner learned about it.[21] Although respondent
constructed her house in 1992, it was only in September 1995 that
petitioner learned of it when she visited the property. Accordingly, she
then made demands on respondent to vacate the premises. Failing to
get a favorable response, petitioner filed the complaint on January 25,
1996, which is within the one-year period from the time petitioner
learned of the construction.

Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of

the complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent
given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner
and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any right to enter into the
co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under the
classification through strategy or stealth.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

September 16, 2003 and the Resolution dated June 11, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69250 areREVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated October 22, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas is REINSTATED. Costs against
respondent.

The Court of Appeals held that there is no forcible entry

because respondents entry into the property was not through
strategy or stealth due to the consent given to her by one of the coowners.We cannot give our imprimatur to this sweeping
conclusion. Respondents entry into the property without the
permission of petitioner could appear to be a secret and clandestine
act done in connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya whom
respondent allowed to stay in her house. Entry into the land
effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the other coowners could be categorized as possession by stealth. [20] Moreover,
respondents act of getting only the consent of one co-owner, her
sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in the
constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which
she utilized in order to enter into the co-owned property. As such,
respondents acts constitute forcible entry.
Petitioners filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view, was
within the one-year period for filing the complaint. The one-year

SO ORDERED.

things subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners and the

undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the same.[13]
The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects,
who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material indivision, which
means that there is a single object which is not materially divided,
and which is the element which binds the subjects, and, (c) the
recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights and
obligations of the co-owners.[14]
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other
co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether
established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the property
or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial nature so that
each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners
and he may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his coowners.[15]
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties
in co-ownership is to create an express trust among the heirs as coowners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every
co-owner is a trustee for the others.[16]
LILIA SANCHEZ vs. CA
Thus, we now look into the merits of the petition.
This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil law:
co-ownership. Throughout the proceedings from the MeTC to the
Court of Appeals, the notion of co-ownership [11] was not sufficiently
dealt with.We attempt to address this controversy in the interest of
substantial justice. Certiorari should therefore be granted to cure
this grave abuse of discretion.
Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as the right of common
dominion which two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a
thing, not materially or physically divided.[12] Manresa defines it as
the manifestation of the private right of ownership, which instead of
being exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the

Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no

individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof.
All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire land or thing.[17]
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided
interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e.,
his undivided interest. He may validly lease his undivided interest to
a third party independently of the other co-owners. [18] But he has no
right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of
the thing owned in common because his right over the thing is
represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical
adjudication.[19]
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property,
the metes and bounds of petitioners lot has not been designated. As
she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered
into by the other co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be

respected. Partition needs to be effected to protect her right to her

definite share and determine the boundaries of her property. Such
partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private
respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under
dispute.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as well as its Resolution dated
8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.A survey of the questioned lot with TCT No. 289216 (formerly
TCT No. 263624) by a duly licensed geodetic engineer and the
PARTITION of the aforesaid lot are ORDERED.
Let the records of this case be REMANDED to MeTC-Br. 49,
Caloocan City to effect the aforementioned survey and partition, as
well as segregate the 1/6 portion appertaining to petitioner Lilia
Sanchez.
The Deed of Absolute Sale by the other co-owners to Virginia
Teria shall be RESPECTED insofar as the other undivided 5/6 portion
of the property is concerned.
SO ORDERED.

Art 749 of the Civil Code reads:

In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be
made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated
and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate public document, unless it is done during the lifetime of
the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall
be notified thereof in an authentic form and this step shall be noted
in both instruments.
It is clear from Article 749 that a transfer of real property from
one person to another cannot take effect as a donation unless
embodied in a public document.
The alleged donation in the case at bar was done orally and not
executed in a public document. Moreover, the document which was
presented by respondent in support of her claim that her father
donated the subject parcel of land to her was a mere private
document of conformity which was executed by her elder brother,
Eduardo in 1956.[5] It may not be amiss to point out that the
brothers Eduardo and Gaudencio had already ceded their hereditary
interests to petitioner Salud Dizon Salamat even before 1950.
The Court of Appeals, however, placed much reliance on the said
document and made the dubious observation that x x x a cursory
reading of the signed statement of Eduardo Dizon, which execution
is undisputed, shows that there was an oral donation x x x.
Significantly, the document relied upon by the Court of Appeals
could hardly satisfy the requirements of the rule on ancient
documents on accounts of unexplained alterations.

THE HEIRS of SALUD DIZON SALAMAT, et al, VS. NATIVIDAD

DIZON TAMAYO
We reverse.

An ancient document refers to a private document which is more

than thirty (30) years old, produced from a custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by alterations or
circumstances of suspicion.[6]

To repeat, the document which was allegedly executed by

Eduardo was marred by unexplained erasures and alterations. While
the document was originally penned in black ink, the number thirtysix (36) in blue ink was superimposed on the number fifty-six (56) to
make it appear that the document was executed in 1936 instead of
in 1956. Moreover, a signature was blotted out with a black pentel
pen and the three other signatures [7] of the alleged witnesses to the
execution of the document at the lower portion of the document
were dated June 1, 1951. This could only mean that the witnesses
attested to the veracity of the document 5 years earlier, if the
document was executed in 1956 or 15 years later, if we are to give
credence to respondents claim, that the document was executed in
1936. Curiously, two of the signatories, namely, Priscila D. Rivera
and Maria D. Jocson signed the document as witnesses two days
after the death of their father Gaudencio, who, as earlier mentioned,
had already sold his hereditary rights to his elder sister Salud in
1949.
In any case, assuming that Agustin really made the donation to
respondent, albeit orally, respondent cannot still claim ownership
over the property. While it is true that a void donation may be the
basis of ownership which may ripen into title by prescription, [8] it is
well settled that possession, to constitute the foundation of a
prescriptive right, must be adverse and under a claim of title.
Respondent was never in adverse and continous possession of
the property. It is undeniable that petitioners and respondent, being
heirs of the deceased, are co-owners of the properties left by the
latter. A co-ownership is a form of a trust, with each owner being a
trustee for each other[9] and possession of a co-owner shall not be
regarded as adverse to other co-owners but in fact is beneficial to
them. Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to the
inference that the possession was adverse because a co-owner is,
after all, entitled to possession of the property.
In the case of Salvador v. Court of Appeals,[10] we had occasion
to state that a mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of
rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings
and fences and the planting of trees thereon and the payment of
land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not

borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts

of possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or
deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners.
The elements in order that a co-owners possession may be
deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the co-owner are: (1) that
he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to
ouster cestui que trust or other co-owners (2) that such positive
acts or repudiation have been made known to the cestui que
trust or other co-owners and (3) that the evidence thereon must be
clear and convincing.[11]
Not one of the aforesaid requirements is present in the case at
bar. There are two houses standing on the subject property. One is
the house where respondent presently resides while the other is a
house built by respondents sister Valenta. Records show that the
house on Lot 227 where the respondent lives is actually the
ancestral house of the Dizons although respondent has remodelled
it, constructed a piggery and has planted trees thereon.
[12]
Respondent herself testified:
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, who is in the possession of this particular residential land
in Bo. San Nicolas, Hagonoy, Bulacan?
A I am in possession of that land, Sir.
Q Do you have your residential house there?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, you said that you have your residential house there, since
when have you stayed there?
A I was born there, Sir.
Q And you are staying there up to the present?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x x x x x x.[13]

It is obvious from the foregoing that since respondent never

made unequivocal acts of repudiation, she cannot acquire
ownership over said property through acquisitive prescription. The
testimony of her son that she merely allowed her sister Valenta to
build a house on the lot[14] is pure hearsay as respondent herself
could have testified on the matter but chose not to.
Finally, the fact that the subject property is declared for taxation
purposes in the name of respondent who pays realty taxes thereon
under Tax Declaration No. 14376 is of no moment. It is well settled
that tax declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive
evidence of ownership.[15]
As regards the improvements introduced by the respondent on
the questioned lot, the parties should be guided by Article 500 of
the Civil Code which states that: Upon partition, there shall be a
mutual accounting for benefits received and reimbursements for
expenses made. x x x
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED.
Lot 2557, Hagonoy Cadastre 304-D covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
10384 is hereby declared to belong the estate of Agustin Dizon. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

BETTY LACBAYAN vs. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR.

Noticeably, the last argument is essentially a question of fact, which
we feel has been squarely threshed out in the decisions of both the
trial and appellate courts. We deem it wise not to disturb the
findings of the lower courts on the said matter absent any showing
that the instant case falls under the exceptions to the general rule
that questions of fact are beyond the ambit of the Courts
jurisdiction in petitions under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. The issues may be summarized into only
three:
I. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on
the issue of ownership;
II. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was
collaterally attacked in the action for partition; and
III. Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating coownership over the subject realties.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Our disquisition in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia 28 is definitive.
There, we explained that the determination as to the existence of
co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for
partition. Thus:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with
the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists,

and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and

may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in
the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is
not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does
not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other
hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist,
partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and
profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is
in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that
event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with
the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This
second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the
accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties
have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award
for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just
share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x
x29 (Emphasis supplied.)
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition,
the same is premised on the existence or non-existence of coownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner
pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties.
Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and
unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it
would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed
properties.30 More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the
claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful
interest over the subject properties.31
Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens
title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack? Most
definitely, it would not.

There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be

collaterally attacked,32 but that rule is not material to the case at
bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title
and not the title itself.33 The certificate referred to is that document
issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the
title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than
not, represented by that document.34 Petitioner apparently confuses
title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership
should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of
such ownership although both are interchangeably used.35
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens
system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be
disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter
only serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. The
certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of
ownership.36 In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the
name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the
certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that
other parties may have acquired interest over the property
subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. 37 Needless to
say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may
be the best evidence thereof.1avvphi1
Finally, as to whether respondents assent to the initial partition
agreement serves as an admission against interest, in that the
respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of coownership between him and petitioner, we rule in the negative.
An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his
interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is
inconsistent with the facts alleged by him.38 Admission against
interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of
a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and

not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and
voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitters interests,
otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.39
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition
Agreement indicates that the document involves matters which
necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a
determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely
divide among themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow
petitioners argument would be to allow respondent not only to
admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well,
who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said
properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever
share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Basic
is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.40

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. is
hereby declared the sole owner of the disputed properties, without
prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed or may file
against him. The award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees in
respondents favor is DELETED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the
Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to
include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on
the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe to
the trial courts view that respondent is entitled to attorneys fees.
Unlike the trial court, we do not commiserate with respondents
predicament. The trial court ruled that respondent was forced to
litigate and engaged the services of his counsel to defend his
interest as to entitle him an award of P100,000.00 as attorneys
fees. But we note that in the first place, it was respondent himself
who impressed upon petitioner that she has a right over the
involved properties. Secondly, respondents act of representing
himself and petitioner as husband and wife was a deliberate
attempt to skirt the law and escape his legal obligation to his lawful
wife. Respondent, therefore, has no one but himself to blame the
consequences of his deceitful act which resulted in the filing of the
complaint against him.

HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR, et al. VS. HEIRS of DOLORES R.

CICHON, et al.
The appellate court having denied reconsideration of its decision,
only the defendants Heirs of Flores filed the present petition,
assigning the following errors:
A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN

REVERSING THE RULING OF THE LOWER COURT
THAT THE PETITIONERS AS HEIRS OF FLORES
RESTAR HAVE ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP BY
ADVERSE POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION.

B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED

IN NOT RULING THAT THERE WAS ACQUISITIVE
PRESCRIPTION ON THE LAND IN QUESTION
NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT
THE
LAND
IN
QUESTION HAS BEEN DECLARED IN THE NAME OF
FLORES RESTAR, FATHER OF PETITIONERS, AS
EARLY AS 1960 AND THAT PETITIONERS AND
THEIR PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN
OPEN,
CONTINUOUS,
EXCLUSIVE
AND
NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER FOR
MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.[20]

The petition is impressed with merit.

Article 494 of the New Civil Code expressly provides:
ART. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the coownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned.
xxx
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does

not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by
prescription[21] where there exists a clear repudiation of the coownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse
and exclusive ownership.[22]

Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be

ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of
ten years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription
can only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted
adverse possession for thirty years.
Thus, the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and
other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of
things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed
by law.
ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over
immovable
property
are
acquired
by
ordinary
prescription through possession of ten years.
ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables
also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession
thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good
faith.

Resolving the main issue of whether petitioners acquired ownership

over the lot by extraordinary prescription, the appellate court held in
the negative.
While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn
by the appellate court from the facts is manifestly mistaken, it may,

in the interest of justice, review the evidence in order to arrive at

the correct factual conclusions based on the record.[23]
Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, the records of
the case amply support petitioners claim that the requirements for
extraordinary prescription had been duly met.
When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro
indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate succession. Respondents
never possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim
thereto until January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint for
partition subject of the present petition.
In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restars
death and exercised acts of dominion thereon tilling and cultivating
the land, introducing improvements, and enjoying the produce
thereof.
The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not
in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good
faith, secured a tax declaration in his name and may, therefore, be
said to have adversely claimed ownership of the lot. And
respondents were also deemed to have been on said date become
aware of the adverse claim.[24]
Flores possession thus ripened into ownership through
acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty years in accordance
with the earlier quoted Article 1137 of the New Civil Code.
The following observations of the trial court thus merit this
Courts approval.

The evidence proved that as far back as 1959, Flores

Restar adjudicated unto himself the whole land in
question as his share from his father by means of a joint
affidavit which he executed with one Helen Restar, and
he requested the Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to have
the land declared in his name. It was admitted by the
parties during the pre-trial that this affidavit was the
basis of the transfer of Tax Declaration No. 6686 from
Emilio Restar to Flores Restar. So that from 1960 the
land was declared in the name of Flores Restar (Exhibit
10). This was the first concrete act of repudiation made
by Flores of the co-ownership over the land in question.
xxx
Plaintiffs did not deny that aside from the verbal
partition of one parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan
way back in 1945, they also had an amicable partition of
the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and Palale, Banga
Aklan on September 28, 1973 (exhibit 20). If they were
able to demand the partition, why then did they not
demand the inclusion of the land in question in order to
settle once and for all the inheritance from their father
Emilio Restar, considering that at that time all of the
brothers and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio Restar,
were still alive and participated in the signing of the
extra-judicial partition?
Also it was admitted that Flores died only in 1989.
Plaintiffs had all the chances (sic) to file a case against
him from 1960, or a period of 29 years when he was still
alive, yet they failed to do so. They filed the instant case
only on January 22, 1999, almost ten (10) years after
Flores death.
From the foregoing evidence, it can be seen that
the adverse possession of Flores started in 1960, the
time when the tax declaration was transferred in his

name. The period of acquisitive prescription started to

run from this date. Hence, the adverse possession of
Flores Restar from 1960 vested in him exclusive
ownership of the land considering the lapse of more than
38 years. Acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches
and prescription of the action for partition should be
considered in favor of Flores Restar and his heirs. [25]
While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land,
nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute
evidence of great weight[26] and can be the basis of a claim of
ownership through prescription.[27]
As for respondents claim that they have been receiving shares
from the produce of the land, it was correctly discredited by the trial
court.
[P]laintiffs claim that Flores Restar gave them five to
eight gantas each as their shares in the produce cannot
be sustained. A few gantas cannot be considered oneeight share of sixty (60) cavans of palay produced per
cropping. One eight of sixty cavans would be at least six
cavans, not merely gantas after excluding expenses for
cultivation and production. If plaintiffs were to be
believed, their whole 7/8 share of the produce would
total two cavans, six gantas only at the usual rate of 25
gantas per cavan.[28]

Unless there are strong and impelling reasons to disturb the trial
courts findings of facts which must, as a matter of judicial policy, be
accorded with the highest respect, they must remain. Respondents

have not, however, proffered any reason warranting the disturbance

of the trial courts findings of facts.
Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession adverse
to his co-heirs: the cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in
the name of Restar and securing another in his name; the execution
of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the owner and possessor thereof
to the exclusion of respondents; payment of real estate tax and
irrigation fees without respondents having ever contributed any
share therein; and continued enjoyment of the property and its
produce to the exclusion of respondents. And Flores adverse
possession was continued by his heirs.
The appellate courts crediting of respondents justification for
failing to immediately take legal action to protect their rights
forbearance toward Flores and/or his wife who asked to be allowed
to cultivate the land to support their childrens education does not
impress. For assuming such justification to be true, why did not any
of respondents assail Flores continuous possession after his children
completed their college education in 1977?
The trial courts finding and conclusion that Flores and his
heirs had for more than 38 years possessed the land in open,
adverse and continuous possession in the concept of owner which
length of possession had never been questioned, rebutted or
disputed by any of respondents, being thus duly supported by
substantial evidence, he and his heirs have become owner of the lot
by extraordinary prescription. It is unfortunate that respondents
slept on their rights. Dura lex sed lex.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the

Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the June 30,
1999 decision of the trial court is REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

REYNALDO BALOLOY vs. ALFREDO HULAR

The Present Petition
The petitioners, who are still residing on the subject property, filed
their petition for review on certiorari for the reversal of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The issues for resolution are:
(1) whether all the indispensable parties had been impleaded by
the respondent in the trial court;
(2) whether the said respondent had a cause of action against the
petitioners for the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019 and OCT No. P16540; for reconveyance and for possession of the subject property; and
for damages; and
(3) whether the respondent had acquired ownership over the
property through acquisitive prescription.
The first issue, while not raised by the parties in the trial court and in the
Court of Appeals, is so interwoven with the other issues raised therein and

is even decisive of the outcome of this case; hence, such issue must be
delved into and resolved by this Court.[26]
We note that the action of the respondent in the trial court is for:
(a) reinvidicatoria, to declare the respondent the absolute owner of the
subject property and its reconveyance to him as a consequence of the
nullification of Free Patent No. 384019 and OCT No. P-16540;
(b) publiciana, to order the petitioners and the other heirs of Iluminado
Baloloy to vacate the property and deliver possession thereof to him; and
(c) damages and attorneys fees.
It is the contention of the respondent that the subject property was
sold by Lagata to his father, Astrologo Hular, in 1961. He adduced
evidence that when his parents died intestate, they were survived by their
children, the respondent and his siblings Elena, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto,
Leo, and Teresita. Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there
are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before
partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the
debts of the deceased. Until a division is made, the respective share of
each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with
his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in
addition to the use and enjoyment of the same.
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may
bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the
recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory
action. A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed
to be instituted for the benefit of all. [27] Any judgment of the court in favor
of the co-owner will benefit the others but if such judgment is adverse, the
same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. If the
action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole
owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper
unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole
ownership over the subject property and praying that he be declared the
sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other co-owners had waived
their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the
respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case in the trial
court. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the respondent as the
sole owner of the property and entitled to its possession, to the prejudice

of the latters siblings. Patently then, the decision of the trial court is
erroneous.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was
mandated to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as
parties. The respondent failed to comply with the rule.It must, likewise, be
stressed that the Republic of the Philippines is also an indispensable party
as defendant because the respondent sought the nullification of OCT No.
P-16540 which was issued based on Free Patent No. 384019. Unless the
State is impleaded as party-defendant, any decision of the Court would
not be binding on it. It has been held that the absence of an indispensable
party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the
filing of the complaint including the judgment. [28] The absence of the
respondents siblings, as parties, rendered all proceedings subsequent to
the filing thereof, including the judgment of the court, ineffective for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.[29]
Even if we glossed over the procedural lapses of the respondent, we
rule that he failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint
against the petitioners; and that he is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for.
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by the
requisite quantum of evidence. If he claims a right granted as created by
law or under a contract of sale, he must prove his claim by competent
evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness or absence of the evidence of that of his opponent. [30] He who
claims a better right to real estate property must prove not only his
ownership of the same but also the identity thereof. [31] In Huy v. Huy,[32] we
held that where a property subject of controversy is duly registered under
the Torrens system, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should
be given weight and in the absence of strong and compelling evidence to
the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the
property until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary
action. A Torrens Certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property
in favor of the person in whose name appears therein. [33] Such holder is
entitled to the possession of the property until his title is nullified.
The petitioners aver that Lot No. 3347 owned by the Spouses
Estopin was coconut, and not residential, land. The petitioners contend
that, under the deed of absolute sale, Victoriana Lagata executed on
November 25, 1961 in favor of Astrologo Hular, she sold the residential

portion of Lot No. 3347; however, the latter constructed his house on a
portion of Lot No. 3353 which Iluminado had purchased from Balbedina,
now covered by OCT No. P-16540. The petitioners assert that along with
their mother Anacorita and their brother Antonio Baloloy, they constructed
their houses on a part of Lot No. 3353, titled in the name of their father
Iluminado; hence, they could not be dispossessed of the said property. The
petitioners posit that, whether the house of Hular was constructed on a
portion of Lot No. 3353 of the property of Balbedina or Gruta is irrelevant
because both properties are now covered by OCT No. P-16540 under the
name of Iluminado, their predecessor-in-interest.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Victoriana Lagata owned the
subject property, which turned out to be 1,405 square meters, and sold
the same to Hular. In contrast, the RTC declared in its decision that while
under the deed of absolute sale executed by Irene Griarte in favor of
Balbedina, Lot No. 3353 had an area of 6,666 square meters, Griarte
actually owned only 4,651 square meters; a portion of the lot was actually
owned by Lino Estopin. Hence, Balbedina sold only 4,651 square meters to
Iluminado[34] because he was aware that he owned only 4,651 square
meters of the land. It also held that, unknown to Lagata, a portion of Lot
No. 3347 was declared as part of Lot No. 3353 when the lands in Juban
were surveyed. The trial court concluded that Lagata erroneously
declared, under the deed of absolute sale executed on November 25,
1961 in favor of Hular, that the property was part of Lot No. 3347.
The trial and appellate courts erred in their decisions.
The evidence on record shows that Irene Griarte owned a parcel of
land with an area of 6,666 square meters, more or less. [35] When she sold
the property to Martiniano Balbedina on August 14, 1945, it was bounded
on the south by the property of Lino Estopin. There was no trail yet
between the property of Griarte on the south and of Lino Estopin on the
north. In the meantime, however, a road (trail) leading to Biriran was
established between the property of Balbedina on the south and that of
Lino Estopin on the north. Thereafter, a cadastral survey of the lands in
Juban was conducted by the Bureau of Lands. The property of Balbedina
was designated as a portion of Lot No. 3353, while that of Estopin was
designated as Lot No. 3347. The other portion of Lot No. 3353, with an
area of 4,561 square meters, belonged to Alejandro Gruta. Because of the
construction of the road, the property of Balbedina, which was a part of
Lot No. 3353, was reduced to 4,651 square meters. Balbedina declared,
under Tax Declaration No. 391, that Lot No. 3353 had an area of 4,651

square meters and was coconut land[36] and that his property was bounded
on the south by a trail (road). Lino Estopin declared Lot No. 3347 under his
name for taxation purposes, in which he stated that his property was
bounded on the north by the trail going to Biriran. [37]Clearly, then, Lot No.
3353 and Lot No. 3347 had a common boundary the trail (road) going to
Biriran.
Balbedina sold his property, which was a portion of Lot No. 3353,
with an area of 4,651 square meters to Iluminado Baloloy on June 4, 1951.
[38]
Under the deed of absolute sale, the property was bounded on the
south by the trail (road) owned by Lino Estopin. [39] The English translation
of the deed of sale attached as page 85 to the RTC Records, which both
the trial court and the appellate court relied upon, is incorrect.
The original deed of absolute sale, which is in Spanish, states that
the boundary of the property on the south is con camino, Lino Estopin,
while the English version of the deed, indicates that the property is
bounded on the south by Lino Estopin. Being an earlier document, the
deed
in
Spanish
signed
by
the
parties
therefore
should
prevail. Conformably to such deed, Iluminado Baloloy declared in Tax
Declaration No. 5359 under his name that the property is bounded on the
south by a trail,[40] and not by Lot No. 3347 owned by Lino Estopin.
The respondent failed to adduce any documentary evidence to
prove how the Spouses Estopin acquired the disputed property. The
respondents reliance on the testimonies of Melissa Estopin, the daughter
of the Spouses Estopin, and on Porfirio Guamos as well as the May 8, 1993
Affidavit of Martiniano Balbedina, and the deed of sale executed by
Victoriana Lagata on November 27, 1961 in favor of Astrologo Hular to
corroborate his claim over the lot in question, is misplaced.
First. Per the testimony of Porfirio Guamos, the witness of the
respondent, Lino Estopin purchased the disputed property in 1941 from
Irene Griarte and insisted that there was a deed of sale evidencing the
sale:
Atty. Dealca:
Q The area of the land in question is 1,405 sq. m., you claim
that way back in 1944 the owner of the land was Lino
Estopin; 41 to 44?
A 1941.

Q And you said that Lino Estopin was able to acquire the land
by purchase?
A That was very long time when Lino Estopin sold the
property.
Q My question is whether you know because you testified
earlier that Lino Estopin was able to acquire the land
by purchase; do you confirm that?
A Yes, Sir.
Q From whom?
A From Irene Griarte.
Q Were you present when that sale was consummated?
A I was not there.
Q So you do not know how much was it bought by Lino
Estopin from Irene Griarte?
A No, Sir.
Q You do not know whether a document to that effect was
actually drafted and executed?
A There was.
Q Have you seen the document?
A I did not see but there was a document.
Q You maintain there was a document but you did not see a
document, is that it?
A In my belief there was a document.
Q In your belief, how did you organize that belief when you
did not see a document?
A I insist there was a document.
Q That is why, why are you insisting when you did not see a
document?
A Well, during the sale that document was used.
Q How was it used when you did not see that document?
A When the deed of sale was executed I did not see the
document, but I insist there was a document.

Q Thats why, how were you able to say before the court that
there was a document when you contend that you did
not see any?
A There was basis in the sale the sale was based on a
document. You cannot sell a property without
document? (sic)
Q Is that your belief?
A Yes, Sir.
Q But you did not see any document?

Third. The respondent even failed to adduce in evidence Tax Declaration

No. 4790 covering the two parcels of land under the name of Lino Estopin
to prove his claim that Lot No. 3347 consisted of agricultural and
residential lands. We note that the petitioners appended a certified true
copy of Tax Declaration No. 4790 under the name of Victoriana Lagata
over Lot No. 3347 to their Motion to Reopen the Case. In the said
declaration, Lot No. 3347 was described as coconut land; this is contrary
to the respondents claim that the said lot was then residential, and that
the boundary of the property on the north was the road to Biriran which, in
turn, is consistent with the petitioners claim. [44] Unfortunately, the trial
court denied the said motion on the ground that it was mooted by its
decision.

Atty. Diesta:
Already answered.
Witness:
A I did not see.
Atty. Dealca:
Q You said that that document was used when the property
was sold by Lino Estopin to Alfredo Hular. . .
A In 1961. Yes.[41]
However, the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the said deed
or even an authentic copy thereof. The respondent did not offer any
justification for his failure to adduce the same in evidence. As against the
respondents verbal claim that his father acquired the property from
Lagata, the Torrens title of Iluminado Baloloy must prevail. [42]
Second. The respondent even failed to adduce in evidence any tax
declarations over the disputed property under the name of Irene Griarte
and/or Lino Estopin, or realty tax payment receipts in their names from
1941 to November 1961. The documents are circumstantial evidence to
prove that Irene Griarte claimed ownership over the disputed property and
that Lino Estopin acquired the same from her. After all, such tax
declarations and tax receipts can be strong evidence of ownership of land
when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for acquisitive
prescription.[43]

Fourth. During the cadastral survey of lands in Juban, the lot of Gruta and
that of Balbedina, inclusive of the subject property, were designated as
Lot No. 3353 with a total area of 9,302 square meters under their names,
while that of Lino Estopin was designated as Lot No. 3347 with an area of
15,906 square meters. Iluminado Baloloy applied for a free patent over Lot
No. 3353, including the disputed property, under his name. The
respondent failed to adduce any evidence that the Spouses Estopin and/or
Astrologo Hular opposed Balbedina and/or Iluminados claim of ownership
of Lot No. 3353 during the survey and after the filing of the application. A
propos is our ruling in Urquiaga v. Court of Appeals: [45]
As succinctly observed by respondent Court of Appeals
in assessing the totality of the evidence
We do not agree with defendants that they are also the
occupants and possessors of the subject lot just because it is
adjacent to their titled property. Precisely, the boundaries of
defendants titled property were determined, delineated and
surveyed during the cadastral survey of Dipolog and
thereafter indicated in their certificate of title in order that
the extent of their property will be known and fixed. Since
the subject lot was already found to be outside their titled
property, defendants have no basis in claiming it or other
adjacent lots for that matter. Otherwise, the very purpose of
the cadastral survey as a process of determining the exact
boundaries of adjoining properties will be defeated.
Defendants own title, O.C.T. No. 0-357 (in the names of Jose
Aguirre and Cristina Gonzales), in fact belies their claim of

occupation and possession over the adjacent subject

lot. Examining said title, we note that: (1) the cadastral
survey of Dipolog was conducted from January, 1923 to
November 1925; (2) defendants titled property was one of
those lots surveyed and this was designated as Lot No. 2623;
(3) during the survey, it was already determined and known
that Lot No. 2623 is bounded on the northeast, southeast,
southwest and west by Lot No. 4443 (as we have seen in our
narration of facts, the subject lot is a subdivision lot of Lot
No. 6552 which was originally identified as Lot No. 4443-B-1,
Dipolog Cadastre 85 Ext.: hence, the subject lot is a portion
of Lot No. 4443); and (4) O.C.T. No. 0-357 was issued on
October 11, 1965 on the strength of the judgment rendered
on July 31 (sic), 1941 by the then Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte in Cadastral Case No. 6, LRC Cadastral
Record No. 756.
From the foregoing facts, we find that as early as January,
1923 when the cadastral survey was started, the boundaries
of Lot Nos. 2623 and 4443 were already determined and
delineated. Since the subject lot was surveyed to be part of
Lot No. 4443, it means that during that time defendants
predecessors-in-interest never claimed ownership or
possession over the subject lot. Otherwise, they would have
complained so that the subject lot could be excluded from Lot
No. 4443 and included in Lot No. 2623, they being adjacent
lots. It is obvious then that defendants predecessors only
claimed Lot No. 2623 and they pursued their claim in
Cadastral Case No. 6, LRC Cadastral Record No. 756 until
O.C.T. No. 0-357 was issued to them. The contention of
defendants that they and their predecessors-in-interest
occupied and possessed the subject lot since time
immemorial therefore is not true.[46]
Fifth. Under the deed of absolute sale dated November 25, 1961,
Lagata sold to Astrologo Hular Lot No. 3347, and not Lot No.
3353. In Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, [47] we
ruled that:
Petitioner VFP maintains that the deed of sale was
valid and enforceable and that it was perfected at the very
moment that the parties agreed upon the thing which was

the object of the sale and upon the price.The parties herein
had agreed on the parcel of land that petitioner would
purchase from respondent PNR, and the same was described
therein; thus, petitioner VFP cannot conveniently set aside
the technical description in this agreement and insist that it
is the legal owner of the property erroneously described in
the certificate of title. Petitioner can only claim right of
ownership over the parcel of land that was the object of the
deed of sale and nothing else.[48]
Sixth. Under the said deed of sale dated November 11, 1961,
Victoriana Lagata sold Lot No. 3347 which had an area of 15,906 square
meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 4790. The deed does not state
that what was sold was only a portion of Lot No. 3347, excluding
therefrom the disputed property. This is understandable, since the subject
property is a portion of Lot No. 3353 owned by Alejandro Gruta and
Iluminado Baloloy, and not of Lino Estopin and/or Victoriana
Lagata. Lagata could not have sold a portion of Lot No. 3353 which she
does not own. As the Latin adage goes: NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET.
Seventh. The Balbedinas Affidavit dated May 8, 1993 offered by the
respondent to prove the contents thereof is inadmissible in evidence
against the petitioners. Balbedina did not testify; as such, the petitioners
were deprived of their right to cross-examine him. The said affidavit is
thus hearsay and barren of probative weight. The affidavit varies the
contents of the deed of absolute sale which he (Balbedina) executed in
favor of Iluminado more than forty years earlier. In the said affidavit, it
was made to appear that Balbedina sold to Iluminado on June 4, 1951 only
a portion of Lot 3353 with an area of 3,333 square meters, when under
the said deed of absolute sale, the property that was sold consisted of
4,651 square meters. The affidavit is proscribed by Section 9, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. - When the
terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there
can be, between the parties and their successors in interest,
no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.
...
It bears stressing that the deed of absolute sale executed by
Balbedina in favor of Baloloy was notarized by the Justice of the Peace

who was an Ex-Officio Notary Public; hence, entitled to full probative

weight.
Eighth. The Special Sketch Plan of Lot No. 3353 prepared by Geodetic
Engineer Rodolfo P. Cunanan [49] cannot prevail over OCT No. P-16540. In
fact, the plan even buttressed the case for the petitioners because it
shows that the subject property is a portion of Lot No. 3353, and not of Lot
No. 3347, covered by OCT No. P-16540 under the name of Iluminado
Baloloy, the deceased father of the petitioners.
Ninth. The conclusion of the RTC that Lagata in fact sold a portion of Lot
No. 3347 under the deed of absolute sale dated November 25, 1961,
unaware that the property was a part of Lot No. 3353, is based on mere
speculations and surmises.
Iluminado Baloloy included in his application for a free patent the property
of Alejandro Gruta, and was able to secure a free patent over said
property in addition to his own. As such, Gruta, not the respondent, is the
proper party to assail such free patent, as well as OCT No. P-16540 which
was issued based thereon.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of the respondent
is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.