CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

BILL OF RIGHTS
DEAN TONY LA VIA

A. FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

A.1 Concept and Application
3 INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE
a) Police power
b) Power of Imminent Domain
c) Power of Taxation

The totality of governmental power is contained in three great

powers, namely:
i. Police Power defined as the most essential, insistent, and
the least limitable powers, extending as it does to all the great
public needs. (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. v. Mayor of Manila, L-24693, July 31, 1967,
citing Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 412 (1911) and
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1163 (1957)
Chief Justice Shaw defined police power as the power vested
in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the
good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of
the same. (Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush, 53 (Mass. 1851),
quoted in U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245, 253-254 (1915)

Selected Cases on Police power

- Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v.
Mayor of Manila, L-24693, July 31, 1967
Facts: There was the assertion of Ordinance No. 4760 being beyond the powers of
the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it regulate motels, on the
ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no
reference is made to motels. it also being provided that the premises and facilities of
such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City
Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives.
Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional,
therefore, null and void.
Held: . . . (there) is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity
that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. The local legislative body, by
enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to
the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise
of police regulation.

Case 2
CHURCHILL vs. RAFFERTY G.R. NO. L-10572, December 21, 1915 ( 32 Phil580)
FACTS:
The case arises from the fact that defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, would like
to destroy or remove any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for
the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be offensive to the
sight. The plaintiffs allege otherwise. Was there valid exercise of police power in this
case?
HELD:
Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine
Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of
Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all
republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and
undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the
ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where
the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health,
safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts.

ii. Power of Eminent Domain - "the power of the

nation or a sovereign state to take, or to
authorize the taking of, private property for a
public use without the owners consent,
conditioned upon payment of just compensation."
(Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga vs.
CA, G.R. No. 150640, 22 March 2007)
iii. Power of Taxation - is the act of levying the
tax, i.e., the process or means by which the
sovereign, through its law-making body, raises
income to defray the necessary expenses of the
government. It is merely a way of apportioning
the cost if the government among those who in
some measures are privileged to enjoy its
benefits and, therefore, must bear its burdens.
(71 Am Jur. 2nd 342; 1 Cooley 72-73).

A.2 Requisites for Valid Exercise

i. Requisites of a valid police measure:
(a.) Lawful Subject the activity or property sought to be regulated affects the public welfare. It
requires the primacy of the welfare of the many over the interests of the few.
(b.) Lawful Means the means employed must be reasonable and must conform to the safeguards
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
ii. Requisites for valid exercise of eminent domain
(a)
Public purpose generally means public advantage, convenience, or benefit, and that anything
which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and promote the productive
power of any considerable number of the inhabitants of a section of the state, or which leads to the
growth of towns and the creation of new resources for the employment of capital and labor, which
contributes to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community. (Barangay Sindalan,
San Fernando, Pampanga vs. CA, G.R. No. 150640, 22 March 2007)
(b)
Just compensation - is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, and the gauge for computation is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. In order for
the payment to be "just," it must be real, substantial, full, and ample; made within a reasonable time
from the taking of the property. (Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga vs. CA, G.R. No. 150640,
22 March 2007)

A.4 Limitations on the fundamental powers

Although inherent and indispensable, the fundamental powers of the state are not
without restrictions-as ours is a government of limited powers, even these
prerogatives may not be exercise arbitrarily, to the prejudice of the bills of rights.
The presumption in libertarian societies is in favor of private rights and against
attempt on the part of the state to interfere with them, "Constitutional provision for
the security of persons and property should be liberally construed." Hence, the
exercise of these fundamental powers is subject at all times to the limitation and
requirements of the constitution and may in proper cases be annulled by the courts
of justice.
A.5 Specific Safeguards in the Bill of Rights
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

The right to due process and equal protection,

The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures,
freedom of expression, speech, press, assembly, religion, travel
the non-impairment clause, and
the guarantees against injustice to the accused

Section 1, Art. III. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,

or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws
. Life
It is not just a protection of the right to be alive or to the security of one's limb against physical
harm. The right to life is the right to a good life... a life of dignity and... a decent standard of
living.
2. Liberty
(1) freedom to do right and never wrong
(Mabini)
(2) right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude
3. Property anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the subject of contract
all things within the commerce of man However, one cannot have a vested right to a public
office as this is not regarded as property. If created by statue, it may be abolished by the
legislature at any time. Mere privileges are not property rights and are therefore revocable at
will
Aspects of Due Process
1. Substantive Due Process 2. Procedural Due Process
As a substantive requirement, it is a prohibition of arbitrary laws.
As a procedural requirement, it relates chiefly to the mode of procedure which government
agencies must follow in the enforcement and application of laws. It is a guarantee of procedural
fairness.

B. DUE PROCESS
B.4 Procedural Due Process in Philippine Jurisprudence
As early as 1908, the Philippine Supreme Court in the case of U.S. v.
Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. 104,111-112 (1908) made an attempt to define
Due Process as First. That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general
powers of the legislative department of the Government; Second. That
this law shall be reasonable in its operation; Third. That it shall be
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;
and Fourth. That it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the
state or to all of a class.

And in Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534, 572 (1918), the Court defined due
process as
Due process of law, in any particular case, means such an exercise of the powers
of the government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction and under
such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribe
for the class of cases to which the one in questions belongs. (U. S. vs. Ling Su Fan,
10 Phil. Rep., 104, 111; Moyer vs. Peabody, 212 U. S., 78; Murray vs. Hoboken
Land and Improvement Co., 18 How., 272; U. S. vs. Ju Toy, 198 U. S., 253, 263.)
B.5 Due process in Judicial Proceedings
As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with
certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following
conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be
lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is
the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to
be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. (Banco
Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca, G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918)

Case 1:
U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910)
Facts: Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao
be slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be
unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary
license. He was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His
counsel in one way or the other argued that the law mandating that one should
acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police
power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of
the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just
and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain
such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to
the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit
condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or
greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.

Violation of Substantive due process

Ynot v. IAC, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987 enunciated the minimum requirements
of procedural due process: (1) notice; (2) hearing; exceptions; and substantive due
process: (1) public interest requires government interference; (2) reasonable means
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
Case 2.

B.6 Due process in Administrative Proceedings

Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 (1940); the Cardinal Primary
Requirements in Administrative Proceedings (1)
The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(cont.)

(cont. Ang Tibay)

2)
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
(3)
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4)
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5)
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6)
The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7)
The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required is only substantial

evidence, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
The law is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its
application.
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:

it violates due process for failure to accord persons fair notice of conduct to
avoid; and,

it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, it was held that there was no violation of due
process because the nature of the charges against the petitioner is not uncertain
and void merely because general terms are used or because it employed terms
that were not defined. The Anti-Plunder law does not violate due process since it
defines the act which it purports to punish, giving the accused fair warning of the
charges against him, and can effectively interpose a defense against on his
behalf.

Case 3
Diosdado Guzman vs. National University, G.R. No. L-6828 July 11, 1986
Due Process Guidelines for the Handling of Disciplinary Cases in Schools
There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process; and these are, that
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

Requisites of SUBSTANTIVE due process:

1.The INTERESTS of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
requires the interference by the government and 2.The MEANS employed are necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Requirements of a valid ordinance: 1.Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
2.Must not be unfair or oppressive
3.Must not be partial or discriminatory
4.Must not prohibit, but may regulate trade
5.Must be general and consistent with public policy
6.Must not be unreasonable
B.8.2 Application of Substantive Due Process in Philippine Case Law
Substantive Due Process and Police Power
Quoting Lawton v. Steel, the Court in U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910) explained the extent of state
interference in private business, thus:
. . . the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large
discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the
public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. (Barbier vs.
Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus interposing its
authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily
interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is
not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court.

Equal Protection Clause

Attacks unwarranted partiality or prejudice Substantive Equality

all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both

as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Equality in enforcement of the law law be enforced and applied
equally
Requisites of Valid Classification:
(a) it must be based on substantial distinctions (b) it must be
germane to the purposes of the law (c) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only

must be enforced as long as the problem sought to be corrected

exists (d) it must apply equally well to all members of the class

both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed

Cases: Equal Protection of Law

In De Guzman v. Comelec, petitioners theorize that Sec. 44 of
RA 8189 is violative of the equal protection clause because it
singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of the
COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city or
municipality for more than four years. The Court held that the law
is valid. The singling out of election officers in
order to ensure the impartiality of election officials by
preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of
their place of assignment. In
-Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City, Ormoc City imposes a tax on
Ormoc Sugar Central by name. Ormoc Sugar Central is the only
sugar central in Ormoc City. The Court held that such ordinance is
not valid for it would be discriminatory against the Ormoc Sugar
Central which alone comes under the ordinance.

. Garcia vs. Drilon (Anti Violence Against

Women and their Children Act upheld by the
Court in 2013)
R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions
A. Unequal power relationship between men
and women
B. Women are the usual and most likely
victims of violence
C. Gender bias and prejudices
II. The classification is germane to the purpose
of the law
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all
members

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
C.1 Concepts
Probable Cause defined - In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.
Search warrant A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before the court.
Arrest Warrant - Legal process issued by a competent authority, directing the arrest of a person or
persons upon grounds stated therein

Section 2
deals with tangibles ;
embodies the castle doctrine (a man's
house is his castle; a citizen enjoys the
right against official intrusion and is
master of all the surveys within the
domain and privacy of his own home.)
This provision applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and
its agencies tasked with enforcement of
the law. It does not protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures
perpetrated by private individuals

C.2 Legal Notes on Search Warrant:

What are the requisites of a valid warrant?
1. It must be issued upon PROBABLE CAUSE.
2.The existence of probable cause is determined personally by the JUDG E.
3.The judge must EXAMINE UNDER OATH the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce. 4.The warrant must PARTICULARLYDESCRIBE the place to be
searched and person or things to be seized
What is the concept of a search warrant?
a.
It is a criminal process akin to a mode of discovery
b.
It is a special and peculiar remedy, which is drastic in nature
Are search and seizures prohibited under the constitution?
c.
No. The constitutional guarantee embodied in Article 3, Section 2 of the
Constitution is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as
it operates only against unreasonable searches and seizures

When is the search or seizure unreasonable?

d.
A search and seizure is unreasonable if it is made without a warrant, or
the warrant was invalidly issued.
e.
In all instances, what constitutes reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure is a purely judicial question determinable from a consideration of the
attendant circumstances.
What are the three situations wherein there must be finding of probable cause?
1. Probable cause in filing of an information

Facts and circumstances that would engender a well-grounded belief

that a crime has been committed and the person to be charged is probably
guilty thereof
2. Probable cause in the issuance of a search warrant

Facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable discreet and

prudent man to believe that there has been a crime committed and the things
and objects connected to the crime committed are in the place to be searched
3. Probable cause in the issuance of a warrant of arrest

Facts and circumstances that would engender a well-grounded belief

that a crime has been committed and the person to be arrested committed it

Why are the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant more
stringent than the requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest?
f.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a core right implicit in
the natural right to life, liberty and property.
Even in the absence of a
constitution, individuals have a fundamental and natural right against
unreasonable search and seizure under natural law.
g.
Moreover, the violation of the right to privacy produces a humiliating
effect that cannot be rectified anymore.
h.
This is why there is no other justification to speak of for a search, except for a
warrant.
i.
On the other hand, in a warrant of arrest, the person to be arrested
can always post bail to prevent the deprivation of liberty.
Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application
for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the
judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission
of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant
shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application
shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending.

What may be the subject of a search warrant?

1. Subject of the offense;
2. Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
3. Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense.

What are the requisites of a valid search warrant?

1. There must be probable causefacts and circumstances that would engender
a well-founded belief in a reasonable prudent and discreet man that a crime has been
committed and the things and objects to be seized can be found in the place to be
searched
2. Which must be determined by the judge personally through searching and
probing questionsquestions not merely answerable by yes or no but could be
answered by the applicant and the witnesses on facts personally known to them
3.
(Upon whom?) The complainant and the witnesses he may produce are
personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath and affirmation
4.
(Based on what?) The applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally
known to them
5. The probable cause must be in connection with the specific offense
6. The warrant specified describes the person and place to be searched and the
things to be seized
7.
The sworn statement together with the affidavits of the witnesses must be
attached to the record

What are the requisites of the personal examination that the judge must
conduct before issuing the search warrant?
1. The judge must examine the witness personally
2. The examination must be under oath
3. The examination must be reduced into writing in the form of searching
questions and answers
For how long is the search warrant valid?
z.
It is valid for 10 days, after which the police officer should make a return to the judge
who issued it
aa. If the police officer doesnt make a return, the judge should summon him and
require him to explain why no return was made
bb. If the return was made, the judge should determine if the peace officer issued the
receipt to the occupant of the premises from which the things were taken.
cc. The judge shall also order the delivery to the court of the things seized.
If the warrant was executed even before the expiration of the 10-day period, can the
peace officer use the warrant again before it expires?
dd. No, of the purpose for which it was issued has already been carried out, the
warrant cannot be used anymore.
ee. The exception is if the search wasnt finished within 1 day, the warrant can
still be used the next day, provided it is still within the 10-day period

In what instances would a search and seizure without a warrant be allowed?

1.

A warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest

a. Arrest must be lawful
b. It must be contemporaneous with the arrest in both time and place
c.
Within the vicinity of the person arrested, immediate control, which
is the evidence of the offense or weapon
2. Search of evidence in plain view
3. Search of a moving vehicle
a. Must be cursory
b. Cant make a thorough search; just have to take a look; not to open
trunks
4. Consented warrantless searches
a. The right exists
b. Person making the consent knows that he has the right
c.
In spite of the knowledge of the right, he voluntarily and intelligently
gives his consent
5. Customs searches
6. Stop and frisk
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances
8. Checkpoints
9. Republic Act requiring inspections or body checks in airports
10. Emergency

What are the instances of a permissible warrantless arrest?

1.
2.
3.

Arrest in flagrante delicto

Arrest effected in hot pursuit
Arrests of escaped prisoners

When is the warrantless search of a moving vehicle allowed?

It is allowed when it is not practicable to secure a warrant

What are the requirements in a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest?
1. Arrest must be lawful
2. It must be contemporaneous with the arrest in both time and place
3.
Within the vicinity of the person arrested, immediate control, which is the
evidence of the offense or weapon
Who should give consent to a warrantless search and what are the requisites?

Only the person whose right may be violated can give the consent; it is a
personal right that cannot be availed of by third parties. The requisites are:
1. The person has knowledge of his right against the search
2. He freely and intelligently gives his consent in spite of such knowledge
What are the requisites for the plain view doctrine to apply?
1. There must have been a prior valid intrusion based on the warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties
2. The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are
3. The evidence must be immediately apparent
4. There was no need for further search

What is a stop and frisk situation? when is it valid?

It is a situation wherein there is a limited protective search of outer

clothing for weapons

While probable cause is not required to conduct a stop and frisk, mere suspicion
or a hunch will not validate such a procedure.

A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person has detained the
weapons concealed about him.
Case 1
Warrantless Search of moving vehicle
Papa v. Mago
Facts: Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police
Department, acting upon a reliable information to the effect that a certain shipment of
personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day
from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks. When the trucks left
gate No.1 at about 4:30 elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and
intercepted them. The load of the two trucks, consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two
trucks, were seized. The respondent Mago, filed a petition for mandamus and certiorari
before the CFI Manila contending that the search and seizure is illegal for lack of a valid
warrant. Moreover, she also contends that such articles sought from her is not included by
the law for prohibited importation and that it no longer under the control of the Tariff and
Customs code for it (articles) were already sold to the petitioner. She also contends that the
search seizure conducted by the respondents are illegally being made outside the jurisdiction
of the BOC and that the subsequent search warrant issued by the collector of customs is not
valid being not issued by a judge.

Held: No. it is a valid seizure. The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo
G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could,
for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect
searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among
others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be
subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws.
He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container
wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of
dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to
stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of
holding or conveying such article as aforesaid It cannot be doubted, therefore, that
petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the
search and seizure of the goods in question. . . It is our considered view, therefore,
that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police
authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search
warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.

Case 2
Stop and frisk
Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288
Facts: Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) conducted surveillance along Magallanes Street,
Davao City. While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag
and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves
as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was unsuccessful. They
then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson
revolver, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2)
live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further
investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or
authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was
prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.
Issue: Whether or Not the warantless search is valid.
Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that under
Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is further
alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.
in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering that it was effected on
the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal
in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner
only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be
useless, futile and much too late.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and
hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.

Case 3
Stonehill vs. Diokno 20 SCRA 283 (1967)
Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally,
and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of
petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal
properties books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the respective
residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other records.
Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the
legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as evidence
against them.
Held: Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being
general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things to
be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of
peace officers.
Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a poisonous
tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.
Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from the
corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different from that
of the corporation

Some doctrines on warrantless search and seizure

Nolasco v. Pano 132 SCRA 152 (1985 articles seized by void warrants should be retuned
to its owners
People v. CFI of Rizal [GR L-41686, 17 November 1980] search of moving vehicle
Carroll doctrine search of moving vehicles or automobiles no search warrant needed;
The rationale of the Mago ruling was nurtured by the traditional doctrine in Carroll v.
United States 6 wherein an imprimatur against, constitutional infirmity was stamped in
favor of a warrantless search and seizure of such nature as herein. On this stable
foundation, the warrantless seizure did not violate Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973
Constitution, which finds origin in the Fourth Amendment of the American Constitution.
People v. Evaristo GR No. 93828 evidence in plain view Harris v. Coolidge, Coolidge v.
New Hampshire no search warrant needed; Malacat v. CA valid waiver must be
made in writing and in the presence of counsel; search incidental to a lawful arrest v.
stop and frisk Terry Case probable cause is not required to conduct stop and frisk but
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate it. A genuine reason must exist.
People v. De Gracia GR 102009-10, 6 July 1994 Eurocar Sales Office crime was in fact
being committed search incidental to lawful arrest valid

C.3 Legal Notes on Arrest Warrant

When may a warrant of arrest be issued?
> if issued by the RTC,
1.
within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.
2. he may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause.
3. if he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the
accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the mtc judge who
conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed
pursuant to section 7 of this rule.
o
pangay v. ganay modified this rule by providing that investigating judges power to order the
arrest of the accused is limited to instances where there is necessity for placing him in
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice
4.
in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must
be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.
5. if the warrant of arrest is issued by the mtc and if the preliminary investigation was
conducted by the prosecutor, the same procedure as above is followed
When is a warrant of arrest not necessary?
> a warrant of arrest is not necessary in the following instances:
1. when the accused is already in detention issued by the mtc
2. when the accused was arrested by virtue of a lawful arrest without warrant
3. when the penalty is of a fine only
4. those covered by a summary procedure

Within what period must a warrant of arrest be served?

> there is no limitation of period
> a warrant of arrest is valid until the arrest is effected or the warrant lifted
> the head of the office to whom the warrant was delivered must cause it to be
executed within 10 days from its receipt, and the officer to whom it is assigned
must make a report to the judge who issued the warrant within 10 days from the
expiration of the period.
if he fails to execute it, he should state the reasons
therefore.
When is a john doe warrant valid? are they valid?
> a john doe warrant is a warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown
> generally, this kind of warrants are void because the violate the constitutional provision which
requires that warrants of arrests should particularly describe the person or persons to be arrested
> but if there is sufficient description to identify the person to be arrested, the warrant is valid
Remedies of a party against whom a warrant of arrest has been issued
>A
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

party against whom a warrant of arrest has been issued may

post bail
ask for reinvestigation
file a motion to quash information
file a petition for review
if denied, he may appeal the judgment after trial (no certiorari)

When is an arrest without warrant lawful?

> a peace officer or private person may arrest without warrant:
1. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
2. when an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
3. when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
4. in hot pursuit

A police officer was chasing a person who had just committed an offense.
the person went
inside a house, so the police officer followed.
Inside the house, the police officer saw drugs
lying around. can he confiscate the drugs and use them as evidence?
> yes. the plain view doctrine is applicable to this case because there was a valid prior intrusion.
the police officer inadvertently discovered the evidence, he had a right to be there, and the
evidence was immediately apparent.
What if the officer merely peeks through the window of the house and sees the drugs, can he confiscate
them and use them as evidence?
> he can confiscate them, without prejudice though to his liability for violation of domicile.
> he cannot use them as evidence because the seizure cannot be justified under the plain view
doctrine, there being no previous valid intrusion.
what is the effect if a warrantless arrest is illegal?
> it doesn't render void all other proceedings, including those leading to the conviction of the
accused nor can the state deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts of record point to his
culpability
sec. 5. arrest without warrant; when lawful. a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
in cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of rule 112.

Citizen's arrest- method of arrest by private person

method of arrest by private person. when making an arrest, a private
person shall inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest
him and the case of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the
commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, or has
escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before the person making the arrest has
opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil
the arrest.
execution of warrant of arrest
sec. 4. execution of warrant. the head of the office to whom the warrant of
arrest was delivered for execution shall cause the warrant to be executed
within ten (10) days from its receipt.
within ten (10) days after the expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was
assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge who issued the warrant.
in case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state the reason therefore.

Some Doctrines
Umil v. Ramos subversion a continuing offense - arrest without a warrant is justified if the
person arrested in caught in flagrante delicto
People v. Aminudin - M/V Wilcon; marijuana not caught in flagrante delicto; search was
unreasonable; evidence inadmissible
Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago pedophiles the rights granted in Section 2 are available to all
persons including aliens, whether accused of a crime or not
People v. Mengote suspicious man outside a person may not be stopped and frisked in broad
daylight on a bust street on a mere unexplained suspicion
Posadas v. Ombudsan Sigma Rho v. Scintilla Juris Arrest made without a valid warrant: Rule
113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court when in the presence of a police officer or a private
individual: 1) the person arrested has committed, is actually committing, or attempting to commit
an offense; 2) when an offense has actually been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
the facts indicating that the person to be arrested committed it; 3) when the person arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where his is serving final or
temporary judgment (pending), escaped while being transferred

Art. III Section 3.

The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Privacy in the Laws
Aside from the Constitution, our laws protect privacy. The Civil Code of the
Philippines states that [e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy,
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.
Also, Article 32(11) of the Civil Code states that any public officer or employee, or
any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs x x x the privacy of communication and correspondence
x x x shall be liable to the latter for damages.

The Anti-Wiretapping Act guarantees a reasonable expectation

of privacy in ones conversations over electronic means. Bank
records are protected by the Bank Secrecy Act and the Secrecy
of Bank Deposits Act.
The Act provides that deposits with banks or banking
institutions are confidential and may not be examined, inquired,
or looked into absent exceptional circumstances.
C. Privacy in Judicial Decisions
Similarly decisions of our Supreme Court recognize the right to
privacy. In Morfe v. Mutuc No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22
SCRA 424 the Supreme Court had the occasion to rule on the
existence of the right to privacy, despite dismissing the action
for declaratory judgment challenging the validity of the
provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic
Act No. 3019). Morfe recognized the constitutional right to
privacy as laid down in Griswold v. Connecticut.

R.A. 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act)

1.The law does not distinguish between a party to the private communication or a third
person. Hence, both a party and a third person could be held liable under R.A. 4200 if they
commit any of the prohibited acts under R.A. 4200 (Ramirez v. Ca)
2.The use of a telephone extension to overhear a private conversation is not a violation of
R.A. 4200 because it is not similar to any of the prohibited devices under the law. Also, a
telephone extension is not purposely installed for the purpose of secretly intercepting or
recording private communication.(Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112)
Types of communication protected: Letters, messages, telephone calls, telegrams and the
like.
Exclusionary rule:
Any evidence obtained shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. However, in
the absence of governmental interference, the protection against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals. (People v. Martin)
D.3. Writ of Habeas Data
The Rule on Habeas Data, promulgated by the Supreme Court on January 22, 2008
through AM 08-1-16 was born in the midst of worsening human rights condition in the
country through extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearance and torture.

What is the nature and scope of the Philippine Habeas data ?

Section 1 provides that:
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The rule [as to parties] allows any individual to file the petition on
the ground that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened. This provision may be interpreted to refer
to an act or omission which violates or threatens the right to
privacy of an individual which in turn, results in violating or
threatening his or her right to life, liberty or security.

Case 1
Grisworld v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479,85 S. Ct. 1678,14 L. Ed. 2d 510,1965 U.S.
Brief Fact Summary. A Connecticut provision outlawing the counseling of others to use
contraception, as well as the use of contraception, was found unconstitutional under strict
scrutiny because it violated the Due Process Clause.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The right of marital privacy lies within the penumbra of the Bill of
Rights. Therefore, it is a fundamental right and strict scrutiny is the standard of judicial review.
Facts. Appellant, Ms. Griswold, was the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut (League). Appellant and the Medical Director for the League gave information
and instruction and medical advice to married couples about birth control. Appellant and her
colleague were convicted under a Connecticut law which criminalized counseling, and other
medical treatment to married persons for purposes of preventing conception. Appellants were
found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. The state appellate courts affirmed.
Issue. Whether the Constitution protects the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on
a couples ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives?
Held. Yes. Judgment of the state appellate court affirmed. The Bill of Rights has a penumbra
expanding the right of privacy. The present case concerns a relationship lying within the zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. It also concerns a law that,
in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks
to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship.
Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle that a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
Thus, the Connecticut statute conflicts with the exercise of this right and is therefore null and
void.

Case 2.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI (193 SCRA 57)
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging
and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and
ask if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the
package making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita
and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of standard
operating procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took
sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to
inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and
found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and
was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his
constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was
inadmissible as evidence against him.
Issue: Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?
Ruling: The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights
governs the relationship between the individual and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the
one who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence
of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless
search and siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain
sight is not a search.

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech,

of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
E.1. Legal Notes on Freedom of Expression
A.
1.

Philosophical Basis of Guarantees Free Market Place of Ideas

For the discovery of political truth

When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and the truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out.(Justice Holmes,Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616.(1919)
The theory behind freedom of expression is the principle that ours is a democratic
society, and so the only way to rule ultimately is by, means of public opinion,
which is possible only when everyone can speak their minds out and compete in
the free market place of ideas.

2. For self government

United States v. Bustos, 37 P 731 (1918)
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984)
HELD:As a consequence of the search and seizure, the premises of the "Metropolitan Mail"
and "We Forum" were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and
publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of
previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under
the fundamental law and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioner's freedom to express
themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic
framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
B. Prior Restraints
Thus any system of prior restraints of expression comes to the Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutionality, giving the government a heavy burden to
show justification for the imposition of such restraint.(New York v. United States
(1971); also in New York Times v. Pentagon and Bantam Books v. Publication of
Pentagon Papers).
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529 (1990)

Subsequent Punishment
And even subsequent punishment is tempered by the greater interest of promoting free public
opinion. The most significant expression is the law on libel.
We consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to debate on public
issues being uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. The falsity of some of the
factual statements and alleged defamations do not qualify the role. And just as factual error afforded
no warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be free, the same is true of injury to official
reputation.(New York Times v. Sullivan, 380 U.S. 51 (1964)
The interest of society and good government demands a full discussion of public affairs. Whether the
law is wisely or badly enforced is a fit subject for proper comment. Public policy, welfare of society,
and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The
inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege.[Justice Malcom, United States v. Bustos, 731 (1918).]
While, under the Revised Penal Code, any defamatory statement is presumed to be malicious (malicein-law), when the defense proves that the communication is privileged, such a presumption of malice
does not arise because of the greater public interest involved.
If the communication is absolutely privileged (as in parliamentary freedom of speech), the
prosecution cannot even prove malice-in-fact.
If the communication is only qualifiedly privileged (Art. 354 enumerates the 2 instances: fair and true
reporting of an official proceeding; legal moral or social duty), the burden is shifted on the
prosecution to prove malice-in-fact, which the defense can overcome by proving the truth of the
defamatory statement (which in the case of public officials may or may not constitute a crime, so
long as related to the conduct of his office) and good motive.

C. Content-Based Restrictions
1.Test of validity of content-based restrictions The U.S. Supreme Court and, by
haphazard imitation, the Philippine Supreme Court, have evolved certain tests to
regulate the contents of speech.
Dangerous Tendency Test:
When the legislative body has determined generally, in the exercise of its discretion,
that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of a substantive evil that they
may be punished, the question whether any specific utterance coming within the
prohibited class is likely, in and itself, to bring the substantive evils, is not open to
consideration. In such cases, the general provision of the statute may be
constitutionally applied to the specific utterance if its natural and probable effect was
to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body might prohibit.[Gitlow v.
New York, 268 US 652 (1925).]
Example: Art. 142.Inciting to sedition. When the legislature has decided that one who
advocates a certain conduct is guilty of a crime, the court cannot intrude. As it
evolved, this test was supposed to apply when there is a statute, in contrast to the
clear and present danger rule which applies when the speech is not prohibited by
statute.

Clear and Present Danger Test:

The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent.It is a question of proximity and degree.[Schenck v. United
States, 249 US 47 (1919).]
The emphasis of the test is the nature of the circumstances under which it
is uttered. The speech itself may not be dangerous. As Holmes said: Many
things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort
that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight. Or saying
"Fire" in a crowded movie house.

Grave-but-improbable danger:
Whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies
such an invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.
[Dennis v. United States, 341 US 494 (1951), quoting Judge Learned Hand.]
This test was meant to supplant the clear and present danger. They both
emphasize the circumstances of the speech, but this latter test consider
the weighing of values.

Direct Incitement Test:

The constitutional guarantees of free speech and press do not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation, except where such advocacy or speech is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action, and is likely to incite or produce
such action.[Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), cited in
Salonga v. Cruz Pano, 134 SCRA 438 (1985).]
The test emphasizes the very words uttered:(a)What words did he
utter?(b)What is the likely result of such utterance? It criticizes the
clear and present danger test for being top dependent on the
circumstances. Speaker may, when tested show no incitement but you
know the speaker is inciting to sedition.

Balancing of Interest Test:

The court must undertake the delicate and difficult task of weighing the circumstances
and appraising the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation
of the free enjoyment of rights.[American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 US 383
cited in Gonzales v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835 (1969A)]
The test applied when two legitimate values not involving national security crimes
compete. Involves an appoint of the competing interest.(Gonzales v. Comelec)
In Aver v. Capulong and Enrile, for instance, it is a question of balancing the freedom of
expression of the producer and the right to privacy of Enrile.

Balancing of Factors Test:

The truth is that the clear-and-present danger test is over- simplified
judgment unless it takes into account also a number of other factors:(1)the
relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with the value of the
occasion for speech or political activity, (2)the availability of more moderate
controls than those the State has imposed, and perhaps (3) the specific
intent with which the speech is launched.(Freund, quoted in Dennis v. United
States in the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter).

Unprotected Speech
1. LIBEL A.FAIR COMMENT (U.S. Rule).
These are statements of OPINION, not of fact, and are not considered actionable, even if the
words used are neither mild nor temperate. What is important is that the opinion is the true
and honest opinion of the person. The statements are not used to attack personalities but to
give ones opinion on decisions and actions.
B.OPINIONS. With respect to public personalities (politicians, actors, anyone with a connection
to a newsworthy event), opinions can be aired regarding their public actuations. Comment on
their private lives, if not germane to their public personae, are not protected.
2. OBSCENITY
A.

Test for obscenity (Miller v. California)

i.
Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.
ii.
ii. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct,
specifically defined by law.
iii.
iii. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value.
B.

Procedure for seizure of allegedly obscene publications

i.
Authorities must apply for issuance of search warrant.
ii.
ii. Court must be convinced that the materials are obscene. Apply clear and present danger
test.
iii.
iii. Judge will determine whether they are in fact obscene. iv. Judge will issue a search
warrant. v. Proper action should be filed under Art. 201 of the RPC. vi. Conviction is subject to appeal

SOME CASES
A. Prior Restraint
Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans The test of limitations on freedom of expression continues to be
the CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE that words are used in such a circumstance and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantial
evils that a lawmaker has a right to prevent. Government has a right to be protected against
broadcasts which incite listeners to overthrow it
Chavez v. Gonzales Hello Garci Case Tests for restraint dangerous tendency doctrine, clear
and present danger rule and balancing of interest test; aspects of freedom of the press
freedom from prior restraint and freedom from subsequent punishment
B. Subsequent Punishment
People v. Perez seditious remarks Criticisms against the branches of government within the
range of liberty and speech unless the intention and the effect be seditious
Gonzales v. COMELEC prolonged political campaigns freedom of expression not absolute; The
speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public interest without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous
restraint to the communication of views or subsequent punishment unless there be a clear and
present danger of substantive evil that Congress has the right to prevent.

DISINI, JR., ET AL. v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R. No. 203335,
FEBRUARY 18, 2014
Cybercrime law - the Tribunal ruled that online libel only applies to the original
author or producer of libelous material. Receiving, responding to, or sharing
libelous material online would not be covered by online libel.
In addition, the Supreme Court also struck down other controversial
provisions of R.A. 10175, such as Section 19 or the Takedown Clause that
allows the government to block or restrict access to internet material it
deems as criminal in nature without a warrant. When a computer data is
prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall
issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data, Section 19
of the Cybercrime Law states.
The Court also struck down Section 12, which would have authorized
government to do real-time collection of traffic data. Section 12 states that
law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized to collect or
record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated
with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the communications origin, destination, route, time,
date, size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not content, nor
identities.

(cont.)
The Supreme Court also declared the following provisions of
R.A. 10175 unconstitutional either wholly or contextually:
Sec. 4(c)(3) (Unsolicited Commercial Communications)
Sec. 12 (Real time collection of traffic data)
Sec. 19 (Restricting or blocking access to computer data)
Sec. 4(c)(4) (online libel- only where it penalises those who
simply receive the post or react to it) but NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL as far as the original author is concerned.
Sec. 5 (aiding or abetting in the commission of a
cybercrime/attempt to commit a cybercrime) only in relation to
secs. 4(c)(2) (child pornography), 4(c)(3) (unsolicited
commercial communications) and 4(c)(4) (libel);
Sec. 7 (liability under other laws) only in relation to secs. 4(c)
(4) (libel) and 4(c)(2) (child pornography).
All other provisions not so declared by the Court are
considered NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL,

(cont.) Cybercrime on line libel

In upholding the constitutionality of the libel provision of
the Cybercrime Law, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General
that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the
government has an obligation to protect private individuals from
defamation. Indeed, it added, on-libel is actually not a new
crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal
code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above
merely affirms that online defamation constitutes similar
means for committing libel.
But for the High Court on-libel is made applicable only
insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the
libelous statement or article. However it struck down as a
nullity Section 5 which penalizes the act of aiding or abetting
the commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act. In
effect the ruling does not consider Liking Sharing or
Commenting as tantamount to aiding or abetting the crime of
libel.

(cont.)
Constitutional law; Unsolicited commercial communications, also
known as spam is entitled to protection under freedom of
expression. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would
deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate
category of speech which is not accorded the same level of
protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State
cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are
legitimate forms of expression.
Criminal law; Cyberlibel under Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Law
is constitutional. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that
libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the
government has an obligation to protect private individuals from
defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since
Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the Penal Code, already
punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that
online defamation constitutes similar means for committing libel.
But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime
law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article.

(cont.)
Criminal law; Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law that punishes
aiding or abetting libel on the cyberspace is a nullity. The terms
aiding or abetting constitute broad sweep that generates
chilling effect on those who express themselves through
cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Its vagueness
raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its
obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially
since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the
cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners
point out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless
consummated. In the absence of legislation tracing the
interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in
other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel,
Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and
Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.

C. Freedom of Expression and the electoral process

Sanidad v. COMELEC prohibition regarding certain forms of propaganda a valid exercise of police
power of the state to prevent perversion and prostitution of electoral process
Adiong v. COMELEC using stickers to campaign ed
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC exit polls allowed
SWS v. COMELEC releasing surveys results before the election allowed
D. Freedom of Expression and the Courts
IN RE: EMIL JURADO journalist and lawyer at the same time - Right to private reputation. Judges are
commonly and rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which
embody more stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required
from private persons. Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise
of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about
a public
official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement and the false statement made
with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.

PEOPLE V. GODOY - cited for contempt based on the latters article in the newspaper - (1) Theres a
need to make a distinction between adverse criticism of the court's decision after the case is
ended and "scandalizing the court itself." The latter is not criticism; it is personal and scurrilous
abuse of a judge as such, in which case it shall be dealt with as a case of contempt. Contempt
proceedings dismissed. Such comments may constitute a libel against the judge, but it cannot be
treated as in contempt of the court's authority. (2) In case of a post-litigation newspaper
publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed. However,
there may be a contempt of court, even though the case has been terminated, if the publication is
attended by either of these two circumstances:
a. Where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the court; or
b. Where there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would be impeded.
And this brings us to the familiar invocation of freedom of expression usually resorted to as a
defense in contempt proceedings.
IN RE: RESOLUTION A.M. 98-7-02 SC - resolution prohibiting demonstrations within a radius of 200
meters from the boundary of any hall of Justice. - The Court, it would seem, has the power to
promulgate rules concerning conduct of demonstrations in the vicinity of the courts to assure the
people of an impartial and orderly administration of justice. It was anchored on Art. VIII Sec. 5 (5)
RE: RADIO/TV COVERAGE OF ESTRADA TRIAL - Can the trial of Estrada in the Sandiganbayan or any
other court be broadcasted in TV or radio? NO. An accused has a right to a public trial, but it is
not synonymous with a publicized trial. Freedom of the press and the accuseds protection from a
possible prejudicial publicized trial must be taken into consideration. And unless there are safety
nets to prevent this event, broadcast media cannot be allowed to publicize the trial.

Cases on UNPROTECTED SPEECH LIBEL

IMBONG ET AL. VS. OCHOA ET AL. G.R. NO. 204819
Issues: WON the ff: rights have been violated
1-The Right to Life Ruling: The Moment of conception is
reckoned from fertilization x x x following the intention of the
Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a
zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception,
that is, upon fertilization.
2. The Right to Health Ruling: Thus, the Court agrees with the
observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law
will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since
the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and
devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With
R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure
the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available
to the public x x x

(cont.)
3. Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech Ruling: it is
not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of
contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modern
reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or
whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or
belief x x x While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were
enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical
practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an
anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality,
their beliefs should be respected.
4. The Family and the Right to Privacy - the RH Law, in its not-sohidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which
tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the
husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making
process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives
the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply
because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.

5. Academic Freedom- Ruling: suffice it to state that any

attack on the validity of Section 14 (mandating the teaching
of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment ) of the
RH Law is premature because the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on ageappropriate reproductive health education.
6. Due Process Ruling: RH law does not suffer from
vagueness and thus does not violate the due process clause
of the Constitution.
7. Equal Protection - Ruling: It should be noted that Section
7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples
who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that
the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their
number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives,
it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As
Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of
the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement
of reproductive health."

(cont. )
8. Involuntary Servitude Ruling: Agrees with the contention of
the OSG that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section
17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as
reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to
the manner and time of giving pro bono services x x x Consistent
with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be
emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this
provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not
allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bono or
otherwise.

(cont.) Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court
declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1]
Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a)
require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who
have suffered a miscarriage access to modern methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2]
Section 23(a)(1) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3]
Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as
they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;
4]
Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as
they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5]
Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case,
as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider
within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or
her religious beliefs;
6]
Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to
support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full

Other cases:
BORJAL V. COURT OF APPEALS - Borjal published in his editorial column in the Philippine Star
about certain anomalous activities of an organizer of a conference - (1) Fair commentaries
on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for
libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until
his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless,
when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it
is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official
may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be
inferred from the facts.
OCAMPO V. SUN STAR PUBLISHING - graft charges filed against the judge. - (1) Generally,
every defamatory information is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following instances:
a. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty;
b. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative, or other official proceeding which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions.the subject articles are under this
exemption.
Pita v. CA Pinoy Playboy - Miller test (3 Tests)
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work,
taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest. (b) whether the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law.
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.

F.

ASSEMBLY AND PETITION

PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO - public meeting at Plaza Miranda - (1) A statute requiring

persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license
therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights
of assembly or a freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by
the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in them issuance of
licenses, to a consideration, the time, place, and manner of the parade and procession,
with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to
provide proper policing and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse
license. (2) In the exercise of police power, the council may, in its discretion, regulate
the exercise of such rights in a reasonable manner, but cannot suppress them, directly
or indirectly, by attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any other
officer. The discretion with which the council is vested is a legal discretion, to be
exercised within the limits of the law, and not discretion to transcend it or to confer
upon any city officer and arbitrary authority, making him in its exercise a petty tyrant.
NAVARRO V. VILLEGAS - Sunken Gardens as alternative to Plaza Miranda - The Mayor
cannot be compelled to issue the permit. A permit should recognize the right of the
applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice, another place may
be designated by the licensing authority if it be shown that a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil if no change was made.

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Clauses under Section 5
1. Non-establishment clause
2.Free exercise of Religion
Distinction between the clauses (School District v. Schempp, 374 US 203)
1.The non-establishment clause does not depend upon any showing of direct
governmental compulsion. It is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an
official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals
or not. The test of compliance with the non-establishment clause can be stated as
follows: What are the purposes and primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion, the law violates the non- establishment clause.
Thus, in order for a law to comply with the non-establishment clause, two requisites
must be met. First, it has a secular legislative purpose. Second, its primary effect
neither advances nor inhibits religion.

2.The free exercise of religion clause withdraws from legislative

power the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of religion.
In order to show a violation of this clause, the person affected
must show the coercive effect of the legislation as it operates
against him in the practice of his religion. While the freedom to
believe (non-establishment) is absolute, the moment such belief
flows over into action, it becomes subject to government
regulation.
Requisites for government aid to be allowable:
1.It must have a secular legislative purpose;
2.It must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion;
3.It must not require excessive entanglement with recipient
institutions.

Case 1

Ang Ladlad vs. Comelec

FACTS: This is a Petition for Certiorari with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
filedby Ang Ladlad LGBT Party ( Ang Ladlad ) against the Resolutions of COMELEC. The case has its
roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Party-List
System Act. Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for
accreditation was denied on the groundthat the organization definition of the LGBT sector makes it
crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. ANG LADLAD
apparently advocates sexual immorality. COMELEC clams that it cannot besaid that Ladlad s
expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole. Ang Ladlad argued that
the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
ISSUE: WON such denial of the COMELEC to recognize Ang ladlad as a party-list is violative of the
constitution
Held:
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our
non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters.
Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy
of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause
for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why

Case 2: Benevolent neutrality-accommodation

Estrada vs. Escritor AM No. P021651, August 4, 2003
FACTS: Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an
investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a
man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is
not personally related either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed the charge
against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the
image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might
appear that the court condones her act. Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered
the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She
admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage
for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as
the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living
together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as
the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement
between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the
congregation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Escritor may be sanctioned in light of the Free Exercise clause
Held: No. The state has the burden of satisfying the compelling state interest test to justify
any possible sanction to be imposed upon Escritor. This test involves three steps:1) The
courts should look into the sincerity of the religious belief without inquiring into the truth of
the belief. 2) The state has to establish that its purposes are legitimate and compelling. 3)
The state used the least intrusive means possible.
The case was remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator so that the government
would have the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold
in opposing Escritors position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable
as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection.

Case 3
Genaro Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al.106 Phil 2
FACTS: Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS and GS students of Cebu. Public school
authorities expelled these students for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem
and recite the pledge required by RA1265. They are Jehovahs Witnesses believing that by
doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They
contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against
official control and religious freedom.
Issue: Has religious freedom been violated?
Held: Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right
to religious worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of
thought. 2.) Freedom to act on ones belief regulated and translated to external acts. The
only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public
safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent. The expulsion of the
petitioners from the school is not justified. Jehovahs Witnesses may be exempted from
observing the flag ceremony but this right does not give them the right to disrupt such
ceremonies. In the case at bar, the Students expelled were only standing quietly during
ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly, it doesnt present any danger so evil and
imminent to justify their expulsion. What the petitioners request is exemption from
flagceremonies and not exclusion from public schools. The expulsion of the students by
reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizens right to free education. The
non-observance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute ignorance of patriotism
and civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national heroes, civic
consciousness and form of government are part of theschool curricula. Therefore, expulsion
due to religious beliefs is unjustified. Expulsion is ANNULLED.

Case 4
Ebralinag v division superintendent of schools of cebu 219 SCRA 256
FACTS: Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS and GS students of Cebu. Public school authorities
expelled these students for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
pledge required by RA1265. They are Jehovahs Witnesses believing that by doing these is
religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel
transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official control and religious
freedom.
Issue: Has religious freedom been violated?
Held: Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right to
religious worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought.
2.) Freedom to act on ones belief regulated and translated to external acts. The only limitation
to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health
and interests where State has right to prevent. The expulsion of the petitioners from the school
is not justified. Jehovahs Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this
right does not give them the right to disrupt such ceremonies. In the case at bar, the Students
expelled were only standing quietly during ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly, it
doesnt present any danger so evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. What the petitioners
request is exemption from flag ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools. The expulsion
of the students by reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizens right to free
education. The non-observance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute ignorance of
patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national heroes, civic
consciousness and form of government are part of the school curricula. Therefore, expulsion due
to religious beliefs is unjustified. Expulsion is ANNULLED.

Case 5
GARCES VS. ESTENZO 104 SCRA 510
Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed. These
resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and projects were implemented. The image was
temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass,
Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was
the churchs property since church funds were used in its acquisition. Resolution No. 10 was
passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the priest for the
recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to
the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The
priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1
and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.
Issue: Was any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.
Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The
image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the
purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio
residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the
acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a laymans custody so that it
could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with
prayers and novena. It was the councils funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is
their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to
give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution , since private funds were used.
Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has
some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church
and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same

within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by law.

Case 1
Manotoc Jr. v. CA May 30, 1986
ISSUE:
WON a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an
unrestricted right to travel
HELD
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This
is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1
of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a
person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. This initself
operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Court also reasoned that the payment
of a bond and the release of the accused based on this is only a continuation of the
original imprisonment, albeit under the charge of keepers of the choosing of the accused.
If these keepers (sureties; in this case FGU Insurance Corp.) have the right to prevent the
accused from leaving the country, then all the more the courts have the authority to do the
same. Manotoc cited a Court of Appeals decision (People vs. Shepherd, C.A.-G.R. No.
23505-R, February 13, 1980) as basis, but the court observed that in the Shepherd case,
there was a sufficient and urgent necessity for the accused to leave the country. Manotoc
had failed to show tha this travel was urgent and necessary, as it was merely a business
trip with no definite timetable. Finally, the Court also pointed out that the Constitutional
provision clearly states:
The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court,
or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health.
(Section 5, Article IV of the1973 Constitution)

Case 2

MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the
liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the
President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to
other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter
one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any
country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public
order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be
arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to
ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

Article III Section 7: The right of the people to information on matters

of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
limitations as may be provided by law.

Aside from the provision in the Bill of Rights, what other provisions in the
Constitution deal with access to information?
The other major Constitutional provision on peoples access to information is
embodied in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), Section 28.
It reads: Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.
In addition, there are also specific classes of information that the Constitution
requires to be made public. Article XII, Section 21 requires information on
foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the government to be made available
to the public. Article XI, Section 17 provides that the declaration under oath of
the assets, liabilities, and net worth of the President, the Vice President, the
members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional
Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces
with general or flag rank, shall be disclosed to the public in the manner
provided by law. In Congress, Article VI, Section 16 (4) requires each House to
keep a
Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same. Section 20 of
the same Article requires further that the records and books of accounts of
Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law,
and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall
publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for
each Member.

Given that there are clear Constitutional provisions on the peoples

right to information and government transparency, is there still a
need for legislation?
The right to information under Article III, Section 7 has been held by
the Supreme Court to be enforceable even without an
implementing legislation. In the leading case of Legaspi vs. Civil
Service Commission (G. R. No. 72119, May 29 1987), the Supreme
Court said that the guarantee provisions are self executing; that
they supply the rules by means of which the right to information
may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty
to afford access to sources of information. The Court concluded
that the right may be asserted by the people without need of
ancillary legislation, and where it is denied, the people have
recourse to the Courts through a Petition for Mandamus1.
However, despite this ruling, the passage of the Freedom of
Information Bill is still necessary. While the Supreme Court has
upheld the enforceability of the right to information, its effective
implementation has for the past two decades suffered from the
lack of the necessary substantive and procedural details that only
Congress can provide.

Limitations on the Right of Information

Recognized restrictions on the right of the people to information:

1.National security matters 2. Intelligence information

3. Trade secrets
4. Banking transactions
5. Diplomatic correspondence
6. Executive sessions
7.Closed door cabinet meetings 8.Supreme Court deliberations

The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of the
Constitution have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws
prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the
correlative state duty may be obliged. However, the following are some of the
recognized restrictions:

(1) national security matters and intelligence information - there is a governmental privilege
against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and
other national security matters. 24 But where there is no need to protect such state
secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other information,
25 provided that they are examined "in strict confidence" and given "scrupulous
protection."

(2) trade secrets and banking transactions -trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the

(2) trade secrets and banking transactions -trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code
27 and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 28)are
also exempted from compulsory disclosure
(3) criminal matters - Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the
apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts neither may
nor inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law
enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police
information regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert
criminal activities.
(4) other confidential information.
The Ethical Standards Act 31 further prohibits public officials and employees from using
or divulging "confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of
their office and not made available to the public." Other acknowledged limitations to
information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and
executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court.
- In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the Court emphasized that the information sought must be "matters of public
concern," access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of full public disclosure extends only
to "transactions involving public interest" and may also be "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
- As to the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern," the Court, in Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, elucidated: In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no
rigid test which can be applied. Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition.
Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these
directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In
the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of
interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

Case 1
Akbayan vs. Aquino , GR 170516
FACTS: This is a Petition for mandamus and prohibition requesting respondents to submit to
them the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA).
Petitioner emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement
violates there right to information on matters of public concern and of public interest. That
the non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable
participation in all levels of social, political and economic decision making.
ISSUE: Are the JPEPA negotiations within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of access
to information?
HELD: No. Secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional
provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.
The Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to
information, a specific showing of need for such information is not a relevant
consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the
government has claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is
indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege,
must show that that the information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity,
but for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic
decision-making. The constitutional right to information includes official information on ongoing negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security
and public order.

Case 2
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
FACTS: The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on
PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for
brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new
agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation. PEA asserts that in cases of on-going negotiations the
right to information is limited to "definite propositions of the government." PEA maintains the right does not
include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the 'exploratory stage'."
ISSUE: Are negotiations leading to a settlement with PIATCO within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of
access to information?
HELD: Yes. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on matters of
public concern: Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Further, The State policy
(Sec 28, Art II) of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right
to information on matters of public concern.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations
of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other
constitutional rights.
Information on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review
committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is
still on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once
the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the
government.

Art. III Section 8. The right of the people,

including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations,
or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
The right to form associations shall not be impaired without due process of law
and is thus an aspect of the right of liberty. It is also an aspect of the freedom
of contract. In addition, insofar as the associations may have for their object
the advancement of beliefs and ideas, the freedom of association is an aspect
of the freedom of speech and expression, subject to the same limitation. The
right also covers the right not to join an association. Government employees
have the right to form unions. They also have the right to strike, unless there
is a statutory ban on them.

Case 1
Occea v. Comelec, 127 SCRA 404
Facts: Petitioner filed a prohibition on the ground that the provisions of
the Barangay Election Act of 1982 which prohibits any candidate in the
barangay election from representing himself as a candidate of any
party and any party or organization from intervening in the barangay
elections were unconstitutional because they violated the right to
form associations and were incompatible with democracy
Held: The right to form associations is not absolute and is subject to the
police power of the state. The prohibition is narrow. It operates only
on concerted action of parties and organizations. Their members,
acting individually may intervene in the barangay elections. Moreover,
members of the family of a candidate within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity and his campaign staff may promote his
election. The restriction is for the purpose of insulating barangays
from the divisive and debilitating partisan political campaign.
Democracy merely guarantees participation of the people in the affairs
of government without assurance that in every instance concerted
partisan activity in the selection of their candidate is allowed.

Section 9. Private property shall not be taken

for public use without just compensation.
Who can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1)The national government
a. Congress
b. Executive, pursuant to legislation enacted by Congress
2)Local government units, pursuant to an ordinance enacted by their
respective legislative bodies (under LGC)
3)Public utilities, as may be delegated by law.
When is the exercise of the power of eminent domain necessary?
It is only necessary when the owner does not want or opposes
sale of his property. Thus, if a valid contract exists between
government and the owner, the government cannot exercise
power of eminent domain as a substitute to the enforcement of
contract.

the
the
the
the

Elements of the power of eminent domain

1)There is a TAKING of private property
2)Taking is for PUBLIC USE
3)Payment of JUST COMPENSATION
"TAKING"
A. Elements:
1. The expropriator enters the property
2. The entrance must not be for a momentary period, i.e., it must be permanent
3. Entry is made under warrant or color of legal authority
4. Property is devoted to public use
5. Utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of the beneficial enjoyment of his property.
B. Compensable taking does not need to involve all the property interests which form part of
the right of ownership. When one or more of the property rights are appropriated and
applied to a public purpose, there is already a compensable taking, even if bare title still
remains with the owner.

"PUBLIC USE"
1.Public use, for purposes of expropriation, is synonymous with public welfare as
the latter term is used in the concept of police power.
2.Examples of public use include land reform and socialized housing.
"JUST COMPENSATION"
1.Compensation is just if the owner receives a sum equivalent to the market value
of his property. Market value is generally defined as the fair value of the
property as between one who desires to purchase and one who desires to sell.
2.The point of reference use in determining fair value is the value at the time the
property was taken. Thus, future potential use of the land is not considered in
computing just compensation.
Judicial review of the exercise of the power of eminent domain
1.To determine the adequacy of the compensation
2.To determine the necessity of the taking
3.To determine the "public use" character of the taking. However, if the
expropriation is pursuant to a specific law passed by Congress, the courts
cannot question the public use character of the taking.

When municipal property is taken by the State:

Compensation is required if the property is a patrimonial property,
that is, property acquired by the municipality with its private funds
in its corporate or private capacity. However, if it is any other
property such a public buildings or legua comunal held by the
municipality for the State in trust for the inhabitants, the State is
free to dispose of it at will.
Point of reference for valuating a piece of property:
General rule: The value must be that as of the time of the filing of the
complaint for expropriation.
Exception: When the filing of the case comes later than the time of
taking and meanwhile the value of the property has increased
because of the use to which the expropriator has put it, the value is
that of the time of the earlier taking. BUT if the value increased
independently of what the expropriator did, then the value is that of
the latter filing of the case.

SECTION 10. NO LAW IMPAIRING THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS SHALL BE

PASSED.
When does a law impair the obligation of contracts:
1)If it changes the terms and conditions of a legal contract either as
to the time or mode of performance
2)If it imposes new conditions or dispenses with those expressed
3)If it authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that
provided in its terms.
A mere change in PROCEDURAL REMEDIES which does not change
the substance of the contract, and which still leaves an
efficacious remedy for enforcement does NOT impair the
obligation of contracts. A valid exercise of police power is
superior to obligation of contracts

Case 1
U.S. v. Conde, 42 Phil., 766
Facts: A complaint was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, charging the
defendants with a violation of the Usury Law (Act No. 2655). Defendants were found guilty. On appeal,
appellants contend that a) That the contract upon which the alleged usurious interest was collected
was executed before Act No. 2655 was adopted; (b) that at the time said contract was made
(December 30, 1915), there was no usury law in force in the Philippine Islands; (c) that said Act No.
2655 did not become effective until the 1st day of May, 1916, or four months and a half after the
contract in question was executed; (d) that said law could have no retroactive effect or operation, and
(e) that said law impairs the obligation of a contract, and that for all of said reasons the judgment
imposed by the lower court should be revoked; that the complaint should be dismissed, and that they
should each be discharged from the custody of the law.
Held: The law, we think, is well established that when a contract contains an obligation to pay interest
upon the principal, the interest thereby becomes part of the principal and is included within the
promise to pay. In other words, the obligation to pay interest on money due under a contract, be it
express or implied, is a part of the obligation of the contract. Laws adopted after the execution of a
contract, changing or altering the rate of interest, cannot be made to apply to such contract without
violating the provisions of the constitution which prohibit the adoption of a law "impairing the
obligation of contract." (8 Cyc., 996; 12 Corpus Juris, 1058-1059.)
The obligation of the contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement if it is not
contrary to the law of the land, morals or public order. That law must govern and control the contract
in every aspect in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affect its validity, construction, or
discharge. Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the parties,
necessarily impairs the contract itself. If a law impairs the obligation of a contract, it is prohibited by
the Jones Law, and is null and void. The laws in force in the Philippine Islands prior to any legislation
by the American sovereignty, prohibited the Legislature from giving to any penal law a retroactive
effect unless such law was favorable to the person accused. (Articles 21 and 22, Penal Code.)

Case 2
Pangasinan Transport Co. vs. Public Service Commission
GR NO. 47065, June 26, 1940
FACTS: This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner Pangasinan Transportation Co. Inc
(Pantranco).The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting
passengers in the province of Pangasinan and Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales.On August 26, 1939,
Pantranco filed with the Public Service Commission (PSC) an application to operate 10 additional buses.
PSC granted the application with 2 additional conditions which was made to apply also on their existing
business. Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration with the Public Service Commission. Since it was
denied, Pantranco then filed a petition/ writ of certiorari.
ISSUES: Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission: - is unconstitutional and void
because it is without limitation - constitutes undue delegation of powers
HELD: The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional because it is a
proper delegation of legislative power, so called Subordinate Legislation .It is a valid delegation
because of the growing complexities of modern government, the complexities or multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation and the increased diffi culty of administering the laws. All that has
been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the use of discretion to carry
out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a
proper and suitable manner. The Certificate of Public Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract,
confers no property rights and is a mere license or privilege, subject to governmental control for the good
of the public.PSC has the power, upon notice and hearing, to amend, modify, or revoked at any time any
certificate issued, whenever the facts and circumstances so warranted.The limitation of 25 years was never
heard, so the case was remanded to PSC for further proceedings. In addition, the Court ruled that, the
liberty and property of the citizens should be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.Not
only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.When private
property is affected with a public interest, it ceased to be juris privati or private use only.

Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by
reason of poverty.
M. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.

Rights of person under investigation for the Commission of an

offense
1)Right to remain silent
2)Right to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of
his own choice
3)Right to provided with the services of counsel if he cannot afford
the services of one.
4)Right to be informed of these rights.
When rights are available:
1)AFTER a person has been taken into custody or
2)When a person is otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way.
3)When the investigation is being conducted by the government
(police, DOJ, NBI) with respect to a criminal offense.
4)Signing of arrest reports and booking sheets.

When rights are not available:

1)During a police line-up. Exception: Once there is a move among the investigators to
elicit admissions or confessions from the suspect.
2)During administrative investigations.
3)Confessions made by an accused at the time he voluntarily surrendered to the police
or outside the context of a formal investigation.
4)Statements made to a private person.
Exclusionary rule
1) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him (the accused).
2)Therefore, any evidence obtained by virtue of an illegally obtained confession is also
inadmissible, being the fruit of a poisoned tree.

Requisites of valid waiver:

1)Waiver should be made in WRITING
2)Waiver should be made in the PRESENCE OF COUNSEL.

Case 1
Miranda v. Arizona
Facts. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) consolidated four separate cases with
issues regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained during police interrogations.
The first Defendant, Ernesto Miranda (Mr. Miranda), was arrested for kidnapping and rape. Mr. Miranda
was an immigrant, and although the officers did not notify Mr. Miranda of his rights, he signed a
confession after two hours of investigation. The signed statement included a statement that Mr. Miranda
was aware of his rights.
The second Defendant, Michael Vignera (Mr. Vignera), was arrested for robbery. Mr. Vignera orally
admitted to the robbery to the first officer after the arrest, and he was held in detention for eight hours
before he made an admission to an assistant district attorney. There was no evidence that he was
notified of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.
The third Defendant, Carl Calvin Westover (Mr. Westover), was arrested for two robberies. Mr. Westover
was questioned over fourteen hours by local police, and then was handed to Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) agents, who were able to get signed confessions from Mr. Westover. The authorities
did not notify Mr. Westover of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.
The fourth Defendant, Roy Allen Stewart (Mr. Stewart), was arrested, along with members of his family
(although there was no evidence of any wrongdoing by his family) for a series of purse snatches. There
was no evidence that Mr. Stewart was notified of his rights. After nine interrogations, Mr. Stewart
admitted to the crimes.
Issue. Whether the government is required to notify the arrested defendants of their Fifth Amendment
constitutional rights against self-incrimination before they interrogate the defendants?
Held. The government needs to notify arrested individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights,
specifically: their right to remain silent; an explanation that anything they say could be used against
them in court; their right to counsel; and their right to have counsel appointed to represent them if
necessary. Without this notification, anything admitted by an arrestee in an interrogation will not be
admissible in court.

Case 2
Escobedo v. Illinois 378 U.S. 478,84 S. Ct. 1758,12 L. Ed. 2d 977,1964 U.S.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Not allowing someone to speak with an attorney, and not
advising them of their right to remain silent after they have been arrested and
before they have been interrogated is a denial of assistance of counsel under the
Sixth Amendment.
Facts. After being arrested and taken into police custody as a suspect in the murder
of his brother-in-law, the petitioner asked to speak to his attorney. His attorney
arrived at police headquarters soon after the petitioner did and was not allowed
to speak to his client as the officers said they had not completed questioning. The
petitioner also was not warned of his right to remain silent before the
interrogation. He was convicted of murder and the Supreme Court of Illinois
affirmed. He was then granted certiorari.
Issue. If a suspect has been taken into police custody and interrogated by police
without their request to see an attorney being honored, nor being advised of their
right to remain silent, have they been denied effective assistance of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment?
Held. Yes. Reverse the petitioners conviction and remand the case.
The Sixth Amendment protects the right to effective assistance of counsel. Here,
because the police investigation focused on the accused as a suspect rather than
a less specific investigation, refusing to allow an accused to speak with his
attorney is a denial of this Sixth Amendment right. The incriminating statements
he made must thus not be admitted into evidence.

Case 3

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME OCHOA et. al. G.R. No. 157399
Petitioners were charged before the Sandiganbayan for allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power
Corporation (NPC) intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), and were indicted
for the complex crime of Malversation through Falsification of Commercial Documents defined and penalized under Articles
217 and 171 (8), in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, in an amended Information, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 19558.
The petitioners are accused of having falsified the NPCs application for managers checks with the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), NPC Branch in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS and TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25), Philippine Currency, intended for the purchase
of US dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), and thus succeeded in diverting, collecting and receiving the
total amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS
AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.75), Philippine Currency from the National Power Corporation, which they
thereafter malverse, embezzle, misappropriate and convert to their own personal use and benefit to the damage and
prejudice of the National Power Corporation.
Issue: What is custodial investigation?
RULING: The investigation under Section 12 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution refers to a custodial investigation
where a suspect has already been taken into police custody and the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit
information and confessions or admissions from the suspect. More specifically
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. And, the rule begins to operate at once as soon as
the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect
who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory question which tend to elicit
incriminating statements.
Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect. Clearly, therefore, the rights
enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by accused-appellant are not available before government investigators
enter the picture.
Thus, the flaw in appellants argument in this regard becomes immediately apparent vis--vis the foregoing legal yardsticks,
considering that his statement was taken during the administrative investigation of NPCs audit team before he was taken
into custody. As such, the inquest was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense at the time and there was, as yet, no
specific suspect.

Case 4 People v. Galit 135 SCRA 465

FACTS:
1. Francisco Galit was arrested for killing Natividad Fernando on the occasion of a robbery. He was detained and
interrogated almost continuously for 5 days. He consistently maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link
him to the crime. The interrogating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. They covered his face
with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl of human waste. The prisoner then admitted what the investigating
officers wanted him to admit. He then signed the confession they prepared. The trial court convicted him of the crime
of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced him to the supreme penalty of Death. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Is the confession admissible in evidence.
HELD:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest
and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if
possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engage by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or
by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused
be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear
questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation.
Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest,
accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other
relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about 2 weeks after he
had executed the Salaysay that his relatives were allowed to see him. His statement does not even contain any waiver
of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed re-enactment, again
accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute grave violations of his rights.
The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were
obtained in a manner contrary to law.

Section 13. All persons, except those charged

with
offenses
punishable
by
reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.

Who are entitled to bail: 1)All persons ACTUALLY DETAINED

2)shall, BEFORE CONVICTION
3)Be entitled to bail.

Who are not entitled to bail:

1)Persons charged with offenses PUNISHABLE by RECLUSION PERPETUA or DEATH, when evidence of
guilt is strong
2)Persons CONVICTED by the trial court. Bail is only discretionary pending appeal.
3)Persons who are members of the AFP facing a court martial.

Other rights in relation to bail.

1)The right to bail shall NOT be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended.
2)Excessive bail shall not be required.

Factors considered in setting the amount of bail:

1)Ability to post bail 2)Nature of the offense
3)Penalty imposed by law
4)Character and reputation of the accused
5)Health of the accused
6)Strength of the evidence
7)Probability of appearing at the trial
8)Forfeiture of previous bail bonds
9)Whether accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested
10)If accused is under bond in other cases

Case 1
People of the Philippines vs Judge Donato & Rodolfo Salas 198 SCRA 130 (1991)
Habeas Corpus Right to Bail Rebellion
Facts: Salas aka NPAs Ka Bilog was arrested and was charged for rebellion. He was
charged together with the spouses Concepcion. Salas, together with his co-accused
later filed a petition for the WoHC. A conference was held thereafter to hear each
partys side. It was later agreed upon by both parties that Salas will withdraw his
petition for the WoHC and that he will remain in custody for the continued
investigation of the case and that he will face trial. The SC then, basing on the
stipulations of the parties, held to dismiss the habeas corpus case filed by Salas.
But later on, Salas filed to be admitted for bail and Judge Donato approved his
application for bail. Judge Donato did not bother hearing the side of the
prosecution. The prosecution argued that Salas is estopped from filing bail because
he has waived his right to bail when he withdrew his petition or habeas corpus as a
sign of agreement that he will be held in custody.
ISSUE: Whether or not Salas can still validly file for bail.
HELD: The SC ruled that Salas did waive his right to bail when he withdrew his petition
for the issuance of the WoHC. The contention of the defense that Salas merely
agreed to be in custody and that the same does not constitute a waiver of his right
to bail is not tenable. His waiver to such right is justified by his act of withdrawing
his petition for WoHC.

Case 1: Comendador v De Villa 200 SCRA 80 (1991)

Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted
Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail.

from

the

Cases on constitutional law (Philippine casebook series)

A historical and juridical study of the Philippine Bill of rights
Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not
available in the military as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a speedy trial is
given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does
not exist. Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of
the military and national security considerations which may result
to damaging precedents that mutinous soldiers will be released on
provisional liberty giving them the chance to continue their plot in
overthrowing the government. Therefore the decision of the lower
court granting bail to the petitioners was reversed.

Case 2 Baylon v Judge Sison 243 SCRA 284 (1995)

Facts: Respondent judge is accused for malfeasance in granting bail to the accused charged with
double murder. Prosecution was not given notice of at least 3 days before the scheduled hearing for
bail in violation of Rule 15, section 4 of the Rules of Court and the filing of petition for bail has only
2 non-working day interval from the schedule of the hearing. Moreover the prosecution also assails
that they were not given the chance to present evidence that strongly prove the guilt of the
accused. Respondent judge justifies not having committed grave abuse of discretion since the
prosecution did not interpose objection with his orders and the lack of previous notice was cured
with the filing of motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge exercised abuse in discretion in the grant of bail to the
accused.
Held: The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the discretion of the judge in granting bail to
the accused considering that the motion for bail was filed on a Saturday and the hearing was
immediately conducted on Monday thereby depriving the prosecution to make an opposition thereto
and violating the 3-day notice rule embodied in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is a well
established rule of law that bail is not a matter of right and requires a hearing where the accused is
charged with an offense which is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Respondent judge should have carefully scrutinized the validity of petition for bail before making an
outright grant of this motion.
A guided legal principle in the right to bail includes:
. . The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very
nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is
weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words,
discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process,
that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the
absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
arbitrariness.

Case 3: Leviste vs CA GR No 189122

Facts: Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was convicted by the RTC for
the lesser crime of homicide. He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA then he field an
application for admission to bail pending appeal, due to his advanced age and health condition,
and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend bail during the course of
appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. That bail is not a
sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison
facility.
On this matter, Levisete questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion in the denial of his application for bail considering that none of the
conditions justifying denial of bail under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
present. That when the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more
than 20 years and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail must be
granted to an appellant pending appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for
bail of Leviste.

Ruling: No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same rule
if the penalty impose is more than 6 years the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be
cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other circumstances:
that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions
of his bail without a valid justification;
that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

Section 14.
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused:
Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear
is unjustifiable.

Rights of an accused Rights of a person charged with a criminal offense

1.Right to due process of law
2.Right to be presumed innocent
3.Right to be heard by himself and counsel
4.Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
5.Right to have a speedy, impartial and public trial
6.Right to meet the witnesses face to face
7.Right to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence in his behalf
DUE PROCESS This means that the accused can only be convicted by a tribunal
which is required to comply with the stringent requirements of the rules of
criminal procedure.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE The Constitution does not prohibit the
legislature from providing that proof of certain facts leads to a prima facie
presumption of guilt, provided that the facts proved have a reasonable
connection to the ultimate fact presumed.
Presumption of guilt should not be conclusive.

RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL

The right to be heard includes the following rights:
1. Right to be present at the trial
A. The right to be present covers the period from ARRAIGNMENT to PROMULGATION of sentence.
B. After arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding absence of accused, provided 2 requisites are met. Note, that trial in absentia is allowed
only if the accused has been validly arraigned.
(i) Accused has been duly notified; and
(ii)His failure to appear is unjustifiable.
C. The accused may waive the right to be present at the trial by not showing up. However, the court can still compel the attendance of the accused
if necessary for identification purposes. EXCEPTION: If the accused, after arraignment, has stipulated that he is indeed the person charged with
the offense and named in the information, and that any time a witness refers to a name by which he is known, the witness is to be understood
as referring to him.
D. While the accused is entitled to be present during promulgation of judgment, the absence of his counsel during such promulgation does not
affect its validity.
2.Right to counsel
(a)Right to counsel means the right to EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION.
(b)If the accused appears at arraignment without counsel, the judge must:
(i)Inform the accused that he has a right to a counsel before arraignment
(ii)Ask the accused if he desires the aid of counsel
(iii) If the accused desires counsel, but cannot afford one, a counsel de oficio must be appointed (iv)If the accused desires to obtain his own
counsel, the court must give him a reasonable time to get one.
3.Right to an impartial judge
4.Right of confrontation and cross-examination
5.Right to compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION

AGAINST HIM
Purposes of the right:
1)To furnish the accused with a description of the charge against him
as will enable him to make his defenses
2)To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal against a further
prosecution for the same cause
3)To inform the court of the facts alleged.
If the information fails to allege the material elements of the offense,
the accused cannot be convicted thereof even if the prosecution is
able to present evidence during the trial with respect to such
elements.
The real nature of the crime charged is determined from the recital of
facts in the information. It is not determined based on the caption
or preamble thereof nor from the specification of the provision of
law allegedly violated.

RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

Factors used in determining whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated
1)Time expired from the filing of the information
2)Length of delay involved
3)Reasons for the delay
4)Assertion or non-assertion of the right by the accused
5)Prejudice caused to the defendant.
Effect of dismissal based on the ground of violation of the accuseds right to speedy
trial
If the dismissal is valid, it amounts to an acquittal and can be used as basis to claim
double jeopardy. This would be the effect even if the dismissal was made with the
consent of the accused
Remedy of the accused if his right to speedy trial has been violated
He can move for the dismissal of the case. If he is detained, he can file a petition for
the issuance of writ of habeas corpus.
Definition of impartial trial
The accused is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. It is an element
of due process.
Definition of public trial
The attendance at the trial is open to all irrespective of their relationship to the

RIGHT TO MEET WITNESS FACE TO FACE

Purposes of the right:
1.To afford the accused an opportunity to cross-examine the witness
2. To allow the judge the opportunity to observe the deportment of
the witness
Failure of the accused to cross-examine a witness
If the failure of the accused to cross-examine a witness is due to his
own fault or was not due to the fault of the prosecution, the
testimony of the witness should be excluded.
When the right to cross-examine is demandable
It is demandable only during trials. Thus, it cannot be availed of
during preliminary investigations.
Principal exceptions to the right of confrontation
1.The admissibility of dying declarations
2.Trial in absentia under Section 14(2)

Case 1.
Presumption of innocence
U.S. v. Pagaduan November 2, 1917 G.R. No. L-12616
Facts: On June 26, 1916, an amended information was filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, charging
Daniel Pagaduan, Francisco Masibay, Evaristo Limpin, and Modesto Raigin with the crime of robbery with
homicide. The defendants on arraignment entered a plea of not guilty and at the same time set up what amounted
to a special plea of autrefois acquit. After trial before the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, judge of First Instance,
Modesto Raigin was acquitted, Daniel Pagaduan, Evaristo Limpin, and Francisco Masibay were convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua). These last named defendant have appealed.

Held: As introductory to a statement of the facts, a few preliminary observations are in order. And first, it is to be
noted that seventeen years elapsed between the alleged perpetration of the crime and the institution of the
prosecution. The duty of the court to resolve all reasonable doubt in favor of the accused is thus intensified. Delay
in the commencement of a criminal action creates a suspicion unless explained. The motive of the prosecution in
suddenly assuming activity after long continued silence, when the accused have made no effort to escape and the
witnesses are available, may well be questioned. Herein, it is suggested by the evidence and in the argument that
personal and political reasons actuated the prosecution. We proffer no comment as to this, but only mention it as
offering a possible ulterior explanation of the prosecution. The lapse of time may also result in the destruction of
affirmative evidence tending to establish the innocence of the accused. Again, and from an entirely different
standpoint, the testimony of witnesses such are found in the present case, while rightly subject to careful scrutiny,
should not be rejected if found to be reasonable and consistent and not contradicted by evidence from any reliable
source. These principles are here set forth, not as establishing any new and novel doctrines, but merely, in
synthesis, as indicative of the attitude of this court as disclosed in numerous decisions.
Notwithstanding, however, instead of giving the accused the benefit of these views, the trial judge, in this decision,
after making statements which would inevitably lead to acquittal, continually nullifies the same, by failing to
believe the evidence for the defense. As opposed to such an attitude, we approach a statement of the case,
remembering not alone the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, but that the passage of time may
have produced an unfavorable effect on the chances of the defense, remembering that, under such conditions, the
prosecution must established its case by evidence which taken together is found to be clear and convincing, and
remembering, finally, that the testimony of the witnesses for the defense are not to be rejected without good
reason but are to be given, in view of the circumstances of this case, special consideration.

Case 2 Due process; Prejudicial publicity

MARTELINO v ALEJANDRO
32 SCRA 106CASTRO; March 25, 1970
FACTS
- There are ongoing court-martial proceedings against the petitioner, Major Eduardo Martelino, Alias Abdul Latif
Martelino, of the AFP, and the officers and men under him, for violation of the 94th and 97thArticles of War,
as a result of the alleged shooting of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on the
island of Corregidor.
Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the general court-martial, following the latter's
admission that he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. He contended that the case had
received such an amount of publicity in thepress and was being exploited for political purposes in connection
with the upcoming 1969 presidentialelections as to imperil his right to a fair trial
ISSUES
1. WON the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as to prejudice their right to afair trial2.
WON each accused was entitled to one peremptory challenge
HELD: NO. The trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the
accused. And appellate tribunals have the duty to make an independent evaluation of the circumstances.
Where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge
should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with
publicity. If publicity during the proceeding threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be ordered.The spate of publicity in this case before us did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the
responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a
"trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government. Absent here is a showing of
failure of the court-martial to protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those connected
with the conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the release of information or to remove the trial to
another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity have subsided.

Case 3: Right to Counsel

People v. Holgado, 85 Phil. 753
Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal
detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without
justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight
hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel)
and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the latter.
Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.
Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed
by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of
attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for
procuring attorney. This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be
held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused
be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does not
show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the
commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on
this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed
instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court
became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the
same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a
mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all,
the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified
plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.

Case 3
Speedy, impartial, and public trial
CONDE VS. RIVERA [45 PHIL 650; G.R. NO. 21741; 25 JAN 1924]
Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to
respond to no less the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared
with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to
see the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for
protection, and now, after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first
information was filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she
was when originally charged.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.

Held: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all
other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go
free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. We lay down the legal
proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements
of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this
instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in
mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by
habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.

Case 4
Right to be informed
Enrile v. Salazar G.R. 92163, June 5, 1990
In February 1990, Sen Enrile was arrested. He was charged together with Mr. & Mrs. Panlilio, and Honasan for the
crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder which allegedly occurred during their failed
coup attempt. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed for the habeas corpus alleging that
the crime being charged against him is non existent. That he was charged with a criminal offense in an
information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was
denied due process; denied his right to bail; and arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause.
ISSUE: Whether or Enriles arrest is valid.
HELD: Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although ordinarily a charge of rebellion would
entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged against him however is complexed with murder and multiple
frustrated murders the intention of the prosecution was to make rebellion in its most serious form so as to
make the penalty thereof in the maximum. The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder. What Enrile et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion because other
crimes such as murder or all those that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is absorbed hence he
should be entitiled for bail. The SC however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was not the proper remedy
so as to avail of bail. The proper step that should have been taken was for Enrile to file a petition to be
admitted for bail. He should have exhausted all other efforts before petitioning for habeas corpus. The SC
further notes that there is a need to restructure the law on rebellion as it is being used apparently by others as
a tool to disrupt the peace and espouse violence. The SC can only act w/in the bounds of the law. Thus SC said
There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly
define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently
utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to
effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies
beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this
matter, which is properly within its province.

Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it.

WHAT IS HABEAS CORPUS?

Habeas corpus means having it brought plus body

To inquire into the legality of the detention of a person

A writ or order requiring that a prisoner be brought before a judge or into court to decide whether he
is being held lawfully.

WHY IS HABEAS CORPUS CONSIDERED AN EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION?

Because it is a prerogative writ and therefore must be decided upon immediately by the court

The habeas corpus proceeding must take precedence over all other cases because it involves the
liberty of the person

WITHIN HOW MANY HOURS SHOULD A JUDGE RESOLVE A HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDING?

Within 48 hours or 2 days

WHAT ARE THE DUTIES OF THE PUBLIC ATTORNEY IF THE ACCUSED ASSIGNED TO HIM IS IMPRISONED?
1.

He shall promptly undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or cause a notice to be
served on the person having custody of the prisoner, requiring such person to advise the

prisoner of his right to demand trial

2.

Upon receipt of that notice, the person having custody of the prisoner shall promptly advise the
prisoner of the charge and his right to demand trial. If at anytime thereafter, the prisoner

informs the custodian that he demands such trial, the latter shall cause notice to that effect to be sent
promptly to the public attorney
3.

Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the presence of the
prisoner for trial

4.

When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the public attorney a properly supported
request for the availability of the prisoner for purposes of trial, the prisoner shall be made

available accordingly.

Case 1
Montenegro v. Castaneda
Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ Habeas Corpus as a Political Question being
a Prerogative by the President

In October 1950, Montenegros son was arrested by military agents. Three days
after the arrest, PP 210 was proclaimed suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. Montenegro then filed before the court to have his son be set
free for his arrest was w/o cause and that the said PP should not be applied
retroactively to his son for it would then constitute a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against bill of attainders. Montenegro then filed a
petition for the writ of habeas corpus demanding the detainers to bring his sons
body and explain his detention. Castaeda et al argued that the court has no
judicial authority over the matter invoking the PP and the previous ruling in
Barcelon vs Baker.
ISSUE: Whether or not Montenegros petition should be granted.
HELD: As ruled by the SC in the Barcelon case, Montenegros petition is likewise
denied. The constitutional authority of the President to suspend in case of
imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under Article 7 may not
correctly be placed in doubt.

Case 2
Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448
Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was
holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general
elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said
candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation
889 was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there is a
conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of
habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a warrant.
It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons caught
in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word actually
staging. Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 subprovinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and
cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only
18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained
that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or
imminent danger thereof, however it became moot and academic since it was amended. Petitioners
further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there
is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was
functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged JulyAugust Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged
apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces
in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may
inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the
Court resolves after conclusive decision reached by majority.

(cont.)
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension
(of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is
final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons.
(2) Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.

Held: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions must
concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there
must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public
safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of
action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had,
already, called out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the
suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.
Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20
barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing
incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and
control nine major labor organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or youth
organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP.

Cases and Doctrines

Barcelon v. Baker (5 Phil. Reports 87, 1905
At the early years of the American Rule in the Philippines, lawlessness
was rampant and criminal activities were at large. Governor-General
James Francis Smith, with the consent of the Philippine Commission,
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the provinces
of Batangas and Cavite. A petition was raised questioning such
suspension of the writ.
The Supreme Court issued a ruling sustaining the suspension of the
privilege of the writ. It said that the decision of the Governor-General
is his duty on his part, and that the court cannot question the acts of
the executive and legislative branches of government. Simply put, the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a political
question that courts cannot decide upon.

Montenegro v. Castaeda (91 Phil. Reports 882, 1949)

President Elpidio Quirino suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in some parts of Luzon in order to stifle the emergence of the
Hukbalahap guerillas. Such suspension was again questioned in the

(Cont.)
Aquino v. Enrile (G.R. No. L-35546, September 17, 1974, 59 SCRA 183
Decided during martial law, it involved the petition of habeas corpus of Marcos critics, notably
Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Jose W. Diokno. The Supreme Court decided unanimously to dismiss
the petitions, but as Chief Justice Querube Makalintal put it, "there was no agreement as to
the manner the issues would be treated and developed. The same destination would be
reached, so to speak, but through different routes and by means of different vehicles of
approach." He said that the reason why the Court did not produce a single, collegial opinion,
among others, was that the members of the Supreme Court are conscious of "the future
verdict of history" upon their stand.
Even before the cases were decided, Diokno, to the chagrin of the Supreme Court, opted to
withdraw his petition on the ground that no fair decision can be made of the court to render
him justice. What made it worse was the fact that before the Supreme Court could respond to
Diokmos challenge, Marcos issued an order releasing him and the other petitioners, leaving
Aquino behind.
Justice Fred Ruiz
application of
founded upon
would destroy

Castro opined that the declaration of martial law automatically suspends the
the said writ, thus Aquino cannot be released. He said that martial law "is
the principle that the state has a right to protect itself against those who
it, and has therefore been likened to the right of an individual to self-defense."

Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile (L-61388, April 20, 1983 ,121 SCRA 472

In this decision involving subversion, the Supreme Court reversed the Lansang ruling and
reverted back to the Barcelon and Montenegro ruling that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is a political question

Section 16.All persons shall have the right to a speedy

disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial,
or administrative bodies.

Distinction between Section 14 and Section 16

While the rights of an accused only apply to the trial phase of
criminal cases, the right to a speedy disposition of cases
covers ALL phases of JUDICIAL, QUASI-JUDICIAL or
ADMINISTRATIVE proceedings.

Section 17.No person shall be compelled to be a witness against

himself.

When is a question incriminating:

A question tends to incriminate when the answer of the accused or the witness would establish a fact
which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime by the
accused or the witness.
Distinction between an accused and an ordinary witness
1.An accused can refuse to take the witness stand by invoking the right against self- incrimination.
2.An ordinary witness cannot refuse to take the stand. He can only refuse to answer specific
questions which would incriminate him in the commission of an offense.
Scope of right
1.What is PROHIBITED is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the
witness or to otherwise elicit evidence which would not exist were it not for the actions compelled
from the witness.
2.The right does NOT PROHIBIT the examination of the body of the accused or the use of findings
with respect to his body as physical evidence. Hence, the fingerprinting of an accused would not
violate the right against self-incrimination. However, obtaining a sample of the handwriting of the
accused would violate this right if he is charged for falsification.
3.The accused cannot be compelled to produce a private document in his possession which might
tend to incriminate him. However, a third person in custody of the document may be compelled to
produce it.

When the right can be invoked:

1.In criminal cases
2.In administrative proceedings if the accused is liable to a penalty
(Ex. Forfeiture of property)
Who can invoke the right:
Only natural persons. Judicial persons are subject to the visitorial
powers of the state in order to determine compliance with the
conditions of the charter granted to them.

CASES AND DOCTRINES ON RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION

Article 3, Section 17, Case Doctrines
Bermudez v. Castillo
handwriting; refused to provide; perjury She was completely
entitled to the privilege invoked by her because she was
compelled to write and were it proven by means of what she might
right later that the documents were written by her, it would be
impossible for her to evade persecution for perjury
Cabal v. Kapunan Jr.
graft; corrupt practices, unexplained wealth Proceedings for the
forfeiture of property are deemed criminal and penal and hence,
the exemption of the defendants in criminal cases from the
obligation to be a witness against themselves are applicable
thereto;
Almonte v. Vasquez
subpoena duces tecum; government agency At common law, a
governmental privilege is recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. In this case,
there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be

People v. Malimit
robbery with homicide The right against self-incrimination is simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the accuseds own lips,
against his ill, admission of his guilt. It does NOT apply when the evidence
sought is NOT an incriminating statement but an object evidence; Miranda
rights
covers only inadmissibility of extrajudicial confession or admission made during
custodial investigation; other evidence (like IDs, wallet, keys, etc) is not
affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.
US v. Tan Teng
substance taken from the body of the defendant The prohibition against
compelling a man in a criminal cause to be a witness against himself is a
prohibition against physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from him and not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be
material.
Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks et. al.

The right of the accused against self-incrimination is extended in

administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are analogous
to criminal proceedings the privilege has consistently been held to extend to
all proceeding sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is
sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.

Section 18. Right against

involuntary servitude

Definition of involuntary servitude

It is every condition of enforced or compulsory service of one to
another no matter under what form such servitude may be
disguised.
Exceptions:
1.Punishment for a crime for which the party has been duly convicted
2.Personal military or civil service in the interest of national defense
3.Return to work order issued by the DOLE Secretary or the President

Section 19.Prohibition against

cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment

When is a penalty cruel, degrading and inhuman?

1.A penalty is cruel and inhuman if it involves torture or lingering suffering. Ex.
Being drawn and quartered.
2.A penalty is degrading if it exposes a person to public humiliation. Ex.Being
tarred and feathered, then paraded throughout town.
Standards used:
1.The punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of
human beings.
2.It must not be applied arbitrarily.
3.It must not be unacceptable to contemporary society
4.It must not be excessive, i.e. it must serve a penal purpose more effectively than
a less severe punishment would.
Excessive fine
A fine is excessive, when under any circumstance, it is disproportionate to the
offense.
Note: Fr. Bernas says that the accused cannot be convicted of the crime to which
the punishment is attached if the court finds that the punishment is cruel,
degrading or inhuman. Reason: Without a valid penalty, the law is not a penal law.

Section 20. No person shall

be imprisoned for debt or
non-payment of a poll tax.
Definition of debt under Section 20
1)Debt refers to a CONTRACTUAL obligation, whether express or implied,
resulting in any liability to pay money. Thus, all other types of obligations
are not within the scope of this prohibition.
2)Thus, if an accused fails to pay the fine imposed upon him, this may result in
his subsidiary imprisonment because his liability is ex delicto and not ex
contractu.
3)A FRAUDULENT debt may result in the imprisonment of the debtor if:
A. The fraudulent debt constitutes a crime such as estafa and
B.

The accused has been duly convicted.

Section 21.No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of

punishment for the same offense. If an act punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.

Requisites for a valid defense of double jeopardy:

1)First jeopardy must have attached prior to the second.
2)The first jeopardy must have terminated.
3)The second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
When does jeopardy ATTACH:(1st requisite)
1)A person is charged
2)Under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
3)Before a court of competent jurisdiction
4)After the person is arraigned
5)Such person enters a valid plea.
When does jeopardy NOT attach:
1)If information does not charge any offense
2)If, upon pleading guilty, the accused presents evidence of complete self-defense, and the court thereafter
acquits him without entering a new plea of not guilty for accused.
3)If the information for an offense cognizable by the RTC is filed with the MTC.
4)If a complaint filed for preliminary investigation is dismissed.

When does first jeopardy TERMINATE:(2ND REQUISITE)

1) Acquittal
2) Conviction
3)Dismissal W/O the EXPRESS consent of the accused
4)Dismissal on the merits.
Examples of termination of jeopardy:
1) Dismissal based on violation of the right to a speedy trial. This amounts to
an acquittal. 2)Dismissal based on a demurrer to evidence. This is a
dismissal on the merits.
3) Dismissal on motion of the prosecution, subsequent to a motion for
reinvestigation filed by the accused.
4) Discharge of an accused to be a state witness. This amounts to an acquittal.
When can the PROSECUTION appeal from an order of dismissal:
1)If dismissal is on motion of the accused. Exception: If motion is based on
violation of the right to a speedy trial or on a demurrer to evidence.
2)If dismissal does NOT amount to an acquittal or dismissal on the merits
3)If the question to be passed upon is purely legal.

Cases on Termination of Jeopardy

1. Bustamante v. Maceren
reopening of a case
No re-opening of a case may be ordered of a criminal case after accused has
started serving his sentence; a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after
the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served or the defendant ha waived in
writing his appeal; withdrawal of plea of guilty does not constitute waiver
of defense of double jeopardy timely invoked.
People v. Obsania rape
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an
accused, the following
requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution/ double jeopardy
attaches when:
a. a valid complaint or information
b. a competent court
c. defendant had pleaded to the charge
d. defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his consent dismissal with express consent
of the defendant constitutes waiver
Rivera v. People
transportation of marijuana
VERBAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL which was not reduced into writing may be set

(cont.)
Cuison v. CA double homicide The promulgation of only one part of the
decision i.e. liability for civil indemnity, is NOT A BAR, to the subsequent
promulgation of the other part, the imposition of the criminal accountability
doctrine on double jeopardy same as in Cudia and Obsania cases.
People v. Velasco
homicide and frustrated homicide Requisites to successfully invoke double
jeopardy (refer to Obsania); Where an acquittal is concerned, the rules do
not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial court or an appeal
on a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal
rule; An acquittal is final and unappealable ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE
JEOPARDY whether it happens at the trial court of before the Court of
Appeals; doctrine that double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial may
apply only when the Court finds that the criminal trial was a sham because
the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was
denied due process.
Salcedo v. Mendoza homicide through reckless imprudence General rule:
dismissal of criminal case upon motion or with express consent of accused
will not be a bar to the subsequent prosecution of the accused for the same
offense. EXCEPTION TO THE RULE: when dismissal is grounded upon the
right of the accused to a speedy trial. This amounts to a judgment of
acquittal on the merits which bars the subsequent prosecution of accused
for the same offense
Oriente v. People homicide; lead pipe It is well settled that when an accused
appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy; Courts have the inherent power to

What are considered to be the SAME OFFENSE:(under the 1st

sentence of Section 21)
1)Exact identity between the offenses charged in the first and second
cases.
2)One offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of the other
offense.
3)One offense is necessarily included or necessary includes the other.
Note: where a single act results in the violation of different laws or
different provisions of the same law, the prosecution for one will
not bar the other so long as none of the exceptions apply.
Definition of double jeopardy (2nd sentence of Sec. 21)
Double jeopardy will result if the act punishable under the law and
the ordinance are the same. For there to be double jeopardy, it is
not necessary that the offense be the same.

Cases on Same Offense

People v. Relova
theft of electricity; punishable by an ordinance and the RPC A person who was charged for violating a
city ordinance which was dismissed for prescription of the offense may not be charged again under the
RPC; claim of double jeopardy is available even if prior offense charged under an ordinance is different
from subsequent offense charged in a statue where both offenses spring from the same act; where an
offense is punished by different sections of a statute, the inquiry, for the purpose of double jeopardy,
is on identity of offenses charged. In contrast, where an offense is penalized by an ordinance and a
statute, the inquiry is on the identity of acts; Identity of offenses (examining elements of the two
offenses); identity of acts (examining the locus or such acts in time and place); For double jeopardy
to be available, not all technical elements of the first offense need be present in the definition of the
second offense; Damages, civil liability will continue to be heard

People v. City Court of Manila

the defense of double jeopardy cannot prosper when there is no identity of the offenses charged.
Evidence required to prove one offense is not the same evidence required to prove the other; An appeal
by the prosecution from the order of dismissal by the trial court SHALL NOT constitute double
jeopardy if:
a. the dismissal is made upon motion or with express consent of the defendant;
b. dismissal is NOT an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case;
c. question to be passed upon the appellate court is purely legal (if dismissal is incorrect, case will be
remanded to the court of origin)

SUPERVENING FACTS
1) Under the Rules of Court, a conviction for an offense will not bar a
prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense
charged in the former information where:
A. The graver offense developed due to a supervening fact arising
from the same act or omission constituting the former charge.
B. The facts constituting the graver offense became known or were
discovered only after the filing of the former information.
C. The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the
consent of the fiscal and the offended party.
2) Under (1)(b), if the facts could have been discovered by the
prosecution but were not discovered because of the prosecutions
incompetence, it would not be considered a supervening event.
Effect of appeal by the accused: If the accused appeals his conviction,
he WAIVES his right to plead double jeopardy. The whole case will
be open to review by the appellate court.

Cases on Supervening facts

Melo v. People physical injuries; injured party dies; homicide The rule
of identity does not apply when the second offense was not in
existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason
that in such case, there is no possibility for the accused, during the
first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then
inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical
injuries and after conviction, the injured person dies, the charged for
homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy.
People v. Buling [less] serious physical injuries; X-ray; two physicians;
two complaints The prosecution of the accused for less serious physical injuries is a bar
for his prosecution with serious physical injuries. If the X-ray
examination disclosed the existence of a fracture when the second
examination was made, this must have been present during the first
examination; There was therefore no supervening fact which would
justify application of the rule of double jeopardy.

Section 22.No ex post

facto law or bill of
attainder
shall
be
enacted.

Definition of ex-post facto law.

1)One which makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done,
criminal, and punishes such action.
2)One which aggravates the crime or makes it greater than when it was committed.
3)One which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than that which the law annexed to
the crime when it was committed.
4)One which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense in order to convict the accused.
5)One which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only BUT, in effect, imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right, which, when done, was lawful.
6)One which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
Note: The prohibition on ex post facto laws only applies to retrospective PENAL laws.
Definition of BILL OF ATTAINDER
1)A bill of attainder is a LEGISLATIVE act which inflicts punishment W/O JUDICIAL trial.
2)The bill of attainder does not need to be directed at a specifically named person. It may also refer to
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without judicial
trial.

Ex post Facto law cases

In Re: KAY VILLEGAS KAMI [35 SCRA 429 (1970)]
Facts: Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a recognized non-stock, non-profit corporation
contests validity of RA # 6132 Sec. 8 saying it violates due process rights of association,
freedom of expression and is an ex post facto law
Issues:
1.
WON it violates three rights?
No. Its set up to prevent prostitution of electoral process and equal protection of laws.
2.
WON it is an ex post facto law?
No. Ex post facto law defined:
a.
makes criminal an act done before law was passed and punishes act innocent when
done.
b.
aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was
c.
inflicts greater punishment than the law prescribed when committed
d.
alters legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less or different tests
e.
assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of right which when done was lawful
f.
deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction of acquittal or a proclamation of
amnesty.
People v. Jabinal possession of unlicensed firearms; secret agent; - No criminal liability would
attach to such possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit.
Jabinal must be absolved; Jabinal may not be punished for an act which at the time it was
done was held not to be punishable; (case of SC abandoning previous decisions; stare decisis)

Bill of attainder cases

People v. Ferrer constitutionality of the [then] Anti-Subversion Act
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment
without a trial; Anti-Subversion act not a bill of attainder; It does
not specify the CPP or its members; CPP is used for definition
purposes only because in the law, it also says any other
organization having the same purpose and their successors;
mere membership to the CPP not punished; even if the Act
specifies individuals, this feature is not enough to consider it a bill
of attainder
People v. Sandiganbayan violation under Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act The new 15-year prescriptive period (formerly 10)
in the Act cannot be given retroactive effect because it will be
prejudicial to the accused.