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this paper was prepared for this course specifically.
Table of contents
1
1.2
Starbucks ................................................................................................................................. 3
1.3
2.2
2.3
2.4
Appendix ...................................................................................................................................... 15
References .................................................................................................................................... 17
1 General overview
1.1 Industry outlooki
Globally the QSR (Quick Service Restaurant) sector generates over $570 billion in revenue. In the US
alone revenue was $200 billion in 2015, which shows material growth compared to the 1970s revenue
of $6 billion. The industry is expected to have an annual growth of 2.5% for the next several years.
This is below the long term average, but better than the average of the last several years. QSR
consumers focus on taste, price and quality. QSRs main focus is on consistency of experience,
affordability and speed. However, there is an increasing emphasis on providing more healthy choices
and socially responsible procurement of food. Among the fast food restaurants in the last couple of
decades, coffeehouse chains started to gain more market share and this led to a real coffee war as big
players like McDonalds (entered in 2009) and Dunkin Donuts (around 2000) went after Starbucks.
As of today, on the US Market, Starbucks serves about one-third (29%) of total QSR, coffee shop, and
convenience store coffee cups. Dunkin Donuts has about 16.1% and McDonalds has about the same.
Research showed that that new entrants to the market and the 2008 recession led to a decreased market
share for Starbucks. Although coffee purchases were relatively recession proof, the amount of money
consumers were willing to spend per visit fell during the recession. This gave McDonalds and Dunkin
Donuts, which both cater to working- and middle-class households, a chance to enter the market with
lower priced, but still quality coffee products. Despite McDonalds and Dunkin Donuts stealing
Starbucks market share, its technically impossible for them to become the industry leaders on the
long run. This is because the premium status that Starbucks maintains is likely to work to its advantage
as the economy improves. Starbucks has increased their lunch offerings to counteract McDonalds and
Dunkin Donuts encroaching on their market share. In addition, going forward, the full impact of the
companys 2012 purchase of La Boulange bakery should start showing benefits. Investors assume that
McDonalds and Dunkin may be hurting each other and not Starbucks (this is an assumption made
based on the analysis of the market strategies of the three companies).
1.2 Starbucks
Starbucks Corporation, founded in 1985, is a premier roaster, marketer and retailer of more than 30
blends and single-origin premium coffees around world. The Company has more than 238,000
employees and operates about 24,000 retail stores in 70 countries around the world: the three major
segments are: Americas (United States, Canada, and Latin America), EMEA and China/Asia Pacific.ii
3
In 2015 Starbucks realized revenues of $19.7 billion and a net income of $2.5billion. The core business
of the Company is purchasing, roasting and selling coffees together with tea and other beverages, as
well as merchandizing a variety of fresh food items through Company-operated stores or other
channels, such as licensed stores, grocery and national foodservice accounts. Together with the original
brand, the Company also owns the following trademarks: Teavana, Tazo, Seattles Best Coffee,
Evolution Fresh, La Boulange, Ethos and Torrefazione Italia Coffee.
In addition to primary services, Starbucks offers coffees, syrups and other products online, sells
packaged goods and supplies specific equipment, such as coffee brewers and espresso machines, to its
licensees. Starbucks` business model includes both company-operated stores and traditional
franchising. The latter is used for Teavana and Seattle's Best Coffee, as well as Starbucks stores within
certain markets. Company-operated stores are mainly located in high-traffic locations: flexibility in
choosing the size and format of the stores allows the company to locate them in or near various settings,
including downtown, suburban retail centers and office buildings.
Number two in the coffee business behind Starbucks in terms of revenue and points of distribution,
Dunkin Donuts other close competitors are Tim Hortons, Costa and McDonalds.vii Dunkin Donuts
4
competitive pricing and brand awareness are their main advantages over the competition. Dunkin
Brands Group plans to continue their domestic and international growth especially in Asia and the
Middle East where their international presence is strongest.
For the risk free rate a 10 year US T-bond was taken as reference at a rate of 1.87% (Yahoo
Finance), while the market risk premium (6.25%) was sourced from the Damodaran website.
Here the US market risk premium was used as the valuation assumes US as base country.
The country risk premium was calculated both by weighted average considering the number of
stores per region as well as the revenue share per region. The revenue was not available per
country, so the key countries were grouped into regions and then a weighted average
calculation was made of the country risks. Using the calculated risks at the regional level, the
weighted total country risk was calculated based on the stores and revenue share. There was
no material difference between the two calculations (.45% store based and .28% revenue
based), however a revenue based calculation was applied as it is a more adequate measure.
Similar Betas were found on the Morningstar, Reuters and Yahoo websites, and Yahoos Beta
(0.734) was applied.
In order to calculate the cost of debt, the best option would be to identify a SBUX bond which
matures in 10 years, however the closest bond will mature in 2023 at 3.85%. As an alternative
option, the FINRA website was consulted for company bond ratings on SBUX; also the credit
rating info of A- was obtained from the Starbucks website. The corporate spread over risk free
rate at 1.75% was sourced from the Damodaran website.
The debt market value was valued at $1,359m from the last five year average of the interest
bearing liabilities taken from the Starbuckss balance sheets which were retrieved from the
Morningstar website.
Calculated on 23rd April 2016. Detailed assumptions can be found in the Appendix and in the supporting excel file.
The equity market value was calculated at $62,952m by averaging shares for the past 5 years
found on the Morningstar website and multiplying that by the average share price from the past
two years. The share price, found through Yahoo Finance was taken only from the past two
years due to the recent material share price increase. A five year average would have
understated the reality.
The Marginal tax rate was used at 40% (from Damodaran), because there was no reference
found to the marginal tax rate in the Starbucks annual report.
The indexes were then inserted into the WACC formula and 6.65% was determined as outcome.
Besides the growth trajectory, further assumptions have been derived from historical performance
associated with operating income, net capex and change in non-cash working capital as follows:2
The Operating income (EBIT * (1-T)) can be referenced as percentage to revenue, averaging
out yearly EBIT% (cleared from tax impact) in the most recent 5 years. Since there was a onetime material hit in 2013 (driven by a lawsuit case lost against Kraft Foods), operating income
and corresponding tax rate were normalized so as not to distort the calculation. As a result,
10.79% will be used as reference for the valuation, which is still a conservative assumption as
the historical trend shows improvement in operational efficiency, hitting 12-13% in last 2 years.
Detailed assumptions can be found in the Appendix and in the supporting excel file.
Data were taken from the Cash flow statements to calculate Net capex to revenue at average of
2.46% in last 5 years, which is lower than the industrial reference (per Damodaran: Global
(9.03%), US (4.19%.) for Restaurants), but can be accepted as basis.
In order to understand change in non-cash working capital, the net working capital was collated
from the Balance sheet. The average for Starbucks shows 7.82% net working capital to revenue,
which exceeds the industrial reference points (Global -0.47%, US 1.87%) indicating that
Starbucks should manage its debtor/creditor portfolio better.
Pulling all these data together, calculating the terminal value for 10+ years, and discounting the
amounts to identify the present value of the firm, the outcome is shown as follows:
in million $
Growth rate
Revenue
projections
Operating
income (EBIT
* (1-T))
Net Capex
Net working
capital
Y0
Y6
Y7
Y8
Y9
Y10
12,5%
Y1
12,5%
Y2
12,5%
Y3
10,0%
Y4
10,0%
Y5
8,0%
8,0%
5,5%
5,5%
5,5%
Y10+
3,0%
19 163
21 558
24 253
27 285
30 013
33 015
35 656
38 508
40 626
42 861 45 218
46 575
2 068
2 327
2 618
2 945
3 239
3 563
3 848
4 156
4 385
4 626
4 880
5 027
471
530
596
671
738
812
877
947
999
1 054
1 112
1 145
1 498
1 685
1 896
2 133
2 346
2 581
2 787
3 010
3 176
3 350
3 535
3 641
NWC
Free CF to
Firm
187
211
237
213
235
206
223
166
175
184
106
1 610
1 811
2 037
2 288
2 517
2 765
2 987
3 221
3 398
3 585
103 582
Present value
1 509
1 592
1 680
1 769
1 825
1 880
1 904
1 925
1 904
1 884
54 434
In line with the DCFF methodology, a few further steps were taken to calculate the intrinsic value of
equity and to understand the fair share price:
72 305
Cash (+)
1 611
Debt (-)
2 348
71 568
1 496
47,84
57,61
-17,0%
The above calculation shows that at our reference point the Market rated the shares higher at
$57.61 than their fair estimated value of $47.84. In other words the conclusion is that the SBUX
shares are slightly overpriced.
For the risk free rate a 10 year US T-bond was taken as reference at a rate of 1.87% (Yahoo
Finance), while the market risk premium (6.25%) was sourced from the Damodaran website.
Here the US market risk premium was used as the valuation assumes US as base country.
Although Dunkin Donuts has franchise operations in over 69 countries worldwide, the detailed
country level revenue information was not disclosed in the annual report. Nevertheless it was
identified that 82% of the revenue was generated in the US, while 74% of the international
business (which covers the remaining 18% of the total cake) was driven by 3 key geographical
areas: South Korea, Japan and the Middle East. In order to understand the DNKN Country risk
premium, a weighted average of the dominant country risk premiums was calculated utilizing
the Damodaran website to obtain country risk premium reference for the regions. The CRP
outcome used in the valuation is 0.23%.
The area of greatest concern was the Beta information. Searching through various websites,
this data was widely spread from 0.08 (Morningstar, Yahoo Finance) through 0.27 (Reuters,
FT) up to 0.7 (Nasdaq). A bottom up beta calculation was also made, supported by Damodaran
formulas, resulting 0.896(see Dunkin bottom up beta sheet for the detailed calculation). For
reference the Damodaran website was also consulted for US and Global industry beta on
Restaurant sector with results of 0.76 and 0.82, respectively. Having concerns regarding the
bottom up beta being the highest, the Global industry beta was used which is justified since
DNKN operates globally.
Since there was no DNKN bond issued and no credit rating information available, the cost of
debt is calculated using the synthetic rating approach (average interest cover ratio in past 5
years) which was matched to an A- rating. As a consequence 1.75% was added as corporate
spread (based on Damodaran) over the risk free rate, resulting in 3.62%, same as SBUX.
The debt market value is a 5 year average of interest bearing liabilities that were taken from
the Dunkin Donuts Balance Sheet (sourced from Morningstar) at value of $1,887m.
Equity market value ($4,077m) was calculated by taking the 5 year average of the number of
outstanding shares multiplied by the 4+ year average share price (IPO was in July 2011). Yahoo
Calculated on 24th April 2016, refined on 19th May 2016. Detailed assumptions can be found in the Appendix and in the supporting excel file.
Finance provided the daily stock price info and the number of shares per year was taken from
the Morningstar website.
The Marginal tax rate was used at 40% (from Damodaran), because there was no reference
found to the marginal tax rate in the Dunkin Donuts Annual Report.
The correct formula was then used from these index points to obtain the WACC of 5.62%.
Besides the growth trajectory, further assumptions shall be derived from historical performance
associated with operating income, net capex and change in non-cash working capital as follows:4
The Operating income (EBIT * (1-T)) can be referenced as percentage to revenue, averaging
out yearly EBIT% (cleared from tax impact) in recent 5 years. Figures are free from distortions,
hence normalization is not required. The average of 24.23% will be used as reference for the
valuation, which is more than twice as the same ratio for Starbucks.
Surprisingly Net capex to revenue calculation results a negative average of -3.12% in the last
5 years. This trend is not sustainable as there will be a minimum need to maintain and grow
business, even Dunkins structure is based more on license revenues than incomes from their
own shops. Considering this, the US industrial reference was used (per Damodaran: Global
(9.03%), US (4.19%) for Restaurants).
In order to understand change in non-cash working capital, the net working capital was collated
from the Balance sheet. The average for Starbucks shows 4.29% to revenue, which still exceeds
the industrial reference points (Global -0.47%, US 1.87%) indicating that Dunkin may manage
its debtor/creditor portfolio better than the industry average.
Detailed assumptions can be found in the Appendix and in the supporting excel file.
Pulling all these data together, calculating the terminal value for 5+ years, and discounting the amounts
to identify the present value of the firm, the outcome is shown as follows:
in million $
Y0
Growth rate
Y1
Y2
Y3
Y4
Y5
Y5+
5,5%
5,0%
4,5%
4,0%
3,5%
3,0%
Revenue projections
811
856
898
939
976
1 011
1 041
197
207
218
228
237
245
252
Net Capex
34
36
38
39
41
42
44
35
37
39
40
42
43
45
Free CF to Firm
170
178
186
194
201
7 899
Present value
161
160
158
156
153
6 009
In line with the DCFF methodology, few further steps were taken to calculate the intrinsic value of
equity and to understand the fair share price:
Value of the firm (m$)
6 796
Cash (+)
260
Debt (-)
2 454
4 602
96
47,94
42,09
13,9%
The above calculation shows that at our reference point the Market rated the shares lower at
$42.09 than their fair estimated value of $47.94. In other words the conclusion is that the DNKN
shares are slightly underpriced.
It is worth mentioning that outcome would be significantly different if the bottom up beta calculation
were used. As a consequence DNKN WACC would increase to 5.95%, and calculated value of Equity
would drop to $3,852m with fair share price value of $40.12. This would result a slightly overpriced
share with -4.7% variance.
3 Relative valuation
To make a relative valuation for Starbucks and Dunkin Donuts, the top quick service restaurants
(QSR) were chosen and we retrieved all the necessary inputs to find comparable values using the
multiples P/E and EV/EBITDA. Although the P/E ratio is a useful ratio for understanding the earning
power of a company, it does not tell the whole story regarding a companys value. Thus, this relative
10
valuation also includes the enterprise value to EBITDA as this metric is more comprehensive in terms
of defining the firm value. In addition to using these multiples, we have also included calculations for
growth, risk and other factors5 in relation to the top QSR to find comparable value for Starbucks and
Dunkin Donuts. A short industry overview6 is represented below.
Table 1. Industry distribution based on P/E and Revenue and Market Capitalization7:
Competitive analysis
50
DNKN
P/E Ratio
40
30
20
10
EAT
SBUX
CMG
WEN PNRA
CBRL
YUM
MCD
DRI
0
$0
$30
$60
$90
Revenue
$120
Billion US Dollars
To find the relative value of Starbucks, we started by analyzing the top three8 companies based on
market capitalization (MCD, YUM and CMG) and have calculated the mean and the median of both
the P/E ratio and EV/EBITDA. These calculations revealed that the mean9 P/E ratio for the top 3
companies is 27.13 and that the mean of the EV/EBITDA of the top 3 companies is 14.18. The
calculations based on the industry averages and data from companies` financials10 reveal an estimated
enterprise value of Starbucks at $69.565 billion and the estimated market capitalization at $74.797
billion dollars. To find the relative value of Dunkin Donuts, we have calculated the mean and median
for similarly sized QSR based on market capitalization which are listed number 4-8 on the top industry
list (BKW, DRI, PNRA, WEN, CBRL and EAT). Based on this sample, the mean values for P/E and
EV/EBITDA are 22.77 and 12.16, that yield the market capitalization and the enterprise value and of
$2.139 billion and $3.808 billion respectively. Descriptive data is represented in the Appendix.
Table 2. Results based on industry averages:
Companies 4-8
Top 3 Companies
Mean
Median
Mean
Median
20.37
20.59
27.13
25.03
11.08
11.52
14.18
14.12
However, accounting only for the size of a firm requires rather strict implicit assumption: all the factors like
growth, risk and cash flows are similar for the comparable firms. To bypass this restriction we went further in
Due to A. Damodaran`s lecture, EV/EBITDA can be decomposed into EV/EBITDA=[1-t]/(WACC-g) + [Depr*tax/EBITDA/(WACC-g) [CapEx/EBITDA]/(WACC-g) - [Change in NWC/EBITDA]/(WACC-g)
6
The list of the closest competitors was taken from the Reuters website: http://reuters.com/
7
(Current) P/E Ratio = Share Price (end of Dec 2015)/Earnings per Share ended in Dec 2015; except for CBRL the Revenues are taken as of Dec
2015(TTM)
8
Table 2 is represented in the Appendix
9
In this case the mean and the median are very close because the distribution of the outliers is approximately symmetric
10
EBITDA and Earnings for SBUX are $4,907 mil and $2,757 mil as of FY2015 for SBUX; for DNKN the values are $343.6 mil and $105 mil
respectively
11
analyzing the industry. We decomposed each multiple into its most significant determinants11: growth and risk
for the P/E ratio and growth, risk, tax rate (effective), ROC and WACC for the EV/EBITDA. Evaluating each
firm using this approach provides us with a much more precise measure of the actual worth.
Table 3. Decomposition of the multiples
Ticker
Earnings Growth12
Tax (effective)
ROIC13
D/E (book) 14
WACC
Beta
MCD
14.05%
32.76%
19.47
2.70
2.98
0.51
YUM
10.98%
29.07%
26.24
7.30
5.46
0.72
5.40%
8.95%
CMG
14.76%
38.20%
23.80
5.61
1.31
0.61
17.45%
14.94%
DRI
14.15%
21.02%
13.52
5.55
3.06
0.51
PNRA
15.21%
36.50%
22.12
2.96
1.93
0.74
7.47%
WEN
15.05%
34.62%
4.01
5.73
2.89
0.86
14.31%
CBRL
9.07%
30.41%
16.34
8.95
3.42
0.48
17.70%
EAT
10.32%
29.55%
17.68
8.17
10.34
0.43
12.15%
SBUX
18.23%
31.93%
23.92
6.65
2.01
0.73
14.96%
DNKN
14.05%
37.36%
7.91
5.62
7.55
0.82
7.71%
Note: Stock S.D. is a stock relative standard deviation over 2013-2015 period.
The calculations suggest that Starbucks company`s operations have two unique features in comparison
to the peer group: on the one hand, it has extremely high growth rates, volatile stock price and high
WACC value, that suggests that this company is at its high growth stage; on the other, it is currently
the second largest player in the market and it has one of the highest return on capital values. On this
basis it is reasonable to assume that the closest proxies for Starbucks are Chipotle Mexican Grill
(CMG) to reflect the potential of a high growth and risk company and McDonalds to account for the
influence of the size and a lower effective tax rate. Taking a simple average of the multiples for these
two companies (28.18 for P/E and 14.9 for EV/EBITDA) and multiplying it by company`s earnings
and EBITDA yield the estimate for the enterprise value of SBUX is $73,089 billion, whereas the P/E
ratio provides us with an estimated market capitalization of $77,692 billion .
As a best comparable for Dunkin Donuts Panera company was chosen. These two firms are very
similar in all respects: they have almost identical effective tax rate, risk (both in terms of stock price
volatility and beta), expected growth and cost of capital. Although there are still a few factors that are
different for the two firms, leverage and ROIC, it is expected that their effects on both multiples will
approximately offset one another. Based on Panera`s multiples (33.5 for P/E and 13.25 for
EBIT/EBITDA) we obtained the estimated market capitalization of $3,520 billion and the enterprise
value of $4,553 billion for Dunkin Donuts.
11
Unless there is a reference to the outside source, the data is taken from companies` financials or is calculated by our team
Expected growth in Earnings (Net Income), projections are taken from the NASDAQ official website http://nasdaq.com/
13 ROC and WACC calculations (for SBUX and DNKN we use own calculations, for DNKN we use bot. up beta) are taken from http://gurufocus.com/
14
D/E and Betas are taken from the Morningstar: http://morningstar.com/
12
12
The final estimations on the relative valuation approach for Starbucks and Dunkin Donuts, together
with actual market capitalization as of December 2015 are represented below15.
Ticker
Multiple base
Actual equity value16
Estimated equity value, industry average approach
Estimated equity value, decomposition approach
% deviation, industry average approach
% deviation, decomposition approach
Calculated share price range (decomposition approach)
DNKN
PE based EV/EBITDA based
$3,945.50
$2,138.64
$2,266.29
$3,519.60
$3,138.48
-46%
-43%
-11%
-20%
$33.67-$37.46
SBUX
PE based
EV/EBITDA based
$84,413.00
$74,797.41
$68,826.10
$77,692.00
$72,350.97
-11%
-18%
-8%
-14%
$49.55 - $53
Based on the relative value findings we suggest that both companies are slightly overvalued as of
December 2015. It is also important to notice the difference in two methodologies: we suggest that the
decomposition approach captures the real value of both companies; it results in an estimated price that
is slightly lower than the actual one. The results for Dunkin Donuts do slightly differ: relative valuation
suggests that it is also slightly overestimated, whereas DCF estimation suggests that it is slightly
underpriced. However, deviations in both directions for this firm are not crucial and we suggest that it
just reflects the deviation around the mean, and the company is approximately fair priced.
15
Enterprise value is adjusted by total debt, cash and equivalents and minority interest; total amount of the adjustments are $2.192 billion and
$0.738 billion dollars for DNKN and SBUX respectively
16
Data on actual market capitalization is taken from the Morningstar website: morningstar.com
13
company is higher ($47.94) than the current treatment in the market ($42.09). For the relative
valuation, Dunkin Donuts was found to be slightly overvalued based on Paneras multiples, the
company that shares similar to Dunkin Donuts growth, risk and other influencing factors, with an
estimated market capitalization of $3,520 billion whereas the actual market capitalization was $3,945
billion at the end of 2015, that yields a price per share range from $37.46 to $33.67. Further analysis
of the company`s price trend reveals that it experienced a significant drop during Sep 2015 March
2016, however, during March-May 2016 it was traded at approximately same market price as in Fall
2015 (at about $48).
In comparing the two companies, there is a higher probability that Dunkin Donuts price is fairly
assessed by the market (or even undervalued) and therefore this should be the best investment option.
Similarly, the market capitalization for Dunkin Donuts has gone up some however it is currently at
the same level ($3,993 million) as at the end of year 2015 which would support the conclusion that it
is fairly priced and would be a better investment in comparison to Starbucks. However, Starbucks does
have more growth potential than Dunkin Donuts. So despite the fact that Starbucks is overvalued at
this time, it should be reassessed as a good investment option in the coming quarters because of its
extremely high revenue,earnings growth rates and positive expectations about company`s future in
general.
14
5 Appendix
Table 1. Starbucks WACC detailed (Reference point 27th September 2015)
Index ref
Index name
Value
Proxy
Source
r(f)
1,87%
10 years US T-bond
6,25%
Damodaran website
MRP
CRP
country risk
premium
0,28%
beta
0,734
r(d)
cost of debt
3,62%
1 359
Morningstar website
equity market
value (in mUSD)
62 952
40%
Damodaran website
Table 2. Dunkin Donuts WACC detailed (Reference point 26th December 2015)
Index ref
Index name
Value
Proxy
Source
r(f)
1,87%
10 years US T-bond
6,25%
Damodaran website
0,23%
0,820
MRP
CRP
country risk
premium
beta
r(d)
cost of debt
3,62%
1 887
Morningstar website
equity market
value (in mUSD)
4 077
40%
Damodaran website
15
201209
2011-09
201309
201409
201509
AVG
6,65%
11 700
1 525
1 787
2 275
3 081
3 601
13,0%
31,1%
1 051
13,4%
32,7%
1 202
15,3%
31,9%
1 549
18,7%
34,6%
2 016
18,8%
29,3%
2 546
9,0%
9,0%
10,4%
12,3%
13,3%
Capex investments
Depreciation
Net capex
532
550
-18
856
581
275
1 151
656
495
1 161
748
413
1 304
934
370
0%
2,1%
3,3%
2,5%
1,9%
Current assets
Current liabilities
Non-cash Net WC
1 352
540
812
1 728
398
1 330
1 672
492
1 180
1 722
534
1 188
2 025
684
1 341
net WC to revenue
6,9%
10,0%
7,9%
7,2%
7,0%
Operating income %
Tax rate% (normalized)
EBIT (1-T)
EBIT (1-T) %
19 163
201112
201212
201312
201412
201512
AVG
5,62%
628
209
33,3%
47,8%
109
17,4%
658
239
36,3%
33,3%
159
24,2%
714
305
42,7%
33,0%
204
28,6%
749
331
44,2%
31,3%
228
30,4%
19
53
-34
22
56
-34
31
49
-18
24
46
-22
30
45
-15
-22
-5%
-5,2%
-2,5%
-2,9%
-1,8%
-3,12%
Current assets
Current liabilities
Non-cash Net WC
37
10
27
32
16
16
47
12
35
56
14
42
53
19
34
45
14
31
net WC to revenue
4,3%
2,4%
4,9%
5,6%
4,2%
4,29%
Capex investments
Depreciation
Net capex
Net capex to revenue
811
318
39,2%
39,1%
47,5%
38,6%
167
20,6% 24,23%
16
Table 5. List of comparable companies. All numbers are in millions except for per share data and
ratio.
Company
Ticker
Market Capitalization
Revenue
McDonalds
Yum! Brands, Inc.
Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc
Darden Restaurants Inc
Panera Bread Co
The Wendy's Co
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store
MCD
YUM
CMG
DRI
PNRA
WEN
CBRL
24.56
25.03
31.8
10.83
33.52
20.59
22.28
14.12
12.74
15.67
12.17
13.25
10.33
11.52
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
107,129.00
30,681.00
14,674.00
7,434.00
4,817.00
2,945.00
3,642.00
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
25,413.00
13,105.00
4,501.00
6,905.00
2,682.00
1,870.00
2,862.00
EAT
14.62
8.14
3,493.00
3,100.00
SBUX
84,413.00
19,734.00
DNKN
3,945.50
810.90
EV/EBITDA
References
6
i
PE Ratio
https://www.franchisehelp.com/industry-reports/fast-food-industry-report/
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/101315/who-are-starbucks-main-competitors.asp
http://time.com/money/3028578/dunkin-donuts-mcdonalds-starbucks-coffee-wars/
http://www.fastcocreate.com/3034572/coffee-week/dunkin-donuts-and-starbucks-a-tale-of-two-coffeemarketing-giants
https://inevitablesteps.com/company-analysis/starbucks-competitors/
https://www.qsrmagazine.com/reports/top-50-breakdown-market-segments
ii
iii
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-68SCR9/1924588177x0x883107/32BF1764-3E53-45CF-9824D8753F797D37/DNKN_Annual_Report_Final_.PDF
iv
vi
vii
Sicoli, Carlo. The Five Largest Coffee Shop Chains on Earth The Richest, February 9, 2014
viii
http://investorplace.com/2016/02/buy-not-dunkin-donuts-starbucks/#.Vz8q5Gxf34h
ix
http://financials.morningstar.com/valuation/earnings-estimates.html?t=SBUX®ion=usa&culture=en-US
and http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ae?s=SBUX+Analyst+Estimates
x
http://investorplace.com/2016/02/buy-not-dunkin-donuts-starbucks/#.Vz8q5Gxf34h
xi
http://financials.morningstar.com/valuation/earnings-estimates.html?t=DNKN and
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ae?s=DNKN+Analyst+Estimates
17