Case 15-00301-KRH

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
RICHMOND DIVISION

In the Matter of:

DOUGLASS HAYDEN FISHER,

Misc. Pro. No. 15-00301-KRH

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the Application of Douglass Hayden Fisher
(Fisher) to Qualify as an Attorney for the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia (the Application) under Local Bankruptcy Rule 2090-1. In the Application
submitted on March 23, 2015, Fisher certified to the Court under penalty of perjury that he had
not been reprimanded in any court nor ha[d] there been any action in any court pertaining to
[his] conduct or fitness as a member of the bar. Fisher did not disclose that he had been
publically reprimanded on January 30, 2014 under procedures established by the Supreme Court
of Virginia in Part Six, IV, 13-15.B.4 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. In the
Matter of Douglass Hayden Fisher, VSB Docket No. 13-032-094098 (3d. District
Subcommittee, Sec. II 2014). The Virginia State Bar entered its reprimand of Fisher after two
hearings conducted on December 20, 2013 and January 23, 2014. The Virginia State Bar found
that Fisher had violated several Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct.

Specifically, the

Virginia State Bar found that Fisher had violated rules pertaining to diligence, communication,
safekeeping of property, and declining or terminating representation. Fisher did not appeal the
reprimand to the Supreme Court of Virginia, as he had the right to do. See Rules of the Supreme
Court of Virginia, Part VI, IV, 13-26.

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As a result of Fishers failure to disclosure the reprimand in his Application, the Court
opened this miscellaneous proceeding on April 2, 2015 and set Fishers Application for hearing
on April 8, 2015 (the Hearing). Notice of the Hearing was sent to Fisher on April 4, 2015, by
first class mail addressed to Douglass Hayden Fisher, Fisher Law, PO Box 7321, 2401 West
Main Street, Richmond, VA 23220-4436.1 Despite the issuance of due and proper notice via first
class mail, Fisher failed to appear at the Hearing. Fed R. Bankr. P. 7004(b)(1).
As a result of Fishers failure to attend the Hearing, the Court entered an Order on April
9, 2010: (i) Denying Fishers Application pending a subsequent hearing that the Court scheduled
for May 6, 2015 (the May 6 Hearing); (ii) terminating Fishers right to participate in the
Courts CM/ECF System in the interim; and (iii) ordering Fisher to appear at the May 6 Hearing
to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for submitting an Application to the Court with a
false certification. On April 10, 2015, Fisher filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Courts
order to show cause, alleging, among other things, that he did not receive adequate notice of the
Hearing.
Fisher subsequently did appear at the May 6 Hearing. In response to the Courts query,
Fisher advised that he did not seek leave to retain counsel and was prepared to proceed with the
May 6 Hearing on his own behalf. Fisher thereupon admitted that he had read the Application
and was fully cognizant of the certification he had made to the Court. Fisher explained that after
speaking with another attorney about the matter, he decided that disclosure of the public
reprimand was not necessary. Fisher advised that he had filed the Application in haste at the
request of a client. Fisher explained that he had wanted to avoid drawing attention to the
disciplinary action taken by the Virginia State Bar. Fisher contended that he did not mislead the
Court by failing to make the disclosure requested in the Application because the reprimand was
1

This is the address Fisher provided to the Court in connection with his Application materials.

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public. Fisher argued that, as the reprimand had come from an agency of the Supreme Court of
Virginia, and not from the Supreme Court itself, there had been no action in any court
pertaining to his conduct or fitness. Accordingly, he concluded that disclosure of the reprimand
was not technically required.
Now having considered Fishers explanations and arguments, the Court finds that Fisher
made a conscious decision not to disclose the public reprimand. Virginia Code section 54.13910 authorizes the Virginia State Bar, as an administrative agency of the Supreme Court of
Virginia, to enforce the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct. Part Six of the Rules of the
Supreme Court of Virginia provides the framework under which the Virginia State Bar operates
and promulgates the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct under which attorneys practice law
in the Commonwealth of Virginia.2 The Virginia State Bar reprimanded Fisher pursuant to
Rules adopted and procedures established by the Supreme Court of Virginia. The reprimand was
directly appealable to the Supreme Court of Virginia under Part Six, IV, 13-26 of the Rules
of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
Fishers technicality argument, which focuses on the words any court, is nothing but
misguided sophistry.3 The information requested in the Application pertaining to fitness or
conduct as a member of the bar was abundantly clear to Fisher. Otherwise Fisher would not
have sought counsel from a fellow attorney. Rather than deciding to proceed forthrightly in an
open and honest manner, Fisher deliberately chose to parse the language in the Application to his

The ethical standards relating to the practice of law in this Court are the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct.
Local Rule 2090-1(I). Those Rules outline the mandatory minimum level of acceptable conduct for attorneys. In
re Soulisak, 227 B.R. 77, 80 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998) (emphasis added).

The term court commonly applies to any place where justice is administered. See e.g., Random House
Websters Unabridged Dictionary 464 (2nd ed. 1999). The term is not confined to refer, as Fisher suggests,
exclusively to the Supreme Court of Virginia. Even if the Virginia State Bar were not an administrative agency of
the Supreme Court of Virginia, the term would, nevertheless, apply to it where it is presiding in its capacity as an
adjudicative tribunal deciding disputes pertaining to ethical conduct.

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own purposes in order to circumvent disclosure of an uncomfortable truth concerning his prior
conduct. Fishers calculated gambit only compounded the problem. The Court finds Fishers
conscious decision to withhold information concerning the public reprimand violated the duty of
candor Fisher owed to the Court.4 The certification made by Fisher in his Application was
materially incorrect. It was both false and misleading. A federal court has an inherent power
to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it. In re Parker,
No. 3:14cv241, 2014 WL 4809844, at *5 (E.D. Va. Sept. 26, 2014) (quoting Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)). The Court concludes that Fisher should be sanctioned for
his reprehensible conduct. The minimum appropriate sanction sufficient to deter repetition of
such conduct in the future is the denial of Fishers Application. Fisher will not be permitted to
practice before this Court.
In consideration whereof,
It is ORDERED that Fishers Application be and it hereby is DENIED on a final basis,
and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerks Office shall serve a copy of this Order via first class mail to
Fisher at the following addresses: (i) Douglass Hayden Fisher, Fisher Law, PO Box 7321,
Richmond, VA 23220-4436, and (ii) Douglass Hayden Fisher, Fisher Law, 2401 West Main
Street, Richmond, VA 23220-4436.

ENTERED:

May 11, 2015

/s/ Kevin R. Huennekens
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
Entered on Docket: 5/11/15

Rule 3.3(a)(1) of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provides: A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a
false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.