Professional Documents
Culture Documents
KAYATTA,
Circuit
Judge.
Alexis
Amador-Huggins
was
Amador-Huggins's
Background
appeal
trains
on
number
of
the
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license plate number, which he did, and she repeated it over and
over to the passengers in her vehicle.
A bit further on, Betancourt's mother found the Lexus on the side
of the road with her son inside, shot in the head.
He died three
days later.
Law enforcement officers arrested Amador-Huggins and
John
Anthony
Morales
Lopez
("Morales"),
charging
them
with
he would give
the Lexus "a little bit of a bump" and the driver would pull over,
thinking it was an accident.
on
the
driver.
Amador-Huggins
bumped
the
Lexus
once;
when
want to hit the Lexus too hard because he was driving his mother's
car and didn't want to damage it.
Amador-Huggins gave
Morales the gun and told Morales that he was going to cut off the
Lexus, at which point Morales should do "whatever it took" to get
the Lexus.
into the car, and Amador-Huggins calmly said, "Man. I think you
killed him."
they didn't manage to steal a car but they did manage to kill
someone--the group "congratulat[ed] [Morales] for what happened"
as they hung out, "celebrating."
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an
individual
in
the
Jeep
that
matched
Morales's
description; and testimony by a witness who knew them both and saw
them together in the Jeep the night of the attempted carjacking.
Presumably
because
of
the
overwhelming
evidence
that
Amador-
Huggins was driving the Jeep that contacted and cut off the
victim's
car,
the
defense
focused
on
undermining
Morales's
Analysis
He
argues that those statements are evidence of "prior bad acts" that
are inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).
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The
See
United States v. Appolon, 715 F.3d 362, 371 (1st Cir. 2013).
The events that led to the challenged comments are as
follows:
the return to the housing project where they celebrated the murder
after the attempted carjacking, the following exchange occurred:
Q.
And what happened when you and Amador
Huggins saw Gordo and four of his friends?
A. Well, at that point he gave him the gun
back.
We bought illegal substances there,
marijuana, Perco[cet].
[Defense Counsel]:
[Prosecution]:
Q. You bought illegal substances?2
A.
Yes, I did.
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was
still
describing
the
celebration,
the
following
exchange
occurred:
Q.
R.
Evid.
404(b)(2).
When
defendant
challenges
the
United States v. Doe, 741 F.3d 217, 229 (1st Cir. 2013)
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United States
hardly have made any difference to the jury whether AmadorHuggins's celebration of the death of a young man was accompanied
by Percocet rather than, for example, milk. In short, any material
prejudice flowed from the part of the story to which there was no
objection, with the Percocet serving at most like a small match
added to a raging conflagration.
985 F.2d 634, 638 (1st Cir. 1993) (erroneous admission of Rule
404(b) evidence was harmless because, in light of the properly
admitted evidence, it was unlikely that the 404(b) evidence had
prejudicial impact).
harmless.
B.
next
challenges
the
district
court's
The district
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To counter this
Marchand what material bumpers are typically made of, the defense
objected on the grounds that Marchand was not qualified as an
expert, and that allowing the "unannounced expert testimony" would
be "trial by ambush."
He
also
testified,
based
on
his
own
experience
denied this motion, ruling that Marchand had offered lay testimony
based on his on-the-job experience investigating bumpers.
Amador-
Huggins now argues that the district court abused its discretion
in denying him a bumper expert to counter Marchand's "expert"
testimony.
As an initial matter, we are inclined to agree that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
Marchand presented only lay testimony.
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statement to the jury, defense counsel told the jury they would
hear testimony that the Jeep was repeatedly hitting the Lexus, but
that they would "see that the front part of the Jeep shows no
evidence of being involved in a repeated hitting of two cars."
Counsel's claims of ambush, then, ring entirely hollow.
Finally, the evidence was overwhelming that, as Morales
testified,
the
white
Jeep
bumped
the
Lexus.
Why
else
did
Betancourt call his mother to say he was "scared" and read the
plate numbers to her?
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The
next
argues
that
the
district
court
The
I have
the district court gave the instruction as part of the jury charge.
Amador-Huggins now argues that the district court erred by not
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plain
as
the
government
argues,
or
for
abuse
of
objectionable response from the witness was fresh was lost due to
defense counsel's lack of objection.
Amador-Huggins offers no
the
end
of
the
evidence.
Indeed,
bringing
up
the
testimony
as
having
more
significance
than
it
actually
possessed.
D.
Amador-Huggins told him, while they were both being detained before
trial, that Amador-Huggins hoped there would not be a "star
witness" against him.
the district court applied the hearsay rules to these facts is for
abuse of discretion.
(1st
Cir.
1997).
Although
the
parties
debate
whether
this
While the
determine
whether
defense
counsel
was
afforded
reasonable
be
for
abuse
of
discretion,
which
in
the
context
of
the
the
defendant
fair
opportunity
to
cross-examine
F.3d 210, 226 (1st Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Amador-Huggins argues on appeal that the district court
did not allow him to probe into the potential bias of Juan
Rodriguez, a witness who testified that, as he was sitting outside
smoking marijuana at a housing project in Caguas the night of the
attempted carjacking, he saw Morales and Amador-Huggins arrive in
a Jeep.
See Fed. R.
answered
no.
Immediately
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afterwards,
on
recross,
Amador-Huggins's
argument
on
appeal
that
his
However, Amador-
1020, 1025 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that arguments raised for the
first time on appeal are waived). Moreover, the bias theory raised
on appeal is premised on something that is not in the record:
Amador-Huggins's drug dealings.
Amador-Huggins--who objects to
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F.
Restitution
Amador-Huggins's final argument is that the district
must demonstrate: '(1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear
or
obvious
and
which
not
only
(3)
affected
the
defendant's
Id.
(quoting United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001)).
Amador-Huggins cannot so demonstrate.
Betancourt's
claimed
$26,665.72
in
father,
who
lives
losses,
including
in
the
funeral
Netherlands,
expenses
for
services in both the Netherlands and Puerto Rico, flights for eight
family members to attend the funeral in Puerto Rico, hotels for
the family, the cancellation fee for Betancourt's private school,
and payment to a traumatology institute.6
Amador-Huggins
makes two claims of error: that the amount was arbitrary because
none of the claimed expenses precisely added up to the amount
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awarded, and that the district court was not authorized to award
restitution either for two funerals or for travel expenses under
the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act ("MVRA"), 18 U.S.C. 3663A.7
We begin with the latter claim.
Id. 3663A(b)(3).
totaled $11,057.97.
Neither
party cites any case that speaks one way or the other to the
question of whether travel expenses are "necessary . . . related
services."
Id. 3663A(b)(3).
also
argues
that
the
amount--almost
To a certain extent,
any line drawing here would be arbitrary, but that does not make
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it inequitable or unsustainable.
responds
to
some
reliable
evidence,
no
more
is
the
funeral
that
took
place
in
Puerto
Rico
(thus
likely
Id.
Conclusion
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