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Held:
NO. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a
substitute candidate should be a person belonging to and certified by
the same political party as the candidate to be replaced.
Petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca, an independent candidate, had first
withdrawn his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member
before he joined the LAKAS party and nominated by the LAKAS
MATUGAS Wing as the substitute candidate. He had filed his certificate
of candidacy and his certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty
candidate signed by Gov. Matugas with his written acceptance of the
partys nomination. Therefore, he is a bona fide LAKAS member.
There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which requires as a
condition precedent that a substitute candidate must have been a
member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he
can be nominated as such.
Soller v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139853
FACTS
Petitioner and private respondent (Saulong) were both candidates for
mayor of the municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11,
1998 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed as mayor by the
municipal board of canvassers. Private respondent filed a petition with
the COMELEC to annul the proclamation. Later, private respondent
filed an election protest against petitioner with the RTC. The COMELEC
dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by private respondent, while
the RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but said motion was denied.
Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari
contending that respondent RTC acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing private
respondents election protest. The COMELEC en banc dismissed
petitioners suit. Petitioner now questions this decision of the COMELEC
en banc.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to decide on the case.
HELD
The SC has ruled in previous cases that the COMELEC, sitting en banc,
does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases
including pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance. This
power pertains to the divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the
Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first
instance is null and void. In the SCs view, the authority to resolve
petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest, like
the questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division of the
COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc.
2.
FACTS
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative
District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that
he was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced
with a petition for disqualification, he amended the entry on his
residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The
Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed
Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion
for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election
later issued an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on
Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office
for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
ISSUE
Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes
domicile to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
HELD
3.
Facts
Petitioner Tony L. Benwaren and private respondent Edwin Crisologo
were candidates for the position of Municipal Mayor of the Municipality
of Tineg, Abra in the May 2004 elections.
During the canvass of the election return of Precinct No. 16A, counsel
for petitioner objected to the inclusion of the election return on the
ground that the same was allegedly prepared under duress, force or
intimidation, or was prepared by persons other than the Board of
Election Inspectors (BEI) concerned.
The MBC deferred the proclamation of the winning candidate for the
position of Municipal Mayor because it contended that the contested
election return from Precinct No. 16A would affect the result of the
election for the position. To speedily settle and put an end to the
Issues:
4.
Trinidad vs Commission on Elections and
Sunga
G.R. No. 135716
September 23, 1999
This is a petition for certiorari questioning the Resolution of the
Commission on Elections disqualifying petitioner as a mayoralty
candidate in the May 1995 elections. Likewise, it seeks the review of a
subsequent resolution annulling petitioners proclamation as elected
mayor in the May 1998 elections.
Facts:
1. NO. Petitioner was able to file an Answer with Counter Petition and
Motion to Dismiss. He was also able to submit his counter-affidavit and
sworn statements of forty-eight witnesses. He was also given a chance
to explain in his Motion for Reconsideration. He was afforded an
opportunity to be heard, through his pleadings, therefore, there is no
denial of procedural due process.
5.
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005
dated 5 June 2001 (Resolution No. 01-005) and Resolution No. NBC
specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft
of said resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no
mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator
Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator
Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the resolution by providing as
it now appears, that the senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th
highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of
former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.
6.
Taule vs Santos
August 12, 1991
G. R. No. 90336
Held:
1. No. The Secretary of Local Government has no jurisdiction to
entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the
FABC. He is only vested with the power to promulgate rules and
regulations and to exercise general supervision over the local
government as provided in the Local Government Code and in the
Administrative Code. It is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
inferior to hear election protest and the COMELEC have the
appellate jurisdiction over it.
2. Yes. The Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under
Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of
the sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vicegovernor, elective members of the said sanggunian, etc. He acted
as the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan. As
presiding officer, he has an interest in the election of the officers
of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the
assembly. If said member assumes his place under questionable
circumstances, the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as
to their validity or legality. Therefore, respondent governor is a
proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the
officers of the FABC.
The election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and
void for not complying with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09.
DLG Circular No. 89-09 provides that the incumbent FABC President or
the Vice-President shall preside over the reorganizational meeting,
there being a quorum. It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC
President nor the Vice-President presided over the meeting and
elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of
Election Supervisors/Consultants. Therefore, there was a clear violation
of the said mandatory provision.
8.
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private
respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed
a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC
alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the
Constitutions one-year residency requirement for candidates for the
House of Representatives.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as
mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution
Held:
Yes. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with
domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her
own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in
the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor
follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioners
domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the
family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual
removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof
of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be
deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the
husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not
mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married
President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely
gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming
that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the
right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts
following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose
Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice
9.
10.
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for
issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their
certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions.
Facts:
In preparation for the 2010 elections, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 8678 the Guidelines on the Filing of
Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates
of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections. Sec. 4 of Resolution No. 8678 provides
that Any person holding a public appointive office or position x x x
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
Held:
No. Sec. 4(a) of the COMELEC Resolution is null and void for being
violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad. Sec.
13(par. 3) of R.A. 9369 & Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code were
also declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Sec. 66 of BP Blg. 881 & RA 8436 relating to the automatic resignation
of elective officials upon the filing of their CoCs was repealed by R.A.
9006 (Fair Election Act). There was, thus, created a situation of
obvious discrimination against appointive officials who were deemed
ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their CoCs, while
elective officials were not.
jurisdiction for dismissing his petition motu propio without any basis
whatsoever and without giving him the benefit of a hearing.
Issues:
WON petition to declare a failure of elections and/or for annulment of
election is considered as an election protest.
WON respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioners petition, in the light of petitioners foregoing
contentions.
Held:
No. Mr. Banaga, Jr.s petition docketed as SPA-98-383 before the
COMELEC was a special action under the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. An election protest is an ordinary governed by Rule 20 on
ordinary actions, while a petition to declare failure of elections is
covered by Rule 26 under special actions. Petitioner also did not
comply with the requirements for filing an election protest such as
failing to pay filing fee and cash deposits for an election protest.
No. Respondent COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition to declare failure of elections and/or for
annulment of elections for being groundless. The petition to declare a
failure of election and/or to annul election results must show on its face
that the conditions necessary to declare a failure to elect are present.
Respondent COMELEC only based its decision on the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code with regard to declaring a failure of election.
There are three instances where a failure of election may be declared,
namely:
the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes;
the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or
after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
In the case at bar, Talaga did not serve for 3 consecutive terms. For
nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his
mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
If one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of
another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered
one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms
allowedthis comment of Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Bernas
applies only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike
government officials, there is no recall election for members of
Congress.
the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for the presidency may contest the
election of the president.
Issue:
May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died
during the pendency of the latters protest case?
Held:
Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President
of the Philippines who received the second or third highest
number of votes may contest the election of the President or the
Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition
with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty
(30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
An election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the
protestant or to the protestee, hence, substitution and
intervention is allowed but only by a real party in interest. Note
that Mrs. FPJ herself denies any claim to the office of President
but rather stresses that it is with the paramount public interest
in mind that she desires to pursue the process commenced by
her late husband. However, nobility of intention is not the point of
reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an
election protest. In such intervention, the interest which allows a
person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigation
and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor
will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this
protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit from
the outcome should it be determined that the declared president
did not truly get the highest number of votes.
HELD:
The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of
Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that "decals and
stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas
provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and
VOID. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on
"mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas
provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional
grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental
right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III).
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned
prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party.
FACTS:
Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in
Oras, Eastern Samar. In 1965, he joined the US Navy and was
naturalized as a US Citizen.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came back to the Philippines and took
a residence certificate. Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation
under R.A. No. 8171 to the special committee on naturalization. His
application was approved on November 7, 2000, and on November 10,
2000, he took oath as citizen of the Philippines.
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of
Oras, Eastern Samar, in addition, on February 27, 2001, he filed his
certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident
thereof for 2 years. On March 5, 2001, Mr. Alvarez filed for the
cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground of
material misrepresentation by stating thereat that the latter has been
a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two years, when in truth and in
fact he had resided therein for only about six months since November
10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. The
Comelec was unable to render judgment on the case before the
election. Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and proclaimed mayor of
Oras, Eastern Samar. On July 19, 2001, the Comelec (2nd Div) ordered
the cancellation of the petitioners certificate of candidacy. Comelec en
banc affirmed the order, thus this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern
Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the term residence is to be understood
not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or
habitation, but rather to Domicile or legal residence, that is, the
place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile
of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place
where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In the
case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin by becoming a US
citizen after enlisting in the US Navy in 1965. From then on and until
November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship,
petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines.
Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for
naturalization as a US citizen. Wherefore, the petition is without merit
and DISMISSED.
The powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the COMELEC
may either be classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasijudicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative and
sometimes ministerial in character