Battle of 73 Easting

forces and artillery of the 1st Infantry Division.[11]

The Battle of 73 Easting was a decisive tank battle

fought on 26 February 1991, during the Gulf War, between United States armored forces of the VII Corps and
those of the Iraqi Republican Guard and its Tawakalna
Division. It was named for a UTM north-south coordinate line (an Easting, measured in kilometers and readable on GPS receivers) in the featureless desert that was
used as a phase line to measure progress of the oensive as they were going through what the Iraqis thought
was trackless desert. The battle was later described in a
documentary of the battle as the last great tank battle
of the 20th century. This battle took place several hours
after another key tank battle known as the Battle of Al
Busayyah.

On the night of 23/24 February, in accordance with General Norman Schwarzkopf's plan for the ground assault
called "Operation Desert Sabre", VII Corps raced east
from Saudi Arabia into Iraq in a maneuver later nicknamed the Hail Mary. The Corps had two goals: to
cut o Iraqi retreat from Kuwait, and to destroy ve elite
Republican Guard divisions near the IraqKuwait border
that might attack the Arab and Marine units moving into
Kuwait to the south. Initial Iraqi resistance was light and
scattered after the breach, and the 2nd ACR fought only
minor engagements until 25 February.
The primary battle was conducted by 2nd ACRs three
squadrons of about 4,000 soldiers, along with the 1st
Infantry Divisions two leading brigades(2nd Armored
Division(FWD)),[12] who attacked and destroyed the Iraqi
18th Mechanized Brigade and 37th Armored Brigade
of the Tawakalna Division, each consisting of between
2,500 and 3,000 personnel.[9]

The main U.S. unit in the battle was the 2nd Armored
Cavalry Regiment (2nd ACR), a 4,500 man reconnaissance and security element assigned to VII Corps. It consisted of three ground squadrons (1st, 2nd and 3rd), an
aviation (attack helicopter) squadron (4th), and a support
squadron. Each ground squadron was made up of three
cavalry troops, a tank company, a self-propelled howitzer
battery, and a headquarters troop. Each troop comprised
120 soldiers, 1213 M3 Bradley ghting vehicles and
nine M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks.[9] Task Force 1-41
Infantry breached the berm on the borders between Saudi
Arabia and Iraq which was the initial Iraqi defensive positions and performed reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance missions prior to the 2nd ACRs actions.[10]
This generally includes destroying or repelling the Iraqis
reconnaissance elements and denying their commander
any observation of friendly forces. The corps' main body
consisted of the American 3rd Armored Division (3rd
AD) and 1st Infantry Division (1st ID) and 2nd Armored
Division (Forward) and 1st Armored Division (1st AD),
and the British 1st Armoured Division (1 AD).

1 Plan
The 2nd ACR was to advance east, locate and engage
the enemy and determine his dispositions and then allow
the mechanized brigades of the 1st ID to pass through
to nish destroying the Iraqis. The 2nd ACRs limit of
advance changed during the operation. VII Corps Fragmentary Plan Seven, issued during the night of February 2526, made the 60 Easting the Regiments initial
limit of advance. After 2ACR made contact with the Republican Guards security zone, Corps changed the limit
to the 70 Easting. Along that line, the 1st ID would
pass through the Regiment and push on to objectives further east. Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks, Jr.,
the commander of the VII Corps, ordered Colonel Don
Holder, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment commander, to locate the enemy and to avoid becoming decisively
engaged.[13]

The job of the 2nd ACR was to cross the border and
advance east as a forward scouting element, led by cavalry scouts in lightly armored M3A1 Bradleys with highly
advanced thermals to detect enemy positions. Following
closely behind were M1A1 Abrams tanks covering them
from the rear, ready at a moments notice to move forward and engage the enemy. Originally advancing ahead
of the 3rd Armored Division until late on February 25th,
they would shift to the east and be ahead of the advancing 1st Infantry Division as it moved north from its initial
objectives. The Regiments mission was to strip away enemy security forces, clear the way of signicant defenses
and locate the Republican Guards defensive positions so
they could be engaged by the full weight of the armored

The Regiment had its three armored cavalry squadrons

operating on line with Second Squadron in the north,
Third Squadron in the center and First Squadron in
the south. The Fourth Squadron (the combat aviation
squadron) ew reconnaissance and attack missions chiey
in the northern and central zones. Unusually for a corps
covering force, the Regiment lacked a reserve tank or
mechanized infantry battalion. Weather restricted ight
operations severely, however, and kept Fourth Squadron
1

2 APPROACH TO THE 70 EASTING

grounded for about half of the daylight hours.

Tawakalna Division. All three squadrons were in contact

Moving through the Republican Guards security area on with security forces by 9 a.m. but a violent sandstorm
the morning of the 26th undetected, the Regiment en- blew into the area and movement to the Regiments limit
countered Iraqs heavily armored Tawakalna Division [14] of advance, the 60 Easting, took until 11 a.m.
in a line facing them in the north and the 12th Iraqi Ar- Air cavalry operations ceased just after 9 a.m. and would
mored Division in the center and south. All Iraqi units not resume until afternoon. Lt. Colonel Tony Isaacs
occupied well-constructed defensive emplacements and First Squadron meanwhile encountered scattered enemy
had prepared alternate positions which enabled them to positions in the south and by noon had reported destroyreorient to the west to face VII Corpss attack. The 12th ing 23 T-55 tanks, 25 armored personnel carriers, six arArmored Divisions assignment to the Republican Guard tillery pieces and numerous trucks.[17] Lt. Colonel Mike
was not known at the time of the engagement.[15]
Kobbes Second Squadron troops all reported resistance
Despite extensive aerial and artillery bombardment by from small Tawakalna Division security outposts while
U.S. forces, most Iraqi units defending along the 70 East- Third Squadron destroyed similar outposts in the Regiing remained eective. The Regiment employed artillery mental center. Lt. Gen. Franks visited the Regiments
re from the supporting 210th Field Artillery Brigade, C main command post just before 1 p.m. There, the RegiBattery 4th 27th FA MLRS, air strikes, and attack he- mental executive ocer, Lt. Colonel Roger Jones and the
licopters (both Apaches of 2-1 Aviation and Cobras of S2, Major Steve Campbell, briefed him on the situation
Fourth Squadron) against the Republican Guard units as and informed him that sensors were reporting movement
the armored cavalry squadrons moved east through the se- of tracked vehicles to the north out of the Regiments
curity zone. Sandstorms slowed this movement through- zone.
out the day, restricting visibility to as little as 400 metres By 3 p.m. Third Armored Division had reached the 50
(1,300 ft).
Easting and begun to move abreast of the Regiment to the
north. First Infantry Divisions movement to join the ght
was taking longer than expected, however. Lt. General
Franks therefore directed the Second Armored Cavalry
2 Approach to the 70 Easting
to continue its attack as far as the 70 Easting and to make
contact with the Republican Guards main defenses and
prevent their movement. At the same time, he ordered the
Regiment to avoid becoming decisively engaged (meaning to refrain from committing all its maneuver forces and
thereby losing freedom of action).
M1A1 Abrams Tanks from the 3rd Armored Division First
Brigade along the Line of Departure.

Colonel Holder issued a Fragmentary Order at 3:20 to

comply with the Corps Commanders directive and by
3:45 Second Squadrons E and G Troops were in contact
with well-organized defenses of the Tawakalna Division.
At the same time the Third and First squadrons in the
center and south moved to clear their zones, encountering
T-72s in Third Squadrons north and T-62 and T-55 tanks
of the Iraqi 12th Armored Division further south.[16]

2d ACR began the 26th of February on the VII Corps

Objective SMASH still oriented to the northeast. In the
early morning hours, Lt. Colonel Scott Marcys Third
Squadron fought companies of the Iraqi 50th Armored
Brigade, which had moved into the Regiments southern
area to conrm reports that allied units were in the vicin- Fourth Squadrons air scouts rejoined the operation as the
weather cleared around 3 p.m. Air scouts identied enity.
emy defenses to the front of Second and Third Squadrons
At 0522 the Regiment received Corps Frag Plan Seven,
and attack helicopters struck several of the security outwhich adjusted its zone and objective and directed all
posts.
Corps units to move east to attack units of the Republican Guard. The order adjusted the boundary be- By 16:10, further south near the east-west UTM coortween 2ACR and the 1st UK Armoured Division to the dinate line 00 Northing, 2nd ACRs E- (Eagle) Troop
south and the early movements of the day involved re- received re from an Iraqi dismounted outpost, a dugorienting the Regiments squadrons and coordinating with in Iraqi ZSU-23-4 and several occupied buildings in an
1st UK Armored Division along the new boundary, the 80 Iraqi village. The American scouts returned re with
their tanks and Bradleys, silenced the Iraqi guns, took
Northing.[16]
prisoners, and continued east. They advanced three more
The aviation squadron led by Lt. Colonel Don Olson eskilometers east to the 70 Easting line. More enemy re
tablished a screen along the 50 Easting by 7 a.m. and by
came in and was immediately returned.
8 a.m. the armored cavalry squadrons had moved into
their new zones. Third Squadron, operating in the center, destroyed a T-72 tank before 8 a.m., establishing the
rst ground contact with the Iraqi Republican Guards

73 Easting

(Lt. Colonel Kobbe had pulled his Troop F out of the

Second Squadrons leading echelon when his zone narrowed.) The operation escalated into a full-out battle as
E Troop (call sign Eagle) maneuvered to the 70 Easting around 3:45 p.m. Heavy combat then spread to the
south as I Troop of the Third Squadron closed the gap between the two squadrons and joined the ght. G Troops
attack to the north of Captain H. R. McMaster's E Troop
made contact with defending units farther east and combat there became intense around 4:45 p.m. Fighting continued into darkness as the Iraqi division commander reinforced the 18th Brigade with his 9th Armored Brigade
in the G Troop zone.
At 4:10 p.m. Eagle Troop received re from an Iraqi
infantry position in a cluster of buildings at UTM PU
6801.[20][21] Eagle troop Abrams and Bradleys returned
re, silenced the Iraqi guns, took prisoners, and continued
east with the two tank platoons leading. The 12 M1A1
tanks of Eagle Troop destroyed 28 Iraqi tanks, 16 personnel carriers and 30 trucks in 23 minutes with no American
losses.[22]

At about 4:20 Eagle crested a low rise and surprised an

Iraqi tank company set up in a reverse slope defence on
the 70 Easting. Captain McMaster, leading the attack,
The Battle of 73 Easting refers narrowly to the violent arimmediately engaged that position, destroying the rst of
mored combat action that took place in the nal hours
the eight enemy tanks to his front. His two tank platoons
of 2nd ACRs covering force operation in the zone of
nished the rest.
Second Squadron and in the northern third of the Third
Squadron zone. In the battle, four of the 2nd ACRs ar- Three kilometers to the east McMaster could see T-72s
mored cavalry troops, Troops E, G, and I with Troop K in prepared positions. Continuing his attack past the 70
contributing to I Troops ght (totaling about 36 M1A1 limit of advance, he fought his way through an infantry
tanks), defeated two enemy brigades, the Tawakalna Di- defensive position and on to high ground along the 74
visions 18th Brigade and, later in the day, the 9th Ar- Easting. There he encountered and destroyed another enemy tank unit of eighteen T-72s. In that action the Iraqis
mored Brigade.
stood their ground and attempted to maneuver against the
The defending Iraqi forces, elements of Tawakalnas 18th
troop. This was the rst determined defense the RegMechanized Brigade and the 12th Armored Divisions
iment had encountered in its three days of operations.
9th Armored Brigade, had arrived in their positions on
Still, the Iraqi troops had been surprised because of the
the evening of 24 February and had oriented to the west
inclement weather and were quickly destroyed by the betto protect the main supply route, the IPSA pipeline Road,
ter trained and better equipped American troops.
just to their rear.[18] The Iraqi resistance that 2ACR met
on the previous day had been from the 50th Armored After defeating that force, McMaster sent a scout platoon
Brigade whose mission had been to cover the preparation of two Bradleys north to regain contact with Troop G.
In doing that the scout platoon encountered another Iraqi
of that defense.
tank position of thirteen T-72s which they destroyed with
The Battle was part of the larger operation and, as it went
TOW missiles.[23]
on, the Third and First Squadron troops in the southern
part of the zone continued to ght through the security Other 2nd ACR Troops I (call sign Iron), K (Killer),
area of the Republican Guard and x enemy units of the and G (Ghost) joined the ght minutes later. Iron
12th Armored Division. First Squadron, the Regiments Troop of Third Squadron had halted around the 67 Eastsouthernmost squadron cleared its zone of remnants of ing to control the limit of advance with its tank cannon.
the 50th Armored Brigade before making contact with As the troop moved north to secure its northern boundary
the 37th Brigade of the 12th Iraqi Armored Division, around 4:45, it came under re from the same group of
ghting to the south of the Tawakalna Division.[19] Scout buildings E Troop had fought through an hour earlier.
and attack helicopters of Fourth Squadron and 2-1 Avi- Captain Dan Miller, commanding I Troop, silenced the
ation Battalion (AH-64 Apache) supported the ght as resistance with return re then attacked to the 70 Eastweather allowed.
ing. There he confronted T-72s in defensive positions
Iraqi T-62 knocked out by 3rd Armored Division re.

The Regiment moved from the 60 Easting with eight of south of those E Troop had just destroyed. With initial
its nine cavalry troops generally abreast of each other. support from Captain Mac Haszards K Troop, Millers

4 74 EASTING AND BEYOND

tanks destroyed sixteen enemy tanks on that position and

then attacked through it. Just beyond the defenses I Troop
observed another formation of enemy tanks moving in its
direction and attacked it with tank and TOW re. During that engagement, TOW missile re from a K Troop
Bradley struck and destroyed an I Troop Bradley wounding all three crewmen.[24] Before returning to positions
along the 70 Easting, I Troop located the defending battalions command post and destroyed its command bunker
and security forces.[25]

Artillery re and air strikes played a large role in the

battle, especially in the far north. In direct support of
2nd ACR, Colonel Garrett Bournes 210th FA Brigade
red missions out to the 78 Easting. Close air support
missions struck targets in greater depth, preventing some
Iraqi units from closing with G Troop or escaping the
battle area. Attack helicopters ew in support of air
scouts at key intervals during the day and the 2-1 Aviation Battalions Apache helicopters, led by Lt. Colonel
Jon Ward, destroyed two batteries of enemy artillery and
struck march units along the IPSA Pipeline Road at 4:30
By 4:40, Captain Joe Sartianos G Troop had gained a po[27][28]
sition on a ridge overlooking a wadi at and parallel to the p.m., just as the battle began in earnest.
73 Easting, north of E Troop. As the Regiments north- In total, the Regimental Fire Support Ocer reported
ernmost unit, G Troop secured an open ank until the 3rd employing 1,382 rounds of 155mm howitzer ammunition
Armored Divisions cavalry squadron arrived to occupy (high explosive, dual-purpose improved munitions and
its own positions along the 70 Easting.
rocket assisted HE projectiles) and 147 MLRS rockets
[29]
The 210th FA Brigade Commander
Sartianos men engaged Iraqi 18th Brigade tanks in defen- on February 26.
estimated
that
his
two
FA battalions and single MLRS, C
sive positions initially. Very quickly, however, G Troop
Battery
4th
27th
FA,
destroyed
17 tanks, seven APCs, six
found itself facing counterattacks by tank units of both
artillery
pieces
and
around
70
other
vehicles. The numthe Tawakalna Division and the Iraqi 12th Armored Diber
of
vehicles
damaged
by
artillery
was greater. The
vision. Additionally other Iraqi units attempted to retreat
number
of
enemy
infantry
casualties
caused
by indirect
to the north along the wadi and that led them directly into
re
proved
impossible
to
determine
but
almost
certainly
G Troops position.
exceeded the thirty infantrymen claimed.[30]
By 6:30, the rst of several waves of Iraqi T-72 and T-55
tanks advanced into the wadi. Fierce ghting ensued as Sporadic re continued throughout the night but no major engagements occurred after 10 p.m. The Regiment
wave after wave of tanks and infantry charged the troop.
Combat became so intense at times that only massed ar- used artillery re and some close air support between the
end of active ghting and the arrival of the 1st Infantry
tillery and mortar res, attack helicopters and Air Force
close air support prevented the enemy from closing with Division at the line of contact.
G Troop. At one point a Military Intelligence (MI) Pla- Based on the intelligence gained during the battle,
toon from the 2nd ACRs 502nd MI Company had to sus- Colonel Holder advised the Corps Commander that the
pend its signal intelligence operation and return the re of 1st Infantry Division should pass through the southern
Iraqi soldiers who exited a burning BMP-1 and continued units of the Regiment. Committing the Division in that
area would keep it clear of the chaotic post-battle condito attack.
During the erce six-hour battle, the G Troop re sup- tions to the north and, more importantly, would steer the
port team called in 720 howitzer and MLRS rounds while main attack around now known positions of the Republiusing its own mortars continually to turn back attack- can Guard divisions.
ers at close range. By 9 p.m., G Troop had expended
all its TOW missiles and was becoming desperately short
on 25mm and 120mm cannon ammunition. To remedy
the emergency, Lt Colonel Kobbe sent his tank company,
Captain Bruce Tylers Company H (Hawk), to relieve
the troop. By then, G Troop had destroyed at least two
companies of Iraqi armor. Hundreds of Iraqi infantrymen and their lightly armored transporters lay scattered
on the wadi oor.[19]
G Troop lost one M3 Bradley to Iraqi IFV re and one soldier, Sergeant Nels A. Moller, the gunner of the Bradley,
was killed. The Bradleys TOW launcher was inoperative,
and the 25mm Bushmaster Cannon had jammed. While
the crew was attempting to get the cannon back in action,
an Iraqi BMP-1 which was thought to be disabled with
a tank shell punched through its armor, red and hit the
vehicles turret with 73 mm cannon re. Moller died instantly and the remainder of the crew evacuated the damaged vehicle.[26]

Lt. General Franks accepted that recommendation and,

beginning around 2 a.m. two brigades of the 1st Infantry
Division passed through the Regiments positions along
the 70 Easting. When the Division had completed passage of all its combat units around 6 a.m. the Second
Cavalry Regiment became part of VII Corps reserve.

4 74 Easting and beyond

By 22:30, the battle at 2nd ACRs front, at 74 Easting, was ending with most of the engaged Iraqi elements
burning or destroyed as the 1st Infantry Division began
its forward passage of lines. The 1st Infantry Division
passed through the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiments line
in total darkness and continued to advance on Objective Norfolk, an area encompassing the intersection of
the IPSA Pipeline Road, several desert trails, and a large
Iraqi supply depot. Now, instead of three armored cav-

4.1

Battle of Norfolk

5
toon. From the perspective of the tank gunners looking
through the thermal sights of the approaching M1 tanks,
these ashes appeared to be T-55 tanks shooting at them.
The young and exhausted American gunners, convinced
they were ghting against a determined enemy, opened
re and hit three more Bradleys. The brigade commander, Colonel David Weisman, decided to pull the battalions back, consolidate, and use his artillery to destroy the
aggressive Iraqi infantry.

4.1 Battle of Norfolk

Iraqi Type 69 tanks after an attack by the 1st United Kingdom
Armoured Division during Operation Desert Storm.

Main article: Battle of Norfolk

The forces involved in the battle were the American 1st
Infantry Division, the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Armored
Division (fwd) (Hell on Wheels) and the Iraqi 18th Mechanized and 9th Armored Brigades of the Republican
Guard Tawakalna Mechanized Infantry Division along
with elements from eleven other Iraqi divisions including
the Iraqi 26th, 48th, 31st, and 25th Infantry Divisions.[32]
The Iraqi 52nd Armored Division was also present.[33]
The British elded their 1st Armoured Division.[34]

Task Force 1-41 Infantry would spearhead the American assault into Objective Norfolk. The Iraqis had halted
the 1st Infantry Divisions initial push into their sector
only temporarily. By 00:30, 27 February, the two attacking brigades of the 1st Infantry Division were positioned
along the 75 Easting, 2,000 meters east of 73 Easting. In
what has since been dubbed the Battle of Norfolk, they
Wrecked Bradley IFV K-12 burns after being hit by Iraqi tank crossed the remaining ten kilometers to their objective,
Objective Norfolk, over the next three hours. By dawn,
re during the rst stages of the battle
the 1st Infantry Division had taken Objective Norfolk and
the ght shifted away from the 73 Easting area to 1st Aralry squadrons, the Iraqi 18th and 37th Armored Brigades mored Divisions attack to the north, started at 20:00 on
faced six heavy battalions of American tanks and infantry 26 February, and the 3rd Armored Division attack just to
ghting vehicles and another six battalions of 155 mm the south of the 1st Division.
eld artillery. At approximately 23:30, yet another en- The British 1st Armoured division was responsible for
counter took place: Lt Colonel Taylor Joness 3rd Battal- protecting the right ank of VII Corps. It was assumed
ion, 66th Armor, ran into an Iraqi tank battalion equipped by the corps planners the Iraqi 52nd Armored Division
with T-55s. As before, the Iraqis did not run or surren- would counterattack 7th Corps once their penetration into
der, but manned their vehicles and weapons to face the Iraqi defenses was discovered. The British 1st Armoured
advancing Americans. Initially, many American units ad- Division had two brigades which participated in Operavanced past Iraqi tanks and crews, who were in shelters or tion Desert Storm. The 4th and 7th Brigades. They would
had not yet turned on their engines and so did not appear both rotate responsibilities as the lead brigade. The 1st
to be threats in the American crews thermal sights.
Armoured was equipped with the Challenger main batA slightly disoriented Bradley platoon, attempting to follow the M1 tanks, moved across the front of these Iraqi
positions, illuminated by burning vehicles behind them.
The Iraqis took advantage of this excellent target and
opened re from three directions. The initial volley hit
a Bradley, killing three American soldiers.[31] An American tank company trailing the lead units observed the
Iraqi re and joined the melee, quickly destroying three
T-55s before they could get o another shot. At the same
time, several small antitank rockets hit the Bradley pla-

tle tank. With a 120mm ried main gun, thermal optics, and Chobham armor, its only rival in theatre was
the American M1A1 Abrams tank. British infantry rode
into battle on the Warrior infantry ghting vehicle. It had
reasonable armor protection and a 30-mm gun. Modied versions of the vehicle included mortar carriers, Milan antitank systems, and command and control vehicles;
and the British possessed a variety of excellent light armored vehicles built on their Scorpion chassis. British artillery was primarily American made M-109s (155mm),

6 NOTES

M110s (203mm), and MLRS systems which were compatible with American systems. Their air support consisted of Gazelle helicopters, used for reconnaissance,
and the Lynx helicopter. The British had their full contingent of engineer, logistics, and medical units.[35]
This division was commanded by forty-seven-year-old
Maj. General Rupert Smith. He was a member of the
British Parachute Regiment and he was an expert on Soviet armor and tank tactics. His division had two brigades
at its disposal. The 4th Brigade, reinforced with extra
engineers and artillery, was used for breakout operations
and to clear the ground at the breach. The armor heavy
7th Brigade was used for tank on tank engagements.[36]
On 25 February 1991 the 1st Armoured Division would
smash into the western ank of the Iraqi 48th Infantry
Division which was commanded by Brig. General Saheb Mohammed Alaw. That night the 48th Infantry Division was destroyed and General Alaw was captured by the
British. That same night the British cleared two lines of
enemy positions during close combat engagements. The
British also destroyed several Iraqi companies of T-55
tanks.[37] That same night other elements of the division
were engaging the Iraqi 31st Infantry Division.[38]

Destroyed Iraqi tanks burning at the Battle of Norfolk during the

1st Gulf War, February 1991.

On 26 February 1991 British artillery units unleashed

an hour long artillery strike on Iraqi positions. It was
the greatest British artillery display since World War
Two. That same night the British 7th Brigade fought a
night tank battle against an Iraqi tank battalion from the
Iraqi 52nd Armored Division. After ninety minutes of
battle over 50 Iraqi tanks and armored personnel carriers were destroyed.[39] That same night the British 4th
Brigade destroyed a headquarters and artillery site belonging to the 807th Brigade of the Iraqi 48th Infantry
Division. British infantry units cleared Iraqi defensive
positions which were occupied by the Iraqi 803rd Infantry Brigade.[40] After 48 hours of combat, the British
1st Armoured Division assisted in destroying or isolating four Iraqi infantry divisions(the 26th, 48th, 31st, and
25th), and had massacred the Iraqi 52nd Armored Division in several sharp engagements. By midnight there
was no more organized Iraqi resistance between the 1st
Armoured Division and the Persian Gulf.[41]

The 2nd ACR, which advanced between the Iraqi 12th

Armored Division and the Tawakalna Division, was the
only American ground unit to nd itself signicantly outnumbered and out-gunned. Nonetheless, the 2nd ACRs
three squadrons, along with the 1st Infantry Divisions
two leading brigades, destroyed two Iraqi brigades (18th
Mechanized Brigade and 37th Armored Brigade) of the
Tawakalna Division. In moving to and through the Battle
of 73 Easting, 2nd ACR and the 1st Infantry divisions
lead brigades(2nd Armored Division(FWD)) destroyed
160 tanks, 180 personnel carriers, 12 artillery pieces and
more than 80 wheeled vehicles, along with several antiaircraft artillery systems during the battle.[45]

On 27 February 1991 the British 1st Armoured Division

secured the nal objectives on the Basra Highway north
of Multa Ridge.[42] The British 1st Armoured Division
had traveled 217 miles in 97 hours. The 1st Armored
Division had captured or destroyed about 200 tanks and a
very large number of armoured personnel carriers, trucks,
reconnaissance vehicles, etc.[43]

eration the Regiment covered the advance of three different U.S. divisions in turn, moved 120 miles in eightytwo hours and fought elements of ve Iraqi Divisions.[44]
The violent battle at 73 Easting xed the southern forces
of the Iraqi Republican Guard Corps and permitted the
Corps Commander to launch First Infantry Division into
the depths of the Iraqi defenses and on into Kuwait.

The equivalent of an Iraqi brigade was destroyed at 73

Easting; it was the rst ground defeat of the Republican
Guard.

6 Notes
[1] Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by
Bourque, p.43
[2] Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by
Bourque P.247
[3] Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by
Bourque P.164

Signicance of the battle

The Battle of 73 Easting and the movement to contact

south of the battle brought the Regiments covering force
mission for VII Corps to its conclusion. During the op-

[4] Bourque, p.331

[5] Bourque pp.134, 144, 377
[6] http://www.checkpoint-online.ch/CheckPoint/Histoire/
His0010-CombatTawakalna.html

[7] Tawakalna Division

[8] Houlahan 1999, p. 332
[9] Brieng, Battle of 73 Easting. The Middle East Institute.

[34] Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by

Bourque, p.260
[35] Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by
Bourque, p.260

[10] Hillman 1993, p. 6.

[36] Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by

Bourque, p.261

[11] Stephen A. Bourque (Autumn 1997). The last battle of

division Tawakalna, jewel of the Republican Guard. The
Middle East Journal 51 (4). Retrieved January 5, 2011.

[37] Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by

Bourque, p.275

[12] VUA Citation.

[38] Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by

Bourque, p.275

[13] Atkinson, Rick (1993). Crusade: The Untold Story of the

Persian Gulf War. Houghton Miin Company. ISBN
978-0-395-60290-4

[39] Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by

Bourque, p.275

[14] Tawakalna Division

[40] Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by

Bourque, p.276

[15] Michael D. Krause, The Battle of 73 Easting, 26 February 1991, A Joint Center of Military History and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Project, 24
May 1991

[41] Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by

Bourque, p.377

[16] Extract of the Second Armored Cavalry Regiments Operations Log, Second Armored Cavalry, ca. April 1991
[17] Houlahan, Thomas (1999). Gulf War: the complete history. Schrenker Military Publishing, p 325. ISBN 09668456-0-9
[18] Bourque. Jayhawk!. p. 310.

[42] Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by

Bourque, p.377
[43] Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: nal report to Congress.
United States. Dept. of Defense. 1992.
[44] Lute, The Regiments Perspective, IDA Conference papers, p. I-115.
[45] Houlahan 1999, p. 332

[19] Bourque. Jayhawk!. p. 330.

[20] Atkinson, p. 443

7 References

[21] Regimental Operations Log Summary, p. 11

[22] Battle of 73 Easting (video).
[23] Houlahan 1999, p. 328
[24] Rick Atkinson, p. 444
[25] Lt. Colonel Scott Marcy, Memorandum for Record, Operation DESERT STORM, Headquarters 3d Squadron, 2d
ACR, 8 March 1991
[26] Atkinson. Crusade. p. 446.
[27] Houlahan 1999, pp. 3289
[28] Bourque. Jayhawk!. p. 331.
[29] Major John Klemencic, Regimental Fire Support Ocer,
Fire Support Mission Summary
[30] 210 FA Brigade, Battle Damage Assessment, Operation
Desert Storm, undated, ca. March 1991.
[31] Bourque, p.335
[32] Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by
Bourque, p.144
[33] Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by
Bourque, p.377

Ghost Troop, Battle at 73 Easting. Crawley,

Vince, Armor, MayJune 1991, VOL C, #3.
The 2nd ACR at the Battle of 73 Easting. Davis,
1LT Daniel L., Field Artillery Journal, PB 6-92-2,
Apr 92, Pg 48.
A Swift Kick, 2nd ACRs Taming of the Guard.
Army Times, 5 Aug 1991.
Dragons Roar: 1-37 Armor in the Battle of 73
Easting. Armor, MayJune 1992, VOL CI, #3.
Draft Report The Battle of 73 Easting, 26 February 1991, a historical introduction to a simulation.
Krause, Col Michael, US Army Center of Military
History, 2 May 1991.
Warriors Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting, retired Colonel Douglas A. MacGregor Naval
Institute Press, Fall 2009. ISBN 1591145058
Crusade: The Untold Story of the Gulf War, Rick
Atkinson, HarperCollins, London 1994; Houghton
Miin, Boston 1993. ISBN 0-395-71083-9 OCLC
28378277

8
Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War,
Stephen A. Borque, Center of Military History Publication 70-73-1, Washington, DC, 2002.
Second Armored Cavalry Regiment: Operation
Desert Storm, Major Steve Gravlin, Troop Information Paper, Headquarters 2d ACR, April 1991
Gulf War, The Complete History, Thomas Houlahan,
Schrenker Military Publishing, New London, NH,
1999
Summary of Fire Missions, 25 and 26 February
1991, Major John Klemencic, Second Armored
Cavalry Regiment, February 1991
Memorandum for Record, Operation DESERT
STORM, Lt. Colonel Scott Marcy, Headquarters 3d
Squadron, 2d ACR, 8 March 1991
Conference Papers from 73 Easting: Lessons
Learned from Desert Storm via Advanced Distributed Simulation Technology, 2729 August
1991, J. Orlansky and J Thorpe, editors, IDA Doc
D-1110, IDA, Alexandria VA, April 1992. (Including presentations by Major General Paul Funk,
3rd Armored Division, Keynote Address"; Colonel
Mike Krause, Center for Military History, Presentation of the 73 Easting Battle"; Colonel (ret.) Gary
Bloedorn, Institute for Defense Analysis, Data Collection Methodology"; Major Douglas Lute, Headquarters Department of the Army, The Battle of 73
Easting: The Regiments Perspective)
Extract of the Second Armored Cavalry Regiments Operations Log, Headquarters Second Armored Cavalry, ca. April 1991
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to
Congress. United States. Dept. of Defense. 1992.

External links
Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells
Us About the Future of Conict, by Stephen Biddle. From International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2
(Fall 1996)
An account of Ghost Troops ght, by Stars and
Stripes
Douglas MacGregors presentation on Warriors
Rage: the Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting at the
Pritzker Military Library

EXTERNAL LINKS

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