World Attairs How Patient Are People in Post-Communist Societies? Rickard Rose i professor at the Contre for the Sad of Public Policy Universit of Stable Glasgow. Scoand By RICHARD ROSE uthoritarian regimes are good at teaching people to wait. Patience is needed whether Subjects are waiting for the realization of the regime's promised goals or forthe collapse of a sysiem that is sullenly bome. Subjects from Prague 10 the Baltic states learned to bear up patiently under regimes imposed after the arival ‘of Soviet troops atthe end of World War Tl. Sovi ct rulers preached the need for patience with existing socialism while waiting for the achieve: ‘ment of the eventual goal of pure coramunisi. Revolutionaries who try to overthrow an authoritarian regime also require patience. In tsarist Russia, Lenin and his colleagues were prepared to work for more than a quarter-centu ry, suffering imprisonment, exile, and the risk of execution, in the hope that some day their time would come. Nationalist movements must bee patient, for the boundaries of a state are not easily changed: nonetheless, groups such as the Quebec Nationalists persevere. During World War Il and afterward, exiled leaders of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania refused to accept the de facto integration oftheir territories in the Sovi= et Union. They patiently maintained that the three Baltic countries should be independent, {goal finally achieved in 1992, Evolutionary theories of democracy neces- sarily require patience, a point that is often left implicit rather than considered as a necessary condition (and conceivably, an obstacle) for democratization, Dahl's (1971, 451 discussion fof the creation of stable polyarchies stresses that they are “more likely to result from rather slow evolutionary processes than from the rev lutionary overthrow of existing hegemonies”: he cites Britain as an example, In Britain, the CChartist demands for such things as one pe fone vote, were first voiced in the 1830s but not achieved in almost full form until 1918, and not Conwicht © 2001. All Richta Reserved. entirely until 1949. In the eases of undemoerat- ie societies that lack Britain's history, Dahl (1971, 47) has implicitly called for patience. declaring that the move to democracy’ is provess, measured in generations.” Since the collapse of communism, patience remains important in dealing with the legacy of the socialist experiment. This is most evident ‘when countries are trying to introduce a market economy without all of the institutions yet in place to make it work properly. Whether people regard current costs of transition as worth later benefits depends on whether they are patient. Politically, half the work of transition—the deconstruction of the Communist system—has ‘been accomplished, The repressive apparatus of security police and censorship has been dis ‘mantled, along with restrictions on internation: al communication and travel. Free competitive elections have been introduce ‘and do vote against the government of the day However, the construction of a stable democra cy requires patience while waiting for the ere ation of new institutions of governance and rep- resentation. Authoritarian rule has left behind skepticism or distrust of most institutions ot civil society (Mishler and Rose fortheoming). I changes in political culture are required, this could take & generation or more, and the more path-dependent the process, the greater the resistance to change is likely to be (cf. Putnam 1993). In Germany after 1945, it required decades and an economic miracle before there way mass commitment 10 tutions of the Federal Republic (ef. Weil 1987: Institut flr Demoskopie 1981). In post-Franco Spain, such commitment came faster, but there ‘was careful preparation for the death of Franco, making it possible for elites to “hargain” for a democratic constitution, ‘The concept of patience is much more famil- jar in theology or biblic and citizens ean 1e democratic insti exegesis, for exaim-You 159No.3__WINTER 1997 1 ple, the Book of Job, than it is in political sci- fence. Even though Max Weber's (1948, 128) description of polities as the “strong and slow boring of hard boards” is well known, he made this remark as an aside in a passage emphasi ing radical action by a heroic, and potentially impatient, leader. Hence, this article seeks to define patience and distinguish it from other ways in which individuals may respond to authoritarian regimes—and what comes after- ward—and then (0 use survey data from eight post-Communist countries—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Belarus, and Ukraine—to show the significance of patience for mass response to the problems of moving from authoritarianism to democracy. PATIENCE IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIM! Political regimes are “sticky” complexes of institutions that cannot be changed easily or fre quently, Like itor not, subjects of such a regime ‘must be prepared to accept its authority indefi- ly, In-an established democracy, there is no ancy between future expectations and current assessment, for the institutions of the regime are secure. If people are dissatisfied with the government of the day. they can vote for a change of government, and the period between elections is normally no more than four years. Insofar as the behavior of politicians is motivated by anticipated reaction of voters at the next election, the waiting time for the removal of grievances is thereby reduced. In an authoritarian regime, time horizons are long, for there is no prospect of changing the government through a free election a few months or a few years hence. People who want a change in regime must wait indefinitely, for horitariam regime does not limit its dura- tion, and the lifespan of a personalistic dictator is difficult to calculate. Subjects do not know whether they or the regime will dic first. Yet even though the scope for public activity against an authoritarian regime is very limited, in the privacy of their minds individuals have the subjective freedom to respond in very dif ferent ways, including fatalistic resignation, positive acceptance, patience, or impatience, leading to frustration and anomie protest Responses to an Authoritarian Regime ‘A new regime can most easily deliver imme- diate satisfaction to the mass of the population if it replaces a highly unpopular predecessor. Since authoritarian regimes differ greatly in the degree of repression that they impose on their subjects (Linz 1975), a new authoritarian regime may be preferred as the lesser evil. But dissatisfaction nonetheless remains, In Central and Eastern Europe, new popular front regimes could claim some support insofar as they replaced Nazi occupation forces. But once non- Communist elements were purged, their claim to be an improvement usually paled Authoritarian regimes are not about what people want but about what the regime wants; the object of such a regime is to gain the com: pliance of its subjects, who are expected to do ‘what the government demands and to avoid public expression of dissatisfaction with the regime (Rose 1969). Compliance makes an Authoritarian regime stable, with some (but not all) of the attributes of legitimacy, such as recognition by foreign states and by social sei- entists as an object of study. ‘The dualism encouraged by a repressive rogime makes outward behavior a poor guide t0 the values and attitudes of repressed subjects Existentally, subjects usually lack the choice between exit, voice, and loyalty (ef. Hirschman 1970; 1993). An outward show of compliance was coerced: voice was subject t© sanctions; and exit was prohibited or allowed only in extreme and risky circumstances, Censorship ensures that opinions expressed in public are state-licensed, Views regarded in democracies as public opinion must be kept private (ef Noelle-Neumann 1993), Elections are occa- sions for the mass mobilization of subjects «0 register a token show of endorsement. The clas- sic Herbert Simon model of satisficing— searching for an alternative in response to dis satisfaction—cannot operate, for people are not free to search for an alternative. ‘The simplest response of repressed subjects is fatalistie resignation. It tends to support a low-level equilibrium in which there is efficient exercise of nonlegitimate authority. A subject yields to the regime what it demands and gives ‘up hope that the country will have another regime in the future—but does not positively support the regime as desirable or right. Fatal- ism may arise from belief that a regime is willed by forces beyond the control of individ ual human beings. A transformatory religion ccan promise thatthe burdens of this world must bbe accepted as the price that must be paid for the enjoyment of benefits in the world here- after, Fatalism may also be a rational response to the powers of the state over the individual: Conwicht © 2001. All Richta Reserved.2. Mort Affairs TET can’t change the system, [had better earn to live with it” In the words of the inquisitor in Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at Noon, “There is no life outside the party.” Resignation involves least friction if a regime does not seek much from parochial sub jects. According t0 Almond and Verba (1963, 18), in such a system, “the specialized agencies of central government might hardly touch the ‘consciousness of those nominally subject tothe regime’s political authority.” However, in a regime with a totalitarian vocation, itis dificult for an individual to be isolated from the state At a minimum, individuals are expected to be ‘compliant subjects. In response to Communist efforts at mobi- lization, resignation to the reality of Commu- hist power encouraged the development of what Hungarian sociologist Blemer Hankiss has described as “ironic freedom, that is, the free- dom of living outside the system in which they lived: the freedom of not identifying themselves with the system” (1990, 7; italics in the origi- nal), Soviet totalitarianism went further, en- ccouraging a dual personality, “two persons in ‘one body.” with “two sides, the hidden one and the visible one” (Dudintsev, quoted in White 1979, 111). The visible person complied with What the authorities wanted; the hidden person remained skeptical. This system of insttution- alized hypocrisy explains two phenomena— ‘outward compliance with Communist regimes For four decades, and their abrupt collapse when the capacity to coerce compliance was broken, Through a mixture of constrains and incen- tives, over time an authoritarian regime may achieve voluntary acceptance from many citi- zens. Initially, ideological idealism may moti- vate some. A generation socialized in an era of stark choice between communism and Nazism ‘contained some idealists, bat that “heroic” age is ow past. Aging can encourage acceptance of the Communist regime (Rose and Carmaghan 1995), At all times, there were mundane incen: lives fo go along with the regime. The inability to obtain promotion at work, & decent flat, or ‘educational benefits for children without a party card and the material benefits of rising in the nromenklatura encouraged people to like the hand that fed them. Soviet regimes sought to ‘puy” acceptance, hoping that material benefits ‘would lead to compliance with laws and accep- tance of Communist authority. Brezhnev’s social contract, a form of "welfare state authoritarian ism:" promised rising material living standards to workers in exchange for quiescent compliance Conwicht © 2001. All Richta Reserved. (Breslauer 1978), a tactic also tried by Bismarck in late-nineteenth-century Germany. However. an authoritarian regime could pursue this strate- gy only as long as it could produce the material ‘goods needed to buy compliance. Patience is derived from the Latin and Greek root for suffering; it is not only about the will ingness of an individual to wait, but also about ‘enduring dissatisfaction without knowing when ‘or whether the source of dissatisfaction will be removed. Patient subjects are likely to comply with the demands of an authoritarian regime: that is part of the indignity tha is suffered. But their motive is different from those who accept the regime or are fatalistically resigned to the powers that be, Patient people do not abandon hhope that, sooner oF later, conditions will be transformed and the current cause of suffering will be gone. However, in the absence of clear evidence about how long the current regime will be able to impose its authoritarian com- ‘mands, patience must rely on an incalculable hope about the future. Patience encourages peo- ple to suffer in the face of discouragement and difficulties. For example, Rosa Parks patiently endured the indignities of being a black wornan in the Deep South for forty-one years before she refused to move to the back of a Jim Crow bus in Montgomery, Alabama in 1955, Impatience is politically significant because its consequences can be immediately manifest. Whereas patience leads to silent reservations about coercive authority, impatience can gener- ate public protest, Protesters differ from patient subjects in their time horizon; they want to do something about a repressive regime und they want to do it now. Not surprisingly, protesters tend (© be youthful—and they are invariably a ‘minority of youth. Impatient protesters tend to differ from patient revolutionaries, forthe latter will avoid protests when the time is not ripe to secure their goals, Frustration among people unwilling to suffer indefinitely the gap between their political wants and the actions of the regime in power can lead 10 nonviolent protests that can spill over into violence initiated by those trying to suppress the protest or by those making it (ef. Gurr 1970), Protests are anomie insofar as they are expressive activities rather than part of a calculated strategy for over: throwing an unwanted regime. Many Central and East European protests against Communist regimes were more of less spontaneous. The organized protest of Solidarnose in Poland. which gained demonstrators « negotiating posi tion vis vis the regime, was the exceptionVo. 159'No.3 WINTER 1997 183 ‘THE EXTENT OF POLITICAL PATIENCE, ‘The need for patience remains great in the new post-Communist regimes of Central and ern Europe, for a double transformation is in process—the introduction of a pluralist poli ical regime and the replacement ofthe old com: ‘mand economy with some type of market econ: ‘omy. The free movement of information and people enables people to see how much their ‘material well-being has fallen behind that in Western Europe and can create a desire (0 ‘catch up" and unrealistic expectations about how quickly it is possible to catch up. New leaders have not had time to learn how to make use of the best features of new institutions and how to dispose of the legacy of Communist rule, Insofar as the fall of the old regime was welcomed, the new regime can ask for patience while it deals with problems inherited from the old regime. But whether patience is forthcom: ing depends upon the disposition of the mass of the electorate Measuring Patience and Impatience A representative sample survey is the appro- priate method for measuring the extent of mass patience and impatience. In Communist times, it was difficult to conduct such surveys (cf. Connor and Gitelman 1977; Mason 1985; Gollin. 1992) and virtually impossible to ask about such politically sensitive matters as the presence or absence of popular support for the regime. Therefore, we cannot measure the sub- jective altitudes of individuals at the height of ‘Communist power. But we can use opinion sur- vveys to measure what is important here and row, such as the extent of patience with a post- ‘Communist regime. These atitudes are likely to reflect how people evaluate the legacy of the ‘old as well as the new regime. Moreover, since row regimes lack the coercive powers that the ‘old regimes had, post-1990 governors have much greater need for forbearance. ‘The survey data analyzed here come from the third annual New Democracies Barometer (NDB) of the Paul Lazarsfeld Society, Vienna, Which included a novel measure of political patience. In each country an established nation- al research institute conducts face-to-face inter views with & nationwide probability sample of adults aged eighteen and above, stratified by region, city size, and urban/rural residence dwork took place between late November 1993 and April 1994, with a total of 8,030 inter- views. Samples were checked afterward for representativeness in terms of three standard census variables—age, education, and gen- cder—and minor weighting introduced as appro- priate (for full questionnaire and sample details, see Rose and Haerpfer 1994) Comparison provides a valuable tool for determining how much is “a lot” or “a little” patience, und it is also necessary for testing hypotheses rather than adducing generaliza- tions from the study of a single country. Eight different post-Communist countries—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Roma- nia, Slovenia, Belarus, and the Ukraine—are analyzed here.’ Under communism, these regimes differed in the extent to which they ‘were repressive. In the mid-1980s, Freedom House classified Bulgaria and Romania at the bottom of its seven-point Freedom House scale of freedom and democracy, along with the whole of the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia was almost at the bottom, while Hungary and the whole of Yugoslavia were on the borderline between unfree and partly free (Gastil 1987, 41D, Since the fall of communism, all countries have improved their position on the Freedom House scale (1996, 15). The Czech Republic and Hungary have ratings as high as Britain, France, or Germany, and Bulgaria is now rated as positively as Greece or Tully. Even countries today classified as only partly free, such as Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Belarus, have improved their position substantially from a decade ago. Subjects who were patiently waiting for a new and freer regime have had their hopes ‘met—at least up (0 a point, But the introduction of a pluralistic regime has not meant the end of problems of governance. New economic prob- Tems have arisen, such as extremely high infla tion rates and unprecedented prospects of unemployment. Mistakes of government give ammunition to critics, and electoral competi tion gives opposition parties incentives to attack it, Throughout Central and Eastern urope there are historical precedents for fur- ther regime change, since fledgling democra- cies introduced there in the aftermath of World War I collapsed and (ured authoritarian or totalitarian in the 1920s or early 1930s. Insofar as people with high hopes of political transtor- mation in 1990 have become impatient, democ- racy could collapse again (cf. Diamond 1996), To measure the degree of political patience or impatience, the New Democracies Barometer asked people to choose between two alterna- tives—Ir will take years for government ro deal Conwicht © 2001. All Richta Reserved.With the problems inherited from the Commu nists, OR If our system can't produce results Soon, that’ a good reason toy some others tem of government, Respondents were also asked whether they definitely orto some extent agreed with ther chosen altemative, thus giving a measure of intensity. The question didnot ask dividuals how long they thought it would take the new regime to deal wth problems inherited from the past, for such questions are likely 10 produce @ high proportion of “don't knows." Moreover, patience is not about waiting a spe- cific amount of time, but about persevering indefinitely inte face of hardship. The question tested impatience by ascertaining whether the respondent thinks that it may nor be desirable to persevere with the present regime and an alter ‘ative regime might become preferable. Patience is the predominant mood in post Communist countries today: 62 percent express a willingness to give the government years 10 deal with problem inherited from the Commu- nist regime (figure 1). The proportion most strongly committed to patience is almost as reat as those less firmly patient, and in Bulgar- World Attire ia, Hungary, and Slovenia, those definitely will ing to show patience actually outnumber those only somewhat willing. Among the 38 percent who are impatient, the somewhat impatient are half again more numerous than the definitely impatient; only 15 percent show a strong incli nation to impatience, Overall, replies reject the argument that if something isn't done to improve conditions soon, there will be popular revulsion against the new democracies. Up to five years after the collapse of Communist rule, the majority of peoples of Central and Eastern Europe continue to show patience with the problems faced by the new regime. The extent of pati ies substantially among post-Communist societies (figure 2). The highest level is in the Czech Republic and in Slovenia, where political and economic con ditions since transformation have been rela: tively favorable. The highest degree of impa- tience, registered by just over half the respondents, is in Belarus and Ukraine. In both former Soviet republics, a change of regime is confounded with a change in national bound aries, there are substantial Russian minorities, Q.Can you choose the statement closet to your view, and say whether you definitely orto some extent saree with it 1 will rake years for government to deal with the problems inherited from the Communists OR If our system can't produce results soon, that's a good reason to try some other system of government. ‘Somewhat patient 35% ‘Somewhat impatient 23% Soure: New Democracies Barometer I, Pas! Lazuseld Society, Vienna (1998) Total unweighted N=& 030, IRE 1. Patience and Impatience in Post-Communist Co ries Definitely patient 2% Definitely impatient 15% Conwicht © 2001. All Richta Reserved.Vou. 159.No.3__WINTER 1997 FIGURE 2. Patience and Impatience by Count E 100 Czech Slovakia Noa. Source: New Democraces Barometer I, Paul Lazaseld Society, Viena, 1994. Teal unvelghied ry in percentages Hongary Belarus @ Romania and the regimes are not yet classified as demo: cratic by Freedom House. INFLUENCES ON POLITICAL PATIENCE, Five sets of theories propose explanations of variations in patience found in every post-Com- ‘munist country: social structure, political econ ‘omy, political legacies and performance, nation- al context, and culture. Since it would be "unreasonable to expect only one theory to be all important, the appropriate way to test compet- ing explanations is to use OLS multiple regres- sion to test the relative importance of a multi- plicity of indicators for each theory, and this is done here. For convenience, the dependent vari- eis described as patience, but it is important to bear in mind that ic is actually a four-point scale, with two points measuring degrees of patience and two measuring degrees of impa- tience. Given that there are differences about patience within each country itis appropriate to follow the logic of Przeworski and Teune (1970) to treat nationality as an intervening variable; therefore, all NDB respondents are pooled into a single data set, with each country weighted equally to 1,000 cases. For clarity in exposition, each set of potential influences is discussed in turn, but the regression statistics are not calc lated on a stepwise but in a single run ‘The Influence of Social Structure, the Economy, and Polities ‘There are two contrasting ways in which social structure could influence political patience. Insofar as patience reflects fatalistic resignation, then more traditionally inclined ‘groups in society—churchgoers, older people, and those in rural areas—would be expected to bbe more patient, and young, urban, secular indi viduals most likely to want instant political gratification, Yet insofar as education improves fan individual's understanding of society, including difficulties resulting from the Com- Conwicht © 2001. All Richta Reserved. 1s136 ‘munist legacy, more educated people ought 10 bbe more understanding and thus more patient of the new regime. It is moot how gender might influence political patience. In fact, social structure has virwally no impact on an individual's degree of political patience (table 1). Age, gender, and education are statistically insignificant, thus indicating that “new politics” types are not particularly impatient. Living in a rural area does tend to make individuals more patient politically, as emphasized in studies of traditional societies. ‘While the relations are statistically significant, Wort Attirs the association of each with patience is weak (beta: .03), Substantively, on a four-point scale, a person living in a village would be less than one-fifth of a point higher in patience than someone living inthe capital city, and fre quent churchgoers less than one-sixth of point higher than those who never went to church. The absence of any link between social structure and patience is confirmed by « separate regression (not shown) using. only social structure indicators. Altogether, the five measures explain only 0.8 percent of the vari- ‘ance in patience. TABLE 1. Individual Determinants of Political Patience Social structure ‘Urban CCharchgoing Education Female Age Economies 18) Egocentric ast household finances bet Bb BewT 0s 03" 285 OF 0s 243 o 188 or 119 0 027 09-06" 585 Coping economically O29 Current family finances satisfactory om 13s Future family finances should be better or Lor Deprived of asc necessities ole 36) ‘Unemployment in family 1 6s Income 056 ) Seciotropic Inflation higher priority thar unempl. 07 os 761 Evaluation economie system in future 2 6 490 Evaluation current economic system or ost 3.77 Evaluation Communist economic system 01054 3.68 ‘Trust in market OL “O88 Politics ) Political legacy Evaluation Communist political regime 02 10-757 Prefers W. European to nat‘ traditions 08 09 7.94 Faire treatment by govt. now Greater freedom now “More influence on govt. now Formecly in Communist party Political performance Party identification 08 06% 5.10 03 oe 298, 0% 0s 2a, 7 04-352 03 M6 483 oF 03" 274 aol O86 Toual variance explained: 13.8 percent *Sigiiant at p< 0 Note Not signin indented; B values ome Source Pooled dats set Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Stveni Romani, Bear, and Ukraine, New Democracies Barometer 1, Pail Lazarstld Soviet. Vienna (199), Tota tmeighcd 9 = 030. Conwicht © 2001. All Richta Reserved.Vol 159No.3__WINTER 1997 at Economic influences are assumed to affect political attitudes in post-Communist societies as well as in established democracies and mar- ket economies (see, e.g., Lewis, Beck 1988; Prreworski 1991). Good economic conditions ‘are assumed to increase support for a regime ‘and unfavorable conditions to reduce support; therefore, those who view the economy favo ably would also be more patient politically because they are not under economic pressure In a complementary fashion, those with a nega tive economic outlook should be most inclined to impatience, favoring a change of political regime in the hope of improving conditions. “The diffuse proposition—"I's the economy. Stupid!”—begs the question: Which particular economic conditions are most influential? Is it the macroeconomic conditions of society as 2 whole, such as inflation conditions varying between individuals or households, such as income? American studies of economic influences on voting behavior (eg, Kinder and Kiewiet 1981) usually find seciotropic macroeconomic attitudes—that is, how individuals evaluate the state ofthe nation- al economy—more important than egocentric microeconomic influences. ‘A second important distinction is. whether ‘economic assessments focus on current, retro- spective, or prospective conditions (see, eg., Fiorina 1981; MacKuen, et al. 1992). If people saw their economic situation worsening by com. parison with the past, we would expect them to bbe more impatient for government to produce results, If people are concerned only with eur- rent gratification, then those who are currently ‘well off will be more patient than those who are not. Insofar as ordinary people think like bankers, then they may calculate that it pays (0 bee patient and wait for future benefits financed by current costs, a point of particular relevance in post-Communist societies. In societies in transformation, survey measures of economic conditions have special value, because official economic statistics ignore many forms of eco- nomic activity important for individual house holds, such as money earned in shadow ‘economies or nonmonetized resources, such as plot of ground for vegetables for home con- sumption (Rose 1993). The New Democracies Barometer includes twelve measures of econom= jc conditions, conventional and unconventional Sociotropic attitudes consistently exert a sig nificant influence on the extent of political patience in post-Communist societies (table 1). “Those who see inflation as a higher priority for government action than unemployment are ‘much more likely to be patient. The demand for currency stabilization is not confined to bankers; 69 percent of NDB respondents worry ‘more about inflation, a problem that affects everyone in a money economy, than about unemployment, the problem of a minority of the adule population (Rose and Haerpfer 1994, Q. 31), People who are negative about the old Communist economic system and positive about the current economic system and what it is hoped to become in the future are signifi- cantly more patient politically (table 1), ‘A striking feature of the regression analysis in table 1 is that six of the seven egocentric influences have no significant effect on patience. People who had suffered unemploy- ‘ment in the family or who see their household's financial situation unsatisfactory today or not getting better in future are no more likely to be Impatient, net of other influences, than indivi vals in favorable economic circumstances. Deprivation of necessities or low income does not cause people to become impatient, nor are those coping with economic changes more like- ly to be patient. The only statistically signifi cant egocentric measure is a decline in the household's economic condition by comparison With the Communist era, In established democracies, theories of mass attitudes often emphasize political perfor- ‘mance: people are expected to show more polit- ical suppor if the performance of the political system is deemed satisfactory. This implies that the worse the perception of regime perfor- ‘mance, the higher is the level of impatience. Newly established post-Communist regimes have many deficiencies in performance, and there is @ great need for effective government action to deal with problems of transformation (sce, ¢.g., Holmes 1995; World Bank 1996, chapters 5, 7). Yet Central and East European experience of “too strong” government—Nazi, authoritarian, and native fascist, as well as Communist—may encourage patience with a weak democratic regime, because itis less able to coerce its subjects. In societies where there has been a change in regime, individuals are likely 0 evaluate the current regime in the light of the political lega- cy of the past regime. Since the great majority of citizens were socialized into a repressive Communist regime, the norms acquired then ccan remain. influential, Insofar as the experi- cence has produced a negative reaction against communism, people will be patient with the Conwicht © 2001. All Richta Reserved.138 World Affairs new regime, as shortcomings in performance will be viewed as a lesser evil by comparison with what went before (Rose 1992; Rose and Mishler 1996). But insofar as people not only ‘complied withthe old regime but also accepted it, they may be impatient with the new regime. For people who have lived under two very dif ferent regimes, the most efficient way to evalu ate the performance of the new regime is by ‘comparison with the old regime, As well as asking about the past, the NDB questionnaire ‘anchors evaluations of some aspects of political performance in comparisons between past and present. People can thus make transitive judg- ‘ments based on their own firsthand experience, and it is possible, as Churchill hypothesized, that even if people view their current political institutions as far from perfect, they may prefer them as “lesser evil” compared to the past (see Rose and Mishler, 1996), All six measures of the legacy of the past are statistically significant. The more likely an individual is to view the old regime negatively the more likely there is to be patience with the current regime (table 1). Whereas in an estab- lished democracy pride in country may be nor- imal, where national traditions are authori- larian, they can be rejected as shameful Individuals who think West European countries rather than their national traditions offer a bet- ter guide for development are also more likely to be politically patient. Such individuals do ‘not expect their native land to become like Britain or Germany or Sweden overnight. They are patient because they understand that, given ‘what has gone before, the adoption of Western political norms will be time-consuming. Not ‘surprisingly, those who Were in the Communist party are more likely to show political impa- tience (table 1), People who believe that they are treated ‘more fairly under the new regime than in the past (or at least, less unfairly) are significantly ‘more likely to be patient politically. Given the repressive character of the old regime, a battery fof questions asked people whether they felt they had more freedom, much the same free dom, or less than in former times to say what they think, decide about religion themselves, and join (or not join) any organization as they cchose. Factor analysis showed that replies formed a single “freedom from the state” scale (sce Rose 1995; ef. Berlin 1969). The freer people feel today, the more likely they are to be politically patient. Similarly, people who feel they have more chance to influence gover Conwicht © 2001. All Richta Reserved. ‘ment today than before are also more patient with the new regime (table 1), Trust in institutions is a classic measure of positive political performance; the higher the level of trust, the better the government (Put- nam 1995; Fukuyama 1995); the theories also imply that more trusting people will show more Patience to government when it makes mis- takes. The NDB survey asked people to indi- cate on a seven-point scale their degree of trust ‘on a great variety of political, social, and eco: nomic institutions, Factor analysis derived two scales of political relevance: trust in seven political institutions, including parliament courts, civil servants, and police; and trust in such traditional institutions as the army and churches (for details, see Mishler and Rose forthcoming); and an economic indicator of trust in the matket. As hypothesized. people ‘who have more trust in political institutions are also significantly more likely to show political patience. The minority who crust traditional institutions are more likely to be impatient, an indication that the church and the army may Still be linked with undemocratic reactionary ‘causes in the minds of some Central and East Europeans. The substantive impact of trust is limited, however, because in post-Communist countries there remains widespread distrust oF skepticism about political institutions, A caution against projecting theories of established democracies onto post-Communist ‘countries is that party identifi indicator of civic attitudes in established demoe- racies, is the only political variable that does not significantly affect political patience. In post- Communist countries, people tend to distrust parties, because the one party most readily iden- tified, the Communist party, is rejected. Parties thus face the difficult task of mobilizing demo- bilized voters (Rose 1996, chapter 8) Altogether, the regression analysis. shows. that almost all political auitudes are important in determining patience, and the political lega cy of the past is most important, The egocentric economic conditions of individuals have virtu- ally no effect, a caution against attempts to reduce politics to the neoclassical economic paradigm of individuals seeking to satisfy their personal wants. The influence of macroeco- omic altitudes reflects evaluations that indi- Viduals make of current and future systems in the ight of the past. An individual's location in the social structure is of virtually no importance; membership in the Communist party, an organization consciously drawing tion, a classicVol 159.No.3__WINTER 1997 wy together people from throughout society, has a higher beta weight than any social structure influence (cf, table 1), ‘Variations in Context and Culture Individuals are not politically socialized in a vacuum; attitudes are formed in a specific con- text and culture, By any measure, the environ- ‘ments of the eight NDB countries differ very substantially. But to say that “nations matter” leaves open what it is that accounts for their influence. One set of influences is contextual, affecting everyone within the country, for example, repressive institutions or inflation, However, such attributes are not unique to asin- ale country; they are generic properties of polit- ical systems that vary from one national context to another. By contrast, cultural attributes of a country, including the residues of critical his- torical events, tend to be unique to one country, for example, the role of the Soviet Union in the Communist bloc. Two countries cannot have the same political history or national culture; however, they can have the same inflation rate or level of freedom of suppression The annual ratings of repression and freedom in the Gastil (1987) and Freedom House (1996) indices offer three different measures of politi- cal context: repression in 1985, a rating nor- mally the same as that for many years before; the level of freedom in 1995; and, since free- dom has risen from different national starting points and to a different extent, a country’s increase in freedom between 1985 and 1995. Since all three measures are correlated, in keep- ing with the logic of testing the legacy of the past on the present, our measure of political context is the reduction in political repression from 1985 to the present. This not only distin: guishes between countries that have made igreater or lesser advances in freedom but also between countries such as Hungary, where peo- ple enjoyed relatively liberal conditions in 1985, and the Czech Republic, which was very much repressed. Macroeconomic indicators are direct mea- sures of such national-level phenomena as a country’s total gross domestic product (GDP), but to draw inferences from them about individ- uals (for example, to assume that all households experience the same rate of change each year as ddoes the total GDP) is to commit the ecological fallacy. Nonetheless, we would expect a sub- stantial correlation between how people per- ceive economic conditions and the actual condi- tions within a country, and @ materialist would argue that the significance of sociotropic att tudes in table 1 is more apparent than real. Although there are significant deficiencies in ‘economic statistics in post-Communist coun- tries (see, eg., EBRD 1995; World Bank 1996, 223 ff), five economic indicators are available for use here: inflation; the unemployment rate; annual growth (or contraction) in gross dom tic product; GDP per capita adjusted for pur- chasing power parity: and the degree of eco- nomic liberalization, that is, the shift from controls of the command economy to market forces (World Bank 1996, figure 1.2). Factor analysis shows that the five separate indicators ‘constitute a single dimension of mactoeconom= je change, accounting for 68 percent of the vari- ance, When macroeconomic conditions turn bad. in a country the effect is pervasive. Context and culture tend to be homogenizing influences within a country and to differentiate ‘countries from each other. The New Democra cies Barometer shows no homogeneity of atti tudes about paticnce in any of the countries sur- veyed. Yet it also shows that the degree of patience does vary between countries, from a high of 81 percent of Czech respondents o a low of 42 percent of Ukrainians. Hence, even though country-level attributes cannot be all important, there is a limit to their potential significance. ‘When a multiple regression equation uses con- textual measures of macroeconomic conditions nd reduction in political repression as the only independent variables, together they explain 5.0 percent of the variance in patience. While each is significant, the variance explained is barely a third that of individual-level attributes ‘When individual and contextual influences are combined in a multiple regression analysis, increased institutional freedom fails to register statistical significance. Since the measure of individual perception of freedom remains sig- nificant inthis equation, this implies that the sig nificance of freedom to an individual is subjee: tive and experiential and not just institutionally based. Objective macroeconomic conditions are significant, and the beta, .09, is higher than for any other economic influence, The subjective evaluations that individuals make of objective economic conditions remain important, too, indicating that what people perceive is nor deter- ‘mined simply by the state of the national econo- my, especially conditions as recorded in official economic statistics. The primary importance of individual-level influences is underscored by the addition of contextual influences adding only 0.7 percent to total variance explained: Conwicht © 2001. All Richta Reserved.Even though everyone in a country is exposed (0 the same politcal history and cul- ture, ina post-Soviet era there is ample evidence that all Hungarians or Czechs or Ukrainians do not think alike. Divisions within nations are a reat caution against explaining patience as a consequence of political culture. Moreover, using culture to explain altitudes risks the effect being invoked as the cause (cf. Fleron 1996). At a minimum, a “two cultures” model is needed to account for divisions within a country. Because most writing about the pos-Com- ‘munist era concentrates on a single country, in default of comparative evidence there is a ten- dency to explain phenomena in terms of a nation-specific culture or idiographic references to individual personalities or events. Inthe pre- ceding pages we have used NDB data to test romothetic influences relevant cross-national. The same data can be used to test the impact of country-specific influences on political patience, by adding countries tothe list of influ- ences tested in the regression in table | If national differences in political patience are influenced by country-specific conditions, Wwe would expect that adding country variables (o the regression model should substantially increase the variance explained; and coeffi- cients for the country variables should be large as well as statistically significant. The addition fof country variables to the regression model adds litle to the explanation of patience: the increase in variance explained is less than two percentage points, If countries are the only independent variables, they explain 6.7 percent of the variance, less than half the amount of variance explained by individual-level influ- ences. Given the distinctiveness of Belarus and Ukraine, another regression was run with belonging to the Soviet Union replacing coun- tries. This does show a statistically significant association and increases variance explained by two percentage points, indicating that being part of the old USSR tends to make people less patient, because less satisfied, with the trans- Formation since. Altogether, individual perceptions of politi- cal and economic conditions are the dominant influence on political patience in post-Commu- nist countries today. Although context and country undoubtedly affect individual assess- ‘ments, that influence is subordinate to the mediating influence of what individuals. see {and do not see) happening around them. Indi- viduals in post-Communist countries are mak- ing decisions about whether to wait patiently Conwicht © 2001. All Richta Reserved. Work Affairs for their regime to improve or manifesting impatience largely on the basis of their own values and judgments AND IMPATIENCE Political patience gains importance insofar as it encourages people to be more supportive of the current regime and expectations of it becoming better in future. In postauthoritarian regimes, the imperfections of fledgling institu tions and the absence of lifelong support of ‘established democracies make patience particu larly important. Reciprocally, politically impa tience is important insofar as impatient people ‘are unwilling t0 support the new regime and agree on the authoritarian alternative that ought to replace it, NDB data can be used to test ‘whether such relationships hold, and if so, their ive as well as statistical significance. Patience and Regime Support To measure support for the current regime and future regime, the New Democracies Barometer uses a heaven/hell scale running from plus 100 to minus 100 (Rose and Mishler, 1994; Mishler and Rose, 1996). The questions asked are: Here is scale for ranking how the govern- ‘ment works. The top, plus 100 is best the bot tom, minus 100, i the worst. Where would you place: (4) The former Communist regime? The social (b) Our curtent system of governing with fee fons and many parties? Our current eco- nomic system? {) Our system of governing i five years time?” Our economic system in five years? In the six Central and Bast Buropean coun- tries, overall 41 percent were positive about the ‘old regime, 59 percent positive about the new regime, and 75 percent positive about what they expect the regime to become in five years (fi ure 3), In Belarus and Ukraine, there is a very different trajectory: 59 percent have a posi view of the old regime, 26 percent are positive bout their current transitional regime, and 44 percent positive about what they expect the regime to be in five years. ‘The consequence of patience for regime sup- port is shown in table 2: the higher the level of political patience, the more likely people are 10 View the current regime positively. Among those who think the new government needs ‘years to clear up the mess left by the Commu- nists, $9 percent are positive. Among those whoeee ene er ra pocne ees eee etree ees HE approving Communist regime [2] % approving regime in ive years HB % approving new regime mee Fi | 7 ee 7 i a 7 1 7 | 16 7 oe 7 7 cal a 7 — 7 : FA ee = 7 Seeee meee ee coe eres ‘are somewhat impatient, support for the current regime averages sixteen percentage points lower, and there is a further 10 percent drop in support between those who are somewhat and definitely impatient, Politically patient individuals are also hopeful about what the regime will be like in five years; ‘more than three-quarters voice approval of what they expect it to become. By contrast, among those somewhat impatient, only 66 percent are hopeful about the future, and among those defi- nitely impatient, there is a further decline in those positive. The difference in regime support between the most patient and most impatient ‘groups is eighteen percentage points (table 2b) When multiple regression analysis is used to identify the most important influences on cur- rent and future regime support, patience is sta- tistically significant (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer forthcoming). Thus, an increase in impatience in a post-Communist society will Tead to a fall in support for the new regime. Impatient People Lack a Clear Altern: ‘Support for the future regime among a major- ity of those impatient has ominous overtones. ‘What kind of regime do impatient people expect to favor? Do they expect the current regime to dispose of problems of the Communist regime, cr do they expect another regime in its place? Testing popular support for alternatives to democracy is very appropriate in Central and Eastern Europe, since every country has endured a multiplicity of undemocratic regimes and every respondent has lived under at least one and sometimes three undemocratic regimes, Communist, Nazi, and native authori- (arian. But the existence of multiple alterna- tives raises the prospect that there may be no consensus among impatient authoritaria Conwicht © 2001. All Richta Reserved.1a Mora Attire TABLE 2 Patience and Support for Current and Future Regimes . Here is scale for ranking how government works. The top, plus 100, és the best: the bottom, minus 100, the worst. Where on this scale would you put 14} Our present system of governing with free elections and! many parties? Patient Definitely Somewhat Impatient Somewhat Definitely We to current regime (%) Positive Neural Negative 9 2 2» of 2» 48 B a 3 2 s4 (Gamma: 26) +b) Our system of governing in five years’ time? Patient Definitely Somesshat Impatient Somewhat Definitely Attude to future regime (9) Positive Newsal Negative 6 B u oo " 10 66 Is 6 58 7 25 (Gamma: 23) Source: Pooled dat st, Bulgaria, Coch Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romani, Bela, and Ukraine, New Democracies Berometer 1, Past tazartld Society. Vienna (1994). Total unweighted ‘about how @ country ought to be governed. ‘Without such a consensus, the current regime is more likely to remain in place. Three alter- natives were offered in the NDB survey, reflecting alternatives that could occur in many ‘countries and, as a matter of historical fact, had ‘occurred in the past: a dictator, return to Com- ‘munist rule, or the army governing the country. ‘The more impatient people are, the more ready they are to reject the current regime and endorse an authoritarian alternative (see the gamma statistics in table 3). When asked ‘whether a strongman would be better than rule by parliament and elections, there is a twenty: four percentage point gap between those most patient and most impatient, and there isa twen- ty-three point gap between the two groups in desiring the return to a Communist regime. The gap is small regarding military rule only because few people approve an army takeover. ‘When many other variables are introduced to explain differences in support or rejection of authoritarian alternatives, patience remains sta- tistically significant as an influence (Rose and Mishler 1996, table 3). Conwicht © 2001. All Richta Reserved. 030 If individual-level associations were all that counted, the data in table 3 appear to support theories of impatience and frustration leading to undemocratic, even aggressive responses. But such an inference ignores the fact thatthe aggre- ‘gate level of support for authoritarian regimes is not high. Barely a third of respondents support- ed a strongman ruling without parliament—and if the question had identified particular individ- uals, the percentage endorsing a particular dic- tator would almost certainly have been lower Less than one-fifth would support the retum of 2 Communist regime, and less than one-tenth, military rule lable 3; for more details, see Rose and Mishler 1996). Thus, preponderant opinion in Central and Eastern Europe is against a tum to authoritarianism. Even though those definite- ly impatient are more likely to support authori- are Tess than one-sixth e, among that ‘group of the impatient there is an almost even split about whether a dictator is desirable, and from two-thirds to seven-eighths would reject 2 retum to the Communist regime or a turn to mil itary nue.ol 159 No.3 WINTER 1997 ms TABLE. Impatience and Support for Alternative Regimes Q. Our present system of government is not the only one that this country hhas had, and some people say we would be beter off if the country was gov ered differents: What do you think? Please tell me for each point whether you agree strongly or somewhat, or disagree somewhat or strongly? 4) Better to get rid of Parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide everything ) We should return to Communist re. ©) The army should govern the country. Approve (%) — ‘Song man Communist Army Total 36 8 9 Impatient Definitely 3 u B Somewhat 2 ey R Patient smewhat 29 rs 8 Definitely 29 u 6 Difference 24 a 7 (Gamma) 26) Gp ay Source: Pooled daa set, Bulgaria. C2zch Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romani, Bears, and Ukraine. New Democracies Barometer Il, Past Lazartld Society. Venn (199), Tol unweighted = 8.030, Substantively, governors inthe post-Commu- nist countries of Central and Eastern Europe ccan expect their citizens to show a lot of patience as they grapple with the legacy of four decades of Communist authority. Furthermore, in an open society with free elections, patience isnot evidence of coerced resignation but a rea- soned recognition that, in view of the Commu- nist legacy, a democratic regime and a market economy cannot be achieved overnight. The existence of patience does not save the gover: ‘ment of the day from being voted out of office by dissatisfied MPs or a dissatisfied electorate. But it does mean that readiness to dismiss the government of the day is not a sign that a majority of people are anxious to get rid of the now regime but that they are prepared to use their new freedoms in a patient, trial-and-error search for a government that can deal with the country’s problems. NOTES 1. The New Democracies Barometer included Poland, but by mistake the key patience question was omitted, While interviews were also conducted in Croatia, warime circumstances made it inappropr ate for comparison. Slovenia is included since itis butside the war zone in former Yugoslavia 2, When NDB Il asked people how long they think i wil take before they reach a standard of lv ing with which they are content, the largest group, 39 Percent, were “don’t knows.” 3, Pull details of statistical able from the author on request. ulations are avail REFERENCES, Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba, 1963, The Civie’ Culture, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. "On Liberty In Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press Breslaver, George W. 1978. “On the Adaptability of Soviet Welfare State Authortaranism.” Pp. 3-25 in Karl W. Ryavec, ed. Soviet Society and The ‘Communist Party. Amherst: University of Massa- chusetts Press ‘Connor, Walter D., and Zvi ¥. 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