Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Police Power
It has been defined as the state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare
It includes: (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good
Being what it is, police power cannot stand still. It also has to
adjust to the demands and realities of changing times
It may be delegated to the (1) President and (2) administrative
boards as well as (3) the law-making body of municipal
corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the
agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are
conferred on them by the national lawmaking body
Requisites -- lawful ends through lawful means
Property taken is
destroyed
Compensation not
immediate;
sometimes leaving
the reward to be
reaped through his
recognition that he
has done
something for the
public good
Eminent Domain
Taxation
Just
Form of
compensation for
protection and
the property
benefits from the
taken
government
Affects only
property rights
May be
May be exercised
delegated to
only by the
some other
government
entities in the
private sector
Property taken is meant for public use
or purpose
Receipt of market
Immediate and
value of his
apparent in the
property that is
form of
taken
protection and
benefits derived
from the use of
taxes paid
Ynot v. IAC
148 SCRA 569 (1987)
Villacorta v. Bernardo
143 SCRA 480 (1986)
Held: Yes. Ordinance No. 22 is null and void being in conflict with
Section 44 of Act 496
Binay v. Domingo
201 SCRA 508 (1991)
The Municipality of Makati approved Resolution No. 60 ratifying
the ongoing Burial Assistance Program, extending financial
assistance coming from the municipal treasury to bereaved
families with gross family income of less than P2,000.00
The COA disapproved Resolution 60. It held that the resolution
cannot be sustained as a legitimate exercise of the police power
due to a lack of perceptible connection or relation between the
objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety,
general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati, and, that the
disbursement of funds was not for a public purpose since it was
for the benefit of only a few individuals and not the whole or
majority of the inhabitants of the Municipality
Held: Yes. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public
duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise
of police power in the promotion of the common good.
Resolution No. 60 is a paragon of the continuing program of our
government towards social justice
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is
not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a
limited number of persons
Basco v. PAGCOR
197 SCRA 52 (1991)
The PAGCOR was created by virtue of PD 1067-A (and PD 1869)
and was granted a franchise to establish, operate and maintain
gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines
Petitioners alleged that such law is null and void for being
contrary to morals, public policy and public order; it further
contends that its exemption from paying any tax is violative of the
principle of local autonomy (waiver of right of City of Manila to
impose tax)
Held: No. Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is
generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does not
mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its
police power
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling
casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the
category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government, thus,
exempt form local taxes
LATON
DESTRUCTION BY NECESSITY
Speaks for itself--condemnation of a
property as a means of self-defense
Entails payment of
just compensation
Primarily exercised
by the government
or self-preservation
The property is precisely destroyed
as a way of promoting the greater
welfare of the populace who might
be endangered or otherwise placed
in harms way
May be exercised by private
individuals
Taxation
The power of the State to impose a charge or burden upon
person, property, or property rights, for the use and support of
the government
Taxation is a destructive power which interferes with the
personal and property rights of the people and takes from them
a portion of their property for the support of the government.
Tax statutes must be construed strictly against the government
and liberally in favor of the taxpayer
Limitations on the Power to tax
The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of tax
Uniformity means that persons or things of the same class shall
be taxed at the same rate. It requires that all subjects or objects
of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike or put on
equal footing both in privileges and liabilities
Uniformity, however, is not equality, the latter term signifying
that the taxes shall be strictly proportional to the relative value
of the taxable property
It is also an inherent limitation on the power to tax that the
proceeds be for public purpose. They could not be used for
purely private purposes xxx the real purpose of taxation is the
promotion of the common good
Taxation is said to be equitable when its burden falls on those
better able to pay. Taxation is progressive when its rate goes up
depending on the resources of the person affected
It is the strongest of all powers of government
The taxing power has the authority to make a reasonable and
natural classification for purposes of taxation but the
governments act must not be prompted by a spirit of hostility,
or at the very least discrimination that finds no support in
reason
Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be
collected without unnecessary hindrance. However, such
collection should be made in accordance with law xxx
Reyes v. Almanzor
196 SCRA 322 (1991)
Petitioners are owners of parcels of land in Manila which are
leased and occupied as dwelling sites by tenants. RA 6359 was
enacted prohibiting from increasing in monthly rentals of dwelling
units and also disallowing the ejectment of lessees upon the
expiration of the usual legal period (amended by PD 20).
Thereafter, City Assessor of Manila increased tax rates.
Petitioners averred that the reassessments made were excessive,
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Tax exemptions
xxx as broad as the power to tax
Like any other power, it is one that may not be exercised
arbitrarily or whimsically
The Constitution declares outright that: Charitable institutions,
churches and parsonages or covenant appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxation
No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress
Partnership among Fundamental Powers
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
v. City Mayor of Manila
20 SCRA 849 (1967)
The Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
4670 regulating the operation of hotels and motels
Petitioners sought to invalidate the ordinance
Held: No. The presumption is all in favor of validity xxx The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given
notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the
people
LATON
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National Blood Service Act. Section 7 of RA 7719 provides phaseout of Commercial Blood Banks. Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of the said provision on the ground, among
others, that such represents undue delegation if not outright
abdication of the police power of the state.
ISSUE: WON RA 7719 is a valid exercise of police power
HELD: Petitions dismissed. The court upholds the validity of RA
7719.
RATIO: The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation
of the State. The health of the people is a primordial
governmental concern. RA 7719 was enacted in the exercise of
the States police power in order to promote and preserve public
health and safety.
Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, requires the interference of the State; and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the
objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals
Police power is the State authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare.
Thus, persons may be subject to certain kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State and to
its fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual
may be subordinated
A2. PHCAP v. Duque III1
535 SCRA 265 (2007)
Health is a legitimate subject matter for regulation by the DOH
(and certain other administrative agencies) in exercise of police
powers delegated to it. The superiority of breastfeeding and
correct information as to infant feeding and nutrition, as in this
case, is infused with public interest and welfare. The DOHs power
under the Milk Code to control information regarding breastmilk
vis--vis breastmilk substitutes is not absolute as the power to
control does not encompass the power to absolutely prohibit the
advertising, marketing, and promotion of breastmilk substitutes.
Implementing rules and regulations imposing labeling
requirements and limitations, as well as a prohibition against
certain health and nutrition claims are inconsistent with the Milk
Code.
Nonetheless, the DOH, in imposing an absolute prohibition on
advertising, promotion, and marketing, the same went beyond its
authority since the same was not within the provisions of the Milk
Code itself.
A3. Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD
526 SCRA 130 (2007)
FACTS: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors
operating drugstores in the Philippines. Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise known as
the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003. Section 4(a) of RA
9257 grants twenty percent (20%) discount as privileges for the
Senior Citizens. Petitioner contends that said law is
unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private
property.
ISSUE: WON RA 9257 is unconstitutional
HELD: Petition is dismissed.
RATIO: The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which,
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LATON
Chapter 2
Due Process
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
4
due process of law.
Due Process of Law
Person
Roe v. Wade
410 US 113, 35 L Ed 2d 147, 93 S Ct 705 (1973)
Caunca v. Salazar
82 Phil. 851, 1 SCUD 177 (1 January 1949)
Lupangco v. CA
160 SCRA 848 (1988)
Property
Ayog v. Cusi, Jr
118 SCRA 492 (1982)
Public Office
Licenses
Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines
283 SCRA 31 (1997)
Right-Privilege Dichotomy
RIGHT
The former come under the
protection of the Due Process
Clause
PRIVILEGE
They are just by way of grant
by the State
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Hierarchy of Rights
Company filed with the COR a complaint for violation of the CBA,
particularly the No Strike-No Lockout clause
PROCEDURAL
The method or manner by
which the law is enforced
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals if liberty, equality
and security against assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the
passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with general principles
Held: Yes. The respondent is the one guilty of unfair labor practices.
Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint
on their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of
petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed,
[among others], unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere
with, retrain or coerce employees on the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in Section Three
SUBSTANTIVE
Requires that the law itself,
not merely the procedure by
which the law would be
enforced, is fair, reasonable,
and just
Primarily directed at the
lawmakers
Implicates
fundamental
notions of fairness and justice
Concerns itself with the law,
its
essence,
and
its
concomitant efficacy
Additional Cases
(B) Due Process [14]
LATON
People v. Cayat
68 Phil. 12 (1939)
The accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province,
and a member of the non-Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating
Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin,
an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine
Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it
is discriminatory and denies equal protection of the laws xxx
HELD: No. Act 1639 satisfies all the requirements:
1. The non-Christian tribes refers, not to religious belief, but to natives
of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization
2. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the nonChristian tribes xxx free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the nonChristian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby
hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life
and civilization
3. It is intended to apply at all times as long as those conditions exist
4. The Act applies equally to all members of the class
Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City
22 SCRA 603 (1968)
Chapter 3
Equal Protection
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
5
protection of the laws.
The guarantee is against class legislation, or such legislation
which denies rights to one which are accorded to others, or
inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is
imposed upon another in like case offending
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according
to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality,
not identity of rights
Gender
The equality of the sexes is something that the Constitution
itself promotes. And this means basically having to treat
women on equal footing with men even as it still maintains a
special solicitude for them
Bradwell v. Illinois
83 US (16 Wall) 130, 21 L Ed 442 (1873)
Mrs. Myra Bradwell, residing in the State of Illinois, applied with the
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Stanley v. Illinois
405 US 645, 31L Ed 2d 551, 92 S Ct 1208 (1972)
Under the [challenged] scheme, the children of unmarried fathers,
upon the death of the mother, are declared dependents without any
hearing on parental fitness and without proof of neglect, though such
hearing and proof are required before the State assumes custody of
children of married or divorced parents and unmarried mothers
HELD: Yes. Stanleys claim in the state courts and here us that failure to
afford him a hearing on his parental qualifications while extending it to
other parents denied him equal protection of the laws. We have
concluded that all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a
hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their
custody. It follows that denying such a hearing to Stanley and those like
him while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to
the Equal Protection Clause
HELD: No. As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the
unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad,
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions
marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse
Age
Dumlao v. COMELEC
95 SCRA 392 (1980)
Section4 of BP 52 disqualifies any retired elective provincial, city or
municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits
to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years
of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to
be elected to run for the same elective local office from which he has
retired
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Academic Performance
Academic ratings could very well determine how a student gets
classified or accepted
Tablarin v. Gutierrez
152 SCRA 730 (1987)
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine
for the school year 1987-1988. However, petitioners either did not take
or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education which is
administered by private respondent Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM)
Petitioners alleged that it is violative of the Equal Protection Clause by
reason of the yearly changes in the cut-off scores for successful
applicants
HELD: No. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring
certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical
schools in the Philippines do not constitute an unconstitutional
imposition
disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to
national economy posed by alien domination and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from such dominance and
control
HELD: The equal protection clause does not prevent the legislature
from recognizing degrees of evil
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In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the
salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based
on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a
benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades
Equalizing Illegality
What is illegal is plainly against the law and the fact that others
were able to get away with it is no justification to provide equal
chances for others under the Equal Protection Clause
Alunan III v. Mirasol
276 SCRA 501 (1997)
The DILG through then Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III, issued a letterresolution exempting the City of Manila from holding election for the
SK on the ground that the election previously held on 26 May 1990 was
to be considered he first under the newly enacted LGC
Private respondents claimed equal protection clause violation
HELD: No. Even assuming that only barangays in Manila were not
permitted to hold SK elections on December 4, 1992 while the rest of
the 5,000 barangays were allowed even if KB elections had already
been held there before, this fact does not give the youth voters in the
897 Manila barangays ground for complaint because what the other
barangays did was contrary to law. There is no discrimination here
Delegated Discrimination
A violation of the guarantee of equal protection may be seen
on the face of the law itself, or perceived and felt in the manner
in which what pretends to be a just and fair regulation is
actually utilized as a tool to camouflage a discriminatory act
Affirmative Action--A Case of Compensatory Discrimination
Affirmative action is a sort of reverse discrimination in the
sense that minorities have been discriminated against in the
past, are given preference in certain areas, like employment
and layoff, as well as admission to educational institutions
LATON
HELD: No. The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is
a substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign
military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other
accused
Additional Cases
(C) Equal Protection
C1. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
582 SCRA 254 (2009)
th
Antonio Serrano, a Filipino seafarer, claims that the last clause in the 5
paragraph of Section 10, RA 8042 deprives them of equal protection
and denies them due process, for it treats OFWs differently from local
Filipino workers
Chapter 4
Searches and Seizures
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
6
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee is a liberty safeguard that
prohibits and directs. While laying down the general rule
against unreasonable searches and seizures, it also provides the
guidelines for acceptable conduct on the part of government
authorities in regard to any intrusion into or invasion of the
peoples right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects
It has also been held that the warrant is not meant to authorize
fishing expeditions
The finding of evidence cannot be the immediate reason for
issuing a search warrant. To use a search warrant for this
purpose would be unreasonable use of the remedy by search
warrant, which is prohibited by law
It assures ones entitlement to privacy and right to be left alone
and do whatever he wishes within bounds without having to be
subjected to the prying eyes of Big Brother
The embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value
the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional
protection against the long reach of government in no less than
to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then
only under stringent procedural safeguards
The privacy of the home has always been regarded by civilized
nations as one of the most sacred personal rights to which men
are entitled
A mans home is his castle, has become a maxim among the
civilized people of the earth
The right extends to all persons, including aliens. So are
corporations also included within its protection, though to a
lesser extent
Requirements for Issuance of Warrants
1. There should be a search warrant or warrant of arrest
2. Probable cause supported the issuance of such warrant
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LATON
opposition candidate. This should have put the judge on guard as to the
motivations of the witnesses and alerted him of possible
misrepresentations from them. One may wonder why it did not occur
to the respondent judge to ask how the witnesses would be so certain
even to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window or
whether it was on the first or second floor, or why his presence was not
noticed at all, or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full
view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law.
These would have been judicious questions that were omitted and
instead, the declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and
the search warrant sought was issued forthwith. The above discussed
defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the
Solicitor general argues that whatever defect there was, was waived
when the petitioner voluntarily submitted to the search and manifested
his conformity in writing. We do not agree because what we see here is
pressure exerted by the military authorities, who coerced the petitioner
to sign the supposed waiver was a guaranty against a possible challenge
later to the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted
with the armed presence of the military and the presumptive authority
of the writ, the petitioner had no choice but to submit. The
respondents argued that the possession of colt magnum pistols and 18
live bullets are illegal per se, being malum prohibitum, hence it could be
taken even without a warrant. The SC held that it does not follow that
because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is
necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the
subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized because
they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. WHEREFORE,
the search warrant issued by the respondent judge is declared null and
void.
Bache and Co (Phil.) v.Ruiz
37 SCRA 823 (1971)
FACTS: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue wrote the respondent
judge requesting the issuance of the search warrant against petitioners
for violating Sec. 46 (a) of the National Internal Revenue Code. The
following day, National Revenue examiner De Leon and his witness,
Logronio, went to the court together with documents i.e. application
for search warrant, affidavits, and other documents already filled out
but unsigned. At that time, Judge Ruiz was hearing a certain case and so
he simply instructed the deputy clerk of court to take their depositions.
After the session adjourned, the judge asked for the stenographer to
read to him the stenographic notes and without propounding any
questions, asked Logronio to take the oath and warned him that is his
deposition was found to be false, he would be charged with perjury.
The search warrant was then signed and BIR agents served the same on
the petitioners office. Petitioners lawyers protested on the ground
that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the
warrant. Nevertheless, the agents proceeded with the search which
yielded 6 boxes of documents. Hence, this petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus to declare the search warrant void.
HELD: The petition should be granted because the respondent judge
failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness. As
provided in the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the examination of
the complainant and witness he may produce shall be conducted by the
judge himself and not by others. The participation of the judge in the
proceedings which led the to the issuance of the search warrant was
thus limited to listening to the stenographers reading her notes, to a
few words of warning against the commission of perjury and to
administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot
be considered a personal examination. The reading of the stenographic
notes to respondent judge did not constitute sufficient compliance with
the constitutional mandate and the rule for by that manner respondent
judge did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and follow up
questions which the judicial mind on account of its training, was in the
best position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound
inference on the all important question of whether or not there was
probable cause. Petition is granted, search warrant is declared null and
void.
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LATON
FACTS: A shooting incident occurred in Lanao del Sur which left at least
five persons dead and two others wounded. In the course of events, a
warrant of arrest was issued against 64 persons: 14 (the petitioners in
this case) who were identified by three witnesses, and 50 John Does.
ISSUE: WON the warrant of arrest is valid; i.e. Can a court issue a
warrant of arrest against an unknown accused?
HELD: NO, it is not valid as far as the 50 John Does are concerned (as for
the 14 petitioners in this case, its an entirely different story because
their names and identities are already known; the warrant of arrest is
valid as regards to them). The warrant in question is of the nature of a
general warrant, one of a class of writs long prescribed as
unconstitutional and once anathematized as totally subversive of the
liberty of he subject. Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction
that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or
persons to be seized, the warrant as against unidentified subjects will
be considered as null and void.
2.
3.
LATON
After a protective sweep of the house revealed that the petitioners son
is not in the house, the officers left.
FACTS: Quezon City police have procured a search warrant against Azfar
Hussain who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at
Abigail Variety Store (hereinafter AVS) in Bulacan. However, the next
day, the search warrant against Hussain was served not at AVS but at
the adjacent apartment (hereinafter Apartment 1), resulting in the
arrest of four Pakistani nationals and the seizure of their personal
belongings, papers and effects, including cash (apparently quite a lot,
too) which was never mentioned in the warrant.
Petitioners sued the federal officials under Bivens (Hanlon v. Bivens 525
US 981, [1988]) and the state officials under 1983. Both allows a
plaintiff to seek money damages from government officials who have
violated the 4th amendment. But government officials are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED statutory or constitutional right of which a
reasonable person would have known. (Harlow v. Fitzgerald 457 US
800, [1982])
The court evaluating a claim for immunity Must first determine
whether the alleged right was clearly established at the time of
alleged violation. (Conn v. Gabbert 525 US 286 [1999])
In 1604 an English court made the now-famous observation that the
house of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his
defense against injury and violence, as for his repose
The law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the
immunity of a mans house, that it stiles in its castle, and will never
suffer it to be violated with impunity.from this reason no doors
may be broken to execute any civil process; though, in criminal cases,
the public safety supersedes the private. William Blackstone
The 4th amendment: the right of the people to be secured of their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and
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seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Respondents concede that the reporters did not assist them in their
task. But they are there to assert that the officers should be able to
exercise reasonable discretion, for good public relations, and also could
serve as to minimize abuse of the officers.
Own purpose of the Reporters, and the fact that it is not the officers
who kept the photographs, though in some cases, presences of 3rd
parties are justifiable, this is not.
Aguilar-Roque was one of the accused in the criminal case for rebellion
before Special Military Commission No.1, and also one of the accused in
a criminal case for subversion before the Military Commission no. 25.
The court held that it is a violation of the 4th amendment for police to
bring members of the media or other 3rd parties into a home during the
execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the
house was not in aid of the execution of the warrant.
Nolasco v. Pao
139 SCRA 152 (1985)
LATON
They learned that Amidu stays at room 413 of the same hotel. While
Omogbolahan and Bhola were billeted at Royal Palm Hotel.
Got there a piece of paper with the name Suchinda Leangsiri written on
it tucked within the pages of his telephone and address book. And
other possessions were confiscated.
LATON
12 small plastic bags containing and paper clip bags containing shabu
and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana. The
accused was charged with the unlawful possession of shabu and
marijuana. Accused was convicted. On appeal, he questions the validity
of the search warrant and the seizure of the bricks of marijuana.
ISSUE: whether or not the seizure of the latter drug (marijuana) was
justified on the ground that the drug was seized within the plain view of
the searching party.
Decision: Not justified. The decision of the trial court was reversed and
set aside. Accused is acquitted.
Rationale: For the plain view doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior
justification, (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence, (c) immediate
apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.
The question is whether these requisites have been complied with.
(Hindi, lalo na yung a at b)
The only justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a
search pursuant to accused appellants lawful arrest for possession of
shabu. The police failed to allege in this case the time when the
marijuana was found; whether or prior to, or contemporaneous with,
the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on
accused-appellants person or in an area within his immediate control.
Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after
the shabu, had been recovered from the cabinet. Moreover, the
marijuana was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not
being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint
could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. The recovery of
marijuana is INVALID. It is inadmissible in evidence against accused andappellant.
LATON
trial court convicted him. On appeal he claims that, among others, his
Constitutional right; against unreasonable search and seizures was
violated by the police authorities.
None of the following circumstances are present in the case at bar. The
police did not merely conducted a visual inspection of the vehicle, they
had to reach inside the vehicleit is not considered a simple routine
check.
The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not
common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not
constitute probable cause as would justify the conduct of a search
without warrant.
Rule: accused is acquitted.
Valmonte v. De Villa
178 SCRA 221 (1989)
FACTS: certain checkpoints in certain parts of Valenzuela and other
cities were set-up by the NCRDC which some of its residents complain
because they claim they are violation of their right against search and
seizures. Furthermore, they claim they are worried of being harassed
and of their safety being placed in arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military. The checkpoints by the military have been
issued to maintain, among others, peace and order.
ISSUE: whether the military checkpoints are constitutional and not an
infringement upon the right from warrantless search and seizures?
HELD: there was no issue to begin with because the petitioners are not
the real party in interest. It was ruled that petitioners who do not
allege that any of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring
action as real party in interest. In the case at hand, no proof to show
that, in the course of the routine checks, the military indeed committed
specific violations of petitioners right against unlawful search and
seizure or other rights.
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and
promote public welfare and an individuals right against a warrantless
search, which is however reasonably conducted, the former should
prevail.
Rule: petition dismissed.
Anag, Jr. v. COMELEC
237 SCRA 424 (1994)
FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution 2323 otherwise known as the Gun
Ban. Pursuant to such resolution, the petitioner instructed his driver to
immediately send his gun that was given to him by the House of
Representatives. Following such order, the driver immediately went to
Manila. At about 20 meters from the Batasang Pambansa, police
authorities conducted a checkpoint. About 14 men search the car
driven by the driver, thus the gun that was to be delivered was seized
and he was charge for the violation of the gun ban.
ISSUE: whether or not the search and seizure of the gun was in violation
of an individuals right against warrantless search?
HELD: It was a violation of such right, since there were no justifying
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Customs Searches
Items which are imported and which are to be subjected to
payment of customs duties are not considered as properly
within the territory of the taxing authority if the appropriate
taxes have not yet been paid
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air
crafts for violations of the customs laws have been the
traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a
search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be
sought before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not
practicable to require a search warrant before search or seizure
can be constitutionally effected
Papa v. Mago
22 SCRA 857 (1968)
FACTS: Counter intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department
misdeclared that a certain shipment of personal effects would be
release from the customs zone pier in manila. When the trucks left the
vicinity other counter intelligence group seize the said trucks.
ISSUE: W/N such act by the counter intelligence of Manila Police
prejudiced the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.
HELD: 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 it was made lawful for
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customs offices not only to board and search vessels within their own
and adjoining examine any vehicle beast or person which is suspected
which are introduce contrary to the law. In the instant case the
petitioner could not question the search for their only complain they
were just intercepted without any search warrant. But even if there is a
search there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would
be needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thus
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as to
recognize the difference between search in the dwelling and search of a
ship, motorboat, wagon or automobile where it is not practicable to
secure a search warrant. For the reason a vehicle could quickly move
out.
The majority of the Court concluded the "stop and frisk" technique was
constitutional as long as the action could be rationally justified by
circumstances.
Adams v. Williams
407 US 143, 32 L Ed 2d 612, 92 S Ct 1921 (1972)
FACTS: While on duty, a police officer was approached by a reliable
informant who told the officer that a person sitting in a nearby car, i.e.,
the defendant, was carrying drugs and a gun. The officer went to
defendants car and grabbed a gun from exactly the same place where
the informant said the gun would be. Then the officer searched the car
and
found
additional
weapons
and
drugs.
ISSUE: Can the officer rely on information obtained from a reliable
informant for reasonable suspicion for a search?
HELD: Yes. The Court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to
conduct the search. Here, the Court noted that the officer had
reasonable suspicion because the officer knew the informant to be
reliable. Thus, the officer had reason to believe that the suspect was
armed and dangerous and he could constitutionally frisk the suspect for
weapons.
Malacat v. Court of appeals
283 SCRA 159 (1997)
FACTS: On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to
bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western
Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National
Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with
three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon
Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza
Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with
each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides
of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These
men were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast. Yu and
his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed
both groups for about 30 minutes. The police officers then approached
one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the
policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended Sammy
Malacat y Mandar. Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation
grenade tucked inside the latters front waist line. Yus companion,
police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom
a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat was charged with
violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. The trial court ruled
that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akin to a stop
and frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to
maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to
obtain more information; and that the seizure of the grenade from
Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found
Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under
Section 3 of PD 1866.
ISSUE: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the
exception of stop and
frisk.
HELD: The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that
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a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected
without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As
regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113
of theRules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances
contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one in
flagrante delicto, while that under Section 5(b) has been described as
a hot pursuit arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are
limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving
vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5)
a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a stop and frisk. The
concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a search incidental to a lawful
arrest must not be confused. These two types of warrantless searches
differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be
validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a
lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante
delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of
personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt
physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just
been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.
Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could not have been one
incidental to a lawful arrest. On the other hand, while probable cause is
not required to conduct a stop and frisk, it nevertheless holds that
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop and frisk. Here,
there are at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was
invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to Yus claim that Malacat was a
member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days
earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record
nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that
group. Second, there was nothing in Malacats behavior or conduct
which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than
that his eyes were moving very fast an observation which leaves us
incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat
and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his
companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating
any commotion or trouble. Third, there was at all no ground, probable
or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly weapon.
None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
discovered inside the front waistline of Malacat, and from all
indications as to the distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale
bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed hiding a grenade, could not
have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant violations
of Malacats rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of
Article III of the Constitution.
team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team. Accused was
found guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
Ruling: YES. It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the
Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time.
The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said
office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid,
there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the
surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the
Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the
occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them
to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. The
Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not
an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives
and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of
automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered
firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably
explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that
time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of
the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by
rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed
and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that
the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition
against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives,
taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable
ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was
consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their
action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding
team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from
the courts. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search
warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
Consented Searches
Where the person to be searched acquiesces in the search of
his person or property, then obviously no warrant need be
procured. He in effect waives his right to otherwise have a
warrant justify the invasion of his liberty and privacy
It should not be presumed from a persons silence that he
waived the illegality of a search
Such a passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances is considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee
Consent must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
Requisites:
1. It must appear first that the right exists
2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right
3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right
Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred but must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics
of the person giving consent and the environment In which
consent is given:
1. The age of the defendant
2. Whether he was in public or secluded location
3. Whether he objected to the search of passively looked on
4. The education and intelligence of the defendant
5. The presence of coercive police procedures
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Airport Searches
Correlated to the lessened expectation of privacy which a
passenger must necessarily have to recognize and accept, part
of the price for traveling in a mode of transportation that has
special concerns for safety and security
online tickets(Sec.9 RA 6235) that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and
seizures do NOT apply to routine airport passengers.
People v. Johnson
348 SCRA 526 (2000)
Leila Johnson was about to fly back to USA. At NAIA departure area,
Olivia Ramirez, the lady in charge of frisking deporting passengers
frisked Johnson. Ramirez felt something hard on Johnsons abdominal
area. Upon inquiry, Johnson explained she needed to wear girdle as she
had undergone an operation. Not satisfied with the explanation and
with the consent of her superior, took Johnson to the ladys room for
inspection. Ramirez asked her to bring out the thing under her girdle.
Johnson brought out three plastic bags, which when examined turned
out to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). She was taken to
the to the Security office where her passport and ticket were taken.
She questions the legality of the warrantless search conducted at her
person.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures. Travellers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their
Guazon v. De Villa
181 SCRA 623 (1990)
Petitioners, claiming to be bona fide residents of Metro Manila and
taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities, seek to prohibit
the military and police officers represented by public respondents from
conducting Areal Target Zonings or Saturation Drives in Metro
Manila. Saturation Drives were conducted in 1987in several critical
areas pinpointed by police and military as places where the subversives
were hiding. The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a
common pattern of human rights abuses.
The petition is REMANDED to the RTCs of Manila, Malabon, and Pasay.
The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a
taxpayers suit. (1)No proper parties. Where one victim complains and
not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not initially for SC.
It is basically one for the executive departments and for trial courts. (2)
There is no proof. A method of pinpointing human rights abuses and
identifying violators is necessary.
Zona- military operation raid of a compound in search of loose firearms,
ammunition and other explosives.
7
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In the meantime and in the prima facie showing that some abuses were
probably committed and could be committed during future police
actions, banging on walls, kicking in of doors, violation of residences,
etc. are temporarily restrained.
Oliver v. United States
466 US 170 (1984)
Whether the open fields doctrine permits police officers to enter and
search marijuana fields without warrant where the fields are secluded
and contain no trespassing signs.
Reports that marijuana was being raised on the farm of oliver, two
narcotics agents went to the farm to investigate. They entered the farm
gate that has no trespassing sign and found a field of marijuana 1 mile
away from his house.
SC: as sated in Hester vs US, the governments intrusion upon open
fields is not one of those unreasonable searches proscribed in the
fourth amendment. The amendment does not protect the merely
subjective expectation of privacy but only those expectations that
society is prepare to recognize as reasonable. That an individual may
not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in
fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home. An
individual has no legitimate expectation that open fields will be free
from warrantless intrusion by the government.
Oliver : circumstances may indicate reasonable expectations of privacy
were violated, it should be decided case to case basis.
Sc: no. it will make it difficult for the policeman to discern the scope of
his authority; it also creates a danger that constitutional rights will be
arbitrarily and inequitably enforced.
no trespassing sign and fences do not effectively bar the public from
viewing open fields and do not demonstrate that the expectation of
privacy was legitimate. The test is whether the intrusion of the
government infringes upon the personal and societal values protected
by the fourth amendment.sc finds no basis for concluding that a police
inspection of open fields accomplishes such infringement.
People v. Valdez
341 SCRA 25 (2000)
A tip was given about a plantation of marijuana allegedly owned by
valdez. The police were instructed to uproot the plants and arrest
cultivator. They found him in a nipa hut then looked around and saw
marihuana plant He admitted ownership but later on alleged that he
only admitted ownership out of fear.
General rule: search and seizure nust be carried on a judicial warrant.
Otherwise, it is unreasonable.
They first located the marijuana before appellant was arrested without
a warrant. There was no valid warrantless arrest which preceeded the
search of appellants premises. The seizure of evidence in plain view
applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. The marijuana plants were not in plain view because further
search was needed. There was illegal search and seizure thus the plant
cannot b admitted as evidence against him. The confession of
ownership without a counsel is also violative of the bill of rights.
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Umil v. Ramos
187 SCRA 311 (1990)
Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad responsible for killing 2
soldiers on Jan. 31, 1988, was arrested on Feb. 1, while being treated
for a gunshot in a hospital. Dural was arrested for being a member of
the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion as a
continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified.
The case filed involves subversion and illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. On Aug. 17, 1988, the lower court found them guilty of
the charge.
In Flagrante Delicto
Under this exception, the arrest is justified by the very fact that
the crime is committed or is about to be committed in the very
presence of the person making the arrest
There is no more need for a warrant as the culprit is caught redhanded
Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule
requires, in addition, that the accused perform such overt act
that would indicate that he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
Elements:
1. The person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime
2. Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer
People v. Burgos
144 SCRA 1 (1986)
Cesar masalmok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities and gave intelligence information that he was forcibly
recruited by Burgos using a firearm. They found the accused plowing his
field, he denied possessing firearm. His wife pointed where the gun was
then the accused showed subversive documents that were allegedly
issued to him by a team leader of NPA. He was convicted of the crime
of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion.
In the constitutional provision against wanton and unreasonable
invasion of privacy and liberty of a citizen, his person, property papers
and effects, What is sought to be guarded is a mans prerogative to
choose who is allowed entry to his residence.
Under rule112, the officer arresting a person who has just committed,
is committing or is about to commit an offense must have a personal
knowledge of that fact. There is no personal knowledge in this case, it
came from masalmok and the location of gun was given by the wife. At
the time of his arrest, he was not in actual possession of the firearm
and the documents. Neither was he committing any act subversive.
State of Rebellion
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may
only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of
rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, if the circumstances so warrant
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary
421 SCRA 656 (2004)
On July 27, 2003, some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP,
armed with ammunitions and explosives stormed into the Oakwood
Apartments in Makati City. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the
soldiers demanded for the resignation of high officials, including the
President. The President then issued Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the AF to
suppress the rebellion. On Aug. 1, 2003, Proclamation No. 435 lifted the
declaration of the state of rebellion. Several petitions were filed
challenging the validity of the Proclamation, the Presidents authority
and the consequence of such declaration, specially in relation to the
arrest of those implicated in the rebellion.
No compelling reason for haste and not secure warrant of arrest. Arrest
of the accused while he was plowing is illegal. The arrest was unlawful,
the search and seizure is likewise not legal since these are mere
incidents of a valid arrest.
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Hot Pursuit
When a crime has just been committed, the law enforcers
ordinarily would have to try to get the culprit as soon as
possible before he eludes them
They may be in possession of enough information or knowledge
by which to identify their quarry and make the arrest before
their job would become more difficult through the passage of
time
Go v. CA
206 SCRA 138 (1992)
FACTS: Rolito Go, petitioner, was driving in the opposite direction along
a one-way street in San Juan Metro Manila, when he nearly bumped
into Eldon Maguans car. Petitioner got out of his car, shot Maguan, and
left. A security guard nearby was able to take down the plate number of
Gos car then the police came at the crime scene. After obtaining
information from (1) the verification of LTO that the car was registered
under the petitioners wifes name, (2) the impression of the credit card
used by him in the bakeshop where he went before the incident
happened, and (3) the positive identification of the guard therein, the
police launched a manhunt. 6 days after the incident, Go, with 2
lawyers, presented himself to the San Juan police station for
verification. He was then detained and the police filed a complaint for
frustrated homicide in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
The Prosecutor filed before the RTC, an information for murder instead
of frustrated homicide, since Maguan died after a few days.
Nevertheless, petitioner was allowed to bail. The RTC judge (1) recalled
the bail, and gave petitioner 48 hrs from receipt of the Order to
surrender, (2) recalled and cancelled the Order which granted the leave
of the Prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation, and (3) treated
as petition for bail the petitioners motion for immediate release and
preliminary investigation and set it for hearing.
Petitioner then filed for a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before the SC, contending that the information was null and
void because no preliminary investigation has been previously
conducted. The SC remanded the petition to the CA wherein petitioner
was found not guilty since he refused to enter to a plea. The CA
dismissed the petitions and held that Gos warrantless arrest was valid
because the (1) offense was freshly committed, (2) his identity was
established through investigation, (3) when he showed up, there was
an existing manhunt and (4) there were witnesses.
ISSUE: WON a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San
Juan police in respect of petitioner
HELD: The reliance of the petitioner and the Solicitor General in Umil v.
Ramos, is misplaced since in the said case, it was held that warrantless
arrests made from 1- 14 days after the actual commission of the crime
is legal in as much as such crime is a continuing crime. In the case at
bar, the crime committed was that of murder and cannot be considered
as a continuing crime since it was commenced and completed at once.
The warrantless arrest in this case does not fall under Sec. 5 of Rule 113
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Since the police arrested
petitioner 6 days after the shooting incident, it is apparent that the
arresting officers were not present during such incident and
therefore cannot be also regarded as one which had just been
committed.
Likewise, the said officers do not have personal knowledge of the
facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman. The information
derived from eyewitnesses did not constitute personal knowledge.
Thus, there was no lawful warrantless arrest.
Petitioner was not arrested at all. He walked in, with 2 lawyers, and
placed himself at the police disposal without stating the he is
surrendering. When the police filed complaint for frustrated homicide
LATON
prosecution, (i) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated
by the lust for vengeance, (j) where there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied, and (k) preliminary injunction has been issued by the SC to
prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of the petitioners.
In the case at bar, PD 1829 was not violated since petitioner had a right
to prevent the arrest bec. it was illegal.
It was found out however by the Office of the Ombudsman that the
intervention by the petitioners allowed the escape of Taparan and
Narag. However, the student suspect, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta, was
not one of those who were attempted to be arrested by the NBI.
The NBI agents are at fault bec. they were unable to arrest Taparan and
Narag. If they believed the information given to them, they should have
applied first for a warrant before attempting to arrest.
Sanchez v. Demetriou
227 SCRA 627 (1993)
FACTS: Petitioner Sanchez, mayor of Calauan, Laguna, and other 6
people were accused of rape with homicide. Charges were filed against
them in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the
killing of Allan Gomez. Preliminary investigation was conducted as
petitioner was represented by his counsel. The PNP sent petitioner an
invitation requesting him to appear for an investigation. When he was
taken to the camp, he was positively identified by 2 witnesses. He was
later placed on "arrest status" and taken to DOJ in Manila. An inquest
was conducted upon his arrival and a warrant of arrest was issued after
the hearing. He remained confined in Camp Crame while information
charges were filed with the others who were accused. A warrant arrest
was then issued and the SC ordered the transfer of such case to Pasig
City, M. Manila. Petitioner filed motion to quash the information since
his warrantless arrest was illegal and the court has no jurisdiction over
him. However, Judge Demetriou denied the petition.
Issues: (1) WON petitioners warrantless arrest was illegal; (2) WON the
court has no jurisdiction over him
HELD: (1) The warrantless arrest was illegal. The arresting officers were
not present during the commission of the alleged crime and they have
no personal knowledge that petitioner is responsible because their
basis was the statement by the witnesses. However, (2) the RTC has
jurisdiction over him because it issued a warrant arrest against him and
the others. It was delayed, but legal though.
can be ordered only in the event that the prosecutor files the
case and the Judge of the Regional Trial Court finds probable
cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest
Lim, Sr. v. Felix
194 SCRA 292 (1991)
FACTS: Vicente Lim, petitioner, was one of those who were charged
with multiple murder with frustrated murder in connection with the
ambush of Masbate Congressman Espinosa and his bodyguards (only
one survived) in the domestic airport of the said province Preliminary
investigation was conducted and the RTC judge was able to find a
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The Fiscal
ruled that the crime of the suspects must be murder for each of the 4
victims killed and physical injuries for the survivor. The Fiscal however
filed 4 separate Informations for murder against the 12 accused, with
no bail. As the petition for change of venue by Lim was granted by the
SC, the cases were transferred to Judge Felix of Makati. Petitioner filed
a motion and manifestation for the transmittal of initial records of
preliminary investigation for the best enlightenment of the court in its
determination of the existence of a probable cause based on the
Constitutional mandate that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing
magistrate have been personally convinced of such probable cause
but it was opposed by the prosecution & denied by the respondent
court. It later issued warrants of arrest against the petitioner and the
others who were accused.
ISSUE: WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by
simply relying on the prosecution's certification & recommendation
that a probable cause exists
HELD: A judge may rely on the fiscals certification of the existence of
probable cause and issue a warrant of arrest. However, such
certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant of
arrest (Placer vs. Villanueva 126 SCRA 463 [1983]).
The judge must have a personal determination of the existence of a
probable cause for a warrant of arrest to be issued, but it does not
necessarily mean that he must personally examine the complaint
(Soliven vs. Makasiar 167 SCRA 393 [1988].
The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge.
Preliminary investigation is done by the prosecutor and does not bind
the judge. Also, there must be distinction between (1) the preliminary
inquiry which determines the probable cause for the issuance of the
warrant of arrest and (2) the preliminary investigation which ascertains
if the offender should be held for trial or be released (People v.
Honorable Enrique Inting GR No. 88919, July 25 1990).
RTC judges no longer have authority to conduct preliminary
investigations (Castillo v. Villaluz 171 SCRA 39 [1989]).
The judge may rely on the COMELEC's resolution to file for the
information in the same way that he may rely on the Prosecutor's
certification (People v Delgado GR Nos. 93419-32, Sept. 18, 1990.
*The constitutional mandate has not been satisfied and the judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion for relying solely on the
Prosecutor's certification where all the records of investigation are in
Masbate. He has not personally determined the probable cause but it
was the Provincial Prosecutor who had done such.
The extent of reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and
subject to the sound discretion of the judge. But when he issues a
warrant of arrest without evidence before him, he abuses such
discretion.
Webb v. De Leon
247 SCRA 652 (1995)
FACTS: The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the
Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert
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Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio Lejano and six (6) other persons,
with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Meanwhile, petitioner Webb
claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the
crime as he went to the United States on March 1, 1991 and returned
to the Philippines on October 27, 1992. Thereafter, the DOJ Panel
issued a 26-page Resolution finding probable cause to hold
respondents for trial and recommending that an Information for rape
with homicide be filed against petitioners and their co-respondents. It
then filed the corresponding Information against petitioners and their
co-accused with the Regional Trial Court. Respondent judge issued
warrants of arrest. Petitioner Webb voluntarily surrendered to police
authorities. Petitioners Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave themselves
up to the authorities after filing their petitions before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrants of arrest issued by respondent
Judge Raul de Leon and later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino met
the constitutional requirement of probable cause.
HELD:
The Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law
repudiates the submission of petitioners that respondent
judges should have conducted searching examination of
witnesses before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
The Court also rejects the petitioners contention that a
judge must first issue an order of arrest before issuing a
warrant of arrest. There is no law or rule requiring the
issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of arrest.
DOJ Panels 26-page report, testimonies of witnesses and
counter- affidavits of petitioners satisfied both respondent
judges that there is probable cause in issuing said warrants
of arrest.
Before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine
personally the PROBABILITY, NOT THE CERTAINTY OF GUILT
of the accused. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to
see if it is supported by substantial evidence.
In search cases:
(1) Items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of their being
connected with criminal activity.
(2) The items will be found in the place to be searched.
In arrest cases:
(1) There must be probable cause that a crime has been
committed.
(2) The person to be arrested committed it.
*Upon filing of an information the Regional Trial Court may issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused.
Talingdan v. Eduarte
366 SCRA 559 (2001)
FACTS: Petitioner, a private practitioner, charged respondent Judge
Eduarte, with improvidently issuing a warrant of arrest in a criminal
case for libel without the requisite preliminary investigation being first
conducted by the Office of the Public Prosecutor. He alleged that
sometime in April 2000, elements of PNP stormed into his residence to
arrest him and his client on the strength of a Warrant of Arrest issued
by respondent Judge. Complainant then filed a Very urgent Motion to
Quash and/or Set Aside Warrant of Arrest and Direct Prosecutors Office
to Conduct Preliminary Examination since they had not been previously
notified of the charge against them and no preliminary investigation
was ever conducted by the public prosecutors office yet. The
respondent granted the motion and recalled the warrant of arrest,
admitting that he issued the same under the mistaken belief that a
preliminary investigation had already been conducted and an
information filed in court. Thus, when he saw the Warrant of Arrest, he
signed the same honestly thinking that the Criminal Docket Clerk had
faithfully complied first with her duty of going over the records of the
case.
Administrative Warrants
The Constitution is explicit that it is only a judge who can issue
warrants
The 1973 Charter allowed such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law to determine probable cause
Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board
9 SCRA 27 (1963)
FACTS: Petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board of
having purchased US Dollars in the total amount of $130,000.00
without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines,
and of clandestinely remitting the same to Hong Kong. A warrant of
arrest of said aliens was issued by the presiding member of the
Deportation Board. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the charges
against them in the Deportation Board on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and that the charges do not constitute legal basis for
deportation. The lower court held that the Board has the power to
issue warrants of arrest and fix the amount of the bond for the
temporary release of the alien.
ISSUE:
(1)
(2)
* Pertinent Laws:
CA No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940) Commissioner of Immigration
was empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after
previous determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence
of grounds therefore.
Section 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code) Lays down
the procedure to be observed should there be deportation
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proceedings.
HELD:
(1)
The charges against the herein petitioners constitute in effect an act
of profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing of US dollars an economic
sabotage which is a ground for deportation.
There seems to be no doubt that the Presidents power of
investigation may be delegated. This is clear from a reading of Section
69 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for a prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive (the President) or his
authorized agent.
(2)
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose
authority the Presidents power to deport is predicated, does not
provide for the exercise of the power to arrest.
An implied grant of power, considering that no express authority
was granted by the law on the matter under discussion, that would
serve as a curtailment or limitation upon the fundamental right of a
person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with
caution. Then, a delegation of that implied power must be REJECTED as
inimical to the liberties of the people.
*The Executive Order insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to
issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien
or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary
release of said aliens, is declared ILLEGAL. The order of arrest issued by
the respondent Deportation Board is declared NULL AND VOID.
Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago
162 SCRA 840 (1988)
FACTS: Petitioners were apprehended from their respective residences
on February 27 1988 by agents of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by Commissioner
Miriam Defensor-Santiago. Petitioners were among the twenty-two
(22) suspected alien pedophiles who were rounded up after three
months of close surveillance by CID agents. Seized during the
apprehension were photo negatives, pictures, posters and other
literature advertising the child prostitutes. After being denied bail,
petitioners availed a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
HELD: The petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is
denied.
REASON:
*Probable Cause such facts and circumstances antecedent to the
issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a
cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof.
In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause
determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which
period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause
justified the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters
without warrant. Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful
arrest and therefore, admissible in evidence.
The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge
does not extend to deportation proceedings.
What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the
alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be
conducted with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the
charge should be substantiated by competent evidence.
In deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right
but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation.
The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by and
under the authority of the sovereign power.
Writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is
or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal from the
beginning.
*Deportation proceedings are administrative in character. An order of
deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a
penal process.
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of those territories.
The Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not have
extraterritorial effect sp as to cover searches made in another
country involving non-American citizen. The social impact is
only between the government and those governed, including
aliens who have gone into the territory of the United States and
developed substantial connections with that country. Thus, if
the person affected is a citizen, it might be an entirely different
matter
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
494 U.S. 259, 108 Led 2d 222, 110 S Ct 1056 (1990)
Facts: Respondent is a citizen and resident of Mexico. He was believed
by the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to be one of the
leaders of a large and violent organization in Mexico that smuggles
narcotics into the United States. He was apprehended by the Mexican
Police and transported him to United States Border Patrol station in
Calexico, California, then arrested by the United States Marshals and
moved him to a correctional center in San Diego, California, pending his
trial. DEA agents, working with Mexican officials, with Director General
of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP), authorizing the searches,
searched his Mexican residences in Mexicali and San Felipe and seized
certain documents. The search of his residence uncovered a tally sheet,
which the Government believes reflects the quantities of marijuana
smuggled by the respondent into the United States. District Court
granted respondents motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that
the Fourth Amendment applied to the searches and DEA agents had
failed to justify searching of the premises without a warrant. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court, divided panel, held that American
citizens tried abroad by United States military officials were entitled to
Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections The court concluded that the
Constitution imposes substantive constraints on the Federal
Government, even it operates abroad. (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,
[1957]). Majority assumed that illegal aliens in the United States have
Fourth Amendment rights. (relying on INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.
1032 [1984]). Majority recognized that American search warrant would
be no legal validity in Mexico, but it is deemed sufficient that a warrant
would have substantial constitutional value in this country, because it
would reflect a magistrates determination that there existed probable
cause to search and would define the scope of the search.
Issue: W/N Fourth Amendment applies to the search and seizure by the
United States agents of property that is owned by a non-resident alien
and located in a foreign country.
Ruling: Reversed (Decision of the Court of Appeals)
Ratio:
*The Fourth Amendment operates in a different manner that the Fifth
Amendment, because the Fifth Amendment guaranteed the privilege
against self-incrimination, which is a fundamental trial right of criminal
defendants, which the constitutional violation will occur only at trial.
*As suggested by Madison, the driving force behind the adoption of
the Amendment was widespread hostility among the former Colonists
to the issuance of writs of assistance empowering revenue officers to
search suspected places for smuggled goods and general search
warrants permitting the search of private houses, often to uncover
papers that might be used to convict persons of libel. (Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 626, [1886])
*Purpose for the Amendment was to protect the people of the United
States against arbitrary action by their own Government; it was never
suggested to be intended to restrain the actions of the Federal
Government against aliens outside of the United States.
*Not every constitutional provision applies to governmental activity
even where the United States has sovereign power.
*Congress was not required to adopt a system of laws which shall
include the right of trial by jury and that the Constitution does not
without legislation and its own force, carry such right to territory so
situated.
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Additional Cases
(D) Searches and Seizures [11-12]
D1. NBI Microsoft Corp. v. Hwang
A former authorize distributor of Microsoft products was raided for
allegedly selling fake Microsoft products. During the raid, installer CDs
were found. What are installer CDs? They lump together in one CD
several programs so how could that be indicative of copyright
infringement. The DOJ however dismiss the case saying that there was
no probable cause because this person who was the subject of the
search warrant was an authorize distributor in the past.
HELD: the presence of installer CDs is indicative of a probable cause of
software infringement because Microsoft does not produce installer
CDs. Microsoft only comes up with CDs of particular programs but it
does not put them together in only one CD. If its windows its just
windows if its office its just office. But if you find them in only one CD,
thats installer CD, and then obviously those are fake or counterfeit. So
the SC said that is indicative of counterfeiting. Therefore there is
probable cause to continue with the case.
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crime will be located at a specified place. The court further held that
the probable-cause requirement looks to whether evidence will be
found when the search is conducted, all warrants are in a sense,
anticipatory. Anticipatory warrants are, therefore, no different in
principal from ordinary warrants. They require a magistrate to
determine (1) that it is now probable that (2) contraband, evidence of a
crime, or a fugitive will be on the described premises (3) when the
warrant is executed. It should be noted, however, that where the
anticipatory warrant places a condition (other than the mere passage of
time) upon its execution, the first of these determinations goes not
merely to what will probably be found if the condition is met. Rather,
the probability determination for a conditioned anticipatory warrant
looks also to the likelihood that the condition will occur, and thus that a
proper object of seizure will be on the described premises. Two prerequisites of probability must be satisfied (1) It must be true that if the
triggering condition occurs there is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place (2) there is
probable cause to believe that the triggering condition will occur.
D4. Los Angeles County v. Rettele
550 U.S. 90 (2006)
FACTS: Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department Deputy Dennis
Watters investigated a fraud and identity-theft crime ring. There were
four suspects of the investigation. The four suspects were known to be
African-Americans. Watters obtained a search warrant for two houses
in Lancaster, California, where he believed he could find the suspects.
The warrant authorized him to search the homes and three of the
suspects for documents and computer files. Watters briefed six other
deputies in preparation for the search of the houses. Watters informed
them they would be searching for three African-American suspects.
However, Watters did not know that one of the houses (the first to be
searched) had been sold to Max Rettele. He had purchased the home
and moved into it three months earlier with his girlfriend Judy Sadler
and Sadlers 17-year-old son Chase Hall. All three, respondents here,
are Caucasians.
The deputies announcement awoke Rettele and Sadler.The deputies
entered their bedroom with guns drawn and ordered them to get out
of their bed and to show their hands. They protested that they were
not wearing clothes. Rettele and Sadler were held at gunpoint for one
to two minutes before Rettele was allowed to retrieve a robe for
Sadler. He was then permitted to dress. By that time the deputies
realized they had made a mistake, they apologized to Rettele and
Sadler.
Rettele and Sadler, individually and as guardians ad litem for Hall, filed
this suit against Los Angeles County, the Los Angeles County Sheriffs
Department, Deputy Watters, and other members of the sheriffs
department. Respondents alleged petitioners violated their Fourth
Amendment rights by obtaining a warrant in reckless fashion and
conducting an unreasonable search and detention. The District Court
held that the warrant was obtained by proper procedures and the
search was reasonable. It concluded in the alternative that any Fourth
Amendment rights the deputies violated were not clearly established
and that, as a result, the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity.
On appeal respondents did not challenge the validity of the warrant;
they did argue that the deputies had conducted the search in an
unreasonable manner. The Court of Appeals concluded that the search
and detention were unnecessarily painful, degrading, or prolonged,
and involved an undue invasion of privacy. Turning to whether
respondents Fourth Amendment rights were clearly established, the
majority held that a reasonable deputy should have known the search
and detention were unlawful.
ISSUE: whether the act of the deputies constitute an unreasonable
manner of conducting a search.
DECISION: No. The court held that the search was reasonable under the
circumstances. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
REASON: When the deputies ordered respondents from their bed, they
had no way of knowing whether the African-American suspects were
elsewhere in the house. The presence of some Caucasians in the
residence did not eliminate the possibility that the suspects lived there
as well. The deputies, who were searching a house where they believed
a suspect, might be armed, possessed authority to secure the premises
before deciding whether to continue with the search. In executing a
search warrant officers may take reasonable action to secure the
premises and to ensure their own safety and the efficacy of the search.
Unreasonable actions include the use of excessive force or restraints
that cause unnecessary pain or are imposed for a prolonged and
unnecessary period of time. The orders by the police to the occupants,
in the context of this lawful search, were permissible, and perhaps
necessary, to protect the safety of the deputies. Blankets and bedding
can conceal a weapon, and one of the suspects was known to own a
firearm, factors which underscore this point. The Constitution does not
require an officer to ignore the possibility that an armed suspect may
sleep with a weapon within reach. The deputies needed a moment to
secure the room and ensure that other persons were not close by or
did not present a danger. The Fourth Amendment allows warrants to
issue on probable cause, a standard well short of absolute certainty.
Valid warrants will issue to search the innocent, and people like Rettele
and Sadler unfortunately bear the cost. When officers execute a valid
warrant and act in a reasonable manner to protect themselves from
harm, however, the Fourth Amendment is not violated.
D5. Valeroso v. Ca
598 SCRA 41 (2009)
FACTS: For resolution is the Letter-Appeal of Senior Inspector Jerry
Valeroso praying that the Feb. 22, 2008 decision and June 30, 2008
resolution be set aside and a new one be entered acquitting him of the
crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
During trial there were two versions as to where Valeroso was arrested.
Prosecution claims that Valeroso was arrested near the INP central
Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about to board a
tricycle; after placing him under arrest, the arresting officers bodily
searched him, and they found the subject firearms and ammunition. On
the other hand, the defense insists that he was sleeping inside a room
in the boarding house of his children in Quezon City and was awakened
by four heavily armed men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at
him and pulled him out of the room, tied his hands and placed him near
the faucet outside the room then went back inside, searched and
ransacked the room and forcibly opened a locked cabinet where they
discovered the subject firearm.
The RTC, branch 97, QC, convicted Valeroso as charged. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification to the penalty. On
petition for review, SC affirmed in full the CA decision. He then filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied with finality on June 30,
2008. The present letter-appeal focused on his breached constitutional
rights against unreasonable search and seizure.
OSG filed a manifestation in lieu of comment recommending Valerosos
acquittal, considering the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense
more credible. The OSG agrees with Valeroso that the subject firearms
was obtained by the police officers in violation of his constitutional
right against illegal search and seizure, and should thus be excluded
from the evidence for the prosecution.
ISSUE: whether the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and
ammunition valid.
DECISION: No. The Feb. 22, 2008 decision and June 30, 2008 resolution
are reconsidered and set aside. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is acquitted of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
REASON: Must give more credence to the version of the defense.
Sec. 2 of Art. III of the Constitution , as a general rule, the procurement
of a warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or
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Issues: (1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the
NBI could be validly made without a warrant; and (2) Whether there
was probable cause for prosecuting petitioner for violation of P.D. No.
1829.
Judgment/Disposition: Affirmed
Held: Respecting the complaint against Atty. Dizon, this court, also in
Posadas v. Ombudsman, held that [f]or the failure of the NBI agents to
comply with the constitutional and procedural requirements, their
attempt to arrest [the two student-suspects] without a warrant was
illegal.
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unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and
efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated
office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement
upon such privacy has been upheld.
The reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the welldefined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the
conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test
requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and,
ergo, constitutional.
The situation is entirely different in the case of persons charged before
the public prosecutors office with criminal offenses punishable with six
years and one day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the
mandatory drug testing are randomness and suspicionless. In the
case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutors office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. To
impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to
the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate
a persons right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. w, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 - CONSTITUTIONAL but declaring its Sec.
36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Chapter 5
Privacy of Communications and Correspondence
The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
8
proceeding.
Part of the right to be let alone is necessarily the corresponding
freedom to communicate in confidence with some other
persons of ones choosing without the contents of that
communication being disclosed to others, especially the
government
Privacy of Communications and Searches
To ensure respect and observance of the guarantee, the
Constitution requires that there be a court order, or some
weighty, justifiable and substantial state interest, such as public
safety or order, before interference with the privacy of
communications and correspondence could be allowed
The guidelines are supposed to be set out in law. Finally, as
further deterrence, it mandates that any evidence obtained in
violation of its proscriptions shall be useless--inadmissible for
any proceeding
Katz v. US
389 US 347, 19 L Ed 2d 576, 88 S Ct 507 (1967)
8
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Zulueta v. CA
253 SCRA 699 (1996)
Salcedo-Ortaez v. CA
235 SCRA 111 (1994)
Private respondent Rafael S. Ortaez filed with the RTC of QC a
complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner
Teresita Salcedo-Ortaez on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or
psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Among the exhibits offered
by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons
The trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence
offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone
conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. these tape
recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed
his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone
Held: No. RA 4200 entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize WireTapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication,
and for other purposes expressly makes such tape recordings
inadmissible in evidence
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider
the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the
cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to
the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the
inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under RA 4200
The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence
Ramirez v. CA
248 SCRA 590 (1995)
A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in
the RTC of QC alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner
offensive to petitioners dignity and personality, contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy--Garcia essentially belittled Ramirezs
intelligence, and attributing her employment to Garcias help. In
support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event and sought moral damages, attorneys fees and other expenses
of litigation. the transcript on which the civil case was based was culled
from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner
Warrant Requirement
Consistent with Section 2 of Article III, searches and seizures,
whether of tangible or intangible things, must be authorized by
a warrant supported by probable cause and with a particularity
of description of what is sought to be searched or seized
Accordingly, what might only be possible is a reasonable
description of the persons whose communication is sought to
be intercepted, identification of the crime that might be
committed by means of such communication, as well as a
delimitation of the period of the allowable search and seizure
Additional Cases
(E) Privacy of Communications and Correspondence
E1. City of Ontario, California, et al. v. Quon et al
560 U. S. ____ (2010)
Petitioner acquired alphanumeric pagers able to send and receive text
messages. Its contract with its service provider, Arch Wireless, provided
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for a monthly limit on the number of characters each pager could send
or receive, and specified that usage exceeding that number would
result in an additional fee. The City issued the pagers to respondent
Quon and other officers in its police department (OPD). When Quon
and others exceeded their monthly character limits for several months
running, petitioner Scharf, OPDs chief, sought to determine whether
the existing limit was too low, i.e., whether the officers had to pay fees
for sending work-related messages or, conversely, whether the
overages were for personal messages. After Arch Wireless provided
transcripts of Quons and another employees August and September
2002 text messages, it was discovered that many of Quons messages
were not work related, and some were sexually explicit. McMahons
report noted that Quon sent or received 456 messages during work
hours in the month of August 2002, of which no more than 57 were
work related; he sent as many as 80 messages during a single day at
work; and on an average workday, Quon sent or received 28 messages,
of which only 3 were related to police business. The report concluded
that Quon had violated OPD rules. Quon was allegedly disciplined.
The employee contends that the privacy of the messages is protected
by the ban on unreasonable searches and seizures found in the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
HELD: No. [O]ffices of government employees...are [generally] covered
by Fourth Amendment protections, but government searches to
retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace
rulessearches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal
in the private-employer contextdo not violate the...Amendment
that Arch Wireless violated the SCA by giving the City the transcript.
Whether the audit was nonetheless reasonable, the court concluded,
turned on. Whether Scharf used it for the improper purpose of
determining if Quon was using his pager to waste time, or for the
legitimate purpose of determining the efficacy of existing character
limits to ensure that officers were not paying hidden work-related
costs. After the jury concluded that Scharfs intent was legitimate, the
court granted petitioners summary judgment on the ground they did
not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit reversed.
Although it agreed that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his text messages, the appeals court concluded that the search was
not reasonable even though it was conducted on a legitimate, workrelated rationale. The opinion pointed to a host of means less intrusive
than the audit that Scharf could have used. The court further
concluded that Arch Wireless had violated the SCA by giving the City
the transcript.
Chapter 6
Freedom of Expression and Assembly
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and petition the government for redress of
9
grievances.
Among the most cherished liberties in a free society, where
freedom of thought and conscience is a bedrock principle, one
that occupies a preferred and predominant status, is the right
to freely speak ones mind
Freedom of expression is the matrix, the indispensable
condition of nearly every freedom. The guarantee of the
freedom of speech has been defined as the instrument and
guarantee and the bright and consummate flower of all liberty
[I]t was made part of the First Amendment to the American
Constitution
Under this guarantee, the people are to determine their own
direction and chart their own destiny through the free
exchange of ideas and not through dictation from or coercion
of the government or anybody elses
The theory of freedom of expression involves more than a
technique for arriving at better social judgments through
democratic procedures. It comprehends a vision of society, a
faith and a whole way of life
Scope of Guarantee -- Prior Restraint, Subsequent Punishment
and Damages
The Freedom of Expression Clause is basically directed against
prior restraint or censorship and subsequent punishment
[I]t means that the people are kept free from any undue
interference from the government in their thoughts and words
[T]he people should be allowed to see and discuss for
themselves what is best for them
The First Amendments guarantee of the freedom of speech,
or of the press prohibits a wide assortment of government
restraints upon expression, but the core abuse against which it
was directed was the scheme of licensing laws implemented by
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General Considerations
To properly understand the value of the freedom of speech, of
the press and of expression, it would be best to consider the
background, the history and the circumstances which called
forth such guarantee
Near v. Minnesota
283 US 697, 75 L Ed 2d 1357, 51 S Ct 625 (1931)
A Minnesota statute declared that one who engages "in the business of
regularly and customarily producing, publishing," etc., "a malicious,
scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical,"
is guilty of a nuisance, and authorizes suits, in the name of the State, in
which such periodicals may be abated and their publishers enjoined
from future violations. In such a suit, malice may be inferred from the
fact of publication. The defendant is permitted to prove, as a defense,
that his publications were true and published "with good motives and
for justifiable ends." Disobedience of an injunction is punishable as a
contempt.
Under said statute, the County Attorney of Hennepin County brought
action to enjoin the publication of what was describe as a "malicious,
scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine and periodical"
known as "The Saturday Press," published by the defendants in the city
of Minneapolis.
Held: Yes. The statute is not directed at threatened libel, but at an
existing business which, generally speaking, involves more than libel"
The object of the statute is not punishment, in ordinary sense, but
suppression of the offending newspaper or periodical
The statute not only operates to suppress the offending newspaper or
periodical, but to put the publisher under an effective censorship (in a
way that, unless the owner or publisher is able and disposed to bring
competent evidence to satisfy the judge that the charges are true and
are published with good motives and for justifiable ends, his
newspaper or periodical is suppressed and further publication is made
punishable as a contempt)
For these reasons we hold the statute, so far as it authorized the
proceedings in this action under clause (b) of section one, to be an
infringement of the liberty of the press guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment
New York Times Co v. US
403 US 713, 29 L Ed 2d 822, 91 S Ct 2140 (1971)
The United States brought these actions to enjoin publication in the
New York Times and in the Washington Post of the contents of a
classified study entitled "History of the US Decision-Making Process on
Viet Nam Policy"
Held: Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.
J. Black & J. Douglas: The amendments were offered to curtail and
restrict the general powers granted to the Executive, Legislative and
the Judicial Branches two years before in the original Constitution.
In the case at bar, we are asked to hold that, despite the First
Amendment's emphatic command, the Executive Brach, the Congress,
and the Judiciary can make laws enjoining publication of current news
and abridging freedom of the press in the name of "national security"
The dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the
widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing
information.
Babst v. National Intelligence Board
132 SCRA 316 (1984)
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The court also concluded that the ordinance was not impermissibly
content-based, because it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest in protecting the community against the biasmotivated threats to public safety and order.
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communication had its genesis not in the nations penal code but in the
Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of
the press.
Borjal did not act with malice, we find the petitioner Borjal to have
acted in good faith. Moved by the civic duty and prodded by his
responsibility as a newspaperman, he proceeded to expose and
denounced what he perceived to be a public deception. Every citizen
has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not
consider that petitioner Borjal has violated that right (of the
respondents) nor abused his press freedom. We must however take
this opportunity to likewise remind media practitioners of the high
ethical standards attached to and demanded by their noble profession.
Filipinas Broadcasting Network Inc (FBNI) v. Ago Medicaland
Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC-BCCM)
448 SCRA 413 (2005)
FACTS: Mel Rima and Jun Alegre, host of radio program Expose aired
every morning over DZRC-AM owned by FBNI heard over Legaspi City.
Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints from students,
teachers and parents against AMEC-BCCM. Alegre said among other
things that 1) AMEC students in Physical Theraphy complained that the
course is not recognized by DECS 2)students are required to take and
pay for he subject even if he subject does not have an instructor,
commenting such greed for money on the part of AMECs
administration 3) the administrators of AMEC BCCM, AMEC Science HS
and the AMEC Institute of Mass Communication in their effort to
minimize expenses in terms of salary are absorbing or continues to
reject making reference to many teachers in AMEC who were former
teachers of Aquinas University but were removed because of
Immorality. In offering to prove that AMEC is a dumping ground,
garbage, not merely of moral and physical misfits, mention was made
of the case of the Dean of Student Affairs of AMEC, Justita Lola, which
according to Alegre, as the family name implies she is too old to work,
being an old woman. On the other hand, Rima echoed Alegres
allegations about Dean Lola. AMEC filed a complaint for damages
claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory, against FBNI, Rima and
Alegre. In reply, they claimed that they were plainly impelled by a sense
of public duty to report the going on in AMEC, which is an institution
imbued with public interest. The trial court rendered a decision finding
FBNI and Alegre liable for libel and held that the broadcasts are libelous
per se. In absolving Rima from the charge, the trial court ruled that
Rimas only participation was when he agreed with Alegres expose.
The parties appealed to the CA, which affirmed the trial courts
judgment with modification, but made Rima solidarily liable with FBNI
and Alegre. Hence, this petition.
HELD: We deny the petition. There is no question that the broadcasts
were made public and imputed to AMEC defects or circumstances
tending to cause it dishonor, discredit and contempt. We do not agree
with FBNI contention that Rima and Alegre did not act with malicious
intent. Every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious. Rima and
Alegre failed to show adequately their good intention and justifiable
motive in airing the supposed gripes of the students.
Some US courts apply the privilege of neutral reportage in libel cases
involving matter so of public interest or public figures. Under this
privilege, a republisher who accurately and disinterestedly reports
certain defamatory statements made against public figures is shielded
from liability regardless of the republishers subjective awareness of the
truth or falsity of the accusation. Rima and Alegre cannot invoke the
privilege of neutral reportage because unfounded comments abound in
the broadcasts. Moreover, there is no existing controversy involving
AMEC when the broadcasts were made. The privilege of neutral
reportage applies where the defamed person is a public figure who is
involved in an existing controversy and a party to that controversy
makes the defamatory statement.
Had the comment been an expression of opinion based on established
facts, it is immaterial that the opinion happened to be mistaken, as long
as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. However, the
comments of Rima and Alegre were not backed up by facts. Therefore,
the broadcasts are not privileged and remain libelous per se. FBNI is
solidarily liable to pay for damages arising from the libelous broadcasts.
An employer and employee are solidarily liable for defamatory
statement by the employee within the scope and course of his
employment, at least when the employer authorizes or ratifies the
defamation. Moreover, FBNI, as shown by circumstances (e.g. no clear
and convincing evidence shows that they underwent FBNIs regimented
process of application and their deficiencies in their KBP accreditation)
lacked the diligence in selecting and supervising Rima and Alegre,
Hence, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay damages together with Rima and
Alegre.
Flor v. People
454 SCRA 440 (2005)
FACTS: Petitioner Flor and Nick Ramos, managing editor and news
correspondent respectively of the Bicol forum, a local weekly
newspaper circulated in the Bicol Region were charged with libel, for
having published an allegedly defamatory news article regarding
financial irregularities involving then minister of the Presidential
Commission on Govt. Reorganization and concurrently Camarines Sur
Gov. Luis Villafuerte. The news article reported, inter alia that the
officials denial that he did not spend government money for his recent
trips to Japan and Israel failed to convince the people and that the
people knew that the trips were purely junket. It also stated that about
P700,000 was collected by way of cash advances by ranking provincial
officials, at the instance of the Governor and without resolution
approving its release, was allegedly used for the two trips. It also
reported that Villafuerte claimed that he spent his own money for the
trips. The petitioner admitted that he wrote the questioned news items
on the basis of a note given to him by a source whom he refused to
identify. Said source was allegedly connected with the Provincial
Treasurers office. He said that prior to writing the article, he went to
his source to ask some clarificatory questions and was given
authenticated records of the cash advances. Villafuerte claimed that no
one from Bicol Forum made any attempt to get his side of the story nor
confirm the veracity of the contents of the article from any source at
the provincial capitol. To him, the Bicol Forum seemed to be making a
mockery of his previous explanations regarding the cash advances and
his trips abroad and such a sweeping statement subjected him to public
ridicule and humiliation. The trial court rendered a decision convicting
both accused which CA affirmed.
HELD: The sole issue here is if the questioned news is libelous. We
reverse. Clearly when confronted with libel cases involving publication
which deal with public official and the discharge of their official
functions, this Court is not confined within the wordings of the libel
statute; rather, the case should likewise be examined under the
constitutional precept of the freedom of the press. A public official is
barred from recovering damages in cases involving defamations. His
entitlement, however, is limited to instances when the defamatory
statement was made with actual malice-that is with the knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.
Vasquez v. CA
314 SCRA 460 ( 1999)
FACTS: Petitioner Vasquez, a resident of Tondo Foreshore area,
together with other families went to see then NHA General manager
Lito Atienza regarding their complaint against their Bgy. Chairman,
Jaime Olmedo. After their meeting with Atienza and other NHA
officials, petitioner and his companions were interviewed by newspaper
reporters concerning their complaint. The following day, a news article
appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa saying that the families
of the Tondo Foreshore Area complained about their Bgy. Chairman
who, in connivance with some of the project managers of NA, managed
to get for themselves some 14 lots in the said area. It was also reported
that Olmedo was involved in illegal gambling and theft of fighting cocks.
Based on the article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against
petitioner alleging that the latters statements cast aspersions in him
and his damaged reputation. The trail court found petitioner guilty of
libel. The CA affirmed.
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HELD:The question for determination in this case is the liability for libel
of a citizen who denounces a bgy official for misconduct in office. SC
held that the decision of CA must be reversed. Petitioner contends that
what he said was true and was made with good motives and for
justifiable ends which the SC found merit.
To find a person guilty of libel under Art 353 of the Revised Penal Code,
the following elements must be proved: a) the allegation of a
discreditable act or condition concerning another, b) publication of
the charge, and c) identity of the person defamed, and d) existence of
malice. In this case, the first 3 elements are present. The question is
whether from the fact that the statements were defamatory, malice
can be presumed so that it was incumbent upon petitioner to
overcome such presumption. Under Art. 361 of the Revised Penal code,
if the defamatory statement is made against a public official with
respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the
truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will be entitled to an
acquittal even though he does not prove that the imputation was
published with good motives and for justifiable ends. In this case,
contrary to the findings of the lower court, petitioner was able to prove
the truth of his charges against the bgy official.
It was error for the lower court to hold that petitioner only tried to
prove that the complainant (bgy official) is guilty of the crimes alluded
to; Accused, however, has not proven that the complainant committed
the crimes. For that is not what petitioner said as reported in the Ang
Tinig ng Masa. The fact that charges had been filed against the bgy.
official, not the truth of such charges, was the issue.
amnesty under PD 1740 and 1840. In both, petitioner did not recognize
that his sale of land to AYALA was on cash basis. Reacting to the news
article, petitioner filed with the RTC an action for damages against BIR
for extortion and malicious publication of the BIRs tax audit report,
claiming that the filing of criminal complaints against him for violation
of tax laws were improper because he had already availed of 2 tax
amnesty decrees, The trial court decided in favor of the respondents
and the CA affirmed. Before the SC, petitioner questions the propriety
of awarding damages to Larin.
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boys masturbating.
Issue: Whether or not New York criminal statute which prohibits
persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances b children
under the age of 16 by distributing material which depicts such
performances is constitutional or overbroad.
Held: No, a trier of fact need not find that the material appeals to the
prurient interest of the average person, it is also not required that
sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a offensive manner and the
material at issue need not be considered as a whole. The law should
not be invalidated for overbreadth unless it reaches a substantial
number of permissible application is hardly novel. Therefore it is
considered as a paradigmatic case of a state statute whose legitimate
reach dwarf its arguably impermissible applications.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
535 U.S. 234, 152 L Ed 2d 403, 122 S Ct 1389 (2002)
Facts: Child Pornography Act of 1996 (CCPA) expanded the prohibition
on child pornography to include not only pornographic images made
using actual children but also any visual depiction like photograph, film,
video, picture or computer or computergenerated image or picture
that depict a minor engage in sexual explicit conduct, also known as
virtual child pornography. Free speech coalition an adult entertainment
trade association filed a suit alleging that the appears to be and
conveys the impression provisions are overboard and vague, chilling
production of works protected by First amendment.
Issue: Whether or not the mentioned provision abridges the freedom of
speech.
Held: CPPA prohibits speech despite its serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value. The statute proscribes the visual depiction of an idea
teenager engaging in sexual activity that is a fact of modern society and
has been a theme in art and literature throughout the ages. Virtual
child pornography is not intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of
children. The harm does not necessarily follow from the speech, but
depends upon some unquantified potential for subsequent criminal
acts. Therefore provision is considered overbroad and
unconstitutional.
Pita v. Court of Appeals
178 SCRA 362 (1989)
Facts: Pursuant to an Anti Smut Campaign, Western Police district,
INP of Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from
dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila
sidewalks magazines, publications and other reading materials believed
to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized
materials. Among seized publication seized was Pinoy Playboy
magazine. The company filed a case for injunction seeking to restrain
respondents confiscating petitioners magazine claiming that the
magazines are decent, artistic and educational magazine, which
protected by the constitution which guarantees of freedom of speech
and of the press.
Issue: Whether or not such confiscation is unconstitutional.
Held: The court rejected the argument that there is neither
constitutional nor legal provision which would free the accused from all
criminal responsibility because of the absence of the warrant. The
reasons are first there is no accused to speak of and second would be
the Mayor could have directly ordered the raid without search warrant
for the reason that the violation of the penal law was already
committed.
LATON
Hecklers veto
-The opposition of a rowdy or obstreperous crowd might as well drown
out the voice of the one seeking to exercise the right to speak. In legal
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Decision: Unconstitutional.
Rationale: It is clear from Art. IX-C that the evil sought to be avoided is
the possibility that a franchise holder may favour or give any undue
advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or
television time. This is also the reason why a columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is
required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign
period. It shall not be construed to mean that the Comelec has also
been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media
practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite
periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression are
neither the franchise holder nor the candidates; in fact there are no
candidates involved in a plebiscite.
Osmena v. Commission on Elections
288 SCRA 447 (1998)
In National Press Club v. Comelec, the court upheld the constitutionality
of Section 11(b) of R.A. no. 6646 which prohibits mass media from
selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or
other political purposes, except the COMELEC. Petitioners, candidates
for public office, seek a re-examination of the validity of aforecited
provision, contending that events after the ruling in National Press Club
have called into question the validity of the very premises if that
decision.
There is no case or controversy to decide, only an academic discussion
to hold.
Decision: Petition is dismissed.
Petitioners claim that the experience in the last five years since the
decision has shown undesirable effects of the law. However, petitioners
do not complain of any harm suffered as a result of the operation of the
law. What petitioners seek is not the adjudication of a case but simply
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Criminal action for libel against those who petitioned for Punsalans
removal was then instituted. Defendants contend that their petition for
removal of the justice of the peace falls within the protection of the
freedom of speech and right to assembly and to petition for the redress
of their grievances. Moreover, they contend that the content of their
petition is to be considered privileged communication and thus, cannot
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front of the Justice Hall of Las Pias was prohibited under the Supreme
Courts En Banc Resolution dated 7 July 1998, entitled, Re: Guidelines
on the Conduct of Demonstrations, Pickets, Rallies and Other Similar
Gatherings in the Vicinity of the Supreme Court and All Other Courts.
They submit that the Supreme Court gravely abused its discretion
and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in promulgating those
guidelines. Freedom of speech and expression despite its
indispensability has its limitations. It has never been understood as the
absolute right to speak whenever, however, and wherever one pleases,
for the manner, place, and time of public discussion can be
constitutionally controlled. As well put by our Justice Isagani Cruz, the
better policy is not liberty untamed but liberty regulated by law where
every freedom is exercised in accordance with law and with due regard
for the rights of others. Court reiterates that judicial independence and
the fair and orderly administration of justice constitutes paramount
governmental interests that can justify the regulation of publics right
of free speech and peaceful assembly in the vicinity of the courthouses.
Even in the United States, a prohibition against picketing and
demonstrating in or near courthouses has been ruled as valid
constitutional.
Petitioners also claim that this Court committed an act of judicial
legislation in promulgating the assailed resolution. They charged that
this Court amended the provisions of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 880,
otherwise known as The Public Assembly Act, by converting the
sidewalks and streets within a radius of two hundred (200) meters from
every courthouse from a public forum place into a no rally zone.
Contrary therefore to petitioners impression, B.P. Blg. 880 did not
establish streets and sidewalks, among other places, as public fora. A
close look at the law will reveal that it in fact prescribes reasonable
time, place, and manner regulations. It requires a written permit for the
holding of public assemblies in public places subject, even, to the right.
Existence of B.P. Blg. 880, however, does not preclude this Court from
promulgating rules regulating conduct of demonstrations in the vicinity
of courts to assure our people of an impartial and orderly
administration of justice as mandated by the Constitution.
SC is especially vested by the Constitution with the power to adopt
measures essential to an orderly administration of justice. These rules
are designed to ensure the orderly and expeditious conduct of court
business as well as to secure the rights of parties. These court-made
rules have the force and effect of law.
Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Asuncion
228 SCRA xi (1993)
Manila Standard published an item entitled Judiciary worse than PNP,
which reported that, according to the opinion polls conducted by the
Social Weather Station (SWS), the Judiciary had an even lower
satisfaction rating than the PNP. The report prompted Judge
Maximiano Asuncion to initiate, motu proprio, proceedings entitled In
the Matter of Findings of Social Weather Research Group Derogatory to
the Judiciary. He then ordered the President of SWS, Prof. Mahar
Mangahas, to explain why he should not be held in contempt for
distributing to the general public without prior permission from any
court findings which tend to directly or indirectly degrade the
administration of justice. An explanation was submitted to the court
and the contempt charge against SWS President was dismissed after
finding the explanation submitted satisfactory. After some time, Prof.
Mangahas addressed a letter to the Chief Justice intended as formal
complaint against Judge Asuncion for grave abuse of authority and
gross ignorance of the law, in connection with the contempt charge
that was initiated by respondent judge.
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence
the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding,
constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by courts.
A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public
confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into
disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally
punishable by courts. In the first there is no contempt where there is no
decision which might in any way be influenced by newspaper
publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a
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layman.
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such
a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of
speech and of the press is the balancing of interests test. The principle
requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation.
Commercial Speech
As noted earlier, at the core of the freedom of speech and of
the press is political expression, or those in connection with the
peoples relationship with their government and politics. It was
only subsequently that the freedom was also considered to
encompass commercial speech
For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we
ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.
If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest
Intrinsically related to commercial speech is the advertising
industry, whose power to influence could either be for good or
bad. Accordingly, the Constitution provides for its regulation by
holding that The advertising industry is impressed with public
interest, and shall be regulated by law for the protection of
consumers and the promotion of the general welfare
LATON
Held: This court has held that, when speech and non-speech
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.
Whatever impression inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
The governmental interest and the scope of the 1965 Amendment are
limited to preventing harm to the smooth and efficient functioning of
the Selective Service System. When OBrien deliberately rendered
unavailable his registration certificate, he willfully frustrated this
governmental interest. For this non-communicative impact of his
conduct, and for nothing else, he was convicted.
Since the 1965 Amendment to 12(b)(3) of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act is constitutional as enacted and as applied.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and
reinstate the judgment and sentence of the District Court. This
disposition makes unnecessary consideration of OBriens claim that the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming his conviction on the basis of the
non-possession regulation.
Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence
468 U.S. 288, 82 L Ed 2d 221, 104 S Ct 3065 (1984)
Facts: In 1982, the National Park Service issued a renewable permit to
respondent Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) to conduct a
wintertime demonstration in Lafayette Park and Mall, which are
National Parks in the heart of Washington, D.C., for the purpose of
demonstrating the plight of the homeless. The permit authorized the
erection of two symbolic tent cities. However, the Park Service, relying
on its regulations particularly on that permits camping (defined as
the use of park land for living accommodation purposes such as
sleeping activities, or making preparations to sleep) only in designated
campgrounds, no campgrounds having ever been designated in
Lafayette Park or the Mall denied CCNVs request that demonstrators
be permitted to sleep in the symbolic tents. CCNV and the individual
respondents then filed an action in the District Court, alleging, inter
alia, that application of the regulations to prevent sleeping in the tents
violated the First Amendment. The District Court granted summary
judgment for the Park Service, but the Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue: Whether or not a National Park Service regulation prohibiting
camping in certain parks violates the First Amendment when applied to
prohibit demonstrators from sleeping in Lafayette Park and the Mall in
connection with a demonstration intended to call attention to the
plight of the homeless?
HELD: Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is
subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions. Symbolic
expression of this kind may be forbidden or regulated if the conduct
itself may constitutionally be regulated, if the regulation is narrowly
drawn to further a substantial governmental interest, and if the interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free speech.
In relation to regulation of activities or conduct on
government property, a distinction would have to be made on whether
such property is traditionally considered as public forums streets
and parks or not.
The Governments ownership of property does not
automatically open that property to the public. It is a long-settled
principle that governmental actions are subject to a lower level of First
Amendment scrutiny when the government function operating [is]
not the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker but, rather, as
proprietor, to manage [its] internal operation[s]
Regulation of speech activity on governmental property that
has been traditionally open to the public for expressive activity, such as
LATON
Issue: Whether or not the mayor of the city of Manila acted in lack or
excess of jurisdiction in denying the rally permit to petitioner and if
such decision abridge their right of expression and assembly?
Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was
violation and even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied
it does not follow that respondent could legally act the way he did. The
validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged.
Held: It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not
devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be
granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence
requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly
occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant
circumstances, still the assumption especially so where the assembly
is scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must be for
the assembly being held there.
While the general rule is that a permit should recognize the right of the
applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice,
another place may be designated by the licensing authority if it be
shown that there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if
no such change were made. Hence the discretion reached by the Court.
The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the
demonstrators does not suffice.
Ordinarily, the remedy in cases of this character is to set aside the
denial or the modification of the permit sought and order the
respondent official to grant it. Nonetheless, as there was urgency in this
case, the proposed march and rally being scheduled for the next day
after the hearing, this Court, in the exercise of its conceded authority,
granted the mandatory injunction in the resolution of October 25,
1983.
A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a
permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the
date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it
were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled
to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well
ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise
whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to
its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to
such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger tests be
the standard for the decision reached. Notice is given to applicants for
the denial.
Academic Freedom
The Constitution guarantees that academic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. This freedom
essentially involves the right of such institutions of learning to
determine what to teach, how to teach them, who may teach
them, and who to admit to study therein
The classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas
Reyes v. Bagatsing
125 SCRA 553 (1983)
Facts: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a
peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the
afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States
Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short
program would be held. The march would be attended by the local and
foreign participants of such conference. That would be followed by the
handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the
closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an
assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights
to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by
it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request was
denied. Reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirming
the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt any
assembly or congregations where a large number of people are
expected to attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued
if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where
the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be
ensured. An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction
was granted on the ground that there was no showing of the existence
of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the
denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is
violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the
holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any
foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court
resolves.
Issue: Whether or not the freedom of expression and the right to
peaceably
assemble
violated.
Ruling: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable
assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has
likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places,
especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is
their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an
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1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule
VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.5The same order also set the case
for preliminary investigation. The following day after the suspension
the petitioner sought for reconsideration of the preventive suspension
and Laguardia ( MTRCB chair person) recuse from hearing the case.
After the case was heard in this court it was given 3 months suspension
of the program Ang Dating Daan.
After which they again filed for petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for injunctive relief with the following issues: (A) BY
REASON THAT THE [IRR] IS INVALID INSOFAR AS IT PROVIDES FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDERS; (B) BY REASON OF
LACK OF DUE HEARING IN THE CASE AT BENCH; (C) FOR BEING
VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW; (D) FOR BEING
VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION; AND (E) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE
OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION.
In ending, what petitioner obviously advocates is an unrestricted
speech paradigm in which absolute permissiveness is the norm.
Petitioners flawed belief that he may simply utter gutter profanity on
television without adverse consequences, under the guise of free
speech, does not lend itself to acceptance in this jurisdiction. We
repeat: freedoms of speech and expression are not absolute freedoms.
To say "any act that restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed
brows" is not to say that any act that restrains or regulates speech or
expression is per se invalid. This only recognizes the importance of
freedoms of speech and expression, and indicates the necessity to
carefully scrutinize acts that may restrain or regulate speech.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the MTRCB in Adm. Case No. 01-04 dated
September 27, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION of
limiting the suspension to the program Ang Dating Daan. As thus
modified, the fallo of the MTRCB shall read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby
rendered, imposing a penalty of THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION on
the television program, Ang Dating Daan, subject of the instant
petition.
Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz, and UNTV Channel
37 and its owner, PBC, are hereby exonerated for lack of evidence.Costs
against petitioner.
Soriano v. Laguardia
(2009)
Ang Dating Daan host Eliseo S. Soriano uttered the following
statements in his TV program against Michael Sandoval (Iglesia ni
Cristos minister and regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang
Daan):
Lehitimong
anak
ng
demonyo[!]
Sinungaling
[!]
Gago ka talaga[,] Michael[!] [M]asahol ka pa sa putang babae[,] o di
ba[?] []Yung putang babae[,] ang gumagana lang doon[,] []yung
ibaba, dito kay Michael[,] ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba? O, masahol
pa sa putang babae []yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga
demonyong ito.
As a result, The MTRCB initially slapped Sorianos Ang Dating Daan,
which was earlier given a G rating for general viewership, with a 20day preventive suspension after a preliminary conference. Later, in a
decision, it found him liable for his utterances, and was imposed a
three-month suspension from his TV program Ang Dating Daan. Soriano
challenged
the
order
of
the
MTRCB.
HELD: The SC ruled that Sorianos statement can be treated as
obscene, at least with respect to the average child, and thus his
utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions
from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis
should be context based and found the utterances to be obscene
after considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the
time of the show, and the G rating of the show, which are all factors
that made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court
emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily understood by a
child literally rather than in the context that they were used.
The SC also said that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather
a form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent
punishment. In affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an order of
suspension, the majority said that it is a sanction that the MTRCB may
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validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free
speech clause. visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that the
suspension is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to
continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was
already issued to him by MTRCB, rather, it was a sanction for the
indecent contents of his utterances in a G rated TV program.
(Soriano v. Laguardia; GR No. 165636, April 29, 2009)
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same day, she issued G.O. No. 5 setting the standards which the AFP
and the PNP should follow in the suppression and prevention of acts of
lawless violence. Prof. Randolf David and others were then arrested
without warrant while they were exercising their right to peaceful
assembly. The authorities also raided the office of the newspaper
Tribune, threatened the media, imposed censorship and threatened
take over public utilities. Petitioners were charged with the crime of
inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, The Public Assembly Act of
1985.
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Chapter 7
Freedom of Religion
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
12
political rights.
A mans faith and belief are his alone and the State has no
business interfering with that
The Constitution also provides in emphatic terms The
separation of Church and State shall be inviolable
The assurance of religious freedom under the Constitution
principally consists of two guarantees, embodied in the socalled Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause
Aglipay v. Ruiz
64 Phil. 201 (1937)
Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against
respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress.
Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional
provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in
the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a
result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the
purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church,
or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent
contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing
for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and
issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the
government.
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faith at all. This is not to say, however that religion has been so
identified with our history and government that religious freedom is
not likewise as strongly imbedded in our public and private life. Nothing
but the most telling of personal experiences in religious persecution
could have implanted such belief.
Marsh v. Chambers
463 U.S. 783, 77 L Ed 2d 1019, 103 S Ct 3330 (1983)
Facts: The Nebraska Legislature begins each of its sessions with a prayer
by a chaplain paid by the State with the legislature's approval.
Respondent member of the Nebraska Legislature brought an action in
Federal District Court, claiming that the legislature's chaplaincy practice
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and seeking
injunctive relief. The District Court held that the Establishment Clause
was not breached by the prayer but was violated by paying the chaplain
from public funds, and accordingly enjoined the use of such funds to
pay the chaplain. The Court of Appeals held that the whole chaplaincy
practice violated the Establishment Clause, and accordingly prohibited
the State from engaging in any aspect of the practice.
Issue: Whether or not the legislature's chaplaincy practice violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Ruling: By a 6-3 vote the Supreme Court permitted the practice of
beginning a legislative session with a prayer delivered by a publicly
funded chaplain, with Chief Justice Warren Burger writing the majority
opinion.
The Court relied almost entirely on historical practice and tradition.
Congress had paid a chaplain and opened sessions with prayers for
almost 200 years. Indeed, the fact that Congress had continued the
practice after considering constitutional objections in the Court's view
strengthened rather than weakened the historical argument.
The opening of sessions of legislative and other deliberative public
bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of
this country. From colonial times through the founding of the Republic
and ever since, the practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with the
principles of disestablishment and religious freedom. In the very
courtrooms in which the United States District Judge and later three
Circuit Judges heard and decided this case, the proceedings opened
with an announcement that concluded, "God save the United States
and this Honorable Court." The same invocation occurs at all sessions of
this Court.
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200
years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative
sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society. To
invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making laws is
not, in these circumstances, an "establishment" or a step toward
establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs
widely held among the people of this country.
Basically, the decision argued that both the Supreme Court and
Congress have traditionally begun their sessions with prayers. Since
individual states do not have to abide by more stringent First
Amendment limits than the federal government, then they, too, are
permitted to use prayers. The "Establishment Clause does not always
bar a state from regulating conduct simply because it harmonizes with
religious concerns."
Marsh vs. chambers
463 us 783 (1983)
Facts: Nebraska Legislature begins its sessions with a prayer offered by
a chaplain who is chosen biennially by the Executive Board of
Legislative Council and paid out of public funds. Respondent, claims
that the Legislatures chaplaincy practice violates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.
Issue: whether or not the prayer offered upon the start of every session
of the Nebraska Legislature and the payment of public funds thereof
constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
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Ammendment?
Held: the prayer offered by the chaplain and the funds paid thereon are
not a violation of the Establishment Clause.
The offering of prayer in the opening of sessions is deeply rooted in the
history and tradition of this country. The practice has coexisted with
the principles of disestablishment and religious freedom. It has
continued without interruption ever since that early session of
Congress. However, standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify
contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees. In this context,
historical evidence shed light not only on what the draftsmen intended
the Establishment Clause mean, but also on how they thought that
Clause applied to the practice authorized by the First Congress- their
actions reveal their intent.
BOARD OF EDUCATION VS. ALLEN
392 US 236 (1968)
Facts: Section 701 of New Yorks Education law requires local public
school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in
grade including those in private and parochial schools. The appellant
school board sought a declaration that the statutory requirement was
invalid as violative of the State and Federal Constitutions, an order
barring the appellee Commissioner of Education from removing
appellants members from office for failing to comply with it, and an
order preventing the use of state funds for the purchase of textbooks
to be lent to parochial students.
Held: the express purpose of the law is the furtherance of the
educational opportunities available to the young. There is nothing that
shows about the necessary effects of the statute that is contrary to its
stated purpose. The law merely makes available to all children the
benefits of a general program to lend school books free of charge.
WALZ VS. TAX COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
397 US 664 (1970)
facts: appellant imsiccessfully sought an injunction in the New York
courts to prevent the NY Tax Commission fom granting property tax
exemptions to religious organizations for properties used solely for
religious worship, as authorized by the state constitution and the
implementing statue. The appellant contends that the grant of tax
exemptions to church property indirectly requires the appellant to
make a contribution to religious bodies, and thereby violates the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clause.
Held: the legislative purpose of the property tax exemptions is neither
the advancement nor the inhibition of religion; it is neither sponsorship
nor hostility. NY has determined thath certain entities that exist in
harmonious relationship to the community at large, and that foster its
moral and mental improvement should not be inhibited in their
activities by property taxation or the hazard of loss of its property for
nonpayment of taxes.
Nothing in this national attitude towards
religious tolerance and two centuries of uninterrupted freedom from
taxation has given the remotest sign of leading to an established church
or religion, it has operated affirmatively to guarantee the free exercise
of all forms of religious beliefs.
Lemon v. Kurtzman
403 US 602 (1971)
Facts: a Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes providing state aid to
church-related elementary and secondary schools. Both statutes are
challenged as violative of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clause.
The Pennsylvanian statutes reimburse the cost of teachers salaries,
textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular subjects.
Rhode Island pays directly to teachers in nonpublic elementary shools a
supplement of 15% of their salaries. A federal court upheld the
Pennsylvania law while a District Court ruled that the Rhode Island law
fostered 'excessive entanglement'.
Held: the assistance was unconstitutional. There are three criteria that
should be used to assess legislation: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances or inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster and excessive government Entanglement with religion."
The two statutes in question violate the third of these criteria. The
teachers whose salaries are being partially paid by the State are
religious agents who work under the control of religious officials. There
is an inherent conflict in this situation of which the state should remain
clear. To ensure that teachers play a non-ideological role would require
the state to become entangled with the church. Allowing this
relationship could lead to political problems in areas in which a large
number of students attend religious schools.
Tilton v Richardson
403 us 672 (1971)
facts: the higher education facilities act was passed in response to a
strong nationwide demand for the expansion of college and university
facilities to meet the sharply rising number of young people demanding
higher education. Act provides federal construction grants and loan for
college and university facilities, excluding any facility used or to be
used for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious worship, or
primarily in connection with any part of the program of a school or
department of divinity. The act stipulated that after twenty years, the
school could use the facilities for whatever purpose they chose.
Held:
the Court decided that the grants for non-religious school facilities did
not violate the Establishment Clause. it decided that the provision
limiting the statutes interest to twenty years was unconstitutional.
The primary effect of the Higher Education Facility Act was not to aid
religious institutes. The objective was to encourage education among
the countrys youth. In an earlier case (Bradfield v. Rob) the Court
decided that not all of financial aid to church-sponsored activities
violates the religious clauses of the constitution. The beneficiaries of
the act are secondary schools in which children are not as susceptible
to religious coercion and in which religious instruction is not as central
to the curriculum. Because the States interest in the structure remains
after twenty years, the provision giving the schools the ability to use
the facility for religious purposes is unconstitutional. This finding does
not require the invalidating of the entire act because it was not
essential to the whole law. The HEFA(higher education financial aid) did
not lead to excessive entanglement because the aid was aimed at
religiously neutral facilities. Also, the aid was non-ideological and was a
one-time, single-purpose program. The taxpayers rights were not
violated by the act because there was no coercion directed at the
practice
or
exercise
of
their
religious
beliefs.
In making this decision the Court did not discuss whether the assistance
to the religious schools for non-religious purposes would enhance their
ability to further their religious instruction. Taxpayers, whose money
was given to religious institutions, were not harmed provided their own
religious practices were not affected.
Agostini v. Felton
521 US 203 (1997)
Facts: A New York parochial school board challenged the District Court's
upholding of a twelve year-old decision in Aguilar v. Felton which
prohibited public school teachers from teaching in parochial schools.
The current proposal offered help to needy students in private schools
by sending public school teachers to tutor them after school. New York
was forced to offer remedial help to students through 'local educational
agencies'. Students did not need to attend public schools in order to be
eligible for the assistance. Those who were to receive tutoring were
students who a) reside in low income areas or b) failed or were at risk
of failing the state's student performance standards.
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Held: the Court allowed public school teachers to tutor private school
students in their private schools. Because of the Supreme Court's ruling
in Aguilar, the State had been forced to tutor students in either public
schools or mobile units outside of the parochial schools. As a result, the
school board was forced to deduct $7.9 million dollars from their
budget for transportation and establishing the mobile units. An earlier
ruling in Zobrest disavowed a ban of placing all public employees in
sectarian schools (a sign language interpreter had been provided for a
deaf student). Additionally, not all government aid that directly assists
in the educational function of religious schools is invalid. The location of
the classroom (either in public or religious schools) should not matter.
Furthermore, there is little difference between providing a sign
language interpreter, which the Court already allowed, and a tutor. The
interaction that would result between the state and church is allowable
because a relationship between the two is inevitable. This decision
reinforces the belief that the state can conduct public programs in
religious schools without becoming excessively entangled with the
religion. This is contrary to the earlier attitude that there must be an
absolute wall between public and religious schools.
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that would offend their countrymen who express their love of country
through the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the
flag ceremony to show respect for the right of those who participate in
the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive
behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of
religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety,
public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest,
that the State has a right and duty to prevent. Without such threat to
public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from school is not
justified.
Also, the expulsion of the members Jehovahs Witnesses from schools
where they are enrolled will violate their right as citizens of the
Philippines, under the 1987 constitution, to receive free education,
because it is the duty of the State to protect and promote the right of
all citizens to quality education... and to make such education
accessible to all Sec. 1, Art. XIV.
Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration
251 SCRA 569 (1995)
Facts: The State moves for a reconsideration of the decision on March
1, 1993 which granted private respondents petition for certiorari and
prohibition and annulled the expulsion orders issued by said
respondents on the ground that the decision created and exemption in
favor of the Jehovah Witnesses religious group members , in violation
of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. Although they refuse
to salute the flag, they are willing to stand quietly and peacefully at
attention in order not to disrupt the ceremony or to disturb those who
believe differently.
Issue: WON the compulsory flag salute is valid
Held: The refusal of the Jehovahs Witnesses in saluting the flag is
based on their religious belief which is shared by their entire
community. As the petitioners were expelled because of their religious
belief, such action, as stated by the Court, was against religious
practice. It is likewise apparent that the said orders and memoranda
would gravely endanger the free exercise of the religious beliefs of the
members of their sects. The refusal to salute the flag is not the same as
the refusal to pay taxes and to submit to compulsory vaccination since
the former has no threat to the life or health of the State. Thus, there is
no reason for compulsory or coercive flag salute. Although the
Constitution provides for a national flag, it does not give the State the
power to compel a salute to the flag.
Cantwell v. Connecticut
310 U.S. 296, 84 L Ed 1213, 60 S Ct 900 (1940)
Facts: Newton Cantwell and his 2 sons, Jesse and Russell, are members
of the religious group Jehovahs Witnesses. They were arrested because
they were engaged in selling books and soliciting in a neighborhood
street which is thickly populated by 90% Roman Catholics. Jesse
Cantwell, asked two men to listen to a phonograph record which
attacked their religion as they were Catholics. They were tempted to
strike Cantwell unless he went away. Thus, Cantwell went away and
there was no evidence that he was personally offensive or had entered
into any argument with them. However, the Cantwells were arrested in
violation of the General Statutes of Connecticut which prohibited
solicitation of money, services, subscriptions, or any valuable thing for
any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause unless such
cause is approved by the secretary of public welfare council. They were
also convicted of the common law offense of inciting breach of peace.
Issue: WON the method adoption by Connecticut to that end
transgresses the liberty safeguarded by the Constitution
Held: The statute deprives the appellants of their liberty without due
process of law in contravention of the 14th Amendment for which they
were arrested. They were also right in their insistence that the Act is
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US v. Ballard
322 U.S. 78, 88 L Ed 1148, 64 S Ct 882 (1944)
Facts: Respondents belong to the I Am movement which promotes
the religious belief and doctrines that a certain Guy W. Ballard, now
deceased, alias Saint Germain, had been selected and designated by
alleged ascertained masters as a divine messenger. They also
believed that the messages of such ascertained masters and of the
alleged divine entity, Saint Germain, would be transmitted to mankind
through Guy W. Ballard. Edna W. Ballard and Donald Ballard were also
allegedly selected as messengers just like Guy. They also believed that
they have supernatural powers which enable them to heal persons with
ailments. They were indicted and convicted for using and conspiring to
use mails to defraud in the organization and promotion of their
movement. They were also charged since they well knew that what
they believed in was false.
Issues: WON in respondents good faith, i.e. whether they did not
believe those things, that Jesus or Saint Germain came down and
dictated, or those things that they wrote, and preached, they used the
mail for the purpose of getting money
Held: On appeal, the Circuit CA reversed, holding that the decision of
the District Court in restricting the jury to the issue of respondents
good faith was error and granted a new trial. The SC granted certiorari
because of the importance of the question presented. The Circuit CA
held that the question of the truth of the representations concerning
respondents religious beliefs or doctrines should have been submitted
to the jury and thus, it remanded the case for a new trial.
We do not agree that the truth or verity of respondents religious
doctrines or beliefs should have been submitted to the jury. The
District court ruled properly when it withheld from the jury all
questions concerning the truth or falsity of the religious beliefs or
doctrines of respondents. The law knows no heresy, and is
committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect
(Watson v Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 728). The First Amendment does not
only forestall compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or
the practice of any form of worship but it also safeguards the free
exercise of the chosen form of religion (Cantwell v Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303). It also does not select any one group or any type of
religion for preferred treatment.
American Bible Society v. City of Manila
101 Phil. 386 (1957)
FACTS: The American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit,
religious, missionary corporation doing business in the Philippines
through its Philippine agency established in manila in 1898. In the
course of its ministry, the Society has been distributing and selling
bibles and/or gospel portions thereof. Sometime in 1953, the acting
City treasurer of manila required the Society to secure the
corresponding Mayors permit and license fees. The Society paid the
accumulated permit and license fees (P5,891.45) under protest and
then filed a complaint in court to question the constitutionality and
legality of the ordinances under which the said fees were being
collected.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 2529 (requiring every entity engaged
in business to pay a license fee based on gross sales) and ordinance
3000 (requiring that a municipal permit to be first obtained before
engaging in business) could be made applicable to the American Bible
Society.
THE COURTS RULING: Defendant was sentenced to return to the
plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it.
REASON: The Constitutional guarantee of the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right
to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can
only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the
grounds that there is a CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER OF ANY
SUBSTANTIVE EVIL which the State has the right to prevent.
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*To have the protection of the religion Clauses, the claims must be
rooted in religious belief.
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union
59 SCRA 54 (1974)
FACTS: Appellee, a member of the religious sect known as the Iglesia
ni Cristo had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc.
since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope
Workers Union. A closed-shop provision was contained in the
collective bargaining agreement which required membership in the
Union as a condition of employment for all permanent employees.
However, RA 3350 was enacted, providing that, such agreement shall
not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of
their members in any such labor organization. Thereupon, the Union
wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate
appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from
the Union as a member. The management of the company informed
appellee that unless he could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with
the Union, the company would be constrained to dismiss him from the
service.
THE COURTS RULING: The decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila enjoining the Company from dismissing the appellee and
sentencing the Union to pay Appellee P500 for attorneys fees and
costs of the action is AFFIRMED.
REASON: It is clear that the right to join a union includes the right to
abstain from joining any union.
RA 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of
the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor
organization. In spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said
religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their
jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective
bargaining union.
Estrada v. Escritor
408 SCRA 1 (2003)
FACTS: Compalinant Alejandro Estrada wrote to the presiding judge of
Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, requesting for an
investigation of rumors that respondent Soleded Escritor, court
interpreter in said court, is living with a man not her husband. They
allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. She admitted
that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., without the benefit of
marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. Quilapio was
likewise married at that time, but had been separated in fact from his
wife. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, the
respondent has executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness that is
recognized as giving the parties the right to marital relationship even if
not recognized by civil authorities.
PRINCIPAL ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty
of the administrative charge of gross and immoral conduct.
SUB-ISSUE: Whether or not respondents right to religious freedom
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Conscientious Objectors
The right of conscientious objectors is based more on statutory
provisions than the constitutional freedom of religion. It is a
governmental accommodation extended to those, who out of
religious scruples, may find themselves opposed to war and the
concomitant taking of lives
In order to qualify for classification as a conscientious objector,
a registrant must satisfy three basic tests:
1. He must show that he is conscientiously oppose to war in any
form
2. He must show that his opposition is based upon religious
training and belief, as the term has been construed in our
decisions
3. He must show that this objection is sincere
Religious Test and Exercise of Political and Civil Rights
The last sentence of the religion clause declares that no
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil and
political rights. This should follow if the State is really to be free
from meddling into religious affairs
This prohibition against religious test has reference to the
historically and constitutionally discredited policy of probing
religious beliefs by test oaths or limiting public offices to
persons who have, or perhaps more properly profess to have, a
belief in some particular kind of religious concept
McDaniel v. Paty
435 US 618, 55 L Ed 2d 593, 98 S Ct 1322 (1978)
Paty, a candidate for delegate to the Tennessee constitutional
convention, sued for a declaratory judgment that McDaniel, an
opponent who was Baptist minister, was disqualified as serving as
delegate. That court held that the statutory provision violated the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. After the election, the Tennessee SC
reversed, holding that the clergy disqualification imposed no burden on
religious belief, and restricted religious action . . . [only] in the law
making process of the government where religious action is
absolutely prohibited by the establishment clause.
WON, Minister or priest is barred from serving as delegates to the
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FACTS: After the US had broken diplomatic relations with Cuba and the
Department of State had eliminated Cuba from the area for which
passports were not required, Louis Zemel applied to have his passport
validated for travel to Cuba to satisfy [his] curiosity . . . and to make
[him] a better informed citizen. His request was denied, and he filed
suit seeking a judgment declaring that:
1. He was entitled under the Constitution and the laws of the
US to travel to Cuba and to have his passport validated for
that purpose;
2. The Secretary of States travel restrictions were invalid; and
that
3. The Passport Act of 1926 and Section 215 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 were unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the Secretary of State is statutorily authorized to refuse to
validate the passports of US citizens for travel to Cuba, and, if he is,
WON the exercise of that authority is constitutionally permissible.
RULING: YES. The court thinks that the Passport Act of 1926 embodies a
grant of authority to the Executive to refuse to validate the passports of
US citizens for travel to Cuba. That Act provides, in pertinent part: The
Secretary of State may grant and issue passports . . . under such rules as
the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the
United States. . . . The right to travel within the United States is, of
course, also constitutionally protected. But that freedom does not
mean that areas ravaged by flood, fire or pestilence cannot be
quarantined when it can be demonstrated that unlimited travel to the
area would directly and materially interfere with the safety and welfare
of the area or the nation as a whole. So it is with international travel (as
is the case here).
Marcos v. Manglapuz
177 SCRA 668(1989)
FACTS: In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the
presidency via the non-violent people power revolution and forced
into exile in Hawaii. Corazon Aquino was declared President of the
Republic. Soon, the Marcos family sought to be allowed to return to the
country but President Aquino barred their return. The Marcos family
filed the instant petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the
Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr.
Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return from the
Philippines.
ISSUE: WON, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution,
the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.
RULING: YES. The President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse
of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos
and his family at the present time and under present circumstances
poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines. That the President has such
power under the Constitution has been recognized by members of the
Legislature. The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to
return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to
travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It
must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those
residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard
and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand
should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or denied. The
petition was dismissed.
DISSENTING OPINION: It is of the dissenters belief that Marcos, as a
citizen of the Philippines, is entitled to return to and live and die in
his own country. The government failed dismally to show that the
return of Marcos dead or alive would pose a threat to the national
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Additional Cases
(H) Liberty of Abode and Freedom of Movement [1]
Chapter 9
Right to Information
The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
14
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
If the people are really and effectively to participate in charting
their own destiny and that of their government, then they must
be given sufficient data and information upon which to base
any intelligent and meaningful decisions
The incorporation of the right to information in the
Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free
exchange of information in a democracy--there can be no
realistic perception by the public of the nations problems, nor
a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied
access to information of general interest
A person could not be presumed to know what was not open to
view, much more so if deliberately kept from sight
Publication and Effectivity
The Civil Code proclaim: Ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith. But it would hardly be fair for the
law to presume knowledge if the government does not
disseminate the laws and rules that govern the norms of
conduct that it expects from its citizens
14
LATON
Bengzon v. Drilon
208 SCRA 133 (1992)
FACTS: The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals who are currently receiving monthly pensions under
R.A. 910 as amended by R.A. 1797.
R.A. 910 provides for the retirement pension of Justices of the Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals, it was amended in 1957 by R.A. 1797
providing in Section 3-A thereof for automatic adjustments of pensions
if salaries of justices were increased or decreased. Identical retirement
benefits were also given, by President Marcos, to the members of the
constitutional commissions under R.A. 3595 and to the members of the
Armed Forces under P.D. 578. Two months later, he issued P.D. 644
repealing Section 3-A of the previous R.As and P.Ds. Subsequently, the
president decreed the restoration of the automatic readjustment of the
retirement pension of officers and enlisted men. A later decree also
issued providing for the automatic readjustment of the pensions of
members of the Armed Forces. On the other hand, the same was not
restored for the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals.
In 1990, Congress, realizing the unfairness of the discrimination,
approved a bill for the reenactment of the repealed provisions of R.A.
1797 and R.A. 3595. However, the president vetoed the bill, stating that
it would erode the very foundation of the governments collective
effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy on
standardization of compensation as articulated in the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989. The following year, retired
Justices of the Court of Appeals filed a letter/petition asking the court
for a readjustment of their monthly pensions in accordance with R.A.
1797 claiming that P.D. 644 repealing R.A. 1797 did not become law as
there was no valid publication, it only appeared for the first time in the
supplemental issue of the Official Gazette. Since, P.D. 644 has no
binding force and effect of law, it therefore did not repeal R.A. 1797.
The court, in its resolution, acted favorably on the request and
pursuant to the resolution, Congress included in the General
Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1992 certain appropriations for
the judiciary intended for the payment of the adjusted pension rates
due to them. The President vetoed provisions of the bill related to
aforesaid appropriations, reiterating the earlier reasons for vetoing the
former house bill.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the veto by the President (cory) of certain
provisions in the general appropriations act for the fiscal year 1992
relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired justices of
the aforementioned courts constitutional.
(2) Whether or not P.D. 644 became law.
DECISION: Petition is GRANTED. (1) The court declared the questioned
veto invalid, set aside as illegal and unconstitutional. (2) The court
agreed that P.D. 644 never became a law.
REASON: (1) It is invalid for being in contravention of the constitutional
guidelines in the exercise of the same, i.e., that it vetoed provisions and
not items. And also what were really vetoed are the R.A. 1797 of 1957
and the Resolution of the Supreme Court in 1991, thus no President
may veto the provisions of a law enacted 35 yrs. before his or her term
of office and neither may the President set aside or reverse a final and
executory judgment of the Supreme Court through the exercise of the
veto power.
(2) P.D. 644 which purportedly repealed R.A. 1797 never achieved that
purpose because it was not properly published, it never became a law
and consequently, it did not have the effect of repealing R.A. 1797. As
justified in the case of Taada v. Tuvera all laws shall immediately
upon their approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in
full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15days from
their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. P.D. 644 was promulgated
by President Marcos in 1975, but was not immediately or soon
thereafter published. It took more than 8 years to publish the decree
after its promulgation.
LATON
questioned check around the second week of May 1979 and that
respondent judge should not have taken into account the date of
release of the Gazette for circulation because Sec. 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that for the purpose of ascertaining the
date of effectivity of a law that needed publication, the Gazette is
conclusively presumed to be published on the day indicated therein as
the date of issue.
ISSUE: whether or not Go Bio, Jr. violated B.P. Blg. 22 when he issued a
check around the second week of May 1979.
DECISION: No. The accused cannot be held liable for bouncing checks
prior to the effectivity of B.P. Blg. 22 although the check may have
matured after the effectivity of the said law.
REASON: The Solicitor General admitted the certification issued by Ms.
Charito A. Mangubat stating This is to certify that Vol. 75, No. 15, of
the April 9, 1979 issue of the Official Gazette was officially released for
circulation on June 14, 1979. It is therefore, certain that the penal
statute in question was made public only on June 14, 1979 and not on
the printed date April 9, 1979. Therefore, June 14, 1979 was the date of
publication of B.P. Blg. 22, before the public may be bound by its
contents especially its penal provisions, the law must be published and
the people officially informed of its contents and/or its penalties. For, if
a statue had not been published before its violation, then in the eyes of
the law there was no such law to be violated and, consequently, the
accused could not have committed the alleged crime. When Go Bio, Jr.
committed the act complained of in May 1979 there was then no law
penalizing such act.
De Roy v. Court of Appeals
157 SCRA 757 (1988)
FACTS: On Aug. 17, 1987, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision
affirming a lower court judgment adverse to the petitioners. Said
decision of the appellate court was received by petitioners on Aug. 25,
1987. On Sept. 9, 1987, the last day of the 15-day period to file an
appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of the time to file a
motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the
appellate court. The petitioners herein filed this instant petitione for
certiorari. The appellate court applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, that the 15-day period for appealing or for
filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. This ruling has
been reiterated in several cases relating to such. Petitioners contend
that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to
apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas
decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the
Court of Appeals was promulgated.
ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and
denied their motion for reconsideration.
DECISION: This court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a
grave abuse of discretion.
REASON: The CA correctly applied the rule laid down in Habulayas case.
Also, contrary to petitioners view, there is no law requiring the
publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before
they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is
the bounded duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues
have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as
the Supreme Court Reports Annotated and law journals.
STATE PROSECUTORS v. MURO
236 SCRA 505 (1994)
LATON
Confidential Matters
While people have the general right to know most everything, it
does not mean, however, that they have an unfettered access
to everything in the possession of the government. In the very
nature of things, some matters have to be kept confidential if
the government is to be effective. One such instance is in
diplomatic negotiations
The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority
and expedition of decision which are inherent in executive
action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its
confidential nature
Indeed, while the Constitution guarantees a right to
information on matters of public concern, for which purpose
access to official records, documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizens, it states at the same time that the same
shall be subject to such limitations as may be provided by law
What is sought to be had then is the grant of enough
information to enable the citizens to exercise their political
rights as the ultimate source of power without sacrificing the
need for the government to keep sacrosanct and confidential
those that need to be kept secret. Where the demarcation line
might be between what should be publicly accessible and what
is to be kept sub rosa is a question that the courts may have to
visit every now and then
Privacy Interests
The people also have the right to keep matters to themselves,
and having certain data and information about them which had
been gathered and stored by the Government does not
authorize others, pursuant to their right to information, to have
access to the same either for their personal consumption or for
publication
Additional Cases
(I) Right to Information [1]
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EO 464 (does it ring a bell? Buset.. minumulto ako ng poli bat gnun?)
2.
3.
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Source: Lexforiphilippines.com
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Chapter 10
Right of Association
The right of the people, including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies
16
for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Man being gregarious by nature would find it natural to
associate with others, whether for intimate companionship or
for social political and other reasons
An individual may join or organize whatever associations and
societies he and kindred minds and hearts like him might want
to form
Just like any other rights, however, the right to associate is still
subject to limitation that it must not be for purposes contrary
to law
Unlike the cases of other guarantees, which are mostly
American in origin, this particular freedom has an indigenous
cast. It can trace its origin to the Malolos Constitution
General Considerations
The right to association may involve such intimate and personal
relations as friendship or marriage to the more impersonal
groupings as those of unions and societies where objectives
might range from purely social to economic and political. The
first one may be considered as the freedom of intimate
association and the latter the freedom of expressive association
The right to form associations also include the liberty not to
join at all. A person can not be compelled to join a group that
he does not want to associate with. The constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of association includes the freedom not to
associate. The right to choose with whom one will associate
oneself is the very foundation and essence of that partnership.
It should be noted that the provision guarantees the right to
form an association. It does not include the right to compel
others to form or join one
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson
357 US 449, 2 L Ed 2d 1488, 78 S Ct 1163 (1958)
Petitioner is a nonprofit membership corporation organized under the
laws of New York for the purpose of advancing the welfare of Negroes.
16
Yes
The rights are personal to the members, who are not immediately
before the court, may be asserted by the association on their behalf for
the right could not be effectively vindicated except through an
appropriate party before the court.
Petitioner argues that the effect of compelled disclosure of
membership list will be to abridge the rights of their rank-and-file
members to engage in lawful association in support of their common
beliefs.
The fact that Alabama has taken no direct action to restrict the right of
the petitioners members to associate freely, does not end inquiry into
the effect of the production order.
Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances
be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly
when the group espouses dissident beliefs.
It is not sufficient to answer that whatever repressive effect
compulsory disclosure of names of petitioners members, may have
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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Intimate Associations
Marriage and family and other personal relationships could
very well illustrate the freedom of intimate association
The Court has long recognized hat, because the Bill of Rights is
designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the
formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal
relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from
unjustified interference by the state
Grisworld v Connecticut
381 US 497, 14 L Ed 2d 510, 85 S Ct 1678 (1965)
A statute makes it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to
prevent conception. Appellants, the Executive Director and the Medical
Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, were found
guilty as accessories for giving married people information and medical
advice on how to prevent conception and prescribing a contraceptive
device or material for the wifes use. They were fined $100 each. They
claim that the accessory statute, as so applied violated the 14th
amendment.
The appellants have standing to raise the constitutional rights of the
married people with whom they had a professional relationship.
Certainly the accessory should have standing to assert the offense
which he is charged is assisting is not, or cannot constitutionally be a
crime.
The right to association is more than the right to attend a meeting; it
includes the right to express ones attitudes or philosophies by
membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful
means. The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of
contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks
to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact
upon that relationship. A governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms. NAACP v Alabama. Would we
allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for
telltale signs of use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marital relationship.
Marriage is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial
or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any
involved in our prior decisions.
..
Mr. Justice Black with whom Mr. Justice Stewarts joins dissenting..
The right of privacy as a comprehensive substitute against
unreasonable search and seizures Privacy is broad, abstract and
ambiguous concept which can easily be shrunken in meaning but which
can also, on the other hand, easily be interpreted as a constitutional
ban against many things other than searches and seizures.
The government has a right to invade the right to privacy unless
prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.
There is no provision in the constitution that gives the court blanket
power to exercise supervisory veto over the wisdom and value of
legislative policies and to hold unconstitutional those laws which they
believe is unwise or dangerous. The use of federal courts of such a
formula or doctrine or whatnot to veto federal laws simply takes away
the power to make laws from congress and transfers the power to this
court for ultimate determination.
It is not too much to say that there is no legislative body ever does pass
laws without believing that they will accomplish a sane, rational, wise
and justifiable purpose.
LATON
Expressive Association
This right to group together people with similar ideas or views
on life and its varied aspects may mean also the right to choose
whom to accept into, or reject from, the group. To that extent,
therefore, the right to associate may be considered as an
aspect of the right to express oneself
The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however,
absolute. Infringements on that right may be justified by
regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests,
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms
Additional Cases
(J) Right of Association [1]
Chapter 11
Eminent Domain
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
17
compensation.
It requires that if the government were to take any private
property, it may do so provided it is for public use and that
there be payment for it, which compensation must be one that
is just
It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept
the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the
power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the
paramount authority of the State over the interests of the
property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible
demands of the public interest in the time-honored
justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare
of the people is the supreme law
17
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We are convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly stated that
the valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one
of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not
substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be
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the
the
the
full
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the local government for the benefit of the people and the
national authority
City of Baguio v. National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority
106 Phil. 144 (1959)
RA 1383 created NAWASA, a public corporation, the purpose of which
is to consolidate and centralize all waterworks, sewerage, and
drainage systems in the Philippines under one control, direction, and
general supervision. The law also provided that all existing government
owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the Philippines are
transferred to NAWASA, and that the net book value of the properties
and assets of said entities shall be received by the Authority in payment
for an equal value of the assets of NAWASA.
A complaint was filed contending that RA 1383 does not include the
Baguio Waterworks System. Also, assuming that it does, said Act is
unconstitutional because it has the effect of depriving the plaintiff the
ownership, control, and operation of said waterworks system without
compensation and without due process of law. NAWASA contended
that RA 1383 is a proper exercise of police power of the State and
assuming that the said act contemplates an act of expropriation, it is
still a constitutional exercise of the power of eminent domain and that
at any rate BWS is not a private property but public works for public
service over which the Legislature has control.
The contention that RA 1383 constitutes valid exercise of police power
rather than a directive to expropriate by the exercise of power of
eminent domain cannot be entertained. The Act does not confiscate,
destroy nor appropriate property. It merely directs that all waterworks
belonging to cities, municipalities and municipal districts in the
Philippines be transferred to the NAWASA.
Baguio Waterworks system is not a property held in trust by a
municipal corporation for the benefit of the public but it is rather a
property owned in a proprietary character. The property held by a
municipal corporation in its private capacity is not subject to
unrestricted control of the legislature, and the municipality cannot be
deprived of such property against its will, except by the exercise of
eminent domain with payment of full compensation.
Salas v. Jarencio
46 SCRA 734 (1972)
RA 4118 was never intended to expropriate the property involved but
merely to confirm its character as a communal land of the State and to
make it available for disposition by the National Government. The
subdivision of the land and the conveyance of the resulting subdivision
lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization do not operate as
an exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation
in violation of the Constitution, but simply as a manifestation of its right
and power to deal with state property.
LATON
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Where the expropriation case had long been final and executory, both
the order of expropriation and the order fixing just compensation can
no longer be modified-the expropriator can no longer withdraw from
the expropriation proceedings.
Also, the expropriation court cannot, by itself, order the expropriating
local government to enact an appropriation ordinance in order to
satisfy its judgment--the land owner must file a separate mandamus
case for that purpose.
LATON
declarations.
W/N Sec. 3-A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended by P.D. 938 will apply.
In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the
complaint, if there was no actual taking prior thereto. Hence, in this
case, the value of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint
on November 20, 1990 should be considered in determining the just
compensation due the respondents. Normally, the time of taking
coincides with the filing of complaint for expropriation as ruled in the
case of Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al. The expropriation
proceedings in this case having been initiated by NPC on November 20,
1990, property values on such month and year should lay the basis for
the proper determination of just compensation.
It should not apply in the case at bar, the acquisition of such easement
is not gratis. The limitations on the use of the property taken for an
indefinite period would deprive its owner of the normal use thereof.
For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation,
which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of
the land taken.
Chapter 12
Contract Clause
No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed
18
18
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LATON
more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent
when the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the
operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States.
Official pronouncements of the Chief Executive states that the
nation has already recovered from the war, and that the peso is one of
the most stable currencies of today.
FACTS: The respondent bank, which was created by a special law (RA
3518), was placed under receivership by the Monetary board of the
Central Bank. Subsequently, the monetary board ordered the
liquidation of the Bank after finding that the Bank had incurred an
outstanding liability of P540, 835, 860.79. The petitioners claim that as
the bank was created by a special law, a contractual relationship now
exists between the Government and the stockholders of the bank that
cannot be disturbed without violation of the impairment clause.
THE COURTS RULING: The Minnesota statute as here applied, does not
violate the contract clause of the Federal Constitution.
REASON:
The conditions upon which the period of redemption is extended do
not appear to be unreasonable. The integrity of the mortgage
indebtedness is not impaired; interest continues to run; the validity of
the sale and the right of a mortgagee-purchaser to title or to obtain a
deficiency judgment if the mortgagor fails to redeem within the
extended period are maintained, and the conditions of redemption
stand as they were under the prior law.
The mortgagor, during the extended period, is not ousted from
possession, but he must pay the rental value of the premises as
ascertained in judicial proceedings, and this amount is applied to the
carrying of the property and to interest upon indebtedness.
An emergency existed in Minnesota which furnished a proper
occasion for the exercise of the reserved power of the state to protect
the vital interests of the community.
The legislation was addressed to a legitimate end, the legislation was
not for the mere advantage of particular individuals, but for the
protection of a basic interest of society.
*Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the
obligation as between the parties, but the reservation of ESSENTIAL
ATTRIBUTES OF SOVEREIGN POWER is also read into contracts as a
postulate of the legal order.
Additional Cases
(L) Contract Clause [1]
RUTTER V. ESTEBAN
93 Phil. 68 (18 May 1953)
FACTS: Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land situated in the City of
Manila for the sum of P9,600, of which P4,800 was paid outright and
the balance was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or before August
7, 1942 and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at rate
of 7 percent per annum. Esteban failed to pay the two instalments as
agreed upon, as well as the interest that had accrued thereon, and so
Rutter instituted on 1949 an action to recover the balance, the interest
due thereon and the attorneys fees stipulated in the contract. Esteban
set up as a defense the moratorium clause embodied in RA 342. He
claims that this is a pre-war obligation and as a war sufferer, payment
of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of eight years
from the settlement of his claim by the Philippine War Damage
Commission, and this period has not yet expired.
THE COURTS RULE: Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P4,800 with interest thereon
at the rate of 7 percent per annum from August 27, 1942, until its full
payment, plus 12 percent as attorneys fees. Failure to pay this
judgement as stated, the properties mortgaged will be sold at public
auction and the proceeds applied to its payment in accordance with
law. The continued operation and enforcement of RA 342 is
unreasonable and oppressive, hence, NULL and VOID.
REASON:
The period in the case at bar seems to us unreasonable, if not
oppressive. The hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote,
Chapter 13
Poverty and Legal Protection
Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by
19
reason of his poverty
The right to litigate us an escape valve to relieve the pressures
of personal disagreements that might otherwise explode into
physical confrontation
While authorities are not required to relieve the accused of his
poverty, they have the obligation not to take advantage of
indigence in the administration of justice
Collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to
the courts is the fundamental right within the protection of the
First Amendment. However, the right would be a hollow
promise if courts could deny associations of workers or others
the means of enabling their members to meet the costs of legal
representation
19
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Chapter 14
Rights of Suspects
Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
20
families.
As now guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, a suspect, or one under
custodial investigation, is accorded the following basic rights,
viz: (a) right to remain silent; (b) right to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice; and, (c)
right to be informed of such rights. He is also entitled to have
counsel appointed for him if he could not afford one. And, to
make his rights more meaningful and not simply forfeited
through ignorance or inattention, the Constitution throws in
RULING: The Court opined that Rio seemed unaware that the former
20
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LATON
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requirement arose in decisions from state courts, over which the Court
lacked the power to impose supervisory non-constitutional rules.
Furthermore, although the Court had previously invited legislative
involvement in the effort to devise prophylactic measures for
protecting criminal defendants against overbearing tactics of the police,
it had consistently held that these measures must not take away from
the protections Miranda had afforded.
In conclusion, the Court held that Miranda announced a constitutional
rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively.
LATON
The court held that the evidence was inadmissible to the court as
evidence as a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused.
LATON
LATON
People v. Maqueda
242 SCRA 565 (1995)
Facts: Accused-appellant Maqueda was charge with robbery with
homicide and serious physical injuries in relation to the slaying of
Horace William Barker and the infliction of serious injuries on his wife,
Teresita Mendoza, on the occasion of a robbery on 27 August 1991.
Maqueda was then fetched from Quezon and brought to the Benguet
Provincial Jail. Its commanding officer directed on his men to get
Maquedas statement. He did so and according to him, he informed
Maqueda of his rights under the Constitution. Meanwhile, in April 1992,
while he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail,
stating therein that he is willing and volunteering to be a State
witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least
guilty among the accused in this case.
In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of Prosecutor
Zarate and obtained permission from the latter to talk to Maqueda.
Salvosa then led Maqueda toward the balcony. Maqueda narrated to
Salvosa that Salvamante then brought him to the Barker house and it
was only when they were at the vicinity thereof that Salvamante
revealed to him that his real purpose in going to Baguio City was to rob
the Barkers.
He also told other details of the incident. After trial, appellant was
convicted. Although the trial court had doubts on the identification of
Maqueda by prosecution witnesses and thus disregarded their
testimonies on this matter, it decreed a conviction based on the
confession and the proof of corpus delicti as well as on circumstantial
evidence.
Issue: Whether or not Maquedas admission constitute as an admissible
as evidence.
Held: The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to
be informed thereof under Section (12), Article III of the Constitution
are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint
or information but are available at that stage when a person is under
investigation for the commission of an offense.
It was therefore, wrong for the trial court to hold that Section 12(1),
Article III of the Constitution is strictly limited to custodial investigation
and that it does not apply to a person against whom a criminal
complaint or information has already been filed because after its filing
he loses his right to remain silent and to counsel.
The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SPO2 Mollena after the
formers arrest was taken in palpable violation of his rights under
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. As disclosed by a reading
thereof, Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights
under the said section. The statement was also taken in the absence so
counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible
pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to prosecutor Zarate
and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand on a different footing. These are not
governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights. Maqueda
voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the
course of an investigation, but in connection with Maquedas plea to be
utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given
to a private person.
In the light of his admission to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa
and his willingness to be a state witness, Maquedas participation in the
commission of the crime charged was established beyond moral
certainty. His guilt was, as correctly ruled by the trial court, established
beyond doubt by circumstantial evidence.
LATON
assisted by counsel.
Under the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions, the right to counsel
attaches at the start of investigation against a respondent and,
therefore, even before adversary judicial proceedings against the
accused have begun.
Given the clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
to extend those under police investigation the right to counsel, this
occasion may be better than any to remind police investigators that,
while the Court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of
counsel during a police line-up, the moment there is a move or even an
urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even
plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time,
from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel,
unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
Exclusionary Rule
Just like the sanction for violation of the proscription against
unreasonable search and seizures, violation of the rule on
Miranda warnings also carries the penalty of exclusion.
However, there is one difference. In the former, the
Constitution says that evidence obtained in violation of the said
provision shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. In the latter, a confession or admission obtained
in violation of the Miranda safeguards shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a
confession to be admissible must satisfy the following
requirements: 1) confession must be voluntary; 2) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express; and 4)
the confession must be in writing. Thus, if the confession or
admission does not comply with said requisites, it will have to
be excluded
Failure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption
of compulsion
Waiver
Related to the voluntary admission and the exclusionary rule is
the rule on waiver. If the suspect knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waives his right to silence and counsel, then that is
his own lookout
LATON
PEOPLE V. LAUGA
615 SCRA 548
FACTS: Lagua, being the father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of
force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally have carnal knowledge with aforementioned daughter, a 13
year[s]old minor against her will. After the deed was done, AAA
recounted what happened with her brother BBB, and then told her
grandfather and uncle, and after which they sought the assistance of
Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan.
Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his
underwear. He invited appellant to the police station, to which
appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he
raped AAA because he was unable to control himself said confession
being something which he denied in his testimony. The RTC found him
guilty and convicted him, and upon appeal said conviction was modified
by the CA (by rendering Lagua ineligible for parole and increasing the
indemnity and moral damages to be paid), hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON his alleged confession with a bantay bayan is admissible
in evidence.
RULING: NO. This Court is convinced that barangay-based volunteer
organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the
"bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to
perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at
the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions
taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has
the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the
entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the
Miranda Rights, is concerned, therefore finding the extrajudicial
confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel,
inadmissible in evidence. (This does not change anything either way as
Laguas guilt was not deduced solely from said confession but from
confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
but thats another issue.)
Chapter 15
Rights of the Accused
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he
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retired from the Armed Forced of the Philippines effective Feb 26,
2986.He assails the order of respondent requiring him to submit his
affidavit and those of his witnesses at the preliminary investigation of a
case for unexplained wealth despite the fact that the PCGG as
complainant had not reduced its evidence in the form of affidavits and
submitted supporting documents. In August 1986, petitioner, was
informed that there was a freeze order issued covering his bank
accounts and a hold order issued against him by PCGG.
Olivas V. Office of the Ombudsman
239 SCRA 283 (1994)
FACTS: Petitioner assails the order of respondent requiring him to
submit his affidavit and those of his witnesses at the preliminary
investigation of a case for unexplained wealth despite the facts the
PCGG, as complainant, had not reduced its evidence in the form of
affidavits and submitted supporting documents. Shortly after petitioner
retired last February 26, 1986, anonymous letters were sent to PCGG
charging him with violations of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act and Unexplained Wealth Act. He is among those AFP personnel
being investigated. The issue is whether the petitioner may be
compelled to file his counter affidavit notwithstanding the fact the no
sworn complaint or affidavit has been field against him.
HELD: We find for the petitioner. The lack of complaint and affidavits
cannot be excused on the plea that this case originate in anonymous
letters sent to the PCGG. Because of leads furnished by those letters, it
would seem that the PCGG has found sufficient evidence justifying its
demand to the petitioner to explain. It is incumbent upon the
complainant to reduce the evidence into affidavits. This is a
requirement not only of Rule II, S4 (a) of the Rules of Procedure but
also of due process in an adversary proceedings.
Alonte v. Savellano Jr.
287 SCRA 245 (1998)
Alonte, then the Mayor of Binan, Laguna was charged with rape
together with Concepcion, who was alleged to have brought the
complainant, Punongbayan, a minor, to Alonte. The case was originally
raffled to a branch of RTC in Binan, but complainant sought a change in
venue. While awaiting action on her request, the complainant, assisted
by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance,
adverting to the delay and inconvenience to her and to her family. The
petitioners then moved for the dismissal of the case which was
opposed by the public prosecutor. Shortly thereafter, the SC approved
the request of change in venue and was raffled to the respondent
judge. The complainant reiterated before the trial court her decision to
abide by her affidavit of desistance. In the meantime, the judge found
probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrests of the
petitioners. On arraignment, both pleaded not guilty. According to the
judge, both parties agreed to proceed while Alonte said that the judge
allowed the prosecution to proceed to present evidence relative only to
the question of voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of desistance.
The parents and the complainant affirmed their decision to desist. The
prosecutor then manifested that in light of the decision of the
complainant and her parents not to pursue the case, the State had no
further evidence against the accused to prove the guilty of the accused,
and moved for the dismissal of the case against both petitioner. Then,
the trial judge promulgated his decision, convicting both accused. They
filed the instant petition, assailing the decision, for among others, being
violative of the guarantee of due process.
HELD: The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the somewhat strange
way the case has proceeded below. Per Judge Savellano after the
waiver by the parties of the pre-trial stage: The trial of the case did
proceed on the merits but thatthe two accused did not present
countervailing evidence during the trail. They did not take the witness
stand to refute or deny under oath the truth of the contents of the
private complainants aforementioned affidavit which she expressed
affirmed and confirmed in court, but instead, thru their respective
lawyers, they rested and submitted the case for decision merely on the
basis of the private complainants so called desistance which, to
them, was sufficient enough for their purposes. They left everything to
LATON
no expert in sign language was available. In 1982 after five years under
another presiding judge directed the school of the deaf and dumb Bago
Gallera, Talmo District, Davao City be availed of to the enable the
accused to intelligently express his understanding of the plea of guilty
or not guilty. Finally in February 10, 1986 without the service of the
expert in sign language, accused was found guilty and sentence to die in
electrocution.
Issue: Whether or not rendering the decision without the aid of an
expert in sign language deprives the accused of due process of law.
Held: Absence of an interpreter in sign language deprived the accused
of the full and fair trial and reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other
means, whether in writing of otherwise, to inform the accused of the
charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due
process of a law. Aside from the unfair setting of circumstance in which
the accused was convicted, insufficiency of evidence to warrant a
finding guilty beyond reasonable doubt also led the court to set aside
the conviction.
People v. Estrada
333 SCRA 699(2000)
Facts: On December 27, 1994 a confirmation was being held at the St.
Johns Cathedral, Dagupan City, when the appellant Roberto Estrada sat
on the Bishops chair. Some churchgoers summoned Mararac, the
security guard of the Cathedral to request the appellant to vacate the
Bishops Chair. Mararac tapped appellants hand with a night stick but
the appellant did not badge. When Mararac attmpt to tapped the
appellants hands again, the appellant drew a knife from his back and
stubbed the gurad. After the commotion appellant got up, went to the
mocirophone and shouted in the local dialect that no one can beat him
there. Mararac expired a few minutes after arrival in the hospital.
Appellant was charged with murder.
Counsel for the appellant filed an Urgent Motion to suspend
arraignment and to commit the accused to the Psychiatric Ward at
Baguio General Hospital because he was suffering mental illness.
Motion was opposed for the reason that the appellant answered the
questions intelligently. Jail warden of Dagupan City wrote the trial
judge informing him of the accused appellants unsual behaviour and
requesting that he be examined at the hospital to determine whether
he should remain in jail or to other institution, judge ignored the letter.
One year later accused appellant counsel filed a Motion to Confine
Accused for Physical , Mental and Psychiatric Examination. Attached to
this motion was a second letter by the new Jail Warden of Dagupan City
accompanied by letter complaint of the Bukang Liwayway Association
City Jail. The judge still ignored the motion. The trial Court instead
found the appellant guilty of murder and sentenced hin to death.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant was deprived of a fair trial, and a
violation to the basic requirements to due process.
Held: The trial court took solely upon itself to determine the sanity of
the accused appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or
psychologist or some of the persons mental health. By depriving the
appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived
appellant for a fair trial. The trial courts negligence was a VIOLATION
OF THE BASIC REQUIREMNTS OF THE DUE PROCESS. There is a need to
reconstitute the records in accordance with the procedure outlined in
the law, in order to dispel and doubt as to the integrity of the records
that were lost and recovered in the office of the Solicitor General. Every
aspect of the right to due process must be afforded the accused
appellant, and this includes the right to examine and assail the veracity
of every piece of evidence contained in the records. Sentence to death
is vacated and the case is remanded to the court a quo for the conduct
proper mental examination on the accused appellant.
LATON
24
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in
rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows to the
contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the
soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that
Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a
communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the
majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents abovenamed in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; "
while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the
killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from
rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court
resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed
for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply
to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a
three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the
prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in
reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten
days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision.
The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day
period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's
memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on
them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the
dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging
that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are
entitled
to
due
process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all
the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally
absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with
the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become
moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for
reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious
irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice
and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and
the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.
LATON
was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang
kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his
thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had
stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and
predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the AquinoGalman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman
case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the
compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity
to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total
absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and
civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over
television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but
by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder
that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner
consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time,
would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty
participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better
arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and
subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of
double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other
witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of
witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's
assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these
persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the
case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the
assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the
uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of
the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a
civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from
Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel. The partiality of
Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had
wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be
denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in
favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the
accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the
prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.
The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming
resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt
and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman
murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our
Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order
or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or
business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of
justice."
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal
collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public
respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only
after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified
respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts
would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere
tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the
truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are
entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at
stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a
void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double
jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no
judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars
anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this
case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of
their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from
rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which
had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's,
comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent
LATON
Obosa was charges with 2 counts of murder, a capital offense for the
ambush slaying of Sec of Interior and Local Govt Jaime Ferrer and his
driver Jesus Calderon. On the day the trial court promulgated its
decision, Obosa manifested his intention to appeal and ask the court to
allow him to post bail.
Is petitioner entitled to bail as a matter of right?
Held: Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with
capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong.
We rule that bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an
accused, who is charged with the capital offense, appeals his convition
for a non-capital crime. In ruling against bail, the lower court found that
treachery attended the killing thereby justifying its action. Hereby
petition is denied.
Paderanga v CA
247 SCRA 741(1995)
Petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as coconspirator in a crime of multiple murder in Cagayan de oro for the
killing of bucag family of which petitioner was mayor at that time.
Felizardo was implicated in the crime. He hired petitioner as counsel
but later during preliminary investigation, he implicated petitioner as
the mastermind of the massacre. Before arrest warrant could be
granted to him, his counsel filed a motion to bail. RTC granted bail.CA
reversed.
The main purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from the rigors of
imprisonment until hi conviction and yet secure his appearance at the
trial. The same cannot be posted before custody over him has been
acquired either by lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. The rationale of
this rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former
pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his
stead to post his bail. As a paramount requisite, only those who have
been arrested detained or deprived of liberty can post bail. This
however is subject to the limitation that the applicant is in the custody
of the law. He was constructively in the custody of the law even if he
was not physically arrested because he was hospitalized.
Section Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that
before conviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the
evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114,
as amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before
conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a
matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its
personal nature 21 and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is
placed in the custody of the law, springs from the presumption of
innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted
incarceration at the outset since after trial he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial
court of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail
as a matter of right, the present exceptions thereto being the instances
where the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment 23 and the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper
application for admission to bail, the court having custody of the
accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing
conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in
accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other
hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the
part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing,
mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, is required with the participation of both the
defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution, this time
to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the
provisional liberty of the applicant. Of course, the burden of proof is on
the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required
quantum.
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LATON
SC reinstated bail.
Bail Hearing
Part of the requirement in the grant or denial of bail, especially
in non-bailable cases, is the necessity for a hearing. The hearing
is summary in nature, meaning such brief and speedy method
of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing
which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for
purposes of bail
It has also been pointed out that: A bail application does not
only involve he right of the accused to temporary liberty, but
likewise the right of the State to protect the people and the
peace of the community from dangerous elements. These two
rights must be balanced by a magistrate in the scale of justice,
hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his exercise of
discretion
Further, arraignment is not a prerequisite to the conduct of
hearings on a petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition
for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his
arrest or voluntary surrender--he need not await his
arraignment
RE RELEASE BY JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO OF AN ACCUSED IN A NONBAILABLE OFFENSE
367 SCRA 285
Yu yuk lai is one of the accused for sale and delivery of 3 kg of shabu,
was reasrested bby PAOCTF while playing baccarat without jail guards
at the holiday inn casino. At that time he was supposed to be detained
at the manila city jail since his bail was denied. It was published in
Philippine star that Yu yuk lai has obtained an order signed by muro
allowing her hospital confinement for medical and humanitarian
reasons. Muro was directed to submit pertinent documents showing
that the order was regularly issued. He complied. He was suspended
and investigated.
Trial judge may rely on statements of someone knowledgeable in the
subject, it should not be to the extent that such reliance would amount
to a surrender of his authority to decide.
As shown by the records, respondent judge was guilty of gross
misconduct constituting violations of the code of judicial conduct for
being utterly inefficient and for manifesting partiality. Despite request
that he be confined in PGH, judge preferred Manila Doctors on the
ground that it is yu yuks choice. He subjected the length of medical
confinement to the will of her physicians. And he did not make incisive
inquiry to ascertain the true state of facts despite the opposition by
another prosecutor. He threw all his cautions in the wind in favor of yu
yuk
Judge was dismissed.
Lavides v Court of appeals
324 SCRA 321 (2000)
Petitioner was arrested for child abuse. His arrest was made without
warrant as a result of entrapment conducted by police. He was caught
with 16-year old complainant. Within a month, nine more informations
were filed against him by complainant and 3 others who had been
exploited in prostitution given money as payment for sexual
intercourse. He was entitled to bail with conditions that 1. He shall not
be entitled to waiver of appearance and must be present at all hearings
2. If he did not, his bail shal be automatically forfeited, warrants shall
be immediately issued and cases will proceed trial in absentia 3. hold
departure-order stands 4. Approval of bail shall be done after
arraignment for courts to acquire jurisdiction over him.
LATON
Presumption of Innocence
The starting point in any criminal prosecution is the
presumption of innocence. This presumption stands as a
fundamental principle of both constitutional and criminal law,
imposing a rule of evidence, a degree of proof that demands no
less than total compliance. The accused goes before the court
without any prejudgment that he is guilty, or any obligation to
establish his innocence. Instead, it is the responsibility of the
State to prove with the requisite amount of evidence--proof
beyond reasonable doubt--that he is guilty
LATON
People v. Mendoza
231 SCRA 264 (1994)
In Re Winship
397 US 358, 25 L Ed 2d, 90 S Ct 1068 (1970)
Facts: Sec 12 of the NY Family Court Act defines a juvenile delinquent as
a person over 7 and less than 16 yrs. of age who does any act which, if
done by an adult, would constitute a crime. During a hearing in 1967,
the judge found that appellant, then a 12-yr old boy had entered a
locker and had stolen $112 from a womans pocketbook, an act which
LATON
Held: The petition is defective since only the OSG may bring and defend
actions on behalf of the People of the Philippines once such actions are
brought before the CA or the SC. However, in this case, petitioner filed
it directly with the Provincial Fiscal of Malaybalay, Bukidnon without
coursing it first through the OSG. It is evident that from the start that
the case of the prosecution against the 3 accused was non-existent
because the stolen articles were found in possession of Barbie Tan and
yet the prosecution did not summon her to the witness stand. Although
the respondent judge erred in the process, since it can be fairly
concluded that there was no standing plea at the time the court
rendered its judgment of acquittal, such acquittal was a nullity.
However, the Court cannot allow such procedural error to prevail over
the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved. Since there was no evidence against Magalop,
his acquittal must be sustained. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit
and the acquittal of the accused is sustained.
PEOPLE V. FRAGO
232 SCRA 653 (1994)
Facts: Appellant, an ice cream vendor, was charged with attempted
rape and rape. According to the version of the prosecution, the accused
went to the residence of nine-year-old Ronalyn Pastera. The accused
entered her bedroom, fanned her face with his handkerchief then lifted
her. He was about to take her out of the room when she suddenly woke
up and screamed for help. As a consequence, the accused drop Ronalyn
on the floor and run out of the house. The prosecution would seem to
infer that after running, he went to the boarding house of Jicelyn. He
carried Jicelyn to a nearby house where he had carnal knowledge while
she was deeply asleep. When she narrated of the harrowing
experience, Jicelyn and her mother went to the hospital where she was
examined. The results indicated the presence spermatozoa and
physical virginity lost. On the same day, Ronalyns father and Jicelyn
reported the incidents to the police authorities then filed their formal
complaints against the accused. Appellant interposed denial and alibi.
After trial, the court a quo found the accused guilty of rape but
acquitted him in the attempted rape case. In his appeal, he imputes
error to the trial courts conviction on the basis of an identification
made without a counsel and according to Jicelyns story, which he
believes fantastic, thereby denying his constitutional right to be
presumed innocent until proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: WON Orlando Fragos conviction in the rape case was proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling: The testimony of Jicelyn shows that she has no reliable basis for
pointing to the accused as the person who raped her. The only
evidence of sexual intercourse is the result of the medical examination.
There was no positive identification of Orlando Frago by Jicelyn.
There seems to be no question that, on the part of the Pastera sisters,
they may have recognized appellant positively because their room was
lighted with a lamp and he was not wearing anything on his face. Since
they were neighbors, there is the possibility of Jicelyn conferring with
the Pastera sisters the identity of the accused. Thus, the Courts
conclusion that Jicelyns identification of Orlando Frago was merely
patterned after the identification made by the Pastera sisters. This is
then a derivative, not positive, identification. The identification then
of appellant by Jicelyn is doubtful.
Appellants denial and alibi are inherently weak, but the prosecution
cannot rely on their frailty to enhance its cause. The prosecution must
draw its strength from its own evidence.
Wherefore, Orlando Fargo is acquitted as his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
when the case is one where the supreme penalty of death may be
imposed. Courts should take extra efforts to assure themselves that the
accused, if ever he pleads guilty, does so with the all the attendant
safeguards by which he could give an informed, intelligent, knowing
and voluntary acknowledgment of his guilt.
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It is clear that the court a quo did not probe carefully and thoroughly
into the reasons for applelants change of plea and his comprehension
of the consequences of said plea. Further, the trial court did not
bother to explain the essential elements of the crime with which
appellant was charged. The trial court did not only neglect to make
the searching inquiry, it also failed to inquire from appellant whether
he desired to present evidence in his behalf.
It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a crime
of violence or is a fugitive from justice to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce, and the possession of a firearm or ammunition
was shipped or transported or received, as the case may be, by such
person in violation of this Act.
The Government seems to argue that there are two alternatives tests
of the validity of a presumption created by statute. The first is that
there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the fact
presumed; the second, that of comparative convenience of producing
evidence of the ultimate fact. These are not independent tests, but the
first is controlling, and the second but a corollary.
Ruling: These cases involve the construction and validity of section 2(f)
of the Federal Firearms Act, which is:
Doubtless the defendants in these cases knew better than anyone else
whether they acquired the firearms or ammunition in interstate
commerce. It would, therefore, be a convenience to the Government to
rely upon the presumption and cast on the defendants the burden of
coming forward with evidence to rebut it. (Justice Roberts)
HIZON V. COURT OF APPEALS
265 SCRA 517 (1996)
FACTS: In response to the reports of illegal fishing operations in the
coastal waters received by the Philippine National Police Maritime
Command of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, the city mayor organized
Task Force Bantay Dagat to assist the police in the detection and
apprehension of violations of the laws on fishing. There was a report
that a boat and several small craft were fishing by muro ami within
the shoreline of Puerto Princesa. The police proceeded to the area and
found several men fishing in motorized sampans and a big fishing boat.
They boarded and inspected the boat. The police saw two foreigners
having only photocopied passports and discovered a large aquarium full
of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish. The license of the boat and its
fishermen were in order, but nonetheless they were brought to Puerto
Princesa for further investigation. The crew and fishermen were
charged with several violations including conducting fishing operations
without mayors permit, employing excess fishermen on board, and
having two Hongkong nationals on board without original passports.
The following day, the police directed the boat captain to get random
samples of fish for laboratory examination. It was found that they
contained sodium cyanide. The PNP Maritime Command of Puerto
Princesa City filed the complaint against the owner and operator
Richard Hizon, the boat captain, Silverio Gargar, the boat engineer,
Ernesto Andaya, two other crew members, the two Hongkong nationals
and 23 fishermen for the offense of illegal fishing with the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance penalized under Sections 33 and 38
of P.D. No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975. After trial, they were
found guilty and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, petitioners question the admissibility
of the evidence which were seized without warrant, and the appellates
courts failure to hold that the statutory presumption of guilt under
Section 33 of P.D. 704 cannot prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
Ruling: Given the evidence admitted by the trial court, the next
question now is whether petitioners are guilty of the offense of illegal
fishing with the use of poisonous substances. Again, the petitioners,
joined by the Solicitor General, submit that the prosecution evidence
cannot convict them. SC agreed.
The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person catches, takes
or gathers or causes to be caught, taken or gathered fish, fishery or
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Equipoise Rule
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Appeals.
SAYSON v. PEOPLE
166 SCRA 680 (1988)
In March 1972, petitioner was charged with the crime of attempted
Estafa through Falsification of a Commercial Document. When
arraigned in December 1972, he pleaded not guilty. In October 1974,
after several postponements, the prosecution rested its case. At the
hearing of 9 December 1974, when the defense was scheduled to
present its evidence, only the petitioner appeared. He said that his
counsel had another case in a different court. In the morning of the said
day, his lawyer also sent a telegram to the court requesting cancellation
of the hearing because he was sick. The court denied the motion for
postponement and the case was considered submitted for decision
without petitioners evidence. The trial court rendered judgment in
January 1975, finding the accused guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed
but modified the penalty by imposing a lower imprisonment term and
eliminating the fine.
Here, the trial court had been liberal in granting the postponements
secured by the petitioner himself, at the same time admonishing the
latter to be ready with his present counsel or another counsel [Original
Records, p.430.] Notwithstanding this admonition, the petitioner kept
on attending the hearings without securing another lawyer to
substitute his present counsel who was constantly absent during the
hearings. Still, as admitted by petitioner in his memorandum, the trial
court, at the December 9, 1974 hearing, allowed him to look for a
lawyer but no one was available at the time [Rollo, p.94.] These steps
undertaken by the trial court removes any doubt that its order was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
People v. Santoclides, Jr.
321 SCRA 310 (1999)
Appellant was charged with and found guilty of the crime of rape. On
appeal, he assigns as one of the errors his being represented at trial by
a person not authorized to practice law, amounting to denial of due
process.
W/N the misrepresentation of his counsel not authorized to practice
would amount to deprivation of his right to counsel and thus result to
his acquittal.
Judgment is SET ASIDE; case is REMANDED to the trial court for new
trial.
When an accused was represented by not a member of the Philippine
Bar during trial, the judgment should be set aside and case must
remanded to the trial court for a new trial. The person who
misrepresents himself as a lawyer shall be held liable for indirect
contempt.
The right to counsel is of such primordial importance that even if an
accused was represented by three successive counsels from PAO, the
court has ordered the remand of a rape case when it found that
appellant was not properly and effectively accorded the right to
counsel.
The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings
should never take lightly. Even the most intelligent or educated man
may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly on rules of
procedure and without a counsel he may convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the
imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against
the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State. Such a right
proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically
means that a person should be heard before being condemned.
Jurisprudence has also held that the right to practice law is not a
natural right or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or
franchise. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
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violated when upon the acquittal of the former crime does not
preclude him convicted on the crime of attempted estafa through
falsification of official and commercial documents.
1st issue:
Right to Be Informed
An element of fair play in the prosecution of any person would
be the requirement that he be adequately informed of what he
is really charged with, of what acts or omission he may have
done or failed to do which amounted to a crime
General Considerations
Aside from providing an accused with information as to his
alleged criminal misconduct, the right to be informed also
affords him an opportunity to set up any defense that might
have been brought about by a prior acquittal, conviction, or
earlier proceeding arising from the same facts or offense. At
the same time, it also informs the court of the facts alleged so
that such tribunal may determine if they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction
Relevant herein is the so-called variance doctrine under which,
in spite of the difference between the crime that was charged
and that which was eventually proved, the accused still may be
convicted of whatever offense that was proved even if not
specifically set pout in the Information provided it was included
in what was charged
2.
3.
Pecho v. People
262 SCRA 518 (1996)
LATON
We find the decision of the trial court sentencing the appellant to death
is shot full of errors, both substantive and procedural. The conviction is
based on an amalgam of inadmissible and incredible evidence
supported by scoliotic logic.
1.
People V. Ramos
296 SCRA 559 (1998)
Appellant was accused of having raped Elizabeth T. Ramos, 14-year old
minor through force, violence and intimidation.
A re-reading of the accusatory portion of the information reveals that
appellant was charged with rape on its simple form with the additional
allegation that the victim was 14 years old. Such act is punishable by
reclusioin perpetua under article 335 of rpc .
In RA 7659 if the offender is the parent of the victim, the penalty is
death.
The trial court arrive at the conclusion that the penalty for that kind of
rape is reclusion perpetua to death and considering the relationship as
a generic aggravating circumstance, imposed him a penalty of death
(the higher of the two indivisible penalties.
The case of people vs bayot gave the reminder that a qualifying
circumstance or an inherent aggravating circumstance should not be
mistaken for a generic aggravating circumstance. The court
distinguishes the two by stating that a generic aggravating
circumstance, not offset by any mitigating circumstance, increases the
penalty which should be imposed to the maximum period without
exceeding the limit prescribed by law, while a qualifying circumstance
not only gives the crime its proper and exclusive name but also imposes
the author thereof no other penalty but that specially prescribed by law
for the said crime.
Held: since the relationship was in a nature of a qualifying
circumstance, and not merely a generic aggravating circumstance, it
must be alleged in the information.
LATON
trial. He also argues that the CA erred in not sustaining the submission
of the Solicitor General for his acquittal. Required to comment, the
Office of the Solicitor General adopted its Motion and Manifestation
filed before the CA and recommended the grant of the petition for
Certiorari averring that the findings and conclusions of the CA are not
supported by substantial evidence.
In his first assignment of error, he claims lack of due process due to the
unusual speed of the trial court.
Applicable to this case is General Order no. 39 amending General Order
no 12, datedSept.30, 1972.
Conde vs Rivera
45 Phil 650 (1924)
The civil court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the military
tribunals over the said crimes, provided that civil courts shall dispose of
such cases w/in 24 hrs after the filing thereof by the arresting officer.
The court or tribunal that first assumes jurisdiction shall exercise
jurisdiction shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others.
She then filed this present petition for mandamus and prohibition.
He was not denied due process, the trial court merely deferred such
conference till after the prosecution had presented its witnesses. (it is
to be noted further that defense counsel was not totally unprepared for
the trial for it was ready with 2 witnesses when asked by the court).
Moreover, after the prosecution had rested its case, trial was resumed
the next day, thereby giving the defense enough time to prepare for
the presentation of its direct evidence.
The trial was not indicative of inordinate haste. On the contrary, they
should be commended for their punctilious compliance with the explicit
mandate of the law.
That the complainant was not a transient visitor, his having been in
Olongapo for a number of times does not make him any less than a
transient or one whose stay is of uncertain duration. Also,
notwithstanding the number of times he has been to the country, he is
still a tourist, or one who travels from place to place for pleasure and
culture.
Also, on Solicitor Generals position that the guilt was not established
beyond reasonable doubt, the complainant was categorical in his
identification of the petitioner-accused and emphatic as to the latters
direct and active involvement in the robbery.
Magat v. CA
116 SCRA 283 (1982)
DACANAY V. PEOPLE
240 SCRA 490 (1995)
The information was filed July 26 1979 at 3pm, a week after the
incident complained of.
Magat was charged together with four others. The case was
immediately raffled and set for arraignment and trial. Only the
petitioner was arraigned at 4:35 the same afternoon.
After arraignment, it proceeded to trial. Counsel asked for time, an
hour at least, to confer with his client, the fiscal said he had no
objection to having a conference between counsel and his witness
provided it be done after he would have already submitted the Peoples
case . The court said it would allow counsel to consult his client before,
and from time to time, during the cross-examination.
The following day, trial was resumed at 830 am. At 1135, judgement of
conviction was promulgated.
He appealed to CA. CA promulgated its decision August 21 1981
affirming but reduced the penalty.
In his appeal to the SC, petitioner raises the issues of having been
denied due process, specifically the right to be heard, including ample
opportunity for the accused and the counsel to confer and prepare for
LATON
In October 1990 the presiding judge set the retaking on the 24th of the
month, however, on the said date the retaking was reset to Nov. 9 due
to the petitioners failure to appear on the scheduled hearing. On Nov.
7, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his right to
speedy trial has been violated. The judge denied the motion to dismiss
and reconsideration and reset the retaking. The petitioner then filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the court of
appeals, anchored on the alleged violation of his right to speedy trial. In
its decision in 1991, the appellate court dismissed the petition and also
denied the motion for resconsideration. Before the SC, petitioner
complains of undue prejudice as a result of the protracted litigation and
of violation of his right to speedy trial.
ISSUE: does the constitutional right to speedy trial include the right to
prompt disposition and judgment
DECISION: the petition is DENIED
REASON: In the determination of whether or not the right to a speedy
trial has been violated and on whether or not a person officially
charged with the administration of justice has violated the speedy
disposition of case guarantee, certain factors may be considered and
balanced against each other such as length of delay, reason for the
delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused
by the delay. In this case, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the
case submitted for resolution in 1979. It was only in 1989 when the
case was re-raffled and only after respondent trial judge ordered the
parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of stenographic notes
that matters started to get moving towards the resolution of the case.
More importantly, it was only after the new trial judge reset the
retaking of the testimonies because of the petitioners absence during
REASON: the speedy trial act of 1998, provides that the trial period for
criminal cases in general shall be 180 days. However, in determining the
right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case. The right to speedy trial is deemed
violated only when: (1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustifiable
postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when without cause
or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without
the party having his case tried.
In the present case, although the absence of prosecution witness
Abratique totaled twenty hearing days, there is no showing that
prosecution capriciously caused Abratiques absences so as to vex or
oppress appellant an deny him his rights. Nor do we find a delay of
twenty hearing days to be an unreasonable length of time. Delay of less
than two months has been found, in fact, to be not an unreasonably
lengthy period of time. Moreover, nothing on the record shows that
appellant objected to inability of the prosecution to produce its
witness. Under the Rules, appellant could have moved the trial court to
require that witness Abratique post bail to ensure that the latter would
testify when required and also he could have moved to have Abratique
found in contempt and duly sanctioned but he did neither. It is a bit too
late in the day for appellant to invoke now his right to speedy trial.
No persuasive reason supports appellants claim that his constitutional
right to speedy trial was violated. One must take into account that a
trial is always subject to postponements and other causes of delay. But
in the absence of a showing that delays were unreasonable and
capricious, the State should not be deprived of a reasonable
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Marcos v. Sandiganbayan
297 SCRA 95 (1998)
REASON: Given the obvious hostility of the judge toward the defense, it
was inevitable that all the protestations of the accused in this respect
would be, as they in fact were, dismissed. And once the confessions
were admitted, it was easy enough to employ them as corroborating
evidence of the claimed conspiracy among the accused.
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CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
541 U.S. 36, 158 L Ed 2d 177, 124 Ct 1354 (2004)
PEOPLE V. PIDO
200 SCRA 45 (1991)
Petitioner was tried for assault and attempted murder. The State
sought to introduce a recorded statement that petitioner's wife Sylvia
had made during police interrogation, as evidence that the stabbing
was not in self-defense. Sylvia did not testify at trial because of
Washington's marital privilege. Petitioner argued that admitting the
evidence would violate his Sixth Amendment right to be "confronted
with the witnesses against him." Under Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56,
that right does not bar admission of an unavailable witness's statement
against a criminal defendant if the statement bears "adequate `indicia
of reliability,'" a test met when the evidence either falls within a "firmly
rooted hearsay exception" or bears "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." The trial court admitted the statement on the latter
ground. The State Supreme Court upheld the conviction, deeming the
statement reliable because it was nearly identical to, i. e., interlocked
with, petitioner's own statement to the police, in that both were
ambiguous as to whether the victim had drawn a weapon before
petitioner assaulted him.
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A
Not so loud, sir.
Q
You are (sic) crying because of happiness, am I right?
A
No, sir.
Q
After making love with you, do you know if this intruder
dressed-up?
A
I do not know anymore sir, I was crying because of fear.
xxx xxx xxx
Q
So, you want to impress this Honorable Court that while you
were making love with the accused this Lydia Sulit passed by?
A
Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q
While you were making love with the accused, do you
remember if the party is (sic) still going on downstairs?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
So, there are (sic) still many people at the ground floor of
your house during that night when you were making love with the
accused?
A
No sir, that is not true.
Q
Which is not true?
A
The people were already asleep, sir.
Q
After making love with the accused, do you know where the
accused passed thru in going down?
A
I do not know, sir.
Q
Is it not true that the accused jumped over the window?
A
I do not know sir, I was crying because I was afraid.
This claim that she did not then know where the accused passed
through is of course inconsistent with her assurance on direct
examination that the accused used the window for his exit:
A
After he put on his panty or shorts, he left through the
window. This window is at the second floor of the house where he
jumped.
xxx xxx xxx
A
He went out of the window where the stairs is just nearby
and he stepped on it. There he already went down.
xxx xxx xxx
A
Well, I don't know how he entered, Your Honor, but he went
out through the window.
then she confirmed on such cross-examination, thus:
Q
So, you were then lying when you testified on January 18,
1982 that the accused jumped over the window?
A
It was not our window that opened in front of where we are
(sic) sleeping, sir.
Q
But you are telling that the window is (sic) still open since
you slept and making (sic) love with the accused?
A
That window was really open because it is (sic) warm, sir.
If the references to "making love" were without basis, or that the
questions based thereon were misleading, the prosecuting fiscal should
have objected. None was made, and there is no showing that the
prosecuting fiscal is incompetent. After this "love-making" rendezvous,
the accused promised to return to make love again.
Q
And after finishing the intercourse what did this intruder do
if he did anything?
A
He told me that he will return, sir.
Q
To make love again with you?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And you said "yes" because you like it?
A
No sir, I was crying.
Q
Because you are (sic) afraid that your husband might know
it?
A
No sir, I was still startled because of my fear.
G
This fear, however, seemed to be more imagined than real in the light
of the above findings clearly demonstrating her consent to the act. As a
matter of fact, there is enough evidence to show that she signaled to
the accused to spend time with her and that she prepared for the tryst.
For reasons only known to the prosecution, it opted not to rebut the
damaging testimony of the accused that among others, complainant
signaled to him to come up; she thereafter took a bath; when he came
up, she ordered him to get inside the mosquito net, and to give him
space beside her, she even moved her youngest child; and then they
simultaneously took off their clothes and made love. While they were
in the act, Lydia Sulit came out of her room and saw them. Because of
embarrassment, complainant cried. He then dressed up and returned
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to the party.
What then seems to be clear is that Lydia did not arrive after the act,
but as testified by the accused and corroborated by complainant
herself, she saw both inside the mosquito net. The complainant was so
embarrassed that she had to concoct the story of rape.
PEOPLE V. NARCA
275 SCRA 696 (1997)
Accused-appellants were charged with murder fo the killing of Mauro
Reglos, Jr. They filed a motion to quash the information, and when this
failed, they filed a motion for bail. During the bail hearing, the victims
wife, Elizabeth Reglos, who was with him on that fateful night, testified
on direct examination. Defense counsel requested the court that his
cross-examination of Elizabeth be conducted on the next hearing, the
following month. However, such cross-examination never took place
because Elizabeth died before the hearing. After hearing, lower court
denied bail, and after trail, convicted the appellants.
Issue: W/N Elizabeths testimony be given credence considering that
she was nit cross-examined.
Held: Where death prevents cross-examination under such
circumstances that no responsibility of any sort can be ascribed to the
plaintiff or the witness, it seems a harsh measure to strike out all that
has obtained in the direct examination.
Besides, mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the
essence of the right to cross-examine. Right to cross-examination is a
personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct
amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus,
where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but
failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to crossexamine and the testimony given on direct examination of witness will
be received or allowed to remain in record.
Sec. 1 (f) of Rule 115 provides that either party may utilize as part of
its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased ***given in
another case or proceeding and under Sec 8, Rule 114 as amended by
circular 12-94, evidence presented during the bail hearings, like the
testimony of the deceased witness Elizabeth, are considered
automatically reproduced at trial.
PEOPLE v. ORTIZ-MIYAKE
279 SCRA 180 (1997)
Accused appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal
recruitment in large scale in RTC of Makati on a complaint initiated by
Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. In
addition, she was indicted for estafa by means of pretenses in the same
court, the offended party being Elenita Marasigan alone.
Of the three complainants in the case for illegal recruitment in large
scale, Marasigan was the only one who testified at the trial. The two
other complainants, Generillo and Del Rosario, were unable to testify as
they were then abroad. in lieu of their testimonies, the prosecution
presented as witnesses Lila Generillo, the mother of Imelda, and Victor
Amin, the sister of Del Rosario. The final witness for the prosecution
was Riza Balberte, POEA representative, testified that appellant was not
authorized or licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment. The
prosecution sought to prove that although two of the three
complainants were unable to testify, appellant was guilty of committing
the offense against all three and, therefore, be convicted as charged.
The TC convicted appellant of both crimes as charged. In convicting
appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower court adopted a
previous decision (conviction for estafa in 1993 wherein complainats
Generillo and Del Rosario charged the appellant) of MTC of Paranaque
as a basis for the judgment. RTC adopted the facts and conclusions
established in the earlier decision as its own findings of facts and as its
rationale for the conviction of the case before the court.
LATON
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It could thus be seen that the Bill of Rights has set up a lot of
guarantees and safeguards by which life and liberty, as well as
property of individuals are protected from being taken by the
State, or otherwise lost. A persons entitlement to his freedom
and to his life and what other things he may own or possess
could not simply be forfeited without having to satisfy the
constitutional shield and requirements, starting with the
presumption of innocence to the quantum of proof needed to
secure a conviction. In between are the other procedural
hurdles designed to ensure fairness in order that only the
guilty, as much as humanly possible, be punished and that the
innocent be set free to continue to enjoy life and liberty and to
bask in the wide open and exhilarating field of freedom
Additional Cases
(N) Rights of Suspects [7]
the allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be
fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused
so much so that it affects his substantial rights.
No matter the victim, accused still guilty! That might have been the
mindset of the trial court judge.
Chapter 16
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the
25
public safety requires it.
Liberty being the rule instead of the exception, there must be
an effective and speedy manner by which any deprivation of
such freedom be swiftly looked into and remedied
Indeed, it has been called the great writ of liberty by which
the legality of ones detention or deprivation of freedom of
movement may be inquired into. Vindication of due process, it
has been well said, is precisely the historic office of the Great
Writ. In a nutshell, it is a writ directed to a person detaining
another, commanding the former to produce the body of the
latter at a designated time and place. The objective of the writ
is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid
and lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued
More specifically, its vital purposes are to obtain immediate
relief from illegal confinement, to liberate those who may be
imprisoned without sufficient cause, and to deliver them from
unlawful custody. It is then essentially a writ of inquiry and is
granted to test the right under which a person is detained
General Considerations
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement by which any person is deprived of his liberty.
The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has long been a haven
of relief for those seeking liberty from any unwarranted denial
of freedom of movement. Indeed, habeas corpus embraces so
broad a dimension--aside from being thorough and complete-it affords prompt relief from unlawful imprisonment of any
kind, and under all circumstances
Further, it has also been held that [i]t is not physical restraint
alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
Reservation in the form of restrictions attached to the
temporary release of a detainee constitutes restraints on his
liberty and limits his freedom of movement of petitioner
Habeas Corpus could also be utilized to invoke the beneficial
effects of a law which was subsequently enacted. Hence, where
the decision convicting the accused is already final, the
appropriate remedy of the convict who invokes the retroactive
application of a statute is to file a petition for habeas corpus,
not a motion for reconsideration with modification of sentence
The privilege of the writ could also be availed of to secure ones
liberty from the restraint imposed by a private person, as
25
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Ilusorio v Bildner
332 SCRA 169
The wife of Potenciano Ilusorio filed a petition for Habeas Corpus of his
86 year old husband. After living for 30 years under the same house,
the couple separated in 1972. The younger daughter of the two filed
apetition for custody of the father because of his failing physical and
mental health. Later on, the daughter allegedly prohibited the mother
from seeing the father and living with her. Potenciano filed a motion to
enjoin a previous motion granted for visitation rights.
WON Writ of Habeas Corpus can compel a husband to live with his wife.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband
to live with his wife. In order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas
corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of
liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction
therefore is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and
wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.
Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda
and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972.
Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration
Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to
live with her in consortium and that Potenciano's mental state was not
an issue. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her
husband was that respondents Lin and Sylvia were illegally restraining
Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of
pure greed.
Motion denied Again
Clearly, Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted Potenciano Ilusorio
to live with her.
The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at
the Court of Appeals on March 23, 1999.16 Potenciano himself declared
that he was not prevented by his children from seeing anybody and
that he had no objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he
loved. We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally
incapacitated to choose whether to see his wife or not. Again, this is a
question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.
Subayno v Enrile
145 SCRA 282
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ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches
conducted by the military personnel and other violations of rights
and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution.
(2) Who can be held liable for such violations: only the military
personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well?
THE COURTS RULE: Accordingly, we grant the petition and ANNUL and
SET ASIDE the resolution of the respondent court. Let the case be
remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings.
REASON: (1) We find merit in the petitioners contention that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
destroy petitioners right and cause of action for damages for illegal
arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights.
The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or
detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to
seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a
speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
(2)Doctrine of state immunity from suit cannot be construed as a
blanket license or a roving commission untrammelled by any
constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and
liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the
Constitution.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or
employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the
Constitutional rights and liberties of another, does not exempt
respondents from responsibility.
LATON
HEL: The SC held that the petitioners anchor for the present case is the
disappearance of Martinez. The matter of his alleged detention is, at
best, merely consequential of his disappearance. The ultimate purpose
for the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful
restraint. It is a remedy intended to determine whether the person
under detention is held under lawful authority. If the respondents are
neither detaining nor restraining the person on whose behalf the
petition for habeas corpus has been filed, then it should be dismissed.
Considering that respondents have persistently denied having Martinez
in their custody, and absent any decisive proof to rebut their denial, the
SC is restrained to affirm the CAs dismissal of the petition for habeas
corpus.
Manalo V. Calderon
FACTS: On May 125, 2007, 5 unidentified men forcibly entered Bgy.
Pinagbayanan Elementary School in Taysan, Batangas, which served as
a polling area for the 2007 National and Local elections. They entered
polling precinct 76-A and poured gasoline over a ballot box in and set it
ablaze. In the investigation that ensued, several eyewitnesses
identified some of petitioners as the perpetrators of the school burning
The investigation also yielded that all petitioners, who are members of
the PNOP regional special operations group, failed to timely respond to
the incident . Acing on the report, the PNP hierarchy issued 3 successive
memoranda. The petitioners contend that these memoranda defines
and circumscribes the scope of petitioners restrictive custody that
although technically speaking, they are not detained or imprisoned,
their physical movements are however, limited within Camp Vicente
Lim; they cannot go home to their respective families and if they would
leave Camp Vicente Lim, they need to be escorted. They said that such
is degrading and their restrictive custody status is illegal. Without
necessarily giving due course to the petition, the Court required
respondents to comment. In lieu of the comment, the OSG manifested
that 2 of the memoranda be recalled.
HELD: Notwithstanding the mootness of the issues on restrictive
custody and monitoring movements of petitioners, we opt to resolve
them given a) the paramount public interest involved b) their
susceptibility of recurring yet evading review and c) the imperative
need to educate the police community on the matter.
The release of petitioners by respondents in a petition for habeas
corpus does not automatically abate a decision on the case. Similarly, a
recall of the custody order challenged by petitioners will not necessarily
call for a dismissal on the ground of mootness alone. Although, the
general rule is mootness of the issue warrants a dismissal, there are
well defined exceptions. Courts will decided cases, otherwise moot and
academic if 1) there is a grave violation of the constitutions 2)
exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is
involved 3) when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public and 4) the case
if capable of repetition yet evading review.
There is no illegal restraint in the restrictive custody and monitored
movements of police officers under investigation. A petition for habeas
corpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being
detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully. A restrictive custody
and monitoring of movements of whereabouts of police officers under
investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or
restrained of liberty.
The ultimate purpose of the write of habeas corpus is to relieve a
person from unlawful restrained. The writ cannot and will not issue
absent a showing that petitioners are deprived of their liberty. Neither
can it relive petitioners, who are police officers, from the valid exercise
of prescribed discipline over them by the PNP leadership.
(25 September
2007)
c.
The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all
other authorized parties to file similar petitions. Likewise, the filing of
the petition by an authorized party on behalf of the aggrieved party
suspends the right of all others, observing the order established herein.
SEC. 3. Where to File. The petition may be filed on any day and at any
time with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or
omission was committed or any of its elements occurred, or with the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, or any justice
of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines.
When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the writ
shall be returnable before such court or judge.
When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of
their justices, it may be returnable before such court or any justice
thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat,
act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be
returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the
Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, or to any
Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was
committed or any of its elements occurred.
SEC. 4. No Docket Fees. The petitioner shall be exempted from the
payment of the docket and other lawful fees when filing the petition.
The court, justice or judge shall docket the petition and act upon it
immediately.
SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. The petition shall be signed and verified
and shall allege the following:
a.
LATON
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable
reliefs.
SEC. 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court,
justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its
face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the
seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge
may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any
officer or person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the
petition which shall not be later than seven (7) days from the date of its
issuance.
SEC. 7. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. A clerk of
court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized
person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court,
justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary
actions.
SEC. 8. How the Writ is Served. The writ shall be served upon the
respondent by a judicial officer or by a person deputized by the court,
justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of
service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent,
the rules on substituted service shall apply.
SEC. 9. Return; Contents. Within seventy-two (72) hours after service
of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified written return together
with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the
following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation,
its resolution and the prosecution of the case.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.
SEC. 10. Defenses not Pleaded Deemed Waived. All defenses shall
be raised in the return, otherwise, they shall be deemed waived.
SEC. 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. The following pleadings
and motions are prohibited:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
Motion to dismiss;
Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition,
affidavit, position paper and other pleadings;
Dilatory motion for postponement;
Motion for a bill of particulars;
Counterclaim or cross-claim;
Third-party complaint;
Reply;
Motion to declare respondent in default;
Intervention;
Memorandum;
Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or
interim relief orders; and
Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any
interlocutory order.
SEC. 12. Effect of Failure to File Return. In case the respondent fails
to file a return, the court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the
petition ex parte.
SEC. 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be
summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a
preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the
possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
The hearing shall be from day to day until completed and given the
same priority as petitions for habeas corpus.
SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at anytime
before final judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any of the
following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon
motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved
party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a
government agency or by an accredited person or private institution
capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an
organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this
Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions
that shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the
aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in
accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the
rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified
motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession or
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SEC. 18. Judgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10)
days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the
allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court
shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper
and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
SEC. 19. Appeal. Any party may appeal from the final judgment or
order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise
questions of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of
notice of the adverse judgment.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus cases.
SEC. 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. The court shall not dismiss
the petition, but shall archive it, if upon its determination it cannot
proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of petitioner or witnesses
to appear due to threats on their lives.
A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo
court that shall, motu proprio or upon motion by any party, order their
revival when ready for further proceedings. The petition shall be
dismissed with prejudice upon failure to prosecute the case after the
lapse of two (2) years from notice to the petitioner of the order
archiving the case.
The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator
a consolidated list of archived cases under this Rule not later than the
first week of January of every year.
SEC. 21. Institution of Separate Actions. This Rule shall not preclude
the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.
SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action
has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed.
The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal
case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs
available under the writ of amparo.
SEC. 23. Consolidation. When a criminal action is filed subsequent to
the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with
the criminal action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent
to a petition for a writ of amparo, the latter shall be consolidated with
the criminal action.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to
apply to the disposition of the reliefs in the petition.
SEC. 24. Substantive Rights. This Rule shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights recognized and protected by the Constitution.
SEC. 25. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. The Rules of
Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this
Rule.
SEC. 26. Applicability to Pending Cases. This Rule shall govern cases
involving extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof pending in the trial and appellate courts.
SEC. 27. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on October 24, 2007,
following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.
Chapter 17
Speedy Disposition of Cases
All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
27
bodies.
27
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TATAD V. SANDIGANBAYAN
159 SCRA 70 (1988)
FACTS: Antonio de los Reyes, charged petitioner, who was then
Secretary and Head of the Department of Public Information, with
alleged violations of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. In January 1980, the resignation of petitioner was
accepted by President Marcos. Four months later, the Tanodbayan
referred the complaint of delos Reyes to the Criminal Investigation
Servive (CIS) for fact-finding investigation. The CIS investigator
submitted his Investigation Report concluding that evidence indicates
that petitioner had violated Sec3(e) and Sec 7 of RA 3019, and
recommended appropriate legal action on the matter. In October 1982,
all affidavits and counter-affidavits were with the Tanodbayan for final
disposition but it was only in July 1985 when the Tanodbayan approved
a resolution recommending that several informations be filed against
the petitioner before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to quash the information
predicated on several grounds including deprivation of due process of
law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against
him.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his constitutional
right to due process and the right to speedy disposition of the cases
against him.
THE COURTS RULE: After a careful review of the facts and
circumstances of this case, we are constrained to hold that the
inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and the
filing of the information in the instant case is violative of the
constitutionally granted right of the petitioner to due process and to a
speedy disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the
informations in the Criminal Cases should be DISMISSED.
REASON:
A painstaking review of the facts cannot but leave the impression
that political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling
the prosecutorial process in this case.
The long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation
cannot be justified on the basis of the facts on record. The law (PD 911)
prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under
preliminary investigation by him from its termination.
A delay of close to three years cannot be deemed reasonable or
justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.
CADALIN V. POEAS ADMINISTRATOR
238 SCRA 721 (1994)
FACTS: Petitioners Cadalin, Amul and Evagelista, in their own behalf
and on behalf of 728 other OCWs what instituted a class suit for money
claims before the POEA arising from their recruitment by Asia
International Builders Corporation (AIBC) and overseas employment by
Brown & Root International Inc. (BRII). In 1989, the POEA rendered its
decision. This was appealed to the NLRC which promulgated its decision
more than two years later. One of the issues raised before the SC is the
alleged violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases.
HELD:
Speedy disposition of cases is a flexible concept, what the
Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive
delays which render rights nugatory.
The final disposition in the administrative level after seven years
from their inception, cannot be said to be attended by unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive delays (complaints undergoing several
amendments, 1,767 claimants, fights between lawyers of complainants)
as to violate the constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the
cases of complainants.
LATON
Scope of Privilege
In determining the circumstances in which the privilege may be
invoked, one would have to take into account the nature of the
evidence, the personality of the person invoking it, and the
proceeding involved. Parenthetically, it is available to one who
might be guilty or one who simply professes innocence. Not
because one claims no wrongdoing that he can not invoke the
privilege to remain silent
The right, while ordinarily available only in criminal
prosecutions, extends to all other government proceedings-including civil actions, legislative investigations, and
administrative proceedings that possess a criminal or penal
aspect--but not to private investigations done by private
individuals
Testimonial v. Physical Evidence
The privilege is basically directed at testimonial evidence or any
evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused
CONSTITUTION, Art. III, 17. In the American Bill of Rights, this is among
those rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment,
which
provides:
No
person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself,...
28
BELTRAN V. SAMSON
53 Phil. 570 (1929)
FACTS: For the purpose of comparing the petitioners handwriting and
determining whether or not it was he who wrote certain documents
supposed to be falsified, the fiscal petitioned the lower court to order
herein petitioner to appear before the former to take dictation in
petitioners own handwriting. Petitioner then filed a petition for
prohibition seeking to enjoin the order of the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether the writing from the fiscals dictation by the petitioner
for purpose of comparing the latters handwriting and determining
whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified,
constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of
the constitutional provision under examination.
THE COURTS RULE: Wherefore, we find the present action well taken,
and it is ordered that the respondents and those under their orders
desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling petitioner to
take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting
the latter for comparison.
REASON:
As to its scope, the privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but
extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence.
It is the duty of the courts liberally to construe the prohibition in
favor of personal rights, and to refuse permit any steps tending toward
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Chapter 19
Political Prisoners and Involuntary Servitude
No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political
beliefs and aspirations.
No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall be duly
29
convicted.
Consistent with the underlying philosophy of a society which
values individual freedom and self-determination and
guarantees freedom of thought and of the mind, it is only
logical that nobody should be imprisoned solely because of
political beliefs and aspirations
And in a society that also values liberty, involuntary servitude
should be anathema. Individuals are free to make their own
decisions, to move about and realize their dreams. They could
not be held in bondage. Slavery and involuntary servitude,
together with their corollary, peonage, all denote a condition
of enforced, compulsory service of one to another.
The only time when they may be forced to do things, in
accordance with the language of the Constitution, is when they
have been found guilty of a crime for which they may rightfully
be compelled to do things in accordance with their punishment.
Another exception would be in regard to service for the
defense of the country, i.e., [t]he Government may call upon
the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof,
all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law,
to render personal military or civil service. Related to this is
the concept of posse comitatus, where able-bodied me may be
called upon to contribute their share in services for the
maintenance of peace and order in their own community
In Aclaracion v. Gatmaitan, a court stenographer, after he had
ceased to be a court stenographer, was compelled to transcribe
his stenographic notes despite hi contention that forcing him to
do so would constitute involuntary servitude. The Court
dismissed such argument by declaring that the situation of
enforced, compulsory service of one to another or the
condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or
imprisonment, and against this will, to labor for another,
whether he be paid or not, simply does not obtain
From the earliest historical period, the contract of the sailor has
been treated as an exceptional one, and involving, to a certain
extent, the surrender of his personal liberty during the life of
the contract. Indeed the business of navigation could scarcely
be carried on without some guaranty, beyond the ordinary civil
remedies upon contract that the sailor will not desert the ship
at a critical moment or leave her at some place where seamen
are impossible to be obtained--as Molloy forcibly expresses it,
to rot in her neglected brine
CONSTITUTION, Art. III, 18(1) and (2). Its counterpart in the American
Constitution
is
the
Thirteenth
Amendment
which
states:
Neither
slavery
nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for the crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction
29
LATON
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the institution.
(1)
(2)
Death Penalty
One of the most contentious issues when it comes to
punishments is the constitutionality or perhaps the advisability
and wisdom of the death penalty. The language of the
Constitution itself implies that the supreme penalty may be
provided for by Congress. The issue therefore boils down to the
conditions which must attend the enactment and the
subsequent application of such a law. Before such a law be
enacted, it is required that there be compelling reasons and
that it is for heinous crimes. The problem in determining what
would constitute compelling reasons and defining what are
heinous crimes. Then even after one may have succeeded,
there is still the question as to whether the manner or method
of execution is constitutional, or whether it is within
constitutional limits to apply the death penalty to certain types
of persons
People v. Echegaray
267 SCRA 682 (1997)
The Facts: Accused appellant Leo Echegaray was found guilty if raping
his ten-year-old daughter for he was sentenced to death. The Supreme
Court affirmed the same on appeal. He filed a motion for
reconsideration. Subsequently, he discharged his defense counsel and
retained the services of Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG). Thereafter, FLAG filed a Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration on behalf of Echegaray. It raised, among the
grounds for reversal of the death sentence, the issue of the
constitutionality of R.A. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law), which took
effect on 31 December 1993, in that it violates the constitutional
prohibition on cruel, inhuman and excessive punishments.
The Issue: Whether or not R.A. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law), which
took effect on 31 December 1993, violates the constitutional
prohibition on cruel, inhuman and excessive punishments.
Held: The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive.
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death,
but punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word
as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
LATON
LATON
Procunier v. Martinez
416 U.S. 396, 40 L Ed 2d 224, 94 S Ct 1800 (1974)
The Facts: Appellees, prison inmates, brought this action challenging
prisoner mail censorship regulations issued by the Director of the
California Department of Corrections and the ban against the use of law
students and legal paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client
interviews with inmates. The regulations also directed inmates not to
write letters in which they unduly complain or magnify grievances,
including contraband writings, namely, those expressing inflammatory,
political, racial, religious or other views of beliefs. The regulations
further provided that inmates may not send or receive letters that
pertain to criminal activity; are lewd, obscene, or defamatory; contain
foreign matter or, are otherwise inappropriate. Prison employees
screened both incoming and outgoing personal mail for violations of
these regulations.
The Issue: The Issue before us is the appropriate standard of review for
prison regulations restricting freedom of speech.
Whether or not prisoner mail censorship regulations constitute a
violation of the Constitutional guaranty against excessive fines and
cruel punishments as well as a violation of any other rights enshrined in
the Constitution.
Held: Applying the teachings of our prior decisions to the instant
context, we hold that censorship of prisoner mail is justified if the
following criteria are met. First, the regulation or practice in question
must further an important or substantial governmental interest
unrelated to the suppression of expression. Second, the limitation of
First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or
essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest
involved.
On the basis of this standard, we affirm the judgment of the District
Court. The regulations invalidated by that court authorized, inter alia,
censorship of statements that unduly complain or magnify
grievances, expression of inflammatory political, racial, religious or
other views, and matter deemed defamatory or otherwise
inappropriate. These regulations fairly invited prison officials and
employees to apply their own personal prejudices and opinions as
standards for prisoner mail censorship.
We also agree to the decision of the District Court that the decision to
censor or withhold delivery of a particular letter must be accompanied
by minimum procedural safeguards. The interest of prisoners and their
correspondents in uncensored communication by letter, grounded as it
is in the First Amendment, is plainly a liberty interest within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment even though qualified of
necessity by the circumstances of imprisonment. As such, it is protected
from arbitrary governmental invasion. The District Court required that
an inmate be notified of the rejection of a letter written by or
addressed to him, that the author of that letter be given a reasonable
opportunity to protest that decision, and that complaints be referred to
a prison official other than the person who originally disapproved the
correspondence. These requirements do not appear to be unduly
burdensome, nor do appellants so contend.
The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has a corollary the
requirement that prisoners be afforded access to courts in order to
challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of
their constitutional rights. This means that inmates must have a
reasonable opportunity to seek and receive the assistance of attorneys.
Regulations and practices that unjustifiably obstruct the availability of
professional representation or other aspects of the right of access tot
the courts are invalid.
The judgment is Affirmed.
LATON
The Court then turned its focus on the nature of the process
that is due, bearing in mind that the interest of both State and
parolee will be furthered by an effective but informal hearing.
In analyzing what is due, it referred to two important stages in
the typical process of parole revocation--(2) the arrest of
parolee and preliminary hearing, and (b) the revocation hearing
itself. Each stage has its own set of procedural requirements in
order not to offend the Due Process Clause.
In the first stage, some minimal inquiry in the nature of a "preliminary
hearing" should be conducted ate or reasonably near the place of the
alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after
arrest to determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable
ground to believe that the arrested parolee has committed acts that
would constitute a violation of parole conditions. This determination
should be made by someone not directly involved in the case. This
independent officer need not be a judicial officer. The granting and
revocation of parole are matters traditionally handled by administrative
officers. The parolee should be given notice that the hearing will take
place and that its purpose is to determine whether there is probable
cause to believe he has committed a parole violation. The notice should
state what parole violations have been alleged. At the hearing, the
parolee may appear and speak in his own behalf; he may bring letters,
documents, or individuals who can give relevant information to the
hearing officer. On request of the parolee, a person who has given
adverse information on which parole revocation is to be based is to be
made available for questioning in his presence. However, if the hearing
officer determines that an informant would be subjected to risk of
harm if his identity were disclosed, he need not be subjected to
confrontation and cross-examination. The hearing officer shall have the
duty of making a summary, or digest, of what occurs at the hearing in
terms of the responses of the parolee and the substance of the
documents or evidence given in support of parole revocation and of the
parolee's position. Based on the information before him, the officer
should determine whether there is probable cause to hold the parolee
for the final decision of the parole board on revocation. Such a
determination would be sufficient to warrant the parolee's continued
detention and return to the state correctional institution pending the
final decision.
Poll Tax
Chapter 22
Double Jeopardy
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
32
another prosecution for the same act.
141 | P
LATON
General Considerations
Like most of the Bill of Rights guarantees, this protection
against double jeopardy is also of American origin. It was
introduced into the country through the Philippine Bill of 1902
and the Jones Law of 1916. This principle is founded upon the
law of reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in the
maxim of the civil law non bis in idem, in the common law of
England, and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence,
and instead of having specific origin it simply always existed.
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
142 | P
LATON
LATON
twice when she was 17 yrs old and when she was 19 yrs. Old. Upon
arraignment on Jan 19, 1997, he pleaded guilty but bargained a for a
lesser penalty for each case. The court issued a sentence of
imprisonment term of 10 years or each crime. After 3 months, the
cases were revived at the instance of he complainant on the ground
that the penalty imposed was too light. As a consequence, he was rearraigned where he entered a plea of not guilty but subsequently he
entered anew a plea of guilty. He was sentenced to death by lethal
injection. On automatic review o the SC, appellant contends that the
trial court erred re-arraigning and proceeding to trail despite the fact
that he was already convicted earlier based on his plea of guilt. He also
argues that when the court rendered judgment convicting him, the
prosecution did not appeal nor more fro reconsideration or took steps
to set aside the order he also posits that the re-arraignment and trial on
the same information violated his right against double jeopardy.
HELD: The January 1997 order of the trial court convicting the accused
appellant on his own plea of guilt is void ab initio on the ground that
accused-appellants plea is not the plea bargaining contemplated and
allowed by law and the rules of procedure. The only instance where a
plea bargaining is allowed under the rules is when an accused pleads
guilty to a lesser offense. It must be emphasized that accused appellant
did not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty to the rape charges
and only bargained for a lesser penalty. In short, he did not plea bargain
but made conditions on the penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous
because by pleading guilty to the offense charged, accused appellant
should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded. Nonetheless,
whatever procedural infirmity in the arraignment of the accused
appellant was rectified he was re-arraigned and entered a new plea.
Accused appellant did not question the procedural errors in the first
arraignment and failing failed to do so, he is deemed to have
abandoned his right to question the same and waived the errors in
procedure.
court a quo if not acquire jurisdiction over the case. The error of the
trial judge was in confusing the concept of jurisdiction with that of
insufficiency on substance of an indictment. We also held that the
application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel required two
sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced
by the defendant personally or though his counsel and second, such
dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount
to an acquittal. Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely within the
periphery of the said doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired
in the corpus of our jurisprudence. The case is hereby remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law.
LATON
taken. We have said that the dismissal of the criminal case predicated
on the right of the accused to speedy trial, amounts to an acquittal on
the merits which bars the subsequent prosecution of the accused for
the same offense. In the present case the respondent judge dismissed
the criminal case upon the motion of the petitioner involving his
constitutional right to speedy trial because the prosecution failed to
appear on the day of the trial on March 28, 1978 after it had previously
been postponed twice. The setting aside of the respondent judge of the
order of dismissal of March 28 1978 and thereby reviving criminal case
places the petitioner twice in jeopardy in the same offense. The
respondent judge therefore committed a grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the order of May 9 1978 setting aside the order of dismissal
issued on March 28 1978.
People V. Declaro (p. 757)
170 SCRA 142
FACTS: Private respondent, Edgar Ibabao was charged with slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence as a result of a traffic
accident. The case was docketed as Criminal case no 1028-N wherein a
certain Crispin Conanan was the offended party. Again, an information,
docketed as Criminal case no 1421 was filed against the same accused
by Eduardo Salido as the offended party. The second case arose from
the same incident. Upon the arraignment of the accused in the first
case , he entered a plea of not guilty. The hearing was set for hearing
but the offended party and the prosecuting fiscal failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing despite due notice. After a series of motion filed, the
court dismissed the case for lack of interest on the part of the
prosecution. Since the case was dismissed, the petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss the second case on the ground that the dismissal for the
prior case is a bar to the prosecution. The court dismissed the second
case on the ground of double jeopardy. Hence, this petition with the
petitioner contending that double jeopardy have not set in because a.)
the dismissal of the first case was at the instance and the express
consent of the accused and his counsel and b.) the second offense
charged is not the same as the fist, nor is it an attempt to commit the
same or a frustration thereof nor does it include in the firs and c.) the
first case is not yet terminated.
HELD; The petitioner is impressed with merit. Although there are
criminal cases which were dismissed upon motion of the accused
because the prosecution was not prepared for trial sine the
complainant or his witnesses did not appear at the trail or where the
court held that the dismissal is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar
further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. However,
the facts and the circumstance of the present case does not warrant
similar ruling. Double jeopardy will apply even if the dismissal is made
with the express consent to the accuse or upon his own motion only if
it is predicated in either of 2 grounds i.e. insufficiency of he evidence or
denial of the right to a speedy trial. In both cases, the dismissal will
have the effect of the acquittal. Since the dismissal in this case does
not fall under either of these 2 instances, and it was made with the
express consent of the accused, it would not thereby be a bar to
another prosecute for the same offense,
33
145 | P
LATON
offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where the Courts play a
vital role. They render justice where justice is due.
not be placed in Double jeopardy for the reason that from the very
beginning lower trial tribunal acted without jurisdiction is in legal
contemplation. Case remanded to the Regional Trial court of Legaspi,
Public prosecutor is ordered to complete presentation of available
witness for the prosecution.
LATON
Facts: Buling was charge of a crime of less serious physical injuries for
having inflicted wounds on Isidro Balaba, which according to the
complaint requires medical assistance for a period of 10 to 15 days.
Accused pleaded guilty and found guilty, then began to serve his
sentence. Balabas injuries however did not heal. Provincial Fiscal filed
another complaint of serious physical injuries. Information alleges that
the victim requires medical attendance and incapacitated him for a
period of 1 to 2 months. After the trial accused is found guilty of
serious physical injuries as a new sentenced.
Held: the new fact did not supervened, what happened was no X ray
examination of wounded hand was made during the first examination,
which was merely superficial. If new fact had been disclosed in the
previous examination may be attributed to the incompetence on the
part of the examining physician. If the X ray examination discloses the
existence of a fracture, such fracture should have existed when the first
examination wear made. Therefore there is no supervening fact that
could be said to have arisen. Judgement conviction was set aside and
the defendant was acquitted for serious physical injury.
Held: Right against double jeopardy does not apply when the second
offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution for
simple reason that in such case there is no possibility of accused, during
the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was inexistent.
Thus where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after
conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the
same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.
People v. Buling
107 Phil. 712 (1960)
Same Offense
Going back to the first situation, the question is: When is there
same offense? Simply put, there is a same offense where the
LATON
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can be held liable for nine criminal
cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and separately be held liable for crime
of estafa under article 315(2-d) of RPC.
Same Act
As noted earlier, when the same act gives rise to prosecution
under a national law and a municipal or local ordinance,
acquittal or conviction under either would be a bar to the
other. Thus, since the two offenses are really different because
they are penalized by two jurisdictions--national and local--if
the second part of the guarantee were not provided, individuals
could be prosecuted twice for the same act, even if under both
regulations they ,ay already constitute same offense if they
were enacted by the same legislative body
Administrative Proceedings
The guarantee against double jeopardy refers to criminal
proceedings. It may not, therefore, be invoked elsewhere
Miscellany
A man is entitled to some definite idea as o how a criminal case
should be determined. There should be some closure that he
can rely on, either in his conviction or acquittal. In either case,
he should be entitled to repose knowing that a particular
matter or chapter in his life has come to [an] end, a book that
he may now close and put aside
Additional Cases
(Q) Double Jeopardy [3]
Q1. People V. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
559 SCRA 449 (2008)
During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor
of San Vicente, Palawan. Tiape (now deceased), a relative of
Villapando's wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del
Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost. Thereafter, Villapando
designated Tiape as Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San
Vicente, Palawan. Maagad and Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape
for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The complaint was resolved
against Villapando and Tiape charging the two with violation of Article
244 of the Revised Penal Code filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Unlawful
appointments.-Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or
appoint to any public office any person lacking the legal qualifications...
There appears to be a dispute. This Court is now called upon to
determine whether Orlando Tiape, at the time of [his] designation as
Municipal Administrator, was lacking in legal qualification. Stated
differently, does "legal qualification" contemplate the one (1) year
LATON
while it is true that double jeopardy will attach in case the prosecution
appeals a decision acquitting the accused, an acquittal rendered in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
does not really "acquit" and therefore does not terminate the case as
there can be no double jeopardy based on a void indictment.
In the case at bar, the trial court dismissed the cases against private
respondents for the denial of their right to speedy trial. In a long line of
cases, we have held that a dismissal on the ground of the denial of the
accused's right to a speedy trial will have the effect of acquittal that
would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same
offense. Thus, we have held that where after such dismissal the
prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal
and the court re-set the case for trial, the accused can successfully
claim double jeopardy as the said order was actually an acquittal, was
final and cannot be reconsidered. Hence, petitioner was correct in
filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging that "respondent
judge committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of dismissal dated November
23, 2001 allegedly on account of the speedy trial rule" as an appeal was
not available to it. Where the dismissal of the case was allegedly
capricious, certiorari lies from such order of dismissal and does not
involve double jeopardy, as the petition challenges not the correctness
but the validity of the order of dismissal and such grave abuse of
discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction which prevents double
jeopardy from attaching.
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed
junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP entered the premises of the
Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City,
where they disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices
around the building. They then declared their withdrawal of support
from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as
President
of
the
Republic.
After much negotiation, the group finally laid down their arms.
Subsequently, an Information for coup detat was filed against them
with the RTC, at the same time that they were tried at court martial for
conduct unbecoming an officer. They question the jurisdiction of the
court martial, contending that the RTC ordered that their act was not
service-connected and that their violation of Art. 96 of the Articles of
War (RA 7055) was absorbed by the crime of coup detat.
Separate Opinion of Justice Tinga:
Double Jeopardy--It is very well-settled that double jeopardy attaches if
one is tried by both a military court and a civilian court over the same
act, notwithstanding the differing natures of both tribunals
Chapter 23
Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder
34
34
(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law
and which was innocent when done, punishes such an act;
LATON
Bills of Attainder
Bills of attainder are legislative acts which inflicts punishment
on named individuals or members of an easily ascertainable
group without judicial trial. Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt
The U.S. Supreme Court gave a concise background of the
constitutional proscription against bills of attainder in United
States v. Brown:
A logical starting place for an inquiry into the meaning of the
prohibition is its historical background. The bill of attainder, a
parliamentary act sentencing to death one or more specific persons,
was a device often resorted to in sixteenth, seventeenth and
eighteenth century England for dealing with persons who had
attempted, or threatened to attempt, to overthrow the government.
In addition to the death sentence, attainder generally carried with it a
'corruption of blood,' which meant that the attainted party's heirs could
not inherit his property. The 'bill of pains and penalties' was identical
to the bill of attainder, except that it prescribed a penalty short of
death, e.g., banishment, deprivation of the right to vote, or exclusion of
the designated party's sons from Parliament. Most bills of attainder and
bills of pains and penalties named the parties to whom they were to
apply; a few, however, simply described them. While some left the
designated parties a way of escaping the penalty, others did not. The
use of bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties was not limited
to England. During the American Revolution, the legislatures of all
thirteen States passed statutes directed against the Tories; among
these statutes were a large number of bills of attainder and bills of
pains and penalties.
The bill of attainder was a tool for political vendetta in an everchanging landscape of temporal ascendancy: Bills of attainder
were typically directed at once powerful leaders of
government. By special legislative Acts, Parliament deprived
one statesman after another of his reputation, his property,
and his potential for future leadership. The motivation of such
bills was as much political as it was punitive--and often the
victims were those who had been the most relentless in
attacking their political enemies at the height of their own
power
The proscription against bills of attainder also includes the socalled bills of pains and penalties, As noted above, it its
restrictive sense, the bills of attainder referred to the
imposition of death as a penalty while the bills of pains and
penalties referred to lesser penalties, such as imprisonment,
LATON
appeal.
Held: Yes. AO 13 and MO 61 are not ex post facto laws.
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally
prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of
the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for
their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and
provide for their punishment. The subject administrative and
memorandum orders clearly do not come within the shadow of this
definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its
composition and functions. It does not mete out penalty for the act of
granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a
frame of reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws,
Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot
be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis for
the Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and
memorandum orders are ex post facto.
Chapter 24
Citizenship
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
35
151 | P
LATON
mother and an alien father 14 years after he has reached the age of
majority?
The reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election
should be made within 3 years from reaching age of majority. But this
period may be extended under certain circumstances as when the
person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. However
span of 14 years is way beyond the contemplation of the requirements
of electing upon reaching the age of majority. Ching offered no reason
why he delayed his election. Philippine citizenship can never be treated
like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed
when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship
has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. He should avail his right
with fervor enthusiasm and promptitude. Application to Philippine bar
denied.
Natural-Born Citizens
It is true that our laws do not say that only male alien may seek
naturalization but we must take into account other provisions on
citizenship. The granting of citizenship by naturalization to a female
alien applicant while her marriage to another alien is subsisting would
be inoperative because she would still be a citizen of the country of her
husand. The result would be dual citizenship which is believed not
contemplated under our laws.
Denaturalization
Naturalization
Qualifications and Disqualifications
Procedure
Effect of Naturalization on Spouse and Children
BURCA vs republic
Petitioner, a Chinese woman filed a petition alleging that she Is married
to a Filipino citizen and possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for naturalization. The SG opposed because it lacks
essential requisites such as formen resisdenc etc. the rtc granted
naturalization. SC agreed with SG and reversed rtc judgement.
The only means by which an alien wife of Filipino be declared as a
Filipino is by full compliance with the procedure in naturalization law.
She must also prove that she has all the qualifications and none of
disqualifications. She must file petition for naturalization in court,
allege and prove all the requisites such as continuous residency of
atleast 10 years, lucrative income, etc.
We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in
a case is resolved by a court or by an administratie agency, as a material
issue to the controversy, after full blown hearing, with the sg of his
authorized representative, and this finding is affirmed by court, the
decision is conclusive f citizenship.
Po vs republic
Betty po lim a native born Chinese woman married lim son hue, alsoa
Chinese, filed with the lower court a petition for admission as citizen of
the Philippines under the commonwealth act no. 473. She was also
LATON
Aznar v. COMELEC
185 SCRA 703 (1990)
Angat v. Republic
314 SCRA 438 (1999)
Facts: Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born Filipino citizen who
lost such until his citizenship by naturalization in USA. On Mar. 11,
1996, he filed before the RTC of Marikina City a petition to regain his
status as a Filipino citizen under CA No. 63, RA No. 965 and RA No. 2630
stating that he was born in 1954 in Tondo, Manila; he lost his Philippine
citizenship when he got naturalized as an American; he returned to the
Phils. in 1991; he has the qualifications required in CA No. 63, and RA
Nos. 965 and 2639 to reacquire Philippine citizenship; he possesses
none of the disqualification prescribed in CA No. 473 and he has reside
in the Phils. at least 6 mos. immediately preceding the date of the
petition. He sought to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the
RP but the motion was denied. He filed another motion to have the
denial reconsidered and he was allowed by the court a quo. The court
also ordered him to take his oath of allegiance to the RP. Thereafter,
petitioner was declared as repatriated and a citizen of the Phils.
However, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion for reconsideration
asserting that the petition should have been dismissed since the court a
quo lacks jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the Special
Committee on Naturalization. The court a quo found the petition
meritorious and declared that it has no jurisdiction and considered the
granting of the petition null and void. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration since his petition was filed on Mar 14 1996 or months
before the Special Committee on Naturalization was constituted by the
Pres. under AO 285 on Aug. 22, 1996, and stated that the court a quo
had the authority over the case. The RTC denied the motion and
petitioner assails the lower courts dismissal of the petition by giving
retroactive effect to AO 285.
Reacquisition of Citizenship
Repatriation
Jao v. Republic
121 SCRA 358 (1983)
Facts: Jao filed a petition in the CFI of Davao for repatriation alleging
that although her father was Chinese, she was a Filipino citizen because
her mother was a Filipina who was not legally married to her Chinese
husband; that she lost her Philippine citizenship when she married a
Chinese with whom she had 3 children and that he died in 1962; that
her illiterate mother erroneously registered her as an alien with the
Bureau of Immigration which issued her an Alien Certificate of
Registration. Petition was not published but notice was served to the
Provincial Fiscal. The CFI subsequently, declared petitioner as judicially
Issue: WON the court a quo had the jurisdiction over the petitioners
case
Held: Under PD No. 725, dated June 5, 1975, amending CA No. 63, an
application for repatriation could be filed by Filipino women who lost
their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens, as well as by natural
born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship with the Special
Committee on Naturalization. The OSG was right in contending that the
petition should have been filed with the Committee and not with the
RTC which has no jurisdiction. It was also incorrect for the petitioner to
invoke RA Nos. 965 and 2639 since these laws could only apply to
persons who had lost their citizenship by rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of an allied foreign country
or of the USA. Also, a person who desires to reacquire Philippine
citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court. All he
has to do is to take an oath of allegiance to the RP and to register that
fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had
last resided in the Phils. Petition for review is DENIED.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC
174 SCRA 245 (1989)
Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed to be the governorelect of Sorsogon on Jan 22, 1988. However, the League of
Municipalities, represented by its President filed with the COMELEC a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation since
he was not a Filipino citizen having been naturalized in the USA on Jan
23 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized but only due to his
153 | P
LATON
LATON
RULING: Article 412 of the Civil Code simply provides: No entry in the
civil registry shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. In a
number of earlier cases, the Court has ruled that the birth entry
regarding a persons citizenship could not be changed under Rule 108
as this would involve substantive rights that the rules of court could not
diminish, increase, or modify under the Constitution. Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the
proper enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article 412 of
the Civil Code and so does not violate the Constitution.
Additional Cases
(S) Citizenship [5]
LATON
LATON
the qualifications set forth in said law apply even to applications for
naturalization by judicial act.
There is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was
intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the
legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of
acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born
aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to
apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the
prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.
In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act,
though at the time of the filing of his petition, administrative
naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was already available. Consequently,
his application should be governed by C.A. No. 473.
Second. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made
applicable even to judicial naturalization, the coverage of the law would
be broadened since it would then apply even to aliens who are not
native born. It must be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only to
aliens who were born in the Philippines and have been residing here.
Third. Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization
is contrary to the intention of the legislature to liberalize the
naturalization procedure in the country. One of the qualifications set
forth in R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant was born in the
Philippines and should have been residing herein since birth. Thus, one
who was born here but left the country, though resided for more than
ten (10) years from the filing of the application is also disqualified. On
the other hand, if we maintain the distinct qualifications under each of
the two laws, an alien who is not qualified under R.A. No. 9139 may still
be naturalized under C.A. No. 473.
In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses he presented
were competent to vouch for his good moral character, and are
themselves possessed of good moral character. It must be stressed that
character witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of
the applicants conduct and character. Thus, they ought to testify on
specific facts and events justifying the inference that the applicant
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided by law.
Petitioners witnesses, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo, did not testify on his
specific acts; they did not elaborate on his traits. Their testimonies do
not convince the Court that they personally know petitioner well and
are therefore in a position to vouch for his qualifications. As correctly
found by the CA, the witnesses testimonies consisted mainly of general
statements in answer to the leading questions propounded by his
counsel. What they conveniently did was to enumerate the
qualifications as set forth in the law without giving specific details. The
pertinent portion of Atty. Adasas testimony follows:
In sum, petitioners witnesses clearly did not personally know him well
enough; their testimonies do not satisfactorily establish that petitioner
has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by
law.
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove
not only his own good moral character but also the good moral
character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons. Within
the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only an
individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not
a police character and has no police record; who has not perjured in the
past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be
credible is not the declaration made but the person making it. This
implies that such person must have a good standing in the community;
that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face
value, as a good warranty of the applicants worthiness.
The records likewise do not show that the character witnesses of
petitioner are persons of good standing in the community; that they are
honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. The
LATON
Chapter 25
Suffrage
Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years
of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least
one year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at
least six months immediately preceding the election. No
literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be
37
imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Corollary to the idea of a republic, or a representative
government, must necessarily go the attendant presence of a
mechanism by which the people can express and manifest their
sovereign will. That is through the exercise of their power of
suffrage. The holding of periodic elections constitutes the
very foundation of a republican form of government such as
ours. Through elections, the people can install who they
choose to momentarily represent them in the governance of
their affairs. By means of elections, too, the people can cleanse
the government of people that they do not think deserving of
their trust, or by their lethargy and inattention retain or elect
people who may not be deserving of the honor and the office.
At the same time, suffrage also gives them a say in regard to
certain issues that may be presented to them for their approval
or rejection, as exemplified in the conduct of plebiscites,
referenda and initiative. Whatever direction the people take
through the exercise of their right, it is the choice they make
would not live up their expectations, then it would simply be a
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mater of getting what they deserve
Also, if only to underscore the importance of the political rights
of the people, it has been held that among those that may not
be the subject matter or object of contracts are certain rights of
individuals, which the law and public policy have deemed wise
to exclude from the commerce of man, such as the political
rights conferred upon citizens, including, but not limited to,
ones right to vote, the right to present ones candidacy to the
people and to be voted to public office, provided, however,
that all qualifications prescribed by law obtain
Suffrage, A Historical Background
While the right of suffrage may be taken for granted now, it has
not always been available, much less to everyone. The
Constitution now guarantees the right to all citizens not
otherwise disqualified by law, eighteen years of age, residents
of the Philippines for at least one year, and of the place where
he or she intends to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election. He or she need not be literate, not must
he show any property, or comply with other substantive
requirements before he or she may cast his or her vote
The 1935 Constitution provided: Suffrage may be exercised by male
citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
twenty-one years of age or over and are able to read and write, and
who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the
municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
preceding the election. The National Assembly shall extend the right of
CONSTITUTION, Art. V, 1
Absolute freedom of choice of the parties and men by whom we shall be
governed, even if only among varying evils, is of the very essence in the
concept of democracy consecrated in the fundamental law of our land.
Gonzales v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835 (1969)
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15 SCRA 7 (1965)
RA 4421s (which requires all candidates for national, provincial, city
and municipal offices...to post surety bond equivalent to one-year
salary...if the candidate fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes)
constitutionality is in question on the ground that the same is
undemocratic and contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
Moreover, it has the effect of imposing property qualifications in order
that a person could run...
The avowed purpose of RA 4421 in requiring a candidate to post a bond
equal to a years salary of the office for which he will run is to curb the
practice of so-called nuisance candidates
Held: No. RA 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall
provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad...In the
absence of restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly exercised its
function as defined in Article VI (The Legislative Department) of the
Constitution
Additional Cases
(T) Suffrage [1]
CONSTITUTION, Art. V, 2
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