JURISDICTION

1. DUERO v. CA

NO. Private respondent was not estopped from

questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. The
fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the
court over an action cannot be waived by the parties,
or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even
by their express consent. Further, a party may assail
the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any
stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. Even if
private respondent actively participated in the
proceedings before said court, the doctrine of
estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against him
because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be
raised at any time and at any stage of the action. As a
general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a
question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an
issue of conferment as a matter of law. Also, neither
waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction
upon a court, barring highly meritorious and
exceptional circumstances.
Thus, in Javier v. Court of Appeals: x x x The point
simply is that when a party commits error in filing his
suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once
be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have
been the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent
interpretations of doubtful legal provisions.
If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such
course of action, part of the blame should be placed
on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby
lulling the parties into believing that they pursued
their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules,
it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action
'whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of
Court) Should the Court render a judgment without
jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or
annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132,
Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the
same.
The doctrine of estoppel must be applied only in
exceptional cases, as its misapplication could result in
a miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, if the RTC's
order were to be sustained, private respondent would
be evicted from the land prematurely, while RED
Conflict Case No.1029 would remain unresolved. Such
eviction on a technicality if allowed could result in an
injustice, if it is later found that he has a legal right to
till the land he now occupies as tenant-lessee.

FACTS:
On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC
a complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Ownership with Damages and Attorney's Fees against
private respondent and two others, namely,
Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena.
Herein private respondent Eradel was declared in
default for failure to file his answer to the complaint.
Thus, petitioner presented his evidence ex parte and a
judgment was rendered in his favor.
On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a
Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been
occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente,
Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over the
complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest
belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to
the land and was responsible to defend any adverse
claim on it.
However, the trial court denied the motion for
new trial. Meanwhile, RED Conflict Case No.1029, an
administrative case between petitioner and applicantcontestants Romeo, Artemio and Jury Laurente,
remained pending with the Office of the Regional
Director of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources in Davao City.
On July 24, 1996, private respondent filed before
the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment,
reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New
Trial. He averred among others that unless there is a
determination on who owned the land, he could not
be made to vacate the land.
On October 8, 1996, the trial court issued an
order denying the Petition for Relief from Judgment.
In a Motion for Reconsideration of said order, private
respondent alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the case, as it was under the jurisdiction of the
municipal trial court. The motion for reconsideration
was denied by the RTC. On January 22, 1997,
petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTC
granted. On March 12, 1997, private respondent filed
his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition,
maintaining that private respondent is not estopped
from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON private respondent is estopped from
assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC.

2. DONATO v. CA

RULING:

FACTS:
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Petitioner Antonio T. Donato is the registered

owner of a real property located at Ciriaco Tuason
Street, San Andres, Manila. On June 7, 1994,
petitioner filed a complaint before the MeTC of
Manila for forcible entry and unlawful detainer
against 43 named defendants and all unknown
occupants of the subject property.
Of the 43 named defendants, only 20 filed a
consolidated Answer wherein they contended that
they cannot be evicted because the Urban Land
Reform Law guarantees security of tenure and priority
right to purchase the subject property among others.
Following trial under the Rule on Summary Procedure,
the MeTC rendered judgment on September 19, 1994
against the 23 non-answering defendants. As to the
20 private respondents, the MeTC issued a separate
judgment sustaining their rights under the Land
Reform Law, declaring petitioners cause of action as
not duly warranted by the facts and circumstances of
the case and dismissing the case without prejudice.
Petitioner appealed to the RTC which sustained the
decision of the MeTC. Undaunted, petitioner filed a
petition for review with the CA.
The CA dismissed the petition on two grounds: (a)
the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by
petitioners counsel and not by petitioner himself, in
violation of Revised Circular No. 28-91; and, (b) the
only annex to the petition is a certified copy of the
questioned decision but copies of the pleadings and
other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition are not
annexed, contrary to Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of
the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
(RIRCA).
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
his Supplement to his motion for reconsideration
submitting the duly authenticated original of the
certification of non-forum shopping signed by
petitioner himself and the relevant records of the
MeTC and the RTC. However, the CA denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration and its
supplement, ruling that petitioners subsequent
compliance did not cure the defect.

1. YES. The rules on forum shopping, which were

precisely designed to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice, should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective
which is simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of
forum-shopping. The subsequent filing of the
certification duly signed by the petitioner himself
should thus be deemed substantial compliance, pro
hac vice. Further, petitioner has adequately explained
his failure to personally sign the certification which
justifies relaxation of the rule. It was physically
impossible for the petition to have been prepared and
sent to the petitioner in the United States, for him to
travel from Virginia, U.S.A. to the nearest Philippine
Consulate in Washington, D.C., U.S.A., in order to sign
the certification before the Philippine Consul, and for
him to send back the petition to the Philippines within
the 15-day reglementary period. A litigation is not a
game of technicalities. When technicality deserts its
function of being an aid to justice, the Court is
justified in exempting from its operations a particular
case. Technical rules of procedure should be used to
promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift
unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective,
granting substantial justice is an even more urgent
ideal. The Courts pronouncement in Republic v. Court
of Appeals is worth echoing: cases should be
determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all
parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses,
rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would
be better served.
2. NO. The proper recourse of an aggrieved party
from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is one
of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was
perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper
remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. It is
necessary to draw a line between an error of
judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of
judgment is one which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an
error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained
of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial
body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctible only by

ISSUES:
1. WON the subsequent compliance of the
petitioner cured the defect.
2. WON Petition for Review under Rule 45 is the
proper remedy.
RULINGS:

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the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Inasmuch as the

present petition principally assails the dismissal of the
petition on ground of procedural flaws involving the
jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain the
petition, it falls within the ambit of a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.

down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. We do not agree. In

countless decisions, this Court has consistently held
that, while an order or decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any
stage, active participation in the proceedings in the
court which rendered the order or decision will bar
such party from attacking its jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves
who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by
instituting an action for reformation of contract
against private respondents. It appears that, in the
proceedings before the trial court, petitioners
vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish.
Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of
the courts jurisdiction during the entire proceedings
which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial
court rendered its decision and issued a writ of
execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first
raise the issue of jurisdiction and it was only
because said decision was unfavorable to them.
Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to
question the courts jurisdiction over the case they
themselves filed.

3. SPOUSES GONZAGA v. CA
FACTS:
In 1970, spouses Gonzaga bought a parcel of land
from Lucky Home Inc. Said lot was specifically
denominated as Lot No. 19 and which the spouses
mortgaged to the Social Security Commission as a
security for their housing loan. Meanwhile, the
spouses started to construct their house on Lot No.
18, and not on Lot No. 19. They mistakenly identified
Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Lucky Homes then informed
them of such mistake but the spouses instead offered
to buy Lot No. 18 to widen their premises, thus they
continued building their house thereon. However for
failure on the part of the spouses to pay their
obligation to the SSS, Lot No. 19 was consequently
foreclosed. The title thereto was cancelled and a new
one was issued in the name of SSS. After such
foreclosure, the spouses offered to swap Lot Nos.18
and 19 and demanded from lucky homes to reform
their contract. Lucky home however refused. This
prompted the spouses to file an action for
reformation of contract with damages before the RTC.
The RTC however dismissed the action for lack of
merit and awarded lucky homes moral damages and
attorneys fees. Subsequently then, a writ of
execution was issued. Spouses urgently filed a motion
to recall such writ, questioning now the jurisdiction of
the RTC on the ground that the case falls within the
jurisdiction of the Housing and land use regulatory
board. Subsequently, the spouses went to the CA to
annul RTCs decision. CA dismissed the petition on the
ground that the spouses were estopped from
question RTCs jurisdiction pursuant to the case of
Tijam.. On the other hand spouses contended that the
doctrine in Tijam case has been abandoned.

4. ESCOBAL v. GARCHITORENA
FACTS:
Escobal was a member of the of Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary. On
March 16, 1990, Escobal was conducting surveillance
operations on drug trafficking at the Sa Harong Caf
Bar and Restaurant located along Barlin St., Naga City.
He somehow got involved in a shooting incident,
resulting in the death of one Rodney Rafael N. Nueca.
On February 6, 1991, an amended Information was
filed against him with the RTC of Naga City. Initially he
filed a motion to quash the info, questioning the RTCs
jurisdiction, contending, among others, that as a PNP
member, his case should have been filed with the
court martial.
His motion was denied. Trial then proceeded.
After the prosecution has rested its case, Escobal
again filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
RTC has no jurisdiction over him and the case, arguing
that since he committed the crime in the performance
of his duties, It is the Sandiganbayan which has
jurisdiction over the case. RTC then conducted a
preliminary hearing as to whether Escobal committed
the crime charged in the performance of his duties.
Upon finding that Escobal was in the performance
of his duties when the crime was committed, RTC
ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended

ISSUE:
Whether the spouses Gonzaga is estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of
this Court have already abandoned the doctrine laid
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Information and to allege that the offense charged

was committed by the petitioner in the performance
of his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and,
conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit
the same, as well as the complete records with the
stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan however remanded the case to the
RTC, saying that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
R.A. No. 7975, the RTC retained jurisdiction over the
case, considering that Escobal had a salary grade of
23. Upon the remand of the records, the RTC set the
case for trial, for Escobal to continue presenting his
evidence. Instead of adducing his evidence, he filed a
petition for certiorari, assailing the Order of the
Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan remanding the
records of the case to the RTC.

Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,

Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
5. AGAN, JR. v. PHIL INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINAL
FACTS:
The contract for the construction and operation
for the NAIA IPT III was to PIATCO. Petitioners, who
are employees of service providers at the MIAA and
NAIA Terminal I and II, and service providers
themselves, assails the following:
a) The provisions in the 1997 Concession
Agreement and the ARCA which grants
PIATCO the exclusive right to operate a
commercial international passenger terminal
within the island of Luzon;
b) The contracts further provide that upon the
commencement of operations at the NAIA IPT
III, the Government shall cause the closure of
Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger
Terminals I and II as international passenger
terminals;
c) With respect to existing concession
agreements between MIAA and international
airport service providers regarding certain
services or operations, the 1997 Concession
Agreement and the ARCA uniformly provide
that such services or operations will not be
carried over to the NAIA IPT III and PIATCO is
under no obligation to permit carry over
except through a separate agreement duly
entered into with PIATCO;
d) With respect to the petitioning service
providers and their employees, upon the
commencement of operations of the NAIA IPT
III, they alleged that will be effectiviely barred
from providing international airport services
at the NAIA Terminals I and 2 as all
international airlines and passengers will be
diverted to the NAIA IPT III. The petitioning
service providers will thus be compelled to
contract with PIATCO alone for such services,
with no assurance that subsisting contracts
with MIAA and other international airlines will
be respected.
PIATCO alleges that the submission of this
controversy to the Supreme Court at the first instance
is a violation of the Rule on Hierarchy of Courts. They
contend that trial courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with the Supreme Court with respect to a special civil

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of his
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC.
HELD:
No. For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive
jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed
by public officers in relation to their office, it is
essential that the facts showing the intimate relation
between the office of the offender and the discharge
of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It
is not enough to merely allege in the Information that
the crime charged was committed by the offender in
relation to his office because that would be a
conclusion of law. The amended Information filed
with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain
any allegation showing the intimate relation between
his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the
RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when
on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment
of the Information to include therein an allegation
that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to
office. The trial court erred when it ordered the
elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It
bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No.
1606 was already in effect and under Section 2 of the
law:
In cases where none of the principal accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
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action for prohibition and hence, resort must first be

had at the trial court.

the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections

for both chapters 30 days after the barangay
elections. Liga sent respondent Mayor of Manila a
letter requesting him that said ordinance be vetoed
considering that it encroached upon, or even
assumed, the functions of the Liga through legislation,
a function which was clearly beyond the ambit of the
powers of the City Council. Mayor signed and
approved the city ordinance.

ISSUE:
Whether direct resort to the Supreme Court was a
proper rememdy?
HELD:
YES.The rule on Hierarchy of courts will not
prevent this court from assuming jurisdiction over the
case at bar. The said rule may be relaxed when
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify the availment of a remedy
within and calling for the exercise of this courts
primary jurisdiction. It is easy to discern that
exceptional circumstances exist in the cases at bar
that call for the relaxation of the rule. The present
case is of transcendental importance as it involves the
the construction and operation of the countrys
premier international airport.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Liga properly filed the case
directly with the Supreme Court.
HELD:
No. Even granting arguendo that the present
petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari,
there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of
courts. No special and important reason or
exceptional and compelling circumstance has been
adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why
direct recourse to this Court should be allowed.
This Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not
exclusive, but is concurrent with the RTC and CA in
certain cases.
SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of
writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction. Petitioners reliance on Pimentel v.
Aguirre is misplaced because the non-observance of
the hierarchy-of-courts rule was

6. LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY v. ATIENZA

FACTS:
Liga is the national organization of all the
barangays in the Philippines, which pursuant to
Section 492 of RA No. 7160 (LGC), constitutes the duly
elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities,
provincial chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter,
and metropolitan political subdivision chapters.
Section 493 of that law provides that the liga at
the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political
subdivision, and national levels directly elect a
president, a vice-president, and 5 members of the
board of directors. All other matters not provided for
in the law affecting the internal organization of the
leagues of LGUs shall be governed by their respective
constitution and by-laws, which must always conform
to the provisions of the Constitution and existing laws.
Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and Bylaws to govern its internal organization. Liga adopted
and ratified its own Election Code. Liga came out with
its Calendar of Activities and Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Liga Election Code of 2002,
setting the synchronized elections for highly
urbanized city chapters, such as the Liga Chapter of
Manila, together with independent component city,
provincial, and metropolitan chapters.
Respondent City Council of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing for the
election of representatives of the District Chapters in

7. MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION

v.
EDDY NG KOK
FACTS:
Eddy Ng Kok is a Singaporean businessman who
purchased a Condominium Unit located at Valle Verde
Terraces from the Petitioner. Kok paid the reservation
fee then later on, paid 90% of the purchase price.
Petitioner through its president executed a Contract
to sell in favor of Kok which states that the
Condominium will be completed and delivered to the
Respondent within 15 months from February 1989 or
on May 8, 1990. In April 1990 Kok went back to the
Philippines for the Unit only to find out that the
turnover was reset to May 31, 1990. In July of the
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same year, Kok again went back to the Philippines but

the Unit was still uninhabitable for lack of electricity
and water facilities, that the petitioner informed Kok
that he will move in on August 1990. Again, Kok went
back on October 1990 and learned that the unit was
still unlovable.
Kok sent the petitioner a demand letter for
damages he incurred which the latter ignored. This
prompted Kok to file a complaint for specific
performance and damages before the RTC of Makati.
Nevertheless, during the pendency of the action,
Kok occupied the Unit, thus his cause of action was
limited for damages.
Judgment was rendered by the RTC in favor of
Kok, which was affirmed by the CA. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied
by the appellate court, hence a petition for review on
certiorari with the Supreme Court.

DISMISSAL;
MOTU
PROPRIO;
JURISDICTION; RESIDUAL PREROGATIVE

RESIDUAL

FACTS:
On August 2, 1963, herein petitioner George
Katon filed a request with the District Office of the
Bureau of Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for
the re-classification of a piece of real property known
as Sombrero Island, located in Tagpait, Aborlan,
Palawan for the purpose of eventual conversion or
reclassification from forest to agricultural land, and
thereafter for Katon to apply for homestead patent.
Then, in 1965, the Director of Forestry informed
the Director of Lands, that since the subject land was
no longer needed for forest purposes, the same is
therefore certified and released as agricultural land
for disposition under the Public Land Act.
However, there were also several favorable
endorsements that were made to survey the island
under the request of herein respondents. Then, the
records show that, on November 8, 1996, one of the
respondents Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent
application for the portion of the island consisiting of
8.5 hectares and the respondent Jesus Gapilango filed
a homestead application on June 8, 1972. The
respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued a
Homestead Patent No. 14527 and OCT No. G-7098 on
March 3, 1875 with an area of 6.84 hectares of
Sombrero Island.
Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead
patents and original certificates of title covering
certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of
respondents on the ground that the same were
obtained through fraud. Petitioner prays for the
reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.
The petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead
patents and original certificates of title issued in favor
of the respondents covering certain portions of the
Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the
whole island in his favor. The petitioner claims that he
has the exclusive right to file an application for
homestead patent over the whole island since it was
he who requested for its conversion from forest land
to agricultural land.
Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and
lawful possessors of their respective portions and
have declared said portions for taxation purposes and
that they have been faithfully paying taxes thereon
for twenty years.
Respondents contend that the petitioner has no
legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is concerned
because an action for reconveyance can only be

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC of Makati has Jurisdiction over
the case.
HELD:
On petitioners contention that the trial court has
no jurisdiction over the instant case, Section 1 (c) of
Presidential Decree No. 1344, as amended, it is the
HLURB which has jurisdiction over the instant case.
The complaints for specific performance with
damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer against
the owner or developer falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HLURB.
While it may be true that the trial court is
without jurisdiction over the case, petitioners active
participation in the proceedings estopped it from
assailing such lack of it. We have HELD: that it is an
undesirable practice of a party participating in the
proceedings and submitting its case for decision and
then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of
jurisdiction before the trial court and the Appellate
Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the
trial courts jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is
now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial
courts jurisdiction.
8. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v.
SARDILLO
9. KATON v. PALANCA

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brought by the owner and not a mere homestead

applicant and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by
laches for his failure to assert his right over the land
for an unreasonable and unexplained period of time.
Respondents filed their Answer with Special
and/or Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due
time. On June 30, 1999, they also filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by
petitioner of the trial courts Order to amend his
Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by
the legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent
Gapilango.The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the
RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the
July 29, 1999 Order was denied by the trial court in its
Resolution dated December 17, 1999, for being a third
and prohibited motion. In his Petition for Certiorari
before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court with
grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the
denied Motion was his first and only Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order.
Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because
of prescription invoking residual prerogative.

qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9,

and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules
of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure brought about no radical change.
Under the new rules, a court may motu
proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from
the pleadings or evidence on record that it
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
when there is another cause of action
pending between the same parties for the
same cause, or where the action is barred by
a prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
x x x."12 (Italics supplied)
On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is
embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, as follows:
"SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect
thereof. A partys appeal by notice of appeal
is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing
of the notice of appeal in due time.
"A partys appeal by record on appeal is
deemed perfected as to him with respect to
the subject matter thereof upon the approval
of the record on appeal filed in due time.
"In appeals by notice of appeal, the court
loses jurisdiction over the case upon the
perfection of the appeals filed in due time and
the expiration of the time to appeal of the
other parties.
"In appeals by record on appeal, the court
loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter
thereof upon the approval of the records on
appeal filed in due time and the expiration of
the time to appeal of the other parties.
"In either case, prior to the transmittal of
the original record or the record on appeal,
the court may issue orders for the protection
and preservation of the rights of the parties
which do not involve any matter litigated by
the appeal, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution
pending appeal in accordance with Section 2
of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the
appeal." (Italics supplied)
The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is
available at a stage in which the court is normally
deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the
subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is
reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the
parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal,
but prior to the transmittal of the original records or
the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial

ISSUE:
Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its
alleged residual prerogative under Section 1, Rule 9
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the
Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition?"
HELD:
Yes. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and
(4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the
evidence on record.
In the four excepted instances, the court shall
motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon
v. Larin11 we explained thus:
"x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a
case was traditionally limited to instances
when the court clearly had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter and when the
plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time or neglected to comply with
the rules or with any order of the court.
Outside of these instances, any motu proprio
dismissal would amount to a violation of the
right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for
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court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to

issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending
appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners
Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on
residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such
order of dismissal was not one for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the
disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA
referred to as residual prerogatives were the general
residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action
motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section
1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority
of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.
To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in
mind when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio
"on more fundamental grounds directly bearing on
the lower courts lack of jurisdiction" and for
prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only
power it has is to dismiss the action.

No. In applying the doctrine of Sibonghanoy, the

petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing
the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised
the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate
court.
At that time, no considerable period had yet
elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though
unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of
"estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the
party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce
them until the condition of the party pleading laches
has in good faith become so changed that he cannot
be restored to his former state, if the rights be then
enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title,
intervention of equities, and other causes. In applying
the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional
case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the
patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having
the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more
after more or less 15 years. The same, however, does
not obtain in the instant case.
We note at this point that estoppel, being in the
nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be
applied rarelyonly from necessity, and only in
extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be
applied with great care and the equity must be strong
in its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel
may be a most effective weapon for the
accomplishment of injustice. Moreover, a judgment
rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter
is void. Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for
remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts
or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the
concerned cases. No laches will even attach when the
judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is
not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the
defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to
dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by
considering not only the status or the relationship of
the parties but also the nature of the issues or
questions that is the subject of the controversy. The
proceedings before a court or tribunal without
jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void,
hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.

10. FIGUEROA v. PEOPLE

ESTOPPEL;
FACTS:
On July 8, 1994, an information for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against
the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bulacan, Branch 18. The merits ensued and on August
19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as
charged. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner
questioned, among others, for the first time, the trial
courts jurisdiction.
The appellate court, however, in the challenged
decision, considered the petitioner to have actively
participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked
the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already
estopped by laches from asserting the trial courts
lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the active participation of the
Figueroa in the trial of the case, which was initiated
not by him but the public prosecutor constitutes
laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy?

11. HANNAH SERANA v. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking
public officer, being then the Student Regent of the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City,

HELD:

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with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private

individual, were charged with estafa before thr
Sandiganbayan for alleged misappropriation of public
funds Amounting to Php 15 Million issued by the
Office of the President, for their personal use and
benefit, and despite repeated demands.
Said funds were for the renovation of the Vinzons
Hall of the University of the Philippines which will be
renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Student Hall. However, the said project did not
materialize prompting the succeeding student regent
to file a case against her. Petitioner moved to quash
the information.
She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not
have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over
her person, in her capacity as UP student regent. She
posited that as a student regent, she was not a public
officer since she merely represented her peers. She
added that she was a simple student and did not
receive any salary as a student regent nor does she
fall under Salary Grade 27.

Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express
provision of law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606
explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction
over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
Petitioner falls under this category.
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR
performs functions similar to those of a board of
trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express
mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer
as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by
the averments in the information. More than that,
jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories
set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a
motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash. Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely
upon the whims of defendant or respondent.
The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was
reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v.
Sandiganbayan. Pertinent parts of the Courts ruling in
Bondoc read: xxxthe inability of the Sandiganbayan to
hold a joint trial of Bondocs cases and those of the
government employees separately charged for the
same crimes, has not altered the nature of the
offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification
punishable by penalties higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of
P6,000.00, committed by government employees in
conspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc.
These crimes are within the exclusive, original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot
be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart
from the fact that even if the cases could be so
transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not be
possible.

ISSUE:
WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
case?
HELD:
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
other felonies committed by public officials in relation
to their office. Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 provides:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The
jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements
that (a) the offense is committed by public officials
and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is
committed in relation to their office. It is not only the
salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has
jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No.
1606.
In Geduspan v. People, We HELD: that while the
first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with
Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions may
not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by
express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction
of the said court.

12. PAT-OG SR. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

FACTS:
Robert Bang-on (Bang-on), then a 14-year old
second year high school student of the Antadao
National High School in Sagada, Mountain Province,
filed an affidavit-complaint against Pat-og, a third year
high school teacher of the same school, before the
Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative
Region (CSC-CAR) for misconduct and a criminal case
against Pat-og for the crime of Less Serious Physical
Injury with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bontoc,
Mountain Province. Ruling of the CSC-CAR: In its
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Decision, dated September 19, 2006, the CSC-CAR

found Pat-og guilty of Simple Misconduct.
On December 11, 2006, the motion for
reconsideration filed by Pat-og was denied for lack of
merit.
The Ruling of the CSC: In its Resolution, dated
April 11, 2007, the CSC dismissed Pat-ogs appeal and
affirmed with modification the decision of the CSCCAR and adjudged Pat-og guilty of grave misconduct.
Pat-og filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning
for the first time the jurisdiction of CSC over the case.
He contended that administrative charges against a
public school teacher should have been initially heard
by a committee to be constituted pursuant to the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. CA affirmed
the resolutions of the CSC. It agreed that Pat-og was
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC
as the records clearly showed that he actively
participated in the proceedings.
CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
Pat-og. Hence, the present petition with the following

unless it be proved that another body is likewise

vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both
bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.
Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several
tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of the others.
13. BOSTON EQUITY v. CA
FACTS:
On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a
complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against
the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. The
respondent Lolita Toledo filed an Answer dated 19
March 1998 but on 7 May 1998, she filed a Motion for
Leave to Admit Amended Answer in which she
alleged, among others, that her husband and codefendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead.
The death certificate of Manuel states 13 July 1995
as the date of death.
As a result, petitioner filed a motion, dated 5
August 1999, to require respondent to disclose the
heirs of Manuel. In compliance with the verbal order
of the court during the 11 October 1999 hearing of
the case, respondent submitted the required names
and addresses of the heirs. Petitioner then filed a
Motion for Substitution, dated 18 January 2000,
praying that Manuel be substituted by his children as
party-defendants. It appears that this motion was
granted by the trial court in an Order dated 9 October
2000.
Pre-trial thereafter ensued and on 18 July 2001,
the trial court issued its pre-trial order containing,
among others, the dates of hearing of the case. The
trial of the case then proceeded. Herein petitioner, as
plaintiff, presented its evidence and its exhibits were
thereafter admitted. On 26 May 2004, the reception
of evidence for herein respondent was cancelled upon
agreement of the parties.
On 24 September 2004, counsel for herein
respondent was given a period of fifteen days within
which to file a demurrer to evidence. However, on 7
October 2004, respondent instead filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint, citing the following as grounds:
(1) that the complaint failed to implead an
indispensable party or a real party in interest; hence,
the case must be dismissed for failure to state a cause
of action; (2) that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court; (3)

ISSUE:
WON CSC has jurisdiction over the administrative
case filed against Pat-og?
HELD:
In Puse v. Santos-Puse, it was HELD: that the CSC,
the Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board
of Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory
Commission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction over
administrative cases against public school teachers.
Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is
the body charged with the establishment and
administration of a career civil service which
embraces all branches and agencies of the
government. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the
Administrative Code of 1987)12 and Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines) expressly provide that the CSC has the
power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary
cases instituted with it or brought to it on appeal.
Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of
the government, has the inherent power to supervise
and discipline all members of the civil service,
including public school teachers.
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed
over the same parties or subject matter at the same
time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law
bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is
to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive
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that the trial court erred in ordering the substitution

of the deceased Manuel by his heirs; and (4) that the
court must also dismiss the case against Lolita Toledo
in accordance with Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.
The trial court, in an Order dated 8 November
2004, denied the motion to dismiss for having been
filed out of time, citing Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997
Rules of Court which states that: *W+ithin the time
for but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be
made.
Respondents motion for reconsideration of the
order of denial was likewise denied on the ground
that defendants attack on the jurisdiction of this
Court is now barred by estoppel by laches since
respondent failed to raise the issue despite several
chances to do so.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that the
trial court seriously erred and gravely abused its
discretion in denying her motion to dismiss despite
discovery, during the trial of the case, of evidence that
would constitute a ground for dismissal of the case.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition on the
ground that when Boston filed the complaint,
defendant Manuel S. Toledo was already dead. Such
being the case, the court a quo could not have
acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendant
Manuel S. Toledo. Thus, the courts denial of the
motion to dismiss as based on the attack on the
jurisdiction of the court.
The CA also held that the attack on the
jurisdiction of the court is not barred by laches,
despite her active participation on the proceedings. It
is well-settled that issue on jurisdiction may be raised
at any stage of the proceeding, even for the first time
on appeal. By timely raising the issue on jurisdiction in
her motion to dismiss is not estopped from raising the
question on jurisdiction. Moreover, when issue on
jurisdiction was raised by respondent, the court a quo
had not yet decided the case, hence, there is no basis
for the court a quo to invoke estoppel to justify its
denial of the motion for reconsideration.
It should be stressed that when the complaint was
filed, defendant Manuel S. Toledo was already dead.
The complaint should have impleaded the estate of
Manuel S. Toledo as defendant, not only the wife,
considering that the estate of Manuel S. Toledo is an
indispensable party, which stands to be benefited or
be injured in the outcome of the case.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion

for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Lolita Toledo is already
estopped from questioning the trial courts
jurisdiction?
2. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over
Manuel Toledo?
3. Whether or not the estate of Manuel Toledo
is an indispensible party?
4. Whether or not the inclusion of Manuel as
party-defendant is a mere misjoinder of party
not warranting the dismissal of the case
before the lower court?
HELD:
1. No.
Petitioners argument that respondents motion
to dismiss questioning the trial courts jurisdiction was
filed more than six years after her amended answer
was filed. Further, respondent had several
opportunities, at various stages of the proceedings, to
assail the trial courts jurisdiction but never did so for
six straight years. This argument is misplaced because
it failed to consider that jurisdiction has several
aspects. The aspect of jurisdiction which may be
barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel by
laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred
from being assailed as a result of estoppel by laches is
jurisdiction over the subject matter. In Tijam, the case
relied upon by petitioner, the issue involved was the
authority of the then Court of First Instance to hear a
case for the collection of a sum of money in the
amount of P1,908.00 which amount was, at that time,
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
municipal courts. In subsequent cases citing the ruling
of the Court in Tijam, what was likewise at issue was
the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject
matter of the case.
Accordingly, in Spouses Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals, 394 SCRA 472 (2002), the issue for
consideration was the authority of the regional trial
court to hear and decide an action for reformation of
contract and damages involving a subdivision lot, it
being argued therein that jurisdiction is vested in the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board pursuant to
PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers
Protective Decree). In Lee v. Presiding Judge, MTC,
Legaspi City, 145 SCRA 408 (1986), petitioners argued
that the respondent municipal trial court had no
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jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment because

the issue of ownership was raised in the pleadings.
Finally, in People v. Casuga, 53 SCRA 278 (1973),
accused-appellant claimed that the crime of grave
slander, of which she was charged, falls within the
concurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts or city
courts and the then courts of first instance, and that
the judgment of the court of first instance, to which
she had appealed the municipal courts conviction,
should be deemed null and void for want of
jurisdiction as her appeal should have been filed with
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
In all of these cases, the Supreme Court barred
the attack on the jurisdiction of the respective courts
concerned over the subject matter of the case based
on estoppel by laches, declaring that parties cannot
be allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent posture
by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they
submitted their cause voluntarily.
Here, what respondent was questioning in her
motion to dismiss before the trial court was that
courts jurisdiction over the person of defendant
Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds
no application in this case. Instead, the principles
relating to jurisdiction over the person of the parties
are pertinent herein.
If the objection to the jurisdiction is not raised
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, the
objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the
plaintiff or the defendant is deemed waived. Since the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a
party to a case is not one of those defenses which are
not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such
defense must be invoked when an answer or a motion
to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver of the
defense. If the objection is not raised either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer, the objection to
the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or the
defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first
sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court.

no valid service of summons upon him, precisely

because he was already dead even before the
complaint against him and his wife was filed in the
trial court.
3. No.
An indispensable party is one who has such an
interest in the controversy or subject matter of a case
that a final adjudication cannot be made in his or her
absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. He
or she is a party who has not only an interest in the
subject matter of the controversy, but an interest of
such nature that a final decree cannot be made
without affecting [that] interest or leaving the
controversy in such a condition that its final
determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity
and good conscience. It has also been considered that
an indispensable party is a person in whose absence
there cannot be a determination between the parties
already before the court which is effective, complete
or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one
who must be included in an action before it may
properly proceed.
On the other hand, a person is not an
indispensable party if his interest in the controversy
or subject matter is separable from the interest of the
other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly
or injuriously affected by a decree which does
complete justice between them. Also, a person is not
an indispensable party if his presence would merely
permit complete relief between him or her and those
already parties to the action, or if he or she has no
interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a
sufficient reason to declare a person to be an
indispensable party simply because his or her
presence will avoid multiple litigations.
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the
case at bar, it is clear that the estate of Manuel is not
an indispensable party to the collection case, for the
simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and his
wife, respondent herein, is solidary. Based on the
provisions and stipulations of the contract were then
followed by the respective signatures of respondent
as MAKER and her husband as CO-MAKER. Thus,
pursuant to Article 1216 of the Civil Code, petitioner
may collect the entire amount of the obligation from
respondent only. The aforementioned provision
states: The creditor may proceed against any one of
the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. The demand made against one of
them shall not be an obstacle to those which may

2. No.
The jurisdiction over the person of Manuel was
never acquired by the trial court. A defendant is
informed of a case against him when he receives
summons. Summons is a writ by which the
defendant is notified of the action brought against
him. Service of such writ is the means by which the
court acquires jurisdiction over his person.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Manuel since there was
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subsequently be directed against the others, so long

as the debt has not been fully collected.
In other words, the collection case can proceed
and the demands of petitioner can be satisfied by
respondent only, even without impleading the estate
of Manuel. Consequently, the estate of Manuel is not
an indispensable party to petitioners complaint for
sum of money.
Based on the foregoing, the estate of Manuel is
not an indispensable party and the case can proceed
as against respondent only. That petitioner opted to
collect from respondent and not from the estate of
Manuel is evidenced by its opposition to respondents
motion to dismiss asserting that the case, as against
her, should be dismissed so that petitioner can
proceed against the estate of Manuel.

or for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to

Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, because
a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action
against one who cannot be a party to a civil action.
Since the proper course of action against the wrongful
inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is the
dismissal of the case as against him, thus did the trial
court err when it ordered the substitution of Manuel
by his heirs.
Substitution is proper only where the party to be
substituted died during the pendency of the case, as
expressly provided for by Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court. Since Manuel was already dead at the
time of the filing of the complaint, the court never
acquired jurisdiction over his person and, in effect,
there was no party to be substituted.

4. No.
Under Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
states that *n+either misjoinder nor non-joinder of
parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties
may be dropped or added by order of the court on
motion of any party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any
claim against a misjoined party may be severed and
proceeded with separately. Based on the last
sentence of the afore-quoted provision of law, a
misjoined party must have the capacity to sue or be
sued in the event that the claim by or against the
misjoined party is pursued in a separate case. In this
case, therefore, the inclusion of Manuel in the
complaint cannot be considered a misjoinder, as in
fact, the action would have proceeded against him
had he been alive at the time the collection case was
filed by petitioner. This being the case, the remedy
provided by Section 11 of Rule 3 does not obtain here.
The name of Manuel as party-defendant cannot
simply be dropped from the case. Instead, the
procedure taken by the Court in Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te,
594 SCRA 410 (2009), whose facts, as mentioned
earlier, resemble those of this case, should be
followed herein. As a result, the case, as against
Manuel, must be dismissed.
In addition, the dismissal of the case against
Manuel is further warranted by Section 1 of Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, which states that: only natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be
parties in a civil action.
Where the defendant is neither a natural nor a
juridical person or an entity authorized by law, the
complaint may be dismissed on the ground that the
pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action

14. PEOPLE v. HENRY T. GO

FACTS:
A certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman against several
individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019 (antigraft).
Among those charged was herein Henry T. Go,
who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO,
for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC
Secretary Arturo Enrile in entering into a contract
which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to
the government.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
found probable cause to indict, among others, herein
Henry T. Go for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
While there was likewise a finding of probable cause
against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted
because he died prior to the issuance of the
resolution finding probable cause.
Thus an information was filed against Henry
before the Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan however
ordered the prosecutor to show cause why this case
should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused considering that the
accused is a private person and the public official
Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already
deceased, and not an accused in this case.
On the other hand, Henry filed a Motion to Quash
the Information filed against him on the ground that
the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute
an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
, citing the show cause order of the SB, also
contended that, independently of the deceased
Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was
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alleged to have conspired, Henry, who is not a public

officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as
a government agent, may not be prosecuted for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution however argued that the SB has
exclusive jurisdiction over Henrys case, even if he is a
private person, because he was alleged to have
conspired with a public officer.SB granted Henrys
motion to quash.

Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer,

assessed taxes against private respondents SM Mart,
Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center,
Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc.,
Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart
Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and
Signature Lines. Said assessment covered the local
business taxes petitioners were authorized to collect
under Section 21 of the same Code.
Because payment of the taxes assessed was a
precondition for the issuance of their business
permits, private respondents were constrained to pay
the P19,316,458.77 assessment under protest. On
January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City] the complaint
denominated as one for Refund or Recovery of
Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business
Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before public respondents
sala [at Branch 112]. In its Order dated July 9, 2004,
the RTC granted private respondents application for a
writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but the RTC denied it in
its Order dated October 15, 2004. Petitioners then
filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA
assailing the July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004 Orders
of the RTC. CA dismissed petitioners petition for
certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the
said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate
jurisdiction over private respondents complaint for
tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its
expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282
(RA 9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari
seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in
the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.

ISSUE:
Whether Henry,, a private person, may be
indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was
alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing
of the Information.
HELD:
Yes. It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's
death, there is no longer any public officer with whom
respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019.
It does not mean, however, that the allegation of
conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or
that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged.
The only thing extinguished by the death of
Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did
not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of
the charge of conspiracy between him and private
respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary
Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer
who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In
fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for
infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14
Were it not for his death, he should have been
charged.
The requirement before a private person may be
indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must be
alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public
officer. The law, however, does not require that such
person must, in all instances, be indicted together
with the public officer. If circumstances exist where
the public officer may no longer be charged in court,
as in the present case where the public officer has
already died, the private person may be indicted
alone.

ISSUE:
WON the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil
action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order
issued by the RTC in a local tax case?
HELD:
While it is clearly stated that the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial
Courts (RTCs) in local tax cases originally decided or
resolved by them in the exercise of their original or
appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical
statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory
RA 9282, which provides that the Court of Tax Appeals
has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing

15. CITY OF MANILA v. JUDGE CUERDO

FACTS:

14
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JURISDICTION

interlocutory orders issued by the Regional Trial Court

in local tax cases filed before it; The prevailing
doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of
certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction
which must be expressly conferred by the
Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the
mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.
While there is no express grant of the power to
issue writ of certiorari, with respect to the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA), Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law and
that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
It can be fairly interpreted that the power of the
CTA includes that of determining whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC
in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court.
It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional
mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari in these cases. Indeed, in order for any
appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate
jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue,
among others, a writ of certiorari.
In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed
tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed
that the law intended to transfer also such power as is
deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such
appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason
why the transfer should only be considered as partial,
not total. Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the
present Rules of Court provides that when by law,
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer,
all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by
such court or officer.
The Supreme Court agrees with the ruling of the
Court of Appeals (CA) that since appellate jurisdiction
over private respondents complaint for tax refund is
vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), it follows
that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should,
likewise, be filed with the same court.If this Court
were to sustain petitioners contention that

jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the

CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by
two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction
over basically the same subject matter precisely
the split jurisdiction situation which is anathema to
the orderly administration of justice.

15
AMDCM

RULES 1 to 5

1. EVANGELINE ALDAY v. FGU INSURANCE

CORPORATION

the presence of third parties of whom the court

cannot acquire jurisdiction.
In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, this Court
capsulized the criteria or tests that may be used in
determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive, summarized as follows:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the
claim and counterclaim largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendant's claim absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support
or refute plaintiff's claim as well s defendant's
counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim
and the counterclaim?
Another test, applied in the more recent case of
Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, is the "compelling test
of compulsoriness" which requires "a logical
relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that
is, where conducting separate trials of the respective
claims of the parties would entail a substantial
duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
court."
Tested against the abovementioned standards,
petitioner's counterclaim for commissions, bonuses,
and accumulated premium reserves is merely
permissive. The evidence required to prove
petitioner's claims differs from that needed to
establish respondent's demands for the recovery of
cash accountabilities from petitioner, such as cash
advances and costs of premiums.
The recovery of respondent's claims is not
contingent or dependent upon establishing
petitioner's counterclaim, such that conducting
separate trials will not result in the substantial
duplication of the time and effort of the court and the
parties. One would search the records in vain for a
logical connection between the parties' claims.
This conclusion is further reinforced by
petitioner's own admissions since she declared in her
answer that respondent's cause of action, unlike her
own, was not based upon the Special Agent's
Contract.
However, petitioner's claims for damages,
allegedly suffered as a result of the filing by
respondent of its complaint, are compulsory.
There is no need for need for petitioner to pay
docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim. On the
other hand, in order for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim,
petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.

FACTS:
FGU insurance filed a collection case with
damages, etc. against their insurance agent, Alday
who allegedly owed it unliquidated cash advances,
unremitted costs of premiums and other charges.
Alday filed her answer and by way of counterclaim
asserted her right for the alleged unpaid commissions
and bonuses and damages against FGU.
FGU filed a "Motion to Strike Out Answer With
Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant
In Default" because Alday's answer was allegedly filed
out of time. Trial court denied the motion and
rejected FGU's motion for reconsideration.
FGU filed a motion to dismiss Alday's
counterclaim, contending that the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction over the same because of the
non-payment of docket fees by Alday. In response,
Alday asked the trial court to declare her counterclaim
as exempt from payment of docket fees since it is
compulsory and that FGU be declared in default for
having failed to answer such counterclaim.
Trial court granted FGU's motion to dismiss
Alday's counterclaim and consequently, denied
Alday's motion. The court found Alday's counterclaim
to be merely permissive in nature and held that
Alday's failure to pay docket fees prevented the court
from acquiring jurisdiction over the same. The trial
court similar denied Alday's motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals sustained the
trial court, finding that Alday's own admissions, as
contained in her answer, show that her counterclaim
is merely permissive. The appellate court denied
Alday's motion for reconsideration, giving rise to the
present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alday is required to pay docket
fees?
HELD:
In determining if Alday is required to pay the
docket fees, the Supreme Court ruled first on the
issue of whether or not the counterclaim of petitioner
is compulsory or permissive in nature.
A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being
cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out
of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication
16
AMDCM

RULES 1 to 5

The rule on the payment of filing fees has been laid

down by the Court in the case ofSun Insurance Office,
Ltd. V. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that
vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where
the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.

PGSMC bound itself to pay USD 306,000 upon the

plants production of the 11-kg. LPG cylinder samples.
Thus, the total contract price amounted to USD
1,530,000. PGSMC paid KOGIES USD 1,224,000.
After the installation of the plant, the initial
operation could not be conducted as PGSMC
encountered financial difficulties affecting the supply
of materials. For the remaining balance for the
installation and initial operation of the plant, PGSMC
issued two postdated checks.
When KOGIES deposited the checks, these were
dishonored for the reason PAYMENT STOPPED. This
prompted it to send a demand letter to PGSMC on
May 7, 1998. The wife of PGSMCs President on the
other hand on the same date faxed a letter to KOGIES
President. She complained that not only did KOGIES
deliver a different brand of hydraulic press from that
agreed upon but it had not delivered several
equipment parts already paid for.
PGSMC replied that the two checks it issued
KOGIES were fully funded but the payments were
stopped for reasons previously made known to
KOGIES.
On June 1, 1998, PGSMC informed KOGIES that
PGSMC was canceling their Contract on the ground
that KOGIES had altered the quantity and lowered the
quality of the machineries and equipment it delivered
to PGSMC, and that PGSMC would dismantle and
transfer the machineries, equipment, and facilities
installed in the Carmona plant.
PGSMC again wrote KOGIES reiterating the
contents of its previous letter.
On July 3, 1998, KOGIES filed a Complaint for
Specific Performance, against PGSMC before the
Muntinlupa City (RTC).
On July 17, 1998, PGSMC filed its Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim, asserting that it had the
full right to dismantle and transfer the machineries
and equipment because it had paid for them in full as
stipulated in the contract; that KOGIES was not
entitled to the PhP 9,000,000 covered by the checks
for failing to completely install and make the plant
operational; and that KOGIES was liable for damages
amounting to PhP 4,500,000 for altering the quantity
and lowering the quality of the machineries and
equipment.
On July 29, 1998, KOGIES filed its Reply to Answer
and Answer to Counterclaim. KOGIES denied it had
altered the quantity and lowered the quality of the
machinery, equipment, and facilities it delivered to
the plant. It claimed that it had performed all the

2. The same rule applies to permissive

counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed
until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may allow payment
of said fee within a reasonable time but also
in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing
fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the
Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.

2. KOREA TECHNOLOGIES CO, LTD., vs. LERMA

FACTS:
KOGIES, korean corp. entered into a contract with
Pacific General Steel (PGSMC), domestic corporation,
whereby KOGIES would set up an LPG Cylinder
Manufacturing Plant in Carmona, Cavite. The contract
was executed in the Philippines and an amendment
was executed in Korea.
The contract and its amendment stipulated that
KOGIES will ship the machinery and facilities
necessary for manufacturing LPG cylinders for which
PGSMC would pay USD 1,224,000. KOGIES would
install and initiate the operation of the plant for which
17
AMDCM

RULES 1 to 5

undertakings under the contract and had already

produced certified samples of LPG cylinders.
It averred that whatever was unfinished was
PGSMCs fault since it failed to procure raw materials
due to lack of funds. KOGIES, relying on Chung Fu
Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, insisted
that the arbitration clause was without question valid.
RTC denied KOGIES motion to dismiss PGSMCs
compulsory counterclaims as these counterclaims fell
within the requisites of compulsory counterclaims.
KOGIES
filed
an
Urgent
Motion
for
Reconsideration of the September 21, 1998 RTC Order
denying
dismissal
of
PGSMCs
compulsory
counterclaims. The CA held that the counterclaims of
PGSMC were compulsory ones and payment of docket
fees was not required since the Answer with
counterclaim was not an initiatory pleading.
Hence, we have this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45.

allowing him to withdraw goods on credit. To secure

his purchases, Mercado assigned three China Banking
Corporation (CBC) certificates of deposit amounting to
P5 million to SMC and executed a continuing hold-out
agreement stating:
Any demand made by [SMC] on [CBC], claiming
default on my/our part shall be conclusive on [CBC]
and shall serve as absolute authority for [CBC] to
encash the [CBC certificates of deposit] in accordance
with the third paragraph of this Hold-Out Agreement,
whether or not I/we have in fact defaulted on any of
my/our obligations with [SMC], it being understood
that the issue of whether or not there was factual
default must be threshed out solely between me/us
and [SMC]
He also submitted three surety bonds from
Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation (EASCO)
totaling P2.6 million.
Consequently, on February 10, 1992, SMC notified
CBC that Mercado failed to pay for the items he
withdrew on credit. Consequently, citing the
continuing hold-out agreement, it asked CBC to
release the proceeds of the assigned certificates of
deposit. CBC approved SMBs request and informed
Mercado.
On March 2, 1992, Mercado filed an action to
annul the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of
assignment in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 55, claiming that that the continuing
hold-out agreement allowed forfeiture without the
benefit of foreclosure. It was therefore void pursuant
to Article 2088 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Mercado
argued that he had already settled his recent
purchases on credit but SMC erroneously applied the
said payments to his old accounts not covered by the
continuing hold-out agreement (i.e., purchases made
prior to the extension of the credit line).
On March 18, 1992, SMC filed its answer with
counterclaim against Mercado. It contended that
Mercado delivered only two CBC certificates of
deposit amounting to P4.5 million and asserted that
the execution of the continuing hold-out agreement
and deed of assignment was a recognized business
practice. Furthermore, because Mercado admitted his
outstanding liabilities, SMC sought payment of the
lees products he withdrew (or purchased on credit)
worth P7,468,153.75.
On April 23, 1992, SMC filed a third-party
complaint against EASCO. It sought to collect the
proceeds of the surety bonds submitted by Mercado.
On September 14, 1994, Mercado filed an urgent
manifestation and motion seeking the dismissal of the

ISSUE:
Whether or not PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
COUNTERCLAIMS are ALL COMPULSORY NOT
NECESSITATING PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES?
HELD:
As aptly ruled by the CA, the counterclaims of
PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim dated July 17, 1998 in
accordance with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at
the time the Answer with Counterclaim was filed. Sec.
8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, A
compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that a
defending party has at the time he files his answer
shall be contained therein.
On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSMC filed its
Answer incorporating its counterclaims against
KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said
counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress,
however, that effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7,
Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket
fees are now required to be paid in compulsory
counterclaim or cross-claims.
3. MERCADO VS. CA
FACTS:
Leonides Mercado had been distributing
respondent San Miguel Corporations (SMCs) beer
products in Quiapo, Manila since 1967. Then in 1991,
SMC extended to him a P7.5 million credit line
18
AMDCM

RULES 1 to 5

complaint. He claimed that he was no longer

interested in annulling the continuing hold-out
agreement and deed of assignment. The RTC,
however, denied the motion. Instead, it set the case
for pre-trial. Thereafter, trial ensued.
During trial, Mercado acknowledged the accuracy
of SMCs computation of his outstanding liability as of
August 15, 1991. Thus, the RTC dismissed the
complaint and ordered Mercado and EASCO (to the
extent of P2.6 million or the value of its bonds) to
jointly and severally pay SMC the amount of
P7,468,153.75.
Aggrieved, Mercado and EASCO appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA) insisting that Mercado did not
default in the payment of his obligations to SMC.
On December 14, 2004, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision in toto. Mercado and EASCO both moved for
reconsideration but their respective motions were
denied.
On October 28, 2005, EASCO filed a petition for
review on certiorari in this Court but eventually
agreed to settle its liability with SMC. The petition was
terminated on September 19, 2007.
Meanwhile, Mercado passed away and was
substituted by his heirs, petitioners Racquel D.
Mercado, Jimmy D. Mercado, Henry D. Mercado,
Louricar D. Mercado and Virgilio D. Mercado.
Petitioners subsequently filed this petition
asserting that the CA erred in affirming the RTC
decision in toto. The said decision (insofar as it
ordered Mercado to pay SMC P7,468,153.75) was
void. SMCs counterclaim was permissive in nature.
Inasmuch as SMC did not pay docket fees, the RTC
never acquired jurisdiction over the counterclaim.
ISSUE:
Whether
permissive?

or

not

SMCs

counterclaim

When Mercado sought to annul the continuing

hold-out agreement and deed of assignment (which
he executed as security for his credit purchases), he in
effect sought to be freed from them. While he
admitted having outstanding obligations, he
nevertheless asserted that those were not covered by
the assailed accessory contracts. For its part, aside
from invoking the validity of the said agreements,
SMC therefore sought to collect the payment for the
value of goods Mercado purchased on credit. Thus,
Mercados complaint and SMCs counterclaim both
touched the issues of whether the continuing holdout agreement and deed of assignment were valid
and whether Mercado had outstanding liabilities to
SMC. The same evidence would essentially support or
refute Mercados claim and SMCs counterclaim.
Based on the foregoing, had these issues been
tried separately, the efforts of the RTC and the parties
would have had to be duplicated. Clearly, SMCs
counterclaim, being logically related to Mercados
claim, was compulsory in nature. Consequently, the
payment of docket fees was not necessary for the RTC
to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.
4. ANTONIO NAVARRO AND GRAHMMS, INV. VS.
MBTC
DOCKET FEES; PAYMENT FAILURE; EFFECTS
FACTS:
The private respondent Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company (respondent MBTC) filed with the RTC
of Makati City a petition for the judicial foreclosure of
the real estate mortgage executed by the petitioners
in its favor. The petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision, however the trial
court issued an order denying the said motion.
On, the last day of the reglementary period, the
petitioners filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal.
However, the petitioners failed to pay the requisite
docket and other lawful fees.

was

HELD:
No.
A counterclaim (or a claim which a defending
party may have against any party) may be compulsory
or permissive. A counterclaim that (1) arises out of (or
is necessarily connected with) the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
partys claim; (2) falls within the jurisdiction of the
court and (3) does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties over whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction, is compulsory. Otherwise, a
counterclaim is merely permissive.

Thereafter, the respondent MBTC filed a Motion

to Deny Due Course to Notice of Appeal with Motion
for Execution on the ground that the notice of appeal
was not timely filed. Acting on the motion, the RTC,
while ruling in favor of the timeliness of the
petitioners' notice of appeal, nevertheless denied the
appeal for not being accompanied by the required
docket fees. Hence, the RTC granted the motion of
the respondents for the issuance of a writ of
execution for the enforcement of the decision.
19
AMDCM

RULES 1 to 5

On June 11, 1998, the counsel for the petitioners

informed the court by letter that on June 9, 1998, he
sent his messenger to the court to pay the docket fees
on the notice of appeal but was refused by the
receiving clerk.11 In a Letter-Response dated June 19,
1998, the trial court instructed the counsel for the
petitioners, to wit:
In response to your letter dated June 11, 1998,
please be informed that as a matter of policy, courts
do not receive payments of docket fees. This should
be made to the Office of the Clerk of Court, with only
the official receipts and/or proofs of payment filed in
court to be attached to the record of the case to be
forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the
court has already resolved all pending incidents
before it, the last one in its Order dated May 27, 1998
so that, if the receiving clerk refused receipt of the
docket fee on the nature (sic) of appeal, it is only in
consonance with the above-mentioned order.
June 29, 1998, the petitioner filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari assailing the May 27, 1998
Order of the RTC for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In their reply to the comment, the
petitioners, for the first time, proffered to the
appellate court an explanation for their admitted
failure to pay the appellate docket fees within the
prescribed reglementary period and the CA
promulgated its Decision dismissing the petitioner's
appeal. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration
and its supplement thereto was, likewise, denied by
the appellate court in its Resolution.
Hence, the petition at bar.

docket fees within this period is a condition sine qua

non to the perfection of the appeal. Contrary to the
petitioners' predication, the payment of the appellate
docket and other lawful fees is not a mere technicality
of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement,
without which the decision or final order appealed
from would become final and executory as if no
appeal was filed at all.
In the present case, the petitioners failed to
establish any sufficient and satisfactory reason to
warrant a relaxation of the mandatory rule on the
payment of appellate docket and other lawful fees.
The explanation given by the petitioners' counsel for
the non-payment was that his secretary, who
migrated to another country, inadvertently failed to
pay the docket and other fees when she filed the
petitioners' notice of appeal with the court. The said
counsel came to know of the inadvertence only when
he received a copy of the RTC's May 27, 1998 Order
which denied due course to the appeal for failure to
pay the required docket fees. The explication deserves
scant consideration. We have reviewed the records
and find that the petitioners failed to show how and
when their counsel's secretary left the country.
Neither did the petitioners submit any explanation
why their counsel failed to ascertain immediately
after April 14, 1998 if the requisite appellate docket
and other lawful fees had been paid by the said
secretary before her departure.
Thus, putting the blame on the counsel's secretary
for her failure to perfect the petitioners' appeal to the
CA is unjustified. As aptly declared by the appellate
court:
The reason given for movants' failure to pay the
docket fees, i.e., that their counsel's employee had
left his office has been debunked by the Supreme
Court as "a hackneyed and habitual subterfuge
employed by litigants who fail to observe the
procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of
Court. (Lanting vs. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 974) The
Supreme Court has also often repeated that the
negligence of clerks which adversely affect the case
handled by lawyers, is binding upon the latter."
(Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 162
SCRA 371.)29

ISSUE:
Whether or not the notice of appeal is duly and
seasonably perfected?
HELD:
Time and time again, this Court has consistently
held that the "payment of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of
an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not
perfected. The appellate court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and
the decision sought to be appealed from becomes
final and executory."
It bears stressing that appeal is not a right, but a
mere statutory privilege. Corollary to this principle is
that the appeal must be exercised strictly in
accordance with the provisions set by law under Rule
41 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the payment of the

5. PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION,

AUTOMOTIVE PHILIPPINES, ASEA ONE
CORPORATION and AUTOCORP vs. BANQUE
NATIONALE DE PARIS
DOCKET FEES; DEFICIENCY IN ASSESSMENT
20
AMDCM

RULES 1 to 5

FACTS:
Sometime in 1995, petitioner Proton availed of
the credit facilities of respondent Banque Nationale
de Paris (BNP). To guarantee the payment of its
obligation, its co-petitioners (Automotive, Asea and
Autocorp) executed a corporate guarantee to the
extent of US$2,000,000.00.
BNP and Proton subsequently entered into three
trust receipt agreements. Under the terms of the trust
receipt agreements, Proton would receive imported
passenger motor vehicles and hold them in trust for
BNP. Proton would be free to sell the vehicles subject
to the condition that it would deliver the proceeds of
the sale to BNP, to be applied to its obligations to it. In
case the vehicles are not sold, Proton would return
them to BNP, together with all the accompanying
documents of title. Allegedly, Proton failed to deliver
the proceeds of the sale and return the unsold motor
vehicles. Pursuant to the corporate guarantee, BNP
demanded from Automotive, Asea and Autocorp the
payment of the amount representing Protons total
outstanding obligations.
These guarantors refused to pay, however. Hence,
on September 7, 1998 BNP filed before the RTC of
Makati a complaint against petitioners praying that
they be ordered to pay (1) US$1,544,984.40 plus
accrued interest and other related charges thereon
subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid and (2)
an amount equivalent to 5% of all sums due from
petitioners as attorneys fees. Petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that BNP failed to
pay the correct docket fees to thus prevent the trial
court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.
The RTC denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss
saying that the docket fees were properly paid.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration being denied,
they brought the case on certiorari and mandamus to
the CA. The CA likewise denied petitioners argument
citing Ng Soon vs. Alday and Tacay vs. RTC of Tagum,
Davao del Norte wherein the Supreme Court explicitly
ruled that where the action is purely for recovery of
money or damages, the docket fees are assessed on
the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive
only of interests and costs. Their motion for
reconsideration to the CA having been denied,
petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari
before the SC arguing that BNP failed to pay the
correct docket fees as Administrative Circular No. 1194 provides that in the assessment thereof, interest
claimed should be included.

1. WON interests are included in the proper

computation of the correct docket fees.
2. WON the case should be dismissed for failure of
BNP to pay the correct docket fees.

ISSUES:

FACTS:

RULINGS:
1. YES.
When the complaint in this case was filed in 1998,
Rule 141 had been amended by Administrative
Circular No. 11-94. Thus, the clerk of court should
have assessed the filing fee by taking into
consideration the total sum claimed, inclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees,
litigation expenses, and costs, or the stated value of
the property in litigation. In the case at bar,
respondent did not pay the filing fee corresponding to
its claim for interest from August 16, 1998 until the
filing of the complaint on September 7, 1998.
2. NO.
While the payment of the prescribed docket fee is
a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at
the time of filing does not automatically cause the
dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period,
more so when the party involved demonstrates a
willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such
payment. In the case at bar, respondent merely relied
on the assessment made by the clerk of court which
turned out to be incorrect.
Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has
the responsibility of reassessing what respondent
must pay within the prescriptive period, failing which
the complaint merits dismissal. With respect to the
interest accruing after the filing of the complaint, the
same can only be determined after a final judgment
has been handed down. Respondent cannot thus be
made to pay the corresponding docket fee therefor.
Pursuant, however, to Section 2, Rule 141, as
amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94,
respondent should be made to pay additional fees
which shall constitute a lien in the event the trial
court adjudges that it is entitled to interest accruing
after the filing of the complaint.
6. RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. HON. PABLO C.
FORMARAN III, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court Branch 21, Naga

21
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RULES 1 to 5

Petitioner obtained a loan from respondents

Romeo Y. Tan (Tan) and Roberto L. Obiedo (Obiedo),
which was secured by real estate mortgages over five
parcels of land, all located in Triangulo, Naga City.
When petitioner was unable to pay the loan, Tan
and Obiedo granted petitioner until 31 December
2005 to settle its indebtedness.
They further executed a Memorandum of
Agreement wherein petitioner was made to execute
Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents Tan
and Obiedo, covering the same parcels of land.
In the event that petitioner is unable to redeem
the parcels of land within the period agreed upon,
respondents Tan and Obiedo could already present
the Deeds of Absolute Sale covering the same to the
Office of the Register of Deeds.
Without payment having been made by petitioner
on 31 December 2005, respondents Tan and Obiedo
presented the Deeds of Absolute Sale before the
Register of Deeds of Naga City, as a result of which,
they were able to secure TCTs over the five parcels of
land in their names.
On 16 March 2006, petitioner filed before the
RTC a Complaint for declaration of nullity of deeds of
sales and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.
The Clerk of Court initially considered Civil Case
No. 2006-0030 as an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation and computed the docket and other legal
fees due thereon according to Section 7(b)(1), Rule
141 of the Rules of Court.
Thereafter, respondent Tan filed before the RTC
an Omnibus Motion in which he contended that the
case involved real properties, the docket fees for
which should be computed in accordance with Section
7(a), not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC which took
effect on 16 August 2004. The RTC issued an Order
holding that both petitioner and respondent Tan must
pay docket fees in accordance with Section 7(a), Rule
141 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner moved for the partial reconsideration
of the said Order arguing that the case was principally
for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale and,
as such, incapable of pecuniary estimation. This was
denied by the RTC.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari with
the Court of Appeals arguing that the RTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, when it ordered that the docket/filing
fees for Civil Case No. 2006-0030, an action for
annulment of deeds of sale, be assessed under

Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as

amended.
The CA affirmed the RTC order. Hence, without
seeking reconsideration with the Court of Appeals,
petitioner filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari
before the SC.
ISSUE:
WON a case for annulment of the Deeds of
Absolute Sale is an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the docket fees for which should be
computed in accordance with Section 7(b)(1), of Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
RULING:
No. Petitioners allegations and reliefs sought in
his Complaint appears to be ultimately a real action,
involving the recovery by petitioner of its title to and
possession of the five parcels of land from
respondents Tan and Obiedo. Hence, the docket fees
for which must be computed in accordance with
Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. The docket fees under Section 7(a), Rule
141, in cases involving real property depend on the
fair market value of the same: the higher the value of
the real property, the higher the docket fees due. In
contrast, Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 imposes a fixed or
flat rate of docket fees on actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, the Court explicitly pronounced that [t]he
court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fee. Hence, the
payment of docket fees is not only mandatory, but
also jurisdictional.
In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,
the Court laid down guidelines for the
implementation of its previous pronouncement in
Manchester under particular circumstances, to wit:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is
not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive
counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until
22
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RULES 1 to 5

and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid.

The court may also allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over
a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment.
It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court
or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fee.

of the Rules of Court, but failed to pay the required

filing fees and to attach to the petition copies of the
material portions of the record. The CA responded by
dismissing the petition for procedural lapses.
Nevertheless, Cobarrubias filed a motion for
reconsiderationand attached copies of the material
portions of the record and the postal money orders.
She maintained that the ends of justice and fair
play are better served if the case is decided on its
merits. The CA reinstated the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA is correct in reinstating the
petition despite the failure of Cobarrubias to pay the
appeal docket fees on time.

7. ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY INC. VS. EVANGELINE

COBARRUBIAS

HELD:
Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory
privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in
accordance with the provision set by law.25 Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court provides that appeals from the
judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing
a petition for review within fifteen days from the
receipt of the notice of judgment.Upon the filing of
the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of
court the docketing and other lawful fees; noncompliance with the procedural requirements shall be
a sufficient ground for the petitions dismissal. Thus,
payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed
period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It
is an essential requirement, without which, the
decision appealed from would become final and
executory as if no appeal has been filed.
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may
have prejudiced a party's substantive rights; like all
rules, they are required to be followed. However,
there are recognized exceptions to their strict
observance, such as:
(1) Most persuasive and weighty reasons;
(2) To relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with
the prescribed procedure;
(3) Good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable time
from the time of the default;
(4) The existence of special or compelling
circumstances;
(5) The merits of the case;
(6) A cause not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules;

DOCKET FEES; APPEALS;PERFECTION; NON-PAYMENT

-EFFECTS
FACTS:
Cobarrubias is an associate professor of the
petitioner and an active member of the union of
faculty and employees. The Collective Bargaining
Agreements contained the following provision that for
teaching employees in college who fail the yearly
evaluation, who are retained for three cumulative
years in five years, shall be on forced leave for one
regular semester during which period all benefits due
them shall be suspended. Petitioner placed
Cobarrubias on forced leave for failing to achieve the
required rating points (85, 77, and 72.9, below the
required rating of 87).
To reverse the imposed forced leave, Cobarrubias
sought recourse from the CBAs grievance machinery
but the parties failed to settle their dispute.
Cobarruubias filed a case for illegal forced leave or
illegal suspension with DOLE but circulation and
mediation again failed.
Cobarrubias argued that the CA already resolved
the forced leave issue in a prior case between the
parties, CA-G.R. SP No. 90596,8 ruling that the forced
leave for teachers who fail their evaluation for three
(3) times within a five-year period should be
coterminous with the CBA in force during the same
five-year period. On the other hand, Petitioner argued
that said CA decision is not yet final for there is still a
pending appeal.
The VA dismissed the complaint, then Cobarrubias
filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43
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RULES 1 to 5

(7) A lack of any showing that the review sought

is merely frivolous and dilatory;
(8) The other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby;
(9) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence without the appellant's fault;
(10)Peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances
attendant to each case;
(11)In the name of substantial justice and fair
play;
(12)Importance of the issues involved; and
(13)Exercise of sound discretion by the judge,
guided by all the attendant circumstances.
Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the
party invoking liberality, to advance a reasonable or
meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply
with the rules, in this case, no explanation has been
given.

A real party in interest is one who stands "to be

benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit."In
this case, petitioner would not be affected by any
judgment in Special Proceedings M-3630.
If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she
cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable
party is one without whom there can be no final
determination of an action.19 Petitioner's
participation in Special Proceedings M-36-30 is not
indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a
judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an
accounting of his conjugal partnership with
respondent, and give support to respondent and their
children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez' conjugal
partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J.
Lopez' share in property co-owned by him and
petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly valid
and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.
Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special
Proceedings M-3630. A necessary party as one who is
not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party
if complete relief is to be accorded those already
parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action. In the
context of her petition in the lower court, respondent
would be accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez
were ordered to account for his alleged conjugal
partnership property with respondent, give support to
respondent and her children, turn over his share in
the co-ownership with petitioner and dissolve his
conjugal partnership or absolute community property
with respondent.

8. Relucio vs. Lopez

G.R. No. 138497
January 16, 2002
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; NECESSARY PARTY;
FACTS:
Angelina Meija Lopez filed a petition for
Appointment as Sole Administratix of Conjugal
Partnership of Properties, Forfeiture, etc. against her
husband Alberto Lopez and Imelda Relucio, for
Alberto abandoned Angelina and her four children
and maintained an illicit relationship with Relucio.
A motion to dismiss was filed by Relucio on the
ground that Angelina Lopez has no cause of action
against her. The judge of the RTC denied her Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that some of the properties
are registered in her name. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by Relucio but the same was
denied by the RTC. Relucio then filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA which denied the same.
Hence the appeal to the Supreme Court.

9. De Castro vs. CA
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; AGENCY
FACTS:
Petitioners De Castro were co-owners of four (4)
lots located at EDSA corner New York and Denver
Streets in Cubao, Quezon City.

ISSUE:

In a letter, Francisco Antigo was authorized by the

De Castros to act as real estate broker in the sale of
these properties for the amount of P23,000,000.00,
five percent (5%) of which will be given to him as
commission.

Whether Relucio is an indispensable party or only

a necessary party.
HELD: Neither.

Antigo found Times Transit Corporation,

represented by its president Mr. Rondaris, as a
24
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RULES 1 to 5

prospective buyer which desired to buy two (2) lots

only, specifically lots 14 and 15. Eventually, the sale of
lots 14 and 15 was consummated.

Castros theory that the other co-owners should be

impleaded as indispensable parties. When the law
expressly provides for solidarity of the obligation, as in
the liability of co-principals in a contract of agency,
each obligor may be compelled to pay the entire
obligation. The agent may recover the whole
compensation from any one of the co-principals, as in
this case.

Antigo however received only P48,893.76 as

commission. He asserted that his total commission
should be P352,500.00 which is five percent (5%) of
the agreed price of P7,050,000.00 paid by Times
Transit Corporation to the De Castro for the two (2)
lots.

10. Orquiola vs CA
Francisco Artigo then sued petitioners Constante
A. De Castro and Corazon A. De Castro to collect the
unpaid balance of his brokers commission from the
De Castros. One of the defenses advanced by the De
Castro is that complaint failed to implead their other
siblings who were co-owners as well.

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; FAILURE TO IMPLEADEFFECTS

FACTS:
Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of
Lot 689, covered by TCT Nos. 111267 and 111266.
This parcel of land was adjacent to certain portions of
Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates, namely, Lot 707-A and
707-B, registered in the name of Herminigilda Pedro
under TCT Nos. 16951 and 16952, respectively.

ISSUE:
Whether the complaint should be dismissed.
HELD:
No. An indispensable party is one whose interest
will be affected by the courts action in the litigation,
and without whom no final determination of the case
can be had.The joinder of indispensable parties is
mandatory and courts cannot proceed without their
presence. Whenever it appears to the court in the
course of a proceeding that an indispensable party
has not been joined, it is the duty of the court to stop
the trial and order the inclusion of such party.

Herminigilda Pedro sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to

Mariano Lising who then registered both lots and Lot
707-C in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and
subdivided them into smaller lots.
Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold
to third persons including herein petitioners, spouses
Victor and Honorata Orquiola.
Sometimes in 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed a
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12918, with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against
Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly
encroaching upon Lot 689.

However, the rule on mandatory joinder of

indispensable parties is not applicable to the instant
case. Under the note/letter sent by the De Castro to
Antigo, a contract of agency was clearly constituted
between Constante and Artigo. Whether Constante
appointed Artigo as agent, in Constantes individual or
representative capacity, or both, the De Castros
cannot seek the dismissal of the case for failure to
implead the other co-owners as indispensable parties.

Subsequently, the trial court adjudged defendants

Pedro and Lising jointly and severally liable for
encroaching on plaintiffs land. As a result, the Deputy
Sheriff directed petitioners Orquiola, through an alias
writ of execution, to remove the house they
constructed on the land they were occupying.
However, to prohibit the RTC from issuing a writ of
demolition and the Quezon City sheriff from
implementing the alias writ of execution, petitioners
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and
preliminary injunction.

The De Castros admit that the other co-owners

are solidarily liable under the contract of agency,
citing Article 1915 of the Civil Code, which reads: Art.
1915. If two or more persons have appointed an agent
for a common transaction or undertaking, they shall
be solidarily liable to the agent for all the
consequences of the agency. The solidary liability of
the four co-owners, however, militates against the De
25
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RULES 1 to 5

Petitioners alleged that they bought the subject

parcel of land in good faith and for value, hence, they
were parties in interest. Since they were not
impleaded in the case, the writ of demolition issued in
connection therewith cannot be enforced against
them because to do so would amount to deprivation
of property without due process of law. The CA
dismissed the petition.

by TCT No. S-50195 in the name of Oliver. The bank

approved the application.
On November 17, 1995, Lim and Oliver executed
in favor of Chinabank a promissory note for
P16,650,000, as well as a Real Estate Mortgage on the
property.
The mortgage was duly registered and annotated
on the original title under the custody of the Registry
of Deeds of Makati and on the owners duplicate copy
in the banks possession. The mortgage document
showed Mercedes Olivers address to be No. 95
Malakas Street, Diliman, Quezon City. For brevity, she
is hereafter referred to as Oliver One.

ISSUE:
Whether the alias writ of execution may be
enforced against petitioners.
HELD:
No. As builders in good faith and innocent
purchasers for value, petitioners have rights over the
subject property and hence they are proper parties in
interest in any case thereon. Consequently, private
respondents should have impleaded them in Civil Case
No. Q-12918. Since they failed to do so, petitioners
cannot be reached by the decision in said case.
No man shall be affected by any proceeding to
which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not
bound by any judgment rendered by the court.

On November 18, 1996, respondent claiming that

she is Mercedes M. Oliver with postal office address
at No. 40 J.P. Rizal St., San Pedro, Laguna, filed an
action for annulment of mortgage and cancellation of
title with damages against Chinabank and Register of
Deeds Respondent, whom we shall call as Oliver
Two, claimed that she was the registered and lawful
owner of the land subject of the real estate mortgage.
On January 31, 1997, Chinabank moved to dismiss
the case for lack of cause of action and non-joinder of
an indispensable party, the mortgagor. RTC denied
the Motion to Dismiss. Chinabank filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order to enjoin enforcement of the March
13, 1997 order and further action on the case.

In the same manner, a writ of execution can be

issued only against a party and not against one who
did not have his day in court. Only real parties in
interest in an action are bound by the judgment
therein and by writs of execution and demolition
issued pursuant thereto. In our view, the spouses
Victor and Honorata Orquiola have valid and
meritorious cause to resist the demolition of their
house on their own titled lot, which is tantamount to
a deprivation of property without due process of law.

Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed

decision, finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the trial judge in ruling that the Rules of
Court provided the manner of impleading parties to a
case and in suggesting that petitioner file an
appropriate action to bring the mortgagor within the
courts jurisdiction.

11. China Banking Corp. vs Oliver

FACTS:

The appellate court said that Rule 6, Section 11 of

the Rules of Court allows petitioner to file a thirdparty complaint against the mortgagor. As to the
judgment by default, the Court of Appeals said that an
order denying the motion to dismiss is inter-locutory
and may not be questioned through a special civil
action for certiorari. The defendant must proceed
with the case and raise the issues in his motion to
dismiss when he appeals to a higher court. The Court

In August 1995, Pangan Lim, Jr. and a certain

Mercedes M. Oliver opened a joint account in China
Banking Corp. Lim introduced Oliver to the banks
branch manager as his partner in the rice and palay
trading business.
Thereafter, Lim and Oliver applied for a P17
million loan, offering as collateral a 7,782 square
meter lot located in Tunasan, Muntinlupa and covered
26
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RULES 1 to 5

of Appeals denied petitioners

reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

motion

for
12. Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. vs. Dela Cruz

ISSUE:

INDISPENSIBLE PARTY; NON-JOINDER EFFECTS

Is the mortgagor who goes by the name of

Mercedes M. Oliver, herein called Oliver One, an
indispensable party in Civil Case No. 96219?

FACTS:
Lotte Phils., Inc. (Lotte) is a domestic corporation.
Respondents herein are among those who were hired
and assigned to the confectionery facility operated by
Lotte. On December 14, 1995and yearly thereafter
until the year 20007J Maintenance and Janitorial
Services (7J) entered into a contract with Lotte to
provide manpower for needed maintenance, utility,
janitorial and other services to the latter.

HELD:
An indispensable party is a party in interest,
without whom no final determination can be had of
an action. It is true that mortgagor Oliver One is a
party in interest, for she will be affected by the
outcome of the case. She stands to be benefited in
case the mortgage is declared valid, or injured in case
her title is declared fake.

In compliance with the terms and conditions of

the service contract, and to accommodate the needs
of Lotte for personnel/workers to do and perform
piece works, respondents (Dela Cruz at. Al) among
others, were hired and assigned to private respondent
as repackers or sealers.

However, mortgagor Oliver Ones absence from

the case does not hamper the trial court in resolving
the dispute between respondent Oliver Two and
petitioner.

However, either in October, 1999 or on February

9, 2000, private respondent dispensed with their
services allegedly due to the expiration/termination of
the service contract by respondent with 7J. They were
either told hwag muna kayong pumasok at
tatawagan na lang kung may gawa; or were asked to
wait pag magrereport sila sa trabaho.
Unfortunately, petitioners were never called back
to work again. Aggrieved, petitioners lodged a labor
complaint against both private respondent Lotte and
7J, for illegal dismissal, regularization, payment of
corresponding backwages and related employment
benefits, 13th month pay, service incentive leave,
moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees
based on total judgment award.

A party is not indispensable to the suit if his

interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct
and divisible from the interest of the other parties.
In this case, Chinabank has interest in the loan
which, however, is distinct and divisible from the
mortgagors interest, which involves the land used as
collateral for the loan.
Further, a declaration of the mortgages nullity in
this case will not necessarily prejudice mortgagor
Oliver One. The bank still needs to initiate
proceedings to go after the mortgagor, who in turn
can raise other defenses pertinent to the two of them.
A party is also not indispensable if his presence
would merely permit complete relief between him
and those already parties to the action, or will simply
avoid multiple litigation, as in the case of Chinabank
and mortgagor Oliver One. Non-joinder of parties is
not a ground for dismissal of an action. since
mortgagor Oliver One is not an indispensable party,
Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which requires compulsory joinder of indispensable
parties in a case, does not apply. Instead, it is Section
11, Rule 3, that applies. Non-joinder of parties is not a
ground for dismissal of an action.

On February 28, 2001, Labor Arbiter rendered

judgment declaring 7J as employer of respondents.
The arbiter also found 7J guilty of illegal dismissal and
ordered to reinstate respondents,8 pay P2,374,710.00
as backwages, P713,648.00 as 13th month pay and
P117,000.00 as service incentive leave pay.
Respondents appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) praying that Lotte be
declared as their direct employer because 7J is merely
a labor-only contractor.

27
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RULES 1 to 5

In its decision dated April 24, 2002, the NLRC

found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the
labor arbiter and affirmed its ruling that 7J is the
employer of respondents and solely liable for their
claims.

to implead an indispensable party despite the order of

the court, the latter may dismiss the
complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure
to comply therefor.
13. OMINGO CARABEO vs. SPOUSES NORBERTO
and SUSAN DINGCO
G.R. No. 190823. April 4, 2011

Respondents motion for reconsideration was

denied by the NLRC in a resolution dated June 18,
2002. Undaunted, they filed a petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals11 against the NLRC and Lotte,
insisting that their employer is Lotte and not 7J. Lotte,
however, denied that respondents were its
employees. It prayed that the petition be dismissed
for failure to implead 7J who is a party interested in
sustaining the proceedings in court, pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.

DEATH OF PARTY - EFFECTS

FACTS:
On July 10, 1990, petitioner) entered into a
contract denominated as "Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng
Karapatan sa Lupa" with Spouses Norberto and Susan
Dingco (respondents) whereby petitioner agreed to
sell his rights over a 648 square meter parcel of
unregistered land situated in Purok III, Tugatog, Orani,
Bataan to respondents for P38,000.

ISSUE:
WON 7J is an indispensable party and should have
been impleaded in respondents petition in the Court
of Appeals?

Sometime in 1994, respondents learned that the

alleged problem over the land had been settled and
that petitioner had caused its registration in his name
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 161806. They
thereupon offered to pay the balance but petitioner
declined, drawing them to file a complaint before the
Katarungan Pambarangay. No settlement was
reached, however, hence, respondent filed a
complaint for specific performance before the RTC of
Balanga, Bataan.

HELD:
An indispensable party is a party in interest
without whom no final determination can be had of
an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs
or defendants.
The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory.
The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to
vest the court with jurisdiction, which is the
authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to
act in a case. Thus, without the presence of
indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding,
judgment of a court cannot attain real finality.

After the case was submitted for decision or on

January 31, 2001, petitioner passed away. The records
do not show that petitioners counsel informed
Branch 1 of the Bataan RTC, where the complaint was
lodged, of his death and that proper substitution was
effected in accordance with Section 16, Rule 3, Rules
of Court. Petitioners counsel filed a Notice of Appeal
with the CA but the latter affirmed the RTC Decision.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been
denied, the present petition for review was filed by
Antonio Carabeo, petitioners son.

The absence of an indispensable party renders all

subsequent actions of the court null and void for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties
but even as to those present. In the case at bar, 7J is
an indispensable party. It is a party in interest because
it will be affected by the outcome of the case.
In Domingo v. Scheer, we held that the nonjoinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action and the remedy is to implead
the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties
may be added by order of the court on motion of the
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner refuses

ISSUE: WON petitioners death rendered

respondents complaint against him dismissible.
RULING: NO. The question as to whether an
action survives or not depends on the nature of the
action and the damage sued for. In the causes of
action which survive, the wrong complained affects
primarily and principally property and property rights,
28
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RULES 1 to 5

the injuries to the person being merely incidental,

while in the causes of action which do not survive, the
injury complained of is to the person, the property
and rights of property affected being incidental. In the
present case, respondents are pursuing a property
right arising from the kasunduan, whereas petitioner
is invoking nullity of the kasunduan to protect his
proprietary interest. Assuming arguendo, however,
that the kasunduan is deemed void, there is a
corollary obligation of petitioner to return the money
paid by respondents, and since the action involves
property rights, it survives.

respondent had validly exercised his right to

repurchase the land.
the CA denied reconsideration and ordered a
substitution by legal representatives, in view of
respondents death on December 24, 1988. Hence, this
Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court lost jurisdiction over the
case upon the death of Pedro Joaquin?
HELD:
Petitioners assert that the RTCs Decision was
invalid for lack of jurisdiction. They claim that
respondent died during the pendency of the case.
There being no substitution by the heirs, the trial
court allegedly lacked jurisdiction over the litigation.

14. Spouses JULITA DE LA CRUZ and FELIPE DE LA

CRUZ, petitioners, vs. PEDRO JOAQUIN, respondent.
[G.R. No. 162788. July 28, 2005]
DEATH OF PARTY; SUBSTITUTION

Rule on Substitution
FACTS:
When a party to a pending action dies and the
claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a
substitution of the deceased. The procedure is
specifically governed by Section 16 of Rule 3, which
reads thus:
Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel.
Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty
of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30)
days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give
the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this
duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from
notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel
for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall
fail to appear within the specified period, the court
may order the opposing party, within a specified time,
to procure the appointment of an executor or
administrator for the estate of the deceased, and the
latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of
the deceased. The court charges in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may
be recovered as costs.

The case originated from a Complaint for the

recovery of possession and ownership, the
cancellation of title, and damages, filed by Pedro
Joaquin against spouses Dela Cruz. alleged that he had
obtained a loan(9,000.00) from them on June 29,
1974, payable after five (5) years; To secure the
payment of the obligation, he supposedly executed a
Deed of Sale in favor of petitioners. The parties also
executed another document entitled Kasunduan.
Respondent claimed that the Kasunduan showed
the Deed of Sale to be actually an equitable mortgage.
Spouses De la Cruz contended that this document was
merely an accommodation to allow the repurchase of
the property until June 29, 1979, a right that he failed
to exercise.
On April 23, 1990, the RTC issued a Decision in his
favor. The trial court declared that the parties had
entered into a sale with a right of repurchase. It
further held that respondent had made a valid tender
of payment on two separate occasions to exercise his
right of repurchase. Accordingly, petitioners were
required to reconvey the property upon his payment.
The CA noted that petitioners had given
respondent the right to repurchase the property
within five (5) years from the date of the sale or until
June 29, 1979. Accordingly, the parties executed the
Kasunduan to express the terms and conditions of
their actual agreement. The appellate court also
found no reason to overturn the finding that

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alleging party must prove that there was an

undeniable violation of due process.

The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted

to protect every partys right to due process. The
estate of the deceased party will continue to be
properly represented in the suit through the duly
appointed legal representative. Moreover, no
adjudication can be made against the successor of the
deceased if the fundamental right to a day in court is
denied.

Substitution in
the Instant Case
The records of the present case contain a Motion
for Substitution of Party Plaintiff dated February 15,
2002, filed before the CA.

The Court has nullified not only trial proceedings

conducted without the appearance of the legal
representatives of the deceased, but also the resulting
judgments. In those instances, the courts acquired no
jurisdiction over the persons of the legal
representatives or the heirs upon whom no judgment
was binding.

Evidently, the heirs of Pedro Joaquin voluntary

appeared and participated in the case. We stress that
the appellate court had ordered his legal
representatives to appear and substitute for him. The
substitution even on appeal had been ordered
correctly. In all proceedings, the legal representatives
must appear to protect the interests of the deceased.
After the rendition of judgment, further proceedings
may be held, such as a motion for reconsideration or a
new trial, an appeal, or an execution.
Considering the foregoing circumstances, the
Motion for Substitution may be deemed to have been
granted; and the heirs, to have substituted for the
deceased, Pedro Joaquin. There being no violation of
due process, the issue of substitution cannot be
upheld as a ground to nullify the trial courts Decision.

This general rule notwithstanding, a formal

substitution by heirs is not necessary when they
themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case,
and present evidence in defense of the deceased.
These actions negate any claim that the right to due
process was violated.
The Court is not unaware of Chittick v. Court of
Appeals, in which the failure of the heirs to substitute
for the original plaintiff upon her death led to the
nullification of the trial courts Decision. The latter
had sought to recover support in arrears and her
share in the conjugal partnership. The children who
allegedly substituted for her refused to continue the
case against their father and vehemently objected to
their inclusion as parties. Moreover, because he died
during the pendency of the case, they were bound to
substitute for the defendant also. The substitution
effectively merged the persons of the plaintiff and the
defendant and thus extinguished the obligation being
sued upon.
Clearly, the present case is not similar, much less
identical, to the factual milieu of Chittick.

15. Navarro vs. Escobido

G.R. No. 153788
November 27, 2009
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; JURIDICAL PERSONS;
CO-OWERNSHIP; SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP
FACTS:
A motor vehicle was leased by Navarro from
defendant as evidenced by a lease agreement with
option to purchase between Navarro and KARGO
Enterprises represented by its manager Glenn Go.
Navarro then delivered six post-dated checks. The
5th and the 6th checks were dishonored by the bank
for insufficiency of funds. Karen Go, married to Glenn
Go, filed a complaint before the RTC for Replevin
and/or sum of money with damages against Navarro.

Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by

heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement
of due process. Thus, when due process is not
violated, as when the right of the representative or
heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or
belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot
affect the validity of a promulgated decision. Mere
failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a
sufficient ground to nullify a trial courts decision. The

In Navarros answer, he alleged as a special

affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no
cause of action, since Karen Go was not aparty to the
lease agreement with option to purchase.
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The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole

proprietorship as a form of business organization
conducted for profit by a single individual, and
requires the proprietor or owner thereof to secure
licenses and permits, register the business name, and
pay taxes to the national government. It does not vest
juridical or legal personality upon the sole
proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an
action in court.
Thus, the complaint in the court below should
have been filed in the name of the owner of Juasing
Hardware. The allegation in the body of the complaint
would show that the suit is brought by such person as
proprietor or owner of the business conducted under
the name and style Juasing Hardware. The descriptive
words "doing business as Juasing Hardware" may be
added to the title of the case, as is customarily done

RTC dismissed the case for the complaints did not

state a cause of action.
Karen Go filed a motion for reconsideration and
the RTC issued another order of setting aside the
order of dismissal, acting in presumption that Glenn
Gos leasing business is a conjugal property.
The RTC held that Karen Go should have included
Glenn Go in the Complain (Section 4, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court), then ordered Karen Go to file a
motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff.
RTC denied the motion for reconsideration of
Navarro, hence the latter filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA contended that the RTC committed a
grave abuse of discretion when it reconsidered the
dismissal of the case and directed Karen Go to amend
her complaints by including Glenn Go as co-plaintiff.

As to Karen Go, whether she is a real party in

interest:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest
is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law
or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.

The CA denied Navarros petition and affirmed the

RTCs order.
ISSUES:
1. Whether KARGO Enterprises can be a party to
an action (Sole Proprietorship)
2. Whether Karen Go is the real party in
interest.
HELD:
As to Whether KARGO Enterprises can be a party
to an action (Sole Proprietorship):
As Navarro correctly points out, Kargo Enterprises
is a sole proprietorship, which is neither a natural
person, nor a juridical person, as defined by Article 44
of the Civil Code:

As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises,

Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or
be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary
to Navarros contention, Karen Go is the real party-ininterest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her
Complaint does not state a cause of action because
her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that
her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises
Whether Glenn Go can legally sign the Lease
Agreement in his capacity as a manager of Kargo
Enterprises, a sole proprietorship, is a question we do
not decide, as this is a matter for the trial court to
consider in a trial on the merits.

Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities
for public interest or purpose, created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been
constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations
for private interest or purpose to which the law grants
a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that
of each shareholder, partner or member.
Thus, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules,
Kargo Enterprises cannot be a party to a civil action.

Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of

Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered under
this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek
possession of these properties.
Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the
co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the coowned property, is an indispensable party thereto.
The other co-owners are not indispensable parties.
They are not even necessary parties, for a complete

In Juasing Hardware vs. Mendoza the SC HELD:

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relief can be accorded in the suit even without their

participation, since the suit is presumed to have been
filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
We hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an
indispensable party in the action to recover
possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be
impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit, based on
Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules.

Klaus filed with PPI, the subsidiary corporation of

Pacific Consultants, several money claims, including
unpaid salary, leave pay, air fare from Manila to
Canada, and cost of shipment of goods to Canada. PPI
partially settled some of his claims (US$5,635.99), but
refused to pay the rest. Klaus then filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal against Pacific Consultants. The
Pacific Consultants moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that the venue should be the Court of
Arbitration of London pursuant to section 21 of the of
the General Conditions of Employment.

16. PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA,

INC VS KLAUS SCHONFELD
VENUE; STIPULATIONS; RESTRICTIVE/EXCLUSIVE
or GENERAL/PERMISSIVE

ISSUE:
Whether the Pacific Consultants in correct?

FACTS:
HELD:
Pacific Consultants International of Japan decided
to engage in consultancy services for water and
sanitation in the Philippines.
Jens Peter Henrichsen, who was the director of
Pacific Consultants International, transmitted a letter
of employment to respondent Klaus K. Schonfeld in
Canada, requesting him to accept the same and affix
his conformity thereto. Respondent made some
revisions in the letter of employment and signed the
contract. He then sent a copy to Henrichsen.
Section 21 of the General Conditions of
Employment appended to the letter of employment
reads:
Any question of interpretation, understanding or
fulfillment of the conditions of employment, as well as
any question arising between the Employee and the
Company which is in consequence of or connected
with his employment with the Company and which
cannot be settled amicably, is to be finally settled,
binding to both parties through written submissions,
by the Court of Arbitration in London.
Klaus Schonfeld was assigned as sector manager
in the Philippines. Later on, Henrichsen informed
Klaus through a letter on May 5, 1999, that his
employment had been terminated effective August 4,
1999 for the reason that Pacific Consultants
International had not been successful in the water
and sanitation sector in the Philippines.
However, on July 24, 1999, Henrichsen, by
electronic mail, requested Klaus to stay put in his job
after August 5, 1999, until such time that he would be
able to report on certain projects and discuss all the
opportunities he had developed.
Respondent continued his work with until the end
of business hours on October 1, 1999. Thereafter

No. The settled rule on stipulations regarding

venue, as held by this Court in the vintage case of
Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, is that
while they are considered valid and enforceable,
venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule,
supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words. They should be considered merely
as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting
venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive
but, rather permissive. If the intention of the parties
were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying
language clearly and categorically expressing their
purpose and design that actions between them be
litigated only at the place named by them. In the
instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely,"
"exclusively in this court," "in no other court save ,"
"particularly," "nowhere else but/except ," or words
of equal import were stated in the contract. It cannot
be said that the court of arbitration in London is an
exclusive venue to bring forth any complaint arising
out of the employment contract.
17. Biaco vs. Countryside Rural Bank
FACTS:
Biaco vs Countryside Rural Bank Ernesto Biaco is
the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco.
Ernesto obtained several loans from the respondent
bank as evidenced by promissory notes.
As security for the payment of the said loans,
Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in favor of
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the bank covering the parcel of land described in

Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-14423. The
real estate mortgages bore the signatures of the
spouses Biaco.

court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Noting that

the spouses Biaco were not opposing parties in the
case, the Court of Appeals further ruled that the fraud
committed by one against the other cannot be
considered extrinsic fraud.

When Ernesto failed to settle the abovementioned loans on its due date, respondent bank
through counsel sent him a written demand . The
written demand, however, proved futile prompting
respondent bank to file a complaint for foreclosure of
mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa
Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons
was served to the spouses Biaco through Ernesto at
his office. Ernesto received the summons but for
unknown reasons, he failed to file an answer. Hence,
the spouses Biaco were declared in default upon
motion of the respondent bank. The respondent bank
was allowed to present its evidence ex parte before
the Branch Clerk of Court who was then appointed by
the court as Commissioner.

ISSUE:
WON CA erred in ruling that there was no fraud
perpetrated by respondent upon her thereby violating
her right to due process?
HELD:
The appellate court acted well in ruling that there
was no fraud perpetrated by respondent bank upon
petitioner, noting that the spouses Biaco were codefendants in the case and shared the same interest.
Whatever fact or circumstance concealed by the
husband from the wife cannot be attributed to
respondent bank.

RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent. In

case of non-payment within the period, the Sheriff of
this Court is ordered to sell at public auction the
mortgaged Lot, a parcel of registered land to satisfy
the mortgage debt, and the surplus if there be any
should be delivered to the defendants spouses
ERNESTO and MA. THERESA [CHAVES] BIACO.
In the event however[,] that the proceeds of
auction sale of the mortgage[d] property is
enough to pay the outstanding obligation,
defendants are ordered to pay any deficiency of
judgment as their personal liability.

An action in personam is an action against a

person on the basis of his personal liability. An action
in rem is an action against the thing itself instead of
against the person. An action quasi in rem is one
wherein an individual is named as defendant and the
purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest
therein to the obligation or lien burdening the
property.

the
not
the
the

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the

person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem
or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction
on the court provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is
acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution
of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court
is recognized and made effective. In a proceeding in
rem or quasi in rem, the only relief that may be
granted by the court against a defendant over whose
person it has not acquired jurisdiction either by valid
service of summons or by voluntary submission to its
jurisdiction, is limited to the res.

Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional

Trial Court decision contending that extrinsic fraud
prevented her from participating in the judicial
foreclosure proceedings. According to her, she came
to know about the judgment in the case only after the
lapse of more than six (6) months after its finality. .
She moreover asserted that the trial court failed to
acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on
her through her husband without any explanation as
to why personal service could not be made. Petitioner
further argues that the deficiency judgment is a
personal judgment which should be deemed void for
lack of jurisdiction over her person.

Similarly, in this case, while the trial court

acquired jurisdiction over the res, its jurisdiction is
limited to a rendition of judgment on the res. It
cannot extend its jurisdiction beyond the res and issue

CA ruled that judicial foreclosure proceedings are

actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not essential as long as the
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a judgment enforcing petitioners personal liability. In

doing so without first having acquired jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner, as it did, the trial court
violated her constitutional right to due process,
warranting the annulment of the judgment rendered
in the case.

pursuing the complaint against Salak and respondent.

Respondent and petitioner also executed a

separate deed of sale with right to repurchase, and
the event if respondent fails to repurchase the
property within 30 days from the date of the deed,
she and her assigns shall immediately vacate the
premises and deliver its possession to petitioner
without need of a judicial order and respondent's
refusal to do so will entitle petitioner to take
immediate possession of the property.
However, the Respondent failed to repurchase
the property within the stipulated period. As a result,
petitioner filed, on June 5, 1998, a complaint for
specific performance or recovery of possession, for
sum of money, for consolidation of ownership and
damages against respondent and other unnamed
persons before the RTC of Olongapo City.

18.
BAUTISTA vs. UNANGST
G.R. No. 173002
July 4, 2008
DOCKET FEES; FAILURE TO PAY; INCORRECT
ASSESSMENT
FACTS:
On November 15, 1996, Hamilton Salak rented a
car from GAB Rent-A-Car, a car rental shop owned by
petitioner Benjamin Bautista. The lease was for three
(3) consecutive days at a rental fee of P1,000.00 per
day. However, Salak failed to return the car after
three (3) days prompting petitioner to file a complaint
against him for estafa, violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 and carnapping.

On July 29, 2004, after due proceedings, the RTC

rendered a decision in favor of petitioner and ordered
that the defendants to vacate from the place and turn
over its possession to the plaintiff.

On February 2, 1997, Salak and his common-law

wife, respondent Shirley G. Unangst, were arrested by
officers of the Criminal Investigation Service Group
(CISG) of the Philippine National Police while riding
the rented car along Quezon City. The next day,
petitioner demanded from Salak at the CISG Office the
sum of P232,372.00 as payment for car rental fees,
fees incurred in locating the car, attorney's fees,
capital gains tax, transfer tax, and other incidental
expenses.

Respondents failed to interpose a timely appeal.

However, on September 10, 2004, respondent
Unangst filed a petition for relief pursuant to Section
38 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. She argued
that she learned of the decision of the RTC only on
September 6, 2004 when she received a copy of the
motion for execution filed by petitioner.
Petitioner, on the other hand, moved for the
dismissal of respondent's petition on the ground that
the latter paid an insufficient sum of P200.00 as
docket fees.

Salak and respondent expressed willingness to

pay but since they were then short on cash, Salak
proposed to sell to petitioner a house and lot titled in
the name of respondent. Petitioner welcomed the
proposal after consulting his wife, Cynthia. Cynthia, on
the other hand, further agreed to pay the mortgage
loan of respondent over the subject property to a
certain Jojo Lee in the amount of P295,000.00 as the
property was then set to be publicly auctioned on
February 17, 1997..

It appears that respondent Unangst initially paid

P200.00 as docket fees as this was the amount
assessed by the Clerk of Court of the RTC. Said
amount was insufficient as the proper filing fees
amount to P1,715.00. Nevertheless, the correct
amount was subsequently paid by said respondent on
February 22, 2005.
In their comment, respondents countered that
they should not be faulted for paying deficient docket
fees as it was due to an erroneous assessment of the
Clerk of Court.

To formalize their amicable settlement, Cynthia,

Salak and respondent executed a written agreement.
They stipulated that respondent would sell, subject to
repurchase, her residential property in favor of
Cynthia and Cynthia also agreed to desist from

The RTC granted the petition for relief.

Subsequently, it directed respondents to file a notice
of appeal within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt
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of the order. Accordingly, on February 23, 2005,

respondents filed their notice of appeal.

No. The failure of the respondents to pay the

correct amount of docket fees was due to a justifiable
reason.

Respondents contended before the CA that the

RTC erred among others, that although the petition
for relief of respondents was filed on time, the proper
filing fees for said petition were paid beyond the 60day reglementary period. He posited that jurisdiction
is acquired by the court over the action only upon full
payment of prescribed docket fees.

The right to appeal is a purely statutory right. Not

being a natural right or a part of due process, the right
to appeal may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the rules provided therefor. For this
reason, payment of the full amount of the appellate
court docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional.
Nevertheless, as this Court ruled in Aranas v. Endona,
the strict application of the jurisdictional nature of the
above rule on payment of appellate docket fees may
be mitigated under exceptional circumstances to
better serve the interest of justice. It is always within
the power of this Court to suspend its own rules, or to
except a particular case from their operation,
whenever the purposes of justice require it.

CA rendered decision in favor of the respondents

Unangast and rationed Appellee recognizes the timely
filing of appellants' petition for relief to be able to
appeal judgment but nonetheless points out that the
proper filing fees were paid beyond the 60-day
reglementary period. Arguing that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the action only upon full payment of
the prescribed docket fees, he submits that the trial
court erred in granting appellants' petition for relief
despite the late payment of the filing fees.

In not a few instances, the Court relaxed the rigid

application of the rules of procedure to afford the
parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases
on the merits. This is in line with the time-honored
principle that cases should be decided only after
giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and
defenses. For, it is far better to dispose of a case on
the merit which is a primordial end, rather than on a
technicality, if it be the case, that may result in
injustice. The emerging trend in the rulings of this
Court is to afford every party-litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of
his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.

Applied in the instant case, the docket fees were

admittedly paid only on February 22, 2005, or a little
less than two (2) months after the period for filing the
petition lapsed. Yet, this matter was sufficiently
explained by appellants. The records bear out that
appellants initially paid P200.00 as docket fees
because this was the amount assessed by the Clerk of
Court of the RTC of Olongapo City (p. 273, Records).
As it turned out, the fees paid was insufficient, the
proper filing fees being P1,715.00, which was
eventually paid by appellants on February 1, 2005 (p.
296, Records). As such, appellants cannot be faulted
for their failure to pay the proper docket fees for,
given the prevailing circumstances, such failure was
clearly not a dilatory tactic nor intended to
circumvent the Rules of Court. On the contrary,
appellants demonstrated their willingness to pay the
docket fees when they subsequently paid on the same
day they were assessed the correct fees.
Hence this appeal.

Technicality and procedural imperfections should

thus not serve as bases of decisions. In that way, the
ends of justice would be better served. For, indeed,
the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending
parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not
to hinder but to promote the administration of
justice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed grave error in
finding that the respondent perfected an appeal even
when the proper docket fees were paid beyond the
period prescribed?
HELD:

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1. ALMA JOSE vs. JAVELLANA et.al

G.R. No. 158239
January 25, 2012
APPEALS; FORUM SHOPPING; FRESH PERIOD RULE
On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma
Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration of P160,000.00
to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional
sale two parcels of land with areas of 3,675 and
20,936 square meters located in Barangay Mallis,
Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that Javellana would
pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and
the balance of P80,000.00 upon the registration of the
parcels of land under the Torrens System (the
registration being undertaken by Margarita within a
reasonable period of time); and that should Margarita
become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact,
Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter,
petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the
payment of the balance and proceed with the
application for registration.
After Margarita died and with Juvenal having
predeceased Margarita without issue, the vendors
undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being
Margaritas sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did
not comply with the undertaking to cause the
registration of the properties under the Torrens
System, and, instead, began to improve the properties
by dumping filling materials therein with the intention
of converting the parcels of land into a residential or
industrial subdivision.
Faced with Priscillas refusal to comply, Javellana
commenced on February 10, 1997 an action for
specific performance, injunction, and damages against
her in the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan
(RTC). Javellana prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling
materials in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla be
ordered to institute registration proceedings and then
to execute a final deed of sale in his favor.

reason to disturb the order of the RTC was not

appealable; that the appeal was not perfected on
time; and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping.
It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed
a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the June 24,
1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his
complaint. The CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari. As to the notice on appeal, the CA reversed
and set aside the RTC decision and remanded the
records to the RTC.
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by Priscilla.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the order of the RTC on June
21, 2000 was not appealable?
2. Whether or not the notice of appeal was
belatedly filed?
3. Whether or not Javellana was guilty of forum
shopping?
HELD:
1. Yes. The denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal was a final
order and appealable. First of all, the denial of
Javellanas motion for reconsideration left nothing
more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a
final order, not an interlocutory one.
The Court has distinguished between final and
interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,
thuswise: The distinction between a final order and an
interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of
the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more
to be done except to enforce by execution what the
court has determined, but the latter does not
completely dispose of the case but leaves something
else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals
with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is
yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to
ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment
leave something to be done in the trial court with
respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order
or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or
interlocutory determines whether appeal is the
correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to
accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect
that "appeal may be taken from a judgment or final
order that completely disposes of the case, or of a

Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the

complaint was already barred by prescription; and
that the complaint did not state a cause of action,
which was initially denied. However, upon her MR
RTC reversed its decision and granted the motion to
dismiss, opining that Javellana had no cause of action
against her due to her not being bound to comply
with the terms of the deed of conditional sale for not
being party thereto.
Javellana moved for reconsideration. The RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any
36
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particular matter therein when declared by these

Rules to be appealable;" but the remedy from an
interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil
action for certiorari.
2. Yes.
The appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes
v. CA
The Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period
rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, by which an
aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse
judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Under the rule, Javellanas notice of appeal filed on
July 19, 2000 was timely filed pursuant to the fresh
period rule.
3. No.
Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant
against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a
favorable opinion in another forum, other than by
appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause or supposition that one
or the other court would make a favorable
disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the
two or more pending cases, there is identity of
parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and
identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis
pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in the other,
there is forum shopping.
For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal
of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties
or at least such as to represent the same interest in
both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts;
and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such
that the judgment which may be rendered in one
would, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the other.
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must
involve the same transaction, same essential facts and
circumstances and must raise identical causes of
action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not
exist where different orders were questioned, two
distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and
two objectives were sought.
In his appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, Javellana
aimed to undo the RTCs erroneous dismissal of Civil
Case No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his judicial

demand for specific performance to be tried and

determined in due course by the RTC; but his petition
for certiorari had the ostensible objective "to prevent
(Priscilla) from developing the subject property and
from proceeding with the ejectment case until his
appeal is finally resolved," as the CA explicitly
determined in its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.
Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the
judicial policy against forum shopping designed to
prevent or to eliminate attendant. The first danger,
i.e., the multiplicity of suits upon one and the same
cause of action, would not materialize considering
that the appeal was a continuity of Civil Case No. 79M-97, whereas C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455 dealt with an
independent ground of alleged grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the RTC. The second danger, i.e., the
unethical malpractice of shopping for a friendly court
or judge to ensure a favorable ruling or judgment
after not getting it in the appeal, would not arise
because the CA had not yet decided C.A.-G.R. CV No.
68259 as of the filing of the petition for certiorari.
2. Medado vs. Heirs of Antonio Consuing
VERIFICATION
FACTS:
Spouses Medado and the estate of the late
Antonio Consing (Estate of Consing), as represented
by Soledad Consing (Soledad), executed Deeds of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage for the former's
acquisition from the latter of the property in Cadiz
City identified as Hacienda Sol. Records indicate that
the sale included the parcels of land covered by OCT
No. P-498, TCT No. T-31275, TCT No. T-31276 and TCT
No.T-31277.
As part of the deal, Spouses Medado undertook to
assume the estate's loan with Philippine National
Bank (PNB).
Subsequent to the sale, however, the Estate of
Consing offered the subject lots to the government
via the Department of Agrarian Reform's Voluntary
Offer to Sell (VOS) program.
On November 22, 2000, the Estate of Consing also
instituted with the RTC, action for recission and
damages against Spouses Medado, PNB and the
Register of Deeds of Cadiz City, due to the alleged
failure of the spouses to meet the conditions in their
agreement.
While the action for rescission was pending, Land
Bank of the Philippines issued in favor of the Estate of
Consing a certificate of deposit of cash and agrarian

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reform bonds, as compensation for the lots covered

by the VOS.
Spouses Medado for feared that LBP would
release the full proceeds thereof to the Estate of
Consing, filed an action for injunction for the issuance
of TRO claiming to be the ones entitled to the
proceeds considering that they had bought the
properties through the Deeds of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage which they and the Estate of Consing had
earlier executed.
RTC granted Spouses Medado's application for the
issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction.
Feeling aggrieved, the heirs of the late Antonio
Consing (Consing) questioned the RTC's order via a
petition for certiorari filed with the CA. They sought,
among other reliefs, the dismissal of the complaint for
injunction for violation of the rules on litis pendentia
and forum shopping.
In their comment on the petition, petitioner
contended that the consolidated verification and
certification against forum shopping of the petition
filed with the CA was defective: first, for being signed
only by Soledad, instead of by all the petitioners, and
second, its jurat cites a mere community tax
certificate of Soledad, instead of a government-issued
identification card required under the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.
The CA granted the heirs petition. Spouses
Medado's MR was denied. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
WON the CA correctly admitted the petition for
certiorari filed before it, notwithstanding alleged
deficiencies in its verification and certification against
forum shopping?
HELD:
The verification requirement is simply intended to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct, and not the product of
the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that
the pleading is filed in good faith. We rule that there
was no deficiency in the petition's verification and
certification against forum shopping filed with the CA.
In any case, we reiterate that where the
petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a
common interest in the property subject of the action,
the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the
verification or certification of forum shopping will not
deter the court from proceeding with the action.
Citing Heirs of Olarte v. Office of the President: The
general rule is that the certificate of non-forum

shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case

and the signature of only one of them is insufficient.
However, the Court has also stressed that the
rules on forum shopping were designed to promote
and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and
thus should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective.
The rule of substantial compliance may be availed
of with respect to the contents of the certification.
This is because the requirement of strict compliance
with the provisions regarding the certification of nonforum shopping merely underscores its mandatory
nature in that the certification cannot be altogether
dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded.
Thus, under justifiable circumstances, the Court
has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such
certification considering that although it is obligatory,
it is not jurisdictional. Verification of a pleading is a
formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement intended to
secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a
pleading are true and correct.
Thus, the court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict
compliance with the rules. It is deemed substantially
complied with when one who has ample knowledge
to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification; and when
matters alleged in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct
Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis
pendentia concur. There is forum shopping when the
elements of litis pendentia are present, i.e., between
actions pending before courts, there exist:
(1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions,
(2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and
(3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is
such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the action under consideration; said
requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for
auter action pendant or lis penden.
3. Commission on Appointments vs. Celso Paler
G.R. No. 172623,
March 3, 2010
FACTS:

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RULES 6 to 9

Respondent Celso M. Paler was a Supervising

Legislative Staff Officer II (SG-24) with the Technical
Support Service of the Commission on Appointments.
Paler requested for vacation leave for 74 working days
(August 1-November 14, 2013). Paler left for the US
without verifying his subsequent application for leave
whether it was denied or approved.
Palers son received a letter from the Commission
Chairman stating that Paler is being dropped from the
roll of employees for his continuous 30-day absence
without leave, this was based on CSC Memorandum
Circular 14 s. 1999. Paler then moved for
reconsideration but was denied for his failure to file
the same within the reglementary period. On appeal,
the Civil Service Commission reversed the decision
and ordered Palers reinstatement. COA filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied by the CSC, hence
the COA filed with the CA a petition for review under
rule 43. CA affirmed the CSCs decision but
nevertheless, set aside the order of reinstatement for
Palers is now in the compulsory retiring age.
Unsatisfied, COA went to the CA arguing that he
CSC should not have entertained Paler's appeal since
it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period,
and the Commissioners decision in dropping paler in
the roll of employees was not deemed approved.
On the other hand, Paler in his comment stated
that theCA did not commit any error in sustaining the
CSC resolutions. He also assails Atty. Arturo L. Tiu's
authority to file the petition and sign the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping on behalf of
the Commission Chairman.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Tiu, as the Commission Secretary
has the authority to file the petition and sign the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping in
behalf of the Commission Chairman
HELD:
The petitioner in this case is the Commission on
Appointments, a government entity created by the
Constitution, and headed by its Chairman.There was
no need for the Chairman himself to sign the
verification.
Its representative, lawyer or any person who
personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in the
petition could sign the verification.
With regard, however, to the certification of nonforum shopping, the established rule is that it must be
executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties
and not by counsel.
In this case, Atty. Tiu failed to show that he was
specifically authorized by the Chairman to sign the

certification of non-forum shopping, much less file the

petition in his behalf. There is nothing on record to
prove such authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to
controvert Palers allegation of his lack of authority.
This renders the petition dismissible.
4. Benguet Exploration Inc. vs. CA
5. ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONARK
EQUIPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 160242.
May 17, 2005
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINTS
FACTS:
Petitioner ACDC eased Caterpillar generator sets
and Amida mobile floodlighting systems from Monark
Equipment Corporation (MEC). For failure, despite
demands, to pay the rentals therefor MEC filed a
Complaint for a sum of money with damages against
petitioner with the RTC of Quezon City.
Petitioner filed a motion to file and admit answer
with third-party complaint against Becthel Overseas
Corporation (Becthel). In its answer, ACDC admitted
its indebtedness to MEC in the amount of
P5,071,335.86. And by way of third-party complaint
against Becthel as third-party defendant, ACDC
alleged that it rendered and complied with its
contracted works with Becthel using MECs rented
equipment. But, Betchel did not pay for the services
of ACDC that resulted to the non-payment of MECs
claim.
MEC opposed the motion of ACDC to file a thirdparty complaint against Becthel on the ground that
the defendant had already admitted its principal
obligation to MEC and the transaction between it and
ACDC, on the one hand, and between ACDC and
Becthel, on the other, were independent transactions.
MEC then filed a motion for summary judgment,
alleging therein that there was no genuine issue as to
the obligation of ACDC to MEC. ACDC opposed the
motion for summary judgment, alleging that there
was a genuine issue with respect to the amount being
claimed by MEC, and that it had a third-party
complaint against Becthel in connection with the
reliefs sought against it which had to be litigated.
The trial court issued a Resolution denying the
motion of ACDC for leave to file a third-party
complaint and granting the motion of MEC, which the

39
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trial court considered as a motion for a judgment on

the pleadings.
ACDC appealed the resolution to the CA but the
CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the assailed
decision. Its motion for reconsideration having been
denied, ACDC filed the present petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the third party complaint is proper.
RULING:
NO. The controversy between MEC and ACDC, on
one hand, and that between ACDC and Becthel, on
the other, is entirely distinct from each other.
The purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of
Court is to permit a defendant to assert an
independent claim against a third-party which he,
otherwise, would assert in another action, thus
preventing multiplicity of suits.
All the rights of the parties concerned would then
be adjudicated in one proceeding. This is a rule of
procedure and does not create a substantial right.
Neither does it abridge, enlarge, or nullify the
substantial rights of any litigant. This right to file a
third-party complaint against a third-party rests in the
discretion of the trial court. The third-party complaint
is actually independent of, separate and distinct from
the plaintiffs complaint, such that were it not for the
rule, it would have to be filed separately from the
original complaint.
A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that
some substantive basis for a third-party claim be
found to exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity,
subrogation, contribution or other substantive right.
The bringing of a third-party defendant is proper if
he would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant
or both for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the
original defendant, although the third-party
defendants liability arises out of another transaction.
The defendant may implead another as thirdparty defendant (a) on an allegation of liability of the
latter to the defendant for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief; (b) on the ground of
direct liability of the third-party defendant to the
plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the third-party
defendant to both the plaintiff and the defendant.
There must be a causal connection between the claim
of the plaintiff in his complaint and a claim for
contribution, indemnity or other relief of the
defendant against the third-party defendant.
In Capayas v. Court of First Instance, the SC made
out the following tests: (1) whether it arises out of the
same transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is
based; or whether the third-party claim, although

arising out of another or different contract or

transaction, is connected with the plaintiffs claim; (2)
whether the third-party defendant would be liable to
the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the
plaintiffs claim against the original defendant,
although the third-party defendants liability arises out
of another transaction; and (3) whether the thirdparty defendant may assert any defenses which the
third-party plaintiff has or may have to the plaintiffs
claim. The third-party complaint does not have to
show with certainty that there will be recovery
against the third-party defendant, and it is sufficient
that pleadings show possibility of recovery.
In determining the sufficiency of the third-party
complaint, the allegations in the original complaint
and the third-party complaint must be examined. A
third-party complaint must allege facts which prima
facie show that the defendant is entitled to
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief
from the third-party defendant.
In this case, the claims of MEC in the RTC, against
ACDC arose out of the contracts of lease and sale;
such transactions are different and separate from
those between Becthel and ACDC as third-party
plaintiff for the construction of the latters project in
Mauban, Quezon, where the equipment leased from
MEC was used by ACDC. Indeed, the controversy
between MEC and ACDC, on one hand, and that
between ACDC and Becthel, on the other, is entirely
distinct from each other. The barefaced fact that
ACDC used the equipment it leased from MEC in
connection with its project with Becthel does not
provide a substantive basis for the filing of a thirdparty complaint against the latter. There is no causal
connection between the claim of MEC for the rental
and the balance of the purchase price of the
equipment and parts sold and leased ACDC, and the
failure of Becthel to pay the balance of its account to
ACDC after the completion of the project in Quezon.
Nonetheless, the denial of the petitioners
motion with leave to file a third-party complaint
against Becthel is without prejudice to its right to file
a separate complaint against the latter.
6. BANCO DE ORO-EPCI, INC. (formerly Equitable PCI
Bank), Petitioner Vs.JOHN TANSIPEK, Respondent
ORDER OF DEFAULT
FACTS:

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RULES 6 to 9

J. O. Construction, Inc. (JOCI), a domestic

corporation engaged in the construction business in
Cebu City, filed a complaint against Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank (BDO) in the RTC of
Makati City for payment of the 4 million check it
allowed to be deposited on John Tansipeks personal
account despite the fact that the checked was crossed
for deposit to payees account only.
PCIB likewise moved for leave for the court to
admit the formers third-party complaint against
respondent Tansipek. Upon Motion, respondent
Tansipek was granted time to file his Answer to the
Third-Party Complaint. He was, however, declared in
default for failure to do so.
Upon being declared in default, respondent
Tansipek filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Default Order.Upon denial thereof, Tansipek filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
which was dismissed for failure to attach the assailed
Orders.
Respondent Tansipeks Motion
for
Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals was denied
for having been filed out of time.
RTC decided in favor of JOCI making PCIB liable to
pay for the amount of check while Tansipek was made
liable to pay PCIB. Tansipek appealed the Decision to
the Court of Appeals. CA held that it was an error for
the trial court to have acted on PCIBs motion to
declare respondent Tansipek in default. The Court of
Appeals thus remanded the case to the RTC and
denied the Motion for Reconsideration of PCIB.
Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc., as successor-in-interest
to PCIB, filed the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in finding that it was an
error for the trial court to have acted on PCIBs motion
to declare Tansipek in default
HELD:
Yes. Respondent Tansipeks remedy against the
Order of Default was erroneous from the very
beginning. Respondent Tansipek should have filed a
Motion to Lift Order of Default, and not a Motion for
Reconsideration, pursuant to Section 3(b), Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court:

order of default may be set aside on such terms and

conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of
justice.

A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from

an ordinary motion in that the Motion should be
verified; and must show fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses.[7] The
allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect, and (2) of meritorious defenses must
concur.[8]
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that
respondent Tansipeks Motion for Reconsideration
may be treated as a Motion to Lift Order of Default,
his Petition for Certiorari on the denial thereof has
already been dismissed with finality by the Court of
Appeals. Respondent Tansipek did not appeal said
ruling of the Court of Appeals to this Court. The
dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari assailing the
denial of respondent Tansipeks Motion constitutes a
bar to the retrial of the same issue of default under
the doctrine of the law of the case.
7. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, et al
DENIALS;
NEGATIVE
PREGNANT;
JUDGMENT; INDISPENSIBLE PARTIES

SUMMARY

FACTS:
On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic,
through the PCGG, represented by the OSG, filed a
petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan
entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E.
Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R.
Marcos.
In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of
the aggregate amount of US$356 deposited in escrow
in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. In addition, the
petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and
US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the
Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well
as income from legitimately acquired property.
On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R.
Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta
and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their answer. Before
the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement
and the Supplemental Agreements were executed by
the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman

(b) Relief from order of default.

A party declared in default may at any time after
notice thereof and before judgment file a motion
under oath to set aside the order of default upon
proper showing that his failure to answer was due to
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and
that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the
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RULES 6 to 9

Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the

assets of the Marcos family.
Subsequently, respondent Marcos children filed a
motion for the approval of said agreements and for
the enforcement thereof. Hearings were conducted
by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the
General/Supplemental Agreements.
On October 18, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for
summary judgment and/or judgment on the
pleadings. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her
opposition thereto which was later adopted by
respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and
Ferdinand, Jr.
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion for
summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings
on the ground that the motion to approve the
compromise agreement "(took) precedence over the
motion for summary judgment." Respondent Mrs.
Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26, 1998
claiming she was not a party to the motion for
approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she
owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10%
belonging to the Marcos estate. After the pre-trial and
the issuance of the pre-trial order and supplemental
pre-trial order dated, the case was set for trial.
After several resettings, petitioner filed another
motion for summary judgment pertaining to the
forfeiture of the US$356 million. The Sandiganbayan
granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment.
Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 arguing that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ago" or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that "the funds

were lawfully acquired" are fully insufficient to tender
genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses' defenses were
a sham and evidently calibrated to compound and
confuse the issues.
Moreover, respondents failed to specifically deny
each and every allegation contained in the petition for
forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All
they gave were stock answers like "they have no
sufficient knowledge" or "they could not recall
because it happened a long time ago," and, as to Mrs.
Marcos, "the funds were lawfully acquired," without
stating the basis of such assertions.
If an allegation directly and specifically charges a
party with having done, performed or committed a
particular act which the latter did not in fact do,
perform or commit, a categorical and express denial
must be made.
Here, despite the serious and specific allegations
against them, the Marcoses responded by simply
saying that they had no knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such
allegations.
Such a general, self-serving claim of ignorance of
the facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture was
insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses
should have positively stated how it was that they
were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged.
Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark
of what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative
pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in
effect an admission of the averments it was directed
at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of
negative expression which carries with it an
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind
favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant
with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in
the pleading.
Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or
modifying language and the words of the allegation as
so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been
held that the qualifying circumstances alone are
denied while the fact itself is admitted.
Therefore, the allegations in the petition for
forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits
in the sum of about US$356 million, not having been
specifically denied by respondents in their answer,
were deemed admitted by them pursuant to Section
11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil

ISSUES:
1. WON Summary Judgment is proper.
2. WON foreign foundations should have been
impleaded as they were indispensable parties without
whom no complete determination of the issues could
be made.
RULINGS
1. YES. Summary Judgment is proper.
The SC finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos and the
Marcos children indubitably failed to tender genuine
issues in their answer to the petition for forfeiture.
A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for
the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an
issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad
faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to
constitute a genuine issue for trial. Respondents'
defenses of "lack of knowledge for lack of privity" or
"(inability to) recall because it happened a long time
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RULES 6 to 9

Procedure: Material averment in the complaint, xxx

shall be deemed admitted when not specifically
denied.
Further, when matters regarding which
respondents claim to have no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and
necessarily within their knowledge, their alleged
ignorance or lack of information will not be
considered a specific denial. An unexplained denial of
information within the control of the pleader, or is
readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient
to constitute an effective denial.
Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact
which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's
knowledge or means of knowing is as ineffective as no
denial at all. Thus, the general denial of the Marcos
children of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture
"for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since
they were not privy to the transactions" cannot
rightfully be accepted as a defense because they are
the legal heirs and successors-in-interest of Ferdinand
E. Marcos and are therefore bound by the acts of their
father vis-a-vis the Swiss funds.
Furthermore, their opposition to the motion for
Summary Judgment was not accompanied by
affidavits, depositions or admissions as required by
Section 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure: x x x The adverse party may serve
opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least
three (3) days before hearing.
After hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show
that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.
The absence of opposing affidavits, depositions
and admissions to contradict the sworn declarations
in the Republic's motion only demonstrated that the
averments of such opposition were not genuine and
therefore unworthy of belief. In sum, mere denials, if
unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible
in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to raise
genuine issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for
summary judgment.
A summary judgment is one granted upon motion
of a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, it
appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions
and affidavits that there are no important questions

or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was described as a
judgment which a court may render before trial but
after both parties have pleaded. It is ordered by the
court upon application by one party, supported by
affidavits, depositions or other documents, with
notice upon the adverse party who may in turn file an
opposition supported also by affidavits, depositions or
other documents. This is after the court summarily
hears both parties with their respective proofs and
finds that there is no genuine issue between them.
Summary judgment is sanctioned in this
jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure:
SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant.- A
party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim,
or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at
any time after the pleading in answer thereto has
been served, move with supporting affidavits,
depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in
his favor upon all or any part thereof.
Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly
no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action.
The theory of summary judgment is that, although an
answer may on its face appear to tender issues
requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits,
depositions or admissions that those issues are not
genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in
dispensing with the trial and rendering summary
judgment for petitioner.
2. NO.
Generally, an indispensable party must be
impleaded for the complete determination of the suit.
However, failure to join an indispensable party
does not divest the court of jurisdiction since the rule
regarding indispensable parties is founded on
equitable considerations and is not jurisdictional.
Thus, the court is not divested of its power to
render a decision even in the absence of
indispensable parties, though such judgment is not
binding on the non-joined party
An indispensable party has been defined as one:
[who] must have a direct interest in the litigation; and
if this interest is such that it cannot be separated from
that of the parties to the suit, if the court cannot
render justice between the parties in his absence, if
the decree will have an injurious effect upon his
interest, or if the final determination of the
controversy in his absence will be inconsistent with
equity and good conscience.

43
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RULES 6 to 9

There are two essential tests of an indispensable

party: (1) can relief be afforded the plaintiff without
the presence of the other party? and (2) can the case
be decided on its merits without prejudicing the rights
of the other party?
There is, however, no fixed formula for
determining who is an indispensable party; this can
only be determined in the context and by the facts of
the particular suit or litigation.
In the present case, there was an admission by
respondent Imelda Marcos in her Manifestation
before the Sandiganbayan that she was the sole
beneficiary of 90% of the subject matter in
controversy with the remaining 10% belonging to the
estate of Ferdinand Marcos. Viewed against this
admission, the foreign foundations were not
indispensable parties.
Their non-participation in the proceedings did not
prevent the court from deciding the case on its merits
and according full relief to petitioner Republic.
The foreign foundations here were set up to
conceal the illegally acquired funds of the Marcos
spouses. Thus, they were simply the res in the action
for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and did not have to
be impleaded for lack of cause of action or ground to
implead them.
Assuming arguendo, however, that the
foundations were indispensable parties, the failure of
petitioner to implead them was a curable error. Nonjoinder is not a ground to dismiss the suit or annul the
judgment. The rule on joinder of indispensable parties
is founded on equity. And the spirit of the law is
reflected in Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal of a suit on
the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and
allows the amendment of the complaint at any stage
of the proceedings, through motion or on order of the
court on its own initiative.

of petitioners property; declaration of nullity of any

foreclosure sale to be held; declaration of nullity of
the mortgage constituted over petitioners property in
favor of respondent; and award of damages.
On July 21, 1999, the RTC issued an Order holding
in abeyance the auction sale set on July 23, 1999, as
agreed upon by the parties. Notwithstanding said
directive, another foreclosure sale was scheduled on
October 15, 1999. Per RTC Order dated October 14,
1999, the October 15 scheduled sale was held in
abeyance; but re-scheduled the sale on November 15,
1999 for the following reasons:
However, P.D. 385 provides that it shall be
mandatory for government financial institution to
foreclose collaterals and/or securities for any loan,
credit accommodations and/or guarantees granted by
them whenever the arrearages on such account,
including accrued interest and other charges amount
to at least 20% of the total outstanding obligation as
appearing in the books of the financial institution.
Moreover, no restraining order, temporary or
permanent injunction shall be issued by the court
against any government financial institution in any
action taken by such institution in compliance with
the mandatory foreclosure provided by said law. x x x
The defendant Land Bank of the Philippines and Eric B.
De Vera, Sheriff of this Court, are hereby authorized
to proceed with the extrajudicial foreclosure sale on
November 15, 1999.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the trial courts Order, but this was denied. Petitioner
then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Injunction which it
denied due course and dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision,
which was eventually denied by the CA. Hence, the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court

8. CANELAND SUGAR CORPORATION, Petitioner, versus - HON. REYNALDO M. ALON, LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, and ERIC B. DE VERA, Respondents.

ISSUE:
whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in not enjoining
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties subject
of this case.

FACTS:
On July 15, 1999, Caneland Sugar Corporation
(petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Silay City, Branch 40, a complaint for damages,
injunction, and nullity of mortgage against the Land
Bank of the Philippines (respondent) and Sheriff Eric
B. de Vera, praying for the following reliefs: issuance
of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent
and the Sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale

HELD:
Without first resolving the foregoing issue, the
Court finds that the petition should be denied for the
sole reason that the act sought to be enjoined by
petitioner is already fait accompli. In Transfield
44
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RULES 6 to 9

Philippines, Inc. v. Luzon Hydro Corporation, the Court

held that
[I]njunction would not lie where the acts sought
to be enjoined have already become fait accompli or
an accomplished or consummated act. In Ticzon v.
Video Post Manila, Inc. this Court ruled that where the
period within which the former employees were
prohibited from engaging in or working for an
enterprise that competed with their former employer
the very purpose of the preliminary injunction has
expired, any declaration upholding the propriety of
the writ would be entirely useless as there would be
no actual case or controversy between the parties
insofar as the preliminary injunction is concerned.
Records show that the foreclosure sale which
petitioner sought to be enjoined by the RTC has
already been carried out by the Sheriff, and in fact, a
Certificate of Sale dated June 26, 2000 was issued to
respondent. There is, therefore, no more actual case
or controversy between the parties insofar as the
RTCs refusal to enjoin the sale is concerned, and any
resolution by the Court of the impropriety or
propriety of the RTCs refusal to issue any restraining
or injunctive relief against the foreclosure sale will
serve no purpose but merely lend further addle to
Civil Case pending before the RTC.
Petitioner does not dispute its loan obligation
with respondent. Petitioners bone of contention
before the RTC is that the promissory notes are silent
as to whether they were covered by the Mortgage
Trust Indenture and Mortgage Participation on its
property. It does not categorically deny that these
promissory notes are covered by the security
documents. These vague assertions are, in fact,
negative pregnants, i.e., denials pregnant with the
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. As
defined in Republic of the Philippines v.
Sandiganbayan, a negative pregnant is a form of
negative expression which carries with it an
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind
favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant
with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in
the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or
modifying language and the words of the allegation as
so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been
held that the qualifying circumstances alone are
denied while the fact itself is admitted.

45
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RULES 10-14
I. LISAM ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. BANCO DE ORO
G.R. NO. 143264. April 23, 2012. Third Division

After service of summons on all defendants,

the RTC issued a TRO and, after hearing, went on to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
respondent PCIB from proceeding with the auction
sale of the subject property.

Amendments to Pleadings; Forum shopping

FACTS:
On August 13, 1999, petitioner Lisam
Enterprises Inc. (LEI), represented by its Corporate
Secretary Lolita A. Soriano filed a Complaint against
respondents for Annulment of Mortgage with Prayer
for TRO& Preliminary Injunction with Damages with
the RTC of Legaspi City.

On September 25, 1999, respondents Lilian S.

Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. filed
an Answer stating,among others, that they were duly
authorized by LEI to mortgage the subject
propertyand that although the Spouses Soriano
indeed received demands from petitioner to pay the
loan, they gave satisfactory explanations why said
demands could not be honored.

In its Complaint, LEI alleged that itpurchased a

parcel of residential land in Legaspi City. On March 28,
1996, defendant Spouses Lilian S. Soriano and the late
Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., as president and treasurer,
respectively of LEI, in their personal capacity and for
their own use and benefit, obtained a P20 Millionloan
from defendant PCIB now Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc.
Said loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over
the above-described property of plaintiff LEI, and had
the same registered with the Office of the Registry of
Deeds. It further alleged that the Spouses Soriano
falsified the signatures of plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano as
corporate secretary and director of plaintiff LEI, in a
document denominated as board resolution, making
it appear that plaintiff LEI's has authorized the
Spouses Soriano to mortgage or encumber all or
substantially all of the properties of plaintiff LEI.
Moreover, Spouses Soriano made it appear that
plaintiff LEI had consented to the execution of a Deed
of Assumption of Loans and Mortgage Obligations and
Amendment of Mortgage wherein plaintiff LEI was
made to assume the P20 Million personal
indebtedness of the Spouses Soriano with defendant
PCIB.LEI claimed that upon discovery of the said
irregular transactions of Spouses Soriano and PCIB, it
made demands from defendants Lilian S. Soriano and
the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., to free subject
property of plaintiff LEI from such mortgage lien, by
paying in full their personal indebtedness to
defendant PCIB in the principal sum of P20 Million.
However, said defendants ignored said demands.
Hence, plaintiff LEI commenced a derivative suit
against defendants Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of
Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., before the Securities and
Exchange Commission, for Fraudulent Scheme and
Unlawful Machination with Damages.

On September 28, 1999, respondent PCIB

filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on grounds of
lack of legal capacity to sue, failure to state cause of
action, and litispendencia.
On November 11, 1999, the RTC issued a
Resolution
dismissing petitioners'
Complaint.
Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
said Resolution.While awaiting resolution of the
motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed, a Motion
to Admit Amended Complaint. The trial court,
however, denied both the Motion for Reconsideration
and the Motion to Admit Amended Complaint saying
that no new argument had been raised by petitioners
in their motion for reconsideration. The trial court
further ruled that the Amended Complaint can no
longer be admitted, because the same absolutely
changed petitioners' cause of action.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Amended Complaint should be
admitted by the trial court.
2. WON, upon admission of the amended
complaint, there is forum shopping considering
plaintiff LEI commenced a derivative suit against
defendants Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro
A. Soriano, Jr., before the SEC.
RULING:
1. YES. Amendments to pleadings are generally
favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance
of justice in order that every case, may so far as
possible, be determined on its real facts and in order
to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the
46
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RULES 10 to 14

circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. That is,

unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable
delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or
the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to
amend.

The courts should be liberal in allowing

amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of
suits and in order that the real controversies between
the parties are presented, their rights determined,
and the case decided on the merits without
unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the
early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where
the amendment was made before the trial of the
case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time
allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.

Since amendments are generally favored, it

would have been more fitting for the trial court to
extend such liberality towards petitioners by
admitting the amended complaint which was filed
before the order dismissing the original complaint
became final and executory. It is quite apparent that
since trial proper had not yet even begun, allowing
the amendment would not have caused any delay.
Moreover, doing so would have served the higher
interest of justice as this would provide the best
opportunity for the issues among all parties to be
thoroughly threshed out and the rights of all parties
finally determined.

2. No. There can be no forum shopping, because

there is no identity of issues. The issue being threshed
out in the SEC case is the due execution, authenticity
or validity of board resolutions and other documents
used to facilitate the execution of the mortgage, while
the issue in the case filed by petitioners with the RTC
is the validity of the mortgage itself executed
between the bank and the corporation, purportedly
represented by the spouses Soriano, the President
and Treasurer of petitioner LEI, respectively.

In Tiu v. Philippine Bank of Communications,

the SC discussed this rule at length, to wit:
x xx [A]fter petitioners have filed their answer,
Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically
allows amendment by leave of court. The said Section
states:

Moreover, since the complaint is for

annulment of mortgage with the mortgagee bank as
one of the defendants. As held in Saura v. Saura, Jr.,
jurisdiction over said complaint is lodged with the
regular courts because the mortgagee bank has no
intra-corporate relationship with the stockholders.

SECTION 3.Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding section,
substantial amendments may be made only upon
leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it
appears to the court that the motion was made with
intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters
provided in this section shall be made upon motion
filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party,
and an opportunity to be heard.

II. TIU PHIL. vs. BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS

G.R. No. 151932
August 19, 2009
Amended
and
Supplemental
Amendments by Leave of Court

Pleadings;

FACTS:
Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI), applied for a
real estate loan with the Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBCOM) to fund its purified water
distribution business. The loan was granted after it
was guaranteed by collateral. Thereafter, AWRI
applied for a bigger loan from PBCOM. Since the
subsequent loan was unsecured, the latter required
all the Board of Directors of AWRI to execute a Surety
Agreement.
Then, AWRI informed the bank of its desire to
surrender and/or assign in its favor, all its present
properties to be applied as dacion en pago for its
existing loan obligation to the bank, which PBCOM
denied. Subsequently, a letter was sent to petitioners

The granting of leave to file amended

pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion
is broad, subject only to the limitations that the
amendments should not substantially change the
cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or that
it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as
enunciated in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, even if
the amendment substantially alters the cause of
action or defense, such amendment could still be
allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest
of substantial justice, prevent delay, and secure a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and
proceedings.
47
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RULES 10 to 14

demanding full payment of its obligation to the bank

but it remained unheeded.
PBCOM filed a complaint for collection against
AWRI, who alleged in its answer that they were not
personally liable on the promissory notes, because
they signed the Surety Agreement in their capacities
as officers of AWRI. They claimed that the Surety
Agreement attached to the complaint as Annexes A to
A-2 were falsified, considering that when they signed
the same, the words In his personal capacity did not
yet appear in the document and were merely
intercalated thereon without their knowledge and
consent. This allegation was supported by a
photocopy of the Surety Agreement was attached.
Because of this development, PBCOMs counsel
searched for and retrieved the file copy of the Surety
Agreement. The notarial copy showed that the words
In his personal capacity did not appear on page two
of the Surety Agreement. PBCOM then filed a Reply
and Answer to Counterclaim with Motion for Leave of
Court to Substitute Annex A of the Complaint,
wherein it attached the duplicate original copy
retrieved from the file of the notary public. PBCOM
also admitted its mistake in making the insertion and
explained that it was made without the knowledge
and consent of the notary public. PBCOM maintained
that the insertion was not a falsification, but was
made only to speak the truth of the parties
intentions. PBCOM also contended that petitioners
were already primarily liable on the Surety Agreement
whether or not the insertion was made, having
admitted in their pleadings that they voluntarily
executed and signed the Surety Agreement in the
original form.
RTC issued an Order allowing the substitution of
the altered document with the original Surety
Agreement. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied. Aggrieved,
petitioners sought recourse before the CA via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.

the original thereof, this Court finds that the RTC did
not err in allowing the substitution.
The pertinent rule on actionable documents is
found in Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that when the cause of action is anchored on
a document, its substance must be set forth, and the
original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the
pleading as an exhibit and deemed a part thereof.
With respect to PBCOMs right to amend its
complaint, including the documents annexed thereto,
after petitioners have filed their answer, Section 3,
Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically allows
amendment by leave of court. The said Section states:
SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except
as provided in the next preceding section, substantial
amendments may be made only upon leave of court.
But such leave may be refused if it appears to the
court that the motion was made with intent to delay.
Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this
section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and
after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity
to be heard.
This Court has emphasized the import of Section
3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in
Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, thus:
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such
manner that the phrase or that the cause of action or
defense is substantially altered was stricken-off and
not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such
amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the
new rules, the amendment may (now) substantially
alter the cause of action or defense. This should only
be true, however, when despite a substantial change
or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the
amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher
interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and
equally promote the laudable objective of the rules
which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN
AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE ORDER OF THE LOWER
COURT ALLOWING THE SUBSTITUTION OF THE
FALSIFIED DOCUMENT BY RELYING ON THE
PROVISION OF SECTION 3, RULE 10 OF THE RULES OF
COURT.

The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a

matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject
only to the limitations that the amendments should
not substantially change the cause of action or alter
the theory of the case, or that it was not made to
delay the action.[28] Nevertheless, as enunciated in
Valenzuela, even if the amendment substantially
alters the cause of action or defense, such

HELD:
As to the substitution of the earlier surety
agreement that was annexed to the complaint with
48
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RULES 10 to 14

amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to

serve the higher interest of substantial justice;
prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.
The courts should be liberal in allowing
amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of
suits and in order that the real controversies between
the parties are presented, their rights determined,
and the case decided on the merits without
unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the
early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where
the amendment was made before the trial of the
case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time
allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.
Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are
generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so
far as possible, be determined on its real facts and in
order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the
circuity of action and unnecessary expense. That is,
unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable
delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or
the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to
amend.

reconsideration. ISL then filed its answer to the

complaint.
On the other hand, respondent British Steel
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before
the CA. Respondent claimed therein that the
complaint did not contain a single averment that
respondent committed any act or is guilty of any
omission in violation of petitioners legal rights. Apart
from the allegation in the complaints Jurisdictional
Facts that:
1.05. Defendants British Steel (Asia) Ltd. and Ferro
Trading GMBH, while understood by the plaintiff as
mere suppliers of goods for defendant ISL, are
impleaded as party defendants pursuant to Section
13, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
No other reference was made to respondent that
would constitute a valid cause of action against it.
Since petitioner failed to plead any cause of action
against respondent as alternative defendant under
Section 13, Rule 3, the trial court should have ordered
the dismissal of the complaint insofar as respondent
was concerned.

3. REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION

VS. COURT OF APPEALS
382 SCRA 499(2002)
ACTIONS;
PLEADINGS
AND
PRACTICE;
AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINTS;

Meanwhile, petitioner sought to amend its

complaint by incorporating therein additional factual
allegations constitutive of its cause of action against
respondent. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner maintained that it can
amend the complaint as a matter of right because
respondent has not yet filed a responsive pleading
thereto.

A complaint can still be amended as a matter of

right before an answer has been filed, even if there is
a pending proceeding for its dismissal before the
higher courtbefore the filing of an answer, the
plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the
complaint whether a new cause of action or change in
theory is introduced.

RTC granted petitioners Motion to Admit

Amended Complaint.
While CA grants the writ of certiorari and orders
the respondent judge to dismiss without prejudice the
Complaint in Civil Case No. 96-79674 against
petitioner British Steel (Asia) Ltd. Petitioners MR was
also denied. Hence, the petition (R45).

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money
and damages arising from breach of contract before
the RTC. Impleaded as principal defendant therein
was Industrial Steels, Ltd. (ISL), with Ferro Trading
GMBH (Ferro) and respondent British Steel as
alternative defendants. ISL and respondent British
Steel separately moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause
of action against them. RTC denied the motions to
dismiss as well as the ensuing motion for

ISSUE:
Can a complaint still be amended as a matter of
right before an answer has been filed, even if there
was a pending proceeding for its dismissal before the
higher court?
HELD:
Yes. Section 2, Rule 1016 of the Revised Rules
of Court explicitly states that a pleading may be
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RULES 10 to 14

amended as a matter of right before a responsive

pleading is served. This only means that prior to the
filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right
to amend the complaint whether a new cause of
action or change in theory is introduced.17 The
reason for this rule is implied in the subsequent
Section 3 of Rule 10.18 Under this provision,
substantial amendment of the complaint is not
allowed without leave of court after an answer has
been served, because any material change in the
allegations contained in the complaint could prejudice
the rights of the defendant who has already set up his
defense in the answer.

his profession in the Philippines. Lourdes sister,

Rosita Dimankanta, filed an action for the partition of
real property and accounting of rentals against
Lourdes and Alfredo. She alleged that while Lourdes
and Alfredo are spouses, of legal age and at present,
residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive, South Seattle,
Washington, U.S.A., but, for purposes of the
complaint, may be served with summons at Gedisco
Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila
where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant
Lourdes Arreola Valmontes spouse holds office and
where he can be found.
Lourdes Valmonte through a letter, referred
Rositas counsel to her husband as the party to whom
all communications intended for her should be sent.
Service of summons was then made upon petitioner
Alfredo at his office in Manila. Alfredo D. Valmonte
accepted his summons, but not the one for Lourdes,
on the ground that he was not authorized to accept
the process on her behalf. Then, the summons of
Lourdes were not served upon her.
On one hand, Alfredo Valmonte file his answer
with counterclaim, and on the other hand, Lourdes
Valmonte did not file her answer. This prompted
Rosita to file a motion to declare Lourdes in default.
Thereafter, Alfredo made a special appearance in
behalf of his wife and opposed the motion filed by
Rosita. The RTC denied Rositas Motion to Declare
Lourdes in default, then the latter moved for a
reconsideration, which was again denied by the RTC.
Rosita then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari,
Mandamus and Prohibition. Accordingly, the CA
declared Lourdes in Default.
ISSUE: Whether Lourdes Valmonte was validly
served with summons.
HELD:No.
To provide perspective, it will be helpful to
determine first the nature of the action filed against
petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D.
Valmonte by private respondent, whether it is an
action in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. This is
because the rules on service of summons embodied in
Rule 14 apply according to whether an action is one or
the other of these actions.
In an action in personam, personal service of
summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot be
personally served, substituted service, as provided in
Rule 14, 7-8 is essential for the acquisition by the
court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant
who does not voluntarily submit himself to the
authority of the court.If defendant cannot be served
with summons because he is temporarily abroad, but

Conversely, it cannot be said that the

defendants rights have been violated by changes
made in the complaint if he has yet to file an answer
thereto. In such an event, the defendant has not
presented any defense that can be altered19 or
affected by the amendment of the complaint in
accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10. The defendant
still retains the unqualified opportunity to address the
allegations against him by properly setting up his
defense in the answer. Considerable leeway is thus
given to the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, as
a matter of right, prior to the filing of an answer by
the defendant.
The right granted to the plaintiff under
procedural law to amend the complaint before an
answer has been served is not precluded by the filing
of a motion to dismiss20 or any other proceeding
contesting its sufficiency. Were we to conclude
otherwise, the right to amend a pleading under
Section 2, Rule 10 will be rendered nugatory and
ineffectual, since all that a defendant has to do to
foreclose this remedial right is to challenge the
adequacy of the complaint before he files an answer.
Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and
should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of
justice in order to determine every case as far as
possible on its merits without regard to technicalities.
This principle is generally recognized to speed up trial
and save party litigants from incurring unnecessary
expense, so that a full hearing on the merits of every
case may be had and multiplicity of suits avoided.
4. VALMONTE VS. CA
Service of Summons
FACTS: Lourdes Valmonte is a foreign resident.
Lourdes Valmonte is married to Alfredo Valmonte
who is a member of the Philippine Bar and practices
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RULES 10 to 14

otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of

summons may, by leave of court, be made by
publication. Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in
an action in personam, who cannot be personally
served with summons, may be summoned either by
means of substituted service in accordance with Rule
14, 8 or by publication as provided in 17 and 18 of the
same Rule.
In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant
must be a resident of the Philippines, otherwise an
action in personam cannot be brought because
jurisdiction over his person is essential to make a
binding decision.
On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi
in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long
as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the
defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the
country, summons may be served extraterritorially in
accordance with Rule 14, 17, which provides:
17. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines and
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff
or relates to, or the subject of which is, property
within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or
claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in
which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part,
in excluding the defendant from any interest therein,
or the property of the defendant has been attached
within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court,
be effected out of the Philippines by personal service
as under Section 7; or by publication in a newspaper
of general circulation in such places and for such time
as the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the
defendant, or in any other manner the court may
deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than
sixty (60) days after notice, within which the
defendant must answer.
In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in
an action in rem or quasi in rem is that it has
jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the personal status of the
plaintiff who is domiciled in the Philippines or the
property litigated or attached. Service of summons in
the manner provided in 17 is not for the purpose of
vesting it with jurisdiction but for complying with the
requirements of fair play or due process, so that he
will be informed of the pendency of the action against
him and the possibility that property in the Philippines
belonging to him or in which he has an interest may

be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff

and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if
he is so minded.
As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a
nonresident who is not found in the Philippines,
service of summons on her must be in accordance
with Rule 14, 17. Such service, to be effective outside
the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal
service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the
court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court should be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the
defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court
may deem sufficient.
5. MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL
CORPORATION vs. TAN
G.R. No. 131724
February 28, 2000
SERVICE OF SUMMONS; JURISDICTION BY
ESTOPPEL
FACTS: Petitioner MICC executed a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage over its real property in favor of
respondent Tan. The mortgage was executed to
secure payment of petitioner's indebtedness to
respondent in the amount of P2 million, without
monthly interest, but which, at maturity date on June
10, 1995, was payable in the amount of P4 million.
Respondent filed against petitioner a complaint
for foreclosure of mortgage in the Regional Trial
Court. Summons and a copy of the complaint were
served upon petitioner through a certain Lynverd
Cinches, described in the sheriff's return, as "a
Draftsman, a person of sufficient age and (discretion)
working therein, he is the highest ranking officer or
Officer-in-Charge of defendant's Corporation, to
receive processes of the Court."
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that there was no valid
service of summons upon it, as a result of which the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
Petitioner invoked Rule 14, 13 of the 1964 Rules of
Court and contended that service on Lynverd Cinches,
as alleged in the sheriff's return, was invalid as he is
not one of the authorized persons on whom summons
may be served and that, in fact, he was not even its
employee.
Petitioner also sought the dismissal of the
complaint against it on the ground that it had satisfied
its obligation to respondent when the latter opted to

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be paid in shares of stock under the stipulation in the

mortgage contract.
Petitioner further prayed for "other reliefs just
and equitable under the premises."
The trial court denied petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its
motion was denied by the trial court for failure of
petitioner to raise any new ground. Petitioner then
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals,
assailing the aforesaid orders of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The
appellate court ruled that although petitioner denied
Lynverd Cinches' authority to receive summons for it,
its actual receipt of the summons could be inferred
from its filing of a motion to dismiss, hence, the
purpose for issuing summons had been substantially
achieved. Moreover, it was held, by including the
affirmative defense that it had already paid its
obligation and praying for other reliefs in its Motion
to Dismiss, petitioner voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. Hence, this petition for
review.
ISSUES:
I. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE OF SUMMONS
UPON A MERE DRAFTSMAN WHO IS NOT ONE OF
THOSE UPON WHOM SUMMONS MAY BE SERVED IN
CASE OF A DEFENDANT CORPORATION AS
MENTIONED IN THE RULES IS VALID.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE INCLUSION OF
ANOTHER AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF IN A MOTION TO
DISMISS ABANDONS AND WAIVES THE GROUND OF
LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE
DEFENDANT THEREIN ALSO PLEADED UNDER
PREVAILING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
HELD: First. NO.Summons is the means by which
the defendant in a case is notified of the existence of
an action against him and, thereby, the court is
conferred jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. If the defendant is a corporation, Rule 14,
13 requires that service of summons be made upon
the corporation's president, manager, secretary,
cashier, agent, or any of its directors. The rationale of
the rule is that service must be made on a
representative so integrated with the corporation
sued as to make it a priori presumable that he will
realize his responsibilities and know what he should
do with any legal papers received by him.
Petitioner contends that the enumeration in Rule
14, 13 is exclusive and that service of summons upon
one who is not enumerated therein is invalid. This is
the general rule. However, it is settled that substantial
compliance by serving summons on persons other

than those mentioned in the above rule may be

justified.
In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this
Court enumerated the requisites for the application of
the doctrine of substantial compliance, to wit: (a)
there must be actual receipt of the summons by the
person served, i.e., transferring possession of the
copy of the summons from the Sheriff to the person
served; (b) the person served must sign a receipt or
the sheriff's return; and (c) there must be actual
receipt of the summons by the corporation through
the person on whom the summons was actually
served. The third requisite is the most important for it
is through such receipt that the purpose of the rule on
the service of summons is attained.
In this case, there is no dispute that the first and
second requisites were fulfilled. With respect to the
third, the appellate court held that petitioner's filing
of a motion to dismiss the foreclosure suit is proof
that it received the copy of the summons and the
complaint. There is, however, no direct proof of this
or that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the
summons to any of the officers of the corporation. In
contrast, in our cases applying the substantial
compliance rule, there was direct evidence, such as
the admission of the corporation's officers, of receipt
of summons by the corporation through the person
upon whom it was actually served. The question is
whether it is allowable to merely infer actual receipt
of summons by the corporation through the person
on whom summons was served. We hold that it
cannot be allowed. For there to be substantial
compliance, actual receipt of summons by the
corporation through the person served must be
shown. Where a corporation only learns of the service
of summons and the filing of the complaint against it
through some person or means other than the person
actually served, the service of summons becomes
meaningless. This is particularly true in the present
case where there is serious doubt if Lynverd Cinches,
the person on whom service of summons was
effected, is in fact an employee of the corporation.
Except for the sheriff's return, there is nothing to
show that Lynverd Cinches was really a draftsman
employed by the corporation. The appellate court
was, therefore, in error in giving weight to
respondent's claims. Receipt by petitioner of the
summons and complaint cannot be inferred from the
fact that it filed a Motion to Dismiss the case.
Second. NO. We now turn to the issue of
jurisdiction by estoppel. Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals held that by raising the affirmative
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defense of payment and by praying for other reliefs in

its Motion to Dismiss, petitioner in effect waived its
objection to the trial court's jurisdiction over it. We
think this is error.
Our decision in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court
of Appeals settled this question. The rule prior to La
Naval was that if a defendant, in a motion to dismiss,
alleges grounds for dismissing the action other than
lack of jurisdiction, he would be deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. This
rule no longer holds true. Noting that the doctrine of
estoppel by jurisdiction must be unequivocal and
intentional, we ruled in La Naval:
Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably
raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to dismiss or
by way of an affirmative defense. Voluntary
appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense.
The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall
not be construed as an estoppel or as a waiver of such
defense.
Finally, we turn to the effect of petitioner's prayer
for "other reliefs" in its Motion to Dismiss. In De
Midgely v.Fernandos, it was held that, in a motion to
dismiss, the allegation of grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
including a prayer "for such other reliefs as" may be
deemed "appropriate and proper" amounted to
voluntary appearance. This, however, must be
deemed superseded by the ruling in La Naval that
estoppel by jurisdiction must be unequivocal and
intentional. It would be absurd to hold that petitioner
unequivocally and intentionally submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the court by seeking other reliefs to
which it might be entitled when the only relief that it
can properly ask from the trial court is the dismissal of
the complaint against it.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and the complaint against petitioner is
DISMISSED.

Private respondent filed a Complaint for

Breach of Contract and Damages against petitioner
before the RTC allegedly for failure of the latter to
comply with its contractual obligation in that, other
than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no
substantial developments.
Summons, with the complaint, were served
upon the petitioner, through its Branch Manager Engr.
Wendell Sabulbero at the stated address at Kolambog,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro (CdO) City but the Sheriffs
Return of Service stated that the summons was duly
served upon petitioner thru SALBULBERO at their new
office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan De Oro
City.Petitioner filed a Special Appearance with Motion
to Dismiss alleging that the summons was served
upon Sabulbero, who is not one of those persons
upon whom service of summons may be made.
Private respondent filed a Motion to Declare
Defendant in Default alleging that petitioner has failed
to file an Answer. Private respondent filed an
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. RTC denied
the Motion to Dismiss as well as the Motion to
Declare in Default, stating that since the summons
and copy of the complaint were in fact received by the
corporation through its branch manager, there was
substantial compliance with the rule on service of
summons and consequently, it validly acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
Petitioner contends that the enumeration of
persons to whom summons may be served is
restricted, limited and exclusive following the rule
on statutory construction expression unios est
exclusion alterius.
ISSUE:

9. E.B. VILLAROSA & PARTNER VS. HON. HERMINIO J.

BENITO
G.R. NO. 136426 AUGUST 6, 1999
SUMMONS; JURISDICTION

Whether or not the service of summons upon

the branch manager of petitioner at its branch office
at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general
manager at its principal office at Davao City was
proper.

FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent executed a
Deed of Sale with Development Agreement wherein
the former agreed to develop parcels of land
belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision for
the construction of low cost housing units.

HELD:
No.
Under the new Rules, service of summons
upon an agent of the corporation is no longer
authorized. The cases cited by private respondent are
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therefore not in point. The designation of persons or

officers who are authorized to accept summons for a
domestic corporation or partnership is now limited
and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14. The
rule now states general manager instead of only
manager; corporate secretary instead of
secretary; and treasurer instead of cashier. The
phrase agent, or any of its directors is conspicuously
deleted in the new rule.

The fact that defendant filed a belated motion

to dismiss did not operate to confer jurisdiction upon
its person. There is no question that the defendants
voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to
service of summons. Before, the rule was that a party
may challenge the jurisdiction of the court over his
person by making a special appearance through a
motion to dismiss and if in the same motion, the
movant raised other grounds or invoked affirmative
relief which necessarily involves the exercise of the
jurisdiction of the court, the party is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.

The particular revision was explained by

retired SC Justice FlorenzRegalado, thus: x xx the
then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed service upon a
defendant corporation to be made on the president,
manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its
directors.

This doctrine has been abandoned in the case

of La Naval Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., which became the basis of the adoption of a new
provision in the former Section 23, which is now
Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules. The
emplacement of this rule clearly underscores the
purpose to enforce strict enforcement of the rules on
summons. Accordingly, the filing of a motion to
dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed by the
defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the defendant can by no means be deemed
a submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

The terms were obviously ambiguous and

susceptible of broad and sometimes illogical
interpretations, especially the word agent of the
corporation. The Filoil case, involving the litigation
lawyer of the corporation who precisely appeared to
challenge the validity of service of summons but
whose very appearance for that purpose was seized
upon to validate the defective service, is an
illustration of the need for this revised section with
limited scope and specific terminology. Thus the
absurd result in the Filoil case necessitated the
amendment permitting service only on the in-house
counsel of the corporation who is in effect an
employee of the corporation, as distinguished from an
independent practitioner.

10. RAMOS VS. RAMOS

SOLEDAD CHANLIONGCO RAMOS, FRANCISCO D.
CHANLIONGCO, ADELBERTO D. CHANLIONGCO,
ARMANDO D. CHANLIONGCO and FLORENCIO D.
CHANLIONGCO VS. TERESITA D. RAMOS, Spouses
TERESITA and EDMUNDO S. MUYOT, Spouses
VEDASTA and FLORENCIO M. DATO, LORETO MUYOT,
Spouses TERESITA and ELMER SOLIS, LICERIA TORRES,
Spouses CORAZON and VICENTE MACATUNGAL,
Spouses PRECILLA and CRISOSTOMO MUYOT, and
Spouses CARIDAD and SALVADOR PINGOL
G.R. No. 144294
March 11, 2003

The purpose is to render it reasonably certain

that the corporation will receive prompt and proper
notice in an action against it or to insure that the
summons be served on a representative so integrated
with the corporation that such person will know what
to do with the legal papers served on him. In other
words, to bring home to the corporation notice of the
filing of the action.

SERVICE OF SUMMONS; NATURE OF THE ACTION

FACTS: Petitioners are children of the late Paulino
V. Chanliongco Jr., who was the co-owner of a parcel
of land known as Lot No. 2-G, Tondo, Manila, it was
co-owned by him, his sister Narcisa, and his brothers
Mario and Antonio. By virtue of a Special Power of
Attorney executed by the co-owners in favor of
Narcisa, her daughter Adoracion C. Mendoza had sold
the lot to respondents on different days in September
1986. Because of conflict among the heirs of the coowners as to the validity of the sale, respondents filed

The liberal construction rule cannot be

invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal
requirements as to the manner in which summons
should be served on a domestic corporation. Even
under the old rule, service upon a general manager of
a firms branch office has been held as improper as
summons should have been served at the firms
principal office.

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with the RTC a Complaint for interpleader to resolve

the various ownership claims.
RTC upheld the sale insofar as the share of Narcisa
was concerned. It ruled that Adoracion had no
authority to sell the shares of the other co-owners,
because the SPA had been executed in favor only of
her mother, Narcisa.
On appeal, CA modified the ruling of the RTC. It
held that while there was no SPA in favor of
Adoracion, the sale was nonetheless valid, because
she had been authorized by her mother to be the
latters sub-agent. There was thus no need to execute
another SPA in her favor as sub-agent. This CA
Decision was not appealed, became final and was
entered in favor of respondents on August 8, 1996.
On April 10, 1999, petitioners filed with the CA a
Motion to Set Aside the Decision and contended that
they had not been served a copy of either the
Complaint or the summons. Neither had they been
impleaded as parties to the case in the RTC. CA
Decision should be set aside because it adversely
affected their respective shares in the property
without due process.
CA denied the motion based on the ff. grounds:
(a) the Motion was not allowed as a remedy under the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; (b) the Decision sought
to be set aside had long become final and executory;
(c) the movants did not have any legal standing; and
(d) the Motion was purely dilatory and without merit.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were entitled to
be served summons
HELD: The Petition is DENIED. The CA decision is
AFFIRMED.
Main ISSUE: Entitlement to Summons

dispute among themselves as to which of them

owned the property. Essentially, it sought to resolve
the ownership of the land and was not directed
against the personal liability of any particular person.
It was therefore a real action, because it affected title
to or possession of real property. As such, the
Complaint was brought against the deceased
registered co-owners: Narcisa, Mario, Paulino and
Antonio Chanliongco, as represented by their
respective estates.
Clearly, petitioners were not the registered
owners of the land, but represented merely an
inchoate interest thereto as heirs of Paulino. They had
no standing in court with respect to actions over a
property of the estate, because the latter was
represented by an executor or administrator. Thus,
there was no need to implead them as defendants in
the case, inasmuch as the estates of the deceased coowners had already been made parties.
Furthermore, at the time the Complaint was filed,
the 1964 Rules of Court were still in effect. Under the
old Rules, specifically Section 3 of Rule 3, an executor
or administrator may sue or be sued without joining
the party for whose benefit the action is prosecuted
or defended. The present rule, however, requires the
joinder of the beneficiary or the party for whose
benefit the action is brought. Under the former Rules,
an executor or administrator is allowed to either sue
or be sued alone in that capacity. In the present case,
it was the estate of petitioners father Paulino
Chanliongco, as represented by Sebrio Tan Quiming
and Associates, that was included as defendant and
served summons. As it was, there was no need to
include petitioners as defendants. Not being parties,
they were not entitled to be served summons.
Petitioner Florencio D. Chanliongco, on the other
hand, was impleaded in the Complaint, but not served
summons. However, the service of summons upon
the estate of his deceased father was sufficient, as the
estate appeared for and on behalf of all the
beneficiaries and the heirs of Paulino Chanliongco,
including Florencio.
We also note that the counsel of petitioners, Atty.
Felino V. Quiming Jr., is a partner of the law firm that
represented the estate of the deceased father. Hence,
it can reasonably be expected that the service upon
the law firm was sufficient notice to all the
beneficiaries of the estate, including Petitioner
Florencio D. Chanliongco.
12.Santos vs PNOC
Summon by Publication (Action in rem/action in
personam)

To be able to rule on this point, the Court needs

to determine whether the action is in personam, in
rem or quasi in rem. The rules on the service of
summons differ depending on the nature of the
action.
An action in personam is lodged against a person
based on personal liability; an action in rem is
directed against the thing itself instead of the person;
while an action quasi in rem names a person as
defendant, but its object is to subject that persons
interest in a property to a corresponding lien or
obligation.
The Complaint filed by respondents with the RTC
called for an interpleader to determine the ownership
of the real property in question. Specifically, it forced
persons claiming an interest in the land to settle the
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FACTS:
PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complaint
for a sum of money against Pedro T. Santos, Jr. in the
Regional Trial Court. Personal service of summons to
Santos failed because he could not be located in his
last known address despite earnest efforts to do so.
Subsequently, on PNOCs motion, the trial court
allowed service of summons by publication. PNOC
then caused the publication of the summons in
Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. Thereafter, PNOC submitted the affidavit
of publication of the advertising manager of Remate
and an affidavit of service of its employee to the
effect that he sent a copy of the summons by
registered mail to Santos last known address. When
Santos failed to file his answer within the prescribed
period, PNOC moved that the case be set for the
reception of its evidence ex parte. The trial court
granted the motion. Santos filed an Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer.
This was denied. Santos went to CA via Rule 65
(Certiorari). He claimed that the rule on service by
publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court applies only to actions in rem, not actions in
personam like a complaint for a sum of money. He
also contended that the affidavit of service of a copy
of the summons should have been prepared by the
clerk of court, not PNOCs messenger. The petition
was denied by the CA.
ISSUE:
1. Whether there was valid service of summons?
2. Whether the affidavit of service of a copy of
the summons should have been prepared by the clerk
of court?
HELD:
1. Yes. Santos invokes the distinction between
an action in rem and an action in personam and
claims that substituted service (Publication) may be
availed of only in an action in rem. Santos is wrong.
The in rem/in personam distinction was significant
under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind
of action to which the rule was applicable. Because of
this silence, the Court limited the application of the
old rule to in rem actions only. This has been changed.
The present rule expressly states that it applies in any
action where the defendant is designated as an
unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his
whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained
by diligent inquiry. Thus, it now applies to any action,
whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
2. No. Service of summons by publication is
proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or

principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising

manager of the newspaper which published the
summons. The service of summons by publication is
complemented by service of summons by registered
mail to the defendants last known address. This
complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit
showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and
order for publication in the post office, postage
prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail
to his last known address. The rules, however, do not
require that the affidavit of complementary service be
executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court
ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and
processes, the duty to make the complementary
service by registered mail is imposed on the party
who resorts to service by publication.

13. Teh vs. Court of Appeals, 401 SCRA 576(2003)

Summons; Although the plaintiff should resort to
other means to determine the correct address of a
defendant when it is informed by the sheriff that he
failed to serve the summons on the defendant, the
plaintiff is not entirely to blame for such failure where
the defendants address was incorrectly indicated on
the General Information Sheets of his co-defendantcorporations, of which he was president. In its desire
to resolve completely the issues brought before it, the
trial court deemed it fitting to properly acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by
ordering the issuance of alias summons on the
petitioner
FACTS:
Respondent EIM International Sales, Inc. filed
in the RTC a Complaint for collection of sum of money
with prayer for issuance of preliminary attachment
against Wood Based Panels, Inc., Sinrimco, Inc.,
Manfred Luig and petitioner (defendants). Petitioner
was impleaded in the case because he was the
President of both Wood Based Panels, Inc. and
Sinrimco, Inc. Summons was served upon the two
corporations and Luig. The sheriff failed to serve the
summons intended for the petitioner because the
former could not locate the petitioners address as
indicated in the complaint. Said address was obtained
by the respondent from the General Information
Sheets filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission by the two corporations.

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Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, but the

same was denied by the RTC. Thereafter, they filed
their respective answers to the complaint. EIM Intl
Sales then filed a motion to set the case for pre-trial,
and the court granted the same and set the pre-trial
on October 19, 1999. A notice of pre-trial was sent by
the RTC to the defendants, including the petitioner.
The notice to the latter was again sent to the address
indicated in the complaint.

ISSUE: WON summons was validly served upon

Teh thereby acquiring jurisdiction over his person by
the trial court?
HELD:
Yes. The Court agrees with the CAs ruling that
there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court when the latter denied the petitioners
motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the
issuance of an alias summons to be served upon him.
Although the respondent should have resorted to
other means to determine the correct address of the
petitioner when it was informed by the sheriff that he
failed to serve the summons on the petitioner, the
respondent is not entirely to blame for such failure
because the petitioners address as indicated by
Wood Based Panels, Inc., and Sinrimco, Inc. on their
respective General Information Sheets, was incorrect.

On October 19, 1999, Teh filed a Motion to

Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial
court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person
because he had not been served with summons. The
RTC ordered the cancellation of the pre-trial and the
resetting thereof on November 19, 1999. The next
day, the respondent filed a Comment explaining that
summons had not been served on the petitioner
because, according to the sheriff, the petitioners
address indicated in the complaint, 138 Maria Clara
Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, could not be located.

Moreover, the trial court was merely exercising its

discretion under Rule 16, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure when it denied the petitioners
motion to dismiss. Under said rule, after hearing the
motion, a judge may dismiss the action, deny the
motion to dismiss or order the amendment of the
pleading. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss
based on its finding that the issues alleged by the
respondent in its complaint could not be resolved fully
in the absence of the petitioner. In its desire to
resolve completely the issues brought before it, the
trial court deemed it fitting to properly acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by
ordering the issuance of alias summons on the
petitioner. Evidently, the trial court acted well within
its discretion. The Court of Appeals did not, therefore,
err in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before
it.

The RTC issued an Omnibus Order denying

petitioners motion to dismiss and directing that an
alias summons be issued against the petitioner to be
served upon him at 138 Maria Clara Street, Sta. Mesa,
Manila. The respondent thereafter filed a
manifestation and motion, informing the court that
the address of the petitioner as indicated in the
complaint was erroneous, and that summons should
instead be served upon him at 138 Maria Clara
Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, which was his
correct address.
Petitioner filed a MR of the trial courts
omnibus order contending that the case should be
dismissed in view of the trial courts failure to acquire
jurisdiction over his person and the respondents
failure to prosecute the case, considering that more
than a year had passed since the complaint was
instituted and yet summons had not yet been served
on him. The respondent opposed the petitioners
motion for reconsideration. RTC denied petitioners
MR.

14. MASON VS. CA

Service of Summons
FACTS: Spouses Efren and Digna Mason owned two
parcels of land located along EDSA in Pasay City. The
Masons entered into a lease contract with Columbus
Philippine Bus Corporation under which Columbus
would construct a building worth 10 Million Pesos at
the end of the year of the lease. Columbus failed to
comply with its obligation and this prompted the
petitioners to file an action against the former for the
rescission of the contract before the RTC.

Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for

Certiorari and Prohibition questioning the trial courts
Omnibus
Order
denying
his
motion
for
reconsideration. CA dismissed the petition for failure
to attach certified true copies of relevant documents
referred to in the petition. Petitioners MR was
likewise denied.
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Summons were served upon AyreenRejalde. The

Receipt of the summons state that Rejalde was the
secretary to the president of Columbus duly
authorized to receive legal processes. Columbus
failed to file an answer thus the Masons filed a motion
to declare Columbus in default. The Motion was
granted and the Masons were allowed by the RTC to
present evidence ex-parte. Decision was rendered
thereafter under which it was in favor of the Masons,
declaring the contract cancelled and terminated. Such
decision became final, then Columbus filed a motion
to lift the order of default. Such motion was opposed
by the Masons and the RTC required both parties to
submit their memoranda. Nevertheless, without
waiting for the same, the motion to lift the order of
default was denied. Columbus, unsatisfied, filed a
motion for reconsideration and a motion to lift the
order of execution, which was again denied.
Columbus then appealed to the CA.
The CA lifted the order of default for Columbus
was not properly served with summons and thus
cannot be at fault in is failure to file its answer.
(AyreenRejalde, a mere filing clerk of Columbus, not
among those persons enumerated by Sec 11, Rule 14,
of the Rules of Court.)
Masons filed a motion for reconsideration but to
no avail, thus a petition for review in the SC.
Petitioner cited in Millenium Industrial
Commercial Corporation v. Tan. And referred to
Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. v. Judge Benito,effectively
ruled that said provision is the statement of the
general rule on service of summons upon corporation
and the substantial compliance rule is the exception
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid service of
summons on Columbus.
HELD: No.
No valid service of summons through persons not
included in Sec 11 Rule 14. We held that there was no
valid service of summons on VILLAROSA as service
was made through a person not included in the
enumeration in sec 11 Rule 14, which revised Section
13 Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
It is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the
other party to be heard and to present evidence is not
a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any
administrative or judicial proceedings. The service of
summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of
due process. We will deprive private respondent of its
right to present its defense in this multi-million peso
suit, if we disregard compliance with the rules on
service of summons.

15.) JOSE vs. BOYON

G.R. No. 147369. October 23, 2003. Third Division
Service of Summons; Actions in Personam, in Rem
and quasi in rem
FACTS:
On July 2, 1998, petitioners spouses Patrick
and Rafaela Jose lodged a complaint before the RTC of
Muntinlupa for specific performance against
respondents spouses Helen and Romeo Boyon to
compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of
a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale.
The RTC, presided by herein public
respondent Judge N.C. Perello, issued summons to the
respondents. As per return of the summons,
substituted service was resorted to by the process
server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons
personally to the respondents failed.
Petitioners then filed an Ex-parte Motion for
Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication
which was granted by the trial court. On July 30, 1999,
respondent judge, issued an Order declaring herein
respondents in default for failure to file their
respective answers. Thus, petitioners were allowed to
submit their evidence ex-parte.
Respondent Helen Boyon, who was then
residing in the United States of America, was
surprised to learn from her sister Elizabeth Boyon, of
the resolution issued by the respondent court. Thus,
respondents filed an Ad Cautelam motion
questioning, among others, the validity of the service
of summons effected by the trial court.The RTC
denied said motion on the basis of the defaulted
respondents supposed loss of standing in court. In its
motion for reconsideration, respondents raised the
issue of jurisdiction but was again denied. Thus,
respondents filed before the CA a Petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the jurisdiction of
the regional trial court (RTC).
The CA held that the trial court had no
authority to issue the questioned Resolution and
Orders saying that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction
over respondents because of the invalid service of
summons upon them. Hence, this Petition for Review
under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
WON there is a proper service of summons.
RULING:
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indicating that such information was verified from a

person who had knowledge thereof.Certainly, without
specifying the details of the attendant circumstances
or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a
general statement that such efforts were made will
not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of
substituted service of summons.
Further, extraterritorial service of summons or
summons by publication applies only when the action
is in rem or quasi in rem. The first is an action against
the thing itself instead of against the defendants
person; in the latter, an individual is named as
defendant, and the purpose is to subject that
individuals interest in a piece of property to the
obligation or loan burdening it.
In the instant case, what was filed before the trial
court was an action for specific performance directed
against respondents. While the suit incidentally
involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession
thereof was not put in issue, since they did not assert
any interest or right over it.

No.Substituted service can be availed of only after

a clear showing that personal service of summons was
not legally possible. Also, service by publication is
applicable in actions in rem and quasi in rem, but not
in personal suits such as the present one which is for
specific performance.
In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant by the service of
summons. Where the action is in personam and the
defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be
done by personal or substituted service, following the
procedures laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of
the Revised Rules of Court, which read:
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served
by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person,
or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering
it to him.
Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable
causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section,
service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant's residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants
office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted
Sections, personal service of summons is preferred to
substituted service. Only if the former cannot be
made promptly can the process server resort to the
latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons
must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of
summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the
efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state
that the summons was served upon a person of
sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the
address, or who is in charge of the office or regular
place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise
required that the pertinent facts proving these
circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in
the officers return. The failure to comply faithfully,
strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements
of substituted service renders the service of summons
ineffective.
In this case, the Return of Summons shows that
no effort was actually exerted and no positive step
taken by either the process server or petitioners to
locate and serve the summons personally on
respondents. At best, the Return merely states the
alleged whereabouts of respondents without

16. Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 130974
August 16, 2006
Summons; Substituted Service
FACTS:
Petitioner (Imee Marcos-Manotoc) was a
defendant in a civil case, for Filing, Recognition and/or
Enforcement of Foreign Judgment, filed by Agapita
Trajano.
Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the
trial court issued a Summons on July 6, 1993
addressed to petitioner at Alexandra Condominium
Corporation or Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at
No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City. On July 15, 1993,
the Summons and a copy of the Complaint were
allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an
alleged caretaker of petitioner at the condominium
unit mentioned earlier. When petitioner failed to file
her Answer, the trial court declared her in default.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over
her person due to an invalid substituted service of
summons.
The trial court rejected Manotocs Motion to
Dismiss on the strength of its findings that her
residence, for purposes of the Complaint, was
Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, No. 29 Meralco
Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, based on the
documentary evidence of respondent Trajano. The
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RULES 10 to 14

trial court relied on the presumption that the sheriffs

substituted service was made in the regular
performance of official duty, and such presumption
stood in the absence of proof to the contrary.
Trial court discarded Manotocs plea for
reconsideration for lack of merit. Then she filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the
Court of Appeals, which the latter also denied. A
motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied,
hence, petitioner has come before the Court for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid substituted service of
summons on petitioner for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction.

We can break down this section into the following

requirements to effect a valid substituted service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the
sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served
promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service.
Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the
sheriff is given a reasonable time to serve the
summons to the defendant in person, but no specific
time frame is mentioned. Reasonable time is defined
as so much time as is necessary under the
circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent
man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty
requires that should be done, having a regard for the
rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other
party.[23] Under the Rules, the service of summons
has no set period. However, when the court, clerk of
court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the
return of the summons and the latter submits the
return of summons, then the validity of the summons
lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias
summons if the service of summons has failed. What
then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a
personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility
of prompt service? To the plaintiff, reasonable time
means no more than seven (7) days since an
expeditious processing of a complaint is what a
plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, reasonable time means
15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a
practice for the branch clerk of court to require the
sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to
the sheriff for service. The Sheriffs Return provides
data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the
Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office
of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10)
days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from
the issuance of summons can be considered
reasonable time with regard to personal service on
the defendant.

HELD:
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired
either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendants voluntary appearance in court. When the
defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts
jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of
summons, any judgment of the court which has no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null
and void. In an action strictly in personam, personal
service on the defendant is the preferred mode of
service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to
the defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable
reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a
reasonable period, then substituted service can be
resorted to. While substituted service of summons is
permitted, it is extraordinary in character and in
derogation of the usual method of service. Hence, it
must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed
requirements and circumstances authorized by the
rules. Indeed, compliance with the rules regarding the
service of summons is as much important as the issue
of due process as of jurisdiction.
Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of
Court which applies to this case provides:
SEC. 8. Substituted service. If the defendant
cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section [personal service on
defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendants residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendants office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof.

Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the

service of summons with due care, utmost diligence,
and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to
prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice.
Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to
accomplish personal service on defendant. On the
other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to
avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must
be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in
serving the process on the defendant. For substituted
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service of summons to be available, there must be

several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the
summons within a reasonable period [of one month]
which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service. Several attempts
means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least
two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite
why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then
that impossibility of service can be confirmed or
accepted.

earliest possible time for the person to take

appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the
relation of confidence to the defendant, ensuring that
the latter would receive or at least be notified of the
receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore
determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling
or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the
recipients relationship with the defendant is, and
whether said person comprehends the significance of
the receipt of the summons and his duty to
immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least
notify the defendant of said receipt of summons.
These matters must be clearly and specifically
described in the Return of Summons.

(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of
Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding
the attempted personal service. The efforts made to
find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure
must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The
date and time of the attempts on personal service,
the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the
name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or
house of defendant and all other acts done, though
futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be
specified in the Return to justify substituted service.
The form on Sheriffs Return of Summons on
Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for
Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy
requires a narration of the efforts made to find the
defendant personally and the fact of failure. Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November
9, 1989 requires that impossibility of prompt service
should be shown by stating the efforts made to find
the defendant personally and the failure of such
efforts, which should be made in the proof of service.

(4) A Competent Person in Charge

If the substituted service will be done at
defendants office or regular place of business, then it
should be served on a competent person in charge of
the place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted
service will be made must be the one managing the
office or business of defendant, such as the president
or manager; and such individual must have sufficient
knowledge to understand the obligation of the
defendant in the summons, its importance, and the
prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the
summons. Again, these details must be contained in
the Return.
Invalid Substituted Service in the Case at Bar
Let us examine the full text of the Sheriffs Return,
which reads:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on many occasions
several attempts were made to serve the summons
with complaint and annexes issued by this Honorable
Court in the above entitled case, personally upon the
defendant IMELDA IMEE MARCOS-MANOTOC located
at Alexandra Condominium Corporation [sic] or
Alexandra Homes E-2 Room 104 No. 29 Merlaco [sic]
Ave., Pasig, Metro-Manila at reasonable hours of the
day but to no avail for the reason that said defendant
is usually out of her place and/or residence or
premises. That on the 15th day of July, 1993,
substituted service of summons was resorted to in
accordance with the Rules of Court in the Philippines
leaving copy of said summons with complaint and
annexes thru [sic] (Mr) Macky de la Cruz, caretaker of
the said defendant, according to (Ms) Lyn Jacinto,
Receptionist and Telephone Operator of the said
building, a person of suitable age and discretion, living

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

If the substituted service will be effected at
defendants house or residence, it should be left with a
person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein. A person of suitable age and discretion is one
who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18
years old) and is considered to have enough
discernment to understand the importance of a
summons. Discretion is defined as the ability to make
decisions which represent a responsible choice and
for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or
wise may be presupposed. Thus, to be of sufficient
discretion, such person must know how to read and
understand English to comprehend the import of the
summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the
summons and complaint to the defendant at the
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with the said defendant at the given address who

acknowledged the receipt thereof of said processes
but he refused to sign (emphases supplied).

In the case Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., it may be true

that the Court held that a Sheriffs Return, which
states that despite efforts exerted to serve said
process personally upon the defendant on several
occasions the same proved futile, conforms to the
requirements of valid substituted service. However, in
view of the numerous claims of irregularities in
substituted service which have spawned the filing of a
great number of unnecessary special civil actions of
certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in
prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses, the
Court rules in the case at bar that the narration of the
efforts made to find the defendant and the fact of
failure written in broad and imprecise words will not
suffice. The facts and circumstances should be stated
with more particularity and detail on the number of
attempts made at personal service, dates and times of
the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of
occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons
for failure should be included in the Return to
satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. That such
effort were made to personally serve summons on
defendant, and those resulted in failure, would prove
impossibility of prompt personal service.

WHEREFORE, said summons is hereby returned to

this Honorable Court of origin, duly served for its
record and information.
A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned
Return readily reveals the absence of material data on
the serious efforts to serve the Summons on
petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid
reason cited in the Return why those efforts proved
inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal
service has become impossible or unattainable
outside the generally couched phrases of on many
occasions several attempts were made to serve the
summons x x x personally, at reasonable hours during
the day, and to no avail for the reason that the said
defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence
or premises. Wanting in detailed information, the
Return deviates from the ruling in Domagas v. Jensen
and other related cases that the pertinent facts and
circumstances on the efforts exerted to serve the
summons personally must be narrated in the Return.
It cannot be determined how many times, on what
specific dates, and at what hours of the day the
attempts were made. Given the fact that the
substituted service of summons may be assailed, as in
the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is
imperative that the pertinent facts and circumstances
surrounding the service of summons be described
with more particularity in the Return or Certificate of
Service.

Moreover, to allow sheriffs to describe the facts

and circumstances in inexact terms would encourage
routine performance of their precise duties relating to
substituted servicefor it would be quite easy to
shroud or conceal carelessness or laxity in such broad
terms. Lastly, considering that monies and properties
worth millions may be lost by a defendant because of
an irregular or void substituted service, it is but only
fair that the Sheriffs Return should clearly and
convincingly
show
the
impracticability
or
hopelessness of personal service.

Besides, apart from the allegation of petitioners

address in the Complaint, it has not been shown that
respondent Trajano or Sheriff Caelas, who served such
summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to locate
petitioner. Certainly, the second paragraph of the
Complaint only states that respondents were
informed, and so [they] allege about the address and
whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting to
substituted service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an
effort in good faith to locate the defendant through
more direct means. More so, in the case in hand,
when the alleged petitioners residence or house is
doubtful or has not been clearly ascertained, it would
have been better for personal service to have been
pursued persistently.

Granting that such a general description be

considered adequate, there is still a serious
nonconformity from the requirement that the
summons must be left with a person of suitable age
and discretion residing in defendants house or
residence. Thus, there are two (2) requirements under
the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable
age and discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in
the house or residence of defendant. Both
requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriffs
Return lacks information as to residence, age, and
discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the
sheriffs general assertion that de la Cruz is the
resident caretaker of petitioner as pointed out by a
certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist and
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telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. It is doubtful

if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in
the condominium unit considering that a married
woman of her stature in society would unlikely hire a
male caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With the
petitioners allegation that Macky de la Cruz is not her
employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary
to have additional information in the Return of
Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruzs refusal to
sign the Receipt for the summons is a strong
indication that he did not have the necessary relation
of confidence with petitioner. To protect petitioners
right to due process by being accorded proper notice
of a case against her, the substituted service of
summons must be shown to clearly comply with the
rules.

Dagupan City for the annulment of the decision of the

MTC in Civil Case No. 879, on the ground that due to
the Sheriffs failure to serve the complaint and
summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway,
the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person.
The respondent alleged therein that the service of the
complaint and summons through substituted service
on her brother, Oscar Layno, was improper because of
the following: (a) when the complaint in Civil Case No.
879 was filed, she was not a resident of Barangay
Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, but of Oslo, Norway,
and although she owned the house where Oscar
Layno received the summons and the complaint, she
had then leased it to Eduardo Gonzales; (b) she was in
Oslo, Norway, at the time the summons and the
complaint were served; (c) her brother, Oscar Layno,
was merely visiting her house in Barangay Buenlag
and was not a resident nor an occupant thereof when
he received the complaint and summons; and (d)
Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the
summons and the complaint for and in her behalf.
In her answer to the complaint, the petitioner
alleged that the respondent was a resident of
Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan and was the
owner of the subject premises where Oscar Layno was
when the Sheriff served the summons and complaint;
that the service of the complaint and summons by
substituted service on the respondent, the defendant
in Civil Case No. 879, was proper since her brother
Oscar Layno, a resident and registered voter of
Barangay. Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, received the
complaint and summons for and in her behalf.
The trial court declared that there was no valid
service of the complaint and summons on the
respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879,
considering that she left the Philippines on February
17, 1999 for Oslo, Norway, and her brother Oscar
Layno was never authorized to receive the said
complaint and summons for and in her behalf.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA
which, on May 6, 2003, rendered judgment affirming
the appealed decision with modifications. The CA
ruled that the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was one
for ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem. The
appellate court ruled that since the defendant therein
was temporarily out of the country, the summons and
the complaint should have been served via
extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to
Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which
likewise requires prior leave of court. Considering that
there was no prior leave of court and none of the
modes of service prescribed by the Rules of Court was

It has been stated and restated that substituted

service of summons must faithfully and strictly comply
with the prescribed requirements and in the
circumstances authorized by the rules.
17. DOMAGAS vs. JENSEN
G.R. No. 158407
January 17, 2005
MANNER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS IN ACTION IN
PERSONAM;
STATUTORY
REQUIREMENT
OF
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE
FACTS: On February 19, 1999, petitioner Filomena
Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against
respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao,
Pangasinan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
879. The summons and the complaint were not
served on the respondent because the latter was
apparently out of the country. This was relayed to the
Sheriff by her (the respondents) brother, Oscar
Layno, who was then in the respondents house at No.
572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. The
Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar
Layno, who received the same.
Nonetheless, on May 17, 1999, the court
rendered judgment ordering the respondent and all
persons occupying the property for and in the latters
behalf to vacate the disputed area and to pay monthly
rentals therefor, including actual damages, attorneys
fees, and exemplary damages.
The respondent failed to appeal the decision.
Consequently, a writ of execution was issued on
September 27, 1999.
On August 16, 2000, the respondent filed a
complaint against the petitioner before the RTC of
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followed by the petitioner, the CA concluded that

there was really no valid service of summons and
complaint upon the respondent, the defendant in Civil
Case No. 879.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VALID
SERVICE OF THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 879 ON THE RESPONDENT HEREIN WHO
WAS THE DEFENDANT IN THE SAID CASE. THE
RESOLUTION OF THE MATTER IS ANCHORED ON THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION OF THE
PETITIONER IN THE MTC AGAINST THE RESPONDENT
HEREIN IS AN ACTION IN PERSONAM OR QUASI IN
REM.
HELD: The ruling of the CA that the petitioners
complaint for forcible entry of the petitioner against
the respondent in Civil Case No. 879 is an action quasi
in rem, is erroneous. The action of the petitioner for
forcible entry is a real action and one in personam.
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an
action determine its character. Whether a proceeding
is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that
matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and
by these only. A proceeding in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations
brought against the person and is based on the
jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his
right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific
property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose
of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The
purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose,
through the judgment of a court, some responsibility
or liability directly upon the person of the defendant.
Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to
specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a
pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is
said to be one which has for its object a judgment
against the person, as distinguished from a judgment
against the propriety to determine its state. It has
been held that an action in personam is a proceeding
to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action
is brought against the person. As far as suits for
injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it
is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs,
the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce
personal rights and obligations and in which personal
judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and
obligations between the affected parties is in
personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in
personam.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is
one brought against persons seeking to subject the

property of such persons to the discharge of the

claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual
is named as defendant and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the
obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions
quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or
liability of a particular property but which are
intended to operate on these questions only as
between the particular parties to the proceedings and
not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all
possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding
only upon the parties who joined in the action.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the
person of a resident defendant who does not
voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by
personal service of summons as provided under
Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot
be personally served with summons within a
reasonable time, substituted service may be made in
accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is
temporarily out of the country, any of the following
modes of service may be resorted to: (a) substituted
service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service
outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by
publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other
manner the court may deem sufficient.
Thus, any judgment of the court which has no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null
and void.
In the present case, the records show that the
respondent, before and after his marriage to Jarl
Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of
Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. This can be
gleaned from the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August
26, 1992 in which she declared that she was a
resident of said barangay. Moreover, in the Real
Estate Mortgage Contract dated February 9, 1999, ten
days before the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was
filed, the petitioner categorically stated that she was a
Filipino and a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent was in
Oslo, Norway, having left the Philippines on February
17, 1999, the summons and complaint in Civil Case
No. 879 may only be validly served on her through
substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.If, for justifiable
causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section,
service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the
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summons at the defendants residence with some

person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants
office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
Strict compliance with the mode of service is
required in order that the court may acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.34 The
statutory requirement of substituted service must be
followed faithfully and strictly and any substituted
service other than that authorized by the statute is
rendered ineffective.35 As the Court held in Hamilton
v. Levy
. . . The pertinent facts and circumstances
attendant to the service of summons must be stated
in the proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise,
any substituted service made in lieu of personal
service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because
substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service. It is a method extraordinary in
character and hence may be used only as prescribed
and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here,
no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully,
strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of
substituted service renders said service ineffective.
As gleaned from the said return, there is no
showing that as of April 5, 1999, the house where the
Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latters residence
or that of the respondent herein. Neither is there any
showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the
residence of the respondent was on the said date. It
turned out that the occupant of the house was a
lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in
the premises only to collect the rentals from him. The
service of the summons on a person at a place where
he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at
the residence or place or abode, where he has
another place at which he ordinarily stays and to
which he intends to return.
The Voters Registration Record of Oscar Layno
dated June 15, 1997 wherein he declared that he was
a resident of No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao,
Pangasinan, as well as the Joint Affidavit of Vicenta
Peralta and Orlando Macasalda cannot prevail over
the Contract of Lease the respondent had executed in
favor of Eduardo Gonzales showing that the latter had
resided and occupied the house of the respondent as
lessee since November 24, 1997, and the affidavit of
Eduardo Gonzales that Oscar Layno was not residing
in the said house on April 5, 1999.
In sum, then, the respondent was not validly
served with summons and the complaint in Civil Case

No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service.

Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent; as such, the decision of the
MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void.
18.DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. HON. REINATO G.
QUILALA
G.R. NO. 168723
JULY 9, 2008
SUMMONS; JURISDICTION
FACTS:
Private respondent All Season Farm
Corporation sought the recovery of a sum of money,
accounting and damages from petitioner Dole
Philippines, Inc. (Tropifresh Division) and several of its
officers. According to Dole, an alias summons was
served upon it through a certain MarifaDela Cruz, a
legal assistant employed by Dole Pacific General
Services, Ltd., which is an entity separate from Dole.
Dole filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person
of Dole due to improper service of summons. The RTC
denied said motion. The Motion for Reconsideration
suffered the same fate. Thereafter, Dole filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
contending that the alias summons was not properly
served. The appellate court, however, ruled
otherwise.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid service of
summons on petitioner for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the corporate
defendant, now the petitioner herein.
HELD:
No, but Dole is estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the Court because it sought affirmative
relief from the trial court.
Well-settled is the rule that service of
summons on a domestic corporation is restricted,
limited and exclusive to the persons enumerated in
Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, following the rule in statutory construction
that expressiouniosestexclusioalterius. Service must
therefore be made on the president, managing
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partner, general manager, corporate secretary,

treasurer, or in-house counsel.

equipments. Petitioner Chu purchased on installment

1 Hitachi Excavator worth P900k from Mach and
initially paid P180k. The balance shall be paid in 12
monthly installments through Prime Bank postdated
checks. Chu also purchased 2 heavy equipments- 1
motorgrader and 1 payloader- on installment basis in
the sum of P1M. He made a down payment of P200k
with the balance to be payable in 12 monthly
installments through Land Bank postdated checks.

In this case, it appears that on April 23, 2003,

MarifaDela Cruz, a legal assistant, received the alias
summons. Contrary to private respondents claim that
it was received upon instruction of the president of
the corporation as indicated in the Officers Return,
such fact does not appear in the receiving copy of the
alias summons which MarifaDela Cruz signed. There
was no evidence that she was authorized to receive
court processes in behalf of the president.
Considering that the service of summons was made
on a legal assistant, not employed by herein petitioner
and who is not one of the designated persons under
Section 11, Rule 14, the trial court did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over petitioner.

The checks were dishonoured by the bank upon

presentment, either by reason of "closed account,"
"drawn against insufficient funds," or "payment
stopped." Mach Asia sent petitioner a formal demand
letter urging the latter to settle his accounts within 5
days from receipt of the letter. In response,
petitioner sent a letter explaining that his business
was badly hit by the Asian economic crisis and that he
shall pay his obligation by giving partial payments and
shall voluntarily surrender the subject units should he
fail to do so.

However, under Section 20 of the same Rule, a

defendants voluntary appearance in the action is
equivalent to service of summons. As held previously
by this Court, the filing of motions seeking affirmative
relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to
file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment,
and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction of the court.

On November 11, 1999, Mach Asia filed a

complaint before the RTC of Cebu City for sum of
money, replevin, attorneys fees and damages against
the petitioner. RTC allowed the issuance of a writ of
replevin on the subject heavy equipments. Sheriff
Doroteo P. Cortes proceeded at petitioners given
address for the purpose of serving the summons,
together with the complaint, writ of replevin and
bond. However, the Sheriff failed to serve the
summons personally upon the petitioner, since the
latter was not there. The Sheriff then resorted to
substituted service by having the summons and the
complaint received by a certain Rolando Bonayon, a
security guard of the petitioner.

Note that on May 5, 2003, petitioner filed an

Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time. It was not
a conditional appearance entered to question the
regularity of the service of summons, but an
appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court
by acknowledging the receipt of the alias summons
and praying for additional time to file responsive
pleading.
Consequently,
petitioner
having
acknowledged the receipt of the summons and also
having invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure
affirmative relief in its motion for additional time,
petitioner effectively submitted voluntarily to the
jurisdiction of the RTC. It is estopped now from
asserting otherwise, even before this Court.

Petitioner failed to file any responsive pleading.

Thus, he was declared in default. RTC then rendered a
Decision against CHU and concluded that the
substituted service of summons was valid. CA
AFFIRMED the decision of the RTC and opined that the
requirement of due process was complied with,
considering that petitioner actually received the
summons through his security guard. Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, the petition.

19. SIXTO N. CHU vs. MACH ASIA TRADING

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 184333
April 1, 2013
SUBSTITUTED
SERVICE
OF
SUMMONS;
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON THE DEFENDANT

Petitioner argues that there was no valid

substituted service of summons and that jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is acquired only
through a valid service of summons or the voluntary

FACTS: Respondent Mach Asia is a corporation

engaged in importing dump trucks and heavy
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RULES 10 to 14

appearance of the defendant in court. Hence, when

there is no valid service of summons and no voluntary
appearance by the defendant, any judgment of a
court, which acquired no jurisdiction over the
defendant, is null and void.

Also, impossibility of prompt personal service

must be shown by stating that efforts have been
made to find the defendant personally and that such
efforts have failed. This is necessary because
substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service. It is a method extraordinary in
character, hence, may be used only as prescribed and
in the circumstances authorized by statute. The
statutory requirements of substituted service must be
followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any
substituted service other than that authorized by
statute is considered ineffective.

Respondent posits that the RTC acquired

jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and the
judgment by default of the RTC was based on facts,
law, and jurisprudence and, therefore, should be
enforced against the petitioner.

ISSUES:

In the case at bar, it was not shown that the

security guard who received the summons in behalf of
the petitioner was authorized and possessed a
relation of confidence that petitioner would definitely
receive the summons. This is not the kind of service
contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security
guard could not be considered as substantial
compliance with the requirements of substituted
service.

I. Whether there was a valid substituted service

of summons ;
II. Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon
the filing of the complaint. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is
acquired either through the service of summons upon
them or through their voluntary appearance in court
and their submission to its authority.

The service of summons is a vital and

indispensable ingredient of due process. As a rule, if
defendants have not been validly summoned, the
court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a
judgment rendered against them is null and void.
Since the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner, the judgment rendered by
the court could not be considered binding upon him
for being null and void.

As a rule, summons should be personally served

on the defendant. It is only when summons cannot be
served personally within a reasonable period of time
that substituted service may be resorted to. Section 7,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

AM No. 11-3-6-SC; new rule on service of

summons on foreign juridical entities.
AM. No. 11-3-6-SC

SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable

causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section,
service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant's residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's
office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.

AMENDMENT OF SECTION 12, RULE 14

OF THE RULES OF COURT ON SERVICE UPON
FOREIGN PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY
Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is hereby
amended to read
as follows:

It is to be noted that in case of substituted

service, there should be a report indicating that the
person who received the summons in the defendant's
behalf was one with whom the defendant had a
relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would
actually receive the summons.

"SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical

entity.
When the defendant is a foreign private juridical
entity which
has transacted business in the Philippines, service
may be made

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RULES 10 to 14

on its resident agent designated in accordance

with law for that
purpose, or, i f there be no such agent, on the
government
official designated by law to that effect, or on any
of its officers
or agents within the Philippines.
If the foreign private juridical entity is not
registered in
the Philippines or has no resident agent, service
may, with leave
of court, be effected out of the Philippines
through any of the
following means:
a) B y personal service coursed through the
appropriate court in the foreign country with the
assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs;
b) B y publication once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the country where the defendant
may be
found and by serving a copy of the summons and
the
court order by-registered mail at the last known
address
of the defendant;
c) B y facsimile or any recognized electronic
means that could generate proof of service; or
d) B y such other means as the court may in its
discretion direct."
This rule shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.
March 15, 2011

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1. DE GUZMAN JR. vs. OCHOA

G.R. No. 169292, April 13, 2011. Second Division

the provision, only the following defenses under

Section 1, Rule 9, are excepted from its application:
[a] lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; [b]
there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause (litispendentia); [c] the
action is barred by prior judgment (res judicata); and
[d] the action is barred by the statute of limitations or
prescription.
In this case, the petitioners raised the ground
of defective verification and certification of forum
shopping only when they filed their second motion to
dismiss, despite the fact that this ground was existent
and available to them at the time of the filing of their
first motion to dismiss. Absent any justifiable reason
to explain this fatal omission, the ground of defective
verification and certification of forum shopping was
deemed waived and could no longer be questioned by
the petitioners in their second motion to dismiss.

Motion to Dismiss an Omnibus Motion

FACTS:
On March 25, 2002, respondent spouses Cesar
Ochoa and Sylvia Ochoa, through respondent Araceli
Azores, acting as attorney-in-fact, commenced in the
RTC in Pasig City an action for the annulment of
contract of mortgage, foreclosure sale, certificate of
sale and damages.
On May 22, 2002, the petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss alleging that the complaint did not state a
cause of action. Respondent RTC Judge denied
petitioners' motion to dismissand at the same time
set the case for pre-trial conference.
On March 31, 2003, the petitioners filed a second
motion to dismiss alleging that the certification
against forum shopping attached to the complaint
was not signed by Cesar Ochoa or Sylvia Ochoa but by
Araceli S. Azores (Azores), who was acting as the
attorney-in-fact of Cesar Ochoa only,in violation of
Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, rendering the
complaint fatally defective and thus dismissible. This
was denied. Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration, but the respondent RTC Judge also
denied the motion.
Aggrieved, petitioners went to the CA via a
petition for certiorari contending that the RTCs denial
of their motion to dismiss was capricious, whimsical
and arbitrary, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and should be struck down as null and
void. The CA denied the petition and agreed with the
RTC that following the omnibus motion rule, the
defects of the complaint pointed out by the
petitioners were deemed waived when they failed to
raise it in their first motion to dismiss.Hence, this
petition for review under Rule 45.

2. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. SISON, 612

SCRA 702(2010)
Intervention;
Requisites:
Intervention
Is
Discretionary upon the Court.
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the
movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation;
and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties,
nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of
being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The
interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve
the matter in litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either
gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of
the judgment.
FACTS:
The Isog Han Samar Movement, represented by
Fr. Noel Labendia of the Diocese of Calbayog,
Catbalogan, Samar, filed a letter-complaint accusing
Governor Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public
officials of the Province of Samar, including
respondent Maximo D. Sison, before the Office of the
Ombudsman relative to the alleged highly anomalous
transactions entered into by them amounting to
several millions of pesos. The alleged calamity funds
were expended without a State of Calamity having
been declared by the President; and that purchases
for rice, medicines, electric fans, and cement were
substantially overpriced. Sison was the Provincial
Budget Officer.

ISSUE:
WON the ground of defective verification and
certification of forum shopping was deemed waived
when petitioners failed to raise it in their first motion
to dismiss.
RULING:
Yes.A motion to dismiss, like any other
omnibus motion, must raise and include all objections
available at the time of the filing of the motion
because under Section 8, "all objections not so
included shall be deemed waived." As inferred from
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RULES 15 to 19

intervene in the action. The court shall consider

whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights
may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

The Office of the Ombudsman found basis to

proceed with the administrative case against the
impleaded provincial officials of Samar. In his counteraffidavit, Sison vehemently denied the accusations
and asserted that his function is limited to the
issuance of a certification that an appropriation for
the requisition exists, that the corresponding amount
has been obligated, and that funds are available. He
averred that he never participated in the alleged
irregularities as shown in the minutes and attendance
sheet of the bidding and that not one of the
documentary evidences so far attached in the lettercomplaint bore his signature.
The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a
Decision, finding Sison and several other local officials
of the Province of Samar guilty of grave misconduct,
dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and dismissing him from
service. Aggrieved, Sison appealed to the CA via a
Petition for Review under Rule 43.

SECTION 2. Time to intervene.The motion to

intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-inintervention shall be attached to the motion and
served on the original parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third
persons, not originally parties to the suit but claiming
an interest in the subject matter, come into the case
in order to protect their right or interpose their claim.
Its main purpose is to settle in one action and by a
single judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole
controversy among, the persons involved.
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the
movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation;
and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties,
nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of
being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The
interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve
the matter in litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either
gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of
the judgment.

CA rendered a decision reversing and setting

aside the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
against Sison.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus
Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached
Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently
denied by the CA in its assailed resolution. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman
may be allowed to intervene and seek reconsideration
of the adverse decision rendered by the CA?

3. ANONUEVO VS. JALANDONI

G.R. NO. 178221
DECEMBER 1, 2010
INTERVENTION

HELD:
No. It is fundamental that the allowance or
disallowance of a Motion to Intervene is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court. The permissive
tenor of the rules shows the intention to give to the
court the full measure of discretion in permitting or
disallowing the intervention,8 thus:

FACTS:
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate
and without issue. Bernardino G. Jalandoni
(Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration with the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to
commence the judicial settlement of the latters
estate. The petitioners and their siblings, claiming that
they are the children of Sylvia Desantis, who was the
daughter of Isabel Blee with John Desantis, pray that
they be allowed to intervene on her behalf in the
intestate proceedings. The petitioners and their
siblings contend that their grandmotherIsabel
was, at the time of Rodolfos death, the legal spouse

SECTION 1. Who may intervene.A person

who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
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RULES 15 to 19

of the latter. For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a

share in the estate of Rodolfo.
The intestate court issued an order allowing
the petitioners and their siblings to take part in the
settlement proceedings. The intestate court was
convinced that the evidence at hand adequately
establish Isabels status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo
and, by that token, permitted the petitioners and
their siblings to intervene in the proceedings on her
behalf.
Upon denial of respondents motion for
reconsideration, a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals was filed. The Court of Appeals
granted the petition and nullified the orders of the
intestate court finding that the previous marriage of
Isabel with John Desantis should have been taken as
established culled from Sylvias birth certificate. There
was also failure to prove that the marriage of Isabel
with John Desantis had been dissolved by the time
she was married to Rodolfo, it then follows that the
latter marriagethe Isabel-Rodolfo unionis a nullity
for being bigamous. From that premise, Isabel cannot
be considered as the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The
petitioners and their siblings, therefore, failed to
show that Isabel has any interest in the estate of
Rodolfo.

Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within

the limits of review under a writ of certiorari, when it
examined the evidence proving Isabels right to inherit
from Rodolfo. The sufficiency or insufficiency of such
evidence determines whether the petitioners and
their siblings have successfully established Isabels
interest in Rodolfos estatewhich, as already
mentioned, is an indispensable requisite to justify any
intervention. Ultimately, the re-assessment of the
evidence presented by the petitioners and their
siblings will tell if the assailed orders of the intestate
court were issued in excess of the latters jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion.
4. Fernandez vs. CA
Intervention
FACTS:Complainants Ethelwoldo Fernandez, and
Antonio Henson were elected to the board of
directors of NADECOR. In a regular stockholders
meeting where two groups were vying for control
over the company, Calalang, De Jesus, Romulo, Ayala,
Lazatin, Fernandez, Nitorreda, Engle were Elected.
Gatmaitan was also elected as Corporate Secretary.
Thereafter, Ricafort/s, claiming to be stockholders of
record, sought to annul the said meeting held. They
filed a complaint before the RTC of PASIG. Ricafort/s
alleged that they were not given due notice of the
said meeting thus they were not present and were not
able to exercise their right. RTC agreed with the
Ricaforts. Four separate Petition for Certiorari were
filed by the members of the board with the CA, all
with application for a TRO and/or preliminary
injunction. The CA denied such applications, but on
the same day nevertheless, the 11th division issued a
TRO. During the effectivity of the TRO, the old Board
of Directors assumed the functions of the new one in
order to prevent any hiatus and not to prejudice the
corporation. All the CA petitions were consolidated as
well as the other cases. On February 17, 2012, the
respondents Ricafort filed their Comment Ad
Cautelam to the petition in CA-G.R. No. 122784. The
petitioners therein thereafter filed three (3) urgent
motions to resolve their application for writ of
preliminary injunction, on March 8, on May 22, and
again on June 6, 2012. The Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was granted by the CA 14th Division, which
not for long was questioned. Complainants filed with
the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition, seeking to annul the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the CAs Special 14th Division.
Complainants also filed an Administrative case against
the Justices of the 14th Division of the CA. Alleged in

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it
nullified the orders of the intestate court allowing the
petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the
settlement proceedings.

HELD:
No. A courts power to allow or deny
intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is
circumscribed by the basic demand of sound judicial
procedure that only a person with interest in an
action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene.
Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to allow a
person, who has no interest in an action or
proceeding, to intervene therein.
Consequently, when a court commits a mistake
and allows an uninterested person to intervene in a
casethe mistake is not simply an error of judgment,
but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is
made in excess of the courts jurisdiction and can only
be the product of an exercise of discretion gravely
abused. That kind of error may be reviewed in a
special civil action for certiorari.

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this administrative complaint that the respondent

Justices are guilty of grave misconduct, conduct
detrimental to the service, gross ignorance of the law,
gross incompetence, and manifest partiality.
ISSUE: Whether the Ricaforts have a legal
personality to assail the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the CA 14th Division.
HELD: NO. A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as
to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or
of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action.Section 1 of Rule
19 of the Rules of Court provides that a person who
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with
leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.
Conversely, a person who is not a party in the main
suit cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as a
preliminary injunction. Indeed, he cannot be affected
by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.
Moreover, a person not an aggrieved party in the
original proceedings that gave rise to the petition for
certiorari, will not be permitted to bring the said
action to annul or stay the injurious writ. Such is the
clear import of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, a person not a party to the
proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot
maintain an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court
to have the judgment reviewed. Stated differently, if a
petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one
who was not a party in the lower court, he has no
standing to question the assailed order.
In this Courts Resolution dated July 18, 2012 in
G.R. Nos. 202218-21, entitled Jose G. Ricafort, et al.
v. Court of Appeals *Special 14th Division+, et al.,
involving a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed
by JG Ricafort, De Jesus, Paolo A. Villar, and Ma.
NalenRosero-Galang, also questioning the validity of
the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Special
14th Division of the CA, we ruled that persons who
are not parties to any of the consolidated petitions
have no personality to assail the said injunctive writ.
In another Resolution, also promulgated on July
18, 2012, in G.R. Nos. 202257-60, a petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by herein complainants
to assail the validity of the writ of preliminary
injunction in the aforesaid consolidated CA petitions,

we likewise dismissed the petition due to lack of

personality of the petitioners, since they were nonparties and strangers to the consolidated CA petitions.
We pointed out that they should first have intervened
below, and then filed a motion for reconsideration
from the questioned CA order. On September 19,
2012, we denied their motion for reconsideration
from the dismissal of their petition.
Having established that the herein complainants
have no personality to assail the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the CAs former Special 14th
Division, we cannot now permit them to harass the CA
Justices who issued the same. For even granting that
the issuance of the writ was erroneous, as a matter of
public policy a magistrate cannot be held
administratively liable for every discretionary but
erroneous order he issues. The settled rule is that a
Judge cannot be held to account civilly, criminally or
administratively for an erroneous decision rendered
by him in good faith.
5. RODRIGUEZ VS CA
INTERVENTION
FACTS:
Purita Landicho (Landicho) filed before the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal an Application for
Registration of a piece of land, measuring 125
hectares, located in Barrio Patiis, San Mateo, Rizal,
which was docketed as Land Reg. Case No. N-5098.
Subsequently, the CFI decreed and confirmed the title
of the applicant, Purita Landicho, to the subject
property. ROD issued to Landicho a TCT rather than an
OCT for the subject property and although TCT No.
167681 stated that it was issued pursuant to Decree
No. 1480, no other detail regarding the decree and
the original registration of the subject property was
filled out. The subject property was thereafter sold
several times, and as the old TCTs of the vendors were
cancelled, new TCTs were accordingly issued to the
buyers. It was finally sold to herein Philippine Chinese
Charitable Association, Inc. (PCCAI). On November 14,
1996, Landicho executed a Deed of Absolute Sales
over the subject property in favor of herein Deogenes
O. Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Two years later, on June 1,
1998, Landicho died.
Rodriguez filed an Omnibus Motion before the
RTC in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. Rodriguez alleged
therein that the Decision and Order of the CFI in Land
Reg. Case No. N-5098 which confirmed Landichos
title over the subject property has not been executed.
Rodriguez specifically stated that no decree of
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registration had been issued by the LRC Commissioner

and that no OCT had been ever issued by the ROD in
Landichos name. PCCAI filed before the RTC a
Verified Motion for Leave to Intervene in Land Reg.
Case No. N-5098. PCCAI justified its intervention by
arguing that it was an indispensable party in the case,
having substantial legal interest therein as the
registered owner of the subject property under TCT
No. 482970. The motion for leave to intervene by
PCCAI and its motion for recon are both denied by the
RTC.

7. JACINTO SAGUID vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC,
MARINDUQUE AND GINA S. REY
G.R. No. 150611
June 10, 2003
FAILURE TO FILE PRE-TRIAL BRIEF; REMEDY
THEREOF;
FACTS: 17-yr old Gina S. Rey was married, but
separated de facto from her husband, when she met
petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in
July 1987. They decided to cohabit as husband and
wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacintos
father. They were not blessed with any children.
Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing
vessel "Saguid Brothers." Gina worked as a fish dealer,
but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from
1992 to 1994. In 1996, the couple decided to separate
and end up their 9-year cohabitation.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent can intervene?
HELD:
Yes. Intervention is governed by Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court. The subject property is presently
covered by TCT No. 482970 in the name of PCCAI. As
the registered owner, PCCAI clearly has a legal
interest in the subject property. The issuance of
another certificate of title to Rodriguez will adversely
affect PCCAI, constituting a cloud on its TCT No.
482970. Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period
when a motion to intervene may be filed, the Court
allowed exceptions in several cases. This rule,
however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been
allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the
Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of
justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford
indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded,
the right to be heard even after a decision has been
rendered by the trial court, when the petition for
review of the judgment has already been submitted
for decision before the Supreme Court, and even
where the assailed order has already become final
and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for
intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines
was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and
injury and to settle once and for all the substantive
issues raised by the parties. In fine, the allowance or
disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the
sound discretion of the court after consideration of
the appropriate circumstances. We stress again that
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure
whose object is to make the powers of the court fully
and completely available for justice. Its purpose is not
to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice.

On January 9, 1997, Gina filed a complaint for

Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with
Receivership against Saguid with the RTC of Boac,
Marinduque, praying that her contribution to the
construction of their house be reimbursed to her and
that she be declared the sole owner of the personal
properties. Gina alleged that from her salary as
entertainer and fish dealer she was able to contribute
P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished
house and was able to acquire appliances, furniture
and household effects, with a value of P111,375.00.
That the amounts were deposited in their joint
account with the First Allied Development Bank.
Petitioner Saguid claimed otherwise. The
expenses were solely from his income as a captain of
their fishing vessel. Selling fish was a mere pastime to
Gina. Saguid further contended that Gina did not work
continuously in Japan from 1992 to 1994, but only for
a 6-month duration each year. When their house was
repaired and improved sometime in 1995-1996,
Ginas earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily
needs and business of her parents and that Saguids
savings were spent in purchasing the personal
properties.
On May 21, 1997, RTC declared Jacinto Saguid in
default for failure to file a pre-trial brief as required by
SC Circular No. 1-89. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order but it was denied. Gina
presented her evidence ex parte. Petitioner filed

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RULES 15 to 19

another motion for reconsideration but the same was

also denied.

that petitioner did not understand the import of the

April 23, 1997 order directing him to file a pre-trial
brief, he could have inquired from the court or filed a
motion for extension of time to file the brief. Instead,
he waited until May 26, 1997, or 14 days from his
alleged receipt of the April 23, 1997 order before he
filed a motion asking the court to excuse his failure to
file a brief. Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or
dismissed because their non-observance may result in
prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all rules,
they should be followed except only for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed.

RTC rendered a decision in favor of Gina. On

appeal, CA affirmed RTC; CA ruled that the propriety
of the order which declared the petitioner as in
default became moot and academic in view of the
effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It
explained that the new rules now require the filing of
a pre-trial brief and the defendants non-compliance
therewith entitles the plaintiff to present evidence ex
parte.
Both parties filed motions for reconsideration
which were denied. Hence, the petition.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the trial court erred in
allowing private respondent to present evidence ex
parte; and

II. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the

effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
specifically, Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, rendered moot
and academic the issue of whether or not the plaintiff
may be allowed to present evidence ex parte for
failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief. While
the rules may indeed be applied retroactively, the
same is not called for in the case at bar. Even before
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on July 1,
1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was required under
Circular No. 1-89 which became effective on February
1, 1989. Pursuant to the said circular, "failure to file
pre-trial briefs may be given the same effect as the
failure to appear at the pre-trial," that is, the party
may be declared non-suited or considered as in
default.

II. Whether CA committed error in applying

retroactively the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in the
present case
HELD: The decision of the CA is affirmed.
I. Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file a
pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to
appear at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present
his evidence ex parte and the court shall render
judgment on the basis thereof. The remedy of the
defendant is to file a motion for reconsideration
showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief was due
to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect. The
motion need not really stress the fact that the
defendant has a valid and meritorious defense
because his answer which contains his defenses is
already on record.

8. YAO vs. PERELLO

G.R. No. 153828
October 24, 2003
REQUISITES
INTERVENTION

TO

FILE

MOTION

FOR

FACTS: The present controversy stemmed from a

complaint filed by petitioner before the HLURB
against a certain corporation, PR Builders, Inc. and its
managers, Enrico Baluyot and PablitoVillarin, private
respondents husband.
The HLURB rendered a decision rescinding the
contract to sell between petitioner and PR Builders,
and ordering PR Builders to refund petitioner and to
pay damages. Thereafter, the HLURB issued a writ of
execution against PR Builders and its managers, and
referred the writ to the office of the Clerk of Court of
Muntinlupa for enforcement.

In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure

to file a pre-trial brief is justified because he was not
represented by counsel. This justification is not,
however, sufficient to set aside the order directing
private respondent to present evidence ex parte,
inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his own risk not
to be represented by counsel. Even without the
assistance of a lawyer, petitioner was able to file a
motion for extension to file answer, the required
answer stating therein the special and affirmative
defenses, and several other motions. If it were true
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RULES 15 to 19

Pursuant to the writ, the deputy sheriff levied on

a parcel of land registered in the names of spouses
PablitoVillarin and private respondent, Bernadine
Villarin. The property was scheduled for public
auction.
Private respondent filed before the RTC, a petition
for prohibition with prayer for TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Sheriff
Bagabaldo from proceeding with the public auction.
On even date, public respondent Judge issued a 72hour temporary restraining order and set the case for
raffle and conference on March 22, 2002.
The case was eventually raffled to RTC, presided
by public respondent judge. Public respondent judge
issued resolution granting private respondents
petition for prohibition and declaring the subject
property exempt from execution. Hence, the
scheduled auction sale did not materialize.
On April 25, 2002, or more than a month after
public respondent judge issued the resolution of
March 22, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for
intervention. However, public respondent judge
denied the motion in her assailed order of May 10,
2002. Petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari.

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,

and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding
the respondent to desist from further proceedings in
the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
provided in the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
(2a)
Consequently, petitioners claim that he had the
right to intervene is without basis. Nothing in the said
provision requires the inclusion of a private party as
respondent in petitions for prohibition. On the other
hand, to allow intervention, it must be shown that (a)
the movant has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration
must be given as to whether the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties may be delayed or
prejudiced, or whether the intervenors rights may be
protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both
requirements must concur as the first is not more
important than the second.

ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONERS MOTION FOR

INTERVENTION SHOULD BE GRANTED
HELD:
NO.Accordingly, private respondent acted well
within her rights in filing a petition for prohibition
against the deputy sheriff because the latter went
beyond his authority in attaching the subject
property. This right is specifically reserved by Section
17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner insists that, in a petition for prohibition,
it is essential that the party who is interested in
sustaining the act or acts sought to be prohibited or
enjoined be impleaded as private respondent. Thus,
as the judgment creditor in the HLURB case,
petitioner claims that he was an indispensable party
in the petition for prohibition and should have been
allowed to intervene in the said case. He was not
allowed to do so.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that

petitioners right as a judgment creditor was adversely
affected by the lifting of the levy on the subject real
property. Records reveal that there are other pieces
of property exclusively owned by the defendants in
the HLURB case that can be levied upon.
Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument
that petitioner indeed had the right to intervene, he
must exercise said right in accordance with the rules
and within the period prescribed therefor.
As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for
intervention may be filed at any time before rendition
of judgment by the trial court. Petitioner filed his
motion only on April 25, 2002, way beyond the period
set forth in the rules. The court resolution granting
private respondents petition for prohibition and
lifting the levy on the subject property was issued on
March 22, 2002. By April 6, 2002, after the lapse of 15

Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2 Petition for prohibition. - When the
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial functions, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
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RULES 15 to 19

days, the said resolution had already become final and

executory.

Accordingly, the summons was published in the

"Metropolitan Newsweek", a periodical edited and
published in the City of Caloocan and Malolos,
Bulacan.

Besides, the mere fact that petitioner failed to

move for the reconsideration of the trial courts
resolution is sufficient cause for the outright dismissal
of the instant petition. Certiorari as a special civil
action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration
is first filed before the respondent court to allow it an
opportunity to correct its errors, if any.

Some of the named respondents filed their

respective responsive pleadings, while the others,
including Vil-Ma, failed to answer, and were thus
declared in default. Consequently, petitioners were
allowed to present evidence ex parte against the
defaulted respondents. The trial court rendered a
partial judgment in favor of the petitioners.

Finally, grave abuse of discretion is committed

when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility. The Court fails to find grave abuse of
discretion committed by public respondent judge in
rendering the assailed resolution and order.

Exactly one (1) year and fifty-seven (57) days

after the above-quoted judgement by default was
rendered, a Petition for Annulment of Judgement with
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus4 was brought
before the Court of Appeals by the titled owners of
the subdivided lots within Vil-Ma. They assailed the
default judgement which nullified all their titles,
arguing that the court a quo had no jurisdiction over
them and their respective titled properties. They also
alleged that they only came to know of the adverse
judgement when petitioners sought the execution of
the judgement by attempting to dispossess some of
the titled owners of the lots and making formal
demands for them to vacate their respective
properties. Also, they claimed that the Partial Decision
against the defaulted respondents was null and void
on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic
fraud.

9. ALBERTO G. PINLAC VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 91486
JANUARY 19, 2001
SUMMONS; INTERVENTION; CONCLUSIVENESS OF
JUDGMENT
FACTS:
The instant case springs from a contentious
and protracted dispute over a sizeable piece of real
property situated in what is now known as Old Balara,
Sitio Veterans, Barrio Payatas and Silangan, all of
Quezon City. Petitioners herein are World War II
veterans, their dependents and successors-in-interest.
Together, they filed a class suit primarily for Quieting
of Title before the RTC. In particular, petitioners
claimed that the real property, which has an
aggregate area of 502 hectares, were part of forest
lands belonging to the government; that they and
their predecessors-in-interest have occupied said
property continuously, adversely, and exclusively for
more than thirty (30) years; and that they have
accordingly filed applications for land titling in their
respective names with the appropriate government
agency.

The trial court granted the preliminary

injunction. Thereafter, granted the petition for
annulment of judgment.
On July 22, 2002, the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), thru the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a motion for intervention and a
Petition-In-Intervention praying that judgment be
rendered declaring:
1) That OCT No. 333 is a valid and existing title
in line with the decisions this Honorable Court had
already rendered;
2) That OCT No. 333 was never expanded from
its original area of 52,949,737 square meters;
3) That the land occupied by petitioners is not
forest land and is covered by OCT No. 333;

One of those so impleaded as a partyrespondent was the Vil-Ma Maloles Subdivision

(hereinafter, Vil-Ma). The individual lot owners of the
said subdivision, however, were not specifically
named. Since personal service of summons could not
be effected on Vil-Ma and some of the other named
respondents, petitioners moved for leave of court to
serve summons by publication which was granted.
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RULES 15 to 19

4) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case

No. Q-35673 with respect to OCT No. 333 are null and
void; and
5) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case
No. Q-35672 is null and void, no notice of the
hearings/proceedings having been sent to the
Republic and other interested parties.

when it refused to consider all the factual issues

raised by petitioners.
b. No.
While the service of summons by publication
may have been done with the approval of the trial
court, it does not cure the fatal defect that the
"Metropolitan Newsweek" is not a newspaper of
general circulation in Quezon City .The Rules strictly
require that publication must be "in a newspaper of
general circulation and in such places and for such
time as the court may order." The court orders relied
upon by petitioners did not specify the place and the
length of time that the summons was to be published.
In the absence of such specification, publication in just
any periodical does not satisfy the strict requirements
of the rules. The incomplete directive of the court a
quo coupled with the defective publication of the
summons rendered the service by publication
ineffective. The modes of service of summons should
be strictly followed in order that the court may
acquire jurisdiction over the respondents, and failure
to strictly comply with the requirements of the rules
regarding the order of its publication is a fatal defect
in the service of summons. It cannot be over
emphasized that the statutory requirements of
service of summons, whether personally, by
substituted service, or by publication, must be
followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any mode of
service other than that prescribed by the statute is
considered ineffective.
Be that as it may, even granting that the
publication strictly complied with the rules, the
service of summons would still be ineffective insofar
as private respondents are concerned. At the time the
complaint for Quieting of title was filed on November
2, 1983, VilmaMaloles Subdivision no longer existed
as a juridical entity. VilmaMaloles Subdivision, a
partnership, was dissolved more than six (6) years
earlier, as evidenced by a Certificate of Dissolution
issued by the SEC dated January 26,1976.
Consequently, it could no longer be sued having lost
its juridical personality.
c. Yes.

The Republic likewise prays for such other

relief as may be just and equitable under the
circumstances.
ISSUES:
a. Whether the CA was correct in granting the
petition for annulment of judgment?
b. Whether publication of the summons made
in the Metropolitan Newsweek was defective, hence
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondents.
c.Whether or not the intervention of the
Republic of the Philippines is proper in this case.
HELD:
a.Yes.
The case before the Court of Appeals was one
for annulment of judgement, certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus. In resolving the same, the Court of
Appeals need not retry the facts. An action for
annulment of judgement is grounded only on two
justifications: (I) extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of
jurisdiction or denial of due process. All that herein
private respondents had to prove was that the trial
court had no jurisdiction; that they were prevented
from having a trial or presenting their case to the trial
court by some act or conduct of petitioners; or that
they had been denied due process of law. Thus, the
Court of Appeals need only to resolve the issues of
lack of jurisdiction, existence of extrinsic fraud, and
denial of due process of law.
The action for annulment of judgement
cannot and was not a substitute for the lost remedy of
appeal. The very purpose of the action for annulment
of judgement was to have the final and executory
judgement set aside so that there will be a renewal of
litigation. Whether or not the assailed Partial Decision
based solely on facts and evidence presented by the
petitioners is meritorious is irrelevant and immaterial.
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err, nor did it
violate the petitioners' right to due process of law,

The rule on intervention, like all other rules of

procedure is intended to make the powers of the
Court fully and completely available for justice. It is
aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of
rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness
of the filing thereof. Indeed, in exceptional cases, the
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RULES 15 to 19

Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the

rendition of judgment by the trial court. In one case,
intervention was allowed even when the petition for
review of the assailed judgment was already
submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.
In Mago v. Court of Appeals, intervention was
granted even after the decision became final and
executory, thus
. . . The permissive tenor of the provision on
intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give
to the court the full measure of discretion in
permitting or disallowing the same. But needless to
say, this discretion should be exercised judiciously and
only after consideration of all the circumstances
obtaining in the case.
Clearly, the intervention of the Republic is
necessary to protect public interest as well as
government properties located and projects
undertaken on Lot No. 3. The Constitutional mandate
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law can certainly be
invoked by the Republic which is an indispensable
party to the case at bar. As correctly pointed out by
the Solicitor General, while the provision is intended
as a protection of individuals against arbitrary action
of the State, it may also be invoked by the Republic to
protect its properties.

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1. DASMARIAS GARMENTS, INC. VS. REYES, 225

SCRA 622(1993)

challenged orders of the Trial Court. Its motion for

reconsideration was denied in a Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated December 11, 1992. Hence,
this petition.

Depositions;
Depositions are intended as a means to compel
disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party
or other person which are relevant in some suit or
proceeding in court. Depositions are not generally
meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in
open court of a party or witness.

ISSUES: 1.)Whether a party could, during the trial,

present its evidence by taking the deposition of its
witnesses in a foreign jurisdiction in lieu of their oral
examination in open Court?
2.) Whether the taking of deposition is a mode of
pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action
comes to trial?
HELD:
1. Yes. Depositions are chiefly a mode of
discovery. They are intended as a means to compel
disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party
or other person which are relevant in some suit or
proceeding in court. Depositions are meant to enable
a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not
only known to him and his witnesses but also those
known to the adverse party and the latters own
witnesses. The object of discovery is to make it
possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the
material and relevant facts, from whoever may have
knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or
motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual
foundation, and all the relevant facts may be.
Depositions are principally made available by law
to the parties as a means of informing themselves of
all the relevant facts. They are not therefore generally
meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in
open court of a party or witness. The deponent must
as a rule be presented for oral examination in open
court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of
the rules of evidence. Any deposition offered to prove
the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing in
lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in
open court may be opposed and excluded on the
ground that it is hearsay.
The party against whom it is offered has no
opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the
time that his testimony is offered. It matters not that
that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded
during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the
opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a
party at the time that the testimonial evidence is
actually presented against him during the trial or
hearing.
Of course the deposition-taking in the case at bar
is a departure from the accepted and usual judicial
proceedings of examining witnesses in open court
where their demeanor could be observed by the trial

FACTS:
American President Lines, Ltd.(APL) sued
Dasmarias Garments, Inc. to recover the sum of US
$53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent to
twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as attorneys fees
and litigation expenses. In its answer, Dasmarias
Garments, Inc. specifically denied any liability to APL
and set up compulsory counterclaims against it. The
case was scheduled for trial. During the trial APL
presented its first witness whose testimony was
completed on November 12, 1988. The case was reset
for reception of the testimony of two (2) more
witnesses in APLs behalf.
At the hearing instead of presenting its witnesses,
APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take the
depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei,
Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose, a
commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed
to the consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines in Taipei **. Five (5) days
later APL filed an amended motion stating that since
the Philippine Government has no consulate office in
Taiwan in view of its one-China policy, there being
in lieu thereof an office set up by the President
presently occupied by Director Joaquin Roces which
is the Asian Exchange Center, Inc., it was necessary
and it therefore prayedthat commission or letters
rogatory be issued addressed to Director Joaquin. This
was opposed by petitioner.
RTC resolved the incident in favor of APL. It
opined that the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. being
the authorized Philippine representative in Taiwan,
may take the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses
residing there by deposition, Petitioners MR was
denied.

Court of Appeals rendered judgment denying

Dasmarias petition for certiorari and upholding the
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RULES 23 to 32

judge; but the procedure is not on that account

rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken,
inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the
exceptions where the law permits such a situation,
i.e., the use of a deposition in lieu of the actual
appearance and testimony of the deponent in open
court and without being subject to the prying eyes
and probing questions of the Judge. This is allowed
provided the deposition is taken in accordance with
the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court and the
existence of any of the exceptions for its
admissibilitye.g., that the witness if out of the
province and at a greater distance than fifty (50)
kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out
of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence
was procured by the party offering the deposition; or
** that the witness is unable to attend to testify
because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment,
etc (Sec. 4, Rule 24, supra, italics supplied)is first
satisfactorily.

rights of the accused to meet the witness against him

face to face.The motion for reconsideration by the
prosecution was also denied. Thereafter the case was
brought before the CA. CA ruled that there is no rule
that disallow the deposition taking of Ping in criminal
cases, adding that the defense could still make a
timely objectionduring the taking of the oral
deposition either through counsel or through the
consular officer who would be taking the deposition
of the witness.
ISSUE: Whether Section 17 Rule 23 could be
applied suppletorily in the case (Criminal case)
HELD: No. WE rule in favor of petitioners. The
Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an
Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered Under
Section 15, Rule 119. The examination of witnesses
must be done orally before a judge in open court.
This is true in criminal cases where the
Constitution secures to the accused his right to a
public trial and to meet the witnessess against him
face to face. The requirement is the safest and most
satisfactory method of investigating facts as it
enables the judge to test the witness' credibility
through his manner and deportment while
testifying.14 It is not without exceptions, however,
as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional
examination of witnesses and the use of their
depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct
court testimony.
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as
to the availability of conditional examination of
witnesses both for the benefit of the defense, as
well as the prosecution. The Court's ruling in the case
of Vda. deManguerra v. Risos:
x xx As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of
Court provide for the different modes of discovery
that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These
rules are adopted either to perpetuate the
testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In
criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure , which
took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the
conditional examination of both the defense and
prosecution witnesses .
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules
of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil cases,
either upon oral examination or written
interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or
person authorized to administer oaths at any time or
place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine
consular official, commissioned officer or person
authorized toadminister oaths in a foreign state or

2.) Not so. Depositions may be taken at any time

after the institution of any action, whenever
necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits
deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or
before it; no prohibition against the taking of
depositions after pre-trial. Indeed, the law authorizes
the taking of depositions of witnesses before or after
an appeal is taken from the judgment of a Regional
Trial Court to perpetuate their testimony for use in
the event of further proceedings in the said court
(Rule 134, Rules of Court), and even during the
process of execution of a final and executory
judgment.
GO vs. PEOPLE
FACTS: Go was charged with Other deceits punishable
under Art. 318 of the RPC. The case was filed before
the Mtc. Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman, and a
witness for the prosecution was unable to testify for
the reason that he had undergone treatment for his
lungs. The prosecution asked the Mtc that the
deposition of Ping be taken. The Mtc then granted the
same. This prompted Go to file a petition for certiorari
before the RTC which granted the same. The RTC held
that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions
of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to
the case since there is a specific provision in the Rules
of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of
prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is
primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional
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country, with no additional

requirement except
reasonable notice in writing to the other party.
But for purposes of taking the deposition in
criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution
witness who would forseeably be unavailable for
trial, the testimonial examination should be made
before the court, or at least before the judge, where
the case is pending as required by the clear mandate
of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads
thus: SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the
prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears that a
witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to
appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to
leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning,
he may forthwith be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending .
Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or
in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the
examination has been served on him shall be
conducted in the same manner as an examination at
the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend
the examination after notice shall be considered a
waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in
behalf of or against the accused.

Concepcion instituted a special civil action for

certiorari before the CA which remained pending
before the appellate court as of the date of this
Decision.
On August 16, 2000, the counsel of Concepcion
filed a motion to take the latters deposition
explaining the need to perpetuate Concepcions
testimony due to her weak physical condition and old
age, which limited her freedom of mobility. The RTC
granted the motion and directed that Concepcions
deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court of
Makati City. Respondents motion for reconsideration
was denied by the trial court. After several motions
for change of venue of the deposition-taking,
Concepcions deposition was finally taken on March 9,
2001 at her residence.
Aggrieved, respondents assailed the RTC orders in
a special civil action for certiorari before the CA. The
CA
favored
respondentsdeclaring
that the
examination of prosecution witnesses, Conception, is
governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court. The latter provision, said the appellate court,
only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific
provision of Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcions
deposition should have been taken before the judge
or the court where the case is pending, which is the
RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of
Makati City.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
WON the examination of prosecution witnesses,
Conception, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
RULING:
Yes. In criminal cases, all witnesses shall give
their testimonies at the trial of the case in the
presence of the judge. This is to afford the accused
the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the
witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties and
their counsel the chance to propound such questions
as they deem material and necessary to support their
position or to test the credibility of said witnesses.
Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the
witnesses demeanor.
In this case, the very reason offered by the
petitioners to exempt Concepcion from the coverage
of Rule 119 is at once the ground which places her
squarely within the coverage of the same provision.
Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be

3. VDA. DE MANGUERA vs. RISOS

G.R. No. 152643. August 28, 2008. Third Division
Deposition; Giving of testimonies
FACTS:
On November 4, 1999, respondents were charged
with EstafaThrough Falsification of Public Document
before the RTC of Cebu City. Respondents allegedly
falsified a deed of real estate mortgage where they
made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the
mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property,
affixed her signature to the document.
Earlier, on September 10, 1999, Concepcion, who
was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in
Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati
Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal
bleeding and was advised to stay in Manila for further
treatment.
On November 24, 1999, respondents filed a
Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in the
Criminal Case on the ground of prejudicial question
arguing that a Civil Case for declaration of nullity of
the mortgage should first be resolved. The RTC
granted the aforesaid motion.Concepcion filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence,
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conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or

infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to
leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule
119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that
the conditional examination be made before the court
where the case is pending. It is also necessary that the
accused be notified, so that he can attend the
examination, subject to his right to waive the same
after reasonable notice. As to the manner of
examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted
in the same manner as an examination during trial,
that is, through question and answer.
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply
to all actions, civil or criminal, and special
proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil
procedure have suppletory application to criminal
cases. However, it is likewise true that the criminal
proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule
119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in
the instant case, there is no cogent reason to apply
Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
While we recognize the prosecutions right to
preserve its witness testimony to prove its case, we
cannot disregard rules which are designed mainly for
the protection of the accuseds constitutional rights.
The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule.
The conditional examination of a witness outside of
the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a
strict construction of the rules.

respondent had the burden to prove through its own

witness during the trial and thus petitioner need not
answer; and, (b) the request for admission regarding
the ownership set-up of petitioner corporation was
immaterial and improper for not having been pleaded
in the complaint.
The
trial
court
disregarded
ALLIED's
Comments/Objections and directed ALLIED to answer
the request for admission within ten (10) days from
receipt of the order, otherwise, the matters contained
in the request would be deemed admitted. ALLIED
moved to reconsider the order; however, the lower
court denied the same and directed the latter to
answer the request for admission within a
nonextendible period of five (5) days from receipt of
the order.
ALLIED failed to submit a sworn answer to the
request for admission within the additional period of
five (5) days granted by the trial court. Hence, CHERRY
VALLEY filed a motion for summary judgment alleging
that there was already an implied admission on the
matters requested for admission pursuant to Rule 26
of the Rules of Court.
The trial court rendered judgment against
petitioner. ALLIED appealed to the Court of Appeals,
but the latter affirmed the trial courts decision.
Hence, the instant petition by ALLIED.
ISSUE:
Whether Allieds failure to answer the
request for admission resulted in its admission of the
matters stated in the request.
HELD:
Yes. Section 1 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 1. Request for admission. At any time
after issues have been joined, a party may file and
serve upon any other party a written request for the
admission by the latter of the genuineness of any
material and relevant document described in and
exhibited with the request or of the truth of any
material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the
request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered
with the request unless copies have already been
furnished.
The purpose of the rule governing requests for
admission of facts and genuineness of documents is to
expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of
proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and
the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable
inquiry. Each of the matters of which an admission is
requested shall be deemed admitted unless within a
period designated in the request which shall not be

4. ALLIED AGRI-BUSINESS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 118438
DECEMBER 4, 1998
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION
FACTS:
A collection of sum of money was filed by Cherry
Valley Farms Limited, foreign company, against Allied
Agri-Business Development Co. Inc., who allegedly
failed to pay several duck hatching eggs and ducklings
despite demands by the former.
ALLIED filed an answer denying the material
allegations of the complaint. CHERRY VALLEY served
on ALLIED's counsel a Request for Admission. ALLIED
filed its Comments/Objections alleging that: (a) the
admissions requested were matters which the private
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RULES 23 to 32

less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or

within such further time as the court may allow on
motion, the party to whom the request is directed
files and serves upon the party requesting the
admission a sworn statement either denying
specifically the matters of which an admission is
requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why
he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those
matters. Upon service of request for admission, the
party served may do any of the following acts: (a) he
may admit each of the matters of which an admission
is requested, in which case, he need not file an
answer; (b) he may admit the truth of the matters of
which admission is requested by serving upon the
party requesting a written admission of such matters
within the period stated in the request, which must
not be less than ten (10) days after service, or within
such further time as the court may allow on motion
and notice; (c) he may file a sworn statement; denying
specifically the matter of which an admission is
requested; or, (d) he may file a sworn statement
setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot
truthfully either admit or deny the matters of which
an admission is requested.
The records show that although petitioner filed
with the trial court its comments and objections to
the request for admission served on it by private
respondent, the trial court disregarded the objections
and directed petitioner after denying its motion for
reconsideration, to answer the request within five (5)
days from receipt of the directive; otherwise, the
matters of which the admission was requested would
be deemed admitted. Petitioner failed to submit the
required answer within the period. The matters set
forth in the request were therefore deemed admitted
by petitioner.

the said persons are all residents of the United States

and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena to
testify since the court had no jurisdiction over them.
Respondent further alleged that the taking of the
oral depositions of the aforementioned individuals
whose testimonies are allegedly material and
indispensable to establish his innocence of the crime
charged is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to
the said motion averring that: 1.] Rule 24, Section 4
of the Rules of Court has no application in criminal
cases; 2.] Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on
Criminal Procedure provides for conditional
examination of witnesses for the accused before trial
not during trial; 3.] Rule 119, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court on Criminal Procedure does not sanction the
conditional examination of witnesses for the
accused/defense outside Philippine jurisdiction.
RTC denied the motion of respondent on the
ground that the same is not allowed by Section 4, Rule
24 and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Court. MR likewise denied by the trial court.
Dissatisfied, respondent Webb elevated his cause
to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for
certiorari.
The People contended that the questioned orders
of the Presiding Judge may be considered merely as
errors of judgment which may be corrected by appeal
in due time.
In
his
Comment,private
respondent
LauroVizconde sought the dismissal of the petition.
The Court of Appeals rendered judgment granting
the taking of deposition (in favour of Webb).
The People forthwith elevated its cause to this
Court by way of the instant petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL JUDGE
GRAVELY ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN DENYING THE
MOTION TO TAKE TESTIMONY BY ORAL DEPOSITIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES WHICH WOULD BE USED IN
THE CRIMINAL CASE BEFORE HER COURT.
HELD: NO. As defined, a deposition is "The testimony of a witness taken upon oral
question or written interrogatories, not in open court,
but in pursuance of a commission to take testimony
issued by a court, or under a general law or court rule
on the subject, and reduced to writing and duly
authenticated, and intended to be used in preparation
and upon the trial of a civil or criminal prosecution. A
pretrial discovery device by which one party (through
his or her attorney) asks oral questions of the other
party or of a witness for the other party. The person

5. PEOPLE VS WEBB
G.R NO. 132577
AUGUST 17, 1999
MODES OF DISCOVERY; DEPOSITION; DEFINITION;
PURPOSE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
FACTS: Respondent Webb is one of the accused in
Criminal Case for Rape with Homicide pending before
Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque,
presided by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino.
During the course of the proceedings in the trial
court, respondent filed a Motion To Take Testimony
By Oral Deposition before the general consul, consul,
vice-consul or consular agent of the Philippines in lieu
of presenting them as witnesses in court alleging that
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RULES 23 to 32

who is deposed is called the deponent.

The
deposition is conducted under oath outside of the
court room, usually in one of the lawyers offices. A
transcript - word for word account - is made of the
deposition. Testimony of [a] witness, taken in writing,
under oath or affirmation, before some judicial officer
in answer to questions or interrogatories x xx.
And the purposes of taking depositions are to: 1.]
Give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining
the truth and in checking and preventing perjury; 2.]
Provide an effective means of detecting and exposing
false, fraudulent claims and defenses; 3.] Make
available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way,
facts which otherwise could not be proved except
with great difficulty; 4.] Educate the parties in
advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and
defenses
thereby
encouraging
settlements;
5.]Expedite litigation; 6.] Safeguard against surprise;
7.] Prevent delay; 8.] Simplify and narrow the issues;
and 9.] Expedite and facilitate both preparation and
trial.As can be gleaned from the foregoing, a
deposition, in keeping with its nature as a mode of
discovery, should be taken before and not during trial.
In fact, rules on criminal practice - particularly on the
defense of alibi, which is respondents main defense
in the criminal proceedings against him in the court
below - states that when a person intends to rely on
such a defense, that person must move for the taking
of the deposition of his witnesses within the time
provided for filing a pre-trial motion.
It needs to be stressed that the only reason of
respondent for seeking the deposition of the foreign
witnesses is to foreclose any objection and/or
rejection of, as the case may be, the admissibility of
Defense Exhibits 218 and 219. This issue has,
however, long been rendered moot and academic by
the admission of the aforementioned documentary
exhibits by the trial court in its order dated July 10,
1998.
It need not be overemphasized that the foregoing
factual circumstances only serves to underscore the
immutable fact that the depositions proposed to be
taken from the five U.S. based witnesses would be
merely corroborative or cumulative in nature and in
denying respondents motion to take them, the trial
court was but exercising its judgment on what it
perceived to be a superfluous exercise on the belief
that the introduction thereof will not reasonably add
to the persuasiveness of the evidence already on
record. In this regard, it bears stressing that under
Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court:

SEC. 6. Power of the court to stop further

evidence. - The court may stop the introduction of
further testimony upon any particular point when the
evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses
to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to
be additionally persuasive. But this power should be
exercised with caution.
The use of discovery procedures is directed to the
sound discretion of the trial judge.There is no
indication in this case that in denying the motion of
respondent-accused, the trial judge acted in a biased,
arbitrary, capricious or oppressive manner. Grave
abuse of discretion x xx implies such capricious, and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act all in contemplation of law.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed
of only if there is concurrence of the essential
requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial functions has actedwithout or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess or jurisdiction, and (b)
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding.
There must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical
exercise of power for it to prosper.
To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or
the agency exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions, the remedy is a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
petitioner in such cases must clearly show that the
public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact
definition, but generally refers to capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.
It has been held, however, that no grave abuse
of discretion may be attributed to a court simply
because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and
evidence. A writ of certiorari may not be used to
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RULES 23 to 32

correct a lower tribunal's evaluation of the evidence

and factual findings. In other words, it is not a
remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are
correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors
of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in
the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long
as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged
errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will
amount to nothing more than errors of judgment
which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by
special civil action for certiorari.
Whether or not the respondent-accused has been
given ample opportunity to prove his innocence and
whether or not a further prolongation of proceedings
would be dilatory is addressed, in the first instance, to
the sound discretion of the trial judge. It is pointed
out that the defense has already presented at least
fifty-seven (57) witnesses and four hundred sixty-four
(464) documentary exhibits, many of them of the
exact nature as those to be produced or testified to by
the proposed foreign deponents.
Under the
circumstances, We sustain the proposition that the
trial judge commits no grave abuse of discretion if she
decides that the evidence on the matter sought to be
proved in the United States could not possibly add
anything substantial to the defense evidence involved.
There is no showing or allegation that the American
public officers and the bicycle store owner can
identify respondent Hubert Webb as the very person
mentioned in the public and private documents.
Neither is it shown in this petition that they know, of
their own personal knowledge, a person whom they
can identify as the respondent-accused who was
actually present in the United States and not in the
Philippines on the specified dates.

Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia

Afulugencia, filed a Complaint for nullification of
mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale
and other documents, with damages, against
respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. and
Emmanuel L. Ortega before the RTC of Malolos City.
After the filing of the parties pleadings and
with the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a
Motion for Issuance of SubpoenaDucesTecum Ad
Testificandum to require Metrobanks officers to
appear and testify as the petitioners initial witnesses
during the hearing for the presentation of their
evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative
to their loan with Metrobank, as well as those
covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of
petitioners 200-square meter land in Meycauayan,
Bulacan.The Motion contained a notice of hearing.
Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing that
for lack of a proper notice of hearing, the Motion
must be denied; that being a litigated motion, the
failure of petitioners to set a date and time for the
hearing renders the Motion ineffective and pro forma;
that pursuant to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the
Rules, Metrobanks officers who are considered
adverse parties may not be compelled to appear
and testify in court for the petitioners since they were
not initially served with written interrogatories; that
petitioners have not shown the materiality and
relevance of the documents sought to be produced in
court; and that petitioners were merely fishing for
evidence.
The trial court denied petitioners Motion for
Issuance of Subpoena DucesTecum Ad Testificandum
for its failure to comply with the requirements for a
valid notice of hearing as specified in Sections 4 and 5
of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court and that the
defendant bank and its officers are adverse parties
who cannot be summoned to testify unless written
interrogatories are first served upon them, as
provided in Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

6. SPOUSES VICENTE AND LETICIA AFULUGENCIA

VS. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY AND
EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA
G.R. NO. 185145
FEBRUARY 5, 2014
WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES
FACTS:

The CA held that the trial court did not

commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed Orders; petitioners Motion is a litigated
motion, especially as it seeks to require the adverse
party, Metrobanks officers, to appear and testify in
court as petitioners witnesses. It held that a proper
notice of hearing, addressed to the parties and

Metrobank is a domestic banking corporation

existing under Philippine laws, while Ortega is the
Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Malolos
RTC.

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RULES 23 to 32

specifying the date and time of the hearing, was

required, consistent with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of
the Rules.
The CA held further that the trial
court did not err in denying petitioners Motion to
secure a subpoena ducestecum/ad testificandum,
ratiocinating that Rule 25 is quite clear in providing
that the consequence of a partys failure to serve
written interrogatories upon the opposing party is
that the latter may not be compelled by the former to
testify in court or to render a deposition pending
appeal. By failing to serve written interrogatories
upon Metrobank, petitioners foreclosed their right to
present the banks officers as their witnesses.

Besides, since the calling party is deemed

bound by the adverse partys testimony, compelling
the adverse party to take the witness stand may result
in the calling party damaging its own case. Otherwise
stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information
useful to its case through the facility of written
interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then the
calling of the adverse party to the witness stand could
only serve to weaken its own case as a result of the
calling partys being bound by the adverse partys
testimony, which may only be worthless and instead
detrimental to the calling partys cause.
Another reason for the rule is that by
requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may
limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent
the calling party from straying or harassing the
adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.

ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners must first serve
written interrogatories to respondent banks officers
before they can be subpoenaed.

In the present case, petitioners seek to call

Metrobanks officers to the witness stand as their
initial and main witnesses, and to present documents
in Metrobanks possession as part of their principal
documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners
may not be allowed, at the incipient phase of the
presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that, to
present Metrobanks officers who are considered
adverse parties as well, based on the principle that
corporations act only through their officers and duly
authorized agents as their main witnesses; nor may
they be allowed to gain access to Metrobanks
documentary evidence for the purpose of making it
their own. This is tantamount to building their whole
case from the evidence of their opponent. The burden
of proof and evidence falls on petitioners, not on
Metrobank; if petitioners cannot prove their claim
using their own evidence, then the adverse party
Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself from
its own defense.

HELD:
a. Yes.
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of
calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not
allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served
upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25
of the Rules, which provides
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written
interrogatories.
Unless thereafter allowed by the
court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure
of justice, a party not served with written
interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse
party to give testimony in open court, or to give a
deposition pending appeal. One of the purposes of
the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and
needless delays; it is there to maintain order and
facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that
a party who does not serve written interrogatories on
the adverse party beforehand will most likely be
unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to
call the adverse party to the witness stand as its
witness. Instead, the process could be treated as a
fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the
proceedings; it produces no significant result that a
prior written interrogatories might bring.

7. DISINI VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DEPOSITION
FACTS:
The Republic (through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government [PCGG]) filed with
the Sandiganbayan a civil complaint for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages
against petitioner Herminio T. Disini (Disini).
Summons for Disini was issued. Per Sheriffs Return
the summons was unserved on the ground that Disini
did not live at the given address, which was No. 92
Kennedy St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. The
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RULES 23 to 32

occupants of said address were the Roman family.

Republic filed an Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Serve
Summons by Publication. It stated that resort to
service by publication was needed because they could
not ascertain Disinis whereabouts despite diligent
efforts to do so. The same was granted and the
summons and the Amended Complaint were
published in Peoples Tonight, with a copy sent by
registered mail to Disinis last known address. Disini
filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default and for Leave to
File and Admit Attached Answer, together with an
Answer to Amended Complaint with Compulsory
Counterclaims. He maintained that he was unaware of
the civil case pending against him because he never
received summons or other processes from the court,
nor any pleadings from the parties of the case. His
answer contained affirmative defenses such as the
respondent courts failure to acquire jurisdiction over
his person through service by publication and the
failure of the Amended Complaint to state a cause of
action against him. The Sandiganbayan resolved to
deny Disinis Motion to Lift Default Order.

over his person by seeking affirmative relief through

the said provision.

9. METROBANK VS. SANDOVAL

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as
successor-in-interest of ASIAN BANK CORPORATION
vs.HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON.
FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR. and HON. RODOLFO A.
PONFERRADA (in their capacities as Chairman and
Members, respectively, of the Second Division of
SANDIGANBAYAN) and the REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 169677
February 18, 2013
CONSOLIDATION; SEVERANCE; SEPARATE/JOINT
TRIAL
FACTS: On July 17, 1987, the Republic brought a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages in the Sandiganbayan
against Andres V. Genito, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Imelda R. Marcos and other defendants. The action
was obviously to recover allegedly ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcoses, their nominees, dummies and agents.
Among the properties subject of the action were 2
parcels of commercial land located in Tandang Sora
(Old Balara), Quezon City, registered in the names of
Spouses Andres V. Genito, Jr. and Ludivina L. Genito.
Republic later on amended its complaint to implead
Asian Bank as an additional defendant since the latter
claimed ownership of the 2 parcels of land as the
registered owner and it was also in possession of the
properties by virtue of the writ of possession issued
by the RTC QC.

ISSUES:
Whether the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction
over the person of DISINI.
HELD:
Yes. Disini originally sought the nullification of the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan on the theory
of lack of jurisdiction over his person, premised on the
alleged impropriety in the service of summons.
However, Disini subsequently filed several motions
with the Sandiganbayan which sought various
affirmative reliefs from that court, sans any
qualification of the nature of its appearance and
without reserving or reiterating its previous objection
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person.
One of the motions (reliefs) filed by Disini is Motion
for Leave to Take Deposition based on Section 1 of
Rule 23 (Depositions Pending Action or De Benne
Esse). it is important to note that there are two
instances when the defendant can take depositions
under Section 1 of Rule 23: (1) after the court has
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or the
property subject of the action; and (2) after an answer
has been served. Both instances presuppose that the
court has already acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant. By seeking the relief contained in this
provision, Disini is deemed to have voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Thus, Disini may be held to have
waived his objections regarding the lack of jurisdiction

When the Republic was about to terminate its

presentation of evidence against the original
defendants in Civil Case No. 0004, it moved to hold a
separate trial against Asian Bank.
Asian Bank sought the deferment of any action on
the motion and contended that it would be deprived
of its day in court if a separate trial were to be held
against it without having been sufficiently apprised
about the evidence the Republic had adduced before
it was brought in as an additional defendant.
Republic maintained that a separate trial for Asian
Bank was proper because its cause of action against
Asian Bank was entirely distinct and independent
from its cause of action against the original
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defendants; and that the issue with respect to Asian

Bank was whether Asian Bank had actual or
constructive knowledge at the time of the issuance of
the TCTs for the properties in its name that such
properties were the subject of the complaint in Civil
Case No. 0004, while the issue as to the original
defendants was whether they had "committed the
acts complained of as constituting illegal or unlawful
accumulation of wealth which would, as a
consequence, justify forfeiture of the said properties
or the satisfaction from said properties of the
judgement that may be rendered in favor of the
Republic."

counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any

separate issue or of any number of claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or
issues.
The text of the rule grants to the trial court the
discretion to determine if a separate trial of any claim,
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or
of any separate issue or of any number of claims,
cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or
issues should be held, provided that the exercise of
such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice to any party.
We conclude that the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a separate
trial as to Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the ground that
the issue against Asian Bank was distinct and separate
from that against the original defendants. Thereby,
the Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule
of having all the issues in every case tried at one time,
unreasonably shunting aside the dictum in Corrigan,
supra, that a "single trial will generally lessen the
delay, expense, and inconvenience to the parties and
the courts."

Asian Banks rejoinder to the reply asserted that

the issue in Civil Case No. 0004 was intimately related
to the issue delving on the character of the properties
as the ill-gotten wealth of the original defendants;
that it thus had a right to confront the evidence
presented by the Republic as to the character of the
properties; and that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction to decide Asian Banks ownership of the
properties because the Sandiganbayan, being a
special court with limited jurisdiction, could only
determine the issue of whether or not the properties
were illegally acquired by the original defendants.

Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only

when there are extraordinary grounds for conducting
separate trials on different issues raised in the same
case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid
prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will
further convenience, or when separate trials of the
issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of
the issues will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise,
the general rule must apply.

Sandiganbayan granted the Republics motion for

separate trial. Asian Bank moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution, but the
Sandiganbayan denied its motion.
Hence, Metrobank commenced this special civil
action for certiorari as the successor-in-interest of
Asian Bank and transferee of the properties.

As we see it, however, the justification of the

Sandiganbayan for allowing the separate trial did not
constitute a special or compelling reason like any of
the exceptions. To begin with, the issue relevant to
Asian Bank was not complicated. In that context, the
separate trial would not be in furtherance of
convenience. And, secondly, the cause of action
against Asian Bank was necessarily connected with
the cause of action against the original defendants.
Should the Sandiganbayan resolve the issue against
Spouses Genito in a separate trial on the basis of the
evidence adduced against the original defendants, the
properties would be thereby adjudged as ill-gotten
and liable to forfeiture in favor of the Republic
without Metrobank being given the opportunity to
rebut or explain its side. The outcome would surely be
prejudicial towards Metrobank.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the Republic was entitled to a
separate trial against Asian Bank;
2. Whether Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to
decide Asian Banks ownership of the properties
because the Sandiganbayan
HELD: Separate Trials are Improper
I. The rule on separate trials in civil actions is
found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
Section 2. Separate trials. The court, in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may
order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
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RULES 23 to 32

Dominador Laxa
committed
fraud
and
misrepresentation in the approval of the
Miscellaneous Sales Application of Oribello. They
alleged that Laxa submitted a false report to the
Director of Lands, by stating that there were no other
claimants to the property and that Oribello was the
actual occupant thereof, when the contrary was true.

II. The Court DECLARES that the Sandiganbayan

has original exclusive jurisdiction over the amended
complaint in Civil Case No. 0004 as against Asian Bank
Corporation/Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company.
10. REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ORIBELLO,
JR. 692 SCRA 645

Office of the Solicitor General, representing

petitioner, instituted a complaint for reversion and
cancellation of title before the RTC. The case was
thereafter consolidated with Civil Case No. 233-0-91,
a complaint for recovery of possession filed by
Oribello against Apog and San Juan.

CONSOLIDATION AND SEVERANCE OF CASES:

CONSOLIDATION IS A PROCEDURAL DEVICE TO
AID THE COURT IN DECIDING HOW CASES IN ITS
DOCKET ARE TO BE TRIED SO THAT THE BUSINESS OF
THE COURT MAY BE DISPATCHED EXPEDITIOUSLY AND
WITH ECONOMY WHILE PROVIDING JUSTICE TO THE
PARTIES. SEVERANCE IS WITHIN THE SOUND
DISCRETION OF THE COURT FOR CONVENIENCE OR TO
AVOID PREJUDICE. IT IS NOT MANDATORY UNDER THE
RULES OF COURT THAT THE COURT SEVER ONE CASE
FROM THE OTHER CASES BEFORE A PARTY CAN
APPEAL AN ADVERSE RULING ON SUCH CASE.

RTC dismissed the consolidated cases without

prejudice for non- substitution of the deceased
plaintiff (Oribello) and his counsel. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration, contending that the Order
applied exclusively to Civil Case No. 233-0-91 (for
recovery of possession) and did not affect Civil Case
No. 225-0-92 (for reversion of property). RTC allowed
the continuation of the presentation of petitioners
evidence.

FACTS:
The present controversy involves a parcel of
land situated in Olongapo City, which was once
classified as forest land by the Bureau of Forest
Development. The property was originally occupied by
a certain Valentin Fernandez (Valentin) in 1968 by
virtue of a Residential Permit issued by the same
government office. Upon Valentins death, his son,
Odillon Fernandez (Odillon), continued to occupy the
property, together with spouses Ruperto and Matilde
Apog. Sometime in 1969, Odillon sold the property to
a certain Mrs. Florentina Balcita who, later on, sold
the same property to Oribello.

Aggrieved, Oribellos heirs filed a Manifestation

and Motion, bringing to the attention of the trial court
the previous 12 September 1997 Order declaring
petitioner to have abandoned the reversion case.
Oribellos heirs pointed out that from the time
petitioner received the Order in 1997, it did nothing
to question the same, making the Order final. RTC
finding merit in defendants Motion and
Manifestation, the Order dated 29 June 2005 granting
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Solicitor
General is recalled and the above-entitled case is
DISMISSED.

Oribello filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application

with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), which denied the application since
the land remained forest land.
On 20 February 1987, the subject property was
declared open to disposition under the Public Land
Act. Thus, Oribello filed another Miscellaneous Sales
Application. The Director of Lands issued an Order for
the issuance of a patent in favor of Oribello.

The CA denied petitioners appeal ruling that the

remedy of appeal is no longer available to petitioner
and that petitioner has lost its right to participate in
the proceedings of Civil Case No. 225-0-92 when it
failed to question the trial courts 12 September 1997
Order, declaring it to have abandoned the case. As a
consequence of petitioners inaction, such order
inevitably became final.
Petitioner contends that the 12 September 1997
Order of the trial court, deeming it to have
abandoned the case, is interlocutory in nature; thus, is
not appealable.14 Respondents argue otherwise,
maintaining that such Order is a dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of failure to prosecute which

Matilde Apog and Aliseo San Juan claiming to be

actual occupants of the property, protested with the
DENR the issuance of the sales patent and OCT in
favor of Oribello. They sought the annulment of the
sales patent, arguing that Oribello and Land Inspector
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RULES 23 to 32

is, under the Rules,15 considered an adjudication on

the merits, and hence appealable.

Notably, the complaint for recovery of possession

proceeded independently of the reversion case, and
was disposed of accordingly by the trial court.

ISSUE: Are the consolidated cases be subject to

multiple appeals?

Since each action does not lose its distinct

character, severance of one action from the other is
not necessary to appeal a judgment already rendered
in one action. There is no rule or law prohibiting the
appeal of a judgment or part of a judgment in one
case which is consolidated with other cases. Further,
severance is within the sound discretion of the court
for convenience or to avoid prejudice. It is not
mandatory under the Rules of Court that the court
sever one case from the other cases before a party
can appeal an adverse ruling on such case.

HELD:
Yes. Consolidation is a procedural device to aid
the court in deciding how cases in its docket are to be
tried so that the business of the court may be
dispatched expeditiously and with economy while
providing justice to the parties. To promote this end,
the rule allows the consolidation and a single trial of
several cases in the courts docket, or the
consolidation of issues within those cases. The Court
explained, thus:
In the context of legal procedure, the term
consolidation is used in three different senses:
(1) Where all except one of several actions are
stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in
the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not
actually consolidation but is referred to as such.
(quasi-consolidation)
(2) Where several actions are combined into
one, lose their separate identity, and become a single
action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is
illustrated by a situation where several actions are
pending between the same parties stating claims
which might have been set out originally in one
complaint. (actual consolidation)
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be
tried together but each retains its separate character
and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This
type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a
single action, or cause the parties to one action to be
parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)
In the present case, the complaint for reversion
filed by petitioner (Civil Case No. 225-0-92) was
consolidated with the complaint for recovery of
possession filed by Oribello (Civil Case No. 223-0-91).
While these two cases involve common questions of
law and fact, each action retains its separate and
distinct character. The reversion suit settles whether
the subject land will be reverted to the State, while
the recovery of possession case determines which
private party has the better right of possession over
the subject property. These cases, involving different
issues and seeking different remedies, require the
rendition and entry of separate judgments. The
consolidation is merely for joint trial of the cases.
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RULES 33 to 38

1. DASMARIAS GARMENTS, INC. VS. REYES, 225

SCRA 622(1993)

challenged orders of the Trial Court. Its motion for

reconsideration was denied in a Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated December 11, 1992. Hence,
this petition.

Depositions;
Depositions are intended as a means to compel
disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party
or other person which are relevant in some suit or
proceeding in court. Depositions are not generally
meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in
open court of a party or witness.

ISSUES: 1.)Whether a party could, during the trial,

present its evidence by taking the deposition of its
witnesses in a foreign jurisdiction in lieu of their oral
examination in open Court?
2.) Whether the taking of deposition is a mode of
pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action
comes to trial?
HELD:
1. Yes. Depositions are chiefly a mode of
discovery. They are intended as a means to compel
disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party
or other person which are relevant in some suit or
proceeding in court. Depositions are meant to enable
a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not
only known to him and his witnesses but also those
known to the adverse party and the latters own
witnesses. The object of discovery is to make it
possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the
material and relevant facts, from whoever may have
knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or
motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual
foundation, and all the relevant facts may be.
Depositions are principally made available by law
to the parties as a means of informing themselves of
all the relevant facts. They are not therefore generally
meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in
open court of a party or witness. The deponent must
as a rule be presented for oral examination in open
court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of
the rules of evidence. Any deposition offered to prove
the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing in
lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in
open court may be opposed and excluded on the
ground that it is hearsay.
The party against whom it is offered has no
opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the
time that his testimony is offered. It matters not that
that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded
during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the
opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a
party at the time that the testimonial evidence is
actually presented against him during the trial or
hearing.
Of course the deposition-taking in the case at bar
is a departure from the accepted and usual judicial
proceedings of examining witnesses in open court
where their demeanor could be observed by the trial

FACTS:
American President Lines, Ltd.(APL) sued
Dasmarias Garments, Inc. to recover the sum of US
$53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent to
twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as attorneys fees
and litigation expenses. In its answer, Dasmarias
Garments, Inc. specifically denied any liability to APL
and set up compulsory counterclaims against it. The
case was scheduled for trial. During the trial APL
presented its first witness whose testimony was
completed on November 12, 1988. The case was reset
for reception of the testimony of two (2) more
witnesses in APLs behalf.
At the hearing instead of presenting its witnesses,
APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take the
depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei,
Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose, a
commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed
to the consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines in Taipei **. Five (5) days
later APL filed an amended motion stating that since
the Philippine Government has no consulate office in
Taiwan in view of its one-China policy, there being
in lieu thereof an office set up by the President
presently occupied by Director Joaquin Roces which
is the Asian Exchange Center, Inc., it was necessary
and it therefore prayedthat commission or letters
rogatory be issued addressed to Director Joaquin. This
was opposed by petitioner.
RTC resolved the incident in favor of APL. It
opined that the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. being
the authorized Philippine representative in Taiwan,
may take the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses
residing there by deposition, Petitioners MR was
denied.

Court of Appeals rendered judgment denying

Dasmarias petition for certiorari and upholding the
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RULES 33 to 38

judge; but the procedure is not on that account

rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken,
inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the
exceptions where the law permits such a situation,
i.e., the use of a deposition in lieu of the actual
appearance and testimony of the deponent in open
court and without being subject to the prying eyes
and probing questions of the Judge. This is allowed
provided the deposition is taken in accordance with
the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court and the
existence of any of the exceptions for its
admissibilitye.g., that the witness if out of the
province and at a greater distance than fifty (50)
kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out
of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence
was procured by the party offering the deposition; or
** that the witness is unable to attend to testify
because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment,
etc (Sec. 4, Rule 24, supra, italics supplied)is first
satisfactorily.

intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the

accused to meet the witness against him face to
face.The motion for reconsideration by the
prosecution was also denied. Thereafter the case was
brought before the CA. CA ruled that there is no rule
that disallow the deposition taking of Ping in criminal
cases, adding that the defense could still make a
timely objectionduring the taking of the oral
deposition either through counsel or through the
consular officer who would be taking the deposition
of the witness.
ISSUE: Whether Section 17 Rule 23 could be
applied suppletorily in the case (Criminal case)
HELD: No. WE rule in favor of petitioners. The
Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an
Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered Under
Section 15, Rule 119. The examination of witnesses
must be done orally before a judge in open court.
This is true in criminal cases where the
Constitution secures to the accused his right to a
public trial and to meet the witnessess against him
face to face. The requirement is the safest and most
satisfactory method of investigating facts as it
enables the judge to test the witness' credibility
through his manner and deportment while
testifying.14 It is not without exceptions, however,
as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional
examination of witnesses and the use of their
depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct
court testimony.
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as
to the availability of conditional examination of
witnesses both for the benefit of the defense, as
well as the prosecution. The Court's ruling in the case
of Vda. deManguerra v. Risos:
x xx As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of
Court provide for the different modes of discovery
that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These
rules are adopted either to perpetuate the
testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In
criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure , which
took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the
conditional examination of both the defense and
prosecution witnesses .
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules
of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil cases,
either upon oral examination or written
interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or
person authorized to administer oaths at any time or
place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine
consular official, commissioned officer or person

2.) Not so. Depositions may be taken at any time

after the institution of any action, whenever
necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits
deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or
before it; no prohibition against the taking of
depositions after pre-trial. Indeed, the law authorizes
the taking of depositions of witnesses before or after
an appeal is taken from the judgment of a Regional
Trial Court to perpetuate their testimony for use in
the event of further proceedings in the said court
(Rule 134, Rules of Court), and even during the
process of execution of a final and executory
judgment.

GO vs. PEOPLE
FACTS: Go was charged with Other deceits
punishable under Art. 318 of the RPC. The case was
filed before the Mtc. Li Luen Ping, a frail old
businessman, and a witness for the prosecution was
unable to testify for the reason that he had
undergone treatment for his lungs. The prosecution
asked the Mtc that the deposition of Ping be taken.
The Mtc then granted the same. This prompted Go to
file a petition for certiorari before the RTC which
granted the same. The RTC held that Section 17, Rule
23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil
cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there
is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with
respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution
witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily
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RULES 33 to 38

authorized toadminister oaths in a foreign state or

country, with no additional
requirement except
reasonable notice in writing to the other party.
But for purposes of taking the deposition in
criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution
witness who would forseeably be unavailable for
trial, the testimonial examination should be made
before the court, or at least before the judge, where
the case is pending as required by the clear mandate
of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads
thus: SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the
prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears that a
witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to
appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to
leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning,
he may forthwith be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending .
Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or
in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the
examination has been served on him shall be
conducted in the same manner as an examination at
the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend
the examination after notice shall be considered a
waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in
behalf of or against the accused.

Concepcion instituted a special civil action for

certiorari before the CA which remained pending
before the appellate court as of the date of this
Decision.
On August 16, 2000, the counsel of Concepcion
filed a motion to take the latters deposition
explaining the need to perpetuate Concepcions
testimony due to her weak physical condition and old
age, which limited her freedom of mobility. The RTC
granted the motion and directed that Concepcions
deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court of
Makati City. Respondents motion for reconsideration
was denied by the trial court. After several motions
for change of venue of the deposition-taking,
Concepcions deposition was finally taken on March 9,
2001 at her residence.
Aggrieved, respondents assailed the RTC orders in
a special civil action for certiorari before the CA. The
CA
favored
respondentsdeclaring
that the
examination of prosecution witnesses, Conception, is
governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court. The latter provision, said the appellate court,
only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific
provision of Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcions
deposition should have been taken before the judge
or the court where the case is pending, which is the
RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of
Makati City.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
WON the examination of prosecution witnesses,
Conception, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
RULING:
Yes. In criminal cases, all witnesses shall give
their testimonies at the trial of the case in the
presence of the judge. This is to afford the accused
the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the
witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties and
their counsel the chance to propound such questions
as they deem material and necessary to support their
position or to test the credibility of said witnesses.
Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the
witnesses demeanor.
In this case, the very reason offered by the
petitioners to exempt Concepcion from the coverage
of Rule 119 is at once the ground which places her
squarely within the coverage of the same provision.
Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be

3. VDA. DE MANGUERA vs. RISOS

G.R. No. 152643. August 28, 2008. Third Division
Deposition; Giving of testimonies
FACTS:
On November 4, 1999, respondents were charged
with EstafaThrough Falsification of Public Document
before the RTC of Cebu City. Respondents allegedly
falsified a deed of real estate mortgage where they
made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the
mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property,
affixed her signature to the document.
Earlier, on September 10, 1999, Concepcion, who
was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in
Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati
Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal
bleeding and was advised to stay in Manila for further
treatment.
On November 24, 1999, respondents filed a
Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in the
Criminal Case on the ground of prejudicial question
arguing that a Civil Case for declaration of nullity of
the mortgage should first be resolved. The RTC
granted the aforesaid motion.Concepcion filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence,
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RULES 33 to 38

conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or

infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to
leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule
119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that
the conditional examination be made before the court
where the case is pending. It is also necessary that the
accused be notified, so that he can attend the
examination, subject to his right to waive the same
after reasonable notice. As to the manner of
examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted
in the same manner as an examination during trial,
that is, through question and answer.
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply
to all actions, civil or criminal, and special
proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil
procedure have suppletory application to criminal
cases. However, it is likewise true that the criminal
proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule
119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in
the instant case, there is no cogent reason to apply
Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
While we recognize the prosecutions right to
preserve its witness testimony to prove its case, we
cannot disregard rules which are designed mainly for
the protection of the accuseds constitutional rights.
The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule.
The conditional examination of a witness outside of
the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a
strict construction of the rules.
4. ALLIED AGRI-BUSINESS VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 118438
DECEMBER 4, 1998
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION

answer; and, (b) the request for admission regarding

the ownership set-up of petitioner corporation was
immaterial and improper for not having been pleaded
in the complaint.
The
trial
court
disregarded
ALLIED's
Comments/Objections and directed ALLIED to answer
the request for admission within ten (10) days from
receipt of the order, otherwise, the matters contained
in the request would be deemed admitted. ALLIED
moved to reconsider the order; however, the lower
court denied the same and directed the latter to
answer the request for admission within a
nonextendible period of five (5) days from receipt of
the order.
ALLIED failed to submit a sworn answer to the
request for admission within the additional period of
five (5) days granted by the trial court. Hence, CHERRY
VALLEY filed a motion for summary judgment alleging
that there was already an implied admission on the
matters requested for admission pursuant to Rule 26
of the Rules of Court.
The trial court rendered judgment against
petitioner. ALLIED appealed to the Court of Appeals,
but the latter affirmed the trial courts decision.
Hence, the instant petition by ALLIED.
ISSUE:
Whether Allieds failure to answer the
request for admission resulted in its admission of the
matters stated in the request.
HELD:
Yes. Section 1 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 1. Request for admission. At any time
after issues have been joined, a party may file and
serve upon any other party a written request for the
admission by the latter of the genuineness of any
material and relevant document described in and
exhibited with the request or of the truth of any
material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the
request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered
with the request unless copies have already been
furnished.
The purpose of the rule governing requests for
admission of facts and genuineness of documents is to
expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of
proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and
the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable
inquiry. Each of the matters of which an admission is
requested shall be deemed admitted unless within a
period designated in the request which shall not be
less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or
within such further time as the court may allow on

FACTS:
A collection of sum of money was filed by Cherry
Valley Farms Limited, foreign company, against Allied
Agri-Business Development Co. Inc., who allegedly
failed to pay several duck hatching eggs and ducklings
despite demands by the former.
ALLIED filed an answer denying the material
allegations of the complaint. CHERRY VALLEY served
on ALLIED's counsel a Request for Admission. ALLIED
filed its Comments/Objections alleging that: (a) the
admissions requested were matters which the private
respondent had the burden to prove through its own
witness during the trial and thus petitioner need not
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motion, the party to whom the request is directed

files and serves upon the party requesting the
admission a sworn statement either denying
specifically the matters of which an admission is
requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why
he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those
matters. Upon service of request for admission, the
party served may do any of the following acts: (a) he
may admit each of the matters of which an admission
is requested, in which case, he need not file an
answer; (b) he may admit the truth of the matters of
which admission is requested by serving upon the
party requesting a written admission of such matters
within the period stated in the request, which must
not be less than ten (10) days after service, or within
such further time as the court may allow on motion
and notice; (c) he may file a sworn statement; denying
specifically the matter of which an admission is
requested; or, (d) he may file a sworn statement
setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot
truthfully either admit or deny the matters of which
an admission is requested.
The records show that although petitioner filed
with the trial court its comments and objections to
the request for admission served on it by private
respondent, the trial court disregarded the objections
and directed petitioner after denying its motion for
reconsideration, to answer the request within five (5)
days from receipt of the directive; otherwise, the
matters of which the admission was requested would
be deemed admitted. Petitioner failed to submit the
required answer within the period. The matters set
forth in the request were therefore deemed admitted
by petitioner.

and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena to

testify since the court had no jurisdiction over them.
Respondent further alleged that the taking of the
oral depositions of the aforementioned individuals
whose testimonies are allegedly material and
indispensable to establish his innocence of the crime
charged is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to
the said motion averring that: 1.] Rule 24, Section 4
of the Rules of Court has no application in criminal
cases; 2.] Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on
Criminal Procedure provides for conditional
examination of witnesses for the accused before trial
not during trial; 3.] Rule 119, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court on Criminal Procedure does not sanction the
conditional examination of witnesses for the
accused/defense outside Philippine jurisdiction.
RTC denied the motion of respondent on the
ground that the same is not allowed by Section 4, Rule
24 and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Court. MR likewise denied by the trial court.
Dissatisfied, respondent Webb elevated his cause
to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for
certiorari.
The People contended that the questioned orders
of the Presiding Judge may be considered merely as
errors of judgment which may be corrected by appeal
in due time.
In
his
Comment,private
respondent
LauroVizconde sought the dismissal of the petition.
The Court of Appeals rendered judgment granting
the taking of deposition (in favour of Webb).
The People forthwith elevated its cause to this
Court by way of the instant petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL JUDGE
GRAVELY ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN DENYING THE
MOTION TO TAKE TESTIMONY BY ORAL DEPOSITIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES WHICH WOULD BE USED IN
THE CRIMINAL CASE BEFORE HER COURT.
HELD: NO. As defined, a deposition is "The testimony of a witness taken upon oral
question or written interrogatories, not in open court,
but in pursuance of a commission to take testimony
issued by a court, or under a general law or court rule
on the subject, and reduced to writing and duly
authenticated, and intended to be used in preparation
and upon the trial of a civil or criminal prosecution. A
pretrial discovery device by which one party (through
his or her attorney) asks oral questions of the other
party or of a witness for the other party. The person
who is deposed is called the deponent.
The

5. PEOPLE VS WEBB
G.R NO. 132577
AUGUST 17, 1999
MODES OF DISCOVERY; DEPOSITION; DEFINITION;
PURPOSE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
FACTS: Respondent Webb is one of the accused in
Criminal Case for Rape with Homicide pending before
Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque,
presided by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino.
During the course of the proceedings in the trial
court, respondent filed a Motion To Take Testimony
By Oral Deposition before the general consul, consul,
vice-consul or consular agent of the Philippines in lieu
of presenting them as witnesses in court alleging that
the said persons are all residents of the United States

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deposition is conducted under oath outside of the

court room, usually in one of the lawyers offices. A
transcript - word for word account - is made of the
deposition. Testimony of [a] witness, taken in writing,
under oath or affirmation, before some judicial officer
in answer to questions or interrogatories x xx.
And the purposes of taking depositions are to: 1.]
Give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining
the truth and in checking and preventing perjury; 2.]
Provide an effective means of detecting and exposing
false, fraudulent claims and defenses; 3.] Make
available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way,
facts which otherwise could not be proved except
with great difficulty; 4.] Educate the parties in
advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and
defenses
thereby
encouraging
settlements;
5.]Expedite litigation; 6.] Safeguard against surprise;
7.] Prevent delay; 8.] Simplify and narrow the issues;
and 9.] Expedite and facilitate both preparation and
trial.As can be gleaned from the foregoing, a
deposition, in keeping with its nature as a mode of
discovery, should be taken before and not during trial.
In fact, rules on criminal practice - particularly on the
defense of alibi, which is respondents main defense
in the criminal proceedings against him in the court
below - states that when a person intends to rely on
such a defense, that person must move for the taking
of the deposition of his witnesses within the time
provided for filing a pre-trial motion.
It needs to be stressed that the only reason of
respondent for seeking the deposition of the foreign
witnesses is to foreclose any objection and/or
rejection of, as the case may be, the admissibility of
Defense Exhibits 218 and 219. This issue has,
however, long been rendered moot and academic by
the admission of the aforementioned documentary
exhibits by the trial court in its order dated July 10,
1998.
It need not be overemphasized that the foregoing
factual circumstances only serves to underscore the
immutable fact that the depositions proposed to be
taken from the five U.S. based witnesses would be
merely corroborative or cumulative in nature and in
denying respondents motion to take them, the trial
court was but exercising its judgment on what it
perceived to be a superfluous exercise on the belief
that the introduction thereof will not reasonably add
to the persuasiveness of the evidence already on
record. In this regard, it bears stressing that under
Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. Power of the court to stop further
evidence. - The court may stop the introduction of

further testimony upon any particular point when the

evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses
to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to
be additionally persuasive. But this power should be
exercised with caution.
The use of discovery procedures is directed to the
sound discretion of the trial judge.There is no
indication in this case that in denying the motion of
respondent-accused, the trial judge acted in a biased,
arbitrary, capricious or oppressive manner. Grave
abuse of discretion x xx implies such capricious, and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act all in contemplation of law.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed
of only if there is concurrence of the essential
requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial functions has actedwithout or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess or jurisdiction, and (b)
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding.
There must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical
exercise of power for it to prosper.
To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or
the agency exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions, the remedy is a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
petitioner in such cases must clearly show that the
public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact
definition, but generally refers to capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.
It has been held, however, that no grave abuse
of discretion may be attributed to a court simply
because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and
evidence. A writ of certiorari may not be used to
correct a lower tribunal's evaluation of the evidence
and factual findings. In other words, it is not a
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RULES 33 to 38

remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are

correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors
of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in
the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long
as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged
errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will
amount to nothing more than errors of judgment
which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by
special civil action for certiorari.
Whether or not the respondent-accused has been
given ample opportunity to prove his innocence and
whether or not a further prolongation of proceedings
would be dilatory is addressed, in the first instance, to
the sound discretion of the trial judge. It is pointed
out that the defense has already presented at least
fifty-seven (57) witnesses and four hundred sixty-four
(464) documentary exhibits, many of them of the
exact nature as those to be produced or testified to by
the proposed foreign deponents.
Under the
circumstances, We sustain the proposition that the
trial judge commits no grave abuse of discretion if she
decides that the evidence on the matter sought to be
proved in the United States could not possibly add
anything substantial to the defense evidence involved.
There is no showing or allegation that the American
public officers and the bicycle store owner can
identify respondent Hubert Webb as the very person
mentioned in the public and private documents.
Neither is it shown in this petition that they know, of
their own personal knowledge, a person whom they
can identify as the respondent-accused who was
actually present in the United States and not in the
Philippines on the specified dates.

mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale

and other documents, with damages, against
respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. and
Emmanuel L. Ortega before the RTC of Malolos City.
After the filing of the parties pleadings and
with the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a
Motion for Issuance of SubpoenaDucesTecum Ad
Testificandum to require Metrobanks officers to
appear and testify as the petitioners initial witnesses
during the hearing for the presentation of their
evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative
to their loan with Metrobank, as well as those
covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of
petitioners 200-square meter land in Meycauayan,
Bulacan.The Motion contained a notice of hearing.
Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing that
for lack of a proper notice of hearing, the Motion
must be denied; that being a litigated motion, the
failure of petitioners to set a date and time for the
hearing renders the Motion ineffective and pro forma;
that pursuant to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the
Rules, Metrobanks officers who are considered
adverse parties may not be compelled to appear
and testify in court for the petitioners since they were
not initially served with written interrogatories; that
petitioners have not shown the materiality and
relevance of the documents sought to be produced in
court; and that petitioners were merely fishing for
evidence.
The trial court denied petitioners Motion for
Issuance of Subpoena DucesTecum Ad Testificandum
for its failure to comply with the requirements for a
valid notice of hearing as specified in Sections 4 and 5
of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court and that the
defendant bank and its officers are adverse parties
who cannot be summoned to testify unless written
interrogatories are first served upon them, as
provided in Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

6. SPOUSES VICENTE AND LETICIA AFULUGENCIA

VS. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY AND
EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA
G.R. NO. 185145
FEBRUARY 5, 2014
WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES
FACTS:

The CA held that the trial court did not

commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed Orders; petitioners Motion is a litigated
motion, especially as it seeks to require the adverse
party, Metrobanks officers, to appear and testify in
court as petitioners witnesses. It held that a proper
notice of hearing, addressed to the parties and
specifying the date and time of the hearing, was
required, consistent with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of

Metrobank is a domestic banking corporation

existing under Philippine laws, while Ortega is the
Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Malolos
RTC.
Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia
Afulugencia, filed a Complaint for nullification of
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the Rules.
The CA held further that the trial
court did not err in denying petitioners Motion to
secure a subpoena ducestecum/ad testificandum,
ratiocinating that Rule 25 is quite clear in providing
that the consequence of a partys failure to serve
written interrogatories upon the opposing party is
that the latter may not be compelled by the former to
testify in court or to render a deposition pending
appeal. By failing to serve written interrogatories
upon Metrobank, petitioners foreclosed their right to
present the banks officers as their witnesses.

in the calling party damaging its own case. Otherwise

stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information
useful to its case through the facility of written
interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then the
calling of the adverse party to the witness stand could
only serve to weaken its own case as a result of the
calling partys being bound by the adverse partys
testimony, which may only be worthless and instead
detrimental to the calling partys cause.
Another reason for the rule is that by
requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may
limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent
the calling party from straying or harassing the
adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.

ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners must first serve
written interrogatories to respondent banks officers
before they can be subpoenaed.

In the present case, petitioners seek to call

Metrobanks officers to the witness stand as their
initial and main witnesses, and to present documents
in Metrobanks possession as part of their principal
documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners
may not be allowed, at the incipient phase of the
presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that, to
present Metrobanks officers who are considered
adverse parties as well, based on the principle that
corporations act only through their officers and duly
authorized agents as their main witnesses; nor may
they be allowed to gain access to Metrobanks
documentary evidence for the purpose of making it
their own. This is tantamount to building their whole
case from the evidence of their opponent. The burden
of proof and evidence falls on petitioners, not on
Metrobank; if petitioners cannot prove their claim
using their own evidence, then the adverse party
Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself from
its own defense.

HELD:
a. Yes.
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of
calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not
allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served
upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25
of the Rules, which provides
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written
interrogatories.
Unless thereafter allowed by the
court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure
of justice, a party not served with written
interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse
party to give testimony in open court, or to give a
deposition pending appeal. One of the purposes of
the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and
needless delays; it is there to maintain order and
facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that
a party who does not serve written interrogatories on
the adverse party beforehand will most likely be
unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to
call the adverse party to the witness stand as its
witness. Instead, the process could be treated as a
fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the
proceedings; it produces no significant result that a
prior written interrogatories might bring.

7. DISINI VS SANDIGANBAYAN
DEPOSITION
FACTS:
The Republic (through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government [PCGG]) filed with
the Sandiganbayan a civil complaint for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages
against petitioner Herminio T. Disini (Disini).
Summons for Disini was issued. Per Sheriffs Return
the summons was unserved on the ground that Disini
did not live at the given address, which was No. 92
Kennedy St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. The
occupants of said address were the Roman family.
Republic filed an Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Serve
Summons by Publication. It stated that resort to

Besides, since the calling party is deemed

bound by the adverse partys testimony, compelling
the adverse party to take the witness stand may result
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service by publication was needed because they could

not ascertain Disinis whereabouts despite diligent
efforts to do so. The same was granted and the
summons and the Amended Complaint were
published in Peoples Tonight, with a copy sent by
registered mail to Disinis last known address. Disini
filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default and for Leave to
File and Admit Attached Answer, together with an
Answer to Amended Complaint with Compulsory
Counterclaims. He maintained that he was unaware of
the civil case pending against him because he never
received summons or other processes from the court,
nor any pleadings from the parties of the case. His
answer contained affirmative defenses such as the
respondent courts failure to acquire jurisdiction over
his person through service by publication and the
failure of the Amended Complaint to state a cause of
action against him. The Sandiganbayan resolved to
deny Disinis Motion to Lift Default Order.

9. METROBANK VS. SANDOVAL

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as
successor-in-interest of ASIAN BANK CORPORATION
vs.HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON.
FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR. and HON. RODOLFO A.
PONFERRADA (in their capacities as Chairman and
Members, respectively, of the Second Division of
SANDIGANBAYAN) and the REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 169677
February 18, 2013
CONSOLIDATION; SEVERANCE; SEPARATE/JOINT
TRIAL
FACTS: On July 17, 1987, the Republic brought a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages in the Sandiganbayan
against Andres V. Genito, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Imelda R. Marcos and other defendants. The action
was obviously to recover allegedly ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcoses, their nominees, dummies and agents.
Among the properties subject of the action were 2
parcels of commercial land located in Tandang Sora
(Old Balara), Quezon City, registered in the names of
Spouses Andres V. Genito, Jr. and Ludivina L. Genito.
Republic later on amended its complaint to implead
Asian Bank as an additional defendant since the latter
claimed ownership of the 2 parcels of land as the
registered owner and it was also in possession of the
properties by virtue of the writ of possession issued
by the RTC QC.

ISSUES:
Whether the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction
over the person of DISINI.
HELD:
Yes. Disini originally sought the nullification of the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan on the theory
of lack of jurisdiction over his person, premised on the
alleged impropriety in the service of summons.
However, Disini subsequently filed several motions
with the Sandiganbayan which sought various
affirmative reliefs from that court, sans any
qualification of the nature of its appearance and
without reserving or reiterating its previous objection
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person.
One of the motions (reliefs) filed by Disini is Motion
for Leave to Take Deposition based on Section 1 of
Rule 23 (Depositions Pending Action or De Benne
Esse). it is important to note that there are two
instances when the defendant can take depositions
under Section 1 of Rule 23: (1) after the court has
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or the
property subject of the action; and (2) after an answer
has been served. Both instances presuppose that the
court has already acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant. By seeking the relief contained in this
provision, Disini is deemed to have voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Thus, Disini may be held to have
waived his objections regarding the lack of jurisdiction
over his person by seeking affirmative relief through
the said provision.

When the Republic was about to terminate its

presentation of evidence against the original
defendants in Civil Case No. 0004, it moved to hold a
separate trial against Asian Bank.
Asian Bank sought the deferment of any action on
the motion and contended that it would be deprived
of its day in court if a separate trial were to be held
against it without having been sufficiently apprised
about the evidence the Republic had adduced before
it was brought in as an additional defendant.
Republic maintained that a separate trial for Asian
Bank was proper because its cause of action against
Asian Bank was entirely distinct and independent
from its cause of action against the original
defendants; and that the issue with respect to Asian
Bank was whether Asian Bank had actual or
constructive knowledge at the time of the issuance of
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RULES 33 to 38

the TCTs for the properties in its name that such

properties were the subject of the complaint in Civil
Case No. 0004, while the issue as to the original
defendants was whether they had "committed the
acts complained of as constituting illegal or unlawful
accumulation of wealth which would, as a
consequence, justify forfeiture of the said properties
or the satisfaction from said properties of the
judgement that may be rendered in favor of the
Republic."

claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or

issues.
The text of the rule grants to the trial court the
discretion to determine if a separate trial of any claim,
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or
of any separate issue or of any number of claims,
cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or
issues should be held, provided that the exercise of
such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice to any party.

Asian Banks rejoinder to the reply asserted that

the issue in Civil Case No. 0004 was intimately related
to the issue delving on the character of the properties
as the ill-gotten wealth of the original defendants;
that it thus had a right to confront the evidence
presented by the Republic as to the character of the
properties; and that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction to decide Asian Banks ownership of the
properties because the Sandiganbayan, being a
special court with limited jurisdiction, could only
determine the issue of whether or not the properties
were illegally acquired by the original defendants.

We conclude that the Sandiganbayan committed

grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a separate
trial as to Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the ground that
the issue against Asian Bank was distinct and separate
from that against the original defendants. Thereby,
the Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule
of having all the issues in every case tried at one time,
unreasonably shunting aside the dictum in Corrigan,
supra, that a "single trial will generally lessen the
delay, expense, and inconvenience to the parties and
the courts."
Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only
when there are extraordinary grounds for conducting
separate trials on different issues raised in the same
case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid
prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will
further convenience, or when separate trials of the
issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of
the issues will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise,
the general rule must apply.

Sandiganbayan granted the Republics motion for

separate trial. Asian Bank moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution, but the
Sandiganbayan denied its motion.
Hence, Metrobank commenced this special civil
action for certiorari as the successor-in-interest of
Asian Bank and transferee of the properties.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Republic was entitled to a
separate trial against Asian Bank;
2. Whether Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to
decide Asian Banks ownership of the properties
because the Sandiganbayan

As we see it, however, the justification of the

Sandiganbayan for allowing the separate trial did not
constitute a special or compelling reason like any of
the exceptions. To begin with, the issue relevant to
Asian Bank was not complicated. In that context, the
separate trial would not be in furtherance of
convenience. And, secondly, the cause of action
against Asian Bank was necessarily connected with
the cause of action against the original defendants.
Should the Sandiganbayan resolve the issue against
Spouses Genito in a separate trial on the basis of the
evidence adduced against the original defendants, the
properties would be thereby adjudged as ill-gotten
and liable to forfeiture in favor of the Republic
without Metrobank being given the opportunity to
rebut or explain its side. The outcome would surely be
prejudicial towards Metrobank.

HELD: Separate Trials are Improper

I. The rule on separate trials in civil actions is
found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
Section 2. Separate trials. The court, in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may
order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any
separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-

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II. The Court DECLARES that the Sandiganbayan

has original exclusive jurisdiction over the amended
complaint in Civil Case No. 0004 as against Asian Bank
Corporation/Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company.

Dominador Laxa
committed
fraud
and
misrepresentation in the approval of the
Miscellaneous Sales Application of Oribello. They
alleged that Laxa submitted a false report to the
Director of Lands, by stating that there were no other
claimants to the property and that Oribello was the
actual occupant thereof, when the contrary was true.

10. REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ORIBELLO,

JR. 692 SCRA 645

Office of the Solicitor General, representing

petitioner, instituted a complaint for reversion and
cancellation of title before the RTC. The case was
thereafter consolidated with Civil Case No. 233-0-91,
a complaint for recovery of possession filed by
Oribello against Apog and San Juan.

CONSOLIDATION AND SEVERANCE OF CASES:

CONSOLIDATION IS A PROCEDURAL DEVICE TO
AID THE COURT IN DECIDING HOW CASES IN ITS
DOCKET ARE TO BE TRIED SO THAT THE BUSINESS OF
THE COURT MAY BE DISPATCHED EXPEDITIOUSLY AND
WITH ECONOMY WHILE PROVIDING JUSTICE TO THE
PARTIES. SEVERANCE IS WITHIN THE SOUND
DISCRETION OF THE COURT FOR CONVENIENCE OR TO
AVOID PREJUDICE. IT IS NOT MANDATORY UNDER THE
RULES OF COURT THAT THE COURT SEVER ONE CASE
FROM THE OTHER CASES BEFORE A PARTY CAN
APPEAL AN ADVERSE RULING ON SUCH CASE.

RTC dismissed the consolidated cases without

prejudice for non- substitution of the deceased
plaintiff (Oribello) and his counsel. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration, contending that the Order
applied exclusively to Civil Case No. 233-0-91 (for
recovery of possession) and did not affect Civil Case
No. 225-0-92 (for reversion of property). RTC allowed
the continuation of the presentation of petitioners
evidence.

FACTS:
The present controversy involves a parcel of
land situated in Olongapo City, which was once
classified as forest land by the Bureau of Forest
Development. The property was originally occupied by
a certain Valentin Fernandez (Valentin) in 1968 by
virtue of a Residential Permit issued by the same
government office. Upon Valentins death, his son,
Odillon Fernandez (Odillon), continued to occupy the
property, together with spouses Ruperto and Matilde
Apog. Sometime in 1969, Odillon sold the property to
a certain Mrs. Florentina Balcita who, later on, sold
the same property to Oribello.

Aggrieved, Oribellos heirs filed a Manifestation

and Motion, bringing to the attention of the trial court
the previous 12 September 1997 Order declaring
petitioner to have abandoned the reversion case.
Oribellos heirs pointed out that from the time
petitioner received the Order in 1997, it did nothing
to question the same, making the Order final. RTC
finding merit in defendants Motion and
Manifestation, the Order dated 29 June 2005 granting
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Solicitor
General is recalled and the above-entitled case is
DISMISSED.

Oribello filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application

with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), which denied the application since
the land remained forest land.
On 20 February 1987, the subject property was
declared open to disposition under the Public Land
Act. Thus, Oribello filed another Miscellaneous Sales
Application. The Director of Lands issued an Order for
the issuance of a patent in favor of Oribello.

The CA denied petitioners appeal ruling that the

remedy of appeal is no longer available to petitioner
and that petitioner has lost its right to participate in
the proceedings of Civil Case No. 225-0-92 when it
failed to question the trial courts 12 September 1997
Order, declaring it to have abandoned the case. As a
consequence of petitioners inaction, such order
inevitably became final.
Petitioner contends that the 12 September 1997
Order of the trial court, deeming it to have
abandoned the case, is interlocutory in nature; thus, is
not appealable.14 Respondents argue otherwise,
maintaining that such Order is a dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of failure to prosecute which

Matilde Apog and Aliseo San Juan claiming to be

actual occupants of the property, protested with the
DENR the issuance of the sales patent and OCT in
favor of Oribello. They sought the annulment of the
sales patent, arguing that Oribello and Land Inspector
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RULES 33 to 38

is, under the Rules,15 considered an adjudication on

the merits, and hence appealable.

Notably, the complaint for recovery of possession

proceeded independently of the reversion case, and
was disposed of accordingly by the trial court.

ISSUE: Are the consolidated cases be subject to

multiple appeals?

Since each action does not lose its distinct

character, severance of one action from the other is
not necessary to appeal a judgment already rendered
in one action. There is no rule or law prohibiting the
appeal of a judgment or part of a judgment in one
case which is consolidated with other cases. Further,
severance is within the sound discretion of the court
for convenience or to avoid prejudice. It is not
mandatory under the Rules of Court that the court
sever one case from the other cases before a party
can appeal an adverse ruling on such case.

HELD:
Yes. Consolidation is a procedural device to aid
the court in deciding how cases in its docket are to be
tried so that the business of the court may be
dispatched expeditiously and with economy while
providing justice to the parties. To promote this end,
the rule allows the consolidation and a single trial of
several cases in the courts docket, or the
consolidation of issues within those cases. The Court
explained, thus:
In the context of legal procedure, the term
consolidation is used in three different senses:
(1) Where all except one of several actions are
stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in
the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not
actually consolidation but is referred to as such.
(quasi-consolidation)
(2) Where several actions are combined into
one, lose their separate identity, and become a single
action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is
illustrated by a situation where several actions are
pending between the same parties stating claims
which might have been set out originally in one
complaint. (actual consolidation)
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be
tried together but each retains its separate character
and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This
type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a
single action, or cause the parties to one action to be
parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)
In the present case, the complaint for reversion
filed by petitioner (Civil Case No. 225-0-92) was
consolidated with the complaint for recovery of
possession filed by Oribello (Civil Case No. 223-0-91).
While these two cases involve common questions of
law and fact, each action retains its separate and
distinct character. The reversion suit settles whether
the subject land will be reverted to the State, while
the recovery of possession case determines which
private party has the better right of possession over
the subject property. These cases, involving different
issues and seeking different remedies, require the
rendition and entry of separate judgments. The
consolidation is merely for joint trial of the cases.
102
AMDCM

RULE 39

RULE 39: EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF

JUDGMENT
AIDA P. BAEZ vs. GABRIEL B. BAEZ
G.R. No. 133628. January 23, 2002
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
FACTS:
These 2 petitions stem from the decision of RTC
Cebu Br. 20, in Civil Case No. CEB-16765. The 1st
seeks the reversal of the CAs decision setting aside
the orders dated October 1 and November 22, 1996
of the RTC. The 2nd prays for the reversal of the
resolution of the CA denying the motion to dismiss.
On September 23, 1996, RTC Cebu Branch 20,
decided Civil Case No. CEB-16765, decreeing among
others the legal separation between Aida Baez and
Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters sexual
infidelity; the dissolution of their conjugal property
relations and the division of the net conjugal assets;
the forfeiture of Gabriels 1/2 share in the net
conjugal assets in favor of the common children; the
payment to petitioners counsel of the sum of
P100,000 as attorneys fees to be taken from
petitioners share in the net assets; and the surrender
by respondent of the use and possession of a Mazda
motor vehicle and the smaller residential house
located at Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to
petitioner and the common children within 15 days
from receipt of the decision.
Petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to
modify said decision, while respondent filed a Notice
of Appeal.
RTC granted Aida Banez urgent ex-parte motion
to modify the decision on October 1, 1996 by
approving the Commitment of Fees dated December
22, 1994; obliging petitioner to pay as attorneys fees
the equivalent of 5% of the total value of
respondents ideal share in the net conjugal assets;
and ordering the administrator to pay petitioners
counsel, Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy, the sum of P100,000 as
advance attorneys fees chargeable against the
aforecited 5%.
In another motion to modify the decision,
petitioner Aida Baez sought moral and exemplary
damages, as well as litigation expenses. On October
9, 1996, she filed a motion for execution pending
appeal. Respondent Gabriel filed a consolidated
written opposition to the two motions, and also
prayed for the reconsideration of the October 1, 1996
order.
On November 22, 1996, RTC denied Aidas motion
for moral and exemplary damages and litigation

expenses but gave due course to the execution

pending appeal.
In turn, in a petition for certiorari, Gabriel Baez
elevated the case to the CA. On March 21, 1997, CA
rendered its decision setting aside the Order dated
October 1, 1996, the Omnibus Order dated November
22, 1996 and the writ of execution dated December 2,
1996 and the Order dated December 10, 1996 by the
RTC
On February 10, 1998, CA denied Aidas MR.
Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 132592, filed by herein
petitioner.
In the meantime, the trial court gave due course
to Gabriels Notice of Appeal and elevated on April 15,
1997 the entire case records to the CA. Aida filed with
the CA a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that Gabriel had failed to file with the CA a Record on
Appeal. CA denied the motion to dismiss as well as
the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence,
the petition in G.R. No. 133628. SC consolidated the
two petitions.

ISSUES:
I. The core issue in G.R. No. 132592 is whether
execution of judgment pending appeal was justified.
NO
HELD: Petitions are denied for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 132592:
As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA
381, 386 (1991), execution pending appeal is allowed
when superior circumstances demanding urgency
outweigh the damages that may result from the
issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being an
instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may well
become a tool of oppression and inequity.
In this case, considering the reasons cited by
petitioner, we are of the view that there is no superior
or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage
which respondent would suffer if he were ordered to
vacate the house. We note that petitioner did not
refute respondents allegations that she did not
intend to use said house, and that she has two (2)
other houses in the US where she is a permanent
resident, while he had none at all. Merely putting up
a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for
execution pending appeal. To do so would make
execution routinary, the rule rather than the
exception.
Similarly, we are not persuaded that the P100,000
advance payment to petitioners counsel was properly
granted. We see no justification to pre-empt the
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AMDCM

RULE 39

judgment by the Court of Appeals concerning said

amount of P100,000 at the time that the trial courts
judgment was already on appeal.
Fajardo vs. Quitalig
A.M. No. P-02-1535
March 28, 2003
Return of Writ of Execution

severely.
ISSUE:
Whether the findings of the OCA is
correct
HELD:
Yes, the OCA is correct. As frontline
officials of the justice system, sheriffs must always
strive to maintain public trust in the performance of
their duties. Having the forsworn duty to uphold the
majesty of the law, they must see to it that the final
stage in the litigation process is carried out without
unnecessary delay.
SEC. 14. Return of Writ of Execution. The writ of
execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it
immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in
part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in
full within thirty days (30) days after his receipt of the
writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the
reason therefore. Such writ shall continue in effect
during the period within which the judgment may be
enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to
the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings
taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or
its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports
shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken,
and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof
promptly furnished the parties.
We find respondents explanation to be utterly
wanting. He is guilty of dereliction of his duty as a
sheriff, because he failed to (1) execute the Writ
within 30 days from his receipt thereof, (2) submit his
Report of Service within the same period, (3) make
periodic reports to the MTCC until the judgment was
fully satisfied, and (4) furnish the parties with copies
of the Reports.
By his own words, respondent admitted his
dereliction of duty. First, as we have said earlier, he
should have immediately executed the Writ when he
served it upon the defendant on March 9, 2000.
Second, he should have immediately reported to
the MTCC that he was unable to enforce the Writ
because another court had issued a TRO enjoining him
from doing so. Third, he should have informed the
parties, particularly the plaintiff or his counsel, about
his inability to enforce the Writ. Fourth, he should
have immediately enforced it twenty days after its
issuance.
Fifth, he should have made periodic Reports to
the MTCC until the judgment was fully satisfied and
the parties furnished a copy thereof. Sixth, within
thirty days from his receipt of the Writ, he should
have promptly made his Return, a copy of which he
should have immediately furnished the parties.

FACTS:
A complaint for ejectment filed by
Fajardo and Perez against Maria Datuin was finally
decided against the latter. The decision being final
and executory. Upon motion of complainant, the
Court issued a Writ of Execution on March 7, 2000
which was brought by respondent Sheriff to the
defendant Datuin on March 9, 2000. However the writ
was not executed on first instance because Datuin
asked for a 2-week period to move out.
Thereafter, the writ was still not executed
because Sheriff alleged that there was a restraining
order prohibiting him to do so. On March 24, 2000
upon verification from the court, complainant found
out that there was no restraining order. So he told the
respondent to implement the Writ of Execution.
Respondent, accompanied by a policeman and the
barangay captain went to the place where the Writ of
Execution is to be implemented at 10:00 that morning
but when they reached the place, respondent did not
do anything except to ask the defendant to bring out
her personal properties. His reason is that an
employee of the Probation Office, Mr. Leonardo
Martinez, talked to him. At 5:30 p.m., the restraining
order was brought to the place, and the respondent
told him that the writ of execution can no longer be
implemented.
Complainant asserted that respondent favored, or
showed partiality in favor of the defendant to his
prejudice.
In his Comment respondent denied the charge
and asked for the dismissal of the case, because he
had already implemented the Writ on August 24, 2000
as evidenced by his August 25, 2000 Report of Service.
He also pointed out that he had made an inventory of
the personal properties recovered from the subject
premises. That he had done so was attested to by
defendants mother, and witnessed by the barangay
captain and two councilors.
The OCA found respondent to have been
negligent in the performance of his duty as a sheriff
and recommended that respondent be ordered to pay
a fine of P5,000 and warned that a repetition of the
same or a similar offense would be dealt with more

104
AMDCM

RULE 39

Clearly, the actuations of respondent constitute

disrespect, if not outright defiance, of the MTCCs
authority. In the absence of instructions to the
contrary, a sheriff has the duty to execute a Writ with
reasonable celerity and promptness in accordance
with its mandate.
In several cases, the Court has said that the failure
to make a return of a writ within the required period
is nonfeasance.
EDGAR Y. SANTOS vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION) and PEDRO Q. PANULAYA
G.R. No. 155618. March 26, 2003. EN BANC.
YNARES-SANTIAGO.
Motion for Execution pending appeal; Forum
Shopping

required bond, the trial court issued the Writ of

Execution.
On August 21, 2002, respondent filed with the
COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of his petition in SPR No. 20-2002. After five
days, he filed a supplemental petition in SPR No. 202002.
Barely two days later, on August 28, 2002, and
while his motion for reconsideration and
supplemental petition in SPR No. 20-2002 were
pending, respondent filed another petition with the
COMELEC, docketed as SPR No. 37-2002. The petition
contained the same prayer as that in the
supplemental petition filed in SPR 20-2002.

FACTS:
On September 3, 2002, the COMELEC issued an
Order directing the parties to maintain the status quo
ante and enjoining petitioner from assuming the
functions of Mayor. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the COMELEC First Division did
not refer the said motion to the COMELEC En Banc.
Hence, petitioner, citing Kho v. COMELEC brought the
instant special civil action for certiorari before the SC.
ISSUES:

Petitioner Edgar Y. Santos and respondent Pedro

Q. Panulaya were both candidates for Mayor of the
Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental in the
2001 elections. On May 16, 2001, the Municipal Board
of Canvassers proclaimed respondent Panulaya as the
duly elected Mayor.
Petitioner filed an election protest before the RTC
of Misamis Oriental. The decision of the trial court
was rendered after almost one year of trial and
revision of the questioned ballots. It found petitioner
as the candidate with the plurality of votes. Petitioner
thereafter filed a motion for execution pending
appeal.

1. WON Execution pending appeal is proper in

Election cases.
2. WON respondent is guilty of forum shopping.
RULING:

Meanwhile, before the trial court could act on

petitioners motion, respondent filed on with the
COMELEC a petition for certiorari, docketed as SPR
No. 20-2002, assailing the decision of the trial court.
Respondent likewise appealed the trial courts
decision to the COMELEC, where it was docketed as
EAC No. A-12-2002.

1. Yes. The grant of execution pending appeal

was well within the discretionary powers of the trial
court. In order to obtain the annulment of said orders
in a petition for certiorari, it must first be proved that
the trial court gravely abused its discretion. He should
show not merely a reversible error committed by the
trial court, but a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The COMELEC dismissed SPR No. 20-2002 after

finding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in rendering the assailed judgment. Thus,
the trial court directs and orders the immediate
execution of its Decision promulgated on April 18,
2002, to install protestant/petitioner EDGAR Y.
SANTOS as the duly elected Mayor of Balingoan,
Misamis Oriental, to take his oath of office and
assume the functions and duties of Mayor after he
shall have filed a bond. After petitioner posted the

In this case, no grave abuse of discretion was

committed by the trial court in granting execution
pending appeal. However, the COMELEC set aside the
aforesaid order, saying that shortness of term alone is
not a good reason for execution of a judgment
pending appeal.
While it was indeed held that shortness of the
remaining term of office and posting a bond are not
105
AMDCM

RULE 39

good reasons, the SC stated in Fermo v. COMELEC

that:
A valid exercise of the discretion to allow
execution pending appeal requires that it should be
based upon good reasons to be stated in a special
order. The following constitute good reasons and a
combination of two or more of them will suffice to
grant execution pending appeal: (1.) public interest
involved or will of the electorate; (2.) the shortness of
the remaining portion of the term of the contested
office; and (3.) the length of time that the election
contest has been pending.
In the case at bar, the decision of the trial
court was rendered after almost one year of trial and
revision of the questioned ballots and found
petitioner as the candidate with the plurality of votes.
Respondent appealed the said decision to the
COMELEC. In the meantime, the three-year term of
the Office of the Mayor continued to run. The will of
the electorate, as determined by the trial court in the
election protest, had to be respected and given
meaning. The Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis
Oriental, needed the services of a mayor even while
the election protest was pending, and it had to be the
candidate judicially determined to have been chosen
by the people.
All that was required for a valid exercise of the
discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that
the immediate execution should be based upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order. The rationale
why such execution is allowed in election cases is, as
stated in Gahol v. Riodique, to give as much
recognition to the worth of a trial judges decision as
that which is initially ascribed by the law to the
proclamation by the board of canvassers.
To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant
execution pending appeal would, in the words of
Tobon Uy v. COMELEC, bring back the ghost of the
grab-the-proclamation-prolong
the
protest
techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians
in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to
an elective office. This would, as a consequence, lay to
waste the will of the electorate.
2. Yes. Respondent was guilty of forumshopping when he instituted SPR No. 37-2002 with
the COMELEC.

institution of two or more actions or proceedings

grounded on the same cause on the supposition that
one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition. For it to exist, there should be (a) identity
of parties, or at least such parties as would represent
the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two
preceding particulars such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration.
In the case at bar, respondent obtained an
adverse decision when his petition in SPR No. 20-2002
was dismissed by the COMELEC. He thereafter filed a
motion for reconsideration and a supplemental
petition, praying for the nullification of the trial courts
order for the execution of its decision pending appeal.
Two days after filing the supplemental petition, and
while the same was very much pending before the
COMELEC, he filed a wholly separate petition for
certiorari, docketed as SPR No. 37-2002, wherein he
pleaded the same reliefs prayed for in the
supplemental petition. In doing so, respondent sought
to increase his chances of securing a favorable
decision in another petition.
Considering that respondent was indubitably
guilty of forum-shopping when he filed SPR No. 372002, his petition should have been dismissed
outright by the COMELEC. Willful and deliberate
forum-shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of
the case, and constitutes direct contempt of court.
RCBC vs. MAGWIN
G.R. No. 152878
May 5, 2003
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, vs.
MAGWIN MARKETING CORPORATION, NELSON TIU,
BENITO SY and ANDERSON UY
Whether the dismissal without prejudice for
failure to prosecute was unconditionally reconsidered,
reversed and set aside to reinstate the civil case and
have it ready for pre-trial are matters which should
have been clarified and resolved in the first instance
by the court a quo.
FACTS: On 4 March 1999 petitioner Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) filed a
complaint for recovery of a sum of money with prayer
for a writ of preliminary attachment against

Forum-shopping is an act of a party against whom

an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in
one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable
opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or
special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the
106
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RULE 39

respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson

Tiu, Benito Sy and Anderson Uy. On 26 April 1999, the
trial court issued a writ of attachment. On 4 June 1999
the writ was returned partially satisfied since only a
parcel of land purportedly owned by defendant
Benito Sy was attached. In the meantime, summons
was served on each of the defendants, respondents
herein, who filed their respective answers, except for
defendant Gabriel Cheng who was dropped without
prejudice as party-defendant as his whereabouts
could not be located. On 21 September 1999
petitioner moved for an alias writ of attachment
which on 18 January 2000 the court a quo denied.
Petitioner did not cause the case to be set for pretrial. For about six (6) months thereafter, discussions
between petitioner and respondents Magwin
Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy and
Anderson Uy, as parties in Civil Case No. 99-518, were
undertaken to restructure the indebtedness of
respondent Magwin Marketing Corporation.
On 9 May 2000 petitioner approved a debt
payment scheme for the corporation which on was
communicated to the latter by means of a letter
dated for the conformity of its officers, i.e.,
respondent Nelson Tiu as President/General Manager
of Magwin Marketing Corporation and respondent
Benito Sy as Director thereof. Only respondent Nelson
Tiu affixed his signature on the letter to signify his
agreement to the terms and conditions of the
restructuring.
On 20 July 2000 the RTC of Makati City, on its own
initiative, issued an Order dismissing without
prejudice Civil Case No. 99-518 for failure of petitioner
as plaintiff therein to "prosecute its action for an
unreasonable length of time . . .."
Subsequently, the petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the Order by informing the trial
court of respondents' unremitting desire to settle the
case amicably through a loan restructuring program.
On 22 August 2000 petitioner notified the trial court
of the acquiescence thereto of respondent Nelson Tiu
as an officer of Magwin Marketing Corporation and
defendant in the civil case.
On 27 July 2000 petitioner filed in Civil Case No.
99-518 a Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for
Pre-Trial Conference alleging that "[t]o date, only
defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the
letter which informed the defendants that plaintiff
[herein petitioner] already approved defendant
Magwin Marketing Corporations request for
restructuring of its loan obligations to plaintiff but

subject to the terms and conditions specified in said

letter."
This motion was followed on 5 October 2000 by
petitioner's Supplemental Motion to Plaintiffs
Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial
Conference affirming that petitioner "could not
submit a compromise agreement because only
defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the
May 10, 2000 letter . . .." Respondent Anderson Uy
opposed the foregoing submissions of petitioner while
respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson
Tiu and Benito Sy neither contested nor supported
them.
The trial court, in an undated Order (although a
date was later inserted in the Order), denied
petitioner's motion to calendar Civil Case No. 99-518
for pre-trial because of the failure of the plaintiff to
submit a compromise agreement.
On 15 November 2000 petitioner filed its Notice
of Appeal from the said Orders. On 16 November
2000 the trial court issued two (2) Orders, one of
which inserted the date "6 November 2000" in the
undated Order rejecting petitioner's motion for pretrial in the civil case, and the other denying due
course to the Notice of Appeal on the ground that the
"Orders dated 8 September 2000 and 6 November
2000 are interlocutory orders and therefore, no
appeal may be taken . . .."
On 7 December 2000 petitioner elevated the
Orders dated 8 September 2000, 6 November 2000
and 16 November 2000 of the trial court to the Court
of Appeals in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure. In the main, petitioner
argued that the court a quo had no authority to
compel the parties in Civil Case No. 99-518 to enter
into an amicable settlement nor to deny the holding
of a pre-trial conference on the ground that no
compromise agreement was turned over to the court
a quo.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the petitioner is required to
pay again the requisite docket fees.
2) Whether or not the court a quo may dismiss a
claim for failure of the parties to submit to a
compromise agreement.
HELD:
1) No. There is no substantial policy worth
pursuing by requiring petitioner to pay again the
docket fees when it has already discharged this
obligation simultaneously with the filing of the
complaint for collection of a sum of money. The
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RULE 39

procedure for dismissed cases when re-filed is the

same as though it was initially lodged, i.e., the filing of
answer, reply, answer to counter-claim, including
other foot-dragging maneuvers, except for the
rigmarole of raffling cases which is dispensed with
since the re-filed complaint is automatically assigned
to the branch to which the original case pertained. A
complaint that is re-filed leads to the re-enactment of
past proceedings with the concomitant full attention
of the same trial court exercising an immaculate slew
of jurisdiction and control over the case that was
previously dismissed, which in the context of the
instant case is a waste of judicial time, capital and
energy.
What judicial benefit do we derive from starting
the civil case all over again, especially where three (3)
of the four (4) defendants, i.e., Magwin Marketing
Corporation, Nelson Tiu and Benito Sy, have not
contested petitioner's plea before this Court and the
courts a quo to advance to pre-trial conference?
Indeed, to continue hereafter with the resolution of
petitioner's complaint without the usual procedure
for the re-filing thereof, we will save the court a quo
invaluable time and other resources far outweighing
the docket fees that petitioner would be forfeiting
should we rule otherwise.
It must be emphasized however that once the
dismissal attains the attribute of finality, the trial
court cannot impose legal fees anew because a final
and executory dismissal although without prejudice
divests the trial court of jurisdiction over the civil case
as well as any residual power to order anything
relative to the dismissed case; it would have to wait
until the complaint is docketed once again. On the
other hand, if we are to concede that the trial court
retains jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 99-518 for it to
issue the assailed Orders, a continuation of the
hearing thereon would not trigger a disbursement for
docket fees on the part of petitioner as this would
obviously imply the setting aside of the order of
dismissal and the reinstatement of the complaint.
2)
Besides the semantic and consequential
improbabilities of respondent Uy's argument, our
ruling in Goldloop Properties, Inc., is decisive of the
instant case. In Goldloop Properties, Inc., we reversed
the action of the trial court in dismissing the
complaint for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute its
case, which was in turn based on its inability to forge
a compromise with the other parties within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the order to do so and held -

Since there is nothing in the Rules that imposes

the sanction of dismissal for failing to submit a
compromise agreement, then it is obvious that the
dismissal of the complaint on the basis thereof
amounts no less to a gross procedural infirmity
assailable by certiorari. For such submission could at
most be directory and could not result in throwing out
the case for failure to effect a compromise. While a
compromise is encouraged, very strongly in fact,
failure to consummate one does not warrant any
procedural sanction, much less an authority to
jettison a civil complaint worth P4,000,000.00 . . .
Plainly, submission of a compromise agreement is
never mandatory, nor is it required by any rule.
As also explained therein, the proper course of
action that should have been taken by the court a
quo, upon manifestation of the parties of their
willingness to discuss a settlement, was to suspend
the proceedings and allow them reasonable time to
come to terms (a) If willingness to discuss a possible
compromise is expressed by one or both parties; or
(b) If it appears that one of the parties, before the
commencement of the action or proceeding, offered
to discuss a possible compromise but the other party
refused the offer, pursuant to Art. 2030 of the Civil
Code. If despite efforts exerted by the trial court and
the parties the negotiations still fail, only then should
the action continue as if no suspension had taken
place.
Ostensibly, while the rules allow the trial court to
suspend its proceedings consistent with the policy to
encourage the use of alternative mechanisms of
dispute resolution, in the instant case, the trial court
only gave the parties fifteen (15) days to conclude a
deal. This was, to say the least, a passive and paltry
attempt of the court a quo in its task of persuading
litigants to agree upon a reasonable concession.
Hence, if only to inspire confidence in the pursuit of a
middle ground between petitioner and respondents,
we must not interpret the trial court's Orders as
dismissing the action on its own motion because the
parties, specifically petitioner, were anxious to litigate
their case as exhibited in their several manifestations
and motions.
In fine, petitioner cannot be said to have lost
interest in fighting the civil case to the end. A court
may dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur
but the real test of the judicious exercise of such
power is whether under the circumstances plaintiff is
chargeable with want of fitting assiduousness in not
acting on his complaint with reasonable promptitude.
Unless a party's conduct is so indifferent,
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irresponsible, contumacious or slothful as to provide

substantial grounds for dismissal, i.e., equivalent to
default or non-appearance in the case, the courts
should consider lesser sanctions which would still
amount to achieving the desired end. In the absence
of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the
case or of a wanton failure to observe the mandatory
requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as
in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense
rather than wield their authority to dismiss.
Clearly, another creative remedy was available to
the court a quo to attain a speedy disposition of Civil
Case No. 99-518 without sacrificing the course of
justice. Since the failure of petitioner to submit a
compromise agreement was the refusal of just one of
herein respondents, i.e., Benito Sy, to sign his name
on the conforme of the loan restructure documents,
and the common concern of the courts a quo was
dispatch in the proceedings, the holding of a pre-trial
conference was the best-suited solution to the
problem as this stage in a civil action is where issues
are simplified and the dispute quickly and genuinely
reconciled. By means of pre-trial, the trial court is fully
empowered to sway the litigants to agree upon some
fair compromise.
Dismissing the civil case and compelling petitioner
to re-file its complaint is a dangerous, costly and
circuitous route that may end up aggravating, not
resolving, the disagreement. This case management
strategy is frighteningly deceptive because it does so
at the expense of petitioner whose cause of action,
perhaps, may have already been admitted by its
adverse parties as shown by three (3) of four (4)
defendants not willing to contest petitioner's
allegations, and more critically, since this approach
promotes the useless and thankless duplication of
hard work already undertaken by the trial court. As
we have aptly observed, "[i]nconsiderate dismissals,
even if without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea
nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets.
While they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to
records of individual judges, they merely postpone
the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the
absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay,
justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on
the merits, and final disposition of the cases before
the court.
City of Iligan vs. Principal Management Group, Inc.
G.R. No. 145260
July 31, 2003
Executions Pending Appeal

FACTS: Mayor Franklin M. Quijano, acting for and

in behalf of the City of Iligan, Requested from the
Sangguinang Panlungsod, a resolution authorizing him
to open a domestic Standby Letter of Credit in the
amount of 14M in favor of Land Bank Realty
Development Corporation and/or PNCC with the
Principal Management Group as the funder. The City
Council approved Quijanos request and passed board
resolutions. A MOA on a turn-key arrangement was
entered into by the parties for the construction of a
sports complex which upon completion will be turned
over to Iligan City for acceptance and the issuance of
Certificate of Acceptance and Authority to Pay to
enable Land Bank Realty-PMGI to call on the SLC.
The construction site was donated by San Miguel
Enterprises Inc. wherein Iligan City, as donee, would
provide for all the expenses for the transfer of the
occupants therein. Thereafter, the construction of the
Sports Complex was stopped due to the refusal of
some occupants therein to vacate for the failure of
Iligan City to provide them for disturbance
compensation.
Thereafter, Principal Management Group
requested payment from iligan City for the portions of
the project which they already finished. Iligan City on
the other hand responded on the negative, stating
that the agreed price of 14M will only be paid upon
completion of the project.
PMGI filed a complaint for the rescission of the
MOA and damages against City of Iligan. The latter
then filed its answer. Nevertheless, PGMI moved for
partial summary judgment claiming that there was no
genuine issue as to the obligation of the City of Iligan
and that the City of Iligan had not specifically denied
under oath the genuiness of the Letter of Credit and
the MOA.
The Trial Court granted the motion of partial
summary judgment. On the other hand, City of Iligan
filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial
court denied. Considering that the MR by Iligan was
denied, Iligan City filed a notice of appeal.
A Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was then
filed by the PGMI, which was granted over the
objection of Iligan City.
The Court is convinced that there are good
reasons to allow the immediate execution pending
appeal. Its adjudication is based on *petitioners+ own
admission hence, any appeal would be unmeritorious
and would only serve to delay execution of the final
order subject of the instant motion. The fact that an
appeal in this case if taken by [petitioner] will be a
merely dilatory tactic has been declared by the
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Supreme Court as a good and sufficient reason upon

which to issue execution of the order under Section
2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The CA affirmed the decision. The appellate court
also ruled that certiorari would not be allowed in this
case, because there were other remedies still
available to petitioner, like the filing of a supersedeas
bond to stay the execution or the filing of a motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the Order granting execution
pending appeal was proper.
HELD: Yes.
Executions pending appeal are governed by
Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:
"SEC. 2. Discretionary execution.-(a) Execution of a judgment or a final order
pending appeal. On motion of the prevailing party
with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court
while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in
possession of either the original record or the record
on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing
of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order
execution of a judgment or final order even before
the expiration of the period to appeal.
"After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the
motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in
the appellate court.
"Discretionary execution may only issue upon
good reasons to be stated in a special order after due
hearing."
There are three requisites for the execution of a
judgment pending appeal: a) a motion must be filed
by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party; b) there must be good reasons for execution
pending appeal; and c) the good reasons must be
stated in a special order.
Execution pending appeal is, of course, the
exception to the general rule. Normally, execution
cannot be obtained until and unless (a) the judgment
has become final and executory; (b) the right of
appeal has been renounced or waived; (c) the period
for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been
filed; or (d) having been filed, the appeal has been
resolved and the records of the case have been
returned to the court of origin -- in which case,
execution shall issue as a matter of right.
On the other hand, when the period of appeal has
not yet expired, the execution of a judgment should
not be allowed except if, in the courts discretion,
there are good reasons therefor.

Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal

is an exception to the general rule, the existence of
"good reasons" is essential. These reasons must be
stated in a special order, because unless these are
divulged, it will be difficult to determine on appeal
whether judicial discretion has been properly
exercised by the lower court.
Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances
that justify the immediate execution of a judgment,
lest it become illusory; or the prevailing party be
unable to enjoy it after the lapse of time, considering
the tactics of the adverse party who may have no
recourse but to delay.
In the present case, the good reason relied upon
by both the trial and the appellate courts was that the
partial adjudication of the case was based on
petitioners own admission; hence, any appeal based
on that point would be unmeritorious and merely
dilatory. Indeed, both courts ruled that an appeal by
petitioner would only serve as "a good and sufficient
reason upon which to issue execution."
The ascertainment of good reasons for execution
pending appeal lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and the appellate court will not normally
disturb such finding. Intervention by the latter may be
proper, if it is shown that there has been an abuse of
discretion.
Like the CA, we find no abuse of discretion in the
trial courts grant of execution pending appeal.
Indeed, this Court has held that a good and sufficient
reason upon which to authorize immediate execution
is when an appeal is clearly dilatory
VILLARUEL vs FERNANDO
Judgments
Judgments; One of the exceptions to the rule that
a judgment that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable and may no longer be
modified in any respect except only to correct clerical
errors or mistakes is when circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable.
FACTS: Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr.
(petitioner) is the former Assistant Secretary of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO), Department of
Transportation
and
Communication
(DOTC).
Respondents Reynaldo D. Fernando, Modesto E.
Abarca, Jr. (Abarca), and Marilou M. Cleofas are the
Chief,
Chief
Administrative
Assistant,
and

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Administrative Assistant, respectively, of the Civil

Aviation Training Center (CATC).

respondents to their mother unit until further orders

by the trial court.
For petitioners continued failure to comply with
the writ of preliminary injunction, respondents moved
to cite petitioner in contempt. Respondents also
moved to declare petitioner in default for not filing an
answer within the period prescribed in the trial
courts order of 26 January 1996. On 28 May 1996,
the trial court granted the motion and declared
petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. The trial court
issued a bench warrant against petitioner.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a special civil action for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts
order finding petitioner guilty of indirect contempt.
Also the trial court declared petitioner in default for
his failure to file an answer to the petition for
mandamus and damages.
Aggrieved, petitioner, represented by the OSG,
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals granted respondents motion for the dismissal
of the petition for certiorari for being moot and
academic.
The Court of Appeals granted the OSG a nonextendible extension until 13 December 1996 within
which to file petitioners memorandum. However, the
OSG failed to file the memorandum.
On 17 February 1998, petitioner, through his new
counsel, filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution
and to Suspend Sheriffs Sale. In his motion, petitioner
alleged that the trial courts decision never became
final and executory as the trial court deprived him of
his right to due process. Petitioner claimed that the
OSG failed to file Petitioners memorandum in CA-G.R.
SP No. 42447 resulting in the dismissal of his appeal.
Furthermore, petitioner alleged that the OSG failed to
inform him of the dismissal of his appeal and of the
trial courts order granting respondents motion for
execution. Petitioner further asserted that the
Resolution of the Ombudsman superseded the
decision of the trial court.
The Ombudsmans Resolution approved the
following recommendation of the reviewing Assistant
Ombudsman:
PREMISES
CONSIDERED,
respondent
MODESTO ABARCA, JR., is hereby found GUILTY of
violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act 6713, for
which the penalty of Suspension Without Pay for Six
(6) Months is hereby recommended pursuant to
Section 10(b), Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07,
in relation to Section 25(2) of Republic Act No. 6770.

Petitioner issued a memorandum dated 27 April

1995 addressed to the respondents, detailing them to
the Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal
effective 2 May 1995.
On 29 April 1995, respondents wrote to DOTC
Secretary Jesus B. Garcia and Undersecretary Josefina
T. Lichauco through petitioner requesting for
reconsideration of the detail order.
On 7 May 1995, in compliance with the detail
order, respondents reported to the Office of
Undersecretary Cal at DOTC.
Without acting on respondents request for
reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on
19 July 1995 addressed to Abarca placing him under
preventive suspension for 90 days without pay
pending investigation for alleged grave misconduct.
On 10 August 1995, respondents requested
Secretary Garcia to lift the detail order and to order
their return to their mother unit since more than 90
days had already lapsed. Respondents also sought the
intervention of the Ombudsman in their case. As a
result, the Ombudsman inquired from Secretary
Garcia the action taken on respondents request for
reconsideration of the detail order.
On 22 November 1995, Secretary Garcia replied to
the Ombudsman that he had issued a memorandum
dated 9 November 1995 directing petitioner to recall
respondents to their mother unit. Secretary Garcia
declared that the law does not sanction the
continuous detail of respondents.
Despite repeated demands by respondents,
petitioner failed and refused to reinstate respondents
to their mother unit. On 24 January 1996,
respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and
Damages with Prayer for a Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction against petitioner with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, which the trial court granted on
February.
Meanwhile, Judge Aurora Navarette-Recia of the
trial court was appointed Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights. Consequently, the case
was re-raffled and assigned to Branch 231 of the
Regional Trial Court, Pasay City.On 12 April 1996, the
trial court issued an order modifying the 23 February
1996 order of Judge Recia. The trial court issued a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering
petitioner to comply with the 9 November 1995 order
of Secretary Garcia directing petitioner to recall

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It is also respectfully recommended that the

charge against respondents REYNALDO FERNANDO
and MARY LOU CLEOFAS be DISMISSED
The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial
courts ruling that the nature of the case before the
Ombudsman is different from the case before the trial
court. The former deals with a violation of RA 6713
office while the latter deals with an ultra vires act
punished with damages. The appellate court ruled
that the findings of the Ombudsman had nothing to
do with the findings of the trial court, as the two
forums are separate and distinct from each other.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the
Ombudsman finding Modesto Abarca, Jr. guilty of
violating Section 7 of RA 6713 rendered the execution
of the trial courts decision unjust and inequitable.
HELD: NO. The Ombudsmans Resolution Does
Not Render the Execution of the Trial Courts Decision
Unjust and Inequitable
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsmans
Resolution finding Abarca guilty of violating Section
7(d) of RA 6713 superseded the trial courts decision
finding petitioner liable for damages. Petitioner insists
that the Ombudsmans resolution rendered the
execution of the trial courts decision unjust and
inequitable.
Settled is the rule that a judgment that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable
and may no longer be modified in any respect except
only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. True, this
rule admits of certain exceptions. One of these
exceptions is whenever circumstances transpire after
the finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable. This, however, is not the case
here. In the present case, the Ombudsman issued his
Resolution prior to the finality of the trial courts
decision. The Ombudsman issued his Resolution on 22
January 1997 while the trial courts decision became
final and executory on 14 June 1997. Therefore, the
resolution of the Ombudsman is not a supervening
event to warrant the stay of the execution of the
decision of the trial court.
Furthermore, the resolution of the Ombudsman
finding Abarca guilty of violating Section 7(d) of RA
6713 did not and could not supersede the decision of
the trial court holding petitioner liable for damages.
The action filed by the petitioner before the
Ombudsman is completely different from the action
instituted by respondents before the trial court. The
two actions, which are clearly separate and distinct
from each other, presented two different causes of
action. Petitioners cause of action arose from

respondents alleged violation of certain provisions of

RA 6713 whereas respondents cause of action
resulted from petitioners refusal to recall
respondents to their mother unit at CATC. In the
administrative case before the Ombudsman, the issue
was whether respondents were guilty of violating RA
6713. In contrast, the issue in the civil action before
the trial court was whether respondents were entitled
to the issuance of the writ of mandamus and
damages.
Spouses JAIME and PURIFICACION MORTA vs.
Judge ANTONIO C. BAGAGAN, Municipal Trial
Court, Guinobatan, Albay; and Sheriff DANILO O.
MATIAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Ligao, Albay
A.M. NO. MTJ-03-1513
NOVEMBER 12, 2003
WRITS OF EXECUTION
FACTS:
In their Administrative Complaint ,
Spouses Jaime and Purificacion Morta Sr. charged
Judge Antonio C. Bagagan of the Municipal Trial
Court of Guinobatan, Albay with gross ignorance of
the law, incompetence, bias and delay in the
disposition of Civil Case No. 481, entitled Jaime
Morta, Sr. and Purificacion Padilla vs. Jamie
Occidental and Atty. Mariano Baranda, Jr., for
Damages with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, and Civil Case No. 482 entitled Jaime
Morta, Sr. and Purificacion Padilla vs. Jamie
Occidental, Atty. Mariano Baranda, Jr. and Daniel
Corral, for Damages with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
Complainants, who are the plaintiffs in the
aforementioned civil cases, alleged that on March 29,
1994, the Municipal Trial Court of Guinobatan, Albay
rendered a decision in their favor. The defendants
appealed to the Regional Trial Court which dismissed
the aforesaid cases on the ground that the claims for
damages are tenancy-related problems which fall
under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board
(DARAB). The plaintiffs filed a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals assailing the decision of the RTC.
However, in its decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower courts ruling that the cases fall
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
DARAB. Thereafter, the First Division of this Court,
acting on the petition for review on certiorari filed by
the plaintiffs, rendered its decision affirming the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Guinobatan,
Albay in Civil Case Nos. 481 and 482 and thereby
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setting aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and

that of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Cases Nos.
1751 and 1752.

change in the situation of the parties that would make

its execution inequitable.
Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 417 SCRA 415(2003)
WRITS OF EXECUTION; SUPERVENING FACTS
The execution of a judgment may be stayed,
nothwithstanding the affirmance of the appealed
judgment by the Supreme Court if there are
supervening facts and circumstances which either
have a direct effect upon a matter already litigated
and settled or create a substantial change in the rights
or relations of the parties therein which would render
execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible or
inequitable or when it becomes imperative in the
interest of justice.
FACTS: The Spouses Serrano were the owners of a
parcel of land as well as the house constructed
thereon located at Road 4, Project 6, Diliman, Quezon
City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
80384, and a parcel of land located in Caloocan City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15191. The
couple mortgaged the said properties in favor of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) as
security for a loan of P50,000. By June 1969, the
couple was able to pay only the amount of P18,000.
On June 23, 1969, the Spouses Serrano, as
vendors, and Spouses Emilio and Evelyn Geli, as
vendees, executed a deed of absolute sale with partial
assumption of mortgage over the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 80384 and the house thereon for
the price of P70,000. The Spouses Geli paid the
amount of P38,000 in partial payment of the property,
the balance of P32,000 to be paid by them to the GSIS
for the account of the Spouses Serrano. The Spouses
Geli thereafter took possession of the property. In the
meantime, Evelyn Geli died intestate and was
survived by her husband Emilio Geli and their
children.
Emilio Geli and his children failed to settle the
amount of P32,000 to the GSIS. The latter forthwith
filed a complaint against Emilio Geli and his children
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the
rescission of the deed of absolute sale with partial
assumption of mortgage. The defendants therein
alleged, by way of special defense, that the plaintiffs
Spouses Serrano failed to furnish them with a detailed
statement of the account due from the GSIS, thus
amounting for their failure to remit the balance of the
loan to the GSIS. On September 6, 1984, the trial court
rendered judgment ordering the rescission of the said
deed.

Complainants now alleged that despite the fact

that the decision of the Supreme Court in the
aforesaid case had already become final and
executory, the respondent Judge still refused to issue
a writ of possession in their favor.
In his Answer/Comment, respondent judge
explained that he had denied complainants Motion
for the issuance of a writ of possession because, by
the time Civil Case Nos. 481 and 482 were finally
decided by this Court on June 10, 1999, they had
already been ousted from the lots in question
pursuant to the Decisions in DARAB Case No. 2413
and Civil Case No. 1920. In Civil Case No. 1920,
respondent judge ordered complainants to vacate the
disputed lots. A Writ of Execution/Demolition was
thereafter issued on January 29, 1998. On the other
hand, the DARAB Decision, which became final and
executory on October 27, 1998, directed them to
cease and desist from disturbing the peaceful
possession of therein petitioner Jaime Occidental.
The OCA found that the explanation of
respondent judge for not granting the Motion for
Execution, filed by complainants, was sufficient.
According to the court administrator, the records
showed that they had indeed been evicted from the
lots they were claiming when Civil Case Nos. 481 and
482 were finally decided by the Supreme Court on
June 10, 1999. Moreover, it emphasized that this
Court had merely affirmed the Decision of the MTC
insofar as the award of damages was concerned.
ISSUE: Whether execution of a final judgment
may be refused.
HELD:
YES. We agree with the OCA that
respondent judge acted correctly in not issuing a writ
of execution/possession. His action was consistent
with the Decision of this Court in GR No. 123417
affirming that of the MTC as to damages. Besides, the
latters Order directing defendants not to molest
complainants in their peaceful possession was
rendered moot when they were ousted from the
disputed lots by virtue of the final and executory
judgments in Civil Case No. 1920 and DARAB Case No.
2413. Indeed, the execution of a final judgment may
be refused, as in this case, when there has been a
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Emilio Geli and his children appealed the decision

to the CA on October 19, 1984. During the pendency
of the appeal, the GSIS foreclosed the real estate
mortgage over the property for non-payment of the
P50,000 loan secured by the said property. At the sale
on public auction, the GSIS was the highest bidder. A
certificate of sale over the property was thereby
issued by the sheriff in its favor on August 30, 1986.
On October 30, 1987 and November 3, 1987, Emilio
Geli paid the redemption price of P67,701.844 to the
GSIS. Official Receipts Nos. 905401 and 901685 for the
said amount with the notation for the account of
Arturo Serrano were issued. Accordingly, on
February 22, 1988, the GSIS executed a certificate of
redemption5 and turned over to Emilio Geli the
owners copy of TCT No. 80384 in the names of the
Spouses Serrano. Emilio Geli did not inform the
Spouses Serrano and the CA that he had paid the
redemption price to the GSIS.
After the remand of the records, the Spouses
Serrano filed with the RTC on January 14, 1994 a
motion for the execution of the trial courts
September 6, 1984 Decision. On February 15, 1994,
the trial court issued an order granting the motion
and forthwith issued a writ of execution. The writ,
however, was not implemented as the Spouses
Serrano were then in the United States. On August 1,
1995, the trial court issued an alias writ of execution
on motion of the plaintiffs. This, too, was not
implemented, because of the defendants change of
address. On May 9, 1996, the trial court issued an
order granting the motion of the plaintiffs for a
second alias writ of execution. On September 6, 1996,
the defendants filed a motion to quash the same
claiming, for the first time, that defendant Emilio Geli
had already redeemed the subject property in 1988
from the GSIS. According to the defendants, this
constituted a supervening event that would make the
execution of the trial courts decision unjust and
inequitable.
On May 19, 1997, the trial court issued an order
denying the aforesaid motion of the defendants. It
noted that the payment by defendant Emilio Geli of
the redemption price to the GSIS took place before
the CA dismissed the appeal and before the decision
of the RTC became final and executory; hence, it did
not constitute a supervening event warranting a
quashal of the writ of execution.
The appellate court ruled that since Emilio Geli
paid the redemption price for the property to the GSIS
in 1987 while his appeal was pending in the CA, the
said redemption was a supervening event which

rendered the enforcement of the writ of execution

issued by the trial court against them unjust and
inequitable.
Hence, spouses Serrano appealed with the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
REDEMPTION CONSTITUTED A SUPERVENING EVENT
WHICH CHANGE THE RELATIONS OF THE PARTIES,
THUS RENDERING EXECUTION INEQUITABLE UNDER
THE PREMISES
HELD: The Supreme Court granted the Petition.
Generally, the execution upon a final judgment is a
matter of right on the part of the prevailing party. It is
the ministerial and mandatory duty of the trial court
to enforce its own judgment once it becomes final
and executory. It may happen, however, that new
facts and circumstances may develop or occur after a
judgment had been rendered and while an appeal
therefrom is pending; or new matters had developed
after the appeal has been dismissed and the appealed
judgment had become final and executory, which the
parties were not aware of and could not have been
aware of prior to or during the trial or during the
appeal, as they were not yet in existence at that time.
In the first situation, any attempt to frustrate or put
off the enforcement of an executory decision must
fail. Once a judgment has become final and executory,
the only remedy left for material attention thereof is
that provided for in Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. There is no other prerequisite mode of
thwarting the execution of the judgment on equitable
grounds predicated on facts occurring before the
finality of judgment. In the second situation, the
execution may be stayed, notwithstanding the
affirmance of the appealed judgment by this Court. It
is required, however, that the supervening facts and
circumstances must either have a direct effect upon
the matter already litigated and settled or create a
substantial change in the rights or relations of the
parties therein which would render execution of a
final judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable or
when it becomes imperative in the interest of justice.
The interested party may file a motion to quash a writ
of execution issued by the trial court, or ask the court
to modify or alter the judgment to harmonize the
same with justice and further supervening facts.
Evidence may be adduced by the parties on such
supervening facts or circumstances.
In this case, the payment by Emilio Geli of the
amount of P67,701.84 on October 30 and November
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3, 1987 to the GSIS for the account of the petitioners

was made while the appeal of the private respondents
from the summary judgment of the RTC was pending.
The summary judgment of the RTC had not yet
become final and executory. It behooved the said
respondents to prosecute their appeal and file their
brief, where they should have invoked the payment of
the redemption price as a ground for the reversal of
the trial courts summary judgment in their favor. The
respondents failed to do so, and even concealed the
payment of the loan for the account of the
petitioners. Worse, the respondents did not pay the
requisite docket fees for their appeal, which resulted
in its dismissal. The respondents even opted not to
file any motion for the reconsideration of the
resolution of the CA dismissing their appeal. In sum,
the respondents allowed the decision of the trial court
to become final and executory. Consequently, the
enforcement of the summary judgment of the trial
court can no longer be frustrated by the respondents
payment, through Emilio Geli, of the amount of
P67,701.84 to the GSIS in 1987.
D' ARMOURED SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION
AGENCY, INC., vs. ARNULFO ORPIA, et.al.
G.R. No. 151325

records were then remanded to the Arbiter for

execution.
Upon respondents motion, the Arbiter issued a
writ of execution. Eventually, the sheriff served a writ
of garnishment upon the Chief Accountant of
Foremost Farms, Inc., a corporation with whom
petitioner has an existing services agreement. Thus,
petitioners receivables with Foremost were
garnished.
Petitioner filed with the NLRC a "Motion to
Quash/Recall Writ of Execution and Garnishment"
which was opposed by respondents. Arbiter denied
the motion and directed the sheriff to release the
garnished sum of money to respondents pro rata. The
MR was likewise denied, hence, it interposed an
appeal to the NLRC. NLRC dismissed the appeal for
petitioners failure to post a bond within the
reglementary period. Its MR was likewise denied.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction. CA dismissed the
petition. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that
petitioners monthly receivables from the Foremost
Farms, Inc. (garnishee) are not exempt from
execution.
HELD: The petition lacks merit. We have ruled
that an order of execution of a final and executory
judgment, as in this case, is not appealable,
otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. On this
ground alone, the instant petition is dismissible.
Assuming that an appeal is proper, still we have to
deny the instant petition. Section 1, Rule IV of the
NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment provides:
"Rule IV EXECUTION
SECTION 1. Properties exempt from execution.
Only the properties of the losing party shall be the
subject of execution, except:
(a) The losing partys family home constituted in
accordance with the Civil Code or Family Code or as
may be provided for by law or in the absence thereof,
the homestead in which he resides, and land
necessarily used in connection therewith, subject to
the limits fixed by law;
(b) His necessary clothing, and that of his family;
(c) Household furniture and utensils necessary for
housekeeping, and used for that purpose by the losing
party such as he may select, of a value not exceeding
the amount fixed by law;
(d) Provisions for individual or family use
sufficient for three (3) months;

June 27, 2005

PROPERTIES
EXEMPT
FROM
EXECUTION;
exemption pertains only to natural persons and not to
juridical entities
FACTS:
On February 9, 1995, respondents, who were
employed as security guards by petitioner, and
assigned to Fortune Tobacco, Inc. filed with the Labor
Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary
claims against petitioner and Fortune Tobacco. L.A.
rendered a Decision, declaring that all the
respondents except Antonio Cabangon Chua are
jointly and severally liable to pay complainants
P1,077,124.29 for underpayment, overtime pay, legal
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month
pay, illegal deduction and refund of firearms bond,
and
ten 10% percent of all sums owing to
complainants is hereby awarded as attorneys fees.
Fortune Tobacco interposed an appeal to the
NLRC. Petitioner did not appeal. NLRC affirmed with
modification the assailed Arbiters Decision in the
sense that the complaint against Fortune Tobacco was
dismissed. This Decision became final and executory.
Thus, the award specified in the Decision of the
Arbiter became the sole liability of petitioner. The

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(e) The professional libraries of attorneys, judges,

physicians,
pharmacists,
dentists,
engineers,
surveyors, clergymen, teachers, and other
professionals, not exceeding the amount fixed by law;
(f) So much of the earnings of the losing party for
his personal services within the month preceding the
levy as are necessary for the support of his family;
(g) All monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities
accruing or in any manner growing out of any life
insurance;
(h) Tools and instruments necessarily used by him
in his trade or employment of a value not exceeding
three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos;
(i) Other properties especially exempted by law."
The above Rule clearly enumerates what
properties are exempt from execution. It is apparent
that the exemption pertains only to natural persons
and not to juridical entities. On this point, the CA
correctly ruled that petitioner, being a corporate
entity, does not fall within the exemption, thus:
"We cannot accede to petitioners position that
the garnished amount is exempt from execution.
Section 13 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is plain
and clear on what properties are exempt from
execution. Section 13 (i) of the Rules pertinently
reads:
SECTION 13. Property exempt from execution.
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
following property, and no other, shall be exempt
from execution:x x x x x x x x x
(i) So much of the salaries, wages or earnings of
the judgment obligor for his personal services within
the four months preceding the levy as are necessary
for the support of his family.
The exemption under this procedural rule should
be read in conjunction with the Civil Code, the
substantive law which proscribes the execution of
employees wages, thus:
ART. 1708. The laborers wage shall not be
subject to execution or attachment, except for debts
incurred for food, shelter, clothing and medical
attendance.
Obviously, the exemption under Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court and Article 1708 of the New Civil Code
is meant to favor only laboring men or women whose
works are manual. Persons belonging to this class
usually look to the reward of a days labor for
immediate or present support, and such persons are
more in need of the exemption than any other [Gaa
vs. Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 304 (1985)].
In this context, exemptions under this rule are
confined only to natural persons and not to juridical

entities such as petitioner. Thus, the rule speaks of

salaries, wages and earning from the personal
services rendered by the judgment obligor. The rule
further requires that such earnings be intended for
the support of the judgment debtors family.
It stands to reason that only natural persons
whose salaries, wages and earnings are indispensable
for his own and that of his familys support are
exempted under Section 13 (i) of Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court. Undeniably, a corporate entity such as
petitioner security agency is not covered by the
exemption.
Perez vs. CA
G.R. No. 157616
July 22, 2005
Effect of Judgments
FACTS:
The spouses Digos, secured a loan from the
International Exchange Bank to finance their project
for the construction of townhouses. To secure the
payment of the loan, the spouses Digos executed a
Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over the said property.
The construction was delayed resulting to the failure
of Sps. Digos to pay their loan which subsequently
caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of their REM.
Consequently, the property was sold at public auction,
with the bank as the highest bidder at P4,500,000.00,
which appeared to be the account of the spouses
Digos at the time. The Certificate of Sale executed by
the sheriff was, thereafter, registered at the Office of
the Register of Deeds.
When the period to redeem the property was
about to expire, sps. Digos ask for an extension from
the bank to redeem property, to which the bank after
previous refusal agreed to one month extension.
However, instead of repurchasing said property, the
spouses filed a complaint for the nullification of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
and sale at public auction and/or redemption of the
property against the bank. The latter filed a motion to
dismiss which was granted by the trial court.
Thereafter the bank sold the questioned property
to petitioners. Subsequently, another complaint was
filed by Sps. Digos against the bank, Perez and Ragua,
for the cancellation and annulment of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
executed by them in favor of the bank, the sale at
public auction as well as the certificate of sale
executed by the sheriff, and the Torrens title issued to
them.
The Digos reiterated their allegations in their first
complaint that they were not notified of the sale at
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public auction, and that the banks P4,500,000.00 bid

for the property was unconscionably low compared to
the prevailing market price of P25,000,000.00. They
also admitted their failure to pay their amortization
on their loans. However, they alleged this time that
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage and the sale at public auction were illegal
because the bank charged much more than the
amount due on their loan account, to wit: interest of
26% per annum on the loan account covering January
2, 1998, whereas under the promissory note executed
in favor of the bank, the new interest rate should
commence only on March 4, 1993; penalty charges of
26% of the account, and 5% penalty charges on top of
the 26% interest per annum, as shown by the banks
statement of account. The spouses Digos also averred
that although they pleaded for a restructuring of their
loan account and a moratorium on the payment of
their account, they were unaware of the erroneous
computation of the balance of their loan account.
They maintained that the banks consolidation of its
title over the property on September 19, 1999 was
premature because they were given until October 8,
1999 to redeem the property.
Perez and Ragua filed a motion to dismiss on
similar grounds of res judicata, splitting of a single
cause of action and forum shopping, which the trial
court denied. The MR was also denied.
Upon elevation to via certiorari (rule 65), the CA
rendered judgment dismissing the petition and
affirming the assailed orders. The appellate court
declared that there was no identity of causes of action
in the two cases because the first action was one for
injunction and redemption of the property, whereas
the second action was for the nullification of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
and the sale at public auction due to the erroneous
computation of the balance on the respondents
account with the bank; hence, the spouses Digos were
not estopped from filing their second action. The
petitioners filed a motion for a reconsideration of the
said decision, which the appellate court denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment in the
first case is res judicata to the second case.
HELD:
Yes. Splitting a single cause of action
consists in dividing a single or indivisible cause of
action into several parts or claims and instituting two
or more actions therein. A single cause of action or
entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided
so as to be made the subject of two or more different
actions.

A single act or omission may be violative of

various rights at the same time, such as when the act
constitutes a violation of separate and distinct legal
obligations. The violation of each of these rights is a
cause of action in itself. However, if only one right
may be violated by several acts or omissions, there
would only be one cause of action. Otherwise stated,
if two separate and distinct primary rights are violated
by one and the same wrong; or if the single primary
right should be violated by two distinct and separate
legal wrongs; or when the two primary rights are each
broken by a separate and distinct wrongs; in either
case, two causes of action would result. Causes of
action which are distinct and independent, although
arising out of the same contract, transaction or state
of fact may be sued separately, recovery on one being
no bar to subsequent actions on the others.
The mere fact that the same relief is sought in the
subsequent action will not render the judgment in the
prior action as res judicata. Causes of action are not
distinguishable for purposes of res judicata by
difference in the claims for relief.
Comparing the material averments of the two
complaints, it would appear that separate primary
rights of the respondents were violated by the banks
institution of a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
the real estate mortgage and the sale at public
auction; hence, the respondents had separate and
independent causes of action against the bank, to wit:
(a) the first complaint relates to the violation by the
bank of the right to a judicial, not extrajudicial,
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and for an
extension of the period for the respondents to
redeem the property with damages; (b) the second
complaint relates to the breach by the bank of its loan
contract with the respondents by causing the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
for P4,500,000.00 which was in excess of their unpaid
account with the bank.
However, we are convinced that the institution by
the respondents of their second complaint anchored
on their claim that the bank breached its loan
contracts with them by erroneously computing the
actual and correct balance of their account when the
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage was filed by it designed to avert the
dismissal of their complaint due to splitting causes of
action and res judicata, following the dismissal of their
first complaint and the dismissal of their appeal
through their negligence. The Court is constrained to
conclude that this was a last-ditch attempt to

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resuscitate their lost cause, a brazen violation of the

principle of res judicata.
Section 49(b)(c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
provides in part:
SEC. 49. Effect of judgments. The effect of a
judgment or final order rendered by a court or judge
of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment or order, may be as follows:
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any
other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity.
(c) In any other litigation between the same
parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment
which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.
Section 49(b) enunciates the first concept of res
judicata, known as bar by prior judgment or estoppel
by judgment, which refers to a theory or matter that
has been definitely and finally settled on its merits by
a court of competent jurisdiction without fraud or
collusion.
There are four (4) essential requisites which must
concur for the application of this doctrine:
(a) finality of the former judgment;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) there must be, between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes
of action.[31]
A judgment or order is on the merits of the case
when it determines the rights and liabilities of the
parties based on the ultimate facts as disclosed by the
pleadings or issues presented for trial. It is not
necessary that a trial, actual hearing or argument on
the facts of the case ensued. For as long as the parties
had the full legal opportunity to be heard on their
respective claims and contentions, the judgment or
order is on the merits. An order of the trial court on
the ground that the complaint does not state a cause
of action is a determination of the case on its merits.
Such order whether right or wrong bars another
action based upon the same cause of action. The
operation of the order as res judicata is not affected
by a mere right of appeal where the appeal has not

been taken or by an appeal which never has been

perfected.
Indeed, absolute identity of parties is not a
condition sine qua non for the application of res
judicata. It is sufficient that there is a shared identity
of interest. The rule is that, even if new parties are
found in the second action, res judicata still applies if
the party against whom the judgment is offered in
evidence was a party in the first action; otherwise, a
case can always be renewed by the mere expedience
of joining new parties in the new suit.
The ultimate test to ascertain identity of causes of
action is whether or not the same evidence fully
supports and establishes both the first and second
cases. The application of the doctrine of res judicata
cannot be excused by merely varying the form of the
action or engaging a different method of presenting
the issue.
Section 49(c) of Rule 39 enumerates the concept
of conclusiveness of judgment. This is the second
branch, otherwise known as collateral estoppel or
estoppel by verdict. This applies where, between the
first case wherein judgment is rendered and the
second case wherein such judgment is involved, there
is no identity of causes of action. As explained by this
Court:
It has been held that in order that a judgment in
one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter
in another action between the same parties or their
privies, it is essential that the issues be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second
action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties will be
final and conclusive in the second if that same point
or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first
suit; but the adjudication of an issue in the first case is
not conclusive of an entirely different and distinct
issue arising in the second. In order that this rule may
be applied, it must clearly and positively appear,
either from the record itself or by the aid of
competent extrinsic evidence that the precise point or
question in issue in the second suit was involved and
decided in the first. And in determining whether a
given question was an issue in the prior action, it is
proper to look behind the judgment to ascertain
whether the evidence necessary to sustain a
judgment in the second action would have authorized
a judgment for the same party in the first action.
In the present case, before the private
respondents filed their first complaint, they already
knew that the balance of their account with the bank
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was P4,500,000.00. They even offered to make a

P1,000,000.00 partial payment of their loan to reduce
their account to P3,500,000.00.
If indeed the bank made an erroneous
computation of the balance of their account as
claimed by the private respondents in their second
complaint, this should have been alleged in the first
complaint as one of their causes of action. They failed
to do so. The private respondents unequivocably
admitted in their first complaint that the balance of
their account with the bank was P4,500,000.00 which
was the precise amount for which the bank sought
the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the
sale of the property at public auction; they even
sought judicial recourse to enable them to redeem
the property despite the lapse of the one-year period
therefor.
Relying on these admissions on the part of the
private respondents, and the fact that the bank has
already consolidated its title over the property, the
Court thus dismissed their first complaint. The Order
of the Court dismissing the first complaint is a
judgment of the case on the merits.
The attempt of the respondents in their second
complaint to avoid the application of the principle of
res judicata by claiming the nature of their account on
the ground therefor and their legal theory cannot
prosper. Case law has it that where a right, question
or fact is distinctly put in issue and directly
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a
first case, between the same parties or their privies,
the former adjudication of that fact, right or question
is binding on the parties or their privies in a second
suit irrespective of whether the causes of action are
the same. The ruling of the CA that the action of the
private respondents and their legal theory in their
second complaint were different from their causes of
action and legal theory in the first complaint is not
correct. A different cause of action is one that
proceeds not only on a sufficiently different legal
theory, but also on a different factual footing as not to
require the trial of facts material to the former suit;
that is, an action that can be maintained even if all
disputed factual issues raised in the plaintiffs original
complaint are concluded in defendants favor.
In this case, the private respondents second
complaint cannot be maintained without trying the
facts material to the first case, and the second case
cannot be maintained if all the disputed factual issues
raised in the first complaint are considered in favor of
the bank.

The principle of res judicata applies when the

opportunity to raise an issue in the first complaint
exists but the plaintiff failed to do so. Indeed, if the
pleading of a different legal theory would have
convinced the trial court to decide a particular issue in
the first action which, with the use of diligence the
plaintiffs could have raised therein but failed to do so,
they are barred by res judicata. Nor do legal theories
operate to constitute a cause of action. New legal
theories do not amount to a new cause of action so as
to defeat the application of the principle ofres
judicata.
Indeed, in Siegel v. Knott, it was held that the
statement of a different form of liability is not a
different cause of action, provided it grows out of the
same transaction or act and seeks redress for the
wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different
causes of action simply because the theory of the
second would not have been open under the
pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve the
right to bring a second action after the loss of the
first, merely by having circumscribed and limited
theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the
first.
It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the
grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place
in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the
suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The
plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every
ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon
which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon
them by piecemeal in successive action to recover for
the same wrong or injury.
A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or
equitable, must present to the court, either by the
pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon
which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at
liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by
piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds
upon which a special relief is sought and leave the
rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first
fails. There would be no end to litigation if such
piecemeal presentation is allowed.
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO. (now BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS), vs. TOMAS TOH, SR., AND
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANDALUYONG CITY,
BRANCH 214
G.R. No. 144018. June 23, 2003. SECOND
DIVISION. QUISUMBING
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL ON THE GROUND
OF ADVANCED AGE
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ISSUE: WON THE GRANT OF EXECUTION PENDING

APPEAL ON THE GROUND OF ADVANCED AGE OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT TOMAS TOH, SR. IS PROPER.

FACTS: On August 29, 1997, Private respondent

Tomas Toh, Sr., together with his sons, Tomas Tan
Toh, Jr., and Antonio Tan Toh executed a
Comprehensive Security Agreement in favor of
petitioner, wherein the Tohs jointly and severally
bound themselves as sureties for the P22 million
credit facilities, denominated as Omnibus Line and
Bills Purchased Line, to Catmon Sales International
Corporation (CASICO). Said credit line expired on June
30, 1998, but the parties renewed the same for
another year, subject to the following amendments:
(1) a reduction in the credit line from P22 million to
P7.5 million; and (2) the relief of Toh, Sr., as one of
the sureties of CASICO.

RULING: Yes. The grant of execution pending

appeal on the ground of advanced age of private
respondent Tomas Toh, Sr. is proper as it is well
within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Discretionary execution is permissible only when
good reasons exist for immediately executing the
judgment before finality or pending appeal or even
before the expiration of the time to appeal. Good
reasons are compelling circumstances justifying the
immediate execution lest judgment becomes illusory,
or the prevailing party may, after the lapse of time,
become unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of
the adverse party who may apparently have no case
except to delay.

On March 17, 1999, Toh Sr. sued petitioner for

the recovery of his bank deposits with petitioner in
the amount of P2,560,644.68 plus damages. He
claimed that petitioner had debited, without his
knowledge and consent, said amount from his savings
and current accounts with petitioner bank and then
applied the money as payment for the Letters of
Credit availed of by Catmon Sales International
Corporation (CASICO) from petitioner. Thus, when
Toh issued two checks to Anton Construction Supply,
Inc., they were dishonored by FEBTCO allegedly for
having been drawn against insufficient funds.

The Rules of Court does not state, enumerate, or

give examples of good reasons to justify execution.
The determination of what is a good reason must,
necessarily, be addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court. In other words, the issuance of the writ
of execution must necessarily be controlled by the
judgment of the judge in accordance with his own
conscience and by a sense of justice and equity, free
from the control of anothers judgment or conscience.
It must be so for discretion implies the absence of a
hard and fast rule.

Petitioner bank, in its answer averred that the

debiting of Tohs bank accounts was justified due to
his surety undertaking in the event of the default of
CASICO in its payments.

In this case, the trial court granted private

respondents motion for discretionary execution due
to his advanced age, citing our ruling in De Leon v.
Soriano. It concluded that old age is a good reason to
allow execution pending appeal as any delay in the
final disposition of the present case may deny private
respondent of his right to enjoy fully the money he
has with defendant bank. The Court of Appeals found
said ruling in conformity with sound logical precepts,
inspired as it is by the probability that the lapse of
time would render the ultimate judgment ineffective.
It further stressed that the trial court was in the
vantage position to determine whether private
respondents advanced age and state of health would
merit the execution private respondent prayed for.

On July 30, 1999, private respondent filed a

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, which the
lower court granted. Thereafter, Toh Sr. filed a
Motion for Discretionary Execution by invoking
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. He
prayed that execution pending appeal be granted on
the ground of old age and the probability that he may
not be able to enjoy his money deposited in
petitioners bank.
The RTC granted private
respondents Motion for Discretionary Execution.
Petitioner without filing a motion for
reconsideration of the trial courts order brought the
matter to the CA in a special civil action for certiorari.
The CA dismissed it. Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied. Hence this appeal.

In De Leon, the SC upheld immediate execution of

judgment in favor of a 75-year-old woman. It ruled
that her need of and right to immediate execution of
the decision in her favor amply satisfied the
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requirement of a paramount and compelling reason

of urgency and justice, outweighing the security
offered by the supersedeas bond. In the subsequent
case of Borja v. Court of Appeals, the SC likewise
allowed execution pending appeal in favor of a 76
year-old man on the ground that the appeal will take
years to decide with finality, and he might very well
be facing a different judgment from a Court higher
than any earthly tribunal and the decision on his
complaint, even if it be in his favor, would have
become meaningless as far as he himself was
concerned.

lots sold were those comprising Block 40. CTDC was

unaware of the NHA Resolution ordering PROSECOR
to have Block 40 utilized as open space of Provident
Village.
When Panotes was succeeded by Araceli Bumatay
as president of the Provident Village Homeowners
Association, she filed with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for revival of
the NHA Resolution. Impleaded therein as defendant
was CTDC, whom she alleged as successor-in-interest
of PROSECOR. Later HLURB rendered its Decision in
favor of Bumatay, reviving the NHA Resolution and
declaring Block 40 of the Provident Village as open
space for the said subdivision. Said decision was
affirmed by HLURB Board of Commissioners and the
Office of the President. CTDC went to the CA which in
turn reversed the decision of the Office of the
President.
ISSUE: Whether the NHA Resolution dated August
14, 1980 may be enforced against CTDC.
HELD: No. An action for revival of judgment is no
more than a procedural means of securing the
execution of a previous judgment which has become
dormant after the passage of five years without it
being executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It
is not intended to re-open any issue affecting the
merits of the judgment debtors case nor the propriety
or correctness of the first judgment.
Here, the original judgment or the NHA
Resolution sought to be revived was between Rogelio
Panotes and PROSECOR, not between petitioner
Araceli Bumatay and respondent CTDC, the latter not
being the successor-in-interest of PROSECOR.
Furthermore, strangers to a case, like CTDC, are
not bound by the judgment rendered by a court. It
will not divest the rights of a party who has not and
never been a party to a litigation. Execution of a
judgment can be issued only against a party to the
action and not against one who did not have his day in
court.
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., vs.
HONORABLE NEMESIO S. FELIX, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, RICHARD C. JAMORA, Branch Clerk of
Court, and EMERITA GARON, G.R. No. 148090
November 28, 2006

In the present case, private respondent Toh is

already 79 years old. It cannot, by any stretch of
imagination, be denied that he is already of advanced
age. Not a few might be fortunate to live beyond 79
years. But no one could claim with certainty that his
tribe would be always blessed with long life.
Private respondent obtained a favorable
judgment in the trial court. But that judgment is still
on appeal before the CA. It might even reach the SC
before the controversy is finally resolved with finality.
As well said in Borja, while we may not agree that a
man of his years is practically moribund, the Court can
appreciate his apprehension that he will not be long
for this world and may not enjoy the fruit of the
judgment before he finally passes away.
PANOTES VS CITY TOWNHOUSE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
FACTS: Panotes is the president of the Provident
Village Homeowners Association, Inc.. He filed a
complaint before the National Housing Authority
(NHA) against Provident Securities Corporation
(PROSECOR), owner-developer of the Provident
Village in Marikina City. The complaint alleges that
PROSECOR violated some of the provisions of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957, one of which is its
failure to provide an open space in the said
subdivision. Later in a Resolution, the NHA directed
PROSECOR to provide the Provident Village an open
space which is Block 40. PROSECOR did not appeal the
said resolution hence the same became final and
executory. Panotes then filed a motion for execution
of the NHA Resolution. However it was found that the
records of the case were mysteriously missing. Hence,
his motion was provisionally dismissed without
prejudice. Meanwhile, PROSECOR sold to City
Townhouse Development Corporation (CTDC),
respondent, several lots in the subdivision. Among the

EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL; REQUISITES

FACTS: The private respondent Emerita Garon
("Garon") filed an action for sum of money docketed
as against Project Movers Realty and Development
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Corporation ("Project Movers") and Stronghold

Insurance Company, Inc. ("Stronghold Insurance").

We agree with Stronghold Insurance that Garon

failed to present good reasons to justify execution
pending appeal. The situations in the cases cited by
the trial court are not similar to this case. In Ma-Ao
Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Caete, Caete filed an
action for compensation for his illness. The
Workmens Compensation Commission found the
illness compensable. Considering Caetes physical
condition and the Courts finding that he was in
constant danger of death, the Court allowed
execution pending appeal. In De Leon, et al. v.
Soriano, et al., De Leon, et al. defaulted on an
agreement that was peculiarly personal to Asuncion.
The agreement was valid only during Asuncions
lifetime. The Court considered that Sorianos health
was delicate and she was 75 years old at that time.
Hence, execution pending appeal was justified. In this
case, it was not Garon, but her husband, who was ill.
The posting of a bond, standing alone and absent
the good reasons required under Section 2, Rule 39 of
the Rules, is not enough to allow execution pending
appeal. The mere filing of a bond by a successful party
is not a good reason to justify execution pending
appeal as a combination of circumstances is the
dominant consideration which impels the grant of
immediate execution. The bond is only an additional
factor for the protection of the defendants creditor.
The requisites for the grant of an execution of a
judgment pending appeal are the following:
(a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party
with notice to the adverse party;
(b) there must be good reasons for execution
pending appeal;
(c) the good reasons must be stated in the special
order.
As a discretionary execution, execution pending
appeal is permissible only when good reasons exist for
immediately executing the judgment before finality or
pending appeal or even before the expiration of the
period to appeal. Good reasons, special, important,
pressing reasons must exist to justify execution
pending appeal; otherwise, instead of an instrument
of solicitude and justice, it may well become a tool of
oppression and inequality. Good reasons consist of
exceptional circumstances of such urgency as to
outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party
may suffer should the appealed judgment be reversed
later.
Fujiki v Marinay
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
Rule 39 Sec 48 : Foreign Judgments- A recognition
of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a

In an Order dated 19 September 2000, the

Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 564 ("trial
court") granted Garons motion for summary
judgment, which included that all other claims and
counter-claims of the parties are hereby ordered
dismissed.
On 6 October 2000, Garon filed a motion for
execution pending appeal. On 10 October 2000,
Stronghold Insurance moved for the reconsideration
of the 19 September 2000 Order of the trial court and
in an Order dated 23 January 2001, the trial court
denied
Stronghold
Insurances
motion
for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
In an Order dated 8 February 2001, the trial court
granted Garons motion for execution pending appeal.
The trial court ordered Garon to post a bond of P20
million to answer for any damage that Project Movers
and Stronghold Insurance may sustain by reason of
the execution pending appeal. On 14 February 2001,
Branch Clerk of Court Richard C. Jamora ("Jamora")
issued a writ of execution pending appeal.
On 16 February 2001, Stronghold Insurance filed a
notice of appeal. Stronghold Insurance also filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to
assail the trial courts 8 February 2001 Order and the
writ of execution pending appeal. In its Resolution8 of
23 February 2001, the Court of Appeals enjoined the
trial court, Jamora and Garon from enforcing the 8
February 2001 Order. However, it turned out that
notices of garnishment had been served before the
Court of Appeals issued the temporary restraining
order (TRO). In its Order9 dated 7 March 2001, the
trial court denied Stronghold Insurances Urgent
Motion for the recall of the notices of garnishment.
ISSUE: Whether or not there are good reasons to
justify execution pending appeal.
HELD:
No. In granting the motion for execution pending
appeal, the trial court ruled:
A perusal of [t]he records of the instant case will
sustain plaintiffs claim that defendants raised no valid
or meritorious defenses against the claims of plaintiff.
The Court notes with interest the fact that defendants
admitted the genuineness and due execution of the
Promissory Notes and Surety Agreement sued upon in
this case.

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marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to

recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and
decided under foreign law.
FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a
Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his
wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost
contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi
Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15
May 2008 in Q.C. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and
they were able to reestablish their relationship.
In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment
from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage) praying that (1) the Japanese Family Court
judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared
void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family
Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate
the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate
of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
National Statistics Office (NSO).
RTC dismissed the petition. SolGen agreed the
petition.Fujiki' s MR was denied. Thus, a direct
recourse to SC from RTC under Rule 45 on a pure
question of law.
ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court can
recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil
Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
HELD: Yes. However, the effect of a foreign
judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts
must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent
with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the

petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment

as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more
specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the
Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an
official publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment. If the office which has custody is in a
foreign country such as Japan, the certification may
be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment
declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Section
48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a
foreign judgment or final order against a person
creates a presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title. Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules
of Court states that the judgment or final order may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. Thus, Philippine courts
exercise limited review on foreign judgments.
Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of
a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is
admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only
be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e.,
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. The
rule on limited review embodies the policy of
efficiency and the protection of party expectations, as
well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, vs.
FEDERICO A. SERRA
G.R. No. 203241.July 10, 2013. SECOND DIVISION.
CARPIO.
Final and executory judgment may be executed by
motion within five years; Exception
FACTS: Respondent Federico A. Serra (Serra) and
petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC) entered into a Contract of Lease with Option
to Buy wherein Serra agreed to lease his land in
Masbate to RCBC for 25 years.

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RULE 39

However, when RCBC informed Serra of its

decision to exercise its option to buy the property, the
latter replied that he was no longer interested in
selling the property. Thus, RCBC filed a Complaint for
Specific Performance and Damages against Serra in
the RTC Makati which ordered Serra to execute and
deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC. Serra
appealed to the CA.

RULING:
No. The Rules of Court provide that a final and
executory judgment may be executed by motion
within five years from the date of its entry or by an
action after the lapse of five years and before
prescription sets in. This rule, however, admits of
exceptions as when execution may be made by
motion even after the lapse of five years. These
exceptions have one common denominator: the delay
is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment
obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.
In Camacho v. Court of Appeals, the SC held that
where the delays were occasioned by the judgment
debtors own initiatives and for her advantage as well
as beyond the judgment creditors control, the fiveyear period allowed for enforcement of the judgment
by motion is deemed to have been effectively
interrupted or suspended.
In the present case, there is no dispute that RCBC
seeks to enforce the decision which became final and
executory on 15 April 1994. This decision orders Serra
to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor
of RCBC. However, to evade his obligation to RCBC,
Serra transferred the property to his mother Ablao,
who then transferred it to Liok. Serras action
prompted RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly,
the delay in the execution of the decision was caused
by Serra for his own advantage. Thus, the pendency of
the Annulment case effectively suspended the fiveyear period to enforce through a motion the decision
in the Specific Performance case. Since the decision in
the Annulment case attained finality on 3 March 2009
and RCBCs motion for execution was filed on 25
August 2011, RCBCs motion is deemed filed within
the five-year period for enforcement of a decision
through a motion.
The purpose of prescribing time limitations for
enforcing judgments is to prevent parties from
sleeping on their rights. Far from sleeping on its rights,
RCBC has pursued persistently its action against Serra
in accordance with law. On the other hand, Serra has
continued to evade his obligation by raising issues of
technicality. While strict compliance with the rules of
procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is
warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the
rules will not serve the ends of justice.
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO
YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON
YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEALOSA vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO

Meanwhile, Serra donated the property to his

mother, Leonida Ablao who subsequently sold the
same to Hermanito Liok. A new land title was issued in
favor of Liok. Thus, RCBC filed a Complaint for
Nullification of Deed of Donation and Deed of Sale
with Reconveyance and Damages against Liok, Ablao
and Serra before the RTC of Masbate City.
The CA, and later the Supreme Court, affirmed the
order of the RTC Makati in the Specific Performance
case. On 15 April 1994, the decision in the Specific
Performance case became final and executory upon
entry of judgment.
On 22 October 2001, the RTC Masbate ruled in
favor of RCBC, declaring the donation in favor of
Ablao and the subsequent sale to Liok null and void. In
a Decision dated 28 September 2007, the CA affirmed
the RTC Masbate decision. Thus, Liok filed a Petition
for Review on Certiorari, while Serra and Ablao filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the SC. In separate
Resolutions dated 30 June 2008 and 22 October 2008,
which became final and executory on 27 August
20087 and 3 March 2009, respectively, the SC found
neither reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion
on the CAs part.
On 25 August 2011, RCBC moved for the
execution of the decision in the Specific Performance
case. This was opposed by Serra arguing that the
motion for execution was already barred by
prescription and laches, and that RCBC was at fault for
failing to register as lien in the original title the
Contract of Lease with Option to Buy. The RTC Makati
denied RCBCs motion for execution. RCBCs motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied. Thus, RCBC
filed this petition.
ISSUE:
WON RCBCs motion for execution was already
barred by prescription and laches.

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E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO

CITY
G.R. No. 198680
July 8, 2013
FACTS: On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together
with some of their cousins, filed a complaint for
Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages
against respondent Gaudioso alleging that Magdaleno
Ypon died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968,
leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J.
Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso
executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused
the cancellation of the certificates of title, leading to
their subsequent transfer in his name to the prejudice
of petitioners who are Magdalenos collateral
relatives and successors-in-interest.
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the
lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his
certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from
Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his
passport. Further, by way of affirmative defense, he
claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action
against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of
action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real
parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the
petitioners have been judicially declared as
Magdalenos lawful heirs.
RTC found that the subject complaint failed to
state a cause of action against Gaudioso. The plaintiffs
therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied due to the counsels failure to state the date
on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Certificate of Compliance was issued. Petitioners, who
were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246,
sought direct recourse to the Court through the
instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTCs dismissal of the
case on the ground that the subject complaint failed
to state a cause of action was proper.
HELD: The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission
by which a party violates a right of another. It is wellsettled that the existence of a cause of action is
determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this
relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause
of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face
to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the
relief prayed for. Accordingly, if the allegations furnish
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed,
regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the
defendants.

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners,

who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that
they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on
the same, prayed that the Affidavit of SelfAdjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null
and void and that the transfer certificates of title
issued in the latters favor be cancelled. While the
foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would
consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said
complaint, the rule that the determination of a
decedents lawful heirs should be made in the
corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC,
in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and
reconveyance, from granting the same.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of
who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made
in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in
an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and
possession of property. This must take precedence
over the action for recovery of possession and
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the
trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in
the civil action for the reason that such a declaration
can only be made in a special proceeding. Under
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a
civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a
special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks
to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is
then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship
can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as
the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of
a status or right.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this
Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be
made in a special proceeding, and not in an
independent civil action.
By way of exception, the need to institute a
separate special proceeding for the determination of
heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of
practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and
already presented their evidence regarding the issue
of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered
judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had
been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.In this
case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of
similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the
need to institute the proper special proceeding in
order to determine the heirship of the parties
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RULE 39

involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil

Case No. T-2246.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the
complaint in determining whether the same fails to
state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard
decisions material to the proper appreciation of the
questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with
applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of
heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for
recovery of ownership and/or possession, the
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether
proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the
RTC erred in ruling on Gaudiosos heirship which
should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and
determined in the proper special proceeding. As such,
the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be
devoid of any legal effect.
CITY OF CEBU vs. APOLONIO M. DEDAMO, JR. G.R.
No. 172852
January 30, 2013

the case was remanded for execution to the RTC,

before which, a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution was filed by Spouses Dedamo on April 4,
2003. On May 16, 2003, the RTC granted the motion
and ordered the issuance of the writ.
In the meantime, Spouses Dedamo passed away
and they were substituted in the case by herein
respondent.
On December 23, 2003, the petitioner paid the
respondent the sum of P19,039,939.50 which is the
difference between the just compensation due and
the provisional payment already made.
On March 24, 2004, the respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion before the RTC to order the
petitioner to pay interest on the just compensation
computed from the time of actual taking of the lands.
On April 30, 2004, the RTC denied the motion and
ruled that it can no longer amend a final and
executory judgment that did not specifically direct the
payment of legal interest.
Adamant, the respondent sought recourse before
the CA asserting that the petitioner is liable to pay: (a)
12% legal interest on the unpaid balance of the just
compensation computed from the time of actual
taking of the property up to the date of payment of
just compensation; and (b) 12% legal interest from the
time the decision awarding just compensation
became final and executory on September 20, 2002
until its satisfaction on December 23, 2003.
Subsequently, the CA rejected the respondents
first claim since the issue was belatedly raised during
the execution stage and after the judgment of just
compensation attained finality. Nonetheless, it found
the second contention meritorious and awarded legal
interest accruing from the time the RTC Order dated
December 27, 1996 awarding just compensation was
affirmed with finality by the Supreme Court up to the
time of full payment.
Both parties elevated the CA judgment to the
Court. The respondents petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 172942 where he sought, in the main, that the
12% interest rate be reckoned from the date of taking
of the property and not from the date of finality of the
Decision dated May 7, 2002 in G.R. No. 142971. The
Court denied his petition on August 22, 2006 for
failure to sufficiently show that the CA committed any
reversible error in the questioned judgment. The
respondents motion for reconsideration of the said
decision was denied with finality on November 27,
2006.
The petitioner prays for the annulment of the
award of 12% legal interest made by the CA in view of

CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT; EMINENT

DOMAIN; LEGAL INTEREST
FACTS: The present controversy is an off-shoot of
Civil Case No. CEB-14632 for eminent domain over
two (2) parcels of land owned by spouses Apolonio
and Blasa Dedamo (Spouses Dedamo), filed by the
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City, Branch 13, on September 17, 1993. The
petitioner immediately took possession of the lots
after depositing P51,156.00 with the Philippine
National Bank pursuant to Section 19 of Republic Act
No. 7160.
During the pendency of the case, or on December
14, 1994, the petitioner and Spouses Dedamo entered
into a Compromise Agreement whereby the latter
agreed to part with the ownership of the parcels of
land in favor of the former in consideration of ONE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P1,786,400.00) as provisional
payment and just compensation in an amount to be
determined by a panel of commissioners. Forthwith,
the panel was constituted and a report was submitted
to the RTC recommending the sum of P20,826,339.50
as just compensation. The report was adopted and
approved by the RTC in its Order dated December 27,
1996.5
The RTC Order was affirmed by the CA and then
by the Court, in a Decision dated May 7, 2002, when
the matter was elevated for review in a petition
docketed as G.R. No. 142971. When the said decision
became final and executory on September 20, 2002,
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RULE 39

the termination of the eminent domain case upon

payment of the just compensation in satisfaction of
the writ of execution. The petitioner further asserts
that the final judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-14632
which did not explicitly pronounce the payment of
interest can no longer be modified lest the basic
principles of remedial law be defiled.
The respondent avers that Section 10, Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court mandating the payment of legal
interest on just compensation forms part of every
judgment rendered in eminent domain cases even if
the same was not directly ordered therein. The
respondent also claims that the award of just
compensation must be reckoned from the date of
taking of subject lots and not from the date of finality
of G.R. No. 142971 because just compensation, before
it is paid, constitutes loan or forbearance of money
that entails the imposition of a 12% interest per
annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the CA as to
the reckoning point from which the legal interest be
computed has obtained its finality.
HELD: YES. The petition is denied on the ground of
res judicata in the mode of conclusiveness of
judgment. A perusal of the allegations in the present
case evidently shows that the petitioner broaches the
issues similarly raised and already resolved in G.R. No.
172942.
Under the principle of conclusiveness of
judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially
tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has
been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them. Stated
differently, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation in a second case of a fact or question already
settled in a previous case.
The adjudication in G.R. No. 172942 has become
binding and conclusive on the petitioner who can no
longer question the respondents entitlement to the
12% legal interest awarded by the CA. The Courts
determination in G.R. No. 172942 on the reckoning
point of the 12% legal interest is likewise binding on
the petitioner who cannot re-litigate the said matter
anew through the present recourse. Thus, the
judgment in G.R. No. 172942 bars the present case as
the relief sought in the latter is inextricably related to
the ruling in the former.

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RULES 40 to 56

CECILIA B. ESTINOZO vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

FORMER SIXTEENTH DIVISION, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 150276. February 12, 2008. THIRD
DIVISION. NACHURA, J.

petition for review, petitioner filed with the appellate

court a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion
for Reconsideration. On June 28, 2001, the CA, in the
its Resolution, denied the said motion pursuant to
Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules of Court and Rule 9,
Section 2 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals (RIRCA). Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the June 28, 2001 Resolution of
the CA but the appellate court denied the same, on
August 17, 2001. Displeased with this series of
denials, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing all the
issuances of the CA.

APPEAL AND CERTIORARI; MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE

FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Estinozo while in Sogod,
Southern Leyte, represented to private complainants
Gaudencio Ang, Rogelio Ceniza, Nilo Cabardo,
Salvacion Nueve, Virgilio Maunes, Apolinaria Olayvar,
and Mariza Florendo that she was one of the owners
of Golden Overseas Employment and that she was
recruiting workers to be sent abroad. She then asked
from the said complainants the payment of placement
and processing fees totaling P15,000.00.

ISSUE: WON SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR

CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS THE PROPER REMEDY
AVAILED OF BY THE PETITIONER.

Private complainants paid the fees, went with

petitioner to Manila. On the promised date of their
departure, however, private complainants never left
the country. Came November 1986 and still they were
not deployed. This prompted private complainants to
suspect that something was amiss, and they
demanded the return of their money. Petitioner
assured them refund of the fees and even executed
promissory notes to several of the complainants; but,
as before, her assurances were mere pretenses.

RULING:
No. The petition is the wrong remedy to question
the appellate courts issuances. Section 1 of Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court expressly provides that a party
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or
final order or resolution of the CA may file a verified
petition for review on certiorari. Considering that, in
this case, appeal by certiorari was available to
petitioner, she effectively foreclosed her right to
resort to a special civil action for certiorari, a limited
form of review and a remedy of last recourse, which
lies only where there is no appeal or plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Complainants then filed seven separate

Informations for Estafa against petitioner with the
RTC of Maasin, Southern Leyte. On request of
petitioner, the cases were consolidated and jointly
heard by the trial court.

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are
mutually exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot coexist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy.
The nature of the questions of law intended to be
raised on appeal is of no consequence. It may well be
that those questions of law will treat exclusively of
whether or not the judgment or final order was
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion. This is immaterial. The
remedy is appeal, not certiorari as a special civil
action.

During the trial, in her defense, petitioner

testified, among others, that she was an employee of
the COA who worked as a part-time secretary at FCR
Recruitment Agency owned by Fe Corazon Ramirez;
that she received the amounts claimed by the
complainants and remitted the same to Ramirez; that
complainants actually transacted with Ramirez and
not with her and that she was only forced to execute
the promissory notes.
On November 9, 1994, the RTC found petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges of
estafa. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the case to the
CA which affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

Granting arguendo that the instant certiorari

petition is an appropriate remedy, still the Court
cannot grant the writ prayed for because there is no
grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA in the
challenged issuances. The rule, as it stands now
without exception, is that the 15-day reglementary

On May 30, 2001, within the 15-day reglementary

period to file a motion for reconsideration or a
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period for appealing or filing a motion for

reconsideration or new trial cannot be extended,
except in cases before the Supreme Court, as one of
last resort, which may, in its sound discretion grant
the extension requested. This rule also applies even if
the motion is filed before the expiration of the period
sought to be extended. Thus, the appellate court
correctly denied petitioners Motion for Extension of
Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration.

and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had

later issued to the respondents.
The respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to
dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of case due to the land being friar
land, and that the petitioners had no legal personality
to commence the case.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. The
petitioners then timely filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion for
reconsideration. Therefore, the petitioners assailed
the dismissal via petition for certiorari, but the CA
dismissed the petition holding that the basic requisite
for the special civil action of certiorari to lie is that
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
remedy of the petitioners was to have appealed the
same to this Court. But petitioners did not. Instead
they filed the present special civil action for certiorari
after the decision of the court a quo has become final.
Certiorari, however cannot be used as a substitute for
the lost remedy of appeal.
The MR of petitioners was likewise denied, hence
this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in
dismissing the petition for certiorari
HELD:
The CA seems to be correct in
dismissing the petition for certiorari, considering that
the order granting the respondents motion to dismiss
was a final, as distinguished from an interlocutory,
order against which the proper remedy was an appeal
in due course. Certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy,
is not substitute for appeal due to its being availed of
only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Nonetheless, the petitioners posit that a special
civil action for certiorari was their proper remedy to
assail the order of dismissal in light of certain rules of
procedure,specifically pointing out that the second
paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court
(An order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being
an appeal from the judgment or final order)
prohibited an appeal of a denial of the motion for
reconsideration, and that the second paragraph of
Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court ( No appeal
may be taken from: xxx An order denying a motion for
new trial or reconsideration) expressly declared that
an order denying a motion for reconsideration was
not appealable. They remind that the third paragraph

It is well to point out that with petitioners

erroneous filing of a motion for extension of time and
with her non-filing of a motion for reconsideration or
a petition for review from the CAs decision, the
challenged decision has already attained finality and
may no longer be reviewed. The instant Rule 65
petition cannot even substitute for the lost appeal
certiorari is not a procedural device to deprive the
winning party of the fruits of the judgment in his or
her favor. When a decision becomes final and
executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the case
and not even an appellate court will have the power
to review the said judgment. Otherwise, there will be
no end to litigation and this will set to naught the
main role of courts of justice to assist in the
enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance
of peace and order by settling justiciable
controversies with finality.
Spouses Reterta vs. Spouses Mores
G.R. No. 159941
August 17, 2011
Subject of Appeal
FACTS:
The petitioners commenced an
action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the
RTC in Trece Martires City averring that they were the
true and real owners of the parcel of land (the land)
situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, containing an
area of 47,708 square meters, having inherited the
land from their father; that their late father had been
the grantee of the land by virtue of his occupation and
cultivation; that their late father and his predecessors
in interest had been in open, exclusive, notorious, and
continuous possession of the land for more than 30
years; that they had discovered in 1999 an affidavit
dated March 1, 1966 that their father had purportedly
executed whereby he had waived his rights, interests,
and participation in the land; that by virtue of the
affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued
in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources;
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RULES 40 to 56

of Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly provided that in the

instances where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to

file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or
granting or denying applications for postponement, or
production or inspection of documents or things, etc.
Unlike a final judgment or order, which is appealable,
as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not
be questioned on appeal except only as part of an
appeal that may eventually be taken from the final
judgment rendered in the case.

The petitioners position has no basis.

For one, the order that the petitioners really
wanted to obtain relief from was the order granting
the respondents motion to dismiss, not the denial of
the motion for reconsideration. The fact that the
order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order
for thereby completely disposing of the case, leaving
nothing more for the trial court to do in the action,
truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the
correct remedy.

Moreover, even Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules

of Court, cited by the petitioners, indicates that the
proper remedy against the denial of the petitioners
motion for reconsideration was an appeal from the
final order dismissing the action upon the
respondents motion to dismiss. The said rule explicitly
states thusly:

The fundamental distinction between a final

judgment or order, on one hand, and an interlocutory
order, on the other hand, has been outlined in
Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, viz:

Section 9. Remedy against order denying a motion

for new trial or reconsideration. An order denying a
motion for new trial or reconsideration is not
appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the
judgment or final order.

The concept of final judgment, as distinguished

from one which has become final (or executory as of
right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A
final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of
a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court
in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits
which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the
trial declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are and which party is in the
right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action
on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or
prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is
ended, as far as deciding the controversy or
determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is
concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the
Court except to await the parties next move (which
among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an
appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the
execution of the judgment once it becomes final or, to
use the established and more distinctive term, final
and executory.
xxx
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose
of the case, and does not end the Courts task of
adjudicating the parties contentions and determining
their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but
obviously indicates that other things remain to be
done by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g., an order
denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the

The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a

motion for reconsideration independently of a
judgment or final order is logical and reasonable. A
motion for reconsideration is not putting forward a
new issue, or presenting new evidence, or changing
the theory of the case, but is only seeking a
reconsideration of the judgment or final order based
on the same issues, contentions, and evidence either
because: (a) the damages awarded are excessive; or
(b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision
or final order; or (c) the decision or final order is
contrary to law. By denying a motion for
reconsideration, or by granting it only partially,
therefore, a trial court finds no reason either to
reverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and
leaves the judgment or final order to stand. The
remedy from the denial is to assail the denial in the
course of an appeal of the judgment or final order
itself.
The enumeration of the orders that were not
appealable made in the 1997 version of Section 1,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court the version in force at
the time when the CA rendered its assailed decision
on May 15, 2002 included an order denying a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:

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Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be

taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

ORDINARY APPEAL
FACTS: Manaloto et al. filed a case of unlawful
detainer before the MeTC against Veloso. MeTC later
on decided in favor of Manaloto et al. This prompted
Veloso to go to the RTC which in turn reversed the
MeTCs decision. Prior, however, to such RTCs
decision and while the appeal was pending therein,
Veloso filed a civil case of breach of contract and
damages against Manaloto et al before the RTC,
branch 227. Manaloto et al in turn filed an omnibus
motion, praying for the dismissal of velosos civil case
(Breach of contract and damages). Later RTC branch
227 issued a resolution/decision dismissing velosos
case. Veloso
received a copy of such
resolution/decision on September 26, 2003. He then
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said judgment
on October 10, 2003, which RTC-Branch 227 denied in
an order dated December 30, 2003. He received a
copy of the RTC-Branch 227 order denying his Motion
for Reconsideration on February 20, 2004, and he
filed his Notice of Appeal on March 1, 2004. However,
the RTC-Branch 227, in an Order dated March 23,
2004, dismissed Velosos appeal for being filed out of
time.
ISSUE: WHETHER VELOSOS NOTICE OF APPEAL
WAS FILED OUT OF TIME.
HELD: No. Jurisprudence has settled the fresh
period rule, according to which, an ordinary appeal
from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3
of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original
judgment of the trial court or from receipt of the final
order of the trial court dismissing or denying the
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
In Sumiran v. Damaso, we presented a survey of
the cases applying the fresh period rule:
As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared
in Neypes v. Court of Appeals that by virtue of the
power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and
create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is
allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of
the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration. This would standardize
the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away
with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal
period should be counted. Thus, the Court stated:
To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his
notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days
from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying
his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.

No appeal may be taken from:

(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any
similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a
judgment by consent, confession or compromise on
the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other
ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or
more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims,
cross-claims
and
third-party
complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the
court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without
prejudice.
In all the above instances where the judgment or
final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
(n)

It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12SC, effective December 27, 2007, has since amended
Section 1, Rule 41, supra, by deleting an order denying
a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration
from the enumeration of non-appealable orders, and
that such a revision of a procedural rule may be
retroactively applied. However, to reverse the CA on
that basis would not be right and proper, simply
because the CA correctly applied the rule of
procedure in force at the time when it issued its
assailed final order.
MANALOTO VS VELOSO
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RULES 40 to 56

Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of

only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision
becomes final and executory after the lapse of the
original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
In the case before us, Veloso received a copy of
the Resolution dated September 2, 2003 of the RTCBranch 227 dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-02-48341 on September 26, 2003. Fourteen days
thereafter, on October 10, 2003, Veloso filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of said resolution. The RTCBranch 227 denied Velosos Motion for
Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30,
2003, which he received on February 20, 2004. On
March 1, 2004, just after nine days from receipt of the
order denying his Motion for Reconsideration, Veloso
already filed his Notice of Appeal. Clearly, under the
fresh period rule, Veloso was able to file his appeal
well-within the prescriptive period of 15 days.

her signature thereon was forged by respondent; and

that she never received P21 Million or any other
amount as consideration for her share of the
property. Thus, petitioner prayed that Ifzal be
enjoined from paying the rentals to respondent, and
the latter from receiving said rentals; that both be
ordered to pay petitioner her share of the rentals; and
that respondent be enjoined from asserting full
ownership over the property and from committing
any other act in derogation of petitioner's interests.
Petitioner also prayed for the payment of moral and
exemplary damages, litigation expenses, and costs of
the suit.
RESPONDENT narrated that: 1.) he was a former
Opus Dei priest but he left the congregation after he
was maltreated by his Spanish superiors; 2.) for
almost 20 years, the Opus Dei divested the Latorre
family of several real properties. In order to spare the
property from the Opus Dei, both agreed to donate it
to the Foundation. Both also decided to revoke the
donation. The Foundation consented to the
revocation but due to lack of funds, the title was
never transferred and remained in the name of the
Foundation; 3.) petitioner lived with him and his
family from 1988 to 2000, and that he provided for
petitioner's needs, spending a substantial amount of
money; that because of this, and the fact that the
rentals paid for the use of the subject property went
to petitioner, both parties agreed that petitioner
would convey her share over the subject property to
respondent; and that petitioner executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of respondent; 4.) that
petitioner left the house because she detested his act
of firing their driver. It was then that this case was
filed against him by petitioner.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the sole
ground that the venue of the case was improperly laid
since the case was a real action. The property is
located in Makati City, hence, petitioner should have
filed the case before the RTC of Makati City and not of
Muntinlupa City.
Ifzal also filed his motion to dismiss on the ground
of want of jurisdiction, asserting that he was immune
from suit because he was an officer of the Asian
Development Bank.
RTC: 1.) issued a TRO; 2.) directed both Ifzal and
respondent to pay petitioner her share of the rentals;
3.) ordered respondent not to commit any act in
derogation of petitioner's interest over the property.
RTC denied respondent's motion to dismiss. Thus, trial
on the merits ensued.

GENEROSA ALMEDA LATORRE vs. LUIS ESTEBAN

LATORRE
G.R. No. 183926
March 29, 2010
RULE 45 IN RELATION TO RULE 41
FACTS:
Petitioner Generosa filed before the RTC of
Muntinlupa City a Complaint for Collection and
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with
application for Injunction against her own son,
respondent Luis and one Ifzal Ali.
Petitioner averred that Luis and Ifzal entered into
a Contract of Lease over a 1,244-sq. meter real
property, situated at No. 1366 Caballero St.,
Dasmarias Village, Makati City. The lease contract
declared that Luis was the absolute and registered
owner of the property. Petitioner alleged that such
declaration was erroneous because she and
respondent were co-owners of the property in equal
shares.
PETITIONER narrated that: 1.) she and respondent
executed their respective Deeds of Donation,
conveying the property in favor of The Porfirio D.
Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis Esteban Latorre
Foundation, Inc. Later on, both executed separate
Deeds of Revocation of Donation and Reconveyance
of the subject property but such Deeds were not
registered so the property remained in the name of
the Foundation; 2.) She discovered that respondent
caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the TCT
of the property, claiming full ownership over the same
by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly
executed by petitioner in favor of respondent. She
claimed that the deed was a falsified document; that
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RULES 40 to 56

Respondent filed an Answer Ad Cautelam,

insisting that the case was a real action and that the
venue was improperly laid.
The RTC dismissed petitioner's claim against Ifzal
because the dispute was clearly between petitioner
and respondent and ruled in favor of respondent,
declaring that the case should have been filed and
tried in the RTC of Makati City.
Petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration,
which the RTC denied for lack of merit. Hence, this
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUES: I. Whether the RTC erred in treating the
venue as jurisdiction and in treating petitioner's
complaint as a real action.
II. Whether the filing of the case directly with this
Court ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Yes
HELD: The Petition is DENIED.
Petitioner came directly to this Court on a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to
Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged
pure questions of law. In Murillo v. Consul, we laid
down a doctrine that was later adopted by the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In that case, this
Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes
of appeal from decisions of the RTC, namely: (1)
ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where
judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by
the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2)
petition for review, where judgment was rendered by
the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction;
and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court.
The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is
brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on questions of
fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second
mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the
CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of
fact and law. The third mode of appeal, provided in
Rule 45, is filed with the Supreme Court only on
questions of law.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there
is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Our ruling in
Velayo-Fong v. Velayo is instructive:
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there
is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to
be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. The

resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the

law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once
it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or
of fact is not the appellation given to such question by
the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised
without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in
which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a
question of fact.
In her Reply to respondents Comment, petitioner
prayed that this Court decide the case on the merits.
To do so, however, would require the examination by
this Court of the probative value of the evidence
presented, taking into account the fact that the RTC
failed to adjudicate this controversy on the merits.
This, unfortunately, we cannot do. It thus becomes
exceedingly clear that the filing of the case directly
with this Court ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from
the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be
entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought
cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. This Court
is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by
the Constitution and by immemorial tradition.
ARIEL A. TRES REYES vs. MAXIMS TEA HOUSE and
JOCELYN POON
[G.R. No. 140853. February 27, 2003]
FACTS: Ariel Tres Reyes was hired by Maxims Tea
House as a driver, assigning him to its Ermita, Manila
Branch. Ariel thereafter was tasked to fetch the
employees of Savannah Moon. Ariel Tres Reyes
complied, and while he was driving the van with the
employees of Savannah Moon inside, it collided with a
truck. The collision resulted to Physical Injuries
sustained by Tres Reyes and the Employee.
Thereafter, Tres Reyes was terminated by Maxims
Tea House.
Tres Reyes filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter however,
ruled in favor of Maxims Tea House and found Tres
Reyes grossly negligent for failure to avoid the
collision. Tres Reyes then file a PARTIAL MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION before the NLRC. The NLRC
treated the Partial Motion for Reconsideration as an
APPEAL, then ruled in favor of Tres Reyes stating that
he was not negligent.

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RULES 40 to 56

Maxims Tea House then file a special civil action

of Certiorari with the CA, arguing that the the NLRC
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
want or excess of jurisdiction in giving due course to
petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration
notwithstanding that it was a prohibited pleading
under Sec. 17 (now Sec. 19), Rule V of the NLRC Rules
of Procedure and despite want of showing that it was
seasonably filed.
The case was then brought before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN TREATING AS AN APPEAL THE PARTIAL
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF TRES REYES.
HELD: YES. The issue involves a question of
substance versus form. Strictly speaking, a motion for
reconsideration of a decision, order, or award of a
Labor Arbiter is prohibited by Section 19, Rule V of the
NLRC Rules of Procedure. But said rule likewise allows
that a motion for reconsideration shall be treated as
an appeal provided it meets all the requisites of an
appeal. Petitioner insists that his pleading was in form
a motion for reconsideration, but in substance it was
an appeal which complied with all the technical
requirements. Respondents counter that the formal
requisites take precedence.
We have minutely scrutinized the records of this
case, particularly the questioned Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, but we find no basis for the
appellate courts finding that said pleading did not
contain a statement as to when petitioner received a
copy of the decision.
Note that all that Section 3, Rule VI of the NLRC
Rules of Procedure requires with respect to material
dates is a statement of the date when the appellant
received the appealed decision. We rule that
petitioners declaration in his motion that he received
a copy of the Labor Arbiters decision on September
28, 1998 is more than sufficient compliance with said
requirement imposed by Section 3, Rule VI. We
likewise find that the motion in question was filed
with the NLRC on October 8, 1998 or on the tenth
(10th) day from the date of receipt by petitioner of his
copy of the Labor Arbiters decision. Otherwise put,
said pleading was filed within the reglementary tenday period, as provided for in Section 1, Rule VI of the
NLRC Rules of Procedure. The law on the timeliness of
an appeal from the decision, award, or order of the
Labor Arbiters, states clearly that the aggrieved party
has ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof to
appeal to the Commission.Needless to say, an appeal

filed at the last minute of the last day of said period is,
for all intents and purposes, still seasonably filed.
the Court of Appeals accepted respondents
averment that petitioners Motion for Partial
Reconsideration was not verified. The records,
however, contradict their averments. We find that
petitioner verified his motion to reconsider the Labor
Arbiters decision on October 8, 1998, or on the same
day that it was filed. We must, perforce, rule that
petitioner has substantially complied with the
verification requirement as provided for in Section 3,
Rule VI of the Commissions Rules of Procedure.
In labor cases, rules of procedure should not be
applied in a very rigid and technical sense. They are
merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice, and where their strict application would result
in the frustration rather than promotion of substantial
justice, technicalities must be avoided. Technicalities
should not be permitted to stand in the way of
equitably and completely resolving the rights and
obligations of the parties. Where the ends of
substantial justice shall be better served, the
application of technical rules of procedure may be
relaxed.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ARLENE DE

LEON and BERNARDO DE LEON,
G.R. No. 143275
March 20, 2003
FACTS:The Respondent spouses Arlene and
Bernardo de Leon filed a petition to fix the just
compensation of a parcel of land2 before the Regional
Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch 63, acting as a Special
Agrarian Court. On December 19, 1997, the agrarian
court rendered summary judgment fixing the
compensation of the subject property as follows: (1)
P1,260,000 for the 16.69 hectares of riceland and (2)
P2,957,250 for the 30.4160 hectares of sugarland.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, for
brevity) and LBP both filed separate appeals using
different modes. DAR filed a petition for review while
LBP interposed an ordinary appeal by filing a notice of
appeal. DARs petition for review3 was assigned to the
Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals while
LBPs ordinary appeal4 was assigned to the Fourth
Division of the same court.
On November 6, 1998, the appellate courts
Special Third Division rendered a decision in the
petition for review filed by DAR, giving due course to
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RULES 40 to 56

the said petition and was ordered by the appellate

court to recomputed the compensation and pay the
legal interest.

interest of fair play, equity and justice, LBP stresses

the need for the rules to be relaxed so as to give
substantial consideration to the appealed cases.

Meanwhile, on February 15, 2000, the appellate

courts Fourth Division dismissed LBPs ordinary
appeal primarily holding that LBP availed of the wrong
mode of appeal. LBP filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied.

On account of the absence of jurisprudence

interpreting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657 regarding
the proper way to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian
Courts as well as the conflicting decisions of the Court
of Appeals thereon, LBP cannot be blamed for availing
of the wrong mode. Based on its own interpretation
and reliance on the Buenaventura ruling, LBP acted on
the mistaken belief that an ordinary appeal is the
appropriate manner to question decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts.

On July 14, 2000, LBP filed before this Court a

petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. On September 10, 2002, this Court rendered
a Decision affirming the decision of the dismissal of
the appellate court due to the wrong mode of appeal.

Hence, in the light of the aforementioned

circumstances, we find it proper to emphasize the
prospective application of our Decision dated
September 10, 2002. A prospective application of our
Decision is not only grounded on equity and fair play
but also based on the constitutional tenet that rules
of procedure shall not impair substantive rights.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES HAD CHOSEN THE WRONG MODE OF
APPEAL.
HELD:
Yes. In affirming the dismissal by the appellate
court of LBPs ordinary appeal, this Court held that
Section 60 of RA 6657 (The Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law) is clear in providing petition for review
as the appropriate mode of appeal from decisions of
Special Agrarian Courts.

SPOUSES GODOFREDO ALFREDO and CARMEN

LIMON ALFREDO, SPOUSES ARNULFO SAVELLANO and
EDITHA B. SAVELLANO, DANTON D. MATAWARAN,
SPOUSES DELFIN F. ESPIRITU, JR. and ESTELA S.
ESPIRITU and ELIZABETH TUAZON, petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES ARMANDO BORRAS and ADELIA LOBATON
BORRAS, respondents.

Section 61 (the provision on which LBP bases its

argument that ordinary appeal is the correct mode of
appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts)
merely makes a general reference to the Rules of
Court and does not categorically prescribe ordinary
appeal as the correct way of questioning decisions of
Special Agrarian Courts. Thus, we interpreted Section
61 to mean that the specific rules for petitions for
review in the Rules of Court and other relevant
procedures of appeals shall be followed in appealed
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.

G.R. No. 144225. June 17, 2003.*

Appeals; Certiorari; In a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, the Supreme Court reviews
only errors of law and not errors of facts.In a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, this
Court reviews only errors of law and not errors of
facts. The factual findings of the appellate court are
generally binding on this Court. This applies with
greater force when both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals are in complete agreement on their factual
findings.

LBP pleads that the subject Decision should at

least be given prospective application considering that
more than 60 similar agrarian cases filed by LBP via
ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals are in
danger of being dismissed outright on technical
grounds on account of our ruling herein. This,
according to LBP, will wreak financial havoc not only
on LBP as the financial intermediary of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program but also on
the national treasury and the already depressed
economic condition of our country. Thus, in the

FACTS: Spouses Alfredo sold for Php 15,000 to

Spouses Borras a parcel of land measuring 81,524
square meters which was mortgaged with DBP for Php
7,000, with the agreement that Spouses Borras will
pay the DBP loan and its accumulated interest and the
balance to be paid in cash to the sellers.

135
AMDCM

RULES 40 to 56

Spouses Borras gave Spouses Alfredo the money

to pay the loan to DBP which signed the release of
mortgage and returned the owners duplicate copy of
OCT No. 284 to the Alfredos. Spouses Borras
subsequently paid the balance of the purchase price
of the Subject Land for which Carmen Alfredo issued a
receipt dated 11 March 1970. The Alfredos then
delivered to Adelia Borras the owners duplicate copy
of OCT No. 284, with the document of cancellation of
mortgage, official receipts of realty tax payments, and
tax declaration in the name of Godofredo Alfredo.
The Alfredos introduced the Spouses Borras as the
new owners of the Subject Land, to the Natanawans,
the old tenants of the Subject Land. The Borrases then
took possession of the Subject Land.

Adelias cited testimony must be examined in context

not only with her entire testimony but also with the
other circumstances.
In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45, this Court reviews only errors of law and not
errors of facts. The factual findings of the appellate
court are generally binding on this Court. This applies
with greater force when both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals are in complete agreement on their
factual findings.
N.B.
Civil Procedure; Actions; Reconveyance; Quieting
of Title; An action for reconveyance is one that seeks
to transfer property, wrongfully registered by
another, to its rightful and legal owner.An action for
reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property,
wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and
legal owner. The body of the pleading or complaint
determines the nature of an action, not its title or
heading. Thus, the present action should be treated as
one for reconveyance.

In January 1994, The Borrases learned that hired

persons had entered the Subject Land and were
cutting trees under instructions of allegedly new
owners of the Subject Land. Subsequently, Armando
and Adelia discovered that Spouses Alfredo had resold portions of the Subject Land to several persons.
This prompted the Borrases to file an adverse claim
with the Register of Deeds of Bataan. Further, they
discovered that Spouses Alfredo had secured an
owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 284 after filing a
petition in court for the issuance of a new copy
claiming in their petition that they lost their owners
duplicate copy. Spouses Borras wrote the Alfredos
complaining about their acts, but the latter did not
reply. Thus, Armando and Adelia filed a complaint for
specific performance.

Prescription; An action for reconveyance based on

an implied trust prescribes in ten years.To
determine when the prescriptive period commenced
in an action for reconveyance, plaintiffs possession of
the disputed property is material. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in
ten years. The ten-year prescriptive period applies
only if there is an actual need to reconvey the
property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of
the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real
owner of the property also remains in possession of
the property, the prescriptive period to recover title
and possession of the property does not run against
him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if
nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for
quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.

The trial court rendered its decision in favor of

Spouses Borras. Petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Court of Appeals issued its Decision affirming
the decision of the trial court in toto.
In its petition for review under Rule 45 petitioners
Alfredo contended that they did not deliver the title
of the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia as shown
by Adelia Borras' testimony on cross-examination.

Laches; Neither is the action barred by laches.

Neither is the action barred by laches. We have
defined laches as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable time, to do that which, by the exercise
of due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.

ISSUE: WON THE PETITIONERS CONTENTION BE

CONSIDERED?
HELD: No. Petitioners raise this factual issue for
the first time. The Court of Appeals could have passed
upon this issue had petitioners raised this earlier, At
any rate, the cited testimony of Adelia does not
convincingly prove that Godofredo and Carmen did
not deliver the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia.
136
AMDCM

RULES 40 to 56

People vs. Corpuz, 412 SCRA 479(2003)

APPEALS

For her part, appellant resolutely denied having a

hand in the illegal recruitment and claimed that she
merely received the money on behalf of Mrs. Reyes,
the President/General Manager of Alga-Moher
International Placement Services Corporation, where
she had been working as secretary for three months
prior to July 30, 1998. On that day, Mrs. Reyes called
her on the telephone and told her to receive private
complainants processing fees. In compliance with the
order of her employer and since the cashier was
absent, she received the processing fees of private
complainants, which she thereafter remitted to Mrs.
Reyes. She had no knowledge that the agencys
license was suspended by the POEA on July 29, 1998.

The principle that findings of facts of the trial

court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of
witnesses and probative weight thereof and its
conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by
the Court great respect if not conclusive effect does
not apply if the trial court ignored, misunderstood or
misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of
substance which if considered would alter the
outcome of the case.
FACTS: In June 1998, private complainants Belinda
Cabantog, Concepcion San Diego, Erlinda Pascual and
Restian Surio went to Alga-Moher International
Placement Services Corporation at 1651 San
Marcelino Street, Malate, Manila to apply for
employment as factory workers in Taiwan. They were
accompanied by a certain Aling Josie who
introduced them to the agencys President and
General Manager Mrs. Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes. Mrs.
Reyes asked them to accomplish the application
forms. Thereafter, they were told to return to the
office with P10,000.00 each as processing fee.

On November 16, 2000, the trial court rendered

the assailed decision, finding appellant Elizabeth
Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale constituting economic
sabotage.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE APPELLANT
HELD: Yes. Appellant contends that she is not
liable for the foregoing illegal recruitment activities
considering that she was merely an employee having
no control over the recruitment business of the AlgaMoher International Placement Services Corporation
and that she did not actually recruit the private
complainants. Moreover, she did not appropriate for
her own use the processing fees she received and she
had no knowledge that the agencys license was
suspended by the POEA.

On July 30, 1998, private complainants returned

to the agency to pay the processing fees. Mrs. Reyes
was not at the agency that time, but she called
appellant on the telephone to ask her to receive the
processing fees. Thereafter, appellant advised them to
wait for the contracts to arrive from the Taiwan
employers.
Two months later, nothing happened to their
applications. Thus private complainants decided to
ask for the refund of their money from appellant6
who told them that the processing fees they had paid
were already remitted to Mrs. Reyes. When they
talked to Mrs. Reyes, she told them that the money
she received from appellant was in payment of the
latters debt. Thus, on January 13, 1999, private
complainants filed their complaint with the National
Bureau of Investigation which led to the arrest and
detention of appellant.

The trial court convicted appellant based on its

findings that despite the suspension of the agencys
license, appellant still convinced the applicants to give
their money with the promise to land a job abroad.
Moreover, as the registered secretary of the agency
she had management control of the recruitment
business.
It is axiomatic that findings of facts of the trial
court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of
witnesses and probative weight thereof and its
conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by
this Court great respect, if not conclusive effect,
because of the unique advantage of the trial court in
observing and monitoring at close range, the conduct,
deportment and demeanor of the witnesses as they

On March 23, 2000, while the case was before the

trial court, private complainants received the refund
of their processing fees from appellants sister-in-law.
Consequently, they executed affidavits of desistance8
from participation in the case against appellant.
137
AMDCM

RULES 40 to 56

testify before the trial court. However, this principle

does not apply if the trial court ignored,
misunderstood or misconstrued cogent facts and
circumstances of substance which, if considered,
would alter the outcome of the case. The exception
obtains in this case.

liable for an act done for and in behalf of his

employer.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
JUDY AMOR, JANE GAMIL, minors GIAN CARLO AMOR
represented by ATTY. OWEN AMOR, and CARLO
BENITEZ represented by JOSEPHINE BENITEZ
G.R. No. 127473
December 8, 2003

The records of the case show that Alga-Moher

International Placement Service Corporation is a
licensed land-based recruitment agency. Its license
was valid until August 24, 1999. Likewise, appellant
was its registered secretary while Mrs. Evelyn Gloria
H. Reyes is its President/General Manager. Part of its
regular business activity is to accept applicants who
desire to work here or abroad. Appellant, as secretary
of the agency, was in charge of the custody and
documentation of the overseas contracts.
Moreover, as stated in the last sentence of
Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons who may be held
liable for illegal recruitment are the principals,
accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical
persons, the officers having control, management or
direction of their business shall be liable.

EVIDENCE; APPEALS
FACTS: Private respondents Judy Amor, Jane
Gamil, minor Gian Carlo Amor, represented by his
father, Atty. Owen Amor, and, minor Carlo Benitez,
represented by his mother, Josephine Benitez, filed
with the RTC of Sorsogon, a complaint for damages
against petitioner due to the latters failure to honor
their confirmed tickets.
It is alleged in their complaint that Judy Amor
purchased three confirmed plane tickets for her and
her infant son, Gian Carlo Amor as well as her sister
Jane Gamil for the May 8, 1988, 7:10 a.m. flight, PR
178, bound for Manila from defendants branch office
in Legaspi City. On said date, Judy with Gian, Jane and
minor Carlo Benitez, nephew of Judy and Jane, arrived
at the Legaspi Airport at 6:20 a.m. for PR 178. Carlo
Benitez was supposed to use the confirmed ticket of a
certain Dra. Emily Chua. They were accompanied by
Atty. Owen Amor and the latters cousin, Salvador
Gonzales who fell in line at the check-in counter with
four persons ahead of him and three persons behind
him.

An employee of a company or corporation

engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as
principal, together with his employer, if it is shown
that he actively and consciously participated in illegal
recruitment. Settled is the rule that the existence of
the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution
the corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally
causes the corporation to commit a crime. The
corporation obviously acts, and can act, only by and
through its human agents, and it is their conduct
which the law must deter. The employee or agent of a
corporation engaged in unlawful business naturally
aids and abets in the carrying on of such business and
will be prosecuted as principal if, with knowledge of
the business, its purpose and effect, he consciously
contributes his efforts to its conduct and promotion,
however slight his contribution may be. The law of
agency, as applied in civil cases, has no application in
criminal cases, and no man can escape punishment
when he participates in the commission of a crime
upon the ground that he simply acted as an agent of
any party. The culpability of the employee therefore
hinges on his knowledge of the offense and his active
participation in its commission. Where it is shown that
the employee was merely acting under the direction
of his superiors and was unaware that his acts
constituted a crime, he may not be held criminally

While waiting for his turn, Gonzales was asked by

Lloyd Fojas, the check-in clerk on duty, to approach
the counter. Fojas wrote something on the tickets
which Gonzales later read as late check-in 7:05. When
Gonzales turn came, Fojas gave him the tickets of
private respondents Judy, Jane and Gian and told him
to proceed to the cashier to make arrangements.
Salvador then went to Atty. Amor and told him about
the situation. Atty. Amor pleaded with Fojas, pointing
out that it is only 6:45 a.m., but the latter did not even
look at him or utter any word. Atty. Amor then tried
to plead with Delfin Canonizado and George Carranza,
employees of petitioner, but still to no avail. Private
respondents were not able to board said flight. The
plane left at 7:30 a.m., twenty minutes behind the
original schedule.

138
AMDCM

RULES 40 to 56

Private respondents then went to the Bus

terminals hoping to catch a ride for Manila. Finding
none, they went back to the airport and tried to catch
an afternoon flight. Unfortunately, the 2:30 p.m.
flight, PR 278, was cancelled due to aircraft situation.
Private respondents were told to wait for the 5:30
p.m. flight, PR 180. They checked-in their bags and
were told to hand in their tickets. Later, a PAL
employee at the check-in counter called out the name
of private respondent minor Carlo Benitez. Plaintiff
Judy approached the counter and was told by the PAL
personnel that they cannot be accommodated. Fojas
who was also at the counter then removed the
boarding passes inserted in private respondents
tickets as well as the tags from their luggages.

misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual

findings are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (g) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; and,
(h) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere
conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or
where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not
disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.
Petitioner invokes exception (b).
As to the first ISSUE: Whether or not private
respondents checked-in on time for PR 178. The
determination of this issue is necessary because it is
expressly stipulated in the airline tickets issued to
private respondents that PAL will consider the
reserved seat cancelled if the passenger fails to checkin at least thirty minutes before the published
departure time.
After a careful review of the records, we find no
reason to disturb the affirmance by the CA of the
findings of the trial court that the private respondents
have checked-in on time; that they reached the
airport at 6:20 a.m., based on the testimonies of
private respondent Judy Amor, and witnesses
Salvador Gonzales and Atty. Owen Amor who were
consistent in their declarations on the witness stand
and corroborated one anothers statements; and that
the testimony of petitioners lone witness, Lloyd Fojas
is not sufficient to overcome private respondents
evidence.

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of

private respondents and ordered petitioner to
reimburse private respondents the purchase price of
the four (4) plane tickets plus damages, attorneys
fees and cost of the suit. On appeal, the CA affirmed
in toto the RTCs decision. The
motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the
appellate court.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA WAS CORRECT IN
UPHOLDING THE RTCS DECISION IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENTS?
HELD: Yes.
Evidently, in resolving the two issues raised in the
present petition, it is inevitable and most crucial that
we first determine the question whether or not the
CA erred in upholding the RTC ruling that private
respondents were late in checking-in. Both issues call
for a review of the factual findings of the lower courts.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, the general rule is that only
questions of law may be raised by the parties and
passed upon by this Court. Factual findings of the
appellate court are generally binding on us especially
when in complete accord with the findings of the trial
court. This is because it is not our function to analyze
or weigh the evidence all over again. However, this
general rule admits of exceptions, to wit:
(a) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b)
when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (c) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when
the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on a

It is a well-entrenched principle that absent any

showing of grave abuse of discretion or any palpable
error in its findings, this Court will not question the
probative weight accorded by the lower courts to the
various evidence presented by the parties. As we
explained in Superlines Transportation Co. Inc., vs. ICC
Leasing & Financing Corporation
The Court is not tasked to calibrate and assess the
probative weight of evidence adduced by the parties
during trial all over againSo long as the findings of
facts of the Court of Appeals are consistent with or
are not palpably contrary to the evidence on record,

139
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RULES 40 to 56

this Court shall decline to embark on a review on the

probative weight of the evidence of the parties.
RUBEN AUGUSTO AND ATTY. NOEL D. ARCHIVAL,
PETITIONERS, . HON. JUDGE TEODORO K. RISOS,
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
27, LAPU- LAPU CITY, CLEOFE OMOLON,
RESPONDENTS.

adverse claim annotated at the dorsal portion of the

title in the Office of the Register of Deeds of LapuLapu City.On October 22, 1997, the RTC issued an
order directing
Atty. Noel Archival to produce the owners copy
of OCT No. 3560 to allow the annotation of Cleofes
interest, upon which the owners duplicate copy of
the title may thereafter be returned.
The trial court declared that, based on the
pleadings of the parties, the issue of ownership over
the property had been raised, a matter which the
court, sitting as a cadastral court, could not pass
upon.

G.R. NO. 131794. DECEMBER 10, 2003.

FACTS: Felisa Augusto and her siblings, Jose
Augusto, Magdalena Augusto and Alfonso Augusto, all
married, were the co- owners of a parcel of land
located in Barrio Mactan, Opon, Cebu. The lot was
sold to Guillermo Omolon for P200.00. Guillermo
Omolon and his wife, Cleofe Omolon. In the
meantime, the property was registered in the names
of Monico, Felisa, Jose, Filomeno, Teofilo and
Sinfroso, all surnamed Augusto, under Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-3560.

The trial court further ruled that pending

resolution of the issue of ownership over the property
in an appropriate proceeding therefor, there was a
need for the annotation of the petitioners interest
over the property. The respondents therein filed a
Motion for a Partial Reconsideration of the Order
alleging that Cleofes interest over the property had
been sufficiently protected by the annotation of her
adverse claim.
However, on November 14, 1997, the court issued
an Order denying the motion of the respondents
therein.

Guillermo Omolon died intestate and was

survived by Cleofe Omolon.
Sometime in July 1995, Cleofe Omolon filed a
petition for the reconstitution of the OCT before the
RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, which grants the petition and
thus directs the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to
reconstitute the Original Certificate of Title. However,
upon presentation of the aforesaid order to the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, Cleofe was
informed that the owners copy had already been
issued to Ruben Augusto, pursuant to an Order issued
by the court dated August 23, 1996, and that based
on the record, the same was in the possession of Atty.
Noel Archival.

On November 26, 1997, the respondents filed a

notice of appeal from the said order to the Court of
Appeals. On December 5, 1997, the RTC issued an
order denying due course therefor, on its perception
that the orders subject thereof were interlocutory;
hence, not appealable.
The respondents, now the petitioners, filed the
instant petition alleging that the public respondent
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction when it issued the
assailed orders, and that there is no appeal nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law available to them.

Hence, on May 14, 1997, Cleofe filed a petition

before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, alleging that as
lawful co-owner and possessor of Lot No. 4429, she
had every right to have and hold the owners
duplicate of the said OCT. She prayed that after due
proceedings, the respondents Ruben Augusto and
Atty. Noel Archival be ordered to surrender the
owners copy of the said title.

The petitioners argue that contrary to the ruling

of the public respondent, its October 22, 1997 Order
was final and appealable, as the same disposed of the
case. In her comment on the petition, the private
respondent averred that the October 22, 1997 Order
of the public respondent was merely interlocutory as
it did not fully dispose of the case and had reserved
the further determination of other questions.

In their Comment on the petition, therein

respondents Ruben Augusto and Atty. Noel Archival
alleged, inter alia, that the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Felisa, Magdalena, Alfonso and Jose, all
surnamed Augusto, was falsified and fictitious, and,
thus, null and void. In the interim, Cleofe had her
140
AMDCM

RULES 40 to 56

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the public

respondent is a final order hence appealable.

1990 in her favor; that Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of

Luz Baloloy received a down payment or earnest
money in the amount of P102,169.86 and P450,000,
respectively; that it was agreed in the contract of sale
that the vendors would secure certificates of title
covering their respective hereditary shares; that the
balance of the purchase price would be paid to each
heir upon presentation of their individual certificate[s]
of title; that Ignacio Rubio refused to receive the
other half of the down payment which is P[100,000];
that Ignacio Rubio refused and still refuses to deliver
to Lim the certificates of title covering his share on
the two lots; that with respect to the heirs of Luz
Baloloy, they also refused and still refuse to perform
the delivery of the two certificates of title covering
their share in the disputed lots; that Lim was and is
ready and willing to pay Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of
Luz Baloloy upon presentation of their individual
certificates of title, free from whatever lien and
encumbrance;

HELD: NO. Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules or Court

provides that an appeal may be taken only from a
final order, and not from an interlocutory one. A final
order is one which disposes of the whole subject
matter or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined. An order or
judgment is deemed final if it finally disposes of,
adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or
rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy
or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and
concludes them until it is reversed or set aside. Where
no issue is left for future consideration, except the
fact of compliance with the terms of the order, such
order is final and appealable. In contrast, an order is
interlocutory if it does not finally dispose of the case.
In this case, the order of the public respondent
directing the petitioners to produce the owners copy
of OCT No. 3560 in the Office of the Register of Deeds
for the annotation of the private respondents
interest over the property is merely interlocutory and
not final; hence, not appealable by means of a writ of
error. The public respondent had not fully disposed of
the case as it had not yet ruled on whether to grant
the private respondents prayer for the surrender of
the owners copy of OCT No. 3560. As gleaned from
the order of the respondent judge, he believed that
he had no jurisdiction to delve into and resolve the
issue of ownership over the property and was
disposed to dismiss the petition.

As to petitioner Corazon Escueta, in spite of her

knowledge that the disputed lots have already been
sold by Ignacio Rubio to respondent, it is alleged that
a simulated deed of sale involving said lots was
effected by Ignacio Rubio in her favor; and that the
simulated deed of sale by Rubio to Escueta has raised
doubts and clouds over respondents (Lim) title.
Now the Defense of Baloloys, Rubio and Escueta .
..

CORAZON ESCUETA VS. RUFINA LIM

G.R. No. 137162 January 24, 2007
(TIME FOR FILING PETITION; CONTENTS AND
VERIFICATION Sec. 3 Rule 38)

As per heirs of Luz Baloloy, Lim has no cause of

action, because the subject contract of sale has no
more force and effect as far as the Baloloys are
concerned, since they have withdrawn their offer to
sell for the reason that respondent failed to pay the
balance of the purchase price as orally promised on or
before May 1, 1990.

FACTS: Respondent Rufina Lim filed an action to

remove cloud on, or quiet title to, real property, with
preliminary injunction and issuance of [a holddeparture order] from the Philippines against Ignacio
E. Rubio. Respondent amended her complaint to
include specific performance and damages.

Rubio and Escueta's defense is that Lim has no

cause of Action because Rubio has not entered into a
contract of sale with the latter. That the P100,000
respondent (Lim) claimed Rubio received as down
payment for the lots is a simple transaction by way of
a loan with Lim.

In her amended complaint, Lim averred inter alia

that she bought the hereditary shares (consisting of
10 lots) of Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy,
Alejandrino, Bayani, and other co-heirs; that said
vendors executed a contract of sale dated April 10,

However, the Baloloys failed to appear at the pretrial. Upon motion of respondent (Lim), the trial court
declared the Baloloys in default. Baloloys then filed a
motion to lift the order declaring them in default,
which was denied by the trial court in an order dated
141
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November 27, 1991. Consequently, respondent was

allowed to adduce evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the
trial court rendered a partial decision dated July 23,
1993 against the Baloloys.

1. CA did not consider the circumstances

surrounding petitioners failure to appear at the pretrial and to file the petition for relief on time. As to
the failure to appear at the pre-trial, there was fraud,
accident and/or excusable neglect, because petitioner
Bayani was in the United States. There was no service
of the notice of pre-trial or order. Neither did the
former counsel of record inform him. Consequently,
the order declaring him in default is void, and all
subsequent proceedings, orders, or decision are void.

The Baloloys filed a petition for relief from

judgment and order dated July 4, 1994 and
supplemental petition dated July 7, 1994. This was
denied by the trial court in an order dated September
16, 1994. Hence, appeal to the Court of Appeals was
taken challenging the order denying the petition for
relief.

2. Petitioner Alejandrino was not clothed with a

power of attorney to appear on behalf of Bayani at
the pre-trial conference.

Trial on the merits ensued between respondent

and Rubio and Escueta. After trial, the trial court
rendered its assailed Decision dismissing the
complaint and amended complaint againts Petitioners
Escueta, Rubio and the Register of Deeds. The
counterclaim of petitioners is also dismissed.
However, [petitioner] Rubio is ordered to return to
the [respondent],Lim, the amount of P102,169.80,
with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from April 10, [1990] until the same is fully paid.

3. The amount encashed by Rubio represented

not the down payment, but the payment of
respondents debt. His acceptance and encashment of
the check was not a ratification of the contract of sale.

ISSUE: WON BAYANI BALOLOY WAS PROPERLY

DECLARED
IN
DEFAULT
FOR
LACK
OF
REPRESENTATION.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial courts order

and partial decision, but reversed the later decision.

HELD: For lack of representation, Bayani Baloloy

was properly declared in default.

The Decision dismissing *respondents, Lim+

complaint is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
is entered. Accordingly;
a. the validity of the subject contract of sale in
favor of [respondent] is upheld.
b. Rubio is directed to execute a Deed of Absolute
Sale conditioned upon the payment of the balance of
the purchase price by [respondent] within 30 days
from the receipt of the entry of judgment of this
Decision.
c. the contracts of sale between Rubio and
Escueta involving Rubios share in the disputed
properties is declared NULL and VOID.
d. Rubio and Escueta are ordered to pay jointly
and severally the [respondent] the amount
ofP[20,000] as moral damages and P[20,000] as
attorneys fees.
3. the appeal of Rubio and Escueta on the denial
of their counterclaim is DISMISSED.

Pre-trial is mandatory. The notices of pre-trial had

been sent to both the Baloloys and their former
counsel of record. Being served with notice, he is
"charged with the duty of notifying the party
represented by him." He must "see to it that his client
receives such notice and attends the pre-trial." What
the Baloloys and their former counsel have alleged
instead in their Motion to Lift Order of As In Default
dated December 11, 1991 is the belated receipt of
Bayani Baloloys special power of attorney in favor of
their former counsel, not that they have not received
the notice or been informed of the scheduled pretrial. Not having raised the ground of lack of a special
power of attorney in their motion, they are now
deemed to have waived it. Certainly, they cannot raise
it at this late stage of the proceedings.
(Legal Basis . . .)

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the CA

Decision was denied. Hence, this petition.

Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and
verification. A petition provided for in either of the
preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed
within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the

Take Note of Petitioner's ff. Argument(s):

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judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set

aside, and not more than six (6) months after such
judgment or final order was entered, or such
proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with
affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting the petitioners good and substantial
cause of action or defense, as the case may be.

REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB)

There is no reason for the Baloloys to ignore the

effects of the above-cited rule. "The 60-day period is
reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge
of the order, judgment or proceedings and not from
the date he actually read the same."

FACTS: Petra Capistrano Piit previously owned a

lot in Cagayan de Oro City. Springfield Development
Corporation, Inc. bought certain parcels of land
including that of Petra and developed said properties
into a subdivision project called Mega Heights
Subdivision.

G.R. NO. 142628 February 6, 2007

(Rule 45 -The principal issue presented for
resolution is whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
has jurisdiction to annul final judgment of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB))

The Baloloys, apparently in an attempt to cure the

lapse of the aforesaid reglementary period to file a
petition for relief from judgment, included in its
petition the two Orders dated May 6, 1994 and June
29, 1994. The first Order denied Baloloys motion to
fix the period within which plaintiffs-appellants pay
the balance of the purchase price. The second Order
refers to the grant of partial execution, i.e. on the
aspect of damages. These Orders are only
consequences of the partial decision subject of the
petition for relief, and thus, cannot be considered in
the determination of the reglementary period within
which to file the said petition for relief.

On May 4, 1990, the Department of Agrarian

Reform (DAR), through its Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer, issued a Notice of Coverage, placing the
property under the coverage of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988. The heirs of Petra opposed DAR. Then on
August 27, 1991, DARAB Provincial Adjudicator
rendered a decision declaring the nature of the
property as residential and not suitable for
agriculture. The Regional Director filed a notice of
appeal, which the Provincial Adjudicator disallowed
for being pro forma and frivolous. The decision
became final and executory and Springfield
proceeded to develop the property.

Furthermore, no fraud, accident, mistake, or

excusable negligence exists in order that the petition
for relief may be granted. There is no proof of
extrinsic fraud that "prevents a party from having a
trial or from presenting all of his case to the court" or
an "accident which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against, and by reason of which the party
applying has probably been impaired in his rights."
There is also no proof of either a "mistake of law or an
excusable negligence "caused by failure to receive
notice of the trial that it would not be necessary for
him to take an active part in the case by relying on
another person to attend to the case for him, when
such other person was chargeable with that duty, or
by other circumstances not involving fault of the
moving party."

The DAR Regional Director then filed a petition for

relief from judgment of the DARAB Decision.
On October 5, 1995, the DARAB granted the
petition and gave due course to the Notice of
Coverage. It also directed the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office to proceed with the documentation,
acquisition, and distribution of the property to the
true and lawful beneficiaries.
The DARAB also issued an Order dated May 22,
1997, ordering the heirs of Piit and Springfield to pay
the farmer-beneficiaries the amount of Twelve
Million, Three Hundred Forty Thousand, Eight
Hundred Pesos (P12,340,800.00), corresponding to
the value of the property since the property has
already been developed into a subdivision.

Petition Denied.
SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC.
and HEIRS OF PETRA CAPISTRANO PIIT, Petitioners,
vs. HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, BRANCH 40,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN

That's why on On June 13, 1997, Springfield and

the heirs of Piit (petitioners) filed with the RTC of
Cagayan de Oro City, a petition for annulment of the
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RULES 40 to 56

DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995 and all its

subsequent proceedings. Petitioners contend that the
DARAB decision was rendered without affording
petitioners any notice and hearing.

Adjudicators on any agrarian dispute or on any matter

pertaining to the application, implementation,
enforcement or interpretation of agrarian reform laws
or rules and regulations promulgated thereunder,
may be brought within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of a copy thereof, to the Court of Appeals by
certiorari, except as provided in the next succeeding
section. Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of
Appeals the decision of the Board or Adjudicator
appealed from, shall be immediately executory.

(The sad part) On motion filed by the farmerbeneficiaries, the RTC issued an Order dated June 25,
1997, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a
special civil action for certiorari, mandamus, and
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order. Petitioners alleged that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the
annulment of judgment filed before it is actually an
action for certiorari in a different color. According to
petitioners, what it sought before the RTC is an
annulment of the DARAB Decision and not certiorari,
as the DARAB Decision is void ab initio for having been
rendered without due process of law.

Further, the prevailing 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, as amended, expressly provides for an
appeal from the DARAB decisions to the CA.
The rule is that where legislation provides for an
appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies
to the CA, it means that such bodies are co-equal with
the RTC, in terms of rank and stature, and logically,
beyond the control of the latter.
Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the
CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a
co-equal body with the RTC and its decisions are
beyond the RTC's control. The CA was therefore
correct in sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the
petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated
October 5, 1995, as the RTC does not have any
jurisdiction to entertain the same.

CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit, ruling

that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to annul the
DARAB Decision because it is a co-equal body.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to annul
a final judgment of the DARAB.
HELD: B.P. Blg. 129 does not specifically provide
for any power of the RTC to annul judgments of quasijudicial bodies.

LETICIA DIONA, represented by her Attorney-inFact, MARCELINA DIONA, vs. ROMEO A. BALANGUE,
SONNY A. BALANGUE, REYNALDO A. BALANGUE, and
ESTEBAN A. BALANGUE, JR.

(Note must be made that the petition for

annulment of the DARAB decision was filed with the
RTC on June 13, 1997, before the advent of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1,
1997. Thus, the applicable law is B.P. Blg. 129 or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, enacted on
August 10, 1981.)

G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013

ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
FACTS: Respondents obtained a loan of
P45,000.00 from petitioner secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage over their 202-square meter property
located in Valenzuela. When the debt became due,
respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand.
Thus, petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint
praying, among others, that respondents be ordered:

DARAB is a quasi-judicial body created by

Executive Order Nos. 229 and 129-A. R.A. No. 6657
delineated its adjudicatory powers and functions. The
DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure adopted on
December 26, 198827specifically provides for the
manner of judicial review of its decisions, orders,
rulings, or awards.

(a) To pay petitioner the principal obligation of

P45,000.00, with interest thereon at the rate of 12%
per annum, from 02 March 1991 until the full
obligation is paid.

Rule XIV, Section 1 states:

SECTION 1. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Any
decision, order, award or ruling by the Board or its
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AMDCM

RULES 40 to 56

XXXX
(c) To issue a decree of foreclosure for the sale at
public auction of the aforementioned parcel of land,
and for the disposition of the proceeds thereof in
accordance with law, upon failure of the respondents
to fully pay petitioner within the period set by law the
sums set forth in this complaint.

its jurisdiction in awarding the 5% monthly interest

but at the same time pronouncing that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in subsequently reducing
the rate of interest to 12% per annum.
Respondents then filed with the same court a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Execution
Sale with Damages. They contended that the portion
of the RTC Decision granting petitioner 5% monthly
interest rate is in gross violation of Section 3(d) of
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and of their right to due
process. According to respondents, the loan did not
carry any interest as it was the verbal agreement of
the parties that in lieu thereof petitioners family can
continue occupying respondents residential building
located in Marulas, Valenzuela for free until said loan
is fully paid.

Respondents filed a Motion to Extend Period to

Answer but despite the extension, respondents failed
to file any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon motion of
the petitioner, the RTC declared them in default and
allowed petitioner to present her evidence ex parte.
The RTC granted plaintiffs motion and rendered a
decision ordering the respondents to pay the sum of
FORTY FIVE THOUSAND (P45,000.00) PESOS,
representing the unpaid principal loan obligation plus
interest at 5% per month reckoned from March 2,
1991, until the same is fully paid.

The CA granted respondents motion for

reconsideration and order the annulment of the
judgement insofar as it awarded 5% monthly interest
in favor of petitioner;

Respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment

claiming that not all of them were duly served with
summons. According them, they had no knowledge of
the case because their co-respondent Sonny did not
inform them about it.

Petitioner sought reconsideration, which was

denied by the CA in its June 26, 2006 Resolution,

Meanwhile, Petitioner moved for the public

auction of the mortgaged property, which the RTC
granted. In the auction sale petitioner was the only
bidder and thus a Certificate of Sale was issued in her
favor.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN

ORDERING THE ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT IN SO
FAR AS THE INTEREST RATE OF THE OBLIGATION IS
CONCERNED

Respondents then filed a Motion to

Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution
Sale claiming that the parties did not agree in writing
on any rate of interest and that petitioner merely
sought for a 12% per annum interest in her Complaint.
Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or
60% per annum) from March 2, 1991 until full
payment. Resultantly, their indebtedness inclusive of
the exorbitant interest from March 2, 1991 to May 22,
2001 ballooned from P124,400.00 to P652,000.00.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the award

of 5% monthly interest violated the right of the
respondents to due process and, hence, the same
may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
The Supreme Court ruled that a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional
circumstances where a party, without fault on his
part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides
that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy
which was lost due to the partys own neglect in
promptly availing of the same. "The underlying reason
is traceable to the notion that annulling final
judgments goes against the grain of finality of
judgment. Litigation must end and terminate

The RTC granted respondents motion and

accordingly modified the interest rate awarded from
5% monthly to 12% per annum.
Displeased with the RTCs Order, petitioner
elevated the matter to the CA via a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The CA
rendered a Decision declaring that the RTC exceeded
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RULES 40 to 56

sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an

effective administration of justice that once a
judgment has become final, the issue or cause
involved therein should be laid to rest."

award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks

basis and disregards due process. It violated the due
process requirement because respondents were not
informed of the possibility that the RTC may award 5%
monthly interest. They were deprived of reasonable
opportunity to refute and present controverting
evidence as they were made to believe that the
complainant petitioner was seeking for what she
merely stated in her Complaint.

While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of

Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be
based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due
process as additional ground to annul a judgment. In
Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that
a final and executory judgment may still be set aside
if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can
be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction
or for lack of due process of law.

Neither can the grant of the 5% monthly interest

be considered subsumed by petitioners general
prayer for "other reliefs and remedies just and
equitable under the premises x x x." To repeat, the
courts grant of relief is limited only to what has been
prayed for in the Complaint or related thereto,
supported by evidence, and covered by the partys
cause of action. Besides, even assuming that the
awarded 5% monthly or 60% per annum interest was
properly alleged and proven during trial, the same
remains unconscionably excessive and ought to be
equitably reduced in accordance with applicable
jurisprudence.

It also ruled that the grant of 5% monthly interest

to the petitioner is way beyond the 12% per annum
interest sought in the Complaint and smacks of
violation of due process.
It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not
prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is
being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a
relief without first ascertaining the evidence
presented in support thereof. Due process
considerations require that judgments must conform
to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence
presented in court. In Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Teston, this Court expounded that: Due
process considerations justify this requirement. It is
improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope
of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which
affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard
with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental
purpose of the requirement that allegations of a
complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to
prevent surprise to the defendant.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

EVANGELISTA
G.R. No. 140945. May 16, 2005

vs.

JOSE

ANNULMENT OF JUDGEMENT
FACTS: Sometime in 1968, a real property
(915.50sqm) located in Quezon City, was originally
awarded by the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation (petitioners predecessor) to a certain
Adela Salindon. After the death of Salindon, it was
transferred to Arsenio Florendo, Jr., Milagros
Florendo, Beatriz Florendo and Eloisa FlorendoKulphongpatana through an extrajudicial settlement
executed by the heirs of Salindon. However, the
award in favor of Salindon was nullified and set aside
in a decision in G.R. No. L-60544, entitled Arsenio
Florendo, Jr., et al. vs. Hon. Perpetuo D. Coloma, for
having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion, and petitioner was declared
the owner of the property.

In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly

interest rate is not supported both by the allegations
in the pleadings and the evidence on record. The Real
Estate Mortgage executed by the parties does not
include any provision on interest. When petitioner
filed her Complaint before the RTC, she alleged that
respondents borrowed from her "the sum of FORTYFIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P45,000.00), with interest
thereon at the rate of 12% per annum" and sought
payment thereof. She did not allege or pray for the
disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither did she present
evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly, the RTCs

Despite said decision, the property was auctioned

off by the Quezon City Treasurers Office for unpaid
real property taxes by the Florendos. The highest
bidder was Luisito Sarte. Sarte filed a petition for
issuance of title and confirmation of sale, which was
granted by the RTC QC. Consequently, Transfer
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RULES 40 to 56

Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28182 was issued in the

name of Sarte, who divided the property into Lot 1-A
(TCT No 108070), and Lot 1-B.
It was in 1991 that petitioner filed Civil Case No.
Q-91-10071 for recovery of real property with Sarte,
the City Treasurer of Quezon City and the Quezon City
Register of Deeds, as defendants. While the case was
pending, Sarte executed in favor of respondent Jose
Evangelista, a Deed of Assignment covering Lot 1-A.
TCT No. 108070 was cancelled and TCT No. 122944
was issued in the name of Evangelista. Subsequently,
the Register of Deeds annotated on TCT No. 122944
an Affidavit of Adverse Claim of petitioner NHA.
Petitioner then filed a motion for leave to file
supplemental complaint in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071,
seeking to include respondent Evangelista, Northern
Star Agri-Business Corporation and BPI Agricultural
Development Bank as defendants (subsequent
purchasers). The trial court, however, denied the
motion. Thus, petitioner, filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for Annulment
of Deed of Assignment, Deed of Absolute Sale, Real
Estate Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos. 122944 and
126639, and Damages, against Sarte, respondent
Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-Business Corporation,
BPI Agricultural Development Bank and the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City. But the trial court dismissed
without prejudice said case on October 23, 1995, on
the ground of the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-9110071.
The trial court, in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071,
rendered its decision in favor of petitioner, stating
that:
3. Any transfers, assignment, sale or mortgage of
whatever nature of the parcel of land subject of this
case made by defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her
agents or assigns before or during the pendency of
the instant case are hereby declared null and void,
together with any transfer certificates of title issued in
connection with the aforesaid transactions by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise
ordered to cancel or cause the cancellation of such
TCTs;
Respondent then filed with the CA a petition for
annulment of the trial courts judgment, particularly
paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion, referring to the
nullity of any transfer, assignment, sale or mortgage
made by Sarte. In his petition, respondent alleged
extrinsic fraud as ground. According to respondent,
since he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071,
he was prevented from ventilating his cause, right or
interest over the property, and the judgment was not

binding on him, as the trial court did not acquire

jurisdiction over his person.
The CA granted the petition and declared null and
void paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion of the trial
courts decision insofar as petitioners title to the
property is concerned. The CA found that respondent
was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 and the
trial court did not acquire any jurisdiction over his
person. The CA also ruled that the judgment violated
respondents right against deprivation of the property
without due process of law. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the
CA. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN
ANNULLING PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE TRIAL COURTS
DECISION ON GROUNDS OF LACK OF JURISDICTION
AND LACK OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in
character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where
there is no available or other adequate remedy.
Jurisprudence and Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court lay down the grounds upon which an action for
annulment of judgment may be brought, i.e., (1)
extrinsic fraud, and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of
due process.
Lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or
over the subject matter of the claim, and in either
case, the judgment or final order and resolution are
void. A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance
in court and his submission to its authority or by
service of summons.
In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was
never made a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. It is
basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding
to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are
not bound by judgment rendered by the court.
Respondent is adversely affected by such judgment,
as he was the subsequent purchaser of the subject
property from Sarte, and title was already transferred
to him. It will be the height of inequity to allow
respondents title to be nullified without being given
the opportunity to present any evidence in support of
his ostensible ownership of the property. Much more,
it is tantamount to a violation of the constitutional
guarantee that no person shall be deprived of
property without due process of law. Clearly, the trial
147
AMDCM

RULES 40 to 56

courts judgment is void insofar as paragraph 3 of its

dispositive portion is concerned.
Petitioner further argues that it should not bear
the consequence of the trial courts denial of its
motion to include respondent as defendant in Civil
Case No. Q-91-10071. True, it was not petitioners
fault that respondent was not made a party to the
case. But likewise, it was not respondents fault that
he was not given the opportunity to present his side
of the story. Whatever prompted the trial court to
deny petitioners motion to include respondent as
defendant is not for the Court to reason why.
Petitioner could have brought the trial courts denial
to the CA on certiorari but it did not. Instead, it filed
Civil Case No. Q-95-23940 for Annulment of Deed of
Assignment, Deed of Absolute Sale, Real Estate
Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos. 122944 and
126639, and Damages, against herein respondent
Sarte and others. Unfortunately for petitioner, this
was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (Branch 82) on the ground of litis pendentia. Be
that as it may, the undeniable fact remains -respondent is not a party to Civil Case No. Q-9110071, and paragraph 3, or any portion of the trial
courts judgment for that matter, cannot be binding on
him.

148
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