Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Facts:
The departure of Chief Justice Renato Corona on May 29, 2012, and the
nomination of former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez (petitioner), as his
potential successor, triggered the filing of this case.
From the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of appointing members of
the Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and
legislative branches of the government. Both the Malolos Constitution and the
1935 Constitution vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in
the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Then, with the fusion of executive and legislative power under the 1973
Constitution, the appointment of judges and justices was no longer subject to the
scrutiny of another body. It was absolute, except that the appointees must have
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary from
political pressure and partisan activities, the members of the Constitutional
Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and independent
body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the
judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC).
Its composition, term and functions are provided under Section 8, Article
VIII of the Constitution, viz:
o (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as
ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme
Court, and a representative of the private sector.
In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of
the JBC, designated one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of
the ex officio members. The House of Representatives and the Senate
would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress
had only one (1) representative.
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having
only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two
(2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House
of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a
vote.
Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001,
decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. At present, Respondents Senator Francis
Joseph Escudero and Congressman Niel Tupas, Jr. simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature.
Respondents contend that the phrase "a representative of Congress" should
mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress, because Congress is bicameral and the absence of either divests the
term of its substantive meaning. In simplistic terms, the House of
Issues:
Does the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allow
more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC? NO.
Is the practice of having two (2) representatives from each house of Congress with
one (1) vote each sanctioned by the Constitution? NO.
Held:
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the
intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the
JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be
discerned that the provision is clear and unambiguous. Thus, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
The use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of Congress" is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction.
The word "Congress" used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in
its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate
or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a
singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
The foregoing declaration is but sensible, since, as pointed out by an
esteemed former member of the Court and consultant of the JBC in his
memorandum, "from the enumeration of the membership of the JBC, it is
patent that each category of members pertained to a single individual only."
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain
and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of
the Constitutional Commission.
Nevertheless, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was
intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical
purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate/deadlock in
voting.
This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not
be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or
among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
By virtue of the principle of equality among the three branches of government, no
dichotomy in Congress need be made since it interacts with the other two co-equal
branches of government.
The Court clarified that it is not in a position to determine as to who should remain
as the sole representative of Congress in the JBC because this is a matter beyond
the province of the Court and is best left to the determination of Congress.
Finally, while the Court finds wisdom in respondents' contention that both the
Senate and the House of Representatives should be equally represented in
the JBC, the Court is not in a position to stamp its imprimatur on such a
construction at the risk of expanding the meaning of the Constitution as
currently worded.
Needless to state, the remedy lies in the amendment of this constitutional
provision. The courts merely give effect to the lawgiver's intent.
The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does
not include the power to correct, by reading into the law what is not written
therein.
Dispositive portion:
The petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a
representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution.
Motion for Reconsideration
Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision
and dismiss the petition on the following grounds:
1) that allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to
absurdity considering its bicameral nature;
2) that the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment when there
was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight;
3) that two representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the
Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and
4) that the rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member composition
would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the
fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined and by
which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe
and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic. Thus, in the interpretation of
the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic postulate that the
Framers mean what they say.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in
order to justify constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012
Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe "representative of
Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers intended that Congress be
entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the
Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in
its other provisions.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were
indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. Thus, to say
that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer