Article

Copyright 2008 SAGE Publications

(Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore)
Vol 7(2): 145164
DOI: 10.1177/1473095208090432
http://plt.sagepub.com

DEMOCRATIC ASSESSMENT OF
COLLABORATIVE PLANNING
PROCESSES
Annika Agger and Karl Lfgren
Roskilde University, Denmark

Abstract Collaborative planning is often mentioned as one of the most

appropriate planning theories in relation to the network society owing to
its focus on creating fair and inclusive institutional settings for deliberations among public and private stakeholders. Even though this theoretical framework discusses potential outcomes, the actual democratic effects
of collaborative planning processes are notably overlooked in the literature. The central question raised in this article is: how can we assess the
democratic effects of collaborative planning processes? The article
presents a tentative evaluative framework for assessing the different
stages (input, process and outcome) of collaborative planning processes
deriving criteria from democratic theory, as well as from theories on
collaborative planning, which can be deployed for empirical studies.
Keywords collaborative planning, democracy, democratic assessment,
networks, participation

How can the quality of democracy in collaborative processes be assessed? While

the initial thoughts on collaborative planning considered the implication of
these processes for democratic governance in a wider context only to a limited
extent, we claim that there are now at least three good arguments for discussing
the issue. First, within the current theoretical debate on collaborative planning,
many of the arguments in favour of using collaborative thinking as a starting
point go beyond the basic idea of collaborative planning, that is, mediating
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between conflicting social interests, and ultimately, creating common visions of

the future of a particular geographical area (Healey, 2003).1 At present, collaborative planning is put in the same category of new democratic instruments
as, for example, deliberative polls, where the planning processes, as well as
possessing value in mediating between social actors, serve as vehicles for
establishing new avenues of more deliberative and participatory modes of
democratic governance in addition to liberal representative institutions
(Collaborative Democracy Network, 2005). Equally, there is considerable
conceptual overlap between theoretical planning approaches, and political
science frameworks for new modes of democracy, where ideas on collaborative
policymaking (Innes and Booher, 2003) and collaborative public management
(Blomgren Bingham and OLeary, 2006), for example, are shared across various
disciplinary boundaries. Consequently, it can be said that the collaborative
planning tradition is forced to reflect on the procedural outcomes of the
processes in a wider democratic perspective.
Second, from a profound theoretical starting point, collaborative planning is
a public policy-making process by default, and as such, part of the democratic
governance of a certain territory (albeit on a micro-level). Even though collaborative planning processes are normally based on delegated actors from
traditional representative democratic institutions within a limited geographical
area, and usually include only those stakeholders who are directly involved in
a planning decision, they do not take place outside the framework of a political system.2 Consequently, since collaborative planning activities have become
institutionalized policy-making processes across many democratic systems, they
should also be subject to democratic scrutiny in line with other political
institutions and processes in society.
Third, while evaluation per se is a well-established aspect of planning
practice in general, the focus within planning research has been mainly on technical and physical achievements (Khakee, 1998), rather than on the normative
democratic foundations. Little attention, if any, is given to the considerable
complexities of democratic theory and practice, and the often contradictory
norms that are embedded in democratic theory and practice. Conversely,
scholars of democratic theory have not put too much effort into actually
developing empirical programmes (see Delli Carpini et al., 2004). Both among
scholars and in the community of planning practitioners, there seems to be
substantial uncertainty about how to assess the democratic effects of collaborative planning processes (Abelson and Gauvin, 2006), while at the same
time, there is a demand for methods on how to appraise the democratic
performance in collaborative planning projects.
This article presents the first steps towards a methodological framework,
based on normative criteria, on how to assess the quality of democracy in
collaborative planning. In the next section, we discuss some of the conceptual
and methodological problems encountered by the researcher, and also the practitioner, as s/he tries to evaluate democracy. We also present our understanding of the assessment of collaborative planning projects, where these processes
are perceived as a form of network governance (to be defined below). In the

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third section, we present our own criteria-based framework for assessing the
democratic effects of citizen involvement in networks based on a synthesis of
modern democratic theory (including Dahl, 1998; March and Olsen, 1995), and
on some of the thoughts embedded in the collaborative planning tradition. This
section is structured around five criteria for democratic assessment: public
access to political influence, public deliberation, development of adaptiveness,
accountability and finally, the development of political identities and capabilities.
Based on these five criteria, we generate a number of general questions, which
we hope will increase the understanding in research and practitioner communities, and provide a framework for assessing the democratic consequences
of collaborative processes in a comparative perspective. In the final section, we
present a tentative scheme of research questions in accord with the different
stages (input, process and outcome) of collaborative planning processes.

A framework for assessing the democratic

effects of collaborative planning
Existing thoughts about democratic assessment
in collaborative planning theory
It would be a red rag to a bull to suggest that collaborative planning circles
ignore democratic values, and criteria. However, from our perspective, and
others, it is clear that this has never been a prioritized research issue (Margerum,
2002; Petts, 2001). Existing thinking on democratic criteria usually portrays them
as interactive qualities of planning processes (Healey, 2003: 106); they remain
undeclared in the works of the collaborative planning tradition and often
conflate with more substantive outcomes (such as community-building). When
they do finally appear, they are limited to partial aspects of the planning process,
but we believe it is possible to extract from the collaborative planning literature
some underlying democratic criteria for the planning process per se and also
some criteria for the outcome. In terms of the process, these include that:
a) representatives from all relevant social groups (stakeholders) are included
in the process; b) individuals are granted the right to express opinions (voice);
c) the actors demonstrate reciprocal respect vis--vis other actors in terms of the
deliberation process; d) the actors are given access to all adequate information
concerning the actual planning issue; e) the actors are given the capacity to
contest other participants assertions; and finally, f) the actors are able to influence the decision-making process and the subsequent outcomes (Healey, 1997;
Hillier, 1998; Innes, 1998, 2000). Turning to outcomes, one of the main claims of
the collaborative planning tradition is the need to expand the domain of inquiry
beyond the modernist paradigm that primarily focuses on substantial outcomes
such as economic achievements, and also to embrace softer outcomes. For
example, the outcome should be assessed on the extent to which a) there is
success, or failure, in reaching reciprocity and consensus among involved actors
(Connick and Innes, 2001); b) the collaborative process creates trust, new
relations and interpersonal networks, and in the end, enhances a higher degree

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of social, intellectual and political capital, among involved actors (Healey et al.,
1999; Innes and Booher, 1999b); c) there is empowerment of the participants
through the joint learning processes embedded in the collaborative planning
processes (Innes and Booher, 1999a); and d) the collaborative processes create
new, and more flexible, institutions (Healey, 1999). Even though we fully
subscribe to these criteria, it is our contention that collaborative planning
theories are ignoring certain democratic criteria (such as accountability), as well
as the methodological problem of how to transfer democratic norms to more
systematic and workable criteria for empirical assessment.
Before presenting our norms and criteria we would like to mention something about the methodological starting point of our framework. We have been
guided by some of the ideas embedded in the UK democratic audit tradition
(see Beetham, 1994, 1999; Lord, 2004; Weir and Beetham, 1999), but also by
newer frameworks for evaluating democratic performance in network governance (Leach, 2006; Mathur and Skelcher, 2007; Skelcher et al., 2005).
Democratic assessment is still a relatively unexplored field within planning
literature compared with traditional public policy evaluations (we exclude the
political science tradition for studying causal links between democracy and
economic development, or constructing league tables of human rights and
democracy in comparative politics; Beetham, 2004; Catt, 1999). However,
based on existing literature in the field we can identify some conceptual and
methodological premises relevant to our framework.

Democratic assessment is not policy evaluation

Democratic assessments are different from normal policy process evaluations
where policy is measured against predefined goals or strategies, and the reasons
for success or failure are analysed (see Vedung, 1997). The purpose of a democratic assessment is to identify the extent to which certain democratic values
are either enhanced, or undermined, by certain institutions or practices. In
relation to policy evaluations, the indicators, that is, the democratic values, are
not given a priori. As a concept, democracy can undoubtedly be placed in the
category of essentially contested concepts in politics, which means it inherits
a normative angle of vision (Connolly, 1993: 29). Therefore, one cannot define
democracy in a purely empirical sense since at the same time, it entails an ideal
a normative statement of how citizens should govern themselves. In this
respect, we cannot simply take a descriptive-exploratory standpoint where
received political institutions, traditions and norms of our traditional representative system provide the benchmarks against which collaborative planning
practices are assessed (see Beetham, 1994). We ourselves need to identify
norms, and subsequent criteria, which can provide indicators. This does not
mean, however, that anything can be included as a basis for democratic
norms and criteria. Following Beetham (2004; see also, Mathur and Skelcher,
2007), in our framework we have derived criteria that combine modern democratic theory, and its universal principles (see later), with the implicit democratic
norms of collaborative planning theories (see earlier), where the choice is

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made on the basis of their contribution to democratic life in the context of

collaborative planning.

Democratic assessment should be criteria-based

Whereas much of the collaborative planning tradition is based on thick narratives of case studies with the assumption that these cases can work somehow as
best practice based on their face value, our methodological framework is based
on criteria. The advantage of choosing a criteria-based methodology is that: a)
it is transparent and replicable; b) it enables comparative assessments between
organizations and over time; and c) it implicitly promotes democratization
initiatives in the local contexts as the results themselves generate incentives for
further democratization (Mathur and Skelcher, 2007).
However, it is worth bearing in mind that a democratic assessment is not
simply a question of judging whether something is democratic versus nondemocratic. Each criterion represents a continuum in which the questions
for assessment are phrased in comparative terms: to what extent . . . ? how
far . . . ?, etc. (Beetham, 1993). Democracy is a matter of more or less, rather
than a Pareto-optimal state of governance. Moreover, a democratic assessment
should not attempt to measure democracy, but rather make a judgement of the
state of democracy. As stated by Lord, most accounts of democracy concern the
felt relationship between rulers and the ruled: whether they feel they have a
right to public control which they exercise as equals (Lord, 2004: 14, original
italics). In this sense, we disagree with Mathur and Skelcher (2007) who make
a distinction between, on the one hand, criteria-based assessment which is
somehow only applicable to measuring democratic hardware (i.e. institutional
design) and, on the other, interpretive approaches for studying democratic
software (i.e. the practice) of networks and partnerships. As we go on to
discuss, we believe it is possible to employ criteria-based approaches for making
judgements based partly on the actors interpretations at least in the field of
collaborative planning.

Collaborative planning as network governance

Another central aspect of democratic assessment is that the choice of criteria
exploited for the assessment should entail a dialectical relation to the object
studied. While there are several different ways of describing collaborative
planning activities, and their underpinning rationale, we suggest that in terms of
governance and organizational form they can best be described as a form of
network governance. The term network signals that the governance of collaborative planning is distinct from the ideal models of governing through
market and hierarchy, but also that the networks per se represent both means
and ends to collaborative planning (Innes and Booher, 1999b). Collaborative
planning often takes shape in the form of networks, or partnerships, composed
of representatives of local governments, business and associations of the civil
society, as well as ordinary citizens. Even though they are usually initiated by
local authorities, they are fairly autonomous vis--vis public authorities and

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traditional representative institutions (Booher, 2004). Our framework is thus

developed for autonomous local networks that are formally initiated by a public
agent, which include both citizens and stakeholders as active members, and
where there is a clear objective to solve planning issues. Our understanding
of citizens is rather broad as it also includes representatives of local nongovernmental organizations (e.g. environmental associations). In terms of
stakeholders, we include both public street-level organizations (e.g. public
housing associations, as well as public administrators from local governments)
and business actors (e.g. land developers and local business). We use the term
collaborative networks as a way of describing the organizational structure of
collaborative planning processes.

Democratic assessment should encompass the whole process

As previously mentioned, the collaborative planning tradition has related
frameworks to the overall theories of democracy only to a limited extent,
thereby putting too much focus on deliberative processes and consensusbuilding and, consequently, neglecting other aspects of democratic theory and
practice. In particular, this concerns the input-side of the planning process
where classical democratic questions on access and participation, such as who
participates, who initiates the deliberations, and who is excluded, are generally
ignored in the literature. Equally, collaborative approaches are not providing
any answers to aspects such as the sustainability of networks, and how to secure
democratic accountability. Even though both the process and the outcome are
important stages of a collaborative planning process, the input to the process is
equally important from a democratic perspective.

Criteria for democratically assessing

collaborative planning processes
As previously stated, defining democracy inevitably implies a normative point
of reference. Various conceptions of the actual meaning of rule by the people
have implicitly included a number of contested issues (rule? rule by? the
people?), which have so far remained unresolved over time, and probably
always will be (Held, 1987). However, in terms of identifying those cornerstones
considered as legitimate among democratic theorists, Dahls five criteria for
evaluating democratic processes have been widely accepted, at least among
students of democracy (Dahl, 1979, 1998; see Habermas, 1996b; Saward, 2001).
The five criteria are: effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda and inclusion of all adults (Dahl, 1998). They are
criteria that a process for governing an association would have to meet in order
to satisfy the requirement that all the members are equally entitled to participate in the associations decisions about its policies (Dahl, 1998: 37). Political
equality is thus the underlying rationale behind the choice of these five. The
search then becomes one of identifying the institutions that can embody them,
and the necessary requisites for safeguarding the existence of these institutions.

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Despite our sympathy with the underlying rationale, and acceptance of these
criteria as vital for our framework, we perceive them, like the UK democratic
audit tradition, as mainly focused on the building of democratic nation states,
rather than micro-level local arrangements for citizen involvement. Consequently, one of the criteria usually employed in Dahls frameworks voting
equality is not immediately applicable in our framework since collaborative
planning processes do not entail election of representatives, and decisionmaking takes place through deliberation.
Moreover, Dahls framework, like most of modern liberal democratic theory,
is founded on a dichotomy between the political and the the private. But we
find that democratic identities and capabilities are not necessarily connected to
this dichotomy. As demonstrated in the studies on the Danish everyday maker
(Bang and Srensen, 1998), a political identity is not just something that
originates in the citizens formal relationship to state authority. This aspect is
also vital for encapsulating the outcome of collaborative network arrangements,
where the results might be weak in terms of better governing, but where aspects
such as democratic learning, community-building and conflict resolution might
be unexpected side-effects. These should not be neglected in the performance
appraisal of collaborative planning activities.
The criteria we are applying are based on a number of democratic norms.
These unify traditional democratic norms (as described by Dahl, 1998) supplemented from the rich literature on communicative and collaborative planning
especially where it relates to criteria for collaborative processes and potential
outcomes. We use the following norms as a point of departure for developing
evaluation criteria:

access, inclusion and participation

public deliberation
democratic adaptiveness
accountability
the development of democratic identities

We go on to describe the different norms, and add some general research

questions which practitioners could raise in order to enable a democratic assessment of collaborative planning processes.

Access: a norm about influence and equality in the channels

for influence
The democratic ideal of access (and inclusion) is one of the major motives for
establishing networks for citizen involvement (and is also one of the basic
norms within most liberal democratic political systems; Dahl, 1998). Ideally, by
establishing extra-parliamentary realms, a group of involved citizens larger
than the normal group of representatives elected for certain posts, should
acquire access to political decision-making. Despite the general consensus, both
in planning and in democratic theory, on granting access to political processes,
this does not imply full enfranchisement of all concerned parties in a local
collaborative network, only that the networks should ideally be accessible to

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those concerned, that is, the stakeholders. The norm on access should, however,
manifest itself through endeavour for a high level of inclusion. Moreover, the
work of the collaborative networks should be transparent to those who do not
actively participate, but would still like to be informed. Two questions are
relevant in this context:
Q1: To what extent are the collaborative networks open to participation by the
affected stakeholders?
Q2: To what extent is the work of the collaborative networks transparent to the
wider public?

Our second issue primarily refers to both the range and extent of these collaborative networks, that is, to the investigation of how many of those who
could participate, actually do so. While classical policy network literature
mainly refers to networks as elitist phenomena, collaborative networks are
supposed to expand the number of involved participatory stakeholders.
Although access is imperative from a democratic perspective, actual participation is equally important. A high (and equally distributed) degree of
political participation within a political system is normally considered to be
beneficial. An enlightened, active citizenship (in contrast to the passive
client or consumer) demands significant popular political involvement. To
define political participation is, however, not an easy task. This implies a
judgement of the distribution of those accessing the networks in terms of
different groups, and of how representative of the population as a whole these
groups are. Classical definitions, such as Verba and Nies (1972) or Parry et al.s
(1992), usually limit political participation to those actions distinctly aimed at
directly (or indirectly) affecting public authorities or political representatives.
Such definitions, however, exclude a number of citizen activities, and consequently also exclude elements of participation that pursue communityshaping and/or identity-shaping (Andersen et al., 1993). What is desirable here
is to identify the extent of citizen participation in the collaborative networks.
Further research on this issue could be framed as follows:
Q3: To what extent are those concerned actively participating, or being represented,
in the networks?

Another requirement of participation is that there should be some form of

equality of access to collaborative networks. One of the main critiques of participatory processes is that they tend to exclude members of ethnic minorities,
that they consist of fewer women than men, and that they are often age-biased;
the result tends to be a majority of white middle-class men. Structural inequalities make it more difficult for certain groups to participate, and favour citizens
and representatives with resources (Fung, 2004). Studies in collaborative
planning demonstrate that a bias exists towards those who are politically active.
Citizens with resources (knowledge, time, etc.) are more likely to be active than
those lacking these means (Nordvig-Larsen, 1999).

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Even though many collaborative planning processes seek to include all those
affected by a certain decision, they often have difficulties in overcoming some
of the structural inequalities that make it easier for some groups, rather than
others, to take advantage of formal opportunities for participation (Young,
1996). Therefore we are interested in investigating whether or not the distribution of those politically active in the collaborative networks is representative
of their communities or groups of people, that is, the passive or marginalized or
excluded citizens.
This issue also concerns the very essence of the classical representation
debate, whether or not representation should be based on ideas and interests
(Pitkin, 1967), or should embody politics of presence, that is, a more descriptive reflection of representation in which historically disadvantaged groups in
society are represented by peers, for example, that women are represented by
other women, etc. (Phillips, 1995). Not only should those participating act in the
interest of those other than themselves, they should also be perceived as representing certain values. This argument also refers to the ideal of bringing in a
variety of knowledge to the planning process. This should comprise not only
technical or expert knowledge, but also tacit knowledge, individual views, and
more practical and moral types of knowledge (Healey, 1997). The questions
relevant in relation to these perspectives are:
Q4: To what extent do the collaborative networks embrace a high level of both
ideational and descriptive representation, that is, idea-correspondence between the
public and its representatives?
Q5: To what extent are different types of knowledge employed in the process?

Even though many formal collaborative networks are open in principle to

participation by any involved citizen, the choice of institutional design related
to the deliberations in the collaborative networks can have an influence on
who actually participates. Some planning theorists point to the fact that different methods of citizen participation attract different types of citizens (Plger,
2004). Moreover, the mechanisms for participation should not just grant stakeholders a formal right to participate where actual deliberative mechanisms
(formal or informal) systematically deprive certain groups of their chance to
influence the processes, but preferably should provide the stakeholders with a
genuine voice throughout the deliberative process. This has proved to be a
particular problem in citizen involvement at a local level, as revealed in Jane
Mansbridges seminal work on town hall meetings, where informal channels of
influence came to dominate decision-making (Mansbridge, 1980; Karpowitz
and Mansbridge 2005). The institutional design, and the methods employed,
always involve choices, which, deliberate or not, may exclude certain actors,
issues, viewpoints, actions and possible substantive outcomes (Connelly and
Richardson, 2004). This leads us to ask:
Q6: To what extent are the participation methods employed enough to secure
genuine access to decision-making?

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Public deliberation: a norm about public debate in

relation to planning processes.
This norm primarily concerns the opportunity for those affected by a planning
process to put items on the political agenda and discuss them in an open and
tolerant manner, prior to the decisive stage of a decision-making process. The
criteria involved here in the study of this norm are concerned with the quality
of the actual participation as it is manifested in the collaborative networks. The
ideal of collective problem-solving through deliberative discussions not only
appears in political science literature on democracy (see Dahl, 1998; Fishkin,
1995), but is also the very essence of the whole collaborative planning tradition
(Innes, 2004).
Two criteria are involved here in appraising the qualitative aspects of
dialogue within collaborative networks. First, it is important to stress the
openness, tolerance and interactivity of public debate. Second, there is every
reason to address the issue of the efficiency of the dialogue. In respect of both
these questions, it is hard to neglect the work of Jrgen Habermas, in particular as it relates to the discussion on deliberation. Habermas has, through his
work on the structural transformation of the public sphere (Habermas, 1996a),
been one of the most well-known critics of the decline and loss of autonomy of
the public sphere in the age of advanced capitalism and the social welfare state.
His work has been a source of great inspiration for the thinking now embodied
in collaborative planning theories, although there is good reason not to
exaggerate its actual influence in collaborative planning processes in practice
(Innes, 2004).
Already in his initial work of structural transformation in the public sphere
Habermas explicitly defines the assumptions and conditions under which
deliberation plays a significant role in democracy (Habermas, 1996a). However,
it is usually his later works on democratic discourse, in which he presents rules
on the ethics of discourse, that is, what a democratic dialogue should entail, to
which collaborative planners refer (Habermas, 1983, 1996a, 1996b). Although
we find this framework rigid,3 collaborative planning theory has drawn at least
one imperative lesson from Habermas in relation to the criteria on public
debate: that is, the value of reciprocity and tolerance (see Hillier, 1998). In
terms of collaborative networks, these two concepts have significant importance
to actual deliberation processes for many reasons. First, it is embodied in the
rules that dialogue should not function as a prejudiced realm for the top-down
dissemination of information, in which participants holding authoritative posts
or roles (such as civil servants, politicians, experts) directly, or indirectly, prevent
representatives of the public from taking part in the actual deliberation prior
to decision-making. This is also in line with Frank Fischers work on the value
of citizen expertise in policy-making, where he suggests that the deliberations
of ordinary citizens can be of value in policy-making processes by contributing
local contextual knowledge to the professionals expertise (Fischer, 2002).
Second, the rules also encourage all participants to a tolerant dialogue vis-vis each other. Certain viewpoints, attitudes and assertions should not be
excluded beforehand, and the dialogue should be based on mutual respect for,

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albeit not necessarily acceptance of, divergent arguments. Moreover, this rule
implies that certain citizen voices should not be granted greater privilege based
on, for example, the duration of residency in the area or the value of certain
property.
Third, the dialogue, at least initially, should be free from coercive arguments
in which, for example, threats of legal action(s) underpin the deliberative
argument. We understand that coercive instruments might be necessary in
certain deadlock situations, but the deliberative process should not initially be
embraced by coercion. The question arising from this norm is:
Q7: To what extent do the debates within collaborative networks approximate
standards of reciprocity and tolerance?

In light of what has just been stated about reciprocity and tolerance in
public deliberation, there is reason to include something on the outcome
of public deliberation. By and large, this is a question of whether or not the
involved participants believe that their voices are actually included in the
decisions made by the network (or conveyed to other decision-making bodies).
In one respect, our recognition of democratic deliberation diverges from
Habermass: we do not agree that the end goal of deliberation should always
seek consensus. Rather we would agree with Mouffe (2000) who, by and
large, criticizes the Habermasian ideal of consensus as conceiving conflicts as
unwelcome antagonism, rather than (productive) agonism (see also Plger,
2004). Conflicts are inevitable, and striving for consensus might in fact undermine the quality of the deliberation process, as it may set up certain frames
for the dialogue too early in the process, thereby suppressing other views and
assertions.
Instead, we limit our criterion on deliberative efficiency to a demand that the
deliberation process should actually produce something that leaves footprints
in the further decision-making process, rather than being an idle talk realm with
no other purpose than the purely symbolic. For example, the participants could
sense a higher degree of network power or glue of collaboration (Innes,
2004). This leads us to ask:
Q8: To what extent do the debates produce something perceived by the participants
as essential to the decision-making process?

Adaptiveness: a norm about the development of an

adaptive political system
By and large, this democratic criterion refers to a vision of matching constantly
changing political institutions and their environments with a commitment
to (enduring) democratic values. If the other criteria are those enlarging
democracy, this criterion is the restraining one.
As discussed previously, democratic institutions are products of democratic
norms, and vice versa. There exists a co-evolutionary relationship between the
environments, that is, the democratic norms or the democratic culture, and those
political institutions that are set up to defend and sustain the very same norms.
As democratic norms are by nature imprecise and obscure, the question

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about which institutions are the most appropriate to fulfil these embedded
democratic norms is one which inevitably involves negotiation of the meanings
of the norms, as well as whether or not the institutions are legitimate, and/or
are adapting to the democratic norms. According to March and Olsen, two
features of political institutions are especially important in the development of
adaptiveness: stability, and the rules to achieve that stability (March and Olsen,
1995). On the one hand, rules serve to coordinate actions, thereby fostering
predictability within a political system, and thus making it less vulnerable to too
rapid external submission to political, technological or economic changes that
threaten human dignity and the political community (Deutsch, 1966). On the
other hand, this inevitably inhibits the possibility of change in the political
system.
In terms of collaborative networks, this feature of political institutions can be
coupled to the temporal aspects of citizen involvement. Just like many other
aspects of contemporary political life, citizen involvement has been subject to
the unbearable lightness of project management in which network-building
with citizens has been conceived as a temporary initiative, with a temporary
budget, and with a more or less clear objective to complete within a short project
period. In contrast, we claim that the democratic success of collaborative
networks is partly embedded in the continuity and stability of citizen involvement. By partly, we suggest that the networks should not become stable and
rigid institutions. What we advocate is the presence of mechanisms (and subsequently rules) for making the network more than just the erection of yet
another tomb in the crowded project cemetery. Even though there might be
reasons to alter the composition of the collaborative network, change the rules,
and even terminate collaborative networks, there should be clear, long-term
strategies for the dissemination of experiences from the networks, the institutionalization of citizen involvement, and the sustaining of the dialogue. The
collaborative planning literature demonstrates that the building of institutional
capacity is seen as an important potential outcome of governance processes
(e.g. Healey et al., 1999). But an interesting question is whether or not these
competences, as regards learning and social capital, erode or can be sustained
when a network comes to an end. The question we induce from this is:
Q9: To what extent do the collective experiences and learning processes of the
involved stakeholders, developed through the work of the collaborative networks,
guarantee sustainability and continuity?

Second, the whole idea of collaborative planning is built on a presumption of

existing conflicts in planning, and the resolution of those conflicts. That is,
collaborative planning schemes should be adapted to handle any conflicts that
may occur within the framework of the planning process. However, this does
not mean that collaborative networks should solve conflicts, merely that they
should facilitate a functioning and legitimate realm for managing conflicts, and
the likely negotiations and trades that may occur as a result of conflicts (March
and Olsen, 1995). With respect to collaborative networks, this question refers to

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one of the more common reasons for catering for citizen participation. That is,
collaborative networks are established with the clear ambition of avoiding, or
at least mitigating, conflicts between governors and those to be governed by
means of public deliberation and inclusion. Even though this might be the
official goal within the network, there is still reason to ask whether the networks
are actually capable of handling conflicts. A benchmark here would be that
the network itself has the autonomy and capacity to actually handle conflicts.
A network in which conflicts are either transferred (back) to traditional political institutions, or by default are passed on to the legal system, is of less importance in enhancing democratic inclusion and equality. The question here is:
Q10: To what extent are the collaborative networks capable of handling conflicts?

Accountability: a norm about developing political accounts

One basic premise of modern democracy is that citizens should have the
capacity to hold policy-makers, in general, accountable for their actions. With
respect to politicians, this principle is exercised through regular elections
where citizens have the prerogative of sanctioning those politicians who have
acted against the citizens will; civil servants are held accountable for their
performance by rules and regulations. Notwithstanding the importance of the
accountability of policy-makers, there is reason to distance ourselves from the
traditional understanding of accountability. Much of the contemporary literature on democratic accountability demonstrates the problems of upholding
this classical chain of accountability since collaborative networks, (among
other political actors) albeit actively engaged in policy-making, are not always
accountable to the citizenry for their performance. Therefore we adopt two
important aspects of accountability from March and Olsen: information and
sanctions (March and Olsen, 1995). The question of information is already
dealt with above in the paragraph on access (transparency); here we examine
the possibility of democratic sanctions.
Sanctions can be both formal and official, exercised through rules and
democratic competition, or they can be derived from internalized personal
obligations of the policy-maker. That is, an inappropriate act is punished by guilt
and a loss of self-respect, and is based on the existence of a strong sense of
community (which might be organizational, professional or political). These two
models of sanctions are not predetermined, rigid or once and for all, but are
always subject to interpretation. Since the collaborative networks we are
discussing here are set up, and usually meta-governed by public authorities, they
are in fact bodies with accountable actors, that is, politicians and civil servants.
As Torfing and Srensen say, the networks should also include elected politicians
in order to secure accountable decisions (Srensen and Torfing, 2005).
Regardless of the active participation of elected politicians in the local
networks, it should ideally be possible to identify some chain of accountability
where sanctions can be imposed. A network for citizen involvement operating
in an accountability void is not favourable to democracy. Another aspect vital

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to securing a high level of accountability is that representation of the (local)

government is not just limited to civil servants. The question that arises here is:
Q11: To what extent can sanctions enforce the accountability of collaborative
networks for their actions?

Political identities and capabilities: a norm about

developing democratic identities
Through civic education, socialization, and participation in democratic deliberation and decision-making citizens learn what is good, who they are, who they
want to be, and the kind of community in which they want to live (March and
Olsen, 1995: 76). The question here is to apply a criterion suitable for handling
the theory and practice of identity formation that supports the empowerment
of actors in the networks. This norm is about how, and if, participation in a
network develops capabilities and new political identities for the actors
involved. From the planning literature we saw that the concept of developing
institutional capital and capacity was a way of analysing the output of network
initiatives. Institutional capital can be divided into three forms: intellectual
(knowledge resources), political (mobilization capacity) and social capital
(relational resources) (Healey et al., 1999; Innes and Booher, 1999a). Social
capital refers to trust-building through social interactions among participants,
and the personal and professional relationships that are built up through faceto-face encounters. Political capital refers to the ability to work collectively for
agreed ends at a relational level. Or as Healey et al. (1999) call it, the mobilization capacity (opportunity structures, arenas, change agents, etc.) at a local
level. At an individual level it relates to an actors personal ability to engage in
political decision-making. Srensen and Torfing formulate three factors that
influence this ability: level of access to the decision-making process (endowment); their capability to make a difference in the process (empowerment); and
their perception of themselves as political actors (political identity) (Srensen
and Torfing, 2005). This can be both at a relational and individual level. Another
way of formulating the capabilities gained through the participation is March
and Olsens distinction between four broad types of capabilities relevant to
governance: rights and authorities, political resources, political competencies and
organizing capacities (March and Olsen, 1995). In this perspective, the process
of deliberation in a formal network contributes to the reconstruction of political identities, so the process is not simply the projection of group interests, but
precedes this via the process of articulation through which identities, representations and rights are themselves contingently constructed (Hillier, 1998). Our
interest here is whether the actors in the networks feel that their participation
has contributed to the development of endowment, empowerment and democratic identity, and whether the networks themselves enhance institutional
capital. In this instance, the questions are:
Q12: To what extent does participation in collaborative networks contribute to
citizen empowerment?
Q13: To what extent do the activities of collaborative networks contribute to the
building, or improvement of institutional capital and capacity?

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Democratic assessment of collaborative planning processes

Concluding remarks
The aim of this article has been to present a framework for assessing the democratic effects of citizens participating in collaborative networks. We took a point
of departure from current planning literature, focusing on theories of collaborative planning with their emphasis on institutional settings for deliberation
and collaboration among actors. In this field, we identify a growing literature
advocating more deliberative and participative approaches to public engagement within decision-making at all levels of policy-making. However, this literature does not explicitly address issues concerning the assessment of the
democratic effects of more interactive decision-making processes, for example,
formal networks in local planning.
We find that the collaborative literature provides us with concepts for collaborative dialogues, which can be used as a normative standard for evaluating
the process in order to secure a democratic and legitimate process. The literature is also explored in terms of the different kinds of potential outcomes, such
as institutional capitals and capacity, which might result from formal network
processes. However, we also find that the collaborative literature has overlooked
certain democratic aspects, including perhaps more traditional accounts of
democracy, for example, in relation to norms about representation and accountability. Hence, we have presented in this article a rather all-encompassing framework with the aim of including most of the major democratic aspects of network
governance in local planning.
There are still some questions not covered in this principally theoretical
article. First, how can this framework be applied in a practical evaluation study
of actual collaborative networks? The questions we have posed are at present
rather all-encompassing, and do not produce detailed research questions for
evaluation. However, it is our belief that any democratic assessments must
encompass the different stages of input, process and outcome of collaborative
networks. While our democratic norms are of a more general character, and
thus applicable to the different stages, we find that some of the criteria are more
easily applicable to certain stages of a collaborative process. The criteria on
access and participation are vital to the discussion of input to collaborative
network processes; the criteria on deliberation and adaptiveness belong to the
process per se; and finally, the criteria on development of political identity and
accountability are important for assessing the outcome.
In terms of using our framework in practical assessments we cannot present
a ready-made research design. However, we attempt a tentative presentation
(in Box 1) on how some of the criteria can become materialized in the shape of
more concrete evaluation questions based on different stages in a planning
process. We have deliberately excluded anything on which research methods
(where methods is not synonymous with methodology) the evaluator should
apply; the choice of research methods is dependent on the actual local context
of the planning process.
A second important issue that needs to be addressed is the trade-off between
these norms and criteria. This problem, for example, can be traced back to Dahl.
Fishkin points out the same problem with Dahls criteria: furthering some

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Input

Are the
deliberation
processes
characterized by
reciprocity and
tolerance?

Do the
institutional
settings for the
processes favour
some types of
participants? Are
the processes
transparent?

Process

Is the networks
work secured
sustainability and
continuity in terms
of e.g.
competencies?

To what extent do
the debates produce
something which
is perceived, by the
participants, as
essential for the
decision-making
process?

Are the outcomes

biased in terms of
fulfilling the
wishes of only
certain groups of
participants?

Outcome

Questions for democratic assessments

Norms

Is the network
capable of handling
conflicts?

What are the

possibilities for
accountability when
implementing the
outcome of the
networks?

BOX 1

Access
Who are invited to
participate? Which
channels for
participation
exist?

Are the processes

transparent?

Have the processes

contributed to the
building of
institutional capital
and capacity?

Adaptiveness
Are there clear
rules for the
network process
prior to the
deliberative
process?

Accountability

Political identities

Is there a clear
political mandate
from politicians
which can be held
accountable?

Public
deliberation
Are different types
of knowledge
included in the
deliberations?

To what extent do
the processes of the
networks contribute
to endowment and
empowerment?

criteria may require the sacrifice of others (Fishkin, 1999). We can, even from a
purely theoretical outlook, see that a high score on one of these norms automatically means a low score on another norm. An example of this can be that
the process had a high score on enhancing democratic capabilities and social
capital, but a low score on the norm of access and inclusion. Our view is that
this is something an empirical study based on this framework needs to consider
in terms of the aims of the investigated collaborative network. If, for example,

Agger and Lfgren

Democratic assessment of collaborative planning processes

the objective of the collaborative network is to enhance competence-building

and empower citizen identity, democratic success should naturally mean that
the citizens feel that the network has contributed to their empowerment.
Equally, if the result is that the collaborative network has merely contributed
to yet another project to be filed in the records of the town hall, and without
any long-lasting effects on building on institutional capacity, this must be seen
as a democratic failure regardless of the symbolic values.

Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to Lenze Schaap, Eva Srensen, Jacob Torfing, Peter
Triantafillou, and the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on
early versions of this article.

Notes
1.

2.

3.

The theories of collaborative planning have also inspired many actual planning
processes within urban regeneration, and land-use planning, both in Europe
(e.g. the Danish urban regeneration project Kvarterlft, and the German
equivalent die Soziale Stadt), as well as in the United States (e.g. watershed
management).
Here we adhere to David Eastons universal definition of politics as the processes,
institutions and decisions through which the authoritative allocation of values for a
society take place (Easton, 1971).
As Nancy Fraser notes: Declaring a deliberative arena to be a space where extant
status hierarchies are bracketed and neutralized is not sufficient to make it so
(Fraser, 1997: 74).

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Annika Agger, PhD, is Assistant Professor in the Department of Society and

Globalization at Roskilde University, and is a member of the Centre for Democratic Network Governance. Her research areas concern public deliberation and
the impact on public governance. She has designed, facilitated and evaluated
forums and events for citizen participation for many years. Her recent book is
co-authored with Birgitte Hoffmann, Borgerne p banen [Citizens on the Agenda],
a public participation handbook for planners (forthcoming).
Address: Department of Society and Globalization, Roskilde University, House
25.1, Universitetsvej 1, DK-4000 Roskilde, Denmark. [email: aagger@ruc.dk]
Karl Lfgren is Associate Professor in Public Administration and Governance in
the Department of Society and Globalization, Roskilde University, Denmark, and
is a member of the Centre for Democratic Network Governance. He co-authored
with Patrik Hall Politisk styrning i praktiken [Political Governance in Practice],
(2006), and has recently published articles in Public Policy and Administration and
Information Polity. He is currently studying new modes of local democracy in
Denmark.
Address: Department of Society and Globalization, Roskilde University, House
25.1, Universitetsvej 1, DK-4000 Roskilde, Denmark. [email: klof@ruc.dk]