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    Bayly Intro To Birth of The Modern World 2004

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    xxiv lest that historians working in diferent regions are offen unaware thet specialists in other fields are making similar arguments anc, indeed, thatthe sets of historic processes they depict were connected, In ether eases, hstor- fans are well avare of the analogies and connections with developments in other subjet areas —let s say, between state building ia nineteenth-century Japan and Vietnam ~ but have not felt the need to incomorate a broader context in their work. Above all, this book tries to stant conversations between historians and historiographies in order to better understatd similasites and Ailferences between socal processes. Large numbers of individual names inevitably appeae inthe book, To give ‘hem all birth and death dates would have ereated a kind of “date soup,” $0 T Ihave only supplied dates sparingly for some major igus. ‘The work uses the word “society” a good deal. It is not only conservative Politicians but many sophisticated andvopologsts who have dened the exat- ence of “societies,” ora eas cautioned against resort to dhe term. The word is not intended here to refer to essentialized, hard-edged cats entities, $0 ‘much as broad clusters of historically defined tats of hun behavior which can be observed within agin grographical ares. The wee ofthe term allows 2 broad analysis beneath the level of the global and above the level ofthe local. It would be theoretically posible, ofcourse, to brea down every social entity to the village level oto individual networks within each village in the world. Az the classical philosophers said, however, there are atoms “al the way down.” From. CoA. Bayly, The Birth of the Mocern \lovla, (780 NAG: Global Connedtiows A Comparisions C Oxford Blauzasell Publishing, 2004) INTRODUCTION “Tits book is a thematic history ofthe world from 1780, the beginning ofthe ‘evolutionary age, to 1914, the onset ofthe Fist World War, which ripped apart the contemporary system of states and empizes, It shows how historical trends and sequences of events, which have been treated separately in regional or national histories canbe brought together This reveals the intercomnectednest ‘nd interdependence of political and socal ehangesacrossthe work wel before the supposed onset ofthe contemporary phase of “globalization” after 1945. (On the one hand, the reverberations of critical world events, such a8 the ropean revolutions of 1789 or 1848, spread outwards and merged with convulsions erising within ether world sovietes. Ow uke her hand events Dutsie the emerging European and American “core ofthe industrial work economy, euch asthe mid-century rebellions in China and India, impacted bck on that cots, molding is ideologies and shaping new socil and political conflicts, i world events Became more interconnected and interdependent, 50 forme of human action adjusted to each other and came o resemble each other ‘cross the word. The book, therefore, traces the ise of global ifr inthe state, religion, political ideologies, and economic lifeas they developed throagh ‘the nineteenth century, This growth of uniformity was visible not only in great instiutions such a8 chorches, royal courts, or systems of justice. Tt was also apparent in what the bouk calle "bodily practices”: the ways in which people ested, spoke, ate nd managed relations within file. ‘These rapidly developing connections between different human societies ‘ducing the nineteenth century created many hybrid polities, mixed ideologies, nd complex forms of global econamic activity. Yet, at the same time, these connections could alo heighten the sense of diference, ans even antagonism, between people in diferent societies, and especially between their elites Increasingly, Japanese, Indians, and Americans, for instance, found strength in theie own inherited sense of national, religious, or cultural identity when conftonted with the severe challenges which arose from the new global econ ‘omy, and especially from European imperialism, The parade that global {orees and local forces ‘cannibaized” oF fed off each other, wse words ofthe soci theorist, Arjun Appadura, is well known to the contemporary humar sciences." But this ambivalent relationship between the alebal and the local, the general and the specific, had along history before the present age. So, in the nineteenth century, nation-states and contending territorial empires took ‘on sharper lineaments and became more antagonistic to each other atthe very same time as the similarities, connections, and linkages betwen them prolier- ted, Broad forees of global change surengthened the appeatance of difeence between human communities. But those diferences were increasingly ex pressed in similar ways ‘Thebook argues that alloca, national, or tegional histories must in import- ant ways, therefore, be global histories. It is no long really posible to write ““uropean’” or “American” history in a narrow sense, and itis encouraging tat many historians ae already taking this view. In the 1950s and 1960s the French “Annales” school of hstrical writing, led by Fernand Braudel, pion- ceredaformof global social and economic history forthe earl modem period? ‘The need to transcend he boundaries of sates and ecological zones f even «learer forthe nineteenth century, This particulary applies tothe history of the Jmperial states of Europe, both the Jand-empires, such as Russia, and the seaborne empires of Britain and France, Historians such as Linda Colley! ‘nd Catherine Hall for Britain and Geoffey Hosking* and Dominic Lieven* for Russa have been in the foreont of ellors to show thatthe experience of| empire in the broadest sense was central to the ereation and form ofthese national sates. Meanwbile, R, Bin Wong,” Kenneth Pomera,* Wang Gang ‘Wa,” and Joanna Waley-Cohen' have begun to write Chines history as global Insworyy taking cose account of the Chinese diasporas which predated and persisted under the surface of Western imperial hegemony. ‘What were the critical driving fores that account for the work's growing intereonnectedness and growing uniformity inthe cours ofthe “long” ine teenth century? No world history of tis period could possibly sidestep the central importance of the growing economie dominance of western Europe and North Americ. In 1780, the Chinese Empire and the Ottoman Empice were still powerful, world-class entities, and most of AMtiea and the Pacific region was ruled by indigenous people. In 1914, by conttat, China and the Oitoman siates were on the point of fragmentation, and Africa had been ‘brutally subjugated by Furopean governments, commercial fms, and mine- owners. Between 1780 and 1914, Europeans had expropriated a vat arca of land from indigenous peoples, especially in northern and southern Afi, in ‘North America, central Asia, Siberia, and Australasia, If tke gross domestic product per head in western Europe and the seaboard of Nerth America was, At most twice that of South Asia and only marginally more than that of coastal ‘China in 1800, he diferenvial had widened to ten times o¢ mote a century Inter, Most pacts ofthe world which were not dicey contealled by Europe oF the United States were now part of what historians have called “informal empires," where disparities of power between losals and outsiders existed, bbut had not yet led to direct annexation, Physical domination was accompanied by different degrees of ideological dependence, Socal concepts, institutions, and procedures honed in the fierce eonfits and competition between European naions became controllers and txemplars for non-European peoples. Those peoples, however, were not passive recipients of Wester bounty a, alternatively, simply the West's supine tistims, Their eeception and remolding of Western ideas and techniques for their own lives set limits to the nature and extent of their domination by Buropean power-olders. At the beginning of the period considered by this ‘books the world was sill a mult-centered one. East Asia, South Asia, and [Aica retained dynamism and initiative in diferent areas of social and eco homie lie, even if powerful competitive advantages bad already accrued to Buropeans and thee oversea colonists. By the end of the period, following the rie of Japan and the beginnings of extr-European nationalisms, Europe's “lead had been significantly challenged. A history ofthis period, therefore, has to demonstrate a numberof diffrent and apparently contradictory things. thas to chart the interdependence of world events, while allowing fr the brute fat of Western domination. At the same time it has to show how, over Jrge parts of the world, this European domination was only partial and temporary. THe ORGANIZATION OF THE BooK ‘The Birth ofthe Moder World isa reflection on, rather than # narrative of, Work history. Chapters 3, 4 6, nd the final chapter attempt to construct & history of work events for chronological sections within the long period fom, 1780 to 1914. They contrast pesiods of telative stability with periods of \workiwide cris, ‘Their im isto select and emphasize certain connections boenween broad series of political and economic changes. Chapter 3, for ‘example, emphasizes the ideological and political links between the revoli- tionary age in Europe anid North America in the generation after 1776 and the ‘contemporary surge forward of European dominance over non-European the “fest age of globsl imperialism.” Recent reinerpretations of the 1848 revolutions in Europe have mae it possible to view other great events, such a3 the convalsions in mid-century China and the great rebellion of 1857-9 in India, ffom related vantage points. Chapter 4 considers the American Civil War 48 global event, not simply as an American crisis. In chapter 6 lte- nineteenth-eentury nationals, imperialis, and ethnic exclusions are con- Sidesed within the same field of analysis, rather than separately, as has often been the case. “These chapters emphasize the proposition that national histories and “area snadey” need to take fller account of changes occurring in the wider world, Ideas and political movements “jumped” across oceans and borders fiom countty to country. For instance, by 1865 the end of the Civil War allowed American liberals to give support tothe radical Meican government ‘of Rent Juarez, which ves under assaul from French-backed conservatives ‘The Mexican radicals tad already received emthusastic support from Giuseppe Garibaldi and other revokutionaries who had been the heroes of the 1848 rebellions against suthority in Burope.!" Here, common experiences agave rite to-a united front across the world. But equally exposure to global changes could encourage literati politicians, and ordinary people to stress dllferenice rather than similarity. By the 1880s, the impact of Chestian mis- slonaries and Western goods, for example, had made Tedians, Arabs, and Chinese more aware oftheir distinctive religious practices, forms of physical eportment, and the excellence oftheir local artisans, In tne, this sensibility of difference itself also created further global links. Indian artists looked to thee Japanese comemporaris as inheritors ofa pute nestietic tradition and Jnconporated thei style into thei own works. The aim theaughout the book is to.combine what might be called “lateral history” ofthis sor the history of| connections ~ with “vertical history,” the history of the development of particular institutions and ideologies. ‘Chapters 1, 2, 5, and the second half of the book, therefore, ate more ‘thematic in spproach. These chopters consider the greit social concepts ‘which have been used by historians, a they were by nineteeath-century writers ane publicists, 1o characterize the dominant changes ofthe nineteenth century, ‘Among these conecpts, the rise ofthe modern state, science, industrahization, Uberalism, science, and “eligion” appear to be the mos important. ‘The purpose ofthese chapters ito bring together material feoma range of regional 1nd national histories in onder to demonstrate how these institutions and ideologies becam: rooted ane empowered in cient places and at dilleren periods of ime. They attempt to provide nhistory of connections and processes ple view ofthe diffusion outward wfmodemnity from tional” European or American center. Hote again, the book insists on the importance of the activity of colonized and semi-colonized non European peoples, and of subordinated groups within Furopean and American society in shaping the contemporary world order S, for instance, the reconsi tution of the European Roman Catholic hierarchy after 1870 was pat of ‘uch wider process of constructing “world elgions” whichus aking place in the Hindu, Confucian, and Buddhist worlds as mach as the Christin, ‘This is hot just a matter of analogy, but of diect causation. Christen churches often ‘began to cooperate and create new orgeniations at home precisely beewuse ‘they needed solidarity in overseas mission activity, where they Found themselves ‘under pressure from a revived Islam of other religious teditions epreading amongst their formally dependent subjects “The book ends with a view of the period before the First World Wor, when 4iplomatie rivalties and international economic changes were facing the system of states and empires with unexampied pressures. The First World ‘War, as Hew Strachan emphasized," was decidedly 2 weld war, even if Started as a civil war within the European core of the world system That conflict was not “inevitable;" bur its explosive force, which was 10 echo down through the twentieth century, resulted from the Nowing together of motile local crises, many of them originating outside Europe isl “The weting of word history tases many acute questions of interpretation and presentation, We consider three of them here, Before opening the discus ‘Sin by considering the growth of uniformity in one particular are, the realm ‘oftivman bodily practice, Propiem Ons: **PRIME MOVERS” AND THE ECONOMIC FACTOR ‘Most professional historians still have atthe back of their mines the question of "why things changed.” Historims and philosophers who lived in the hineteenth century tended to think dhat history was moved along by big spiritual and intellectual changes. They believed that God or the Spirit of Reason, or the Urge for Liberation was moving in the world. Some of them believed in 4 European Christian “eivilizing mission,” Others thought that races and civilizations moved up and down according to natural laws of ‘competition, survival and decline. Inthe twentieth century, materialist ex planations of change came to the fore. By 1950, many leading historians had ben influenced by socialist theories and saw the logic of industrial capitaism the dominant force explaining changes in hurnan affairs after 1750. This perspective remains central, Atone level, it must be true thatthe critical Iistorcal change inthe nineteenth century was the shift ofthe most powerfal states and societies towards urban industialsm. The deste of capitalist to ‘maximize their income and to subordinate labor was an inexorable force for change, not just in the Wes, but across Asia and Africa, “Themost powcrflly written and consistent ofall the English Iangunge work! Listories in print, Exic Hobsbawm's great four-votume work," makes this ‘plicit especialy his The lgeaf Capital. However, as Perry Anderson remarked ‘when Hobsisawm’s autobiography waspublishedin 2002 the great political and intellectual developments ofthe nineteenth century didnot necessarily wrkon 1 time scale whieh dicetly reflected the underlying growth of the power of industrial capital." The movements of economies ideologies, and states were notalwaye synchronous, Tey tended tbe interactive. The French Revolution, the dominant political event of the peti, occurred before significant industri- zation had occurred even in rian, and few historians noweee the evolution a8 triumph of the "bourgeoisie." Certainly, many lawyers and “midaing People” took part in the revolution, but they were hangers-on of nobles and tegicnal assemblies eather than incipient capitalists. Hvenin 1870, the high age feapital, according to Hobsbawan's interpretation, landowners and arstocats termained the power-holdets in mest societies The later nineteenth century Was indeed “the age of capital," but even this period cannorbe “reduced” tocapital. Twas algo the age of nobles, landowners, and priests, and, over much ofthe world, an age of pessants Tnview ofthese problems, ome historians towards the end ofthe twentieth ‘century cast the state and “governmentality,” particularly the domineering ‘categorizing, Westernstye state, asthe “prime mover" ttammas. But this does not really solve the problem ethes, The carer ofthe modem state was evidently causally connected with te great economic changes of the era at some level, even if i¢ was not rigdly determined by them. Besides, to sires the rise of che state or of governmientality ina wider Sense sil leaves the underlying question: why, indeed, dil the modern state develop at al The puzzle is even less tractable i we remember that the most hovel political project of the era, the United States of Ameria, had scarcely begun to industrialize before the 1830s, and ite structure and constitution ‘represented a successful revolution again the domineering European state, ‘This book snot designed centrally to addres such fsues of deep causation. edocs, however, suggest that any word history needs to psit amore complex lneraction between politcal organization, political idess, and economic ae- tivity, ‘The economy certainly retains an estential role in he argument, Pat- tems of local economic intensification were leading motors of change even before full-scale industaization. Chapter 2 suggests thatthe economic his- ‘orian Jan de Vries concept of the “industeiousrevolutien” can be usefully expanded! to track many forms of economie intensificatien which had been ‘curring across the world since at least 1650, Over the eighteenth century, “industrious revolutions” were continuing to reorder society in variety of Ailferent locations. Capital and labor were being made to work hare from south China to Massachusetts, Small-scale technological innovations were ‘matched by modifications i the distribution of goods and people's matetal hhbits, Peatont families became prosperous farming families. Petty shopkeep- crs became urban burghers in Amsterdam, Malacca, and Fez, They wanted bbeter-quality food andl clothing, more honor and status, ‘Yet to siess the importance of industrious revolutions, 4s this book doess is not necessuily to give priority in historical causation to just another type of ‘economic motor, Fr industrious revolutions were not simply brute changes in the distribution of material frees. They were also evolutins in “discourse,” {0-use today’s jargon. People’s horizons of desire changed, because informa- tion about the ideals and life-styes of ruling groups was akeady circulating faster." Middling people” wanted to emulate the consumption of royal cours, which were representing themselves in more pleasing and persuasive ways. It ‘was this prior set of conceptual shifts which empowered the shopkeepers, created new demands for labor, and sent merchantnien across the oceans in search of luxuries. In turn, new, more aggresive states, particularly in western Europe, took advantage of these changes and began to link the industrious revolutions together across the world with armed shipping and monopoly companies. The slave system of the Caribbean represeated the vltimete, forced, industrious revolution. ‘These social and economic changes were uneven and unsettling. They ‘opened up differentials between groups and between different societies, ‘They spawned lust for wealth, envy, and distrust of neighbors, They led to ‘overseas wars, unequal taxation, social turmoil, and the questioning of estab lished authority, royal and religious. The tutmoil was worldwide. French philosophers and religious teachers in central Arabia felt equally the impact ‘of the new connections and the turbulence they unleashed. I was in this fontext that many localized confits spun out of contol across the world between 1720 and 1820, and expecilly after 1780, The aggressive French revolutionary sate itself engendered many ferce enemies. The European sate, its colonial ffhoots, and adjacent non-European states, notably the Ottoman Empite, the Chinese Empire, and Tokugawa Japan, were forced 10 ‘widen their scale of ambition, ‘The leaders of these states had vo appropriate tnd modi the new ideologies. They had to trench into ares of society that ‘nad formerly been auonomous ‘The polical and ideological changes ofthe evolutionary era were there= fore, "eatastrophic,” in the sense that they could not be predicted oF ac- ‘counted for simply on the basis of the contradictions snd conflicts of the old regime, or even, ultimately, on the development of capitalism alone. The stat, ‘now posed by the new ideologies which criss had generalized, developed s kind of elephansiasis. Elites battled for much ofthe early nineteenth century ‘vith the problems of order and legitimacy that this caused, Ideological and poltcl confit had, infact, achieved a global scale, bore economic niform- ies were established across much of the world. The tse of capital was not, therefore, a free in itsel. Te spread in social ecology which had already been treated by wider aspirations to power, oxinership, justice, and sanctity. Tewas only after about 1840, in fat, that the patchy, but now relentless shift ‘ovtard industilization began to “kick in” ata global level. It did so atthe tine when another series of erses had shaken the world order: the 1848 revolutions in Europs, massive rebellions in Asia, and the American Civil ‘War, Ralng groupe worked to stabilize the socal osder by promoting indus> Uilization, or at least providing a framework frit-Iadustealization provided new resources for the state and nev weapons forts armies. The age of capital had indeed arrived by the 1870s, as Hobsbawm surmised. But the men of capital could stil only acquire status and respectability by sharing influence with kings, aristocrats landowners, and bureaucrats who staffed the offices of the new; hard-edged nation-states, The age of capital was therefore also = peiod when hierarchy was perpetuated and religions became more foreeul and demanding, 48 chapters 9 and 1 attempt to show. In the broadest terms, then, historical development seems to have been Aetermined by a complex parallelogram of forces constituted by economic shanges, ideological constructions, and mechanisms of the state, Develop- ‘ments in the worid economy da ot eelly seem to have been “prior tothe ieologicel and political structare in any strsghtforward. sense. ‘These domains peneteated and influenced each other to diferent degrees and at Ailecent mes. So there were pesiods when the state and the povtrful narra- ‘ives people ereated about it were the “diver” of historical change. There were periods of ux and fluidity, a8 for instance berween 1815 and 1850. Agni, there were indeed periods when significant economic restructuring ‘amulatvely determined the direction of governmentalty end its ideologies. And just sit ifered overtime, so the balance ofthese elements differed from ‘ociety to society across the continents. Prontem Two: GLopat History AND PosTMODERNISM ‘A second problem in writing world history, however, derhes from the recent rise to prominence of some historians who donot think ia Unis way at all nd tend to reac all “grand narratives” of capital, the state, and even ideological change, After about 1980, some historians were influenced by a tread of thought that has been ealled postmodernist or postcolonial. Writers taking these postions are often hostile to broad comparative hoes, or so-called rmeta-narratives, which, they argue, ae complicit with the very processes of impesialism and capitalism which tho seek to desribe."The naratves ofthe state or of capita, described above, would constitute two ofthe targets of such authors, Instead historians writing in thi style try to recover the “decentered” narratives of people without power. ‘These diempossered people are held to nave been subordinated by the European sind American rile capitalists who wrote the political specches and government minutes of the time, Conse- ‘quently, their woices have been sytematieally expunged fom the grand natra tives of world history constructed by laterhistorans, ‘The postmodernist nn in some history writing has therefore created an area tension The academic and popular demand for world histories seems to be expanding enormously as “lobalization” becomes the mest fashionable cancept of the day. Yet some of the bisie assumptions of world history writing have been subjected to Stringent criticism by postmodernists on the grounds tit they homogenize human experience sn “airbrush out" the history of “people without power.” ‘There is no reason why the human sciences should all adopt the same methovdology. Controversies ofthis sort can be quite praguctive, History has shyays flourished when diferent types of historical writingare aiable on the same bookshelf, when questions about “hat happened” are challenged by the questions “Who seid so2" and "What did it mean?” This was tue in the 1970s and 1980s, when a stl inflential Marxist school was challenged by ‘neo-conservatve historians in Europe and North America, One thing i clear however. Even when writing of the particular experiences of the poor, the subordinated woman or the “native,” the postmodemist and postcolonial historians make constant reference to the states religion, snd colonialism, all broad phenomena, but ones which are sometimes taken for grated in such accounts, The postmodemist works, therefore, usally conceal their own underlying “meta-narraive,” which is politcal and mordizing in ite origins and implications. For example, many of these accounts appear to assume that a better world might have evolved i sul historical engines of dominance os the unitary state, patriarchy, or Wester Finlightenment rationalism had not beni so powerful. All histories, then, even histories of the “agment” are implicitly universal histories, Writing world history can therefore help to uncover a variety of hidden meta-narztives. This is particlady the ease ‘when causation isa issue, Why things change has always teen a predominant concern of historians, For this reason, it emains important to consider the fesources and steateges, end mutual collisions of dominant groups and thei supportets ata world-historial level, as wells o char the experience ofthe pesple without history." “Thisie not to argue that histories ofthe experience of individuals and groups isolated from the main centers ofthe production of histary ate unimportant. ‘Themarginal has always worked to construct the grand narative as muchas the converse has been tue. Especially before the mid-nineteenth century, ic was ‘common for people on “the tinges” to become historically central. Nomads tnd trial warriors became imperiat generals, Barber-surgeons became scien- tists, Dancing women became queens. People easly crossed often flexible boundaries of status and nationality, Historieal outcomes remained open. Cenainly, to do no more than insist on the rive of capitalism the modern stat, othe concept ofthe nation hides and excludes much of what as really interesting about historical change. Yet itis dificult to deny, and few, even amongst postmodernist historians, do deny, the importance of the weight of change towards uniformity over the “long” nineteenth century. ‘Of course, in 1914, the heterodox, the transgressive, and the Nid weee stil everywhere in view. ‘The trinmph of modern Christianity was challenged by the efloescence of spiritualism and esoteric healing clts even in its European heart, The rie of orthodox Islam wa challenged by « pervasive ambiguity Which sill allowed Hindus, Buddhists or Avican tribal healers to mingle at shrines with Muslim worshippers. New centers of power proliferated to deny victory to the modesn state and nationalism, not leat the powerfal phalanx of organized labor. All the same, these unpredictable and unstandardized forms ‘of human ife-and-thought were increasingly marked-by-the~imprint-of common forms of govesnmentality. They were influenced yy common ideas about the nation and the workings oF international capital markers. Seers and Spiritualists carne to use the printing press, while the protagonist of organized labor kept bank balances and wpdated ther mints and memoranda ike the ‘eat corporations, This book therefore rejects the view that any pe of ‘contradiction exists between the study of the socal fragment or the diemn- Powered and the study f the bread processes which constructed modernity. Prosiem Tree: THE CONTINUING “RipDLE OF THE MODERN” leis now worth directly addeessing the issue of “the modern," a word which is ‘sed inthe tide ofthis book and inl the contemporary human sciences. Inthe 1950s and 19605, S.N. Eisenstadt!” and othersused theword todenotea clutch of global developments, which combined to create a step-change forward in Jhuman organization ancl experience which they called “modernity.” The changes they charted affected many different domains of human life, ‘These included the replacement of big, extended families with small nuclear families, 4 change which was often associated with urbsnization. They encompassed 10 industralization, che notion of individual political rights, and secularism, the supposed decline ofthe religious mentality In many wayetneir model built on the seminal work Max Weber, the German cociologiet, we ten 50 years earlier. ‘Weber himself slays had Karl Mars in mind, even though he emphasized the independent role ofidcologeal change in his theory, Consiquenly the chron ‘logy of Eisenstadt and other liberal writer ofthis period had a fot in commnon ‘ith that of Marxist writers. All of them tended to locate the origins of the ‘modem in the sixteenth century, bt sa the nineteenth century a its critical phase. All of them tended aso to privilege the West a the source of al global ‘change, the non-West as a ere recipient which woudl eventally “catch up." By the 1980s, the postwar “modernization theorists" had come under tack from a number of mutually hostile quarters. Deraographess became wary ofthe idea ofthe shift from the extended tothe nucle family. Economie historians began to doubt that fuenen evalution “nected” to have gone {rough a phase of industrialization. Sociologists invoked the Islamie revolt= tion in Iran in 1979, oF the onward march of evangelical Christianity in the USA, to challenge the iden of the triumph of secularism. After about 1980, scholars began 10 walk of “multiple modernities,” implying tht a Western -modemity might be quite dierent feom, say, a Senegalee or an Indonesian ‘one. In this of couts, they were arguing along similar lines to politicians and itelectusls in Germany, Russia, and China who, ever in the nineteenth century, argued for “modernity in our own way." Tn the fist decade of the tseenty-first century, the issue remains confused, The posimodernistphiloso- per Bruno Latour stated, "We were never modern,” pointing ta the resilience of sensibilities, emotions, and apprehensions of magi, which contradicted the idea that the bourgeois individual subject i yet dominant: Meanwhile; other social theorists, notably Eraest Geller!" Alan Macfadane,"” and’ David Landes, resolutely insisied on the eelity of the “riddle of the modem,” the onee-and-for-all step forward of mankind Tn the fist place, this book accepts the idea that an essential part of being ‘moder i thinking you are modern. Modernity san aspieation tobe “up with the times.” It was a proces of emulation and borvowing. I seems dificult 10 deny that between about 1780 and 1914, increasing numbers of people de- cided that they were medern, or that they were living ia a modstn world, wether they liked itor not. ‘The Scottish and French philosophers of the cighteenth century believed that @ good deal of all previeus human thought could safely be dumped. By the end ofthenineteenth centr, iconsoftechical modernization ~ the eae, the aeroplane, the telephone ~ were all around to

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