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Working Bibliography

Brandon Evans, English 1010, 9 April 2016


Is it constitutional to have the Government force corporate companies to give them
their customer's private information?
Customers, corporate companies, government
Hotz, Robert Lee. "Demanding the Ability to Snoop." Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, CA). Oct. 3
1993: A1+. SIRS Issues Researcher. Web. 22 Apr. 2016.

Questions that arose from reading this article: Back in 1993 the government
tried to have a backdoor in other phones. Why does this issue not stay dead?
Has the wiretap law changed and if so what is it now?
Summary: Back in 93 the government wanted a code that would give them
access to users data a code that no one else would have. A backdoor if you
will. Very familiar scenario. It goes on to talk about how this act would indeed
raise major constitutional questions, however the most in depth that it
goes into that subject is a few measly sentences: Federal laws are designed
to limit the government's ability to wiretap, not guarantee it, they say.
Where does the U.S. government get the right to understand everything
that is transmitted? asked Michel Kabay, director of education for the
National Computer Security Assn. in Carlisle, Pa. It goes on to say that the
government had proposed an idea where a base code would be implemented
into every major communication media that would give the government
access if they needed it and it would protect users and keep their data
private at the same time. They called it skipjack. And heres some beef to
chew on: Under U.S. law, any wiretap not sanctioned by a court order is a
felony. They introduce some other ideas and play devil's advocate saying
that others who have had access to this information have done some wrong
things, like selling it or using it to wrong others or kill them.
My take on this: I think it opens my eyes as to the fact that this debate has
been going on for YEARS now, for what it seems like to be since the dawn of
electronic communications. And the government, it seems, have been too
stubborn to give up this idea. I think I need to look into this wiretap law, and
Ill find some more information there, and get a better idea of things.
--Upon looking at the wiretap act, I have learned that it has been amended by
a few other acts (the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA, the USA
PATRIOT Act (which has been succeeded by the Freedom act), and the FISA Amendments Act) so
Im going to look for some sources on what those are about.

FISA: Has to do with international and foreign intelligence/ info gathering, not
what we need to know
Freedom act: Ends bulk collection of phone calls, and prohibits bulk collection
of call data. Essentially deals with bulk collection. So the meat and potatoes
must be in CALEA....
--"What Is CALEA (Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act)? Definition from WhatIs.com." SearchSecurity. Web. 22 Apr. 2016.
Questions: Could this be the end of the road on my search? Is this website
accurate of its brief explanation of what CALEA is?
Summary: This is the main successor to the Wiretap Act, as far as it has to do
with the subject at hand. It enables the government to intercept wire and
electronic communications and call identifying information under certain
circumstances, ESPECIALLY when its necessary to protect national security.
There are limitations involved that are intended to protect people from
unwanted intrusion as well, and the example given is that carriers are not
responsible for decrypting (or ensuring the governments ability to decrypt)
any communication encrypted by a subscriber, unless the carrier provides
the encryption method and has the knowledge necessary to decrypt the
signals. In addition, CALEA does not authorize law enforcement to require or
designate specific equipment specifications to be adopted by service
providers.
My Take: The way that everything is written out The only way that the
government has any right to ask apple to do what theyre asking is if they
believe that its truly a threat to national security. It even says that the
government cant force carriers to decrypt data, unless its provided by the
carrier themselves. And a double whammy is that the government cant tell
the service providers to adopt other equipment specifications. So from the
sounds of it everything thats going on is super fishy. Im going to find
another source to see if I can confirm my suspicions and then this will be a
case closed ladies and gents.
Masnick, Mike. "How Existing Wiretapping Laws Could Save Apple From FBI's
Broad Demands | Techdirt." Techdirt. 24 Feb. 2016. Web. 22 Apr. 2016.
Summary: The true meat and potatoes Ive been scouring the internet for,
this article explains CALEA in context of this entire debate. They bring up,
essentially, all the points that I did in my summary of the bill. The
Department of Justices excuse?

Put simply, CALEA is entirely inapplicable to the present dispute [because] Apple is not acting as a
telecommunications carrier, and the Order concerns access to stored data rather than real time
interceptions and call-identifying information

This article shoots that down pretty quickly with the help of Albert Gidari,
who is The Director of Privacy at Stanford Law School.
Rubin, Joel, Maura Dolan, and James Queally. "Apple Argues Federal Judge Overstepped Authority."
Los Angeles Times. 26 Feb. 2016: A.1. SIRS Issues Researcher. Web. 22 Apr. 2016.

Summary: This particular request from the government actually breaks the
first and fifth ammendments of the constitution, the first, because the
government is forcing Apple to write computer code (which is considered as
compelled speech which is banned under the first ammendment), and also
the fifth because it protects companies from being forced into the
governments service. It goes on to say that if this goes through, no doubt
the government will not have this be a one time thing but rather, the
government will go on to ask for large requests like this and expect the
people to comply, because of this one time that they got things done. It adds
a tidbit at the end which says that this is indeed not the only case the
government has as far as this calibur goes, but they have in fact made 13
other requests just like this.
Gillis, Tom. "Why the Government Shouldn't Mess With Encryption." Forbes.
Forbes Magazine, 9 Mar. 2016. Web. 25 Apr. 2016.
Summary: Tom Gillis goes over all the reasons why the governnment
shouldnt have a backdoor/Master key with any software. And theres a lot
of reasons. It puts almost everyone at risk, and a lot of companies as well.
His main point is the fact that privacy is simply a human right, that we all
deserve, and with the government being able to spy on anybody at anytime
isnt right and it isnt safe. Yeah, the attempt to help other people by opening
this other can of worms is a great, and nice gesture from the government,
but the fact is, that others will eventually learn to use the same back door
they are, and then there will be a counter attack on the government using
their own systems, and then its all over.
Baldwin, Roberto. "The Apple vs DoJ Encryption Battle Is Far from over."
Engadget.com. 29 Mar. 2016. Web. 27 Apr. 2016.
Summary: Roberto takes an interesting view on this topic, explaining that the
whole phone encryption thing is far from over. He goes into several points
such as, to what lengths will the government attempt to do this again? If
they just go behind peoples backs now (to accomplish their means) will
anything in the supposed future stop them? Other phones exist, and phones
will continue to exist so when will the debate end? And such other things
Roberto speaks of.