THE MATERIALIZATION OF MORALITY

A Response to Sam Harriss Scientific Basis for Ethics

Bethany Flanders
Dr. Swanson
PHL 480 Philosophy of Science
18 April 2016

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Bethany Flanders
Dr. Swanson
PHL 480 Philosophy of Science
18 April 2016
The Materialization of Morality:
A Response to Sam Harriss Scientific Basis for Ethics
INTRODUCTION
In the present era, there are few individuals who so bluntly represent the ever
expanding modern worldview which grounds nearly all perception and understanding of
reality in empirical science as well as Sam Harris, New York Times bestselling author,
speaker, philosopher, and neuroscientist. Rational, progressive, scientific, proreason, and morally logical -- these are words often used to describe Sam Harris and
other modern thinkers who deny any foundation for morality which is independent of
the realm of empirical science.
I have attempted to understand the journey human morality has undergone, and
I believe we have witnessed the materialization of not only humanitys moral nature, but
the very nature of man himself. Materialization can hold two fundamental definitions:
there is the disappearance of something, but there is also the meaning which equates to
the giving or assigning material form to something. I find that both of these definitions,
in fact, starkly diagnose the current condition of humanitys worldview of human nature
in relation to morality, and accurately depict the ramifications of Sam Harriss deeply
materialistic, and I would argue, inaccurate and inconsistent view of morality.

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BEGGING THE QUESTION, THE IS-OUGHT PROBLEM, AND WHY CARE?
The first time I discovered Sam Harris was through one of his Ted Talks on how
Science Can Answer Moral Questions (Harris, 2010). I found this topic to be one of his
areas of interest, which he has also addressed in several of his bestselling books such as
The Moral Landscape, and in many of his lectures at prominent universities and
seminars around the world.
When discussing the nature of Harriss position, it is important to note that
atheism, which he strongly defends, is recognized with its proper philosophical
categories which act as a description of the world. His position can be characterized as a
materialistic, naturalistic atheism. Materialism is the belief that there is only one thing
that existsa type of monism in a senseand that one thing is matter. Naturalism
asserts that all phenomena which occurs in reality can be fully explained without any
reference to supernatural causes and explanations. Atheism is most always correlated
with both of these beliefs.
In his Ted Talk, Harris begins by countering the popular belief that science can
never answer moral questions, or questions relating to human values and what
constitutes a good life. He proceeds by explaining how many believe science can allow us
to witness or see what we already value, but it cannot show us what we ought to value.
However, Harris claims that such a division between science and human morality is
illusory. Very quickly, it became clear the power Harris believes science to have in
relation to understanding morality.
Harris proceeded to describe how sentience, and consciousness of sentience, is
the factual basis for our moral concern over living beings.

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Values are a certain kind of fact. They are facts about the well-being of
conscious creatures. And there's no notion, no version of human morality and
human values that I've ever come across that is not at some point reducible to a
concern about conscious experience and its possible changes. (Harris, 2010).
Already, Harris has missed the point. He claims that morality can be defined as
reducible to a concern about conscious experience, as if the metaphysical,
epistemological, and existential questions regarding the existence of morality can be
satisfied by the recognition of this concept of concern. In response we are forced to
ask, why do we, as human beings, have concern for other beings? Of course, sentience
and consciousness are the factual biological and mental components of the
philosophical discussion regarding morality, but such components do not tell us what
we ought to value, or that we ought to value at all, as Harris argues they do. Such
components only tell us that pain can be caused, that a being of interest is conscious of
such pain, but never why we ought to spare someone pain or injustice or why we ought
to improve the lives of other conscious beings, or why a being of interest is of interest in
the first place. Yes, values are a certain kind of fact, but what makes them moral fact?
What makes universal moral values and concepts factual? Even further, why do values
exist in an amoral world of matter, chance, and purposeless determinism which Harriss
materialistic, naturalistic worldview is bound to? At what point do atoms care? To
identify what cares, who cares, and what or who is cared for doesnt come close to
identifying or solving the why question. Why do we have moral concerns at all in the
first place, or concerns about anything for that matter?
SENTIENCE AND VALUES AS FACT
Even more technically, we must admit that there is an inherent flaw in Harriss
particular view that sentience is factthat is, when we extrapolate sentience to other

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living beings beside ourselves. This dilemma is only problematic under a
presuppositional naturalistic, materialistic worldview. I fully admit, loosely speaking, it
is natural for us to believe that all living beings in fact do share, to different extents,
modes of sentience, and I would agree that they do. But why do we naturally hold this
position as fact? Harris would answer, because of the evidence of pain and suffering, or
conversely pleasure. But how is this recognizable to us, and how is this incoming data
converted from amoral neurochemical impulses to a triggering of moral concern?
Logically, we must accept the notion that there exists a uniformity to nature not only
through time, but also across living things in various forms and degrees in order to allow
this evidence to speak to us, if you will. But how is this explained under a naturalistic
worldview where there is no real foundation to trust the consistency of the laws of
nature?
Within the philosophy of naturalism, there is no foundation for accepting the
uniformity of nature. This precisely relates to the problem of induction, which in a very
real sense is crucial for our ability to have the authority to assert our recognition of
sentience in other beings, not to mention the moral importance this recognition has.
Again, sentience is something Harris argues is vital to our moral reasoning. Thus, if we
are to hold the position that we can indeed trust the uniformity of nature both across
beings and through time, such a task can never be accomplished under a naturalistic
philosophy. How can we even begin to discuss morality if we do not have a solution to
this dilemma? It cannot be achieved with any presuppositional materialistic account of
reality.

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THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM: REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM
What is morality for a materialist or naturalist? For an atheist? For a person who
rejects the concept of free will and is bound to a deterministic philosophy? This is also to
ask, what is morality for Sam Harris? Taken from his book, Free Will, Harris discusses
the ramifications of his purely scientific worldview and claims:
This [neuroscientific] understanding reveals you to be a biochemical puppet
[our thoughts and intentions] emerge from background causes of which we are
unaware and over which we exert no conscious control." (Harris, 2012).
Undoubtedly, the ramification of a purely naturalistic worldview on human freedom is
indeed determinism. If we are to be consistent with naturalism, the idea that all of
existence and being can be explained through a purely materialistic account and the
laws of nature, we must admit that there is no essence of the human being, such as a
soul, which can rise above the biochemical reactions and neural impulses of our material
bodies. This is consistent with materialism.
As an aside, it is important to note that of course, Harris would argue that
believing in the existence of the soul is entirely scientifically unverifiable, which is
certainly true. I would argue, however, that relying on a scientific explanation for such
matters is entirely reductionistic and misapplied. Even those so fervently bound to their
view of scientism cannot reason without being inconsistent with that very belief. Are
laws of logic scientifically detectable? Laws of nature? Mathematics? Certainly not, but
we do not doubt their existence. Why is that? It is because we can only ever make sense
of reality by positing their existence. Even those supposedly bound to materialistic
philosophies violate their own worldview when they believe in and utilize laws of logic
and laws of nature on a daily basis. In this same way, I argue, we begin to make sense of
human freedom only when we admit that in order to rise above the chains of

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determinism, which is inherently necessary to even make an argument for or against
determinism, we must be more than mere matter.
Now, this is not to say that all atheists are naturalistic, materialistic, soul-denying
determinists. Certainly not. Many atheists are just the opposite, and are deeply moralminded individuals. Rather, it is to say that to be logically consistent with atheism,
there is no room for anything other than naturalism, materialism, and determinism
which are philosophically incompatible with the existence of morality.
But if this is truly the case, if naturalism is true, then man is not a moral agent
and morality does not ultimately exist. Only an illusion of morality exists. Just as your
beliefs and actions would ultimately be determined by biochemistry, so too would your
morality and your consequent actions which would be based on your moral framework.
These very words I am communicating would be determined not by will, but by
biochemistry, rendering truth neither relevant or irrelevant- simply arelevent. True by
chance- possibly, false by chance- possibly, but never true by conscious rational thought
and identification.
Consequently, in an attempt to disprove the existence of free will, and promote
his own idea of morality, Harris inevitably pulled the rug out from underneath himself
by destroying the basis for his own argument: freedom of thought through reason. If
Harriss own argument was indeed true, we would never truly know it. The very
definition of knowledge would be meaningless without human freedom. The realm of
epistemology, and nearly all human pursuit would be entirely meaningless if we have no
real cognition of truth and falsity, and the freedom to believe one over the other.
Argumentation would never be recognizably coherent or consistent with reality in any
significant way because atoms alone, no matter how theyre arranged, are not

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normatively held accountable to adhere to laws of logic and rationality, only to
deterministic laws of chemistry. Harris would not have chosen his own argument and
position, chemistry would have determined it. You would not have chosen your response
to Harriss claims, chemistry would have. If atoms cannot search for truth, what is? You
see, in order to argue that determinism is true, one must utilize free will for the
argument to hold any meaning or relevancy to truth whatsoever. And if free will does
not exist, this discussion means nothing. In fact, my claim that the discussion means
nothing would also mean nothingand so on. Reductio ad absurdum: in other words,
we see that the adoption of determinism inevitably leads to a reduction to absurdity.
WHAT IS GOOD VS. WHAT IS RIGHT
An overarching problem present in Sam Harriss scientific basis for morality is
the equivocation between the good and the right. Harris believes that what is
morally right is determined by what brings about the least suffering to an individual or
group of individuals. This is very much a utilitarian approach, ever-changing in relation
to our evolutionarily derived values, he claims. However, if this is the case, if what is
good for an individual is always equivalent to what is right, how can we explain
decisions of self-sacrifice in order to save the life of another being? Surely, the individual
risking his or her life to save another is not committing an act which is good for his or
her own physical or mental flourishing, and will most certainly undergo much pain and
suffering for this purpose. Therefore, because in this case what is good for one
individual is not equivalent to what is good for another, it does not logically follow under
Harriss conditions that this decision would be morally right. Yet, most of us would
conclude that not only is it morally right, it is even heroic. In spite of risking one life
for another, in spite of the pain and suffering brought on willingly by the individual

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saving the person in danger, the act is actually right. And we see this in our world,
some of the most horrific amounts of suffering by many even to save the lives of a few
are viewed as being morally right. This is the inherent problem with naturalistic,
materialistic utilitarian approaches: even if you can empirically identify pain and
suffering, without universal moral laws, you can never establish such pain and suffering
to be right or wrong, only painful or pleasurable. While what is good for an individual is
subjective to that individual, we are inclined to believe that what is right rises above
subjective goodness. There lies a deep rooted need as human beings to believe that, for
example, the evils of ISIS are not a matter of subjective moral differences, they are truly
and ultimately wrong. This need for moral absolutes cannot be explained under a
materialistic account of morality.
CONCLUSION
When taken to its logical conclusion and adopted consistently, a materialistic
worldview carries with it significant and profound consequences for morality. We
witness the disappearance of the human self and the rejection of objective moral laws.
We see the denial of the human will and the disappearance of moral accountability
under a deterministic escape hatch. On the other hand, if the existence of moral
absolutes is accepted, and if a belief in the human soul is restored, it can never be
logically carried out under a materialistic, naturalistic worldview. It is my hope that we
understand the role scientific naturalism plays in our entire philosophical and moral
framework, and that we realize the ramifications of taking this reductionist approach in
life. As my favorite philosopher has illustrated:
One of the great temptations to intellectuals is to assume that in grabbing the
finger of their own discipline they have grabbed the fist of reality.
-Ravi Zacharias

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Works Cited
Harris, Sam. Free will. Simon and Schuster, 2012.
Harris, Sam. "Science Can Answer Moral Questions." TED. Feb. 2010. Web. 18 Apr.
2016.
Harris, Sam. The moral landscape: How science can determine human values. Simon
and Schuster, 2011.
Zacharias, Ravi. Deliver us from evil. Thomas Nelson Inc, 1998.