Short Duration Patrolling by the Chinese Bandits Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav in January 1966 ... RANGER Jerry Conners, Chinese Bandit 13.
Upon completion of our first Cambodia border combat action, the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav, 1st Airborne Brigade was rotated to the AnKhe perimeter defensive positions that were still under construction in January 1966. The Chinese Bandits were ordered to conduct reconnaissance patrols and establish ambush positions where the 1st and 2d Scout Squads were des
Short Duration Patrolling by the Chinese Bandits Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav in January 1966 ... RANGER Jerry Conners, Chinese Bandit 13.
Upon completion of our first Cambodia border combat action, the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav, 1st Airborne Brigade was rotated to the AnKhe perimeter defensive positions that were still under construction in January 1966. The Chinese Bandits were ordered to conduct reconnaissance patrols and establish ambush positions where the 1st and 2d Scout Squads were des
Short Duration Patrolling by the Chinese Bandits Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav in January 1966 ... RANGER Jerry Conners, Chinese Bandit 13.
Upon completion of our first Cambodia border combat action, the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav, 1st Airborne Brigade was rotated to the AnKhe perimeter defensive positions that were still under construction in January 1966. The Chinese Bandits were ordered to conduct reconnaissance patrols and establish ambush positions where the 1st and 2d Scout Squads were des
Short Duration Patrolling by the Chinese Bandits Recon Ist Bn (ABN) 8th Cay in January
1966...RANGER SGT Jerry Conners, Chinese Bandit 13.
Upon completion of our first Cambodia border combat action, the Ist Bn (ABN) 8th Cav, Ist
Airborne Brigade was rotated to the AnKhe perimeter defensive positions that were still under
construction in January 1966, The Chinese Bandits were ordered to conduct reconnaissance patrols
and establish ambush positions where the Ist and 2d Scout Squads were designated areas of
operations which where suspected NVA approach routes to Hong Kong Mountain located near
AnKhe; and the 3d Scout Squad (Chinese Bandit 13) was selected for various reconnaissance
patrolling duties at various scattered areas to the northwest and southwest where enemy movement
had been recently detected. The majority of the scout squad patrols were intended to be completed
in three days and involved day and night movement and the selection of one ambush position that
was to be determined by the scout squad leader and based on detected or suspected enemy use of
the area,
‘The patrols conducted by the Chinese Bandit 13 scout squad required one day of planning and
preparation and were executed in three or four days, followed by a one or two day opportunity to
visit the "sights of AnKhe', Although the patrols were under the direct control of the scout squad
leader, various squad members were designated as the patrol leader and all scouts were rotated
into positions that provided them training to sharpen their field leadership skills in navigation,
‘communications and general patrolling skills, The designated patrol leader was required to
organize and conduct the warning and operations orders, rehearsals, and ALL execution phases of
the patrol and prepare the final debriefing. Frank Spickler, Carlos Hatcher, Frank Cunningham,
Louis Tyler and Raymond Carley displayed the most interest in the opportunity to being assigned
the patrol leader duties and normally lead the patrols, the actual 3d Scout Squad Leader, Sergeant
Jerry Conners, accompanied them. The operations were conducted with the leadership roles
performed in the same manner as students attending the 101st Recondo and Ranger schools.
jpating in the navigation team was of interest to all members and Sergeant Conners spent the
majority of his time working with those chosen to determine the route, construct the terrain table,
and perform the point team navigation role during the patrols, We had used this training method
before the war to prepare their scouts for the 101st Recondo and Ranger schools where they were
expected to be the honor graduates of their class and return with the Recondo guidon and Ranger
honor graduate plaque. The skill improvements were essential and the confidence and morale of the
Chinese Bandit 34 Scout Squad improved significantly during this period.
Our last in-country parachute training, proficiency pay jumps, were conducted a month earlier in
late December; however other air assault training was performed during the period before and
after the patrols. The Chinese Bandits provided the instructors for assault rappelling refresher
training for the Ist Airborne Brigade, Carlos Hatcher had the most interest in helicopter operations
and was responsible for maintaining the helicopter rappelling equipment, including wire rope,
clamps, anchor rings, 20001b tensile snap links and 3000+ Ib tensile strength green rope (and
sections cut into Swiss seats) and a roll of white “glacier’ rope having a lesser stretch factor. The
‘equipment was stored in one of our conex containers near our Jumping Mustangs LZ located
downhill from our tents at AnKhe. Hatcher was an 11th Air Assault trained and designatedrappelling jumpmaster and rigged the two UH-Is that we used to conduct refresher training; and
performed the jumpmaster duties on one of the helicopters during the actual rappelling. The 227th
Aviation Battalion regularly provided helicopter support and the crews were experienced in day
and night helicopter rappelling. Their helicopters would begin to overheat after about thirty
minutes and required ‘dropping the ropes and going for a cooling run’. Although not an aviator but
having established an excellent working relationship with the flight crews while in the 11th Air
Assault, Hatcher was occasionally allowed to sit in the co-pilots seat during these short low level
flights and permitted to fly the helicopter. The flights lasted only ten minutes but were the highli
of Hatcher's involvement in the training, He was scheduled to attend the Army's flight school and
took every opportunity to volunteer in our pathfinder and other air assault duties but was killed at
Bon Song a month later. He normally served as our rear security man and fought at the right
of the scout squad leader when engaged with the enemy and had done so since December 27, 1965
when the Chinese Bandits were fired upon during an air assault near Pleiku. As the last man in
movement, the assault formation was confirmation that all men were on line and
could provide an explanation when they were not. He could perform any scout duty well but was
indispensable in many. He, Raymond Carley and Frank Spickler (ex-11th Air Assault Recon)
designed and ordered the Chinese Bandit Sudden Death cobra pocket patches and "calling cards".
Neither Hatcher or Carley lived to see them nor the seroll pateh designed later by Combat Jones;
however, visiting members of the Chinese Bandits place the patches on their graves.
Louis Tyler was the lead point team scout during this period. He had an eye for anything unusual
along the route and did not hesitate to evaluate anything that alarmed him, He had a developed
interest in topographic maps and aerial photographs, as did all Chinese Bandit 13 scouts, and took
responsibility for locating the enemy and moving quickly along our route. When I hear the words to
ink of him, Then SSG Robert
Grimes, our platoon leader and platoon sergeant at the time, selected him as a member of the
Chinese Bandit LRRP Team that conducted the 75 km operation along the northern border of
Cambodia in the spring of 1966. He was the lead scout on much of that operation but medivaced
when he became unconscious and his fever was dangerously elevated. We spent many hours
together prior to the three and four-day patrols performing the topographic map spider drills and
creating practice trail sketches to sharpen our tracking skills. Tyler had an unusual interest in
everything. We have been unable to locate him or his family, but continue to try.
the later released rock and roll song "Run through the Jungle", I
Frank Spiekler, the 3d Scout Squad Team leader, and second in command was courageous without
a fault, He attempted fo master everything related to conducting day and night long range
patrolling and combat engagements. His position required that he more frequently serve as the
patrol leader and did so. His training was something that he chose but focused on navigation and
‘communications, including fire and aerial support coordinations and the training of the other
Chinese Bandits. During this period I began to have confidence in hit
Chinese Bandit 13 would perform as well with or without me, Frank never lost his abi
and perform in the most dangerous situations, he simply gritted his teeth and put “getting the job
done’ first. The fact that he survived the Vietnam war was not something that I expected. During
any engagement Spickler would maneuver himself to get into the best position to assist the men and.
our efforts to control any situation had an imaginary line that only he and I could see and we bothoperated on our side of that line. This arrangement worked and we both discussed our roles if one
of us had been killed and the adjustment in the chain of command that would have been necessary.
We practiced this combat change of command during several drills preparing for the patrols. No
‘one had any doubt that Frank would take command when it became time to do so and his
standards for performance would be as high and probably higher than mine. At times it was
difficult to harness his energy but never an unpleasant experience, only a strong pressure felt on the
reins during enemy contaet, Frank would later spend many months in a hospital and almost die
from a chest wound while serving as an airborne platoon sergeant in the 101st Airborne Di
ision,
‘Terry Stevens was the Chinese Bandit 13 radio operator, somewhat reluctantly at first since he
wanted to carry the M60 machine gun that was carried when the weapon was necessary. He carried
the PRC- 25 and the field expedient vertical half rhombic in addition to his short and long antennas
and the SOI tethered about his neck and was developing the ability to know n to six digi
coordinates at all times, He was able to accomplish this eat during this period where we were
conducting the patrols from our base at AnKhe. He would perform a map check at each ridgeline
and mid-valley crossing and then visualize his position on the map between. He also memorized the
pre-arranged fire and other critical check point names and locations and could eall a fire mission
without consulting his map, or at least initiate the call and adjust as necessary. The advantage of his
ability to do so was appreciated by all Chinese Bandits and something that is a pleasure to
remember. Stevens' willingness and preference to serve as the Chinese Bandit 13 RTO occurred
only when it was apparent that he was a FO first and RTO second. I rarely actually used the radio,
and relied him to perform all routine radio transmissions and only did when he thought I might
have something to offer or believed that something was to be gained by my personally
ing. He prepared every situation report and I only confirmed the grid coordinate
locations after Stevens and another scout had completed a confirmation check. I do not recall him
‘ever making a mistake. Although our internal SOPs required my checking all coded messages, I
rarely did so and relied totally on Stevens and another scout to insure that no errors were made.
Stevens was also selected for the Chinese Bandit LRRP Team and his role as an RTO was expanded
since he was often not in direct contact with either SSG Grimes or myself. His command and
control responsibilities required an expertise and level of initiative that was necessary since
separation between LRRP team members was normally deemed essential. He performed these
duties without any problems occurring, The PRC-25 did not provide the long distance capabili
needed during these short duration patrols; however the Division had aviations assets and relay
‘equipment that were used to support our hourly situation reporting requirements. The inherent
danger of not operating with continuous uninterrupted communication capabilities and unable to
request supporting fires and other support was apparent to all. We were provided emergency
frequencies for contact with other friendly forces, however no direct coordinations were or
rehearsed with such units. Operating without established and continuous communications
-s Was an error that was not rectified for two months, Stevens continued to sharpen his
RTO and FO skills during this early combat period and several months later I recall our running
towards each other while he was initiating a call for fire and only having to say "SHIFT RIGHT
and FIRE FOR EFFECT". Stevens was largely responsible for our being deadly on the battlefield.
‘communie:
We have been unable to locate Stevens either. Duke Barrett of the Chinese Bandit 2d Scout Squadsaid several years ago, "your Chinese Bandit 13 scouts came home and disappeared back into the
mountains where they came from.” That may not be true for those scouts that had been born and
raised in cities, but it may apply to Terry Stevens, eI Ith Air Assault Recon,
Frank Cunningham had been assigned to the Chinese Bandits while we were conducting the first
Cambodia border operations in early January. He had volunteered for a levy from his V Corps
LRRP unit while assigned to Germany. Cunningham required little training and only an
adjustment fo our procedures and the terrain, He quickly demonstrated his superior scouting skills
and assisted in training the other Chinese Bandits in map reading and navigation and specifically
route selection. Cunningham trained and demonstrated his excellent abilities as the designated
patrol leader and in January it was understood that if Frank Spickler or I would go down then
Cunningham would move into our leadership position. He preferred point but was later to assume
the rear security role when Hatcher was killed. Cunningham was an obvious candidate for the firs
LRRP team operation along the Cambodia border but was not selected to insure the leadership of
Chinese Bandit 13 in the event of my death. Frank Spickler was likewise prevented from
participating in our first 12 day LRRP operation, but both men would participate in the second
LRRP operation along the border of Laos where we participated in an evaluation of the NVA's
radio communications capabilities. Cunningham's skill and determination to perform long-range
reconnaissance operations greatly influenced Chinese Bandit 13 being selected to perform such
roles, His demeanor was and remains that of a genuine explorer and scout and the photograph of
his Chinese Bandits aboard the UF-I prior to an air assault captures the spirit of Larry Thorne
and Robert Rogers and the Chinese Bandits, He is a reincarnation of Kit Carson,
Glen Winnescheck, a proud Wisconsin Winnebago and at my side earlier in the year when I had
made an error resulting in the Chinese Bandits being exposed to enemy fire and were forced to
attack and maneuver from a poor position. I was only able to yell, “enemy to front, ATTACK’
Winnescheck came flying out of somewhere behind me and into his assigned fighting pos
left. The next few seconds occurred without firing our weapons but low erawling and diving to get
into a more favorable and dominating position and although the Chinese Bandits were online and
advaneing at most times Winnescheck remained ahead of me maneuvering himself which shielded
me to some degree. I was to ask him later if he had done this to protect me from fire. He did not
answer and I had to say, "You will answer and I want the truth.” He stared defiantly back and
answered quietly "Yes." I did not have to ask him why and the memory of him awakens strong
‘emotions, Of all the Chinese Bandits, I was the closest to Winnescheek. He is dead now, buried on
the Reservation and we need to visit his grave when the tribe has a ceremony honoring him. It is
not uncommon for fighting men to risk their lives for another, but it is unusual to be a man who has
had the honor of one doing so for them, In January, I assumed many of us would die and that
Winnescheck would do so at my side. Winnescheck fought on quietly during his tour with intense
effort and commitment to the Chinese Bandits and our objective to help the Vietnamese and was of
course wounded but survived the war. I regret going home and leaving him in-country alone but
with other the Chinese Bandits. At the time we believed that we were freeing the oppressed and
Winnescheck was committed proudly to that goal. He conducted himself honorably and was a
gracious and courageous defender of the poor and disadvantaged. He served as a senior scout but it
was understood that when our roles became more combat then reconnaissance he would be
ion on myinstrumental in overcoming the NVA opposition. He was a scout second and a warrior FIRST.
Big and Little Hall, one in red beret and the other always in the designated patrol uniform, both
men rotated on point and mastered map reading and navigating. They performed point duties
always as a team and were wounded early but were instrumental in developing the Chinese Bandits
patrolling techniques and protocols during the January three and four-day patrolling period.
Malaria brought down all of us from time to time and some more than others. Punji sticks took a
toll on the point teams more than those performing other patrol duties and the Halls suffered from
both experiences and Chinese Bandit 13 did not perform as well when they were absent, On one
occasion while we were patrolling in the mountains near the border, Big Halls’ confidence had
peaked and with morale soaring donned his red beret and proceeded down a tall grassy tr:
following old tracks into the valley. We were spread long distances apart but when I came out of the
trees and looked down the grassy slope ahead, I saw a prominent red item moving near the base of
the hill. I ran down the trail {o catch up with my point team and passed Little Hall to confront Big
Hall, We linked up in an area that was coved in triple canopy jungle and along the trail heading
towards the border of Cambodia. He had his rifle in the “ranger carry' position and was moving at
a brisk walk. The tracks were still aged and there was no indication of the enemy, and he was
determined to close the distance between the NVA and us, He heard me approaching when I was 20
meters behind him and turned grinning. I was wearing my snake eyes expression and he stopped.
smiling and waited for me, "Do you honestly think that red hat can’t be seen?" I asked. "Do you
want me to take it off and not wear it?” He responded. " No I want you to answer my question." It
took him a few seconds to answer, "There are no NVA here and it will take us at least another half
day to locate them." "Are you referring to their location on the aerial photos we were given," I
replied. "Yes, but there are also no fresh tracks or other signs," he stated with conviction. I
responded "You ain't that good to make that call yet. Don't wear the hat when it can be seen from a
distance." And then, "Am I correct?" I asked. He replied, "Yes," immediately. Hall removed the
hat and put it in his butt pack, Later it was demonstrated on many occasions that I was wrong. His
knowledge was excellent and judgment regarding where the enemy were and were not was
outstanding and he was permitted to wear the red beret whenever he believed it was appropriate to
do so. The last time I saw him wearing it was not on patrol, although he did so, but in Sin City at
the bar. Little Hall had some type of brown beret. The berets had been bought or traded from some
South Vietnamese troops. Neither of the Halls, both men wounded during the same operation, has
been located since their evacuation.
Other Chinese Bandits arrived later as replacements and the original eight man seout squad
reached an assigned strength of twenty-three men but could rarely field nine men with individuals
hospitalized for wounds and disease and authorized R & R. These new men were absorbed, trained
and performed heroically and excellently.
Several of the patrols that we conducted in January 1966, have special significance but share a
threshold of common experiences. The planning and preparation, air assault, day and night
movements searching for the NVA, ambush selection and occupation, searching for the NVA wi
moving towards the pickup zones, extraction and debriefing phases were similar but the variati
in the terrain and enemy situation provided the variables that kept the patrolling interesting andchallenging.
All air assaults involved at least thirty minutes of flight time from our base at AnKhe and often
provided by the same flight crews assigned to the 227th Aviation Battalion. The routes were never
conducted directly to the insertion landing zones but varied for obvious reasons. The patrol areas in
January were located at distances where artillery support was unavailable and encompassed the
valleys and hills immediately east of the northern Cambodia and southern Laos borders.
‘st of these three and four-day patrols was to be performed west of AnKhe in a long valley,
which was not believed to be occupied or used by the NVA and only small Viet Cong units, were
believed to be operating in the area, I selected Frank Spickler as the ‘informal’ patrol leader and
assisted him with the warning and operations order while Louis Tyler and Frank Cunningham
worked with Raymond Carley on point team skills including map reading with emphasis placed on
performing his * exercise and creation of the terrain table, Carley had been designated
the assigned M60 gunner in part due to his persistent request to carry the machinegun and another
scout was temporarily designated to carry the M60 on the patrol. The area of operation provided
the opportunity to make use of the machine gun and Spickler had chosen to use the weapon despite
my "vote! not £0 do so,
‘Two UH-4s arrived at 0600 on the Mustang LZ located near our tents at AnKhe and the erews shut
down their engines and secured their aircraft. | accompanied Spickler when he briefed the flight
crews and discussed details related to our flight route, altitude, checkpoints, and actions
approaching and on the landing zone where we would be inserted. The flight would take
approximately 30 minutes.
With our patrol caps tucked into our shirts, we loaded aboard the helicopters thirty minutes later
and began the flight to the insertion point. Spickler knelt behind and between the pilot and copilot
seats and wore a flight helmet connected to the aircraft's communication system, I set in the seat
nearest the pilot and observed Spickler call off each checkpoint while enroute and confirmed the
release point ahead before removing the flight helmet as we approached the landing zone. Spickler
‘gave the signal and we moved to sit on the edge of the floor with our feet on the landing struts of the
helicopter. With the other helicopter to our rear, the pilot flared the helicopter and we exited onto
the dry short grass field and ran towards the near tree line that marked the edge of the western hill,
The helicopters would return to AnKhe by another route and made no fake insertions. The
procedure was deemed too dangerous for the flight crews and provided marginal benefits to
minimizing our insertion being detected. We believed that any insertion would be investigated and
that is was important that we quickly move long distances away from any landing zone and thereby
increase the degree of difficulty in being followed and detected.
1¢ Chinese Bandits from both helicopters assembled on the run and transitioned into a file
formation with Carley at the lead. Tyler and Cunningham followed a short distance behind him.
Carley lead the patrol northward along a trail towards the first checkpoint where we would
conduct our first “laydog’. He, Tyler and Cunningham occasionally stopped to exam the trail thatwas dry and did not contain tracks of any kind, No member of the patrol conducted pace counts
and was expected (o "remain on the map’ at all times with minimal map checks of the topographic
maps that had been issued to each man, We moved at a 4 kilometer per hour pace and arrived at
the laydog site in hour. The route along the valley consisted of gently rolling terrain with dense
small, less than 25-foot tall trees and tall shrubs and became more dense and damp as we advanced
northward, We occupied the site forming a 100-meter diameter circular perimeter after circling
back along the trail. The scouts moved into the previously designated positions that had been
identified from aerial photographs and all persons began the process to adjust to the sights, sounds
and smells of the area. We did not anticipate enemy activity but understood the importance of
optimizing our perception skills quickly and after only fifteen minutes of the last man occupying the
, the Chinese Bandits patrol began its file movement towards the next checkpoint.
Spickler and Terry Stevens would link up and discuss prearranged fire targets and emergency
rendezvous points Spickler and I assisted Stevens in his efforts to stay on the map within six digit
coordinates using only infrequent map checks. Tyler and Cunningham were making similar efforts
with Carley. We slowed our movement to about 2 km per hour without encountering any enemy or
\digenous persons and stopped at predetermined locations where we “lay dogged’ and observed
and persons were permitted to eat portions of the C- rations that were carried. Each man carried
only one C-ration meal per day and was permitted to carefully bury and conceal any cans,
Wrappers or other trash, We were easily able to advance northward for a distance of twenty-five
kilometers before sundown,
I made frequent trips to the rear and brainstormed rear security duties and methods with Carlos
Hatcher. I would take one of the Halls with me each time so that they would also benefit from the
wolved when occasionally lagging back behind a greater distance in an effort to
determine if we were being followed. During my movements along the patrol file I would normally
carry my map out and had each individual point out our location using a small twig. Most of the
Chinese Bandits were still struggling with terrain association at this time and their navigation skills
were a major factor in their selection for participation on more difficult and dangerous missions.
Earlier patrols conducted in late November and December had identified those individuals who
‘were not committed to the mastery of navigation and other the skills required and they had been
transferred to other units, ‘Remaining on the map' was approaching a “do or die’ standard in
Chinese Bandit 13 and each of the remaining men demonstrated continued improvement.
As darkness fell, the scouts moved closer together attempting to maintain visual contact with the
man ahead. This was accomplished only sporadically, since the trail that we were following
meandered through the tall trees and prevented continuous visual contact unless persons were to
maintain a distance of less than twenty feet. On this early patrol we had planned to maintain a
minimum distance between scouts of 50 meters that required adjusting as a scout was detected at
lesser distances.
As planned, I joined the point team at ECT and assisted the point team in their navigation and
tracking duties. We discussed many things during the next few hours, including the origin of any
ghting, sound or smell and stopped frequently to examine the trail surface for any evidence ofusage. Carley had not master map reading and land navigation at this stage and we stopped many
times in the night to have ‘class’. The Chinese Bandits’ rifle slings had been removed and members
typically went down on one knee when stopping or leaned against a tree and selected halt positions
that provided some advantage that could be either a creature comfort or afforded some tactical
advantage.
We maintained our 50% awaken and alert policy at each laydog position and each scout was
afforded the opportunity to sleep three hours during the first twenty-four hours of the patrol. Sleep
eyeles required the use of two men groupings during halts both during the day and night. Although
1 regularly ‘walked the line’ to insure everyone was ‘accounted for' the standard for mainta
contact, knowing when to sleep and remained
teamwork needed to operate in this manner until late February. A counter-snoring program was
enacted early and before December 1965; however, it took some time to solve the problem that was
often specific to each individuals needs. In addition to 50% remaining alert, the two men grouping
when sleeping was permitted also required an individual to prevent his “ranger buddy' from
snoring. As we lost weight from our physical activity, minimal diet, and disease, persons that had
snored previously did not or at least rarely; however, we remained vigilant to prevent the sounds of
snoring or other noises being made by our sleeping comrades. Few persons talked in their sleep or
experienced nightmares. We did not carry or wear gloves and learned to aggressively place a hand
over the mouth and nose of others when necessary. I do not recall anyone sleepwalking but we
remained alert for that behavior also.
One of the earliest errors that occurred when we stopped during laydog or other halts was a person
urinating/defecating near their position, The smells dominated the odors in the area and prevented
persons from developing the smell perceptions needed and would have been easily detected by
anyone moving nearby. The Chinese Bandits had learned that urinating and defecating required
planning and that persons having diarrhea should not patrol on missions where stealth was
especially important,
An essential element at halts was the planning to do so after scouting trail interseetions in all
directions and then moving the entire patrol beyond that intersection where the rear security team
‘would then monitor in the manner that was appropriate. Many previously unidentified trail
intersections were discovered which required variation and flexibility to optimize our efforts to
locate the enemy and minimize the risk of our discovery.
We encountered many suitable ambush sites but having found no evidence of human occupation or
usage of the area, we continued northward to the planned trail intersection that turned westward
and up the hillside covered in taller and sparsely spaced trees. As the sky began to lighten we
approached the ridgeline having stopped many times to hold one-on-one navigation and tracking
classes with specific patrol individuals, Noise discipline was not maintained and the discussions
were not done quietly. I was confident of our assessment that the area was not occupied by enemy
forces and took the opportunity to TRAIN. When operating in more dangerous situations, the
Chinese Bandits remained in a training ‘mode’, including individuals performing pushups and sit-
ups on a frequent, often hourly basis; however, such physical training was discretionary butsomething that many of us believed important and necessary. Hatcher and [ often “pushed away the
mountains of Vietnam’ with our feet elevated upslope. I do not recall for certain if he could do more
than I but believe that he did so.
We performed the planned lay dog on the ridge line and I met with each Chinese Bandit t
that they had our position plotted on their maps and remember the planned route that we would be
taking during daylight and the tentative ambush site that would be occupied that night. Every
Chinese Bandit correetly identified the route, ambush site and other critical points. We had only
moved about six kilometers during the night and proceeded down hill along the trail reaching the
next checkpoint located in the valley floor before 6 AM. We had moved more than 35 kilometers
-e being inserted.
At the valley floor we intercept the trail running parallel to the hill ridgeline. The valley terrain and
vegetation was identical to that we had encountered the previous day and we advanced slowly
southward towards at a pace that was intended to allow our passing the planned ambush site in the
carly evening, Again, no signs of human occupation or usage of the trail was found; however, we
did not "go admin’ and remained vigilant and shifted into our maximized efforts to maintain noise
discipline while focusing on training the newly designated point team which consisted of the Halls,
yler and Cunningham remained with them while Carley resumed his duties carrying the M60
machine gun. I continued moving along the file working with each man, but walked with Carley for
long periods discussing our plans to get his navigation and tracking skills to the level that he sought.
Despite my direction and requests, many of the men had not abandoned their smoking habit and.
those individuals knew not to request that they be allowed fo smoke but often carried the issued
cigarettes with them hoping that conditions might permit them doing so. "Don't even think about
it," I would say to some of them as we met along the trail. Chewing was not permitted either and
spitting would have compounded the problem in our minimizing signs of our use of the trai
I doubled back often to examine the signs that we were making along the trail and discussed the
problem with Hatcher often, Each man avoided the trail when it was easily marked but this was
more difficult to determine during darkness and we did not have the skills that would later evolve.
Circling back at each planned halt and lay dog was always expected to reveal a talented enemy or
local hunter following us, but that never happened until the Crazy Horse operation five months
later and the cireumstances were different.
‘The Halls had advanced navigation and tracking skills and after rotating Carley, Tyler was
designated the patrol leader and Spickler moved rearward to assume his normal role in Chinese
Bandits 13. I spent the much of the day with Tyler assisting him when needed and discussing our
SOPs. He was very motivated and wanted to learn more. The need for a Ranger-Recondo school
was evident and we talked about him going to Ranger school when he rotated home. I believed that
he could have easily passed the course without attending either the 101st Recondo or 82nd Raider
courses, but recommended he do so if assigned to either unit which was the expected next
assignment for returning Chinese Bandits. I lost track of Tyler after the Chinese Bandit tour and
do not know what he did later. Frank Spickler did attend the 101st Recondo School when herotated but was shot in the chest on his second tour and his physical profile prevented
attending Ranger school or remain on jump status and he left the military.
1 did not intervene or coach anyone as the Chinese Bandit 13 patrol approached and passed the site
selected earlier as a tentative ambush site. The site was located at a T-intersection of trails. The
intersection did not reveal and signs of usage but Tyler made the decision that we would occupy the
te as planned and lead the patrol southward for several kilometers before reversing direction and
doubling back along side but not on the trail towards the T- intersection where the Chinese Bandits
would occupy and form an L-shaped ambush. Hatcher remained back with another scout in an
early warning role alongside the trail. He was not equipped with any radio equipment that would
allow communication with Tyler at the actual ambush site and the SOP at the time required that he
allow any personnel that numbered less than 10 persons pass without any action, If more than 10
persons were to pass, then he was expected to fire his M16 on full automatic at those following the
“first ten’ and immediately break contact and move rapidly to the designated rallying point that
was located about 1000 meters uphill from the trail. In the event Hatcher made the decision to open
fire, then all Chinese Bandits were required to immediately move towards the rally point and
abandon any trip flares or Claymore mines that were setup in the kill zone, The point men, on this
night, the Halls, were likewise occupying the other early warning position that was located uphil
along the trail and had the same SOP.
As the men occupied their ambush position under EENT light conditions, I moved towards the
Halls position and located them when they waved their patrol eaps with "ranger eyes' in my
direction, We talked quietly for an hour. None of the Chinese Bandits anticipated contact but
remained vigilant with the °50% awake' routine, We did not have starlight scopes and the heavier
infrared seopes and power source was only carried when we operating in open terrain where a long
shot could be made. However, Chinese Bandit 13 did carry two smaller infrared observation
devices capable of viewing objects to a range of about fifty meters. Each early warning team used
‘one IR device.
1 returned to the center of ambush site occupied by Tyler and Stevens and remained with them for
several hours and informed them that I would move to Hatcher's position before moving southward
further down the valley as I had planned earlier. Since we did not anticipate contact, I would move
by myself southward along the trail for several thousand meters and meet the patrol in the morning
at the designated checkpoint. In the event of an enemy engagement where weapons fire was
‘exchanged, then I would meet the patrol at the designated ambush rally point. I did not take this
action for practical reasons but scouting ‘out ahead’ was something that did have some merits and I
enjoyed doing so and attempting to find the NVA alone. Some of the Chinese Bandits were
permitted to also do th
We linked up in the morning as planned and I rotated Carley back on point and Spickler as the
patrol leader. The route we used crossed the valley where it narrowed and then northward along
the opposite side ofthe valley. We occupied another ambush that night without detecting any sign
of the enemy or indigenous personnel. Again, I left the patrol during the ambush and followed a
trail that led towards a small treed depression in the valley. At daybreak, I reached the edge of thetree line where I found a small paper pamphlet that read "Don't be cannon fodder for Johnson, go
followed the trail into and down the slope into the bottom of the sink hole where I
observed a pith helmet lying on the ground about 20 meters ahead. I turned and moved quickly
back along the trail and in daylight back towards the checkpoint where I would link up with the
patrol. I did discover human barefoot tracks that I had not noticed while moving in the darkness,
We were to be extracted from a clearing near the depression where I had located the pamphlet.
When we were assembled, I notified Tyler and the others of the discovery of tracks, pamphlets and
pith helmet and we discussed using the alternate LZ located further to south and near the route
that we had taken the previous day. Stevens who had been transmitting hourly status reports
during the daytime was instructed to send our extraction request using the alternate LZ in his next
report. We were to be extracted at 7 AM and moved several kilometers backward along the trail to
the LZ. and arrived about twenty minutes before the aireraft were scheduled to arrive. We secured
the LZ. and did not locate any evidence of enemy activity but remained vigilant of the possible
presence of enemy approaching from the direction where we had came and where the sightings
were discovered.
Two UHL-Is arrived as planned and we quickly boarded and made the return flight with each man
considering what would have occurred if we had extended the patrol and followed the tracks found
at the treed depression, Spickler again knelt between the pilots and ealled out the checkpoints along
the route. Hatcher was doing the same thing in the trailing aircraft.
After landing at the Mustang LZ. in AnKhe, the Chinese Bandit 13 patrol assembled at the pieni
table near the field mess and compared notes and assisted in preparing the debriefing report while
SSG Robert Grimes I discussed the pamphlet and other findings that were made only a few hours
ago. We all ate breakfast together and the men returned to the Chinese Bandit tents while Grimes
and I went to present the NATO format debriefing. The discoveries became the hot topic in the
briefing and steered the group away from the equally important problem of solving our radio
‘equipment limitations that would be only partially solved to any of our satisfaction two months
later when the first DOD/MACV directed LRRP operation was performed by the Chinese Bandit
LRRP team along the northern Cambodia border.
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