The Viet Cong

D445
Battalion
Their Story

(and the Battle of Long Tan)

Ernest Chamberlain - 2016

Nui Dat June 1969

Ernie Chamberlain a Vietnamese linguist, served in South Vietnam as an
intelligence officer from April 1969 to November 1970. He later taught the
Vietnamese language for two years at Point Cook, and was the Vietnam desk officer
in the Joint Intelligence Organisation from late 1972 until April 1975 visiting
Vietnam in mid-1974. Ernie Chamberlain later served as the Defence Attache in
Cambodia (1991-1993) and Head of the Australian Defence Staff in Indonesia
(1996-1998). Following retirement from the Australian Defence Force in 1998, he
served in East Timor for several years principally in United Nations appointments.
He has written several books on Timor. His earlier published works on the Vietnam
War include: D445 Battalion (2011); D440 Battalion (2013); and the 33rd NVA
Regiment (2014).

D445 Battalion S k etc h M ap : Battle of Long Tan

(18 A u gu st 1966 f or analysis, s ee footnote 275)

The Viet Cong

D445 Battalion

Their Story

(and the Battle of Long Tn)

Ernest Chamberlain 2016

Published in Australia in 2016 by Ernest Chamberlain, Point Lonsdale VIC 3225.

Copyright Ernest Chamberlain 2016

email - chamber@pipeline.com.au

This work is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of private study,
research, criticism or review as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be
reproduced by any process, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by
any means, electronic, mechanical photocopying or otherwise, without the prior written
permission of the author. Inquiries should be made to the author/publisher.
The author has also published:
The Struggle in Iliomar: Resistance in rural East Timor; Editions - 2003, 2004 and 2008
(ISBN 9780980562309).
Perjuangan di Iliomar: Perlawanan di Pedesaan di Timor-Leste, 2004 (ISBN 0-97503501-0).
Faltering Steps Independence Movements in East Timor in the 1950s and 1960s; 2005
(ISBN 0 97500350 2 9).
Faltering Steps: Independence Movements in East Timor 1940s to the early 1970s;
Editions 2007, 2008 and 2010 (ISBN 9780980562330).
Rebellion, Defeat and Exile: The 1959 Uprising in East Timor; Editions - 2007 and 2009
(ISBN 9780980562316).
Forgotten Men: Timorese in Special Operations during World War II, 2010
(ISBN 978-0-9805623-2-3).
The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story, 2011 (ISBN 978-0-9805623-4-7).
The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story, 2013 (ISBN 978-0-9805623-5-4).
The 33rd Regiment North Vietnamese Army: Their Story, 2014 (ISBN 978-0-97503505-4).
National Library of Australia : Cataloguing-in-Publication Entry
Chamberlain, Ernest, 1944
The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story and the Battle of Long Tan.
Bibliography; Index.
ISBN 978-0-9805623-4-7
Mat t n dan to giai ph ng mien nam Viet Nam.
Vietnam War, 1961-1975 History.
Vietnam War, 1961-1975 Participation , Australian.
Dewey number:

959.7043394

Every effort has been made by the publisher/author to contact holders of copyright to
obtain permission to reproduce copyright material. However, if any permissions have
been inadvertently overlooked, apologies are offered, and should the rightful party
contact the publisher, all due credit and necessary and reasonable arrangements will be
made at the earliest opportunity.

PREFACE
The Australian War Memorial has published a comprehensive three-volume
official history of the Australian Armys involvement in the Vietnam War.1 Separately,
each of the nine Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) infantry battalions that served in
Vietnam has produced histories of their tour or tours, of duty. Other units have also
published histories. This modest work on the Viet Congs 2 D445 Battalion3 - a battalion
on the other side, will hopefully complement those publications and the official
histories and also those of the Viet Cong D440 Battalion and the 33rd NVA Regiment.4
This work of some 348,200 words presents a translation and close examination of
The Heroic 445 Battalion : its History and Tradition (Tiu on 445 Anh Hng :
Lch S/Truyen Thng) ie the 445 Battalion History published in 2004.5 As near as
possible to a literal translation of the Vietnamese text has been attempted.
As comments on the text and to add context, a considerable number of
Translators Notes have been added as footnotes to the translation, creating an
exegesis. The original footnotes in the Vietnamese text (totaling 39) have been retained
ie translated, and are indicated with an asterisk eg 6 *.The large number of
Translators Notes include detailed references to enable interested readers to readily
access primary source material much of it now available via the Internet. Many of these
comments relate to intelligence material such as captured NVA/VC documents, and
also cite other Vietnamese and Australian histories that have somewhat different accounts

McNeill, I., To Long Tan The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950-1966, St Leonards, 1993;
McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, Crows Nest, 2003; and Ekins, A with McNeill, I., Fighting to the
Finish, Crows Nest, 2012. All were published by Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War
Memorial.
2
In this work, the Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) is referred to as the North Vietnamese Army
(NVA); and the Peoples Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF), guerrillas and infrastructure are termed the Viet
Cong (VC) as the general readership is more familiar with the terms NVA and VC. The term Vit
Cng is avoided in Vietnamese communist writings. The Vietnamese communists did not refer to
themselves as Vit Cng (Cng Sn Vit Nam - Vietnamese Communists) as this was a pejorative
term initiated and used by the Republic of Vietnam (RVN - ie South Vietnam), the US, and its Free
World allies.
3
NVA/VC formation and unit nomenclatures included prefix letters to designate size eg A for
section/squad; B platoon; C Company; D battalion; E regiment (also Q); F and CT
division; and T Military Region. B was also used as a prefix for some fronts eg B2, B3. K was
often used as a prefix designation for hospitals. Sometimes abbreviated to Min, COSVNs principal
cover designators were R, Nm Trng, and Chn Nam. U was a designator for provinces (eg: U1
and U3 were cover designators for the Bin Ha Province Unit. The B Ra Province Units designator was
U2, Bnh Dng Province was U4, Ty Ninh was U5, Long Khnh was U8, and Phc Thnh was U9).
4
See: Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2013; and
Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment - North Vietnamese Army: Their Story (and the Battle of Bnh Ba),
Point Lonsdale, 2014.
5
An exegesis a translation with a comprehensive commentary, of a 1991 edition was published as:
Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2011.

of events - including engagements with the Australian forces eg: the History of the 5th
Infantry Division (2005). 6
A series of 18 discrete annexes have also been included that cover a range of
aspects of probable interest. These include translated extracts from the 5th VC Division
History; the organisation of 445 Battalion in mid-1966 before the Battle of Long Tn; an
examination of the casualty figures for that Battle; outline biographies of nine key 445
Battalion cadre 7; and information on the Battalions Party organisation and activities
that also includes age and social data of the Battalions personnel in mid-1966. As the
275th VC Main Force Regiment was the principal VC element at the Battle of Long Tn,
an annex on the history and operations of that formation has also been included together
with an extract on the Battle of Long Tn from the Regiments mid-2015 History8, a
biography of the Regiments commander Nguyn Thi Bng, and appendices with the
personal details of 176 of the Regiments personnel killed at the Battle of Long Tn. The
work includes a comprehensive index with the names of over 400 NVA/VC personnel.
Many of the comments on the 445 Battalion History are based on an examination
of captured NVA and VC documents and the debriefings of prisoners and ralliers (ie
defectors). During the Vietnam War, this material was collated centrally by the Combined
Intelligence Center Vietnam (CIC-V) in Si Gn with the captured documents
processed by its Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC).9 A very large
quantity of CIC-V material is held by The Vietnam Center and Archive (VCAT) at the
Texas Tech University, Lubbock Texas, United States. Without access to the records
held by the VCAT, it would have been quite difficult to comment meaningfully on the
text of the 445 Battalion History. Accordingly, access to the records held by Texas Tech
University is gratefully acknowledged and noted in this work as VCAT material.
This account of the D445 Battalion History differs in several aspects from their
1991 version made available in English in 2011 (see footnote 5). This later 2004 edition
is less descriptive of military engagements than the 1991 version, and has less direct
speech. 10 Usefully however, it includes sketch maps not presented in the 1991 version
including of the Battle of Long Tn (18 August 1966) see the reverse of the front cover
and page 76. On that Battle see pages 71-80, the Vietnamese writers have quoted long
passages on the Battle of Long Tn from the work of the late British military academic
The 5th Division History relates that the Viet Cng forces at the Battle of Long Tn in August 1966 were
not fully prepared for the engagement against the Australian forces on 18 August 1966, see Annex K.
7
Almost all NVA/VC cadre, soldiers and infrastructure personnel had two-word nicknames/aliases/
pseudonyms (t, b danh). Invariably, these comprised a number (from 2 to 10) or occasionally t
(meaning youngest), followed by their given name. Party members sometimes also had a secure -name
ie an additional full Vietnamese name of three words.
8
H Sn i - Colonel (ed), Lch s Trung on Bo Binh 5 (1965-2015) - The History of the 5th ((275th ))
Infantry Regiment, Nh Xut Ban Quan oi Nha Da (The Peoples Armed Forces Publishing House), H
Noi, 2015 a Vietnamese-language copy was provided to the authro (Chamberlain) by Blair Tidey in late
September 2015.
9
At the Australian Task Force base in Ni t, captured documents were processed by the Detachment of
the 1st Divisional Intelligence Unit before on-forwarding to CDEC in Si Gn.
10
The Vietnamese text of this 2004 edition lacks professionally editing there are several errors of
Vietnamese grammar and spelling, chronology, and dates. Some sketch maps lack an accompanying text.
6

and author, Dr John Pimlott but not accurately. The Vietnamese text of this edition also
implies that the D445 commander at the Battle was V/V Quc Chanh (T Chnh) ie
not Bi Quang Chanh, which I consider highly unlikely.
All published Vietnamese histories and senior Vietnamese veterans describe the
Battle of Long Tn as a mobile ambush with the Australian forces having been
lured11 into the B ic Plantation in the Long Tn area. Some Australian writers
however have contended that the Viet Cong force had planned to attack the base of the 1st
Australian Task Force at Ni t, and that the Long Tn engagement was an encounter
battle that preempted such a planned attack on the base. These two views were examined
in the Australian Official History published in 1993, and the late Dr Ian McNeill
concluded that: Too much information is missing to make a conclusive assessment of the
enemy intentions and motives.12 The Vietnamese view of a planned ambush is
unchanged. On 18 December 2014, senior Vietnamese veterans in H Ch Minh City
published an updated official account of The Ambush Battle at Long Tn and an
English translation and commentary on that article is provided for readers interest at
Annex Q. Perhaps this 445 Battalion History and the examining comments offered, will
assist readers to reach a view on that aspect and others. A very brief description of the
Battle Long Tn by a D445 rallier is at Annex R.
As with the Battle of Bnh Ba (June 1969)13, the recent availability of some new
Australian and US SIGINT (signals intelligence) material on NVA/VC operations in
Phc Tuy Province has provided further insights into the Battle of Long Tn and this
is examined in Annex E, including Top Secret material declassified and released to the
author in February 2016.
While their 1991 D445 History concluded with victory in April 1975, this edition
reaches out to 2004 - and covers operations against the Saigon military remnants, postWar counter-revolutionaries, and the Battalions operations against the Khmer Rouge
forces in Cambodia. In their Preface to this edition, the Vietnamese writers acknowledge
that many documents were mislaid during the War and as it has not been possible to
gather sufficient witnesses, the book no doubt has been unable to avoid shortcomings.
445 Battalions strength varied considerably during the War. On its founding ie
as a battalion, its strength was reportedly 350-450, and it was at its strongest in January
1968 at 608 just before the Tt Mau Thn General Offensive. However, in January 1971
according to their 1991 History, the strength of a company was only about 20
riflemen. According to the Battalions 2004 History: Based on the reality of the
battlefield situation, at the beginning of September 1971, the Sub-Region decided to
disperse 445 Battalion, breaking it into three companies and allocating these as core
elements for our campaign in the two critical regions. In May 1972, the Sub-Region
11

The tactic is described in the Vietnamese accounts as luring the tiger from the mountain a Chinese
and Vietnamese saying (Vietnamese: Dn h/cp khi ni; Sino-Vietnamese: iu h ly sn; Chinese:

). See also footnote 270 in the main text and Annex R.

12
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.364. Recently, Dr Peter Edwards has similarly summarised
that: The debate continues to this day. Edwards, P., Australia and the Vietnam War, Australian War
Memorial/New South Publishing, Sydney, 2014, p.151.
13
Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment North Vietnamese Army: Their Story, op.cit, 2014.

Headquarters decided to re-concentrate 445 Battalion after almost a year of dispersed

operations. Annex C provides detail on 445 Battalions strength figures over-time.
The 445 Battalion History lists 539 martyrs. However that list only includes one
of its soldiers killed in action at the Battle of Long Tn - Trn Vn Chin, a company
commander (for a detailed examination of casualty figures for the Battle, see Annex F).
Another interesting aspect is that while the combat effectiveness of NVA/VC
forces was seriously hampered by high malarial rates, malaria is not mentioned at all in
the text of the 445 Battalion History. At Annex O, this aspect is examined in relation to
the 275th VC Regiment the major Viet Cong element at the Battle of Long Tn.
445 Battalion was formally deactivated in 2008. A memorial to the Battalion has
been mooted for several years. In July 2015, a Joint Province Committee determined that
the D445 Memorial would be built on a two hectare site in B RaTown adjacent to the
Province Administrative Offices and the Public Security Headquarters.
In November 2014, a 23-minute Vietnamese documentary film on the War in
Phc Tuy Province was released that featured D445 Battalion and the Battle of Long
Tn.14 An Australian feature-length film on the Battle at Long Tn titled Danger
Close, was planned for release in mid-2016 but its production is now uncertain.15
Annexes to the earlier exegesis of the D445 Battalion History (1991) published
in 2011, included translations and commentaries on several District and other local
histories. These together with additional material, will be re-published in 2016 as a
compendium - ie as: Phc Tuy: the Viet Cong District and Local Histories.16
For ready reference, a map of Phc Tuy Province is provided on the rear
cover; and the Vietnamese sketch map of the Battle of Long Tn has been included at the
reverse of the front cover. Vietnamese-language histories rarely, if ever, include an index.
However, as noted, an extensive index and a bibliography have been prepared and
included at the end of this English-language publication.

Ernie Chamberlain
March 2016

14

V Vn Cm - Director, Trng thnh t trong chin u - Coming-of-age during combat, B Ra Vng Tu Television, 4 November 2014 see the photographs at footnote 18 and at page 179.
15
Walsh, Martin (Producer)/Red Dune Films, Danger Close the Battle of Long Tan.
16
The History of the Revolutionary Struggle in Long t District (1986); The History of the Struggle
of t District (2006); The History of the Revolutionary Struggle of Chu c District (2004);
The Resistance War in Xuyn Mc (1989); The History of the Peoples Revolutionary Struggle in Tn
Thnh District (2014 ?); The Minh m Base (2006); Chu Thnh District Struggle and Development
(1988); The History of the Ha Long Village Party Chapter (25 April 2009).

L Chnh & Lu Thnh Lun (eds), Lch S Tiu an 445: on V Anh Hng Lc
Lng V Trang Nhn Dn 1965-2004 (The History of 445 Battalion: An Heroic Unit
of the Peoples Armed Forces 1965-2004),
Nh Xut ban Quan oi Nhn dn (Armed Forces Publishing House), H Noi, 2004.
(Phm Quang nh)

The Party Committee Military Headquarters

B Ra Vng Tu Province

The History of 445 Battalion:

An Heroic Unit of the Peoples Armed Forces
(1965-2004)
(internal distribution)

The Peoples Armed Forces Publishing House

Content Guidance (Ch o ni dung):

The Party Committee Province Military Headquarters
B Ra Vng Tu Province
Editors (Bin son):
L Chnh Lu Thnh Lun
with the assistance of Major General Nguyn Minh Ninh
and the war veterans of 445 Battalion.
Manuscript finalization (Hon chnh bn tho): Nguyn nh Thng.
Responsible for publishing: Phm Quang nh.

CONTENTS
Introduction
The Beginning
B Ra Vng Tu, The Land, The People, The Military Tradition
and the Layout of the Battlefield the Cradle of 445 Battalion.

1
3

PART 1
The Birth of 445 Battalion, Making an Important Contribution to the
Victory of the Anti-American Resistance War of National Salvation
on the B Ra Long Khanh Battlefield.
Chapter 1
Founding 445 Battalion, fighting while coming-of-age (1965-1968).

46

Chapter 2
445 Battalion in the period of opposing the strategy of the
Vietnamization of the War (1969 1972).

110

Chapter 3
Attacking the encroaching enemy, participating in the campaign to liberate
B Ra Long Khanh (1973-1975).

156

PART 2
445 Battalion in the task of developing and defending the Fatherland (1975-2004).
Chapter 1
Defending the Government and the revolution, pursuing the puppet military
remnants, and undertaking our international duty (1975 1989).

180

Chapter 2
High combat readiness, effective training, and developing a solid and complete
unit (1989 2004).

196

Conclusion

209

Addendum

217

ANNEXES 17
Annex A Key Cadre: D445 Battalion Outline Biographies (nine).
Annex B Senior Cadre: D445 Battalion.
Annex C D445 Battalion: Strength Figures.
Annex D The Probable Organisation of D445 Battalion Mid-1966.
Annex E The Battle of Long Tn: A Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Summary.
Annex F The Battle of Long Tn: Casualties and Losses.
Annex G The Party in D445 Battalion.
Annex H D445 Command and Political Reports mid-1966.
Annex I D445 Battalion: Medals Submission 10 July 1966.
Annex J Higher Headquarters.
Annex K The History of the 5th Infantry Division (1965 2005): Extracts.
Annex L The Battle of Long Tn 18/8/66 NVA/VC Revisited
(a listing of participating elements).
Annex M The Battle of Long Tn: D445 History 1991.
Annex N The 274th Regiment - Not at the Battle of Long Tn.
Annex O The 275th Main Force Regiment.
Appendix 1: 275th Regiment Personnel KIA - Battle of Long Tn (140 names).
Appendix 2: Lieutenant General Nguyn Thi Bng A Biography.
Appendix 3: The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment (2015) Extract.
Appendix 4: List of Martyrs Killed at Long Tn 18.8.66.
(G Cat Cemetery List of 36 February 2016).
Annex P D440 Local Force Battalion.
Annex Q The Ambush Battle at Long Tn (December 2014).
Annex R The Battle of Long Tn as related by the D445 rallier Hunh Vn Hoa.
Bibliography
Index

17

These Annexes were not part of the 2004 D445 History but have been included as additional reference
material as explained in the Preface.

This Giy Khen Letter of Appreciation was awarded to Trnh Vn Lim

a section commander in the 2nd Company of D445 Battalion. Lim was born in Long
Phc village, Chu c [sic] District, B Ra Province. The Letter recognises his
bravery and other achievements in the battle at Phc Hai. Dated 10 January 1967, the
Letter is signed by the D445 Battalion Political Officer, Vn Lin (CDEC Log 051407-67). Subsequently, while serving as the Political Officer of the 2nd Company, Trnh
Vn Lim was killed in an Australian ambush at C Thi (Xuyn Moc) on 31 December
1970 (see footnote 478). Awards for the Battle of Long Tn are related in Annex F.

A D445 (?) soldier (left foreground) firing an RPG-2 (B40) rocket launcher.18
18

This photograph and the photograph at page 179, were included in a late 2014 Documentary Film on
the history of D445 Battalion ie: V Vn Cm - Director, Trng thnh t trong chin u (Comingof-age during combat), B Ra - Vng Tu Television, 4 November 2014.

Introduction
On 19 May 1945 [sic Translators Note: should be 1965], in an area of jungle
at the Sui Rao Stream (Long Tn Long t), the 445 Battalion the local B Ra
Province1 troops, was officially formed. The birth of 445 Battalion was a milestone
marking the growth of the revolutionary movement in the region - and marking the
coming-of-age of the armed forces of B Ra Province that were greatly loved and helped
by the people. Fighting right on its very own homeland, in every situation including the
most difficult and violent, the cadre and soldiers of the Battalion were always united and
closely bound in taking up arms and confronting the Americans, puppets, Australians and
New Zealanders. Despite the enemys wicked warfare of plots and schemes, our troops
fought and won. The feats of arms, the memories, the painful losses throughout the AntiAmerican War of National Salvation, and the period of our International Duty in
Cambodia have all left marks that will never fade in the hearts of the generation of cadre
and soldiers of 445 Battalion as well as in the Party chapters, the authorities, and the
people of B Ra Vng Tu Province. The honourable title of an Heroic Unit of the
Peoples Armed Forces2 that the Party3 and the Nation bestowed on the unit, will
forever be a highly valued legacy of the armed forces of B Ra Vng Tu Province for
the development and defence of the nation the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
From its very founding until today, 445 Battalion has always been worthy of its
title as the Main Force Fist/Punch of the Province. The Battalion operated effectively

Translators (E. Chamberlain) Note: B Ra Province the Si Gn Governments Phc Tuy Province,
was 445 Battalions principal area of operations. Occasionally, the Battalion also operated in Long Khnh
Province and Bnh Tuy Province respectively to the immediate north and north-east of Phc Tuy/B Ra
Province. Post-War, the Battalion also operated in Cambodia. Phc Tuy Province was about 55
kilometres from east-to-west and about 35 kilometres from north-to-south (an area of 1,958 sq km about
83% of the size of the Australian Capital Territory, or 21.3% of the size of Tasmania). The Province capital
- Phc L/B Ra Town, was about 110 kilometres by road south-east of Si Gn via Route 15 (nowadays
Route 51). In 1967, the population of the Province was about 103,000 - including B Ra Towns
population of about 15,600; and was 112,683 in January 1970. An historical summary of Phc Tuy
Province from the late 18th Century can be found in OBrien, M., Conscripts and Regulars with the
Seventh Battalion in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1995, pp.14-22. A detailed political history of
the Phc Tuy-Vng Tu region from 1930 can be found in Lin on Lao ng tnh B Ra Vng Tu,
Lch s Phong Tro Cng Nhn, Vin Chc, Lao ng va Hot ng Cng on B Ra-Vng Tu Giai
on 1930-2006 (The History of the Workers, Public Servants and Labourers Movement and Trade
Union Activities in the Period 1930-2006), Vng Tu, 2011.
2
Translators Note: 445 Battalion is included as an Heroic Unit in H Sn i & Trn Quang Toi, ng
Nai n V Anh Hng (The Heroic Units of ng Nai), Nh Xut Bn ng Nai (ng Nai Publishing
Company), ng Nai, 1985, pp.14-20.
3
Translators Note: The Communist Party of Vietnam was disbanded in 1945 and re-emerged as a party
ie the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP ie Lao ng Party), in 1951. In January 1962, it created its
ostensibly separate southern arm the Peoples Revolutionary Party (PRP). The Peoples Revolutionary
Party organisation in the South was directed locally by H Nis COSVN (The Central Office for South
Vietnam) see footnote 59 for detail on COSVN organisation and activities. Vit Cng military units and
the National Liberation Front were directed and controlled by the People's Revolutionary Party through its
organs at all levels. In 1976, the PRP in South Vietnam was merged with the VWP of North Vietnam to
reconstitute the Communist Party of Vietnam. For the functioning of the Party including its Youth Group,
and in North Vietnamese and Vit Cng units, see Annexes G and H.

2
on an important battlefield of the Eastern Nam B Region4 (comprising Bin Ha, B
Ra, and Long Khanh5) wiping out the enemy, destroying their grip, coordinating with
higher main-force troops, fighting in many battles of annihilation, and contributing
towards the bankrupting of the enemys war strategy . The title 445 Battalion became
symbolic of a spirit of revolutionary attack, a will for self-reliant strength, a proficiency in
applying the methods of the peoples warfare of the Party and Uncle H, and
embellishing the legacy and the excellent nature of the Troops of the Great Uncle H.
With feelings of unbounded gratitude for the dedicated sacrifices of earlier
generations and the agreement of Province Standing Committee and the Peoples
Committee of B Ra Vng Tu Province, the Party Committee of the Military
Headquarters of B Ra Vng Tu Province organised the writing of this book on The
History of 445 Battalion An Heroic Unit of the Peoples Armed Forces (1965 2004)
with the aim of recounting the process of the Battalions founding, its coming-of-age, and
development through the historic stages by the Heroic 445 Battalion. In this way,
valuable lessons and experiences in the process of developing a rich, solid and
comprehensive region can contribute to the teaching of revolutionary history for todays
generation and for those that follow. The book: The History of 445 Battalion An
Heroic Unit of the Peoples Armed Forces (1965 2004) is one contribution in a
program to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Heroic 445
Battalion (1965 2005).
As many documents were mislaid during the War - and as it has not been possible
to gather sufficient witnesses, the book no doubt has been unable to avoid shortcomings.
It is hoped that comrades and country-men will contribute constructive ideas to enable an
opportunity to include revisions when republishing. The Party Committee of the Military
Headquarters of B Ra Vng Tu Province respectfully introduces this book: The
History of 445 Battalion An Heroic Unit of the Peoples Armed Forces (1965 2004),
to the broader readership.
The Party Committee of the Military Headquarters
B Ra Vng Tu Province

Translators Note: Nam B was the communist term for the region of Vietnam south of the Central
Highlands - equating to the earlier French colonial Cochin China region. The US historian and author,
Merle Pribbenow translated Nam B as Cochin China.
5
Translators Note: For information on Long Khanh Province in the mid-1960s including administration
and population detail, see USOM, Information Brief: Long Khnh Province - Vietnam, December 1965 VCAT Item No.6850102002. Long Khnh Province had a total land area of 4,000 square kilometres
(double that of Phc Tuy) with a maximum length of 90 kilometres and an average width of 70
kilometres. It comprised two Districts: Xun Lc and nh Qun its population of 131,300 (1965) lived in
18 villages (107 hamlets).

The Beginnings
B Ra Vng Tu : The Land, The People, Its Military History
and the Layout of the Battlefield
The Cradle of 445

1. The Geographical Position, Historical Characteristics, and the Layout of the

B Ra Vng Tu Province Battlefield.
The Province of B Ra Vng Tu comprises eight administrative units: the city
of Vng Tu, the town of B Ra and the districts of Tn Thnh, Chu c, Long in,
t , Xuyn Mc, and Cn o. Geographically, B Ra Vng Tu lies between the
geographic coordinates of 10 degrees 19 minutes to 10 degrees 18 minutes of latitude,
and from 106 degrees 50 minutes to 107 degrees and four minutes of longitude
excepting the island of Cn o which lies at 8 degrees 35 minutes to 8 degrees 45
minutes of latitude and 106 degrees 50 minutes to 107 degrees 4 minutes of longitude.
The total surface area of the Province is 2,047.66 sq km. To the north, it borders ng
Nai Province; and to the north-east Bnh Thun Province. To the west and to the southwest, it borders H Ch Minh City and to the south and south-east, the Eastern Sea ((ie
the South China Sea)).
In terms of its geographical position, B Ra Vng Tu is the gateway to Eastern
Nam B. It lies astride a cross-Asia axis, with a system of seaports, airfields, and a
convenient system of waterways. National Routes 51, 55, and 56 together with a system
of inter-provincial roads and inter-district lines of communication, comprehensively links
B Ra Vng Tu Province with other provinces within the country, and also
internationally. Because the terrain was advantageous for military activities (both for us
and the enemy), B Ra Vng Tu routinely had changes in its administration. For the
revolutionary authorities - from 1945 onwards, there were up to 14 changes in
administrative borders:
-

In 1945 (August): B Ra Province and Cp Province (Cape St Jacques) ((ie

Vng Tu)) included Cn Gi District.
In 1945 (December): B Ra Province.
In 1951: B Ch Province (B Ra Ch Ln).
In 1955: B Ra Province was re-established.
In 1963 (at the beginning of the year): Bin Ha Province was incorporated
into B Ra to form B Bin Province.
In 1963 (at the end of the year): B Ra Province was reformed.
In 1966: Long B Bin Province (B Ra, Bin Ha, and Long Khanh) was
formed.
In 1967: Bin Ha was removed from Long B Bin Province, and B Ra
Long Khanh Province was established.
In 1971: B Ra Long Khanh Province was disbanded, and B Ra SubRegion formed.
In 1972: B Ra Sub-Region was disestablished, and B Ra Long Khanh
Province was re-instituted.

4
-

In 1975 (April): Vng Tu City was established as directly subordinate to the

Eastern Region Committee, while Cn Gi District became directly
subordinate to H Ch Minh City.
In 1976: B Ra Long Khanh was incorporated with Bin Ha to form ng
Nai Province.
In 1979: Vng Tu City was removed from ng Nai Province and Cn o
was removed from Hu Giang Province to form the Vng Tu Special Region
and Cn o was made directly subordinate to the Centre.
In 1991: The three districts of Xuyn Mc, Chu Thnh, and Long t of
ng Nai Province together with the Vng Tu Special Zone - Cn o,
were formed into B Ra Vng Tu Province.

In the period of the Americans and their puppets, the area always comprised three
distinct provinces: Phc Tuy, Long Khanh, and Bin Ha.
B Ra Vng Tu Province lies in a region with a tropical monsoonal climate
that is influenced by the ocean. Consequently, its climate is relatively comfortable. More
than 60 percent of its land area is composed of solid ground with mountain tops and high
ranges that are difficult to access and lie scattered from the north of the Province down to
the coast. Skirting a region of the Eastern Nam B coastal plains, it is an area of special
military advantage that includes the My To Mountains6, the Ni Dinh7 and Ni Th Vi
Mountains and the Minh m8 Mountains.
There are many rivers and streams in B Ra Vng Tu. These include large
rivers such as the Th Vi River, the Xoi River (the source of the Dinh River), and the
Sng Ray River. However, the principal sources of fresh water for the lives of the people
and our troops during the Dry Season9 were the Xoi River (west of Route 2) and the
Sng Ray River (east of Route 2).
Before 1975, the jungle areas in B Ra Vng Tu Province ran for some
distance along both sides of Route 15 (which today is Route 51), Route 23 (nowadays
Route 55), Route 44, and Inter-Provincial Route 2 (now Route 56) and these joined up
with the jungles in ng Nai Province (Xun Lc, Long Khanh, Long Thnh) and in
Bnh Thun (Bnh Chu, My To). In particular, the Hi Bi, Ph M, and Long Sn
mangrove jungle areas joined up with the Rng Sac jungle10 (Cn Gi H Ch Minh
6

Translators Note: The My To Mountains straddle the Phc Tuy/Long Khnh/Bnh Tuy tri-border area.
Translators Note: The Ni Dinh Mountains were colloquially called The Warburtons by Australian
troops see White A.T., Starlight, Copyright, Brisbane, p.60 and http://www.malnral.com/Warbies.htm .
8
Translators Note: The Minh m is a range of hills and a Vit Minh/Vit Cng base area/secret zone
within the areas/boundaries of the villages of Tam An, Phc Long Hi, Phc Hi and Long Hi (of Long
t District in modern-day B Ra-Vng Tu Province). The Minh m area is more than nine kilometres
long and almost five kilometres at its widest. See: Phm Ch Thn, Cn C Minh m 1945-1975 - The
Minh m Base 1945-1975, B Ra-Vng Tu Province Information and Cultural Office, 2006 - see
translated extracts at Annex M to Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story, Point
Lonsdale, 2011. Australian forces referred to the Minh m area as the Long Hi Hills.
9
Translators Note: The Dry Season in southern Vietnam begins in November; and the Wet Season begins
in April/May. The season timings are: Spring January/February, March, April; Summer May, June,
July; Autumn August, September, October; Winter November, December, January.
10
Translators Note: The Rng Sc/Sc/St lies about 32 kilometres south-southeast of Si Gn and
comprises about 1,250 square kilometres of tidal swamp. Its population in 1968 was about 18,000. The
Lng Tu River runs through the Rng Sc and connects Vng Tu/South China Sea with Si Gn. For a
very detailed US report (circa mid-1968) on the Rng Sc and the Vit Cng on 10 Group (997-strong,
including 211 guerrillas) see Haines, E.B., Rung Sat Special Zone Intelligence Study, 1968 VCAT Item
No.4000105007. For a comprehensive history of the conflict in the Rng Sc to 1975 in Vietnamese, see:
H S Thnh, c Khu Rng Sc, Nh Xut Bn Tr, 2003. 1 ATF conducted its first combat assault and
7

5
City) and all have been resistance base regions, areas for rear service stocks, and
regrouping and concealment areas for the revolutionary forces.
A special area was the Nam ((South)) Xun Sn base (north of the old Route 23)
that was a base for 445 Battalion during the resistance war against the Americans and that
quite fully satisfied the requirements of clement weather, favourable terrain, and concord
with the local people etc.
The Sui Rau base was about five kilometres to the north-east of the centre of
Long Tn village, about 10 kilometres from the t District Sub-Sector11 to the south,
with the Long L Ha Long Sub-Sector 12 kilometres to the south-west, c Thnh
(Ngi Giao) 12 kilometres to the north-west, and to the east and the north-east it bordered
the Xun Sn jungle (Chu c District). The base had an area of about 20 square
kilometres and was located in the basin of the L Ln Stream and so the trees there
were green throughout the year.12* Along both sides of the stream, were the slopes of
hills with an average height of about 50 metres (above the water level), and there was a
degree of cover from the older jungle that included many types of trees such as c ke, la
bung, and paperbark etc. These were types of trees that did not drop their leaves and had
thick foliage. The paperbark trees were a species of tree whose bark was easy to peel off.
It had an acrid taste, and the villagers used to peel off the bark and sell it to people who
ate betel nut.
Along the rivers and streams in the Province, bamboos grew thickly, and this was
a source of food supply (fresh bamboo shoots) for our troops. In the jungle areas, there
were many types of animals such as: monkeys, mouse deer, sambar deer, and weasels.
Thanks to these natural advantages and our close relationships with the people in the Tam
Long area13 (especially Long Tn and Long Phc) and t (Phc Th, Phc
Thnh, Phc Li, Long M, Hi M) etc, the business of rear service supplies for the
troops of 445 Battalion and the revolutionary forces was ensured - although at times there
were difficulties when the enemy attacked fiercely and blocked our supply routes. Later,
445 Battalion created a number of new bases in Xuyn Mc (in the L Ph rubber
plantation) and the rear services area at T Lon Stream but the Sui Rau base area
remained the principal base for our troops, and the place from which the Battalion was
launched into the General Offensive and Uprising in Spring 1975 that completely
liberated B Ra Vng Tu Province.
The fertile rice paddies were concentrated in the Don Fields (Ha Long village)
and the fields in Long in, t , Cu Nh, and Lm Sang (Xun Lc) that bordered the
revolutionary base areas places that were termed the breast milk of the revolution.
The Province contained many pools and swamps such as Bu Nham, Bu Su, Bu Nga,
and Bu Ma (in Xuyn Mc District) that were within our base areas. These were places
with large numbers of fish and prawns a source of food supply for the revolutionary
forces, including the 445 troops.
a search and destroy operation (Operation Hayman) into Long Sn island adjacent to the Rng Sc, in
the period 8-12 November 1966 1 ATF, Opord 1-14-66, 4 November 1966 in file AWM95, 1/4/16.
11
Translators Note: Chi khu a military sub-sector, encompassing a Republic of Vietnam - ie Saigon
Government, district. In Phc Tuy Province, these sub-sectors/districts were: Long L, Long in, t
, c Thnh and Xuyn Mc. For detail on the functions of Phc Tuy Province Sector and its SubSectors, see: 1 ATF, Standard Operating Procedures, Ni t, November 1969 (revised) AWM95, 7/3/88.
12
* The jungle and hill area of Long Tn Ha Long had B Lp trees that were green throughout the year,
and a very sweet soup could be made from the trees without needing spices. In 1966, the American
imperialists spread poisonous chemicals, but the trees remained green. Our Province liaison personnel
broke off some branches to make soup but were poisoned with one comrade dying. The Province
Committee then advised that units were not to use that type of tree.
13
Translators Note: Tam Long ie the Three Long villages of: Ha Long, Long Phc, and Long Tn.

6
The jungle and mountainous areas were where our countrymen the Chu Ro14
people cultivated slash-and-burn fields which were concentrated in the Hc Dch15, Gia
Cp, Long Tn, Cu Nh, and Bu Lm areas etc. These were the rear service production
bases self-sufficient and self-supporting, for the troops of 445 Battalion throughout the
anti-American resistance war.
The population of B Ra Vng Tu Province was not large if compared to other
provinces.16* However, within the Province, all the religions and beliefs were
represented, such as: Buddhism, Christianity, Protestantism, Cao i17, the ng Trn
religion18, and the customs of the worship of ancestors, saints, heroes and ascetic
luminaries etc. As a fertile, populous and wealthy region in Eastern Nam B, since time
immemorial refugees from many different regions have gathered here to work and re-start
their lives. No matter from which elements of society, they all had a common spirit of
attachment, compassion and chivalry. This tradition was increasingly expressed from the
time that the Vietnam Communist Party came into being.
On 3 February 1930, the Vietnam Communist Party was founded, marking a turn
in the revolutionary history of Vietnam. The first Communist Party chapter in the B Ra
Vng Tu region was established in Phc Hi village (1934). Subsequently, three
chapters were developed as: the Phc Hi Party Chapter, the Long M Party Chapter,
and the Bnh Ba X Bang Xun Sn Plantations Party Chapter. The establishment of
the two earliest Party Chapters in B Ra Vng Tu Province in the two villages on the
edge of the Chu Long Chu Vin Mountains (Minh m) was an extremely important
event that had a great influence on subsequent developments in the local revolutionary
movement.
In B Ra Vng Tu at the time - apart from fishermen, salt workers, and
farmers, a large group of rubber workers toiled in the rubber plantations and played an
important role in the local revolutionary struggle. As their working conditions were
extremely hard and miserable and they were badly exploited, the rubber workers were
14

Translators Note: The Chu Ro are a minority Mon-Khmer ethnic group of about 26,800 (2009) of
whom about 85% live in ng Nai, B Ra and Long Khnh provinces.
15
Translators Note: The Hc Dch/Ht Dch area was defined by USMACV as the area bounded by
coordinates YS 1790 YS 4690 YS 2572 and YS 4572, containing the jungle area south of the Bnh Sn
Rubber Plantation and east of Route 15 to Route 2, with the Ni Th Vi Mountains on the south. The
small village of Hc Dch was located in the vicinity of YS 3477, about 11 kilometres west of the c
Thnh District Sub-Sector.
16
* The total population of the Province was 821,912 (in 2000). Under the American-Dim regime, the
concentration areas (khu tp trung) and the Agrovilles (khu tr mt) were places where the assembled
people lived surrounded by barbed wire and minefields that the enemy set up to closely manage the
population and not allow them any contact with the revolution. Concentration area was the term the
enemy used before the ng Khi uprising into which they gathered their opponents, their families, and
those associated with the revolution. Agroville was the term that the enemy used after we had risen up and
destroyed camps in our ng Khi Movement. The demagogic enemy recreated and used these to
counter their problems in social and economic development in order to lure and entice the people.
Translators Note: For the ng Khi Movement the Simultaneous/Concerted Uprising, see footnotes 26,
58, and 639.
17
Translators Note: Almost solely a Vietnamese religion, the Cao i - i o Tam K Ph (The
Great Faith for the Third Universal Redemption) was formally founded in southern Vietnam in 1926. With
several million adherents, the Holy See of this syncretic religion is in Ty Ninh Province. The Cao i
Sects armed forces fought against the French colonial regime and that of President Ng nh Dim. For a
history of the Cao i, see Chapter 19 in Department of Army, Minority Groups in the Republic of
Vietnam, Pamphlet 550-105, Washington, 1966 VCAT Item No.13450205001. For a May 1968 report by
US Colonel (Retd) E.G. Lansdale on the Cao i leadership see VCAT Item No.23970224008.
18
Translators Note: The ng Trn religion was founded by L Vn Mu (1855-1935) - associated with
the T n Hiu Ngha sect in An Giang Province that had resisted the French in the period 1887-1890. L
Vn Mu led 20 disciples to Long Sn Island in 1900 and established the religions group there.

7
soon won over to the ideas of the class struggle and the revolutionary struggle. This
provided the conditions for the early establishment of the Vietnam Communist Party, and
the propagation of the revolutionary path and Marxist-Leninist ideology among the ranks
of the workers and labourers.19 The large number of rubber workers were concentrated in
an important area that was occupied by our minority countrymen the Chu Ro people,
and this saw the coming-into-being of the Bnh Ba X Bang Xun Sn InterPlantation Party Chapter which was the precursor to the revolutionary struggle and the
process of creating the local armed forces for the two periods of resistance.20
The people of B Ra Vng Tu have always had a tradition of patriotism and
revolutionary struggle linked closely to their constant and wedded affection to their
native land:
When there is no mud left in Bng Bc,
and Bu Thnh is empty of water, only then will my love fade.21
Despite having to live under the domineering enemy and forced to abandon their
fields and homes and live in the concentration camps and Agrovilles, the peoples hearts
and minds were still with the revolution and with the young fighters of 445 Battalion.
When the villagers were forced to leave, they buried and concealed their property and
food leaving it completely for the use of our cadre and soldiers. Regarding those youth
who left to join the war of resistance, our Party chapters and infrastructure cadre led the
people in legal ways to prevent the enemy from oppressing the families of those youths
who had joined us. Broad movements among the people were initiated such as
Collecting agricultural contributions and The Mothers Association for the Soldiers,
and these provided additional strength for our resistance forces. Many generations of
cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion were deeply moved by our countrymen in Ha Long
Long Phc when the villagers were forced to part with our unit. Uncle Ba R (Nguyn
Vn R) in p Bc (Long Phc) said emotionally: My family is leaving but take
any of the remaining chickens for your food. Mother T (V Th Ngy) said: Ive left
my rice in the large pottery jar take it, and cook some rice for yourselves. Many
families gave their children to the revolution. They earnestly - and with peace of mind,
entrusted them to the troops of 445.
Indeed, during the most violent and difficult situations, the honest-minded farmers
took many very original initiatives to avoid the harsh inspections by the enemy and
brought a lot of food, supplies and goods to the troops. Popular methods were: hollowing
out the bamboo handles of hoes and machetes to conceal medicines and bandages within;
concealing rice in hollow bamboo tubes (used to channel water from the flooded fields);
carrying panniers with rice and medicine hidden underneath piles of pig and buffalo dung.
19

Translators Note: As noted, a detailed political history of the Phc Tuy-Vng Tu region from 1930
can be found in Lin on Lao ng tnh B Ra Vng Tu, Lch s Phong Tro Cng Nhn, Vin Chc,
Lao ng va Hot ng Cng on B Ra Vng Tu Giai on 1930-2006 (The History of the Workers,
Public Servants and Labourers Movement and Trade Union Activities in the Period 1930-2006), Vng
Tu, 2011.
20
Translators Note: For a brief history of Vit Minh activity post-World War II to 1954 in Phc Tuy
Province - see Lu Dng, Nhng chng ng pht trin ca lc lng v trang B Ra-Vng Tu
(The Stages of Development of the Armed Forces B Ra-Vng Tu), C Quan ca ng B ng Cng
Sn Vit Nam Tnh B Ra-Vng Tu, Vng Tu, 17 December 2009; and Lch s ng b x Ha Long
(1930-2005) - The History of the Ha Long Village Party Chapter (1930-2005), 25 April 2009 - see
translated extracts at Annex N to Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story, Point
Lonsdale, 2011.
21
Translators Note: This short piece of lc bat poetry ie a traditional 6-8 word verse form, also
appears in the D440 Battlion History (2011), p.19 see Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion:
Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2013, p.15.

8
On many occasions, the women and children would bring rice to the fields for their
midday meal, but going hungry, would pass it to the troops.
There were families who encouraged many of their children to join 445 Battalion
such as the family of Mrs Trn Th Hai (of Long Phc) whose two sons were
heroically killed; the family of Mrs Nguyn Th Trng (of Long Phc) whose three sons
that were sent to 445 all died courageously; and the family of Mrs Nguyn Th Ci (of
Long Phc) whose four children joined 445 and three died heroically etc.
Additionally, there were hundreds and thousands of other circumstances that symbolized
the militia spirit of whole country and that between the people of the Districts in the
Province and 445 Battalion.
The feelings of the people of B Ra Vng Tu for the revolution and the
resistance war gave further strength to 445 Battalion from its very first toddler-like
steps and its continuous development with gun-in-hand to protect the people and defend
the Fatherland. The people did not shrink from hardships in order to provide cover for and to nourish, 445 Battalion as it came-of-age.
After the Geneva Agreement was signed in July 1954, the American imperialists
installed Ng nh Dim as President of the Republic of Vietnam making South
Vietnam their new type of colony. B Ra Vng Tu was created into a military base
and rear area for their invasion. The Americans and their puppets built many military
bases, ports, and rear bases for their main-force units in B Ra. They strengthened a belt
around sensitive locations that - together with Bin Ha, protected their centre Si Gn.
To create a secure shield for their military installations and their pleasure centres
at Vng Tu and Long Hi, from the middle of 1964 the combined AmericanVietnamese headquarters (established in August 1964) decided to militarily incorporate
the provinces of B Ra and Bin Ha into a military area directly subordinate to
Headquarters III Corps, which they called the Phc Bin Special Zone.22 This
combined both military and civilian management under the authority of the officer
commanding the Special Zone. Apart from the local forces, the enemy added to this
region the 36th Ranger Battalion stationed at Ph M, a mechanised squadron at Phc L
(B Ra), and two platoons of 105mm artillery. The mobile forces of III Corps ready to
support the Phc Bin Special Zone comprised: the 30th, 33rd and 35th Ranger Battalions;
the 3rd and 4th Marine Battalions - and additionally there were a number of units of the
Airborne Brigade and an armoured cavalry regiment.
The Phc Tuy Sector23 and the Sub-Sectors of Long L, Long in, and t
formed a shield in the barrier defending the Province capital. From this arc, Route 23
ran at an angle to the north-east out to the Xuyn Mc Sub-Sector that obstructed access
into our revolutionary base areas and towards the sea in the farthest area of Eastern Nam
B. From Phc Tuy [sic], Route 2 ran north to Xun Lc, dividing B Ra into two parts
East and West, and connecting with Route 1 that ran from the jungle areas down to the
sea. Along Route 2 were the c Thnh Sub-Sector in the north - about 18 kilometres as
the crow flies from the Phc Tuy Province capital, with the Phc Tuy [sic] Special

22

Translators Note: Phc Bin Special Zone comprising Phc Tuy and Bin Ha Provinces, was
promulgated by Ministry of the Interior Instruction No.023/TTL/I/TC/M, 11 May 1964.
Translators Note: As noted earlier, for detail on the functions of the Phc Tuy Province Sector and its
Sub-Sectors, see: 1 ATF, Standard Operating Procedures, Ni t, November 1969 (revised) - AWM95,
7/3/88. Phc Tuy Sector was subordinate to the 33rd Tactical Area (Khu 33 chin thut) that with its
headquarters in Xun Lc Town, encompassed the four provinces of Phc Tuy, Bnh Tuy, Long Khnh,
and Bin Ha, and the city of Vng Tu. In the period 1961-1969, the ARVN 10th/18th Infantry Division
based at Xun Lc, had responsibility for the 33rd Tactical Area.

23

9
Zone and the strategic hamlet of Bnh Gi creating the pincer claws that threatened our
Hc Dch base.
For our side, the B Ra Vng Tu territory also held an extremely important
position. It was one of the important supply gateways by sea for our armed forces located
in the Eastern Nam B and the Region 6 areas. It was also a strategic corridor connecting
the coastal plain of the Eastern Nam B region with War Zone D and the far areas of
Southern Trung B. It created a very large and connected battlefield for our revolutionary
forces to continuously attack and wipe out the enemy, and to directly threaten Si Gn
the centre from which the Americans and their puppets managed the war.
In the years following the signing of the ((1954)) Geneva Agreement, we strictly
implemented the Agreement under the conditions that neither our government, military
forces, armed forces - nor our weapons, had to be regrouped to the North.24 The political
mission of the whole Party did undergo a basic change: from armed struggle to political
struggle. These were extremely difficult months and years for the revolution in the South
in general.
As for many of the provinces in Eastern Nam B, the armed forces of B Ra
Vng Tu were reformed quite early before the Politburos Resolution 15.25* Our
armed forces came into being in the difficult situation and straitened circumstances on all
sides. However, from the very first days, we had the direct leadership of the Party and
for that reason, we quickly merged our organisations; conducted armed propaganda; built
the revolutionary infrastructure; and created the nucleus for the revolutionary movement
of the masses to rise up, kill the cruel oppressors, and advance towards initiating the
ng Khi Movement26 across the whole of the South. That was the precursor the very
important condition, that allowed the Party and the people of B Ra Vng Tu to create
the Provinces concentrated armed forces the predecessors of the Heroic 445 Battalion.

24

Translators Note: Article 14 (d) of the 1954 Geneva Agreement allowed for a change of zone of
residence a 300-day period to 19 May 1955. In that period, 888,127 people (or 892,876 to 20 July 1955)
reportedly moved from the North to the South. The Vit Minh leadership reportedly ordered 90,000 of its
Southern troops to move to the North see Zasloff, J.J., Political Motivation of the Viet Cong: the
Vietminh Regroupees, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, May 1968. According to a 1954 Top Secret US
report, in 1954-55 there were 130,000 Viet Minh departures for the North (87,000 Warriors, 43,000
Admin cadre, liberated POWs, and families) of whom 16,000 had assembled at Hm Tn/Xuyn Mc.
The 1954 Geneva Agreement: A Retrospective View, VCAT Item No.2410403028. Bi Tn, Fight for the
Long Haul, in Wiest, A (ed), Rolling Thunder in a Gentle Land (Wiest, A. ed), Osprey Publishing, Botley,
2006, p.56 notes 42,000 of the regroupees to the North were military and, in North Vietnam, made up the
350th, 324th, and 325th Divisions. Bi Tn notes that North Vietnam did not send whole units to the South
in 1959 and early 1960, but infiltrated selected regroupees - Bi Tn, Following Ho Chi Minh: The
Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel, Crawford House Publishing, Bathurst, 1995. The Xuyn Mc
History (1989) relates that the Nam B Committee selected the Xuyn Phc C base area near C Trch
village, as a regroupment centre for about 12,000 troops. They later moved to Ph M where they boarded
vessels to regroup to the North. V Kim Hanh (et al), Xuyn Mc Khang Chin 1945-1975, Nh Xut Bn
ng Nai, Bin Ha, 1989, p.89. For regroupees, see also footnotes 135 and 274.
25
* The Politburos Resolution 15 on: The Way for the Vietnamese Revolution in the South (January
1959). Translators Note: Although Resolution 15 was approved in January 1959, the guidelines for the
implementation of the Resolution reportedly went through three more drafts before it was finally presented
in May 1959. In May, Group 559 that was to manage the Trail was also established. See: Nguyen,
Lien-Hang T., Hanois War, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2012, p.45.
26
Translators Note: The ng Khi Movement or the Simultaneous/Concerted Uprising against the
Dim regime (beginning in very late 1959 and peaking in 1960), is cited by communist sources as the start
of the armed struggle in the South. The Uprising reportedly began in M Cy District of Ben Tr Province
in mid-January 1960.

10
2. The Organisation and the Activities of the Predecessor Units of 445 Battalion.
In 1956, after many armed clashes with the Si Gn armed forces, the Bnh
Xuyn27 were defeated, fled, and lodged their troops scattered throughout the Rng Sac
(Long Thnh), the Ni Th Vi Mountains, and the Ging Chu Pha jungle etc. The
Eastern Nam B Inter-Provincial Committee assigned a number of military proselytising
cadre to meet with the Bnh Xuyn General Staff and discuss their joining with the
revolution in opposing the American-Dim regime. Our delegation persuaded Colonel V
Vn Mn the leader of a Bnh Xuyn battalion, to break away and locate to Bu Lm
(Xuyn Mc) for a period. Subsequently, the group moved to War Zone D.
At the same time, the Eastern Region28 Inter-Provincial Committee appointed
Comrade Nguyn Quc Thanh a member of the Communist Party, to operate within a
Bnh Xuyn unit following the persuasion of Nguyn Vn Ph, a Bnh Xuyn company
commander.29* Comrade Nguyn Quc Thanh was appointed as a company second-incommand ((2ic)). In a short time, the Long Thnh District Committee (Bin Ha
Province) had selected 15 core youths in the Rng Sac area (now part of Nhn Trch
District, Cn Gi) to join the break-away Bnh Xuyn armed unit.30* When Nguyn Vn
Ph was killed in an engagement, Nguyn Quc Thanh took control as the unit
commander with more than 30 men under arms. These included 19 comrades our
infrastructure members that we had introduced into the unit (eight Party members and 11
members of the Labour Youth Group31) to build a secret base and to operate in the Rng
Sac area (now part of the Districts of Nhn Trch and Cn Gi).32
In December 1956, almost 500 political prisoners destroyed the Bin Ha prison
a victorious prison break-out. A group of political prisoners from B Ra Province
(comprising 20 comrades) led by Trn Ngc B (ie Sau Tm) cut through the jungle and
27

Translators Note: The Bnh Xuyn gangster group first emerged in the early 1920s in Si Gn. In the
1950s - under General L Vn Vin (aka "By Vin"), the Bnh Xuyn was an independent military force
within the Vietnamese National Army whose leaders once had lived outside the law and had sided with the
Vit Minh. During its heyday, the Bnh Xuyn funded itself with organized crime activities in Si Gn/Ch
Ln while effectively battling communist forces. For the early history of the Bnh Xuyn ie to late 1955,
see Chapter 19 in Department of Army, Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam, op.cit., 1966 VCAT
Item No.13450205001. On the Bnh Xuyn, see also the interviews of General Edward G. Lansdale by T.
Gittinger, 5 June and 15 September 1981, VCAT Item No.23970331002 and No.23970332001.
28
Translators Note: The Eastern Region - ie Min ng, was the eastern half of Nam B. As noted,
Nam B comprised those provinces in the Republic of Vietnam from the Central Highlands to the south. A
Military Ban literally Section, has been translated as Committee at echelons above Province. A
history of Vit Cng political geography in the South from 1954 is detailed in: United States Mission in
Vietnam (USOM), Viet-Cong Political Geography of South Viet-Nam March 1971, Viet-Nam Documents
and Research Notes No. 93, March 1971. The organisation of the Eastern Nam B Region changed five
times in the period 1967-1972 see Communist Territorial Organization in the "Eastern Nam Bo" and the
Saigon-Cholon-Gia-Dinh from 1966 to Date, June 1973 VCAT Item No.2310510003. In late 1965, the
Military Staff of Eastern Nam Bo (Military Region T.1) numbered 450 including its organic headquarters
support elements. For its senior cadre, see CDEC Bulletin No.250, 22 March 1966.
29
* Nguyn Vn Ph had been our military proselytising agent since the war against the French.
30
* At Liberation, a number of those comrades were still active: Nguyn Minh Ninh, Nguyn Thanh Hiu,
and o Vn Tun.
31
Translators Note: The organisation of the Peoples Revolutionary Party (PRP) included Party Labour
Youth Groups (on) at all levels whose members aspired to Party membership. Selected members could
graduate to probationary membership of the Party (at about age 24) then full membership of the People's
Revolutionary Party. See details at Annex G The Party and the reports in Annex H for detailed numbers
in mid-1966 for 445 Battalion before the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966.
32
Translators Note: This early Bnh Xuyn period, is covered in greater detail in the 1991 edition of the
D445 Battalion History eg: On 16 December 1955, the first three revolutionary soldiers were incorporated
into the Bnh Xuyn force. See: Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit., 2011, pp.2-3.

11
returned to the Hc Dch base.33 Comrade L Minh H representing the Province
Committee, gave Comrade Trn Ngc B the task of organising political classes for the
escapees, building a secret base, and undertaking armed propaganda activities. The terrain
to the west of Route 2 became their base, and they created the first armed unit in the B
Ra area of the anti-American period.34
At the beginning of 1957, the Eastern Region Inter-Provincial Committee
deployed the unit led by Nguyn Quc Thanh from the Rng Sc (Long Thnh) to the
Ging jungle (Hc Dch) to build a base - and to receive and protect the group of political
prisoners who had broken out and fled into the countryside. After they had completed the
task of protecting the political prisoners and guided those from Western Nam B back to
G Cng, Nguyn Quc Thanhs unit returned to their Hc Dch base. From May 1957,
six comrades from that group of political prisoners from Western Nam B and Si GnGia nh volunteered to remain and joined the C.40 unit including Comrade Vn
Chng (Ba Lin)35 who was later the Political Officer of 445 Battalion for a time.
At the beginning of 1958, the Military Committee of the Eastern Region
appointed Comrade L Minh Thnh (Sau Thnh) to take a section and a radio to B Ra
and organise an armed force. After more than 20 days of cutting through the jungle and
crossing hills, the group of Eastern Region military cadre safely reached the Sui C
Stream.
In June 1958, C.40 was established in the Sui Qut region with the title of the
Eastern Nam B Liberation Forces.36 Comrade L Minh Thnh was its commander,
with Comrade Nguyn Quc Thanh as its deputy commander.37 C.40s military strength
came from three sources - comprised about 40 cadre and soldiers, and was structured as
33

Translators Note: This period is related in Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg) and Ban Chp Hnh ng b tnh
B Ra - Vng Tu (Executive Committee of the B Ra - Vng Tu Party), Lch s ng b tnh B RaVng Tu (1930 - 1975) (The History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), Nh Xut bn Chnh tr Quc gia
(National Political Publishing House), Chng V (Chapter 5), H Ni, 2000. Trn Ngc B is shown as
Trn Vn Bu.
34
Translators Note: On 22 October 1956, the Si Gn Government (ie the Republic of Vietnam) retitled
their B Ra Province as Phc Tuy which included the adjacent Cn Gi District and Vng Tu.
However, the communist side preferred the earlier title of B Ra Province. While the Province capital
was officially titled Phc L (until 1982), it was commonly referred to as B Ra Town by both sides.
Cn Gi District and Vng Tu were subsequently detached from the Province which thereafter had an area
of 1,958 sq km about 55 kilometres from east-to-west and 35 kilometres from north-to-south (ie, as noted,
about 83% of the size of the Australian Capital Territory; or 21.3% of the size of Tasmania).
35
Translators Note: For a biography of Vn Chng - Ba Lin (also as / Vn Lin and
sometimes incorrectly as ng Vn Chng), who became the political officer of 445 Battalion, see Annex
A Key Cadre (nine outline biographies).
36
Translators Note: According to the ng Nai History (1986): In the middle of 1958, at the Sui Qut
T-Junction, the armed forces of B Ra led by V Tm and the Long Thnh (Bin Ha ) group led by
Nguyn Quc Thanh united as one unit and took the title of the 40 th Unit ((b i)) with a strength of
almost 30 Subsequently, they established a number of bases at Phc Thi, Cm M, Gia Ray, V c,
nh Qun, Xuyn Mc Footnote 1: The Commander of the 40th Unit was L Thnh Cng, and Nguyn
Quc Thanh was the Deputy Commander. - Phan Ngc Danh, Trn Quang Toi & Phm Van Hy, ng
Nai 30 Nm Chin Tranh Gii Phng (1945-1975) - The 30-year Liberation Struggle in ng Nai (19451975), Nh Xut Bn ng Nai, ng Nai, 1986, pp.86-87.
37
Translators Note: Vit Cng personnel did not have formal military ranks or insignia. Rather, they were
referred to by the functional title of their position. Generically, they were also referred to as cn b (cadre
ie officer-ranking, ie section commander and higher) or chin s (combatant or soldier). Prior to 1958,
the Peoples Army of Vietnam (ie PAVN, the North Vietnamese Army NVA) did not have rank insignia.
Until the early 1970s, infiltrating NVA personnel routinely discarded their rank insignia - although some
were still referred to by their NVA ranks ie lieutenant, major etc. see Advanced Research Projects
Agency, Basic Profile: NVA PW MR3, Summary Report No.15, Washington, 14 January 1971, VCAT
Item No.2321314001.

12
four sections directly subordinate to the company headquarters. However, weapons and
equipment were only sufficient to arm about half of its strength. The unit established a
Party Chapter (of eight Party members) and a Labour Youth Group. The units base was
set up in the Bng Lng (Hc Dch) area. The coming-into-being of C.40 was an
important marker in the process of re-establishing the B Ra armed forces in the war of
resistance against the Americans.
In May 1959, the Ng nh Dim government promulgated Law 10-59 that
placed Communists outside the law. Many cadre, Party members and patriotic
countrymen continued to be murdered, arrested, suffer every form of corporal
punishment, and were disposed of secretly. The cruelty of the enemy increasingly
inflamed a hatred of the enemy and heightened the resolve of the people of B Ra to take
up arms for the uprising.38
The Politburos Resolution from the 15th Conference (January 1959) affirmed that
the basic path for revolution in the South was through an uprising that put the government
in the hands of the people. Resolution 15 was a large step and a watershed for the
revolution in the South in general and for the revolutionary movement in B Ra Vng
Tu in particular.
On the night of 12 March 1960, C.40 of the Liberation Forces of Eastern Nam
B coordinated with our Secret Self-Defence elements39 and the masses to attack the
post at Bnh Ba on Route 2 (nowadays Route 56) 14 kilometres north of the
administrative capital of Phc Tuy Province. This began the armed uprising movement
across the whole Province. Participating in the attack were 30 cadre and soldiers of C.40
led by Comrade L Minh Thnh and Nguyn Quc Thanh. After only 15 minutes of
combat, our forces had control of the battlefield, wiped out the gendarmerie ((hin binh))
post commander, and seized weapons (including a medium machinegun). In this battle,
Comrade Mi Hng was killed and two comrades were wounded (Mi Quang and Ba
Khi).40

38

Translators Note: For a 1959 administrative survey of Phc Tuy Province, see: Local Administration in
Vietnam the Number of Local Units, USAID/Michigan State University, 1963 VCAT Item No.
1490116001. Province population: 132,202; 7 cantons; 44 villages; 284 (or 277) hamlets.
39
Translators Note: Below the level of D445 Battalion and the local district companies, the Vit Cng
irregulars in Phc Tuy Province included village guerrillas, self-defense forces, and secret selfdefense forces. In early December 1966, the United States Sector S-2 (Intelligence) advisor in B Ra
Town estimated the strengths of these elements respectively as: guerrillas 467; self-defense forces 245;
secret self-defense forces 207; Total 917. The ARVN estimates were respectively 420; 1,445; 410; Total
2,275. The MACV Order-of-Battle estimates were 405; 575; 410; Total 1,390. See CICV, Estimate of
Vit Cng Irregular Forces Strength in SVN, 24 March 1967 VCAT Item No.0240612012. Disagreement
between MACV and the CIA on irregular force numbers continued until mid-September 1967 ie until a
MACV/DIA/CIA conference in Saigon, see footnote 244. USMACV removed secret self defense forces
essentially low level fifth columnists, used for information collection from their order-of-battle reporting
in late 1967 USMACV Briefing, 1 November 1967 VCAT Item No.2120907019. The CIA v MACV
disagreement was reported in the US media ie: CIA reported enemy strength 150,000 NVN and VC troops
in the South, Pentagon claimed 100,000, White House said about 70,000 Know Your Enemy: The
Numbers Game, Newsweek, 4 March 1968, p.13 VCAT Item No.F029200050770. An agreed
assessment was formalised in: Director of Central Intelligence, Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists
for Fighting in South Vietnam (Special National Intelligence Estimate 14.3-67), Langley, 13 November
1967, pp.15-16. VCAT Item No.F029200050309. For a summary, see Adams, S., (CIA), Chronology of
VC/NVA Problem, 22 Oct 1969, VCAT Item No. F029200060698. See also footnotes 318 and 534. For
assessments of D445 strengths over time, see Annex C.
40
Translators Note: The engagement at Bnh Ba is described in more detail in the 1991 D445 Battalion
History which states the attack occurred on 30 March 1960: the first military exploit of the Provinces
first concentrated unit.

13
The victory at Bnh Ba had a strong impact on the revolutionary movement across
the whole Province. Immediately after the battle, C.40 was strengthened by a further 15
recruits. The total number of cadre and soldiers in the unit was then 61.
In April 1960, the Province Committee decided to remove key cadre from C.40
and also to recruit new troops to establish C.45 as an additional Province unit. C.45
became a Province unit with Comrade Nguyn Quc Thanh as its Commander and
Comrade Ba H as the Political Officer. C.45 was stationed to the west of Route 2 and
also was tasked as a mobile unit to wipe out a number of ((enemy)) units, and to defend
the Hc Dch base ((see footnote 15)). It was also to conduct armed propaganda and
support the political struggle of the people in a number of villages along Route 2
(nowadays National Route 56) and Route 15 (now National Route 51).
C.40 continued to be termed a unit of the Eastern Nam B Liberation Forces and
was commanded by Comrade Su Thnh41 as Company Commander with Comrade Ba
i as its Political Officer. C.40 was stationed to the east of Route 2 (in the My To
area, Xuyn Mc) with the tasks of armed propaganda in the villages along the coast and
the region of Route 23.
In May 1960, C.40 coordinated with our infrastructure to wipe out a section of
puppet commandos42 led by Ti a notorious thug in the Xuyn Mc region. They had
killed 30 people involved in the old resistance war; and had beaten, injured, and crippled
over 70 people. This commando section had been detached to Xuyn Mc by the Phc
Tuy Sector.43 Assisting with this attack was Comrade Trn Vn Chin (Su Chin)44 - one
of our three underground agents in the ((enemys)) Self-Defence Corps ((Dn V))45 post
at Phc B who had been recruited by Hunh Vn T (Chn T). Hunh Vn T had
been a Xuyn Mc District cadre from the time of the anti-French resistance, and had
been organised to stay behind to build our forces. Trn Vn Chin had provided important
information on the enemy to us, and this time directly coordinated with C.40 to kill Ti
and his commando unit. Having determined the activity routine of the puppet commando
unit, Trn Vn Chin reported to C.40 and developed a plan to strike the enemy while
telling Ti that there were Vit Cng46 about and, guiding him to round them up, went
from B T to Bng Mn. At about 8am, the whole commando section led by Ti with
Trn Vn Chin leading, fell into C.40s ambush (at the agreed site). Ti kept close to
Trn Vn Chin not letting him get even a step away. When the commando group
reached the middle of a clearing and came into view, Comrade T Minh fired a burst
from his medium machinegun into about the middle of the enemy formation. When that
firing ceased, our unit immediately assaulted, surrounding and killing 11 of the enemy on
41

Translators Note: L Thnh Cng (Su Thnh) was also known as L Minh Thnh. According to the
1991 D445 History, Su Thnh was concurrently the head of the Province Military Section
Translators Note: The text uses the term bit kch a term used by the communist forces for enemy
commando/special forces-type troops eg the Civilian Irregular Defence Groups/Mobile Strike Force
(CIDG/Mike Force) elements, the Special Air Service, and earlier Dim-era forces. In February 1960,
President Dim established 75 150-man commando companies later to become ARVN Ranger units (ie
the Bit ng Qun). 1 ATF infantry patrols were also routinely referred to by the VC as commandos.
43
Translators Note: A Sector (Tiu Khu) was the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) regional
military command covering a province; Sub-Sectors (Chi Khu) were the subordinate district-level ARVN
military commands. These regional levels commanded territorial forces - ie the Civil Guard/Regional
Forces and Self-Defence Corps/Popular Forces.
44
Translators Note: Trn Van Chin (Su Chin) later become the commander of the Battalions 1 st
Company see footnotes 152, 163, 218, 278, 453 and Annex B Senior Cadre.
45
Translators Note: The Dn V were replaced by the Popular Forces (PF Ngha Qun) in 1964.
46
Translators Note: The Vietnamese communists did not refer to themselves as Vit Cng (a contraction
of Cng Sn Vit Nam - Vietnamese Communists) as this was a pejorative term initiated and used by
the Republic of Vietnam (RVN - ie South Vietnam).
42

14
the spot. As for Ti, he turned and ran off, but Chn Hng rushed out and captured him.
Before being shot and killed, Ti resisted determinedly - wounding Comrade Chn Hng
and killing Comrade Sau Tn. The engagement ended after a determined exchange of
about 30 minutes in which Tais commando section was completely wiped out. On our
side, two comrades were killed Sau Tn and our medic Hng. Four comrades were
wounded: Tam (Tam axit), T Minh, T Tun, and Chn Hng.
That very afternoon and evening, Trn Van Chin (Su Chin) guided an element
of C.40 that coordinated with our underground agents to completely wipe out the enemy
in the Self-Defence Corps post at Phc B including the chief of the post, L.47
These concentrated attacks were important combat outcomes for C.40 in the areas
of Phc B, the Cy Cam Slope, and B T etc as they were the first steps in
destroying the enemys grip in the coastal region of Xuyn Mc District.
Also in May 1960, C.45 attacked the X Bang Plantation, seizing 120,000 ng
(in puppet currency).48 This was quite a large amount of money at that time, and was used
to further strengthen the units rear service supply reserves.
After the attack on X Bang, the Province Committee ordered C.45 to fight a
batttle that had decisive characteristics and was aimed at wiping out an important part of
the enemys capability by forcing them to withdraw from their Hc Dch post - and thus
expand our base area region in the Province. Our agents advised that there were 55 enemy
equivalent to two platoons, in the Hc Dch post. With a change-over monthly, they
were to rotate a similar force on Friday. The Hc Dch post was occupied by a Civil
Guard/Civil Defence Force ((Bo An))49 platoon - that was directly subordinate to the
Special Sector ((yu khu)) at Ph M, and by a section of Self-Defence Corps ((Dn
V))50. Every two weeks, they changed-over their troops. Each time when changing-over,
the enemy conducted an operation with two platoons from the Special Sector at Ph M
into the Hc Dch. One platoon would remain at the post, and the other would be replaced
by a newly-arrived platoon.
After some planning, our unit decided on a method of attacking the enemy outside
their post at a point and time that the enemy were changing their troops in the area of the
Bn Tu Stream in July 1960. The area chosen was the Bn Tu area which was quite
open. There was jungle growing on the higher side of the area with a small clearing
opposite with only sparse jungle. The headquarters for the attack comprised: Comrade
Nguyn Quc Thanh as its commander; with Comrades L Thnh Ba, Trn Vn B, Hai
Sng, Ba H, and T as deputy commanders.
At that time, C.45 only had two sections armed with weapons including an
FM.51 The Province Committee reinforced the unit from the Districts armed propaganda
elements and the defence element of the Province Committee. Long t District provided
a team of three comrades led by Trn Lng; the Cao Su Party Affairs Committee sent
three comrades led by Nguyn Vn Cao; and the defence element from the Province
Committee participated with three comrades led by Trn Vn Cng a total of 41 armed
47

Translators Note: These actions are described in less detail in the Xuyn Mc History (1989) that notes:
Following the two victories at Phc B village, a village guerrilla section was established. V Kim
Hanh (et al), Xuyn Mc Khang Chin 1945-1975, op.cit., 1989, p.106.
48
Translators Note: In May 1960, the black market rate was 1 USD equivalent to 90 ng/piastres. The
attack is also recounted in the Chu c Duc History (2004).
49
Translators Note: The Vietnamese text above uses the term Bo An ie the Civil Guard/Civil Defence
Force which was restructured/replaced by the Regional Forces (a Phng Qun) in 1964. However,
even after 1964, the communists often still referred to the Regional Forces as Bo An.
50
Translators Note: As noted earlier, the Dn V (Self-Defence Corps) were replaced by the Popular
Forces (PF Ngha Qun) in 1964.
51
Translators Note: An FM is probably a fusil mitrailleur (French) machinegun.

15
comrades. The Provinces military weapons section was able to make a Mantis gun52
and provided locally-made mines to be used in the battle. Comrade Nguyn Quc Thanh
had been wounded in the leg in the battle at X Bang but with a determination to lead
his unit victoriously in its first battle, used a walking stick to enable him to participate and
command at the engagement.
As our force was small and the enemy was more numerous, the agreed plan was to
wait until after the enemy had changed over its troops and then open fire on the element
that was returning to the post. Comrade Nguyn Quc Thanh commanded our element
that would block the enemy column; Comrade L Thnh Ba commanded our group to
block the enemys rear; and Comrades Ba H, T and V Tm53* led the main group in
the killing zone54. At 8am, a Civil Guard/Civil Defence Force platoon from the Hc Dch
post moved to their change-over site and fell into our ambush. Immediately afterwards
[sic], the two Civil Guard/Civil Defence Force platoons that had patrolled from Ph M
reached their assembly position.55 There, they discussed their change-over of tasks and sat
down in scattered groups right at our ambush position, but not quite fully within our
ambush site.
This situation was not as had been planned. Usually, the enemy changed-over a
platoon - but this time they had added an extra platoon to clear the way and to then escort
the platoon that had just been relieved back to Ph M. The enemy force was many times
larger than ours, and they were spread out over a large area. Comrade Nguyn Quc
Thanh at the forward position crawled over to Comrade V Quc Chanh our comrade
with the medium machinegun at the forward blocking position, to discuss changing the
plan for our attack.
At that time, an unexpected event suddenly occurred. An enemy soldier armed
with a machinegun leaned his weapon against a tree while he relieved himself. Comrade
Tng in the guard group was forced to open fire immediately and killed the enemy
soldier. Faced with this situation, the commander Nguyn Quc Thanh, decided to give
the order to attack. The medium machinegun carried by V Quc Chanh (T Chanh) fired
successive loud bursts of fire into the enemy ranks. The ambush element in the killing
zone simultaneously engaged the enemy decisively. The firepower of the medium
machinegun that Comrade Tng in the guard group had just seized, was used by Comrade
Sau Chin to add to our firepower, firing rounds thick and fast into the enemy who were
outside the ambush site. Attacked by surprise, the enemy panicked and quickly
disintegrated. We killed more than 30, captured 10, and seized 15 weapons including
three medium machineguns. The remaining enemy fled.
The next day, the enemy still in the Hc Dch post also abandoned their post in
fear and fled. Our underground agents in Hc Dch - who were Chu Ro minority people,
brought two of the villages Self-Defence Corps sections to hand over their weapons and
to join the revolutionary armed forces.
The C.45 units battle at Bn Tu was not only an engagement that was highly
successful killing many enemy and seizing a large number of weapons and also
52

Translators Note: The Vit Minh and later the Vit Cng, manufactured over 40 different types of
sng nga tri ie mantis guns. These were locally-produced tube-type recoilless rifles or rocket
launchers dubbed mantis guns as their thin supporting legs resembled those of the mantis insect.
53
* Comrade Nguyn Quc Thanh - the deputy commander of the Province Unit - and concurrently the
company commander, was the commander. Comrade L Thnh Ba (Ba Bi) - a cadre of the Province
Committee; Comrade V Tm - a Province Committee cadre with responsibility for the masses movement
in the villages along Route 15; Comrade T ; and Comrade Ba H were deputy commanders.
54
Translators Note: Literally: quyt chin im decisive point.
55
* Usually, the enemy changed-over one platoon, but on this occasion they had added an extra platoon to
clear the way and to then escort the platoon that had just been relieved back to Ph M.

16
securing the revolutionary base area and liberating a village (the first village liberated in
the Province), but it had greater meaning as it created an affection and a belief in us
among the people.56 The title : Four Four Five troops57 came into being at that time.
With the weapons we had seized, the Province Committee directed the recruitment of
additional new troops for C.45 in order to establish two platoons. Accordingly, one month
after the victory at the Bn Tu Stream, we had three fully-constituted platoons.
One month after the victory at Bn Tu, C.40 deployed for an engagement at
Khnh Lm (Phc Thi) and wiped out a Self-Defence Corps section, seizing all their
weapons.
At the beginning of 1961, C.45 joined with the local Long t District armed
forces to eliminate an enemy platoon at the B p post. In this battle, C.45 employed
both internal and external tactical methods and so achieved a great victory, seizing 30
weapons of various types and equipment for the District troops and the village guerrillas.
The ng Khi Uprising58 across the whole of the South from 1960 created an
extremely important change. The form of the revolutions armed struggle in the South
became clearer each day and expanded rapidly. Our military proselytising elements and
agents who had previously been active among the ranks of the Self-Defence Corps were
withdrawn and formed into armed forces at the Province and local level.
On 15 February 1961, COSVN59 decided to unite the armed forces across the
whole of the South into the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces. Our forces and the
people of B Ra were elated and joined the fighting with a new momentum. The
Province Military Committee was established with Comrade L Minh Thnh as the Head
of the Province Military Committee - with Comrades Nguyn Quc Thanh60 and Nguyn
Vn i as deputies.
At this time, the revolutionary movement in the countryside had expanded widely
and required an armed force as its core to support the masses. The Province Committee
decided to assign a number of cadre and soldiers in the Provinces concentrated force to
become this nucleus in order to create District armed forces. Comrade Bin and a section

56

Translators Note: This battle is also related in less detail in Chapter 5 of: Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg),
Lch s ng (The History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000. but the special weapon
is described as a Mocch ie mortar.
57
Translators Note: This claim is incongruous as 445 was not an entity until about six months later - ie
in about March 1961 see the following footnote 64. The 1991 D445 History makes a similar claim but
not until after the battle of the Long Phc tunnels in April 1963 ie: The term Soldiers of Four Four Five
began to echo resoundingly throughout the region.
58
Translators Note: As noted earlier, the ng Khi Movement or Simultaneous/Concerted Uprising
against the Dim regime (beginning in very late 1959 and peaking in 1960), is cited by communist sources
as the start of the armed struggle in the South. The Uprising reportedly began in M Cy District of Ben Tr
Province in mid-January 1960.
59
Translators Note: The Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN Vn Phng Trung ng Cc Min
Nam) - directed from H Ni and located in the Cambodia/South Vietnam border area north-west of Saigon,
was the communist political and military headquarters responsible for South Vietnam south of the Central
and Southern Highlands - an area termed Nam B (as noted earlier, equating to the French colonial
Cochin China region). Geographically, the COSVN area covered the southern 32 of South Vietnams 44
provinces reportedly containing 14 million of South Vietnams total population of 17.5 million (ie about
80%); 53% of its land mass; and 83% of the rice-growing areas (in 1968) USMACV briefing, Saigon, 9
January 1970 - Sorley, L., Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, 1968-1972 (Modern Southeast Asia
Series), Texas Tech University Press, Lubbock, 2004, p.336. COSVN however, did not control the area of
its geographic coverage described above. Sometimes abbreviated to Min, COSVNs principal cover
designators were R, Nm Trng, and Chn Nam.
60
Translators Note: In a Letter of Introduction dated 12 July 1966, Nguyn Quc Thanh was noted as
having been newly reassigned to the Province Military School. CDEC Log 09-1864-66.

17
were sent to Long t District61; and Comrade Nhn and a section went to Xun Lc
District. Comrade Mi Nng and a section went to Long Thnh District. Comrade Hai
Thun and Nm Kin [sic] together with a section, went to Chu Thnh District.62
Armed propaganda groups were organised to become the concentrated armed forces of
the Districts, and were equivalent to platoons.
At this time, the concentrated armed forces of the Province were also consolidated
and re-organised in order to coincide with the developing situation and the move to a
higher combat posture. At the direction of the Eastern Region Military Committee, the
Province Committee decided to combine the C.40 and C.45 units into one company
C.445 Company, based in the Bng Lng base (Hc Dch village63). All the weapons and
equipment of the cadre and soldiers of the two units were merged to form the first
Province-level armed unit that carried the title 445 Company. That company-level title
was formally promulgated and used from that time.64
445 Company was structured with four platoons (three infantry platoons and a
combat support platoon); communications, reconnaissance, and production management
sections; a medical treatment team; and a Western bugle team.65 Comrade Nguyn Vn
Thanh (T Thanh) was the Company Commander66, Comrade V Quc Chanh (T
61
Translators Note: The t District History (2006) relates an earlier founding ie: The armed
propaganda unit became a District local unit with the title of the 25 th Long t District Company, and in
late November 1960 led by Comrade L Vn Vit laid an ambush at a Ging (on Route 44) Two
enemy in the vehicle were killed including an American advisor.. ng Tn Hng (ed), The History of
the Struggle and Development of the Party Committee, the Forces and the People of t District (19302005), ng Nai Collective Publishing House, Bin Ha, 2006.
62
Translators Note: The Chu c District History (2004) relates at p.108: The armed forces of Chu
Thnh District were established on 5 February 1961 and, titled C.20, at first only comprised seven
comrades with insufficient weapons and ammunition. The communist Chu Thnh District was
restructured and renamed in 1965 ie according to the Chu c District History (2004): In 1965, to
contend with the battle against the Americans, the B Ra-Long Khnh Province Committee combined the
two districts of Chu Thnh and c Thnh to form Chu c District. - Nguyn Cng Danh & L Minh
Ngha et al, Lch s u Tranh Cch Mng Ca ng B V Nhn Dn Huyn Chu c (1930-2000)
The History of the Revolutionary Struggle of the Party Chapter and the People of Chu c District (19302000), Nh Xut Bn Chnh Tr Quc Gi, H Ni, 2004. A local Party History notes that Chu c
District was formed on 24 May 1965 with Nguyn Vn Tin (Nm Tin) as the Secretary of the District
Committee with the Committees base in the jungle at Bng Lng (ng Ngh). Trn Vn Khnh (et
al/tg), Lch s ng (The History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter VII. A draft
history of Chu Thnh District was prepared in 1988 ie: Trn Vn Cng (et al/tg) , Chu Thnh u
Tranh v Xy Dng (1945-1985) S Tho (Chu Thnh District The Struggle and Development 19451985 - Draft), Nh Xut Bn ng Nai/Nh In Thanh Nin, 1988.
63
Translators Note: The small village of Hc Dch was located in the vicinity of YS 3477, about 11
kilometres west of the c Thnh District Sub-Sector that was situated beside Route 2.
64
Translators Note: The formation of the 445th Company at the beginning of 1961 is also related in the
publication: Military Region 7 Headquarters (Qun Khu 7), 50 Nm Lc Lng V Trang Qun Khu 7
(The Armed Forces of Military Region 7: 50 Years), Wattpad, 1995. The Military Region 7 (Eastern
Region) area founded in 1945, was re-established in May 1961 to encompass the provinces of Ty Ninh,
Bnh Dng, Bnh Long, Phc Long, Phc Thnh, Bin Ha and B Ra.
65
Translators Note: The ng Nai History (1986) similarly relates that in 1962, the 445th Company the
concentrated Province Unit, was established with three platoons (120 troops) and sufficient weapons and
led by Nm Ninh ((Nguyn Minh Ninh)) and T Chnh ((V Quc Chanh)). - Phan Ngc Danh , ng
Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.101. Note: a draft version - ie S Tho, is also available, see
Bibliography. For biographical detail on Nguyn Minh Ninh (Nm Ninh) and V Quc Chanh (T Chnh)
and seven other key 445 Battalion cadre, see Annex A Key Cadre.
66
Translators Note: However, according to the earlier 1991 D445 History, at the founding of the 445th
Company: Comrade T was appointed as the company commander of the 445 th Company and Comrade
Nm Ninh ((Nguyn Minh Ninh)) became its political officer and concurrently operated as the secretary of
its Party Chapter. Comrade T Chnh ((V Quc Chanh)) was made second-in-command, and Comrade Ba

18
Chanh) was the Company second-in-command, Comrade Nguyn Minh Ninh was the
Political Officer, and Comrade Ba Quang was the Deputy Political Officer. The
Companys main base was at Bng Lng (Hc Dch).
In its first days after being established, the unit faced many thousands of
difficulties with most of those difficulties arising from external sources which were
unavoidable for any small unit when converted into a larger unit. This included the
perception of the units leadership regarding its role, function, mission, management
capabilities, direction of the units build-up, training, and combat activities etc as well
as the psychological readiness of older cadre and soldiers who had just arrived from
many different sources, to accept the merger and conversion.
Getting a timely grip on that situation, the Province Committee ordered agencies
and the associated units of the two branches military-civil and political-Party, to focus
on coordinating with the Company Headquarters to find ways of resolving each issue by
stages and steps. Next, the Province Military School and the Province Party School began
a large number of training classes to rapidly create cadre in order to raise the standards of
training, technical combat techniques, management capabilities in building the unit, and
to create a new political awareness for the 445 Company cadre. The folk song and dance
group from the Province Committees Political Propaganda Section was located close to
the unit and regularly visited at times in our base, at other times right on the battlefield.
They raised the morale of the cadre and soldiers in a timely way after every victory in
battle, as well as when facing difficulties, challenges, losses, and sacrifices.
Immediately after its founding and while it was still consolidating, 445
Company engaged in its first battle against an enemy sweeping operation at Le [sic] Hill
(about 1.5 2 kilometres as the crow flies from the Bng Lng base). On hearing that a
puppet Civil Guard/Civil Defence Force battalion was moving into our base area, the
Company Headquarters actively organised for a reconnaissance element to follow them
closely to their temporary bivouac position at Le [sic] Hill (a Vng Stream). Having
swiftly organised our forces, a group of approximate platoon strength that was heavily
armed, quickly moved through the jungle in the darkness and rain to attack the enemy at
first light. They attacked the battalion headquarters and inflicted considerable losses,
forcing them to disperse, distracting them from their attack on the base of the Province
Committee and the enemy finally abandoned their operation. In this engagement,
although not many of the enemy were killed or weapons seized, it was significant in
defending our base a site of concern to the unit as it was where we re-organised and also
trained and familiarised our recruits. Additionally, it evidenced the Companys spirit and
determination to dare to attack and for one to strike twenty of the enemy and it
opened the first page of the Battalions subsequent tradition of resolving to fight and
win.67 After that counter-sweeping operation, 445 Company operated across a wide area
from Long Thnh to Xun Lc and from B Ra to Long t, coordinating with the local
District troops and village guerrillas to attack the enemy and to liberate a number of areas.
With the strong support of the armed forces, the people in many places rose up, took
control, and created many new organisations in the hamlets etc. The momentum of the
revolutionary struggle in the Province increased strongly.
Representative of our operational activities at that time was the attack on the Bnh
Sn post. In May 1961, 445 Company moved secretly from the Bng Lng base to attack
the Bnh Sn post (in the Bnh Sn Plantation, Long Thnh District) with the aim of
Qung was appointed deputy political officer. See also the preceding footnote that notes Nm Ninh and
T Chnh as the 445 Company commanders.
67
Translators Note: The engagement at Le [sic] Hill probably Ni L (YS 6263), by 445 Company is not
related in the 1991 D445 Battalion History.

19
seizing a lathe for use in the engineers workshop. The enemy troops stationed in that post
were paid by the plantation owner to protect his property, so their fighting spirit was not
particularly high. Consequently, when we attacked the plantation, we merely fired a few
shots showed the flag68, and the troops in the post fled. We quickly took control of the
plantation, threatened and captured the plantation owner and his deputy, and seized many
weapons and a lot of equipment from the enemys post together with a large amount of
supplies and food. In particular, we took a large-sized lathe and provided it to the
engineers workshop. In this engagement, we mobilised about 200 workers to carry
material off for us - machinery, food, and supplies. Our unit told the families of the
plantation owner and his deputy both French, to bring money in order to ransom them.
In July 1961, 445 Company deployed its 2nd Platoon led by Comrade Sau Chin,
together with a section of the Chu Thnh District troops, to ambush the enemy in an area
near the Phc Hu T-Junction. Our aim was to strike the Self-Defence Corps at the
Long Phc post that regularly conducted patrols to show their flag. However, on the
afternoon that the unit had planned the ambush, the Self-Defence Corps element in the
post did not come out. Our agents reported on the situation and proposed attacking a
group of quisling69 administrators returning from B Ra - as a warning. Comrade Sau
Chin agreed, re-organised our forces, and - stopping their vehicle, killed Lung and
Tung members of Long Phc villages Administrative Council, at about 1630hrs to
1700hrs. On hearing this news, the wicked Commando Platoon of the Phc Tuy Sector
immediately deployed about 30 minutes later. They blocked our withdrawal route
eastward from the Phc Hu T-Junction. When our 1st Section withdrew past that spot,
they encountered the enemy who opened fire first but we suffered neither killed nor
wounded. Our 2nd Section that included Comrade Sau Chin, heard the sound of
gunfire and knowing that our 1st Section had been contacted by the enemy, hurriedly
returned and attacked the enemy Commando Platoon from the flank and the rear and
encircled them. Panic-striken, the commandos fled in the direction of the ricefields. The
result of this engagement was that we killed a number of the enemy, seized seven
weapons, and wounded Kim breaking his leg (very afraid, he later left the commando
unit to work as a civilian, and was subsequently imprisoned).
At the end of 1961, the Staley-Taylor Pacification plan aimed at pacifying the
South in 18 months, was launched. This was basically the first plan of the Americans
Special Warfare strategy.70 The gathering of the people into Strategic Hamlets71 was
68

Translators Note: Presumably, the flag of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam the
Front was formed in December 1960.
Translators Note: The term quislings (bn t) a synonym for traitors, was applied by the
communists to Vietnamese who served the Si Gn government. The English term quisling has its origins
with the infamous World War II Norwegian Nazi collaborator, President Vidkun Quisling (1887-1945). For
government administration in Phc Tuy Province in 1969 see USAID, Public Administration Bulletin,
No.50, Saigon, 1 August 1969. For the Village and Hamlet Reorganization (Decree No.093-TT/NV), 2 June
1969, see pp.41-58. The Bulletin also includes Province and District appointments.
70
Translators Note: The strategy was announced in May 1961 and, together with its component
Pacification program, was colloquially referred to as the Staley/Taylor plan - ie after the Stanford
University academic Eugene Staley and US General Maxwell Taylor (later US Ambassador in the Republic
of Vietnam 1964-1965). For a useful contemporary review of Pacification to the end of 1968, see Young,
E.J., Stability in Rural Vietnam, December 1968, VCAT Item No.13510141001.
71
Translators Note: The Strategic Hamlet (p Chin Lc) program was wider than the earlier
Agroville resettlement program begun by President Dim in 1959. In 1964 ie post-Dim, the Strategic
Hamlets program was revitalized as the New Life Hamlets (p i Mi) - and in 1965 retitled
Secure Hamlets (p Tn Sinh ie New Life Hamlets, but in Sino-Vietnamese). For a communist
account, see: The Failure of Special War 1961-65, Vietnamese Studies, No.11, Hanoi, 1965 VCAT Item
No.2120201001.
69

20
elevated to become a national policy. In March 1962, the Americans and Dim
commenced their Sunrise Campaign.72 They combined their regular main-force units,
Civil Guard/Civil Defence Force, Self-Defence Corps, and police on a large scale from
company-level up to regiment-level to launch highly destructive attacks into the
provinces of the Eastern Nam B Region in order to round up the people into strategic
hamlets. In B Ra, the enemy concentrated a large force and launched a sweeping
operation Thunder and Wind, into the Hc Dch base.73
In April 1962, the enemy began to build model strategic hamlets at An Nht (in
Long in Sub-Sector), Ha Long (Long L Sub-Sector), and at Bnh Gi (c Thnh
Sub-Sector). They established the Vn Kip Training Centre74 in B Ra; consolidated the
Long L Sub-Sector; further strengthened their 611th and 612th Civil Guard/Civil Defence
Force Companies under the Xuyn Mc Sub-Sector; and established posts from Ni Nhn
Mountain to the bridges at Cu Di, Cu Trng and Sui Cat to support the gathering up
of villagers and the setting-up of strategic hamlets in that area. Our armed forces and the
people of B Ra Province were forced into great hardships by these schemes and plots of
the enemy.
To confront the enemys scheme to gather the people and establish strategic
hamlets in the territory of B Ra, the Province Committee gave the task to the Province
armed forces to join together with the local armed forces and actively strike the enemy
and support our political forces and those of the masses of the three villages of Ha Long,
Long Phc, and Long Tn in Chu c District; and a number of villages in Long t
District.
In Long Phc, the 445 Company Headquarters tasked Nguyn Vn Li to kill
i t. i t was a wicked thug who owed many blood debts to our countrymen in
Long Phc. As a youth, Li had volunteered to join our troops and was quickly trained
in reconnaissance techniques and was sent to work tending buffaloes for a family in
Long Phc. After many days of closely studying our ways of fighting, Li was given a
long-barrelled revolver by our Political Officer Nguyn Minh Ninh. He hid the weapon
under a basket of mangoes and went off to sell them. Li got close to t in a tailors
shop near the Self-Defence Corps post in Long Phc where t usually sat and chatted
with the owner. Li fired very suddenly shooting and wounding t in broad daylight.
After his attack on that thug, Li went into the jungle permanently with the unit and was
appointed into 445 Companys bugle group although he was only 13 years of age. t
avoided being killed but did not dare to be as bold as before. The villagers of Long Phc
were very elated by this incident.
After the shooting of the thug in Long Phc, 445 Company studied ways of
attacking the Self-Defence Corps at the post in the Phc Tnh market. From studying the
information provided by our infrastructure agents, it was apparent that the enemy there
were very subjective and lacked awareness. They would routinely leave the post, stroll
into the market, eat and drink, and prey on the people. At the same time, we also learnt
that the routine and activities of a commando group led by Mi Du, included
regularly travelling to the Phc Tnh market by civilian bus. With forward and
innovative planning, in June 1962, 445 Company prepared a platoon disguised as troops
72

Translators Note: Operation Sunrise launched in Bnh Dng Province in late March 1962, began
the Strategic Hamlet Program. In 1962, the focus of the Program was the six provinces around Si Gn
(including Phc Tuy) and Kontum Province. Initially, 11,316 strategic hamlets were planned but the
program faltered with the assassination of President Ng nh Dim in November 1963.
73
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History adds: but they were driven back by the 445th Company.
74
Translators Note: The ARVN Vn Kip National Training Centre was located on B Ra Towns eastern
outskirts and included the US MACORDS Team 89 compound.

21
of Mi Dus commando group. Our disguised platoon was led by Comrade T the
Company Commander. By night, our men moved secretly down from the Minh m base
to occupy an area of new jungle (on c M Hill) near the L Vi T-Junction. In the
morning - at between about 7.30am and 8.00am, the first bus from the direction of Long
in appeared. We intended to stop the bus, but we feared being discovered because at
the time a section of Self-Defence Corps troops were opening up the road. So, we held
our ground and waited to stop the second bus at about 9.30am to 10.00am. At that time,
the Self-Defence Corps element on security patrol would have returned to rest at their
post. Our false commando platoon was set down by the bus at the top of the market,
and then crossed the crowded market and entered the Phc Tnh post without raising any
suspicions at all. In the post at that time, there was only a communications soldier as all
the others had gone out, and were scattered about seeking something to eat. Having
threatened and captured the soldier - and seized the armoury, our Platoon Commander
Sau Chin struck the drum that the enemy soldiers used for training, warning, etc - then
our troops departed the place. We seized 15 weapons of various types and all the military
equipment - and withdrew in the direction of the Ca Lp River. There, our infrastructure
agents had prepared two boats to ferry our troops across the river for the move back to the
Minh m base.75 Having crossed the river, our troops withdrew in the direction of G
Sm (in Vng Tu) and waited until dark before crossing the river and then returning to
the Minh m base. On the withdrawal route, we distributed pamphlets and
propagandized to encourage the villagers.
That was 445 Companys first engagement using deception. It was very daring,
and we had been able to maintain secrecy and surprise for quite a long period of time
thus enabling us to achieve a complete victory, particularly in political terms. The unit
had successfully and openly conducted armed propaganda in an area settled by Christian
refugees ie all Catholics.76 On our side, everyone was safe. The armed propaganda
action at Phc Tnh evidenced the thoughtful preparation of the unit in a new way a
public attack by day using disguises. If they had been discovered no matter at what
stage, when moving into their assembly area, then they could have been surrounded by
the enemy and wiped out.
In August 1962, 445 Company employed a platoon to conduct an ambush at
Ging (Long Hi) to wipe out Su L and his wicked commando platoon. Su L led a
commando platoon in Long in District. Every day, he would lead his platoon on search
operations, destroying our revolutionary infrastructure in the nearby areas. Capturing our
cadre or infrastructure members, Su L would cut open their stomaches and remove the
livers and then return to the Long in market and eat them during a drinking session.
Determined that Su L and his commando group must suffer retributive punishment, 445
75

Translators Note: As noted, the Minh m is a range of hills and was a Vit Minh/Vit Cng base
area/secret zone within the areas/boundaries of the villages of Tam An, Phc Long Hi, Phc Hi and
Long Hi (of Long t District in modern-day B Ra-Vng Tu Province). The Minh m area is more
than nine kilometres long and almost five kilometres at its widest. See: The Minh m Base History (2006)
ie: Phm Ch Thn, Cn C Minh m 1945-1975 (The Minh m Base 1945-1975), B Ra-Vng Tu
Province Information and Cultural Office, 2006 translated extracts at Annex M in Chamberlain, E.P.,
D445, op.cit., 2011. Australian forces commonly referred to the area as the Long Hi Hills.
76
Translators Note: The villagers of Phc Tnh were almost all Catholic principally comprising
refugees from the North following the 1954 Geneva Accords. In 1970, its population was 10,697 in four
hamlets. The Catholic percentages of the hamlets were recorded as: 97%, 97%, 66%, and 96% respectively.
The village was supposedly founded by Emperor Gia Long in the very early 19th Century when he stopped
there to take on water. In the modern era, it was re-founded by 2,000 Catholics from the North in 1954.
Bnh Gi village (see footnote 122) in central Phc Tuy Province was also founded by Northern Catholic
refugees.

22
Company devised a plan to ambush and wipe out the enemy in the Ging area when
Su L and his commando platoon were conducting a search operation at Long Hi.
Falling into our ambush, Su L and his group were wiped out, ending the days of
brutality that they had inflicted on the people and our infrastructure agents in the Long
in area.77
Following that action, a platoon of 445 Company conducted an ambush to kill Thu
and his pacification group78 in the area of the Ha Long T-Junction. Thu was the group
leader a Sub-Sector pacification cadre who had engaged in many wicked crimes deceiving, enticing, and trying to win-over the people. He had raped women and
destroyed much of our revolutionary infrastructure in the Ha Long area. Once, on a
pacification operation, he had shot and killed Miss Bu one of our movements cadre in
p Bc hamlet of Ha Long. After she had been killed, Thu heartlessly raped her. His
vile act greatly outraged the local people. With the assistance of the villagers, a
reconnaissance team from 445 Company led by L Vn Tranh79, concealed themselves
in a scorpion tree for several days in order to determine Thus routine and movements. As
a result of that reconnaissance of the enemy, the unit devised a suitable plan to completely
wipe out the pacification group and Thu by surprise in an open area of ground.80
At the beginning of 1963, COSVN decided to establish B Bin Province by
merging the two provinces of B Ra and Bin Ha with Comrade Nguyn Vn Kim
[sic] as the Secretary of the Province Committee, and Comrade L Minh Thnh (Sau
Thnh) as the Province Unit Commander.81 Subsequently, L Minh Thnh was assigned to
the Military Regions Central Rear Services Agency, and Comrade Nguyn Vit Hoa
(Mi Th) was appointed as the Province Unit Commander. The central task of the
whole Party was affirmed as speeding up our three-pronged attacks82 and destroying the
strategic hamlets across the Province. Our method of struggle was to coordinate the threepronged attacks, use our weapons as leverage, kill the thugs, destroy their oppression, and
move towards the disintegration of the enemys system of strategic hamlets.

77

Translators Note: According to the t District History (2006): Long t Districts C25 Company
coordinated with the Provinces C445 unit to mount a daylight mobile ambush on the road at a Ging
joining An Ngi to Long Hi wiping out an eight-man commando section led by Su L and seizing eight
weapons. ng Tn Hng (ed), The History t District (1930-2005), op.cit., 2006.
78
Translators Note: The killing of Thu in August 1962 is very similarly related in The History of the Ha
Long Village Party Chapter (1930-2005), op.cit., 2009, except that Thu is described as a member of the
Popular Forces. For translated extracts of the Ha Long Village History, see Annex N in Chamberlain,
E.P., D445 , op.cit., 2011.
79
Translators Note: L Tranh (L Vn Tranh, aka Nm Tranh) was interviewed by T. Burstall in
November 1987 see Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns A Long Tan veteran discovers the other side of
Vietnam, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1990, pp.141-145. L Tranh claimed to have later been
the deputy commander of 445 Battalion in 1972-1974 see Annex B. In both the 1991 and 2004 D445
Histories, L Tranh (Nm Tranh) was cited for his exploits in the defence of the Long Phc base on 21
May 1966. In this 2004 D445 History, he is later noted as one of two Battalion 2ics in May 1972.
80
Translators Note: A passage appears to have been inadvertently omitted. The 1991 D445 History adds:
Following this, we deployed a platoon to secretly ambush and eliminate Thu in Ha Long. A further seven
enemy were captured. The most notorious and wicked thugs in the Long in, Ha Long region had been
judged and punished and this limited the brutal and cruel activities of the other thugs.
81
Translators Note: The Vit Cng B Bin Province encompassing B RaLong KhnhBin Ha was
first established in April 1963 see Annex J, Higher Headquarters. Nguyn Vn Kim was also known as
Nguyn Sn H see the Chu c District History (2004).
82
Translators Note: Three-pronged or three spearhead attacks - literally: ba mi giap cng, was a
commonly-used term descibing a strategy of: military action, political action, and propaganda/proselytising/
agitation among enemy troops. The term three-pronged attacks was also applied to describe attacks by:
local troops, militia, and guerrillas.

23
The punishment of the most notorious and brutal thugs in the Long in and Ha
Long areas made the other wicked thugs stay their hand, and they didnt dare show their
faces as boldly as before. Many of the Self-Defence Corps posts on the outskirts were
automatically abandoned. The people were elated and increasingly had confidence in the
struggle against the enemy who had been dragging the villagers into strategic hamlets.
By the middle of 1963, the enemys system of strategic hamlets in Long t was
relatively complete. Apart from the model strategic hamlet at An Nht (Phc Tnh), in
Long in the fences of the strategic hamlets ran from the Bu Thnh T-Junction past
Long Phng up to the grave of Mr Huyn and to Dinh C joining with the strategic
hamlet at An Ngi village. In t , the fences encircled the three villages of Phc
Thnh, Phc Th, and Phc Ha Long - with hamlet gates set up on Routes 52 and 23.
In the sandy areas at Phc Li, Long M, and Phc Hi, the fences of the strategic
hamlets cut across Routes 44 and 52 and ran along the coast to the Con post up to Hng
Dng and past the ch post (the Sp post). Depending on the terrain, the fences of the
strategic hamlets had at least three rows of barbed wire. Outside the fences, there were
ditches with a width of two to three metres, two-and-a-half metres deep, with bamboo
panji stakes and illuminating flares.
In the Xuyn Mc area83, at Bnh Chu village, they built two strategic hamlets:
Lang Gng and Bn Li. The village of Bng Ring had two strategic hamlets: p Mt
and p Hai; Phc Bu village had three hamlets: Xm Ry, B T and Ni Nhn on
Route 23; Ba Mu village had one hamlet; Lang B village had one; and Bu Lm village
had three. The strategic hamlets for refugees were wholly for refugees from Qung Nam
and Qung Ngi Provinces. Strategic hamlets were established for Nng84 refugees of
1954. Phc Bu village had two hamlets: G C and B T [sic]. In Xuyn Mc village
- in the centre of the Sub-Sector, the enemy built a large strategic hamlet with strong
fences surrounding the hamlets of Nhn Ngha, Nhn Tr, Nhn c, and Nhn Tm.85
In Chu Thnh District, the enemy established the strategic hamlets of Ph M,
M Xun, Hi Bi, Phc Ha (three hamlets), Chu Hi, Kim Hi, Ha Long, Long
Phc, Sng Cu, Bnh Ba, Xun Sn, Ngi Giao, Bnh Gi (three hamlets) located
along Routes 15 and 2. Among these, the strategic hamlet of Bnh Gi was regarded as a
model hamlet an inviolable fortress.
Supporting the movement to destroy the strategic hamlets, the Province armed
forces regularly deployed to the principal areas to attack the enemy with raids and
ambushes. On the night of 24/25 August 1963, 445 Company joined with the Long t
District forces and the Military Regions 800th Battalion86 together with the guerrillas of
Tam Phc and Phc Tnh villages, to concentrate for an attack on Ng nh Dims
palace at Long Hi, the officers convalescence centre, and the offices of the public
security police at Long Hi. We killed tens of the enemy including Second Lieutenant
. This was a large-scale battle with combined and relatively large forces that had a
83

Translators Note: The Xuyn Mc District Unit the 51st Company, had been founded in October 1962
in the village - V Kim Hanh (et al), Xuyn Mc Khang Chin 1945-1975, op.cit., 1989, p.115.
84
Translators Note: As noted, the Nng are a Chinese ethnic minority 50,000 fled as refugees to the
South from North Vietnam in 1954, led by General Vong A Sang. Separately, there is a Vietnamese Nng
minority people whose homeland is in the northern border provinces of northern Vietnam.
85
Translators Note: This paragraph is included in V Kim Hanh (et al), Xuyn Mc Khang Chin 19451975, op.cit., 1989, pp.115-116.
86
Translators Note: In June 1962, the title of the 500 th VC Battalion changed to the 800th Battalion/ng
Nai Battalion. When the 274th VC Regiment was later founded in March 1965 at the Phc Thnh Festival
Place ie Sn L Phc Thnh, in War Zone D, the 800th Battalion was an inaugural unit and was
initially retitled as H-12 Battalion. CDEC Log 08-076-66. For the 500th Battalion formed in 1972, see
footnotes 532, and 538.

24
great impact on the psychology of the revolutionary masses - and on the puppet troops
and administration as well.87
To further fulfil the above mission, the Province Committee assigned Comrade L
Thnh Ba as the head of the Committee to destroy the strategic hamlets. The 1st Platoon
(445 Company, B Ra [sic] Province) was deployed to Long Phc to assist the villagers
in digging tunnels and to stay close to, and attack, the enemy. The Long Phc Party
Chapter mobilised the villagers and the forces to participate in the digging of the tunnels.
The Committee also mobilised the participation of labourers88 from Ha Long and from
many of the villages along Route 2. Having just restored the stretches of tunnels
remaining from the time of the resistance war against the French, the Committee directed
the construction of a main tunnel from p ng hamlet to p Bc hamlet. Off this main
tunnel, there were many side branches that all joined together to create a solid and linked
complex. Within the tunnels, there were storehouses full of weapons, food89, tanks of
water, and first-aid stations etc.90
Having discovered that our forces were restoring the Long Phc tunnels, on 5
March 1963, the enemy deployed a Civil Guard/Civil Defence Force Company, a Combat
Support Platoon from the Sector, and a Self-Defence Corps Platoon from the Long Phc
post together with M113 support, to sweep into Long Phc. Having predicted this
situation, the Province and District reconnaissance elements and the village guerrillas
took the initiative and blocked the enemys advance at some distance. Meanwhile, our
remaining forces manned the tunnels, organised a large number of fighting pits, and set
many minefields in order to wipe out the enemy. The enemy was strong in number and
heavily equipped but were completely surprised by their inability to access the tunnel
systems. They were forced to withdraw to the main roads, re-group, and fire their artillery
into the hamlets. In more than 20 days of fierce combat, the enemys plan to gather the
people into strategic hamlets could still not be achieved. On our side, combined with our
armed activities, the village Party chapters mobilised our core comrades members of the
Womens Association, to constantly demonstrate against the enemy firing their artillery,

87

Translators Note: These attacks in late August 1963 are related out of chronological sequence, but are
referred to in several other communist histories. The Minh m Base History (2006) relates that on 24
August 1963, the 45 [sic] Company Provincial Unit in conjunction with Long t District guerrillas and
elements of the Military Regions 800th Battalion attacked an officers recreation facility at Long Hi
killing and wounding 19 and seizing 40 weapons see Phm Ch Thn, Cn C Minh m 1945-1975 The Minh m Base , op.cit., 2006, p.45. The t District History (2006), p.79 omitting reference
to 445 Company relates: on the night of 24-25 August 1963, the District troops (C25), Eastern Region
troops (D800), and the Long Hi guerrillas attacked Ng nh Dims holiday centre and the puppet
officers recreation area (the Huy Hong hotel now the holiday centre for the Province union). We killed
and wounded 19 enemy including the wicked Second Lieutenant , and seized more than 40 weapons
and a large amount of military equipment. A similar account appears in The Long t District History
(1986), p.113 see translated extracts at Annex L to Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit., 2011.
88
Translators Note: For Civilian Labourer Policies probably issued by VC Military Region 5, that
includes: categories (A, B, C), ages, work periods, exemptions, privileges, load weights (eg adult male:
25kg in lowland areas for trips of 20 days or more) including for pack bicycles, awards, disciplinary action,
etc - see VCAT Item No.2311603006.
89
Translators Note: Literally lng thc translated as grain. This term is sometimes more broadly
translated as cereals encompassing rice, corn/maize, manioc, potatoes and beans; and is also
occasionally translated in other contexts more generally as rations, provisions, or supplies.
90
Translators Note: The other major Vit Cng tunnel systems in Phc Tuy Province were at Kim Long
in the Vit Cngs Chu c District and at Hc Dch in todays Tn Thnh District. The Long Phc
tunnels were declared an historical site by the B Ra-Vng Tu authorities on 9 January 1990 see ia
o Long Phc, 26 September 2010 note that the item also claims two Australian battalions were
destroyed at the Long Tn battle in August 1966.

25
stealing property, and arresting innocent villagers and also encouraged enemy soldiers
to oppose the war.
Taking advantage of the enemys failure to attack, the Committee directed the
mobilisation of the people in the villages and our labourers to continue repairing and
expanding the tunnels, and strengthening the fighting positions and the firing loop-holes
in p Bc and p Ty hamlets and preparing for new battles.
On 1 April 1963, the enemy reinforced and deployed a Ranger battalion and Civil
Guard/Civil Defence Force elements equivalent to an infantry regiment, supported by a
platoon of M113 armoured vehicles, a flight of combat aircraft, and artillery fire support
to launch a new attack on the entrances to the tunnels at p Bc.91 A column of enemy
vehicles advanced violently. The leading M113 struck a home-made mine created by
Comrade Thai Vn Cho a 445 Company reconnaissance soldier, at the Cy Me culvert
and burnt fiercely. The column of M113s stopped suddenly, not daring to move towards
the tunnels. Seizing the moment, our troops launched several counter-attacks on the
enemy infantry. In the afternoon, the enemy withdrew from the area of the entrances to
the tunnels.
On 8 April 1963 (the fiercest day of fighting in the 44 days and nights), the enemy
rushed headlong to destroy the tunnels with the aim of forcing the people into the
strategic hamlet at Long Phc. On our side, the Companys fighting troops were
reinforced with a platoon. At 8am, the enemy concentrated to attack. The main thrust of
their infantry and tanks was focused to seize the firing loop-holes around our combat
positions at the entrance to the p Bc tunnels. Two of our Companys reconnaissance
soldiers Comrade Tt and Comrade Tranh, used grenades to destroy a M113 at the
Tranh Clearing (behind p Bc). The enemy had to temporarily halt their attack and reorganise their formations. At 10am, they continued with a new attack attempting to seize
the tunnel entrance and eight of our firing loop-holes. In the afternoon, the enemy
grouped for a strong attack against the defensive positions of 445 Companys 2nd Platoon
in p Ty (about 400 metres from the p Bc battlefield). There, the enemy were
decisively opposed, but at the end of the afternoon we had expended almost all our
ammunition and had used all of our grenades so we had to withdraw into the tunnels.
The enemy then seized that battleground and converged their forces to take p Bc.
In the p Bc area, we had 12 firing loop-holes (set among banana trees and
covered with thick planks, earth, and grass). At about 11am, the situation became
extremely dangerous as the enemy used 12 M113s to tightly cover over the 12 loop-holes
with the vehicles underbellies pressing down on the loop-holes which were also the
main entrances that we used for entry and exit. The enemy used megaphones to call on us
to surrender threatening that if we didnt surrender then they would throw petrol bombs
into the tunnels and burn everyone to death. At this time, there were about 250 people in
the tunnels comprising our civilian cadre, guerrillas, core agents, and a platoon of 445
Company. All were trapped and, unable to escape, were forced into a last-ditch defence.
It was pitch black in the tunnels, and the silent and pervading atmosphere was stifling.
Comrade Nguyn Minh Ninh 445 Companys Political Officer who was personally
leading our combat platoon, was also trapped underground. In this dangerous situation,
Comrade Nguyn Minh Ninh discussed the circumstances with V Quc Chanh (T
91

Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History describes these engagements at the Long Phc tunnels in
greater detail eg: on the enemy: the 38th Ranger Battalion and the 61st Civil Guard/Civil Defence Force
Battalion coordinated with Self-Defence Corps elements and aircraft and artillery support to launch an
operation over several days with the aim of wiping out the Long Phc liberated zone. At this time, the 445
Companys strength was over 120 organised in three platoons. One platoon was operating with the local
combat force at An Ngi (t ) with the other two platoons in Long Phc.

26
Chanh) the Company Commander [sic] to find a way of escape. There was only one
anti-tank mine left that had earlier been locally-manufactured from a 15 kilogram bomb.
It had been used previously, but had failed to detonate. The bomb was opened for
inspection, and it was seen that the wires had been incorrectly joined. Nguyn Minh Ninh
the Political Officer, rejoined the wires and then decided to task two of our soldiers
(Mi Dm and Su Bo)92 to use a wooden plank to affix the mine to the underside of
the vehicle blocking the tunnel entrance. Until the two soldiers returned to their hiding
positions, Comrade Nguyn Minh Ninh and Comrade V Quc Chanh (T Chanh) waited
one holding the battery and the other the electric detonating device. A resounding
explosion split the air, and the enemy vehicle was thrown up into the air, and fell on its
side with its tracks broken.
Exploiting the situation, many of the cadre and soldiers of 445 Company leapt up
from the tunnel entrances and loop-holes and hurled grenades at the enemy. These
included Comrade Su Bo who threw an illuminating incendiary grenade at an M113
nearby and in conjunction with our sniping fire, forced the enemy to withdraw in panic
from the area of the tunnel entrances. From then until the afternoon, the enemy launched
a large number of attacks but did not dare to again place their vehicles over our firing
loop-holes. They were constantly met with strong resistance from our forces defending
the tunnels with the fiercest resistance coming from the cadre and soldiers of 445
Company. At about 4pm, the enemy withdrew from the area of the tunnels and returned
to their positions at the Long L Sub-Sector.
That night, as ordered from above, the platoon from 445 Company and the
majority of the cadre and people secretly left the tunnels and dispersed into the
countryside to consolidate our forces. A section of 445 led by Comrade By Sang was
detached to remain behind and coordinate with the Long Phc village guerrillas and the
District troops (20th Company93) to stick close to the enemy and continue the fight.
In the following two days, the enemy continued with many attacks. They used
their M113 armoured vehicles, recoilless rifles, and various types of mortars to fire from a
distance into the area of the tunnels. At the same time, they also conducted
reconnaissance patrols and caused stress and psychological and physical exhaustion for
our forces still holding the tunnels. The enemys aim was to prepare for a decisive attack
if the opportunity arose.
On 11 April 1963, the enemy assembled a large force (including armoured
vehicles and bulldozers) to attack into the tunnel complex. They used their recoilless
rifles to destroy our fighting positions, and used their bulldozers to cover the tunnel
entrances and to collapse the coverings of our communication trenches. The M113s
crushed and flattened the surface of the ground. Our buried mine-detonating electrical
cables were all completely cut and destroyed. In the tunnels, our effective strength, and
our weapons and equipment became casualties and represented a large loss as they could

92

Translators Note: Nguyn Mi Dm - probably Qua h Vn Mi was later noted as the commander
of the Battalions 1st Company in February 1968 see footnotes 95, 96 and 325*. Nguyn Vn Bo (Su
Bo), noted above as a section commander, was interviewed post-War by T. Burstall in August 1987. Bo
b.1943 near Long M, declared that he had joined the guerrilla army at 16, and had been a company
commander in 445 Battalion in the period 1966-1968 (but had not been involved personally in the Battle
of Long Tn) then posted to 5th VC Division - Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, pp.65-66. See
also the following footnotes 96, 143*, 325*, 334, 360*, and 396* - and also Annex B.
93
Translators Note: The 20th Company was the Chu Thnh/Chu c District Unit ie as noted: The
armed forces of Chu Thnh District that were established on 5 February 1961 and, titled C.20 (C20, C20), at first only comprised seven comrades with insufficient weapons and ammunition. - Chu c
District History (2004) ie: Nguyn Cng Danh , Chu c District, op.cit., 2004, p.108.

27
not be replaced in a timely way. In this adverse situation, our forces defending the tunnels
decided to withdraw completely to save our strength.
As a result of the 44 days and nights of staunchly hanging-on and fighting in the
tunnels, 445 Company and the local armed forces had defeated the enemy although at
the peak of the fighting (8 April), we were outnumbered by ten to one. The enemy also
had a powerful armoured force in support. However, we drove hundreds of enemy from
the battleground and destroyed four M113 armoured vehicles.
Following that battle, many of the cadre and soldiers of 445 Company were
recommended by our higher command for the award of medals94 and for letters of
appreciation. In particular, two soldiers Nguyn Vn Bo and Quach Vn Mi95, were
proposed by our Political Officer Nguyn Minh Ninh, for admission into the Party on
the battlefield. This was approved by our higher authority, and Comrade Vn Chng
(Ba Lin) as the representative of the Party Committee, organised the admission of
Comrades Bo and Mi at the units base camp at t Gai (Long Phc).96
The battle at the fighting tunnels of Long Phc had proved the courage, will, and
perseverance of 445 Company to attack and to wipe out the enemy. 445 Battalion had
endured long days of fighting against a more numerous and better equipped enemy. In our
role as a premier force, we had coordinated harmoniously with the District troops, militia,
and guerrillas to fight a large battle, had wiped out much of the enemys capability, and
staunchly held-on and fought. The battle had clearly evidenced that the features of
peoples war and the coordination of the three forces (provincial, district, and
militia/guerrillas) were completely compatible. This battle also showed the united spirit of
our forces and the people (the fish and the water) fighting together side-by-side to
defend our homeland. The battle of the tunnels and the creation of combat villages
produced a jagged saw-toothed pattern of control97 across the B Ra Vng Tu
battlefield from the very first years of the anti-American resistance war of national
salvation.
In May 1963, 445 Company was given the task of destroying the strategic hamlet
at Bu Lm ((Xuyn Mc District)), expanding the liberated zone, and creating
favourable conditions for the corridor used to move weapons from the landing wharf at
Lc An98 to the bases. Bu Lm was a hamlet located on the border of our base area
94

Translators Note: USMACV/CDEC translators in Saigon were not always consistent in translating
terminology for NVA/VC medals. The author has translated Hun chng qun cng as the Military
Exploits Medal, and the lower grade Hun chng chin cng as the Military Feats Medal.
95
Translators Note: Qua h Vn Mi (aka Mi Dm, real name: Qua h Vn Tm) born in Phc Hi
village in 1941, was noted as a platoon commander in the 1 st Company. See his Personal History Statement
dated 25 August 1965 at CDEC Log 12-2394-66.
96
Translators Note: The fighting at Long Phc is also described in the local Party history including the
admission into the Party of Nguyn Vn Bo and Qua h Vn Mi. Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s
ng (The History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter VI.
97
Translators Note: According to an early 1964 US report: A recent report from COMUSMACV states
that the Viet Cong exercise 80% control in Phc Tuy, a non-critical province. It thus appears that Phc
Tuy should be considered as a possible addition to the list of critical provinces ((ie with the critical 13 of
the total of 43 provinces)). Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum: The Situation in South Vietnam
(OCI 1061/64), 28 February 1964. VCAT Item No.F029100030389. For areas of control as assessed by
USMACV at 31 May 1966 (11.5% of the Phc Tuy population under VC control), see footnote 229.
98
Translators Note: Lc An is located on the coast in the Sng Ray River estuary about five kilometres
north-east of Phc Hi village. The first landing of weapons and equipment from North Vietnam in May
1961 is related in the t District History (2006) ie ng Tn Hng (ed), The History of t
District , op.cit., 2006, p.179; and also in the earlier Long t District History (1986) - ie Phan Ngc Danh
, Lch S u Tranh Cch Mng Ca Huyn Long t, op.cit., 1986, pp.114-115 giving the landing
date as 29-30 November - see Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit., 2011, Annex L. However, according

28
region at Xuyn Mc. At Bu Lm, the enemy had created a model strategic hamlet.
The hamlet was surrounded by a two-metres wide communication trench that was twometres deep and protected by a barbed-wire fence. The hamlet had two entrance gates that
were guarded throughout both the day and the night. The enemy had decided to turn that
place into an anti-Communist fortress by creating divisions among our minority people
and religious people and arousing the villagers to oppose and destroy the revolution.
Previously on 30 December 1963 [sic], our Company had attacked the enemy at Bng
Ring.
Having been provided with information by our underground agents on the
activities of the enemy in the strategic hamlet, 445 Company secretly deployed and
concealed three platoons within the village. Comrade Nguyn Vit Hoa (Mi Th)99
the Commander of the Province Unit, personally accompanied the Company. On the night
of 15 January 1964 [sic]100, 445 Company split into three groups and suddenly broke into
the Bu Lm strategic hamlet. It was dark and difficult to distinguish between friend and
foe, and when we opened fire one of our comrades was accidentally killed (Comrade
Lim from Ha Long village). With this surprise casualty and unable to further develop
our attack, the Headquarters ordered our troops to withdraw back to our assembly area.
There, the Headquarters met and exchanged ideas. Our Political Officer L
Minh Vit101, put forward the idea: that as we had deployed - but had not yet been able to
attack the enemy and had suffered a casualty - we needed to consolidate immediately and
attack the enemy directly in order to maintain the fighting will of our men in the unit. We
could exploit the aspect that the enemy were subjective and complacent, thinking that we
usually came into the hamlets to conduct armed propaganda during the night and

to the The Minh m Base History (2006), the vessel arrived at Lc An on the night of 3 October 1963
see Phm Ch Thn, Minh m Base, op.cit., 2006, p.45. A political/labour history also cites 3 October and
relates that the onward movement was managed by Group 1500 (on 1500 - previously Group 555)
assisted by the 5th Company of 800 Battalion (a Regional element) - Lin on Lao ng , Lch s ,
op.cit., 2011, p.16. A detailed account of this supply operation - confirming the date as 3 October, can be
found in Nguyn Qu i, Hnh trnh t nhng con tu khng s, in Hng hi VN - Mt thi ho hung
(Nhng tp th v c nhn tiu biu ngnh GTVT 1945-2005) eg the vessel, Number 41, was captained
by L Vn Mt and landed 40 tonnes of weapons and stores. This landing is briefly described in McNeill,
I., To Long Tan The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950-1966, Allen & Unwin/Australian War
Memorial, St Leonards, 1993, pp.219-220 citing the Long t District History (1986). However, in that
official Australian history, on 1500 (ie Group 1500) - a logistics element of the 84th Rear Services
Group (on 84), was incorrectly translated as 1500 cadres. Further landings at Lc An (29 November,
1 February 1965) are related in extracts from the on 125 History ie - Phan L Hong H, Chuyn k v
ng mn H Ch Minh trn bin: Huyn thoi nhng con tu, vietbao.vn, 30 April 2005. For the
landings at Lc An and the operations of on 1500 see also the detail in: Nguyn nh Thng, Trn Ton,
Trn Quang Toi, H Sn i (eds), ng H Ch Minh Trn Bin B Ra-Vng Tu, (The H Ch
Minh Trail by Sea - B Ra-Vng Tu), Nh Xut Bn Vn Ha Vn Ngh, TP H Ch Minh, 2014; and
footnotes 119 and 131.
99
Translators Note: Mi Th - a military cadre, returned ((ie from North Vietnam)) at the end of 1962
and became the Province Commander. - Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.101.
In late 1963, Nguyn Vit Hoa (Mi Th) was noted as the Province Unit Commander - ie of then B Ra
Province.
100
Translators Note: The date 15 November 1964 is out of chronological sequence and is patently
incorrect. In the similar account of the attack on Bu Lm in the 1991 D445 History, that date is not
included.
101
Translators Note: L Minh Vit - nickname: Su Vit (Six Vit), was subsequently (1966) the Deputy
Political Officer of the B Ra Province Unit.

29
withdrew before dawn. Accordingly, if we returned and attacked strongly, the enemy
would be surprised and unable to react in time.
With the agreement of V Quc Chanh the Company Commander, and the
approval of Nguyn Vit Hoa the Province Unit Commander, the unit regrouped and
deployed back to the C strategic hamlet. Following their routine, every morning before
going on their clearing patrol, the enemy gathered to have breakfast in the market. Our
unit deployed two platoons to ambush both sides of the road, with a platoon at the rear.
Comrade B (B Gi)102 had the heavy machinegun with our leading group at the
military barrier in the market. When the enemy fell into our ambush, B Gi pulled the
trigger on the heavy machinegun. At the same time, the 445 Company soldiers all opened
fire together. Despite being attacked by surprise, the enemy stubbornly returned fire.
After a few minutes of fighting, we had killed 27 of the enemy (including the brutal
Hng). In our rear group led by Platoon Commander By Sang, Nguyn Phi Hng
staunchly held back the enemy and died courageously. Nguyn Phi Hng was a new
soldier from Phc Bu village, and was young, handsome, and fought very bravely.
Before dying, he raised his head up and shouted three times: Long live H Ch Minh.
Nguyn Phi Hngs courageous sacrifice will be sung about by future generations. Our
Political Officer L Minh Vit wrote a poem in praise of him that included the verse:
You fell as the sun was just rising,
Dawn came and the grass in the early morning was covered in dew .103*
After the battle, the cadre and soldiers of 445 Company together with the
villagers under the leadership of the Party Chapter, rose up and destroyed the Bu Lm
strategic hamlet. Having completed its task outstandingly at Bu Lm, 445 Company was
deployed to the Route 2 battlefield to join with the Cao Su District104 Unit in conducting
armed propaganda and mobilising the masses. Immediately on the first day of our
deployment, C.445 won a resounding victory in a chance encounter with the forces of
c Thnh District in the area of c M hamlet (Bnh Ba). This engagement was
unforeseen by both sides.
The c Thnh District Chief had received intelligence information that at about
2pm each day Vit Cng disguised as civilians would stop vehicles and conduct armed
propaganda activities. The c Thnh District Chief - with forward and innovative
planning, intended to capture that Vit Cng group. He was not aware that the group
included the commander of the Cao Su District Unit, Mi Quang a dangerous
opponent that the District Chief had been hunting for frenetically. The District Chief and
102

Translators Note: Trn Vn B (T B, aka B Gi) was reportedly later a company commander in 440
Battalion in mid-1968 and appointed a 2ic of 445 Battalion on 4 November 1969. Subsequently, when
Commander of the Chu c District Unit, Trn Vn B (T B) was killed by Australian forces on 4
February 1971 at YS 593877. Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM No. 35/71, Ni t, 4 February 1971.
103
* A number of comrades still remember that this poem was published in the cultural pages of the
magazine of the B Ra Long Khanh Propaganda and Education Committee.
104
Translators Note: The principal Vit Cng districts (huyn) in the B Ra (ie southern) half of B Ra
Long Kha h (ie B Long) Province were Long t (ie Long in and t were combined in April
1960), Xuyn Mc, and Chu c see the map at the back cover. Chu c District was formed from
Chu Thnh and c Thnh Districts on 24 May 1965 [sic] see the The History of the Ha Long Village
Party Chapter (1930-2005), op.cit., 25 April 2009. Occasionally, Cao Su (ie Rubber) District
encompassing the rubber plantations from Bnh Ba to the north, including the Courtenay Plantation and
several others in southern Long Khnh Province, operated as a discrete district. For the boundaries of Vit
Cng sub-districts, see the map: 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF), VC Districts and Sub-Districts,
Special Overprint AFV/MISC/ 2187, Special Use S.E. Asia 1:100,000 Sheet 6430 Series L607, circa
1971. The boundaries of the Vit Cng B Ra area were adjusted during several re-organisations see
Annex J, Higher Headquarters.

30
his Deputy both led this operation personally. The Deputy District Chief and a section of
enemy soldiers - disguised as civilians and with their weapons concealed, travelled on a
three-wheeled Lambretta ready to greet Mi Quang. The District Chief also had a
platoon of soldiers mounted on another vehicle with rounds in the chambers of their
weapons, ready to respond.
The enemys intelligence information was completely accurate. Mi Quang the
District Unit Commander, was waiting for the vehicle carrying the group of soldiers
disguised as civilians (about whom he was unaware) and ready to conduct armed
propaganda. However unknown to both Mi Quang and the c Thnh District Chief,
on that very day and in accord with their plans, 445 Company had also sent a force (a
platoon) into the Bnh Ba rubber plantation with the intention of acquiring a lathe for their
engineering workshop. Our unit was regrouping in the rubber plantation about 500 metres
away. Our Company Commander V Quc Chanh (T Chanh), and three of our
reconnaissance soldiers led by Nguyn Vn B105 (the soldiers were: Li and Nam), went
to the edge of the road to check the situation. There, they met Mi Quang. They only
just had time to greet him when the Lambretta carrying the group of soldiers disguised as
civilians approached. The Commander of the Cao Su District Unit Mi Quang, said
farewell to our men and stepped forward onto the road to halt the vehicle. A volley of
medium machinegun rounds fired from the vehicle passed over his head. Mi Quang
immediately crouched very low to the ground.
Immediately, Comrade V Quc Chanh and Nguyn Vn Bs reconnaissance
team opened fire to assist Mi Quang. The enemy returned fire determinedly but were
unable to match our marksmen. The vehicle rolled over, and we seized a medium
machinegun and captured one of the enemy soldiers.
Hearing the sound of gunfire, the c Thnh District Chief reacted by rushing
down in a military vehicle from the c Thnh Sub-Sector. Meanwhile, our platoon in
the rear heard the gunfire and reacting, moved swiftly forward from the rubber
plantation. The Company second-in-command Nguyn Vn Xun (Hai Xun), and the
Platoon Commanders: L Minh Kin, Ba Lng and Mi Sinh, went forward quickly
with our men to the edge of the road and fired fiercely on the enemys reaction force. As
a result, the Civil Guard/Civil Defence Force Platoon was wiped out completely
(including the District Chief).106 V Quc Chanh alone shot and killed five of the enemy
with his familiar .45 Colt pistol. We seized a large number of weapons including a 60mm
mortar, a Colt .45 pistol, and a PRC-10 radio107. Bo the Deputy Chief of c Thnh
105

Translators Note: Nguyn Vn B (aka Phc and Phc) - born in Long Phc in 1934, had been a
member of C445 since July 1961. See his Personal History Statement dated 25 August 1965 at CDEC Log
12-2394-66.
106
Translators Note: According to the Chu c District History (2004), ie Nguyn Cng Danh ,
Chu c District, op.cit., 2004, p.122: In July 1964, the enemy continued to deploy infantry and Civil
Guard troops from the c Thnh District capital to seize Bnh Ba. Troops from C.445 and the Bnh Ba
guerrillas resolutely opposed the enemy and killed the District Chief Nguyn Vnh Trinh, who had
personally led the operation, and captured 11 of the enemy including the Deputy District Chief, destroyed
a jeep, and seized weapons including a 60mm mortar. An account in the local Party history is similar Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s ng b tnh B Ra-Vng Tu (1930 - 1975) (The History of the B
Ra-Vng Tu Party Chapter), Chapter VI, 2000. The MACV account shows the engagement on 9
September 1964 and includes a Ranger company commander KIA, see VCAT Item No.F015800030379.
107
Translators Note: A US-manufactured AN/PRC-10 VHF FM manpack radio (.9 watt output). Its
planning range was 8 kilometres with its short aerial. With RC-292 antennae at each end of a link, the range
was 19 kilometres. As noted earlier, due to the PRC-10s unsatisfactory performance, in mid-1965 General
W.C. Westmoreland COMUSMACV, ordered the replacement of the PRC-10 held by US forces in
Vietnam with the more effective AN/PRC-25 radio. D445 reportedly also held the earlier - and less capable,
PRC-6 walkie-talkie-style radio (range less than a mile) see also footnote 200.

31
District, was captured and taken prisoner. This chance-encounter battle became a great
victory that even also surprised our comrades in the Province Unit.
The fate of the prisoner was unanticipated. It was thought that District Chiefs and
Deputy District Chiefs had committed enough crimes to be sentenced to death. It was
known that Bo had earlier passed his baccalaureate education, and had just graduated
from officer training. L Minh Vit the Political Officer, proposed that Bo be reeducated then released. The unit organised a small meeting at our forward springboard
base at Long Phc, displaying the momentum of our victory and deterring anyone from
becoming lackeys and obstructing or opposing the revolution. Then, we made Bo sign a
promise abandoning the road of being a lackey of the enemy, and write a letter to his
parents asking them to come to the base to ransom him. Through our liaison
infrastructure, Bos family (his mother and father, wife, and sister) came to the base and
asked the revolution to spare him. They also promised to educate Bo against following
the enemy and opposing the revolution. His re-education and release had a great impact
on our enemy proselytising effort at that time, raising the profile of the lenient policy of
the revolution with the people in the region that had been temporarily seized. At the same
time, this assisted the unit in gaining further experience in applying our three-pronged
attack against the enemy in the future.
Based on that victory, 445 Company108 operated continuously across all the
important areas of the Province, coordinating with the District armed forces and the
village guerrillas to attack and force the withdrawal from a series of enemy posts, and
destroying a number of strategic hamlets.109 The people enthusiastically returned to their
old areas to make their livings.
On 11 November 1963, the internal factions in the puppet government conducted
a coup and overthrew the dictatorial regime of Ng nh Dim. Taking immediate
advantage of the situation, on that night of 11 November, 445 Company joined with the
Cao Su District forces to attack the strategic hamlet at ng Ngc Khi. In this battle,
Comrade V Quc Chanh the Company Commander, used his pistol (Colt .45) to kill
108

Translators Note: In October 1963, a 445B transport unit was formed ie distinct from 445 Company.
A supply route had been established from Bn Tre in the Mekong Delta north to Cn Gi (Rng Sc) then
to Ph M, across Route 15 and up into the Hc Dch base area and extended northward into War Zone D.
445B commanded by L Minh Thnh (Sau Thnh), transported material including arms, on the sector
from Ph M into the Hc Dch. In February 1964, 445B was subsumed into a new K-10 regimental-sized
transport organisation which became the 84th Rear Services Group in June 1965 (commanded by L Minh
Thnh). - Nguyn nh Thng (ed, et al), ng H Ch Minh Trn Bin B Ra-Vng Tu, (The H Ch
Minh Trail by Sea - B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2014, pp.77-97. The activities of 445B - and the Hc Dch
base area as a Thnh a (Citadel) of Eastern Nam B, are also related in the Tn Thnh District
History (2014 ?). For captured documents related to 445B, see CDEC Bulletin No.1422, 8 November 1966;
and CDEC Log 11-1293-66.
109
Translators Note: As noted at footnote 87, a major attack by Vit Cng forces in late August 1963 is
related earlier in this 2004 D445 History but out of chronological sequence. According to The Minh
m Base History, on 24 August 1963, the 45 Company Provincial Unit in conjunction with Long t
District guerrillas and elements of the Military Regions 800 Battalion attacked an officers recreation
facility at Long Hi killing and wounding 19 and seizing 40 weapons see The Minh m Base History,
op.cit., 2006, p.45. The Long t District History (1986) also relates that: on 25 August 1963, C25, C45
and Khu (D800) attacked the Long Hi complex killing 19. - Phan Ngc Danh & Trn Quang Toi, Lch
S u Tranh Cch Mng Ca Huyn Long t -The History of the Revolutionary Struggle in Long t
District, Nh Xut Bn ng Nai (ng Nai Publishing House), ng Nai, 1986, p.113. The t
District History (2006) relates: on the night of 24-25 August 1963, the District troops (C25), Eastern Region
troops (D800) and the Long Hi guerrillas attacked the Ng nh Dims holiday centre and the puppet
officers recreation area (the Huy Hong hotel now the holiday centre for the Province union). We killed
and wounded 19 enemy including the wicked Second Lieutenant , and seized more than 40 weapons
and a large amount of military equipment.

32
four of the enemy. Our troops surrounded and wiped out a Self-Defence Corps platoon
and seized a pistol and a 60mm mortar. The people rose up and destroyed the ng Ngc
Khi strategic hamlet. Exploiting the impetus of that victory, 445 Company continued to
coordinate with the Cao Su District troops and attacked the strategic hamlet at Xun Son,
liberating Xun Son village (Chu Thnh).
At this time in B Ra Long Khanh, the liberated zone was expanded in almost
all areas of the countryside. The enemy only held posts in the towns, Sub-Sectors and
District capitals, and a number of key positions along the communication axes.
Employing flexible combat techniques sometimes concentrating our forces and
sometimes splitting into small teams and sections, 445 Company joined with the District
and village forces to strike at the enemy and to support our countrymen resisting the
enemys efforts to drag them into strategic hamlets. We coordinated with the armed
forces and the people to hold a number of villages and hamlets in the critical areas.
Map: The Attack on the Phc Hi Village Council Offices by 445 Company and C25
Company (on the day/night of 1 December 1963)110

At the end of 1963 - prompted by the favourable changes in the situation, COSVN
decided to re-establish B Ra Province with Comrade Nguyn Vit Hoa (Mi Th) as
the Province Unit Commander. Implementing COSVNs instructions to continue the
destruction of the strategic hamlets, the B Ra Province Committee decided to begin a
series of large-scale attacks on strategic hamlets across the whole Province. The armed
forces of the Province were tasked to attack and wipe out the enemy, and support the
struggle movement of the masses to rise up and destroy the strategic hamlets.
At the beginning of 1964111, the Province Committee decided to deploy a number
of cadre and soldiers from 445 Company to become the core of 440 Company led by
110

Translators Note: There is no text in the 1991 D445 History nor this 2004 D445 History describing an
an attack on Phc Hi in December 1963. The t District History (2006) does not relate such an
attack, nor does the Long t District History (1986) ie the higher headquarters for C25 Company. The
map indicates: the 1st Platoon of 445 Company and the 1st Platoon of C25 Company attacking a post at
Long Phc Hi; breaching the wire obstacles north-east of Phc Hi village; and attacking objectives
within the village area - including the Village Council (HD x). A Buddhist pagoda (Cha Tht) and
the South China Sea (Bin ng literally: Eastern Sea) are also indicated on the map.

33
Comrade Nm nh as Company Commander with Nguyn Minh Ninh as its Political
Officer.112
After moving a number of cadre and soldiers to create 440 Company, 445
Company again consolidated and adjusted its organisation. Comrade V Quc Chanh
remained Company Commander, Comrade L Minh Vit (Sau Vit) was the Political
Officer, and Comrade Nguyn Vn Xun (Hai Xun) was the Company second-incommand.
The attack at Sng Cu by 445 Company in October 1964 had a large and
significant impact. We not only wiped out the enemy capability, expanded our area of
control, but also had a strong effect on mobilising the masses. We had received
intelligence113 from our infrastructure agents that a Regional Forces114 platoon routinely
entered the Sng Cu strategic hamlet (Ha Long) at night and stayed among the people.
During their stay, the enemy troops would check on the people, and obstruct and capture
any of our cadre entering the village. The Company Headquarters put forward a plan to
wipe out this group of enemy soldiers. Our Political Officer and concurrently Party
Chapter Secretary L Minh Vit, participated directly in creating the plan to attack the
Sng Cu strategic hamlet. At first, the plan intended we attack on the Saturday, but it
was deferred until Sunday night as on the Saturday the enemy usually went out on the
town until late making it difficult to choose a place where we could attack them as a
group.
Nguyn Vn Tm (Tm Mo) a Platoon Commander, armed with a medium
machinegun was tasked with suppressive fire and signalling the commencement of the
attack. In the middle of the night, the whole of 445 Company moved in close to the
objective. According to our combined plan arranged between the unit and our
revolutionary infrastructure within hamlet, Comrade Nguyn Vn Tm fired a short burst
over the roofs of the houses to warn the villagers to go down into their shelters. Next, he
lowered the barrel of his weapon and fired at the intense rate into our targets. The enemy
were unable to react in time, and fled in fear for their lives and fell into our ambush.
Having thrown grenades, the whole reconnaissance team followed Nguyn Vn B in
assaulting the enemy. A number of the enemy were killed, a number surrendered, and the
reconnaissance team shot three.
After a few minutes of combat, we had complete control of the battlefield, having
wiped out a Regional Forces platoon, seized all their weapons (comprising 30 rifles of
various types and two medium machineguns), and captured seven. The villagers in the
Sng Cu Ha Long area greatly admired 445 Companys skilful method of attack as
not one villager was wounded. From generation to generation, our countrymen sang: The
weapons carried by the troops of 445 Company have eyes. That very night, the cadre and
111

Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History and the local Province Party history relate that the ARVN
officer responsible for Route 15 security Major Nguyn Vn Phc, came to an accommodation/dtente
(ha hon) with the local communist forces and provided 50 M.26 grenades and 2,000 rounds of
ammunition to V Vn Lt (commander of intelligence unit 316) in April 1964. Trn Vn Khnh (et
al/tg), Lch s ng (The History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter VI. Phcs
local dtente is also related in the t District History (2006), pp.187-188 and in the Tn Thnh
District History (2014). See also footnotes 306, 410 and 448 for accommodations and local dtente.
112
Translators Note: List 1 in the Addendum to this 2004 D445 History states that this change occurred in
10-1964.
113
Translators note: Vit Cng sketch maps of Sng Cu hamlet were made on 31 July and 5 October 1963
by agent 980 CDEC Log 12-1845-66.
114
Translators Note: The Vietnamese text above uses the term Bo An. However, as noted earlier, the
Civil Guard/Civil Defence Force (Bo An) was restructured/replaced by the Regional Forces (a
Phng Qun) in 1964. However, as shown in the above text, the communists continued to routinely
referred to the new Regional Forces as Bo An.

34
soldiers of 445 Company and the villagers tore down the barbed-wire fences of the Sng
Cu strategic hamlet.
The Battle of Sng Cu was swift, wiped out the enemy completely and we
suffered no casualties because of our successful preparation and the assistance and close
coordination with our infrastructure agents and the people. At the same time, we had an
effective reserve support element. With the experience of the attack on the Bu Lm
strategic hamlet (May 1963) and the attack on the Sng Cu strategic hamlet (October
1964), the unit clearly saw the utility of a reserve support element ((mi vu hi)) and
exploiting the thrust of an attack.
At the end of the 1964 Wet Season, 440 Company coordinated with our Secret
Self-Defence115 elements in the Bnh Ba rubber plantation to attack the post at Bnh Ba
(Chu Thnh). We wiped out a platoon of Popular Forces116, and seized 51 bags of rice
(about five tonnes).117 This rice provided a timely solution to our difficult situation by
providing food for our Province concentrated armed forces and our political, Party, and
infrastructure agencies.
Also at this time, in implementing tasks assigned by our higher headquarters, a
platoon of 445 Company joined with a Province labour unit118 to safely move over 20
tonnes of weapons sent from North Vietnam - that had been landed at Lc An119, back to
the our bases.
3. Contributing to the Victory of the Bnh Gi Campaign.
In 1964, the peoples war movement was developing strongly across the whole of
the South. Our military and the people had defeated an important part of the enemys
national policy of establishing strategic hamlets. The two-year plan - aimed at
strengthening the Staley-Taylor plan, had its origins in the Americans plan for a
general attack to achieve a decisive victory in 1963 and to push forward with their
special warfare to a peak but they were unable to save the situation in either the
political or military spheres.
The above situation required that we urgently build the revolution objectively and
with real strength in order to catch up with the requirements of our mission. In particular,
on the military front, we needed a sufficiently strong punch to create a new complexion
115

Translators Note: See footnotes 39 and 244, and 314.

Translators Note: The Vietnamese text uses the obsolescent term Dn V ie: Self-Defence Corps.
The Dn V - together with the Hamlet Combat Youth, were replaced by the Popular Forces (PF ie:
Ngha Qun) in 1964. However, the communists often still referred to the Popular Forces as Dn V.
117
Translators Note: According to a contemporary US report: On 9 September 1964 near Bnh Ba, Vit
Cng forces ambushed a Ranger Company and two Popular Force squads/sections led by the c Thnh
District Chief. Government forces suffered 12 killed including the District Chief and the Ranger
company commander the Vit Cng force suffered two killed. A 60mm mortar, 15 weapons and a radio
were seized by the Vit Cng force. USMACV Military Report, Saigon, 5-12 September 1964 VCAT
Item No.F015800030379. The 1991 D445 History relates that both 445 and 440 Company were involved in
this attack on Bnh Ba village. It also mentions that each bag of rice weighed one quintal (ie 100
kilograms), and that: This quantity of rice overcame the food difficulties of the provincial concentrated
armed forces and was also sufficient to support over 500 people in our civilian labour group within the
Province. See also the following footnote on civilian labour capabilities.
118
Translators Note: The organisation and management of civilian labour is detailed in the B Ra-Long
Khnh Province Forward Supply Council report of 25 August 1969 that report also covers the purchasing
and requisitioning of rice and other foodstuffs. - CDEC Log 02-1480-70.
119
Translators Note: As noted, Lc An is located on the coast in the Sng Ray River estuary about five
kilometres north-east of Phc Hi village. For the movement of weapons and supplies by sea to Lc An,
see footnote 98.
116

35
for the revolution in order to move forward and win a decisive victory. In executing the
policy of the Politburo and COSVN for the tasks in the Winter-Spring period of 19641965, the Military Committee and Headquarters of COSVN decided to launch its first
campaign in B2120 on the Eastern Nam B and the far Southern Trung B battlefields
with the objective to:
- Wipe out a part of the enemys capability, make changes in the balance of
forces, and change the complexion to our advantage;
- Support the political struggle movement of the masses to enable them to rise
up and destroy the enemys tight control, destroy the strategic hamlets, and
speed up the peoples war;
- Expand the Hc Dch base to the east and west of Route 2, connect the Eastern
Region with the coastal region of Military Region 6, construct landings and
wharves to receive weapons from the North by the sea route; and
- Train the regular troops to a technical and tactical standard, raise the standard
of leadership at all levels, and apply our experiences in organising and
commanding a campaign.
In implementing the above objectives, the terrain chosen for the campaign had an
area of about 500 square kilometres within the provinces of B Ra, Bin Ha, and Bnh
Thun (ie the titles of those provinces at that time nowadays the provinces of: B Ra
Vng Tu, ng Nai, and Bnh Thun). The main focus of the campaign was in B Ra
Province, with the lesser and associated areas being Nhn Trch Long Thnh (Bin
Ha), and Hoi c and Tanh Linh (Bnh Thun). The area south-east of Si Gn was a
place that the enemy regarded as its rear area and close to its nerve-centre installations. If
attacked there, they would surely concentrate their forces in response. We had the
opportunity to wipe out the enemys capability outside their defensive networks. Our
campaign would have a large impact on the political movement in the towns and even
in the capital of the enemy itself.
Before the curtain was raised on the campaign, COSVN Headquarters directed the
Eastern Region and Region 6 battlefields to move strongly and wipe out the enemy as
well as drawing the enemys attention away from the main object of the campaign, in
order to ensure surprise. In particular, the Bin Ha airport was shelled (on the night of 31
October/1 November 1964), and heavy casualties were inflicted on the American forces
as was admitted in the American media: for which there was no precedent in the history
of the American Air Force.
Within B Ra at this time, 440 Company and 445 Company had each been
coming-of-age, getting a firm grip on their political tasks, staying close to our
infrastructure elements, and truly becoming the regular punch of the Province. They
effectively supported the struggle movement of the masses and the people to rise up,
destroy the strategic hamlets, and to take control. The majority of the strategic hamlets in
the Province had been destroyed, and there only remained a number of model strategic
hamlets adjacent to the Sub-Sectors and District capitals which were difficult for us to
attack. Among these was the strategic hamlet of Bnh Gi.
Having been provided with information on the situation by our agent who was a
member of the Chu Ro minority, 440 Company Headquarters decided to attack the Bnh
Gi strategic hamlet a site that the enemy usually boasted of as being inviolable. Our
120

Translators Note: Created in 1961, the B2 Bulwark Front encompassed all the provinces of Nam B,
as well as the five southern provinces of Military Region 5 in Southern Trung B: ie Ninh Thun, Bnh
Thun, Qung c, Tuyn c, and Lm ng. See: Trn Vn Tra, Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2
Theatre, Vn Ngh, H Ch Minh City, 1982.

36
units determination was approved by the Province Committee and the Province Unit
following their thorough and careful consideration and discussion.
Bnh Gi121 village lies on Route 327 off Provincial Route 2 ((to the east)), and
adjacent to the c Thnh Sub-Sector and 18 kilometres to the north of B Ra Town.
The village had three hamlets: Vinh H, Vinh Chu, and Vinh Trung (usually called:
Village 1, Village 2, and Village 3). The population of Bnh Gi village (in 1964) was
5,726 of whom 90 percent were Catholic refugees.122 The enemy had built the village as
a strategic hamlet with a system of strong defences, communications trenches, weapon
pits, fighting bunkers, barbed-wire fences, and panji-stake traps. There were also thick
minefields around very solid natural fences of bamboo.
There - apart from the quisling administrators, the enemy had organised a military
force comprising 147 Regional Force personnel (organised in several strongly-armed
platoons), and a Combat Youth123 force of 108 who were well-equipped (including with
PRC-10 radios). Additionally, there was also a Ranger Company (2nd Company, 38th
Ranger Battalion) with a strength of 131 that was permanently in the field to defend the
Bnh Gi strategic hamlet. Principally for these reasons, the enemy declared that: Bnh
Gi is a fortress of anti-communism, and The Bnh Gi strategic hamlet is inviolable.
In October 1964, 440 Company124 opened fire and attacked Bnh Gi for the first
time. In that battle, Ba L (of the Chu Ro minority) acted as a guide, and our forces hid
near the main gate of the strategic hamlet (towards c M Hill, the church in Village 2).
At exactly 6am, the enemy soldiers opened the gate, and our forces simultaneously
opened fire and poured through the gate. The bodies of many of the enemy were
abandoned at the gate. Exploiting our surprise factor, our forces seized Village 2 and
exploited towards Village 3. The fighting was fierce and decisive as the enemy regrouped
their forces and counter-attacked. At 9am, they forced a number of reactionary religious
villagers to demonstrate - demanding that we release the thugs that we had captured. A
number of the more extreme villagers were armed with sticks and assaulted our troops.
Comrade Trn Vn Chin opened fire into the air to disperse the group of demonstrators.
Our troops expanded their methods of attack on the enemy propagandising the Partys
policy on religion and the United Fronts platform.
In the Bnh Gi strategic hamlet, more than 90 percent of the population were
Christian refugees, and we had no infrastructure cadre in the villages. For this reason,
before attacking Bnh Gi, the cadre and soldiers of 440 Company and other
participating forces (comprising cadre involved with refugees and Assault Youth125) were
121

Translators Note: In Vietnamese histories of Bnh Gi, there are orthographic discussions on the
correct spelling of the village complex - ie either Bnh Gi or Bnh Gi. The village was founded in
November 1955 with 2,100 Catholic refugees from Ngh An (North Vietnam) led by their priests including Nguyn Vit Khai, via initially, Bnh ng and Xun Trng in the Si Gn area.
122
Translators Note: According to the account in a principal Vietnamese military history, the population of
Bnh Gi comprised more than 400 families religious refugees from the North, and almost all were the
families of officers and soldiers of Ranger and Marine units. - Nguyn Vn Minh Colonel (ed), Lch s
Khng chin chng M cu nc The History of the Anti-American Resistance War for National
Salvation, Tp 3 (Vol 3), Nh Xut Bn Chnh Tr Quc Gi, H Ni, 1999.
123
Translators Note: In the 1991 D445 History, this group is titled: Defenders-of-the-Church Youth.
124
Translators Note: In the 1991 D445 History, both 440 and 445 Companies are described as attacking the
village in October 1964 ie: In October 1964, our two companies attacked Bnh Gi. A few days later,
the two companies the 445th and the 440th, continued to attack Bnh Gi for a second time.
125
Translators Note: First activiated in April 1965, Assault Youth were discrete elements comprising
mostly full-time males and females aged 16-35, that assisted NVA/VC forces principally in liaison and
logistic tasks such as portering and battlefield clearance. For a Vit Cng report, see: VCAT Item
No.2311008007; and for formal US assessments see: Director of Central Intelligence, Capabilities of the
Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam (Special National Intelligence Estimate 14.3-67),

37
carefully instructed on the policy of the Peoples Liberation Front on religion. When our
forces attacked Bnh Gi, they executed the policy very seriously and were received with
consideration by the villagers. However, as the people had been incited and exploited by
the enemy, a number of the villagers came out and demonstrated and hindered our attack.
Further, we had to face the determined resistance of the enemy. Facing this situation, the
Company Headquarters decided to withdraw. However, the next day, we organised an
attack on Village 3 and wiped out a number of Rangers. Our refugee affairs cadre used
megaphones to call on the enemy soldiers to surrender and conducted armed propaganda
targeting the religious villagers who had been deceived by the enemy. Following those
activities, our troops withdrew to regroup our forces.
440 Company attacked Bnh Gi twice, but were unable to completely liberate it
only seizing Village 2 and Village 3 and wiping out part of the enemys capability.126
Most important of all, our local armed forces were able to gain invaluable experience and
lessons on attacking the enemy in a place where they had their most reliable defences.
The Bnh Gi strategic hamlet was no longer inviolable. At the same time, we were
able to determine the enemys operational routine and methods. Every time that we
attacked the Bnh Gi strategic hamlet, the enemy would immediately mobilise a relief
force of their mobile strategic forces from the Sub-Sector and Sector. This was a factor
that the cadre staff group at COSVN Headquarters who were investigating the
battlefield in preparation for the 1964-1965 Winter-Spring Campaign, paid utmost
attention.127 The cadre staff group at COSVN Headquarters proposed conducting a much
larger attack and holding-on in the strategic hamlet with the aim of sounding out the
enemys reaction in order to choose our combat procedures and methods for the large
campaign across the whole of the COSVN region.
Only one week later, the third attack on the Bnh Gi strategic hamlet
commenced. This time, Comrade Nguyn Vit Hoa (Mi Th) the Commander of the
B Ra Province Unit, directly participated in commanding the operation. Our forces
comprised 440 Company, 445 Company Province troops, Chu Thnh Districts 20th
Company, Ngi Giao village guerrillas, and a section of our refugee affairs cadre as in
the previous attack. The enemy reacted decisively. On that very afternoon, they mobilised
60 helicopters to land a Ranger battalion at Bnh Gi to break the blockade.128 Our troops
dug trenches and hung-on for five days and nights against the enemy counter-attacks.
Langley, 13 November 1967 - VCAT Item No.F029200050309; and USMACV/JGS, Assault Youth, ST
67-060, 1 July 1967 VCAT Item No.F015900240978. For the actions of the C.12-65 Assault Youth
Company in the Battle of Long Tn 18 August 1966, see Annex F, pp.12-13.
126
Translators Note: As noted above, according to the 1991 D445 History, both 440 and 445 Companies
were involved in this second attack. That History relates: However, this time the enemy deployed 60
helicopters in the afternoon to insert a Ranger battalion to relieve the encirclement. ... The 445th Company
itself suffered over 20 casualties . The local Party history, also related that both 440 and 445 attacked
Binh Gi twice more - Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s ng (The History of the Party in B RaVng Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter VI.
127
Translators Note: According to the 1991 D445 History, following the second attack: When the 445 th
Company and the 440th Company withdrew from Bnh Gi to consolidate their forces and to prepare for
subsequent attacks, Comrade Nm Ninh and Comrade Su Vit met a group of COSVN staff cadre who had
come to reconnoitre battlefields in the area. This group of COSVN staff cadre was led by Comrade Trn
ng Hng and had come to study the battlefields in preparation for a large campaign in the Xuyn McLong t region. Having listened to the ideas put forward by Nm Ninh and Sa Vit ie: We should
launch a large campaign against Bnh Gi, the COSVN staff cadre remained in the Route 2 area to follow
the situation. Su Vit the nickname for L Minh Vit, was subsequently (1966) the deputy political
officer of the B Ra Province Unit.
128
Translators Note: In the 1991 D445 History, the Ranger insertion is related as having occurred during
the second attack see the preceding footnote 126.

38
This unequal combat became fiercer each day. Our casualty numbers continued to rise
in 445 Company alone we had 20 casualties, and Comrade L Minh Vit (Sau Vit) the
Political Officer, had to personally carry the wounded.129 Facing such adverse conditions,
the Province Unit Headquarters ordered a withdrawal to c M Hill to conserve our
forces.
Having attacked Bnh Gi many times130 although we had not achieved our goal
as planned, we had discovered the enemys strong points and their weak points. This
became the basis for COSVN Headquarters to decide that c Thnh Xuyn Mc was
the principal area, and that Bnh Gi was to be the point of attack to raise the curtain on
the 1964-1965 Winter-Spring Campaign in which we would employ our tactic of
attacking a position and defeating the relief forces and wiping out puppet regular
forces. 445 Company was chosen as the detonator for attacking the position, holding-on
in the strategic hamlet, and creating the conditions for our regular COSVN troops to
wipe out the relief forces. Because of the importance of the initial attack task, 445
Company was reinforced with the 2nd Company of the 1st Battalion of Q761 ((271st VC
Regiment)) a regular COSVN formation, commanded by Sau Chay and with Sau Mi
as the Companys Political Officer. 440 Company was ordered by the Province Unit to
withdraw and conduct operations in the a Ging area (Long Hi) and undertake
diversionary tasks while defending the Lc An131 coastal landing site and preparing to
receive weapons there to resupply the Bnh Gi Campaign.
129

Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History relates the 20 casualties and the actions by L Minh Vit
(Sau Vit) as occuring during the second attack.
Translators Note: According to the 1991 D445 History, the two Companies attacked Binh Gi twice in
October 1964 then, observed by the COSVN group, The 445th Company and the 440 th Company
launched three further attacks against Bnh Gi. In the final phase, we held on for five days in the hamlets.
131
Translators Note: For activities at Lc An, see also footnote 98. According to an ARVN Marine officer:
On 22/12 [sic], a NVA cargo ship carrying 44 [sic] tons of weapons landed at Lc An. The most notable
guns were the CTC [sic] personal firearms, AK 47 rifles, K50s ((sub-machineguns)), RPD ((medium))
machineguns and the B40 anti-tank rockets. - Trn Ngc Ton, The 4th Marine Battalion and the Battle
of Binh Gia, 24 July 2014. A Marine officer also stated that as the Marines moved south-east from Bnh
Gi to the site of a downed US helicopter: Second Lieutenant Hu came to me and said: It seems as if the
2nd Company is surrounded by an enemy battalion. But First Lieutenant Tng is standing firm ... they've
captured three B40 rocket launchers, five AK-47 rifles and have killed seven enemy. Trn V: Tiu
on 4 - Bnh Gi Oi ! Cn Nh Mi, 2 September 2012. A US account relates that on 31 December
1964 east of Bnh Gi: most individual Viet Cong were armed with a new AK-47 assault rifle. - Price,
D.L., The First Marine Captured in Vietnam A Biography of Donald G. Cook, McFarland & Company,
North Carolina, 2007. Translators Note continues: The foregoing indicates that elements of the Vit Cng
forces at the Battle of Bnh Gi were armed with the highly effective AK-47 automatic assault rifles. The
9th Division History (2010) states: On 1 February 1965, at Lc An (Bn Tranh Landing, Sng Ray
River), Group (on) 1500 and 271st Regiment elements landed 70 tonnes of weapons (including a large
number of AK-47 rifles). The 271st Regiment was the first unit to be equipped with the AK-47. Nguyn
Thanh Nhn, Lch s S on b binh 9 (1965-2010) (The History of the 9th Infantry Division), Nh xut
bn Qun i Nhn dn, H Ni, 2010. A history of on (Group) 125 notes that Vessel 56 landed 44
tonnes of weapons and equipment at Lc An in time for Military Region 6 units to use in the 2 nd Phase of
the Bnh Gi Campaign (January 1965). Vessel 56 landed 47 tonnes of weapons at Lc An on 1 February
1965 for the militia of Region 6 to participate in the 3rd Phase of the Bnh Gi Campaign. Phan L Hong
H, Chuyn k , op.cit., 30 April 2005. A recent press item relates On 1 February 1965, the third
vessel Vessel 46 [sic], carrying 70 tonnes of weapons landed safely at Lc An. Most of the weapons in
this phase were AK-47s, B40s and B41s [sic]. - Lu Dng, Bn Lc An, mt im n ca on tu
khng s, 22 November 2011. For the final battle of the Bnh Gi Campaign at Chi ng, see footnotes
151 and 154. See also the detail in: Nguyn nh Thng (ed, et al), ng H Ch Minh Trn Bin B
Ra-Vng Tu, (The H Ch Minh Trail by Sea - B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2014. For the ARVN, the USsupplied M-16 rifles only began to arrive in April 1967 but only in sufficient quantities for ARVN
Airborne and Marine units. Westmoreland, W.C. General, Report on the War in Vietnam (as at 30 June
1968), Section II, pp.215-216.VCAT Item No.168300010017. See also: USMACV, An Evaluation of the
130

39
The Campaign Headquarters132 that was established comprised the following
comrades: Trn nh Xu Commander; L Vn Tng Political Comissar; Nguyn
Ha Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff; Nguyn Vn Ba Deputy Commander; and
L Xun Lu (Sau An) Deputy Political Commissar. Others participating in the Party
Committee for the Campaign were Comrade Nguyn Vn Ch of the Standing
Committee of the Eastern Nam B Regional Committee, and comrade L Minh H the
Secretary of the B Ra Province Committee. For the main attacks, the forces to be
employed133 comprised two infantry regiments (Q761134 and Q762135), four combat
support battalions (regular COSVN elements), and two companies ie 440 and 445
Impact of Arming the Vietnamese Army with the M-16 Rifle, 30 June 1968. VCAT Item
No.F015800240227.
132
Translators Note: Some contemporary US histories incorrectly cite the 9 th VC Division as the
commanding headquarters at the Battle of Bnh Gi eg: Westmoreland, W.C. General, Report on the War
, op.cit., pp.84-86 . However, the 9th VC Division was not formally founded until 2 September 1965
with Hong Cm as its first commander. See: Hong Cm, Chng ng Mi Nghn Ngy (Stages in a
10,000-day Journey), Nh Xut bn Qun i Nhn dn, H Ni, 2001; and Nguyn Thanh Nhn, The
History of the 9th Infantry Division, op.cit., 2010.
133
Translators Note: An official Vietnamese history relates that the forces in the Campaign led by Trn
nh Xu, comprised: the 1st and 2nd Regiments, the 80th Artillery Group, 445 Local Forces Company, and
the Hoi c Local Forces Platoon (Bnh Thun). - The History of the Vietnam Peoples Armed Forces,
Vol III, The Coming of Age of the Peoples Armed Forces of Vietnam during the Resistance War against
the Americans for National Salvation (1954-1975), Military History Institute of Vietnam, Peoples Armed
Forces Publishing House, Hanoi, 1994 (see also as: Pribbenow, M.L., Victory in Vietnam, University Press
of Kansas, 2002). A recent Vietnamese history also adds the following to the VC forces: two infantry
battalions Military Region 7 (500th and 800th), the 186th Artillery Battalion (Military Region 6), and the
Bin Ha Artillery Squadron with four 75mm artillery pieces . - Phm Vnh Phc, Colonel (ed - et al),
Operations in the US Resistance War (Tm Tt Cac Chin Dch ), Th Gii Publishers, H Ni, 2009,
p.2. A recently-published major Vietnamese history states that the Bnh Gi Campaign involved 7,000
troops and was waged widely across four provinces: B Ra, Long Khanh, Bin Ha, and Bnh Thun
with the main efforts [sic] in Bnh Long [sic] and Phc Long [sic] involving five regimental-level
battles and two battalion-level battles killing 1,755 enemy, capturing 293 (including 60 American
advisors) - L Mu Hn (ed), i Cng Lch S Vit Nam (The Fundamentals of Vietnamese History)
- Tp III (1945-2006), Nh Xut Bn Giao Dc Vit Nam, H Ni, 2010.
134
Translators Note: Q761 Regiment (founded in July 1961) also known as the 1st Regiment, was later
re-titled the 271st Regiment (the Bnh Gi Regiment) and was subsequently a founding formation of the 9 th
VC Division in early September 1965. Q761was reportedly commanded at Bnh Gi by Nguyn Th
Truyn (aka Nm Truyn and also aka Nm Si Gn). Truyn later commanded the 5th VC Division from
1966 until late November 1967 - and was killed in combat in early February 1968 during the NVA/VC Tt
Mu Thn (1968) Offensive while serving as Commander of Sub-Region 1. Bi Thanh Vn (t Lim) was
the second-in-command of Q761 at the Battle of Bnh Gi. For the activities of the 271st (Q761) Regiment
at Bnh Gi - Trung on Bnh Gi, see an account by its political commissar Nguyn Vn Tng, at:
http://vietbao.vn/Chinh-Tri/Trung-doan-Binh-Gia/40060434/96/ .
135
Translators Note: Q762 Regiment also known as the 2nd Regiment, C.58, and the ng Xoai
Regiment, was later re-titled the 272nd Regiment and was subsequently a founding formation of the 9 th VC
Division in early September 1965. Q762 was raised in 1961 from former Vit Minh troops who had
regrouped (tp kt) to North Vietnam in 1954-1955 and infiltrated back into the South - ie were
returned cadre (cn b hi kt). For a comprehensive booklet on the history of the 272nd Regiment
(dated 19 May 1967) that includes the Regiments major ambush on Route 2 on 9 [sic probably 13]
December 1964 and an ambush on Route 15 on 17 December 1964 - see CDEC Log 03-2284-68, CDEC
Log 03-2656-67, and also footnotes 149 and 154. At Bnh Gi, Q762 Regiment was led by T Minh Khm
with Nguyn Thi Bng (t Thi) as the Regiments second-in-command. Subsequently, Nguyn Thi
Bng is believed to have commanded the 275th Regiment at the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966. In
the period August-October 1966, Bng was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the 5 th VC Division until
reportedly moving to the COSVN staff in January 1967. Nguyn Thi Bng later served as Commander 9th
VC Division and on retirement in the late 1990s, was Vietnams Vice Minister of Defence (as a
Lieutenant General). Born in 1927 in Ty Ninh Province, he passed away on 22 January 2014. For further
information, see his biography at Appendix 2 to Annex O The 275th VC Regiment.

40
Companies (B Ra). Regional and local forces would also cooperate.136 The primary
combat method137 of the Campaign was to attack the enemy outside their defences,
employ ambush tactics, and deploy to attack and defeat the enemys tactic of heliborne
movement and armoured vehicle transport.
On the night of 4-5 December 1964, the curtain went up on the Bnh Gi
Campaign.138 Our participating forces included: 761 ((271st)) Regiment, 762 ((272nd))
Regiment, COSVN artillery combat support units139, and 445 Company (Province
troops). Among these, 445 Company had the mission of attacking directly into Bnh Gi.
The two COSVN regiments were the principal forces to wipe out puppet reserve troops
attempting any relief operation.
At this time, 445 Companys numbers had been strengthened to 140 comrades
(with 120 comrades to directly participate in combat). The Companys weapons were
almost all Thompson sub-machineguns, carbines, and Garand rifles. Our fire support was
quite strong, comprising: 14 medium machineguns, two 60mm mortars, and two heavy
machineguns. The Long t District Unit had seized a heavy machinegun140 from a
Cotcach vehicle during the battle at the An Nht bridge (in August 1963), and this had
been given to Comrade Nguyn Vn Quang141 to use. Comrade Nguyn Vn Quang and
his heavy machinegun were inseparable during the years of fighting the Americans during
which he achieved many outstanding feats in combat.
136

Translators Note: As noted above, a 2009 translation of a 2003 official Vietnamese publication
identifies the participating forces as: the 271st and 272nd VC Regiments; two infantry battalions of Military
Zone 7 (500th and 800th), 186th Artillery Battalion (Military Region 6), the Bin Ha Artillery Squadron
[sic] with four 75mm artillery pieces, 53 60-82mm mortars, 41 57-75mm recoilless rifles, and eight
12.7mm anti-aircraft guns; and local militia. - Phm Vnh Phc, Colonel (ed - et al), Operations in the US
Resistance War, op.cit., 2009, p.2. However, the Chu c District History (2004) clarifies that: Military
Region 6 was responsible for the secondary objective (Hoi c-Tnh Linh); and the forces responsible for
the coordinating attack at Nhn Trch-Long Thnh comprised the 500th Battalion, main-force troops from
Military Region 7, and Bien Ha regional forces. The Battle is also recounted in - Trn on Lm, The 30
Year War, Th Gii Publishers, H Ni, 2012 (English), pp.537-540. The account in the Chu c District
History (2004) also includes a detailed coloured sketch map of the Battle see pp.124-129 of that work.
137
Translators Note: The political and logistic preparations for the Campaign are related in the local Party
history including the establishment of the K76A Hospital in Base Area 1 (Bu Lm village) and the K76B
hospital west of Route 2 at Gia Cp etc. Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s ng (The History of the
Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter V. For later detail on K76A Hospital in the My To
Mountains including organisation and sketch maps, see Annex A to the 6RAR/NZ After Action Report
Operation Marsden, Ni t , 23 February 1970 (file AWM95, 7/6/30).
138
Translators Note: According to the 9th VC Division History (2010): On 20 November 1964, the 271st
Regiment assembled to the east of Route 2 south of Xun Sn; and the 272nd Regiment was located southeast of Ni Ngh. On 2 December 1964, the artillery troops shelled the headquarters of the c Thnh SubSector, and 445 Company (B Ra local forces troops) attacked the Bnh Gi strategic hamlet killing 60
Regional Force personnel and seizing control of the whole strategic hamlet. Nguyn Thanh Nhn, The
History of the 9th Infantry Division, op.cit., 2010. A US cryptological history of the War notes: The Binh
Gia Campaign at the end of 1964 showed the first extensive use of Morse to set up and coordinate a local
campaign by the VC. The first US signals intelligence (SIGINT) personnel had arrived in Saigon in May
1961 and provided direction-finding and analysis support to the South Vietnamese forces. - Thomson, R.J.,
United States Cryptological History, Series VI, Book II: Centralization Wins, 1960-1972, NSA Fort
Meade, 1995, p.504, p.539.
139
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History cites the supporting COSVN Artillery Regiment as Q563
[sic]. The COSVN Artillery Regiments title was Q763 (cover designator: on 80) and comprised four
battalions.
140
Translators Note: A photograph of Nguyn Vn Quangs heavy machinegun at p.80 of this 2004
D445 History shows a US .30 calibre medium machinegun.
141
Translators Note: Nguyn Vn Quang (1944-2000) see also footnotes 140, 220, 228, 309, and 613,
was later declared a Hero of the Peoples Armed Forces and - after training in North Vietnam from 1968
to 1972, returned as the second-in-command/Chief of Staff of 445 Battalion in March 1972.

41
At 3am on 5 December 1964, 445 Company was divided into two groups for the
attack on Bnh Gi.142 At this time, because of the requirements of our battlefield tasks,
the units military cadre had been sent for training at the Military Region143*, so our
leadership during the battle were almost all political cadre. The principal attacking group
the 1st Platoon, was under the direct command of its commander, Ba Lng. Our Political
Officer L Minh Vit (Sau Vit) and the Deputy Company Commander o Thanh
Xun, also went with this group. The secondary group the 2nd Platoon, was under the
direct command of its Platoon Commander L Minh Kin (Ba Kin) and its Platoon
Political Officer T Dng. Both groups concentrated on attacking through the main gate
of Village 2.
The enemy had been attacked many times, and so they were very vigilant and had
taken precautions. They regularly changed the configurations of their mines and their
defensive system. The 1st Platoon group had approached close to the hamlet gate when
they tripped a grenade, wounding three comrades. Hearing the sound of the exploding
grenade near the hamlet - and suspecting that we were again going to attack, all calibres
of the enemys firepower fell upon our troops. At that moment, Nguyn Vn Quangs
heavy machinegun which he had set up 60 metres from the hamlet gate, fired long
bursts that restrained the enemys firepower and allowed our reconnaissance soldiers to
place explosives against the hamlet gates that then blew them apart. When Comrade
Hngs bazooka had blown apart the hamlet gates, the two infantry groups one-andall, assaulted through the gates. The heavy machinegun in the hands of Nguyn Vn
Quang fired resoundingly and stamped out many of the enemys firepower groups.
Thanks to his strength, burly stature, and his technical mastery of the weapon, from his
very first use of the heavy machinegun, Nguyn Vn Quang had brought into play the
firepower superiority of that weapon. He carried the heavy machinegun and actively
supported assaults on decisive positions, effectively supporting our attacking elements.
After more than 10 minutes of fighting, our assault groups had beaten the Regional Force
platoon into disarray and expanding our attack, had seized in turn Village 2 and Village
3 and wiped out tens of the enemy.
Cooperating closely with 445 Company, the regular troops of the 2nd Company of
Q761 ((271st)) Regiments 1st Battalion - led by Company Commander Sau Chay and
Political Officer Sau Mi, attacked and seized Village 1.144 The Campaigns pointattacking force had successfully completed its mission and created favourable conditions
for the relief-destroying forces that were ready to strike the enemy in many other
locations.
Implementing the orders of the Campaign Headquarters145, 445 Company
together with the 2nd Company (1st Battalion, Q761 Regiment) consolidated their defences
Translators Note: On 2 December 1964, in support of 445 Battalions [sic] attack on Bnh Gi, the 1st
Battalion of Q761 and COSVN artillery attacked the c Thnh Sub-Sector headquarters - Nguyn Vn
Minh Colonel (ed), Lch s Khng chin , op.cit., Tp 3 (Vol 3), 1999.
143
* These included the Company Commander V Quc Chanh (T Chanh); and Comrades Nguyn Minh
Khanh (Hai Khanh), Nguyn Vn Bo (Sau Bo) and o Vn Tng (Tam Tng).
144
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History similarly notes: On the same night, a battalion of 761
Regiment attacked and seized Village 1.
145
Translators Note: The Campaign Headquarters was located in the Ni Na Hill area (YS 540745) about
5 kilometres south-east of Bnh Gi. As noted, for an account of the Battle of Bnh Gi by the 1964-65
political commissar of the 271st Bnh Gi Regiment see Nguyn Vn Tng, Trung on Bnh Gi, 18
December 2004. http://vietbao.vn/Chinh-Tri/Trung-doan-Binh-Gia/40060434/96/ . The article also
includes a group photo of commanders left-to-right: Bi Thanh Vn (2ic 271st Regiment), T Minh Khm
(Commander 272nd Regiment), Nguyn Vn Tng (political commissar 271st Regiment), and Nguyn Thi
Bng (2ic 272nd Regiment). The article is also http://tuoitre.vn/tin/chinh-tri-xa-hoi/chinhtri/20041218/trungdoan-binh-gia/60434.html (Tui Tre Online, 18 December 2004).
142

42
and hung on. In the face of the strong enemy counter-attacks, in two days of fighting, 445
Company lost nine comrades killed (including Comrade Hong Vn Tn a platoon cadre
and member of the Chu Ro minority from Ha Long village), and tens of other comrades
were wounded.
Holding-on together with 445 Company and the 2nd Company regular troops (of
the 1st Battalion, Q762) [sic an error, should be Q761], was a platoon of Assault Youth
(front-line conscripted labourers) led by Ba Lo who carried the wounded. This large
front-line labour force comprised Assault Youth from the villages who had volunteered to
serve in the Campaign. They were very brave - crossing through the enemy artillery fire
and air attacks to move our wounded to the rear. A forward surgery section - under
Assistant Doctor Nguyn Thanh Hiu146, was constantly at the side of the unit both
conducting surgery in-place for our wounded while also ready to fight the enemy and
defend the Company Headquarters. Although only recently an Assistant Doctor, Hiu
came-of-age in the fighting and learned much from the experience. Assistant Doctor
Nguyn Thanh Hiu having accumulated this experience and whole-heartedly treating
the wounded, gained the confidence of the cadre and soldiers of the unit.
In the second [sic] day of the Campaign, the enemy used helicopters to lift the 38th
Ranger Battalion from Ph M and landed them south-west of c Thnh (near Rung
Tre). This force was attacked by 762 ((272nd)) Regiment and scattered.
At 6pm, the remaining elements of the 38th Ranger Battalion had huddled together
in the church at Village 2 (comprising about two companies). They exploited the church
precinct to fire on 445 Company. Implementing our religious policy, our troops did not
fire into the church, and so we were unable to advance. The Company Headquarters had a
rushed meeting and decided to deploy two recoilless rifles opposite the church and to fire
the weapons along the two corridors in order to support our troops in assaulting the
enemy. At the same time as these assaults, the units civilian proselytising element and
the refugee affairs section spoke with the religious villagers around the church explaining
the Fronts policies and the tricks of the enemy.147
After five days and nights of attacking the enemy in the Bnh Gi strategic hamlet,
the unit was ordered to withdraw and to cooperate with the regular regiments in attacking
the enemy relief forces. The Campaign Headquarters assessed the fighting spirit of 445
Company as very high and unyielding. As a local armed force participating in a large
COSVN campaign for the first time with an attacking-point role, 445 Company had
combined very effectively with the regular troops. We had fought courageously, held-on
doggedly, and completed our mission outstandingly as the detonator of the Campaign.
146

Translators Note: Also as Nguyn Vn Hiu (Nm Hiu) later in this 2004 D445 History. For detail
on 445 Battalions medical equipment and stores as at 5 July 1966 and 8 August, see the signed report by
the Battalions doctor on D445s medical supply holdings Nguyn Vn Hiu, that includes several
thousand chloroquine tablets for malarial prophylaxis and treatment. CDEC Log 12-2427-66.
147
Translators Note: According to a 9th VC Division History (2010): On 8 December, the 1st Battalion of
the 271st Regiment attacked the t Sub-Sector, killing 100 and seizing 32 weapons. Nguyn Thanh
Nhn, The History of the 9th Infantry Division, op.cit., 2010. As noted at footnote 135, on 9 (or 13)
December 1964, the 272nd Regiment ambushed a squadron of the ARVNs 3rd Battalion/1st Armored
Regiment clearing Route 2 on the southern edge of Bnh Ba village (in the area of the Sng Cu crossing).
14 M1113 vehicles were reportedly destroyed, and 107 killed (including seven US personnel). See a secret
internal-distribution 272nd Regiment booklet (No.121/T-T dated 15 May 1967) CDEC Log 03-2284-68,
VCAT Item No.2310206019 - and also CDEC Log 03-2656-67 for an 11-page report on the ambush by VC
Military Region 1. On 14 December, the 4th Marine Battalion a III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) reaction
force, was deployed to c Thnh Sub-Sector, cleared Bnh Gi and Route 2 south to the ambush site, and
recovered the bodies of those ARVN killed. The Marine battalion then cleared Route 2 to Phc L/B Ra
Town, and returned via Route 15 to its base at D An. See: Trn Ngc Ton (Lieutenant, 4th Marine
Battalion, 1964) The Bnh Gi Front, 10 January 2000 http://www.k16vbqgvn.org/tranbinhgia.htm .

43
In Phase 1 of the Campaign, 440 Company had a diversionary mission in the Long
Hi area (Long t District) with the aim of attacking and deceiving the enemy in order
to maintain the secrecy and surprise for the main attack of the Campaign on Bnh Gi. On
25 December 1964 [sic], 440 Company launched an attack on the enemy Mai Phoc
and Tp Phoc troops at Ging, inflicting heavy casualties on them.148 We
significantly depleted an enemy company, killed a company commander, seized 10
weapons of various types, and a PRC-25 [sic] radio.149
Exploiting Phase 1 of the Campaign, at 4am on 28 December 1964, the sounds of
gunfire heralded the start of Phase 2 of the Bnh Gi Campaign. 445 Company again
attacked into Bnh Gi to lure the enemy into pouring in troops. Afterwards, the Company
again joined with 761 ((271st)) Regiment and 762 ((272nd)) Regiment to attack and to
disintegrate the 33rd Ranger Battalion and the 4th Marine Battalion crack forces of the
enemys Strategic Reserve, that came to the relief of Bnh Gi.150
148

Translators Note: This engagement is related in the t District History (2006): On 24 December
1964, the Provincial 445 [sic] Company joined with District troops to ambush the enemy at Ging
(Route 44) from An Ngi to Long Hi. The Military Regions 800th Battalion provided two 75mm
recoilless rifles (RCL). On 25 December at 0030hrs, the enemy vehicles fell into our ambush. In 30
minutes, we destroyed two enemy companies there were 150 enemy corpses, including an American
advisor. We destroyed four armoured vehicles, captured 18 enemy, and seized 48 weapons and a PRC-25
[sic] radio. These were two companies of corporals being trained to become post commanders in the
villages as part of plan to strengthen the enemys pacification program. The ambush is also described in
the Long t District History (1986): Phan Ngc Danh , Lch S u Tranh Cch Mng Ca Huyn
Long t, op.cit., 1986, p.121.
149
Translators Note: According to the 1991 D445 History: The 440th Company was then ordered to
deploy down to Long t together with 761 Regiment, to attack the enemy at the t Sub-Sector and
the surrounding area, and to create the conditions for 762 Regiment to destroy a squadron/company ((chi
on)) of armoured vehicles advancing on Route 2 [sic] to relieve t [sic should be Bnh Ba, 9
December 1964]. After the fighting, only three of the enemys 14 armoured vehicles remained intact and
100 enemy had been killed including nine American advisors. The first phase of the Bnh Gi Campaign
had concluded in victory. This is a confused and incorrect reference probably meant to refer to the
ambush of ARVN armour on Route 2 at Bnh Ba on 9 (or less likely 13) December 1964 by the 272 nd VC
Regiment see footnotes 135 and 147. However, a later engagement in the t area is related in the
Long t District History (1986): At the end of December 1964, the 445th Company (Province) assisted
the t area attacking at Ging on Route 44 between Long Hi and An Ngi on 24 December
1964. Long t was provided with two 75mm recoilless rifles (RCL) by 800 Battalion; two companies
from the Long Hi training centre were destroyed (150 killed - including a US advisor). - Phan Ngc Danh
, Lch S u Tranh Cch Mng Ca Huyn Long t, op.cit., 1986, p.121. AN/PRC-25 radios were not
introduced into Vietnam until late 1965 accordingly, AN/PRC-10 radios were probably seized.
150
Translators Note: On 28 December 1964, two Ranger companies with armed helicopter support
reportedly failed to retake Bnh Gi village (elements of the 30th and 38th Ranger Battalions). On 29
December 1964, the 33rd Ranger Battalion and a company of the 30th Ranger Battalion were landed from
helicopters in the Bnh Gi area, followed by the 38 th Ranger Battalion on 30 December. The 4 th Marine
Battalion (428-strong) moved from Bin Ha on 30 December and joined the Ranger battalions at Bnh Gi.
The Marines secured Bnh Gi and a company was deployed to the south-east on 31 December to secure the
site of a downed US helicopter and were engaged by Vit Cng main-force elements. Having suffered
heavy casualties, the 4th Marine Battalion elements fell back to Bnh Gi that evening. On 3 January 1965,
elements of the ARVN Airborne Brigade (1st, 3rd and 7th Battalions) deployed to Bnh Gi to secure the
area. See: Battle of Binh Gia, Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report No.47, January 1965 VCAT Item
No. F031100170123. See also the account with maps, by an ARVN Marine Corps participant - Trn Ngc
Ton, Lieutenant, The Bnh Gi Front, 10 January 2000. The 4th Marine Battalion suffered 112 killed
including the Battalion commander and his 2ic, 71 wounded, and 13 missing. In the Battle of Bnh Gi,
three US servicemen were captured (two advisers with the 33 rd Rangers, one with the 4th Marine Battalion).
Four US helicopter crewmen were also killed when their aircraft was shot down on 30 December 1964. See
also: Trn V, Second Lieutenant, Tiu on 4 Bnh Gi i! Cn nh mi (I Still Recall Binh Gia), 2
September 2012; and Moyar, M., Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War 1954-1965, Cambridge University
Press, 2006, pp.336-340.

44
Supported by COSVN and Province troops, the people and the District and village
armed forces had destroyed a series of strategic hamlets along Routes 2, 52 and 44 - and
the coast near Xuyn Mc. We had opened up the resistance bases from Chu Pha to Hc
Dch, and the east and west of Route 2 were joined with War Zone D and the provinces of
Military Region 6. On 3 January 1965, Phase 2 of the Bnh Gi Campaign was completed
successfully.151
The military feats of 440 Company and 445 Company152 that contributed to the
general victory of the Bnh Gi Campaign were extremely important.153 However, our
sacrifices were not small 30 of our cadre and soldiers fell, and many comrades were
wounded.154
151

Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History summarized the Campaign: We had removed 1,755 enemy
from the battlefield including 60 American advisors. We had captured 293 enemy, destroyed 45 military
vehicles, shot 56 aircraft down in flames, and completely destroyed two battalions and one armoured
vehicle company. We had inflicted heavy casualties on six other battalions. Importantly, for the first time
we had destroyed an armoured company and a battalion of the puppet strategic reserve (the 4 th Marine
Battalion). The puppet forces tactic of deployment by helicopters and armoured vehicles had been
bankrupted by our great Campaign. The t District History (2006) relates: In the Bnh Gi
Campaign, we wiped out (removed from the enemy order-of-battle) the 33rd Ranger Battalion; the 4th
Marine Battalion that had come as a reinforcement from Vng Tu; an M113 armoured squadron at Sng
Cu; shot down an aircraft piloted by an American lieutenant colonel in the rubber plantation at Xun Sn
village; and killed Major Nguyn Vn Nho the commanding officer of the 33rd Ranger Battalion.
According to the official history of the 5th VC Division (2005), the communist forces at the Battle of Bnh
Gi inflicted the following casualties: 2.000 enemy captured; 45 M113s destroyed; 56 aircraft shot down;
611 weapons seized; and three battalions, an armoured company and two detachments of mechanized
vehicles destroyed. - H Sn i Colonel (ed), Lch S S an B Binh 5 (1965-2005) The History
of the 5th Infantry Division (1965-2005), The Peoples Army Publishing House, H Ni, 2005. A principal
Vietnamese military history cites enemy losses similar to the 1991 D445 History cited above ie: the Si
Gn Governments forces suffered: 1,755 killed; 193 captured; 45 vehicles destroyed (mostly M113
armoured personnel carriers); and 56 aircraft - Nguyn Vn Minh Colonel (ed), Lch s Khng chin ,
Tp 3 (Vol 3), op.cit., 1999. The 9th Division History (2010) also relates that subsequently - on 9 February
1965, the 272nd Regiment under its 2ic Nguyn Thi Bng, attacked two ARVN Airborne battalions that
had been inserted in the Chi ng area (C Bi village, west of Route 2 about eight kilometres north-west
of Bnh Gi). In a three-hour battle, more than 300 enemy including 30 Americans were reportedly
eliminated from the fighting, and the 272nd Regiment suffered 43 killed and 84 wounded. This was the
final battle that concluded the victorious Bnh Gi Campaign. - Nguyn Thanh Nhn, The History of the
9th Infantry Division, op.cit., 2010. According to ARVN Airborne histories, the 5 th and 6th Airborne
Battalions were deployed into the Hc Dch area on 9 February 1965 with the 7th Airborne Battalion in a
blocking position to prevent VC withdrawal towards Route 15. The date for the end of the Campaign is also
stated as 7 March 1965 Phan L Hong H, Chuyn k v ng mn H Ch Minh trn bin:
Huyn thoi nhng con tu., 30 April 2005. The 1991 D445 History as in several Vietamese histories,
concludes: following the victory of the Bnh Gi Campaign, General Secretary L Dun stated With
the Battle of p Bc in 1963, the enemy realized that it would be difficult to defeat us after the Bnh Gi
Campaign, the enemy realized that they had lost to us. The foregoing statement is inscribed on the Bnh
Gi Victory memorial in Bnh Gi village which includes a North Vietnamese flag, ie not a National
Liberation Front (NLF) flag.
152
Translators Note: An Order by the Eastern Nam B Military Region Headquarters dated 22 March 1965
awarded Certificates of Commendation to the following C.445 personnel: Trng Vn Van Assistant
Squad Leader; Nguyn Vn Thu - Platoon Leader; and Trn Vn Chin Company Executive Officer.
CDEC Log 03-1342-66.
153
Translators Note: H Vn Phong - a reconnaissance team leader of 445, was awarded a Certificate of
Commendation by the B Ra Province Unit for his achievements during the Bnh Gi Campaign having
killed seven enemy, including one officer during the attack on Bnh Gi hamlet. CDEC Log 12-2405-66.
154
Translators Note: Other VC casualties are unclear. However, in April 2013, the remains of some of the
fallen 271st and 272nd Regiment personnel were recovered from the Bnh Gi battlefield and reinterred in
the Chu c cemetery (271st Regiment: 25, killed in the period 28-31 December 1964; 272nd Regiment:
one killed on 9 December 1964, seven on 3 January 1965, and 22 on 9 February 1964 at Chi ng the
last of the battles of the Bnh Gi Campaign).

45

The predecessors of the B Ra Vng Tu armed forces were created from many
different sources comprising a force of Long Thnh Districts core youth, an element of
the Bnh Xuyn forces that had been won over to our ideals by the Party, a group of
political prisoners who had escaped from the Tam Hip prison, and about a section
provided by higher headquarters. When first established, our weapons and equipment
were rudimentary and inadequate. Our main task was armed propaganda and supporting
the peoples political struggle movement. However, thanks to the direct leadership of the
Party and the protection and mutual help of the people, the predecessor armed forces of
445 Battalion developed and swiftly came-of-age.
From our first armed propaganda unit (C.40) established in 1958, we developed
into two Companies (440 and 445) in 1964. The combat capability of these predecessor
units continued to strengthen and develop in leaps and bounds: from killing tyrants,
destroying the oppression, small independent attacks employing deception and
diversionary tactics etc then up to concentrated combat actions closely combined with
local forces (comprising District troops, militia, and guerrillas). Higher level forces
(regular troops) fought relatively larger battles, wiping out much of the enemys
capability (such as the counter-sweeping operations in the Long Phc tunnels, attacking
the enemy at Sng Cu and Bnh Gi, and - most of all, the attack on the Bnh Gi
strategic hamlet).
The combat achievements of the predecessor units of 445 Battalion made an
important contribution to the success of the ng Khi movement in our home Province,
destroying the American-Dim strategic hamlet plan in B Ra Province and, most of
all, achieving the victory of the Bnh Gi Campaign. This was indeed an historic time
marking the coming-of-age of the concentrated armed forces of B Ra Province, and
heralding a new and stronger capability to be developed into the future.

46

PART ONE (p.67)

The Founding of 445 Battalion; Contributing Significantly in the
Victory of the War of National Salvation against the Americans on the
B Ra Long Khanh Battlefield
Chapter 1

Founding 445 Battalion, Fighting While Coming-of-Age (1965 -1968)

1. Founding 445 Battalion the Pillar of the B Ra-Long Khanh Armed Forces;
Combat Activities and Support of the Revolutionary Movement (1965 1967).
Following the defeat of their Special Warfare strategy - with the aim of saving the
situation and avoiding the collapse of the Si Gn puppet regime, the Americans moved
to a strategy of Limited War and brought in American expeditionary forces and their
vassals to fight directly on the battlefields in the South.
By the beginning of 1965, the regional revolutionary movements had developed quite
strongly. The majority of the strategic hamlets155 in the Province had all been destroyed
including the important model strategic hamlets on Route 15 adjacent to the B Ra
Sector.156
The liberated areas of the Province had expanded with the Minh m157 base
joining the liberated areas of Long t and Chu c158 Districts to Xuyn Mc District
155

Translators Note: As noted, the Strategic Hamlet (p Chin Lc) program was wider than the
Agroville resettlement program begun by the Republic of Vietnams President Ng nh Dim in 1959.
Operation Sunrise launched in Bnh Dng Province in late March 1962, began the Strategic Hamlet
program. In 1962, the focus of the program was the six provinces around Si Gn (including Phc Tuy)
and Kontum Province. Initially, 11,316 strategic hamlets were planned country-wide. In Phc Tuy, as at
31 July 1963, reportedly 135 of the Provinces planned 162 strategic hamlets had been completed
covering 121,000 (87% of the Provinces population), see USOM, Notes on Strategic Hamlets, VCAT Item
No. 2397021101. However, the program faltered with the assassination of President Ng nh Dim in
November 1963. On 23 February 1964, the program was revitalized as the New Life Hamlets (p i
Mi) program - and in 1965 retitled Secure Hamlets (p Tn Sinh ie still New Life Hamlets, but
in Sino-Vietnamese).
156
Translators Note: A Sector (tiu khu) was the military area equivalent to a province; a Sub-Sector (chi
khu) equated to a district. In mid-1966, the Phc Tuy Sector Commander was Lieutenant Colonel L c
t with the Sub-Sector Commanders: Long L Lieutenant Trn Tn Phat; t Captain Lng
nh Chi; c Thnh Captain Nguyn Vn B; Long in Captain Trn Thanh Long (ex Xuyn Mc);
Xuyn Mc Captain L Vn c. USOM, Office of Rural Affairs, 1 July 1966 - VCAT Item
No.23970222002. In the 1970s, a Sub-Sub-Sector (phn chi khu) covered a village or group of villages. The
Long t District History (1986) states that in 1974 11 military Sub-Sub-Sectors (phn chi khu qun s)
were established in that District (ie then VC Long Xuyn District).
157
Translators Note: As noted, the Minh m is a range of hills and a Vit Minh/Vit Cng base
area/secret zone within the areas/boundaries of the villages of Tam An, Phc Long Hi, Phc Hi and
Long Hi (of Long t District in modern-day B Ra-Vng Tu Province). The Minh m area is more
than nine kilometres in length and almost five kilometres at its widest. See also: Phm Ch Thn (ed), Cn
C Minh m 1945-1975 - The Minh m Base 1945-1975, S Vn Ha Thng Tin Tnh B Ria-Vng
Tu - B Ria-Vng Tu Province Information and Cultural Office, 2006.
158
Translators Note: As noted at footnote 62, the communists Chu Thnh District was restructured and
renamed in 1965 ie according to the Chu c History (2004): In 1965, to contend with the battle
against the Americans, the B Ra-Long Khnh Province Committee combined the two districts of Chu
Thnh and c Thnh to form Chu c District. A local Party History notes that Chu c District was

47
and up to War Zone D. The recruiting movement in the regions of the Province was
extremely active particularly in the two districts of Long t and Chu c, and
hundreds of youths volunteered to serve in the armed forces of the Province and the
Districts. Provincial armed forces were created and expanded in all three categories. The
number of troops and weapons were notably increased after the victory at Bnh Gi.
To implement the Resolution of the Military Region and the Province Committee
and to establish concentrated armed forces, on 19 May 1965 the B Ra Province force
was officially established at the Sui Rao Stream (Long Tn village Long t District)
on the basis of combining two units: 440 Company and 445 Company, enlisting recruits
from the two districts of Long t and Chu c; and further strengthening the force
with elements taken from organisations of the Province Committee and the Province Unit.
The total force numbered about 450 comrades. Comrade Bi Quang Chnh (Su
Chnh)159 was the Battalion Commander; Comrade L Thnh Ba (Ba Bi) was the
Political Officer160 and concurrently Secretary of the Battalions Party Committee;
Comrade V Quc Chanh (T Chanh) was the Battalions second-in-command161; and
Comrade Nguyn Minh Ninh was the Deputy Political Officer.162 The Battalion was
structured with four companies including a fire support company (C4).163 It included a
formed on 24 May 1965 with Nguyn Vn Tin (Nm Tin) as the Secretary of the District Committee
with the Committees base in the jungle at Bng Lng (ng Ngh). Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s
ng (The History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter VII.
159
Translators Note: Earlier on 23 February 1965, as Nguyn Quang Chnh, Bi Quang Chnh had been
assigned to the B Ra Province Concentrated Unit as the Battalion Commander see captured
document: T1 Headquarters, Decision 015/QD, CDEC Log 09-1863-66, Bulletin No.1063. According to
the ng Nai History (1986): On 19 May 1965 in the Long Tn base (Long t), the B Ra Province
Committee established the Provincial Main Force [sic] Battalion with the title of 445 with Comrade T
Chnh ((ie V Quc Chanh)) as the Battalion Commander and Comrade L Thnh Ba as its political
officer. Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.123. However, it appears that both the
1991 D445 History and this 2004 D445 History (ie the text above) have corrected the name of 445
Battalions inaugural commander to Bi Quang Chnh (Su Chnh). Bi Quang Chnhs appointment as
the inaugural Battalion Commander is also related in the local Party history - Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg),
Lch s ng (The History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter VII. However, a
number of other publications have cited T Chnh as the initial 445 Battalion Commander probably
influenced by the ng Nai History (1986) eg: the ng Nai Monograph (2001) ie: a Ch ng Nai, Nh
Xut Bn Tng Hp ng Nai, Bin Ha, 2001. For biographical notes on Bi Quang Chnh (Su Chnh)
and eight other key 445 Battalion cadre, see Annex A Key Cadre.
160
Translators Note: According to the Military Region Decision 015/QD document of 23 February 1965
noted above, T Ngha was initially appointed as the Political Officer of D445 Battalion - ie the B Ra
Province Concentrated Unit ie by T1 Headquarters, Decision 015/QD, 23 February 1965 - CDEC Log
09-1863-66, Bulletin No.1063.
161
Translators Note: Company Commander V Quc Chanh was appointed as the Deputy Commander of
D445 Battalion - ie the B Ra Province Concentrated Unit, by T1 Headquarters, Decision 015/QD, 23
February 1965 - CDEC Log 09-1863-66, Bulletin No.1063.
162
Translators Note: Nguyn Vn Ch alias Ninh, was appointed Assistant Political Officer of D445
Battalion - ie the B Ra Province Concentrated Unit, by T1 Headquarters, Decision 015/QD, 23 February
1965 -CDEC Log 09-1863-66, Bulletin No.1063. See also the following footnote on subsequent political
officer appointments.
163
Translators Note: According to a footnote in the 1991 D445 History: The four companies were three
infantry companies and one fire support company - 1st Company: Su Chin as company commander and
T Dng as political officer; 2nd Company: Su Thu as commander and Hai Khanh as political officer; 3 rd
Company: Nm Thnh as commander, Khi as political officer; 4th Company: T Nh as commander,
Thng as its political officer. Translators Note continues: Subsequently on 20 October 1965, the B Ra
Province Unit formally promoted: Trn Vn Chin (Su Chin) from company executive officer to
company commander; T Dng from platoon leader to assistant political officer; Nguyn Minh Khanh (Hai
Khanh) from assistant political officer to political officer; Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu), Trn Vn Khi, and
Nguyn Vn Thng from platoon leaders to executive officers - CDEC Log 09-1876-66. Note however, that

48
headquarters and staff, political and rear services sections together with a surgical
section led by Assistant-Doctor Nguyn Vn Hiu.164
The Battalions Party Chapter had five cells. Every company had a cell and a
branch of the Youth Group. At the beginning, innumerable difficulties and straitened
circumstances had to be faced.165 However, with the Province Committee and the
Province Unit paying the utmost attention to assisting us, the Battalion quickly
consolidated all aspects in order to commence operations. Cadre were provided to
strengthen the Headquarters and the Surgical Section, and personnel were withdrawn
from some organisations to reinforce the Battalions numbers. The Province Committee
provided 100,000 piastres (Si Gn currency) the equivalent of seven tonnes of rice,
and that was put aside in three storehouses as a precaution against any contingencies.
In the process of combat operations, development, and coming-of-age, 445
Battalions rear services were able to inherit the experience of building the peoples rear
services organisation, the in-place rear services, the creation of storehouses among the
people, and the operational transportation of principal supplies by shoulder-borne
porterage.166 The unit put away reserves in preparation for each engagement and
operational phase the most important being burying rice in ammunition containers and
tin cans right in its area of operations. Because the operational area was very large and the
peoples rear services organisation and the in-place rear services covered a wide area,
there were times when each element of 445 Battalion suffered hunger. However, this did
not last long even when the enemy attacks were at their fiercest.
The Battalions military equipment service was created immediately after the
Battalion was established. The Battalion had two sewing machines one was provided by
the rear services, and the other belonged to Nm M (born in Ha Long). When she fled
to join the Battalion, she asked her family to let her take a sewing machine with her so
that she could make clothes for the troops. During both operations and the period of
development, the Battalions rear services requested and were given an additional 6-7
sewing machines by the people, and recruited a number of skillful craftsmen such as
Comrade Trng Thanh Tng (from Ty Ninh), Comrade T Chc (a native of Long
in), Comrades By Kin and Tam Tng (from Phc Li), and a number of other
comrades with skills in making uniforms for the troops.
the date on that document (Command Committee T.1 No. 602/TB) was incorrectly written as 20 October
1966, instead of 1965. See CDEC Bulletin No.1064, 21 September 1966.
164
Translators Note: For Nguyn Vn Hiu see CDEC Log 12-2427-66. However, note that earlier in this
2004 D445 History, he is also referred to as Nguyn Thanh Hiu. Also, a discrete medical history reports
his name as Nguyn Thanh Hiu see: L Thanh Dng (et al), Lch S Ngnh Y T B Ra-Long Khnh
(1945-2006) - The History of the B Ra-Long Khnh Medical Services (1945-2006), Vng Tu, 2008.
165
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History notes: The issue of rear services support required immediate
attention and was resolved in stages. Comrade Ba Tm was appointed the staff officer responsible for rear
services, and Comrade Nguyn Tun Gii (Mi Gii) became its adjutant. For Nguyn Thanh Tm (aka
Ba Tm), see CDEC Log 05-1808-67, and Log 05-1797-67. For his correspondence with the 445 Battalion
adjutant - Nguyn Tun Gii (Mi Gii), see CDEC Log 05-3474-67, and Log 05-3406-67. Subsequently,
Nguyn Thanh Tm as the Battalion 2ic, was killed in an ambush by 1 ATFs 7th Battalion (7RAR) on 31
December 1970 at C Thi in the Xuyn Mc area see footnotes 382, 383, 396, 476, 478, 479, and 641.
Nguyn Tun Gii (Mi Gii - b. Qung Ngi, North Vietnam) was noted as a platoon commander in the
5th Company of 445 Battalion in January 1966, attended a COSVN training course at the H21 Rear Services
School in February-early August 1966, and was formally appointed adjutant (qun l) of 445 Battalion in
September 1966. The Battalion adjutant was responsible for managing rear services support - including
finances. Nguyn Tun Giis captured diary indicated that he was enroute from H21 back to Phc Tuy
Province at the time of the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966.
166
Translators Note: Several US references calculated NVA/VC porterage on a basis of 50lb (22.72kg)
loads per porter and a trip of 30km per day. See also footnote 88 for VC labourer policies.

49
Uniforms, camouflage hats, hammocks, and webbing straps were all beautifully
made. Following suggestions from the troops, the Battalion Headquarters agreed to direct
the rear services to create light and compact equipment for the men. In stages, nylon
hammocks replaced the canvas hammocks. Uniforms were sewn with nylon thread thin
and quick-drying, and replaced the cotton cloth that had been provided by the Province
rear services.167*
Immediately after its founding, the Battalion quickly determined its structure, and
organised military and political training for its troops. This included technical aspects,
tactics, and tasks and the plots and schemes of the enemy, all in response to the
requirements of the battlefield. In only a short period of time, the technical and tactical
standards and the political consciousness, of the Battalions cadre and soldiers had been
clearly raised.168
After a short period of basic training within the unit, the Battalion organised an
ambush of the enemy at the Lang Cat strategic hamlet on Route 15. In this first
engagement, the impetus and fighting resolve of the Battalion was very high but the
outcome of that attack on the enemy didnt result as had been wished. At the end of the
battle, we had only seized two weapons, and many of our comrades had been wounded.
Following that battle, the Battalion headquarters was able to draw a number of
experiences, including:
Number One: Our reconnaissance study did not fully appreciate that the enemy
could hide among the people, and our troops were confused and unable to develop the
thrust of the attack thus creating opportunites for the enemy to organise a counterattack.
Number Two: The troops advanced, but selecting the point of attack was too
complicated, and it was difficult to score a goal.
Number Three: A strong and basic point for the Battalion was that it achieved
relatively good cooperation between the attacking thrusts.
In this period, the 2nd Company was ordered by the Province Unit and the
Battalion Headquarters to deploy to Cn Gi to coordinate with the local District troops
to attack the enemy and support the guerrilla movements while at the same time
destroying the enemys grip and setting up and expanding a revolutionary region there.
As the commander of the 2nd Company (Comrade Nguyn c Thu) was absent on
training, Comrade Trn Vn Chin the commander of the 1st Company was given the
task of leading the 2nd Company to fight in Cn Gi. In 40 days and nights of operations
in Cn Gi, the 2nd Company fought three battles and liberated two villages.
In the first battle, two platoons of the 2nd Company coordinated with an element of
the District troops to attack an enemy platoon stationed in the council offices of ng
Ha village. At that location, the enemy had built posts and fighting trenches to defend
the village council. We used 57mm recoilless rifles (RCLs) placed at the jungles edge to
fire on the enemys posts creating the conditions for our infantry to assault and seize the
post and take control of the village council. A large number of weapons and military
167

* In the middle of 1969, the enemy fiercely attacked 445 Battalion, and its ordnance organisation was
transferred to the Provinces rear services. From that time, the Province rear services accepted and
developed the military equipment function.
168
Translators Note: According to a principal Vietnamese history of the War: In May 1965, the troops of
Xun Lc District together with 445 Provincial Battalion and Military Region main force elements,
attacked and liberated Route 1 from Gia Ray to Rng L ((Long Khnh Province)), and the hamlets of Tr
Tn 1 and Tr Tn 2 on Route 3 - Nguyn Vn Minh Colonel (ed), Lch s Khng chin , Tp 3 (Vol 3),
op.cit., 1999, footnote 16. Neither the 1991 nor the 2004 D445 Battalion Histories record any Battalion
involvement in such engagements in Long Khnh Province in mid-1965.

50
equipment were seized - enemy were wiped out, a number were wounded, and the
remainder fled in terror. We completely liberated the village of ng Ha.
In the second battle following the attacking tactics employed at the battle at
ng Ha, we used two platoons in conjunction with the District troops to strike an
enemy platoon in Long Thnh village. The 1st Platoon of the 2nd Company together with
District forces, attacked the village council. The 2nd Platoon together with a group of
60mm mortars and 57mm RCLs from the Rng Sc troops169 fired upon and wiped out
the enemy blockhouses and the strong points within the post. Our infantry assaulted and
seized the objective. There, the enemy resisted resolutely, and it took an hour before they
abandoned the position and fled. We took control and were able to liberate the village of
Long Thnh.
In the third battle, our intention was to ambush a group of Popular Force troops
((Dn V))170 that usually patrolled on the road from Cn Thnh to Ven hamlet. Our
ambush formation comprised two platoons. The 2nd Platoon had the task of blocking the
enemys leading elements, while the 1st Platoon had the mission of attacking from the
flank. Our organisation and preparations for the ambush were all completed before
sunrise. At 6am (when the sun was up), we could see across to the other side of the fields
our ambush position was about 100 metres in length; and we saw many groups of the
enemy wearing steel helmets and green uniforms advancing straight towards us. We
realised that they were not Popular Forces, but the Company Headquarters was still
determined to attack them. The enemy platoon opened fire first and a number were
killed on the spot. They withdrew - taking cover in the villagers houses and behind trees,
and resisted resolutely. Our 1st Platoon, hearing the sound of gunfire, quickly deployed
and launched a flanking attack on the enemys position. The enemy was attacked by two
pincers and, unable to resist, suddenly fled across the fields back to Cn Thnh but
leaving behind the bodies of many who had been killed. We took control of the battlefield
after an hour of decisive combat, protecting the village, and liberating Long Thnh.
After 40 days and nights of fighting on new grounds characterised by waterways
and constricted terrain, 445 Battalions 2nd Company doggedly overcame difficulties, took
the initiative to successfully attack the enemy, supported the revolutionary struggle of the
Party Chapters and the people of Cn Gi, and outstandingly completed the tasks directed
by the higher authorities.171
169

Translators Note: The Rng Sc/Sc/Rng St lies about 32 kilometres south-southeast of Si Gn and
comprises about 1,250 square kilometres of tidal swamp for detail, see footnote 10.
170
Translators Note: As noted earlier, the Dn V (Self-Defence Corps) - together with the Hamlet
Combat Youth, were replaced by the Popular Forces (PF ie: Ngha Qun) in 1964. However, many
communist writings continued to use the term Dn V for the Popular Forces ie forces that operated
within a district.
171
Translators Note: These engagements in mid-1965 in Cn Gi are not related in the 1991 D445 History.
However, in July 1965, the B Ra Province Unit reported that, during June, their forces in the Province
were involved in 169 engagements in which 148 enemy were killed, 134 wounded - while suffering 15
killed and 34 wounded. Almost all activity involved district forces and village guerrillas. CDEC Log 122987-66. More specifically, two subsequently captured Letters of Appreciation signed by L Thnh Ba - the
445 Battalion political officer, commended two personnel of the 4 th Company for their outstanding combat
exploits in a successful attack on B Ra on 16 (or 26) July 1965. CDEC Log 12-2425-66. Morale
problems were later discussed at a four-day political conference held by the B Ra Province Unit in midSeptember 1965, and it was reported that 44 personnel in the Province had deserted in the preceding twomonth period (July, August) including eight from 445 Battalion, 10 from the Long t District Unit, eight
from the Chu c District Unit and four from the Bnh Chu (Xuyn Mc) guerrilla unit. The main
reasons cited for desertion were: fear of death, shelling - particularly enemy aircraft attacks, hardship - and
a preference for the easy life at home CDEC Log 09-2601-66 (signed by B [sic] Lin Head of the
Political Section of the B Ra Province Unit) The signature is identical to that of Vn Lin - aka Ba
Lin ( Vn Chng), who became the 445 Battalion political officer soon after (ie replacing L Thnh

51
After the battle at Lang Cat, the unit returned to the L base172 (Long Tn) to
consolidate.173 Comrade L Thnh Ba the Battalions Political Officer, was posted for
duty on the Province Committee. Comrade Vn Chng (Ba Lin) was appointed as
the Political Officer of the Battalion.
On 23 August 1965, the whole of the Battalion deployed for a second battle, with
the determination to achieve victory and develop momentum. Our opponents this time
were elements of the police in Long in Sub-District, stationed in the Five-Building
Complex.174 As this was a battle in a town, the Province Unit reinforced our unit with a
sapper-reconnaissance team from Province.
Having carefully studied the terrain, the Battalion Headquarters ordered a surprise
attack using both firepower and an assault. Our forces used in the engagement comprised
two companies - with comrades selected from our companies for their battle-experience,
courage, technical expertise, skill and spirit. That force combined with the reconnaissance
element from the Province Unit and the Battalion reconnaissance unit to form the main
pillar. It was divided into three groups: two groups as the main thrust and a group to block
any enemy reinforcements. The Headquarters was set up in Long in Town about 500
metres from the objective and under the command of Comrade Bi Quang Chnh (Su
Chnh) the Battalion Commander, and Comrade Vn Chng the Political
Officer.175
The battle unfurled favourably in the first period as the enemy was surprised from
the time we moved to the assembly area, cut the fences, placed explosives, and opened
fire and we were able to seize the ground floor of the Five-Building Complex. The
enemy retreated up to the higher floors to set up last-ditch defences, and hurled down
grenades thick and fast. Losing the initiative, we suffered quite a large number of
wounded. Two of our reconnaissance comrades were killed including Comrade Ninh, a
province sapper cadre.176* At the same time, our reinforcement blocking group wiped out
more than 10 of the enemy who had tried to break through. After an hour of fighting, the
Battalion withdrew to Long Phc, tended to the wounded, buried our martyrs, and
carried rice and the wounded back to the base.
The Battle of the Five-Building Complex (in Long in Town) was our first joint
combat action at battalion-minus level in a town. High combat efficiency was achieved,
much of the enemys vitality was destroyed, and a Sub-Sectors police force was crippled.
We intimidated and damaged the morale of the enemy officers and soldiers, and proved
Ba - ie Ba Bi, who appears to have been posted to the Political Section of B Ra Province Unit). CDEC
Log 09-1883-66, see footnote 175.
172
Translators Note: The L Streams the Large and the Small, are north-east of Long Tn village.
173
Translators Note: As noted above, a report by the B Ra Province Headquarters - following a
conference on 15 September 1965, recorded that in July and August 44 personnel had deserted to the
enemy including 18 from D445 Battalion. The main reasons for desertion were cited as: fear of death,
enemy aircraft, hardships, and personal disappointment with immediate commanders.- CDEC Log 092601-66.
174
Translators Note: The Five-Building Complex or the Five-Storey Centre in Vietnamese: Ph
Nm Cn. In the 1991 edition of the D445 History, it is termed the Lu Nm Cn, and the attack was
described in greater detail.
175
Translators Note: Ba Lin - ie Vn Chng (also as Vn Lin), had been the Head of the
Political Section of the B Ra Province Unit up until at least late September 1965 see footnote 171 and
his biography in Annex A Key Cadre. Ba Bi (L Thnh Ba) appears to have been posted to the Political
Section of B Ra Province Unit CDEC Log 09-1883-66, and subsequently to Long t District. For a
biography of Vn Chng (Ba Lin) - also as Vn Lin (and incorrectly as ng Vn Chng), who
became the political officer of 445 Battalion, see Annex A Key Cadre.
176
* The unit had only just held a declaration ceremony (a wedding) for him and Ms L Th Bich Thy at
the base less than a month previously.

52
445 Battalions ability to infiltrate and conceal a large number of troops (two companies)
in the base and lair of the enemy. However, the attack also revealed failures in tactical
and technical aspects, and the selection of attack objectives. Our troops were not yet
familiar with the tactics of storming defended positions - and consequently were confused
and unable to exploit attacks on strong-points. These were valuable experiences and the
lessons strengthened our instruction and the training of the units personnel.177
Not long after the battle at the Five-Building Complex, the Battalion178 joined
with troops of Long t Districts 25th Local Force Company179 to set an ambush and
attack the enemy at a Ging (Long Hi).180 The Battalions opponents in this battle were
the enemys Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) Battalion from the Phc Tuy NCO
training school at Long Hi. Each day, the enemy troops moved from Long Hi to the
edge of Cng Qunh a Ging, and their column stretched out over several kilometres.
Their movement was poor they shuffled along, and they were not very alert. Having
confirmed their activities and routine, the Battalion resolved to attack the enemy and
submitted a plan to the Province Unit for consideration.181
On the night of 24 December 1965 [sic]182, 445 Battalion coordinated with the
25th Company (Long t) to set a mobile ambush183 on the enemy in the a Ging area
(Route 44 Upper). Our ambush configuration covered a stretch of the road for more than
one kilometre about 500 metres from the edge of L Vi. The 2nd Company had the task
of blocking the head of the enemy column (near the base of the Minh m Mountains)
and was strengthened with a 75mm RCL. The 1st Company had the mission of wiping out
the enemy in the killing zone (in the central area) and was reinforced with two 57mm
RCLs and a fish-tail heavy machinegun. The 3rd Company had the task of sealing the
rear of the ambush together with Long t Districts 25th Company, at the Long Hi
end.
In the salt pans opposite the killing zone, the Battalion deployed a platoon in the
Rng Sc led by Comrade ng Cng Quang (Quang H) with the task of attacking the
177

Translators Note: Soon after the attack, on 28 August 1965 the Commanding Officer of 445 Battalion
Bi Quang Chnh, promoted 16 junior personnel (named) to squad/section leader or assistant squad/section
leaders in C4 Company. CDEC Log 04-1397-66.
178
Translators Note: According to the 5th Division History (2005), in mid-December 1965, a coordinating
conference was held between the staffs of the 5th Division, the 445th B Ra Battalion, the 25th Long t
Company and the 240th Company to plan future activity.
179
Translators Note: The involvement of the Long t District unit in this and other, operations is
described in the Long t District History (1986) ie Phan Ngc Danh , Lch S Huyn Long t,
op.cit., 1986 for translated extracts, see Annex L in Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit., 2011; and in
the t District History (2006) - ie ng Tn Hng (ed), The History t District (1930-2005),
op.cit., 2006.
180
Translators Note: a Ging is sometimes misspelt in communist sources as a Vng and on some
maps appears as Ni (Mount) a Dung. The ambush occurred in the vicinity of grid reference YS 432549.
181
Translators Note: On 11 November 1965, the 3 rd Battalion of the 275th VC Regiment attempted to
ambush a 52nd Ranger Battalion convoy on Route 15 at Kim Hi hamlet (Phc Ha about 10 kilometres
north-west of B Ra Town) but suffered heavy casualties for detail, see Annex O (The 275th Regiment).
182
Translators Note: In the 1991 edition of the D445 Battalion history, the a Ging ambush is related
more fully and as having occurred on 7/8 January 1966. The US MACV Military History Branchs
Chronology of Significant Events during 1966, 27 April 1967 - recorded: 8 January 1966, VC ambush
RF convoy in Phuoc Tuy Province, 31 RF KIA, 3 US KIA, 30 RF WIA, 10 MIA. - VCAT Item No.
13370149004. This 2004 D445 History - citing the date as 24 December 1965, has probably confused the
action with the D445 Battalion ambush on 24 December 1964 see earlier footnotes 148 and 149, when
it actually occurred on 8 January 1966. The authors of the 2004 edition may have been misled by the date
in the ng Nai Monograph (2001), see footnote 186.
183
Translators Note: phc kch vn ng see a discussion of the mobile ambush tactic at footnotes
187 below and 267.

53
enemy when they attempted to flee. The Battalions Political Officer Vn Chng
(Ba Lin) had encouraged a number of cadre and soldiers in this platoon to overcome the
difficulties and bear the hardship of getting soaked as the tide rose and to hold-on and
stick it out in their positions until the time for action came. The Province Unit
Commander Nguyn Vit Hoa184, participated directly by commanding the engagement
together with the Battalion Commander Bi Quang Chnh, and the Battalion Political
Officer Vn Chng. At 12pm midday the next day, the enemy moved towards the
Battalions ambush position. Our combined ambush groups fought valiantly. After 10
minutes of combat, we had complete control of the battlefield, and had wiped out two
companies of the NCO training battalion, seized 46 weapons, set fire to four armoured
vehicles, seized two PRC-25 radios185, and captured 18 of the enemy.186 This was the
first Battalion-level mobile ambush187 - a resounding victory, and one among 445
Battalions annihilation battles.188
Following that battle189, the Battalions prestige increased greatly. The enemy
were alarmed and afraid. On our side, the people and the revolutionary organisations were
184

Translators Note: Captured Vit Cng documents show the commander of the B Ra Province Unit in
1965 to mid-1966 was Nguyn Vn Mi - ie the cover name for Nguyn Vit Hoa (Mi Th). Nguyn
Vn Mi as the commander of the B Ra Province Unit, signed several Letters of Appreciation
including for a sapper/reconnaissance member of the 445 Battalions 5 th Company for exploits at the a
Vng [sic] battle on 8 January 1966 CDEC Log 06-1013-66.
185
Translators Note: The US AN/PRC- 25 VHF military manpack radio. This radio was introduced in late
1965 to replace the less effective AN/PRC-10 see footnote 107. The 1991 D445 History does not record
any seizure of PRC-25s in this ambush ie on 7/8 January 1966, nor 24 December 1965. However, the
seizure of an AN/PRC-25 is also related in the t District History (2006) see the following footnote.
It is possible that such only recently-available AN/PRC-25 radios were carried by US advisors three were
killed in the engagement.
186
Translators Note: The t District History (2006) relates that: 120 enemy were killed including
two Americans, 46 weapons were seized, four armoured vehicles destroyed, two PRC-25 radios seized, and
18 prisoners taken. A captured Vit Cng document claims that at a Ging, the communist forces
appealed to US troops to surrender unsuccessfully, so they shot and killed them all see CDEC Log
03-1270-66. According to the ng Nai Monograph (2001): on 24 December 1965, 445 Battalion with C25
Company (Long t) destroyed two companies of NCOs from the Long Hi Regional Forces Training
Centre - a Ch ng Nai, op.cit., 2001. The B Ra Vng Tu Party History (2000) relates the a
Ging ambush similar to the account in the t District History (2006) but cites the date of the ambush
as 25 February 1966. As noted in the preceding footnote 182 above, a US report relates the ambush date as
8 January 1966 see also the awards related at footnotes 184 and 188.
187
Translators Note: Vit Cng ambushes were generally classified as either area, static, mobile or
manoeuvre. Detailed discussion on such from a Vit Cng doctrinal publication is in McAulay, L., The
Battle of Long Tan, Arrow Books, London, 1987 see Appendix 4: The Vietcong Ambush. For static
and mobile ambushes, see also: USMACV/CICV, VC Ambush Tactics, OB Study 67-026, Saigon, 6
January 1967. VCAT Item No.F015900210563. For published contemporary Australian military doctrine
on enemy ambush tactics, see: Army Headquarters, The Enemy 1964, Canberra, 1 July 1964, pp.37-38.
188
Translators Note: Several Letters of Commendation were awarded by the 445 Battalion Commander
Bi Quang Chnh (Su Chnh), for exploits at the a Ging battle on Route 44 including for the
57mm recoilless rifle section of the 4th Company see CDEC Log 12-2425-66. On 15 May 1966 vide
Decision #49/QD-KT, the Headquarters of the South Vietnamese Liberation Army awarded the Liberation
Military Exploits [sic but probably Military Feats] Medal 2nd Class to the Concentrated Battalion of B
Ra Province for its destruction of the Long Hi NCO School students on 8 January 1966 and its
superior performance of duties in the Phc Thnh Battle on 26 April 1966. CDEC Log 09-1972-66.
Letters of Commendation were also awarded to 445 Battalion personnel for the a Ging battle including
to platoon commander Nguyn Vn i and squad leader H Vn Phong see CDEC Log 12-2413-66. On
10 January 1966, the Battalion Political Officer Vn Lin (Ba Lin), wrote a letter of condolence to
the parents of section commander Nguyn Quc Thng killed in a battle on Route 44 on 8 January 1966
CDEC Log 01-1032-67.
189
Translators Note: The a Ging battle of early January 1966 is not mentioned in the published history
of the Minh m Secret Zone Base ie Phm Ch Thn, Cn C Minh m, op.cit., 2006. However, on

54
even more elated in spirit, supported our troops, and brought their children into the jungle
to join the resistance war. The Battalion returned swiftly to its base area, studied
engagements to draw further experience and lessons, and rewarded comrades for their
outstanding performance. The Battalion structure was reviewed and its strength,
weaponry, equipment, and supplies increased, in order to continue to achieve tasks in the
subsequent series of operations.
Through its involvement in combat, 445 Battalion had drawn a lot of valuable
experience in organising appropriate combat operations against a range of opponents
based on the special characteristics of each enemy element. Consequently, the Battalions
combat performance increased daily. Additionally, there were many other active support
activities. Our military intelligence organisation was able to organise a network of covert
agents in those areas temporarily occupied by the enemy, and provided us with timely
information on the enemy situation. Military intelligence also organised observation posts
and employed technical means190 to follow the enemys movements and attacks and
thereby support the Battalions combat operations.
The system of military proselytising among the enemys armed forces was
strengthened. All of the political sections from the Battalion level to the Province Unit
and District Unit had cadre specialising in the military proselytising of the enemy.
Assistant-level political cadre were assigned with this task at company level and in
village units. Depending on the requirements of each engagement, our military
proselytising forces received specific instructions and were allocated to our elements to
conduct proselytising of the enemy. At times, our unit employed a section-sized, platoonsized, or company-sized force to conduct armed propaganda and military proselytising
activities. This was carried out routinely, and was thoroughly understood by each of our
soldiers. It was included in the tactical plan of each and every operation and attack. Our
enemy proselytising sections studied documents and the thoughts and ideology of the
22 March 1966, a force comprising Vit Cng sappers (240C Company) and an artillery element from the
5th VC Division moved from the Minh m base and attacked and shelled the Vng Tu airfield and the
Ch Linh Rural Development Cadre Training Centre in Vng Tu see Phm Ch Thn, Cn C Minh m
(The Minh m Base), op.cit., 2006, pp.47-48. The Eastern Nm B Region citation for the attack on
Vng Tu shows the date of the attack as 12 March CDEC Log 09-1880-66; as does the COSVN award of
the Liberation Military Exploits Medal 3rd Class CDEC Log 09-2189-66. See also the account of the
attack in the 5th Division History (2005) at Annex K, footnote 13. According to a rallier (hi chnh) from
240C Sapper Company, the unit incorporated a platoon from 445 Battalion and had undergone training
directed by Su Chnh - the commander of 445 Battalion, prior to the attack on Vng Tu. The organisation
of 240C Company and preparations for the attack on 13 March 1966 are detailed in a USMACV report VCAT Item No.F034600931151. See also the account in the 5th Division History (2005) at Annex K, and
the t District History (2006) - pp.195-196 that cites the attacking unit as A.65.
190
Translators Note: This is highly probably a reference to signals intelligence intercept of the radio
communications of South Vietnamese, US, and other forces. On 24 October 1966, Australian forces
captured a female radio operator on Ni Dinh Mountain (YS 332657) ie T Th Nu, equipped with a
Type RT-77/GRC-9 radio (believed to be a 5th VC Division equipment used to report movement on Route
15) 1 ATF, Intelligence Review, Ni t, 29 October 1966; McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., pp.395398. For detail, see Hartley, R.W., AM & Hampstead, B.V., The Story of 547 Signal Troop in South
Vietnam 1966-1972, Googong, 2014, pp.72-75. For detail also see: See VC/NVA Electronic Warfare
(EW) Capability MACV ST 67-061, CICV, 1 July 1967, VCAT No. 2250110001; and for the B-28
Technical Reconnaissance Unit of Military Region 7, see VCAT Item No.2311214015. The t District
History (2006), p. 193, p.242 relates: The Province military intelligence elements established observation
posts on the Minh m Mountains, and used technical means to follow the activities of the enemy.
According to the enemys messages that we intercepted . For 1 ATFs awareness of the intercept threat,
see: 1 ATF, Troops Information Sheet, No.79, Ni t, 14-20 January 1968; 1 ATF, INTSUM No.150/69,
Ni t, 30 May 1969; and 1 ATF, Vietnam Digest, Issue No.26-69, Ni t, 28 June 5 July 1969. 1
ATF advised its units of the responsibilities of 547 Signal Troop the Australian Radio Research Unit,
for communications security aspects see: 1 ATF, Signal G223, Ni t, 28 February 1967.

55
local enemy soldiers, and created a document: The Six Essences of Military
Proselytising in Combat comprising:
- Miltary propaganda and proselytising in combat;
- Capturing prisoners;
- Exploiting and utilizing prisoners and defectors in battle;
- Implementing prisoner and defector policy;
- Moving prisoners and defectors to assigned concentration sites;
- Putting up posters, spreading pamphlets.191*
Strengthened military proselytising activities in combat also contributed towards
combat procedures. Calling on the enemy to surrender and the taking of prisoners were
regarded as one of the important objectives and norms of our battles. In combat, military
proselytising work played an important role by supplementing resources for the
revolution and reducing bloodshed in combat.
From the middle of 1965, after their heavy defeats in the Bnh Gi campaign in B
Ra Long Khanh, the puppet military disintegrated in large part, and the puppet
authorities at all levels were in a situation of serious crisis.The enemy troops concentrated
and huddled together in their bases and rear areas in the towns and cities (B Ra, Vng
Tu, Long Khanh).
To save the puppet regime both at its centre and in the regions, the American
imperialists brought their expeditionary forces and those of its vassals192, into South
Vietnam. On 5 May 1965, the Americans 173rd Airborne Brigade followed by a New
Zealand artillery battery and an Australian infantry battalion, landed at Vng Tu and
were concentrated at Bin Ha.193
In April 1966, the Royal Australian Armed Forces [sic] completed the deployment
of a task force into South Vietnam.194 Confronted by this new situation, the B Ra
Province Committee convened a conference to thoroughly examine COSVN195
191

* A summary of military proselytising activities in B Ra Vng Tu Province in the Anti-American

Resistance War approved manuscript, p.45.
192
Translators Note: Vassals literally: ch hu, was a term routinely used to refer to Australian, New
Zealand, Korean, and Thai armed forces.
193
Translators Note: The US 173rd Airborne Brigade arrived at Bin Ha in early May 1965.
194
Translators Note: At the end of 1965, the American plan to build up combat forces had included an
Australian element consisting of a balanced force of two infantry battalions, an S.A.S. squadron .
During informal discussions in Saigon, possible deployment areas suggested were: the Mekong
Delta; Phan Rang ((on the central coast)), or Vung Tau. The Australian military representative (Brigadier
K. Mackay) expressed a preference for Vung Tau where a task force is required to keep open the southeastern end of the road ((Route 15)) to Saigon Defence Liaison Branch, Department of External
Affairs, Canberra, 4 January 1966. The 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) opened at Vng Tu on 20
May 1966 having initially been commanded by Brigadier O.D. Jackson from Saigon for several days due
to that citys superior communications links. Following Operation Hardihood to secure the area, 1 ATFs
5RAR infantry battalion occupied the Ni t site on 2 June 1966 - with elements of the 173rd Airborne
Brigade in adjacent positions to the west across Route 2 until their departure on 8 June.
195
Translators Note: As outlined in the earlier footnote 59, the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN)
- directed from H Ni and located in the Cambodia/South Vietnam border area north-west of Saigon, was
the communist political and military headquarters responsible for Vietnam south of the Central and
Southern Highlands - an area termed Nam B (as noted, equating to the French colonial Cochin China
region). Geographically, the COSVN area covered the southern 32 of South Vietnams 44 provinces
reportedly containing 14 million of South Vietnams total population of 17.5 million (ie about 80%); 53%
of its land mass; and 83% of the rice-growing areas (in 1968) USMACV briefing, Saigon, 9 January 1970
- Sorley, L., Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, op.cit., 2004, p.336. COSVN however, did not
control the area of its geographic coverage described above. For US and ARVN operations into
Cambodia from April to June 1970, see: II FFORCEV, Commanders Evaluation Report Cambodia
Operations, 31 July 1970, VCAT Item No.4900110003.

56
Resolution 4196 and to disseminate the policy to: Continuously attack the enemy forces,
strive to consolidate and build revolutionary organisations, hold fast onto the resistance
bases, strike against the enemys pacification activities, and coordinate with the peoples
forces in the Eastern Region to defeat the enemys Dry Season counter-attack, and wipe
out the Americans combat capacity and means.
The ideological guidance by the Province Committee at this time was that
although the situation was both difficult and complicated, we must resolutely hold onto
our ground and the people and strongly maintain an attacking posture. The Province
Committee directed the development of armed forces at all three levels, the creation and
consolidation of bases, the establishment of positions in areas surrounding the
Australians base, blocking their attacks in order to defend our bases, protecting our
Province organisations, and re-organising the battlefield (Xuyn Mc, Long t, and
Chu c).
At this time, the Province armed forces were strengthened at all three levels. The
cadre and soldiers while determined, were also worried and concerned about our
combat methods when confronting a strong enemy with modern fighting methods,
modern weapons, and a maximum of fire support. Our Province armed forces were given
the task to: Study the Americans fighting methods, strike straight into their lairs, attack
the American invaders and their means of warfare, and resolve to be victorious from the
very first battle.
445 Battalion launched an emulation movement to kill the enemy throughout 1966
divided into several phases. The first phase was a movement to: Resolve to fight and
defeat the American invading aggressors during the Winter-Spring seasons. To ensure
the outcome of this emulation campaign, the Battalion Headquarters and the companies
created concrete targets for each separate unit and between units and individuals who all
shook hands very enthusiatically and pledged to compete with one another.
In January 1966197, the American military launched their first Dry Season strategic
offensive with two pincers: search and destroy198 and pacification hoping to wipe
out our main-force elements and recover the initiative on the battlefield. B Ra Province
was on the main axis of the Americans strategic counter-offensive and the fighting
there was very decisive.199
196

Translators Note: COSVN Resolution 4 of March 1966 reportedly implemented the Lao ng Partys
(Vietnam Workers Party ie communist party) Politburo Resolution 12 of December 1965 see CDEC
Bulletin No.2561. For a US CIA analysis of these Resolutions, see VCAT Item No.0240904006. For an
index of Resolutions, see VCAT Item No.2320732001.
197
Translators Note: According to the 1991 D445 History: at the beginning of 1966, the Battalion
conducted an ambush on Route 15 with the aim of destroying military transport vehicles and seizing war
booty to equip our units logistic personnel who lacked equipment. The Battalion destroyed six trucks of the
South Korean forces and seized a quantity of white cloth (lengths of cloth) which was later dyed and made
into uniforms. That mention of South Korean troops may be a reference to the major RVNAF Operation
Dn Tm 36 (late February-early March 1966) that extended into the Minh m Mountains. A Republic of
Korea engineer company participated in that operation part of the Republic of Koreas Dove Force
based at Bin Ha from late February 1965. A Vit Cng account of that operation by their C.900
intelligence staff and dated 16 March 1966 is at CDEC Log 09-2497-66.
198
Translators Note: For a later revision of the term search and destroy, see footnote 208.
199
Translators Note: In March 1966, a US military report assessed the population of Phc Tuy Province
as 100,000 with a further 38,000 living in Vng Tu. Of Phc Tuys population, 87% reportedly lived in
government-controlled areas, 22% in areas undergoing pacification, 12% in areas considered relatively
free of VC, and 17% living in VC-controlled areas. A curfew was in effect between 10pm and 4am but
was not rigidly enforced. VC infrastructure was established down to village and hamlet level. The VC
had a high degree of control over the rural population and had little difficulty moving throughout the
Province. - see: US 1st Infantry Division, Combat Operations After Action Report Operation Abilene,
April 1966 at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/387599.pdf . A mid-1966 US CIA memorandum cited

57

((Translators Note: Between pp.80-81, there are 24 photographs titled as follows))

-

On 3 June 1976, the Party and the Nation awarded 445 Battalion with the
commendation: Heroic Unit of the Peoples Armed Forces.
A letter by the 445 Battalion Political Officer Nguyn Minh Ninh calling upon
the puppet troops to join the revolution. (Photograph Minh L).
A 445 Battalion bugle used to give commands for assaults in every battle
displayed in the museum of the B Ra Vng Tu Province Peoples Armed
Forces. (Photograph on Sn).
Heavy [sic US .30 calibre] machinegun (No.52919-45-1963) associated with
the combat feats of Nguyn Vn Quang Hero of the Peoples Armed Forces.
The Sp Post (at Phc Hi) destroyed by 445 Battalion in 1966 ((f.299)).
The main attacking force of 445 Battalion deploying in depth to cut-off and
destroy the enemy in the battle at Long Phc village. (Photograph from
records).
People of B Ra Long Khanh supplying food and provisions to the troops of
445 Battalion. (Photograph from records).
Comrade Kiu An a 445 Battalion mortar crewman, who had wiped out
many enemy targets. (Photograph from records).
A 445 Battalion mortar crew with a hatred of the enemy, raining fire down
on the invaders heads. (Photograph from records).
Recovering battlefield booty and capturing the enemy during the Long M
battle 1974. (Photograph from records).
Battlefield booty seized from the encroaching enemy at Long Phc on 14
June [sic] 1973. (Photograph from records).
Taking inventory of battlefield booty seized from the enemy. (Photograph
from records).
Cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion on parade in 1976 at the ceremony for the
presentation of the honourable title: Heroic Unit of the Peoples Armed
Forces. (Photograph from records).
Farewelling 445 Battalion troops departing for International Duty to assist
our Cambodian friends. (Photograph from records).
445 Battalion marching on parade at the 10th anniversary of the founding of B
Ra Vng Tu Province. (Photograph Hong Chng).
A cultural and literature exchange between 445 Battalion and the B Ra
Vng Tu Cultural Department on 22 December 2002. (Photograph Hong
Chng).
Reviewing experiences following a training activity. (Photograph Hong
Chng).
Moments of relaxation on the training ground. (Photograph Hong Chng).
A group of cadre studying the history with witnesses beside the Soldiers
Well in the L base Long Tn. (Photograph Hong Chng).
Preparing the book: The History of 445 Battalion witnesses meeting and
exchanging experiences in Ha Long village. (Photograph Minh L).

the population of Phc Tuy Province as 116,995 in 35 villages. VC armed militia and political cadre in the
villages were assessed as numbering 2,956 but these figures were not considered completely accurate
due to input limitations. See: CIA Director of Current Intelligence Memorandum, Viet Cong Strength
by Village, 12 May 1966, VCAT Item No.F029200030138.

58
-

A conference preparing for the writing of The History of 445 Battalion 16

May 2003. (Photograph Minh L).
A workshop on The History of the Heroic 445 Battalion 25 November
2003. (Photograph Hong Chng).
Representatives and witnesses following the second workshop on The
History of 445 Battalion 15 May 2004, (Photograph Minh L).

In the spirit of continuously attacking and wiping out the enemy in order to
achieve the tasks directed by the Province Committee and COSVN Headquarters, the
Battalion Headquarters - under the direct orders of the Province Unit200, re-organised,
strengthened, and adjusted the employment of its forces.201 This applied to unit tactical
and technical aspects; and dividing our forces into teams, sections/squads (small units) in
order to more easily attack the enemy at lightning speed - while at the same time
coordinating closely so that - when needed, our forces could be quickly concentrated to
strike, wear down, and wipe out the enemy in larger engagements.202
On 8 April 1966, the Battalions reconnaissance elements reported that the
Americans were deploying troops to the B Lang tactical airfield (Bnh Gi Chu
c).203 The Headquarters ordered our 4th Fire Support Company under the direct
200

Translators Note: The 1991 and 2004 D445 Histories recount capturing PRC-25 and PRC-10 VHF
radios. However, a 1967 US MACV study lists the Battalions signal equipment as comprising only five
PRC-10 and two earlier model PRC-6 walkie-talkie-style radios (range less than a mile see footnote
107) and ten field telephones. - US MACV, VC/NVA Signal Order of Battle - Update, Study 67-021,
Saigon, 16 September 1967 - VCAT Item No.F015900250094. In 1969, 445 Battalion had HF morse radio
communications with the Province Headquarters see footnote 417. However, a primary means of contact
was by courier (ie commo-liaison) and employing a postal system utilizing Letter Box Numbers (LBN)
see footnotes 495 (personal letters) and 527. 445 Battalions LBNs included 6142.VT; 61,202/VT D12
from March 1969; and 61.450/VT (as 1st Local Force Battalion from July 1970). For a history of the
postal system (covering B Bin Province with Sub-Region 9) including safe conduct pass modalities,
see CDEC Log 01-1367-69 (VCAT Item No.2311201008). A comprehensive instruction on passes and mail
management (circa mid-1969) - apparently recovered in Cambodia in May 1970, is at CDEC 05-2772-70
(VCAT Item No.2310907010). LBNs changed from a five-digit system to a six digit system on 1 July
1970 for a June 1972 RVNAF JGS analysis, see: VCAT Item No.2311005037.
201
Translators Note: On 15 February 1966, B Ra Province Order #101/QD commended eight 445
Battalion personnel (named) among a total of 33 personnel. Additionally, the B Ra Province Unit awarded
445 Battalions 1st Company and the Long t District Unit the rotating Determined to Fight and Defeat
the Americans flag. - CDEC Log 04-1394-66.
202
Translators Note: As noted earlier, neither the 1991 D445 History nor this 2004 History mentions the
major ARVN operation Dn Tm 36 (22 February-5 March 1966) into the c Thnh, Xun Son, Bnh Ba,
Tam Long (Tam Long = the three villages of: Ha Long, Long Phc, Long Tn), and Minh m areas. A
detailed report by an element of the B Ra Province Committee (C900 ie the intelligence staff) dated 16
March 1966 is at CDEC Log 09-2447-66. That report claimed that 206 enemy were killed, 73 wounded and
two weapons seized in the engagements. Subsequently, on 29 March 1966, the Political Section of the B
Ra Province Unit produced a directive on political activities deemed necessary following counter-sweep
operations in the Long Tn area in the period 23-28 February indicating morale problems in 445 Battalion
CDEC Log 09-1882-66.
203
Translators Note: The B Lang airfield/airstrip is located on the north-western edge of Bnh Ba village
not Bnh Gi village. The US 1st Infantry Division conducted Operation Abilene in Long Khanh and Phc
Tuy Provinces in the period 30 March-15 April 1966. Forces included the US 173rd Airborne Brigades
Australian battalion, 1RAR. Operation Abilene had the aim of destroying the 94th ((274th)) VC Regiment,
the 5th ((275th)) VC Regiment, and the My To Secret Zone 1RAR Op Ord 7/66, Bin Ha, 24 March
1966. Initially operating in the Courtney Plantation area (YS 4591) from 29 March, 1RAR departed the
Bnh Ba logistic base area on 8-9 April 1966 by road/air to Bin Ha and US forces continued Operation
Abilene. On 13 April, 1RAR joined the 173rd Airborne Brigade on Operation Denver in the Sng B area of
Phc Long Province until 22 April. A VC activity report dated 24 April 1966 signed by L Quang
(probably of Chu c District) - and covering the period 23 March to 23 April 1966, described the

59
command of its leader Comrade T Nh 204, to quickly deploy its mortars (81mm and
61mm [sic] to attack the airstrip at B Lang and exploit the enemys weaknesses as the
enemy was in the process of setting-up. Immediately on the night of 8 April, the mortar
section of the 4th Company moved more than four kilometres along jungle tracks to the
enemy positions. Employing the improvised fire205 method, the Battalions mortars
rapidly fired 35 rounds into the designated grid reference. The B Lang tactical airstrip
was enveloped in smoke and flames and successive explosions boomed out. 12 enemy
helicopters and four M113 armoured vehicles were set ablaze, and more than 20
American troops were killed or wounded.206 This was a military feat207 by 445 Battalion
in its first clash with the American military in the B Ra homeland, and it fired the
enthusiasm of the cadre, the soldiers, and the people of the Province. It was also symbolic
of the defeat of the Americans search and destroy tactics on the Eastern Nam B
battlefield.
Also in April 1966, while resisting an enemy sweeping208 operation on Route 2,
our military intelligence provided information on the activities of the puppet Panther Skin
commando company209 stationed at the Thy Ba base (t ). To support the local
occupation of the Bnh Ba airfield (ie as Logistic Base 1 at YS 435741) by two brigades of the US 1st
Infantry Division on 2 April 1966 ((ie: Operation Abilene which also involved the Australian 1RAR)).
CDEC Log 08-1664-66. That VC report noted VC casualties as four killed, three wounded, and 13 youths
captured. On Morale, the report related: Guerrillas were afraid of the enemy armored vehicles and
aircraft and dared not to fight. Cadre failed to motivate the population and the guerrillas to overcome their
fear of enemy war equipment. CDEC Log 08-1664-66. 117 C-123 Provider sorties were flown into the
Binh Ba South airstrip during Operation Abilene. The US 1 st Infantry Division After Action Report listed
the strength of D445/860 Battalion as 500. See: 1 st Infantry Division, Combat Operations After Action
Report Operation Abilene at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/387599.pdf .
204
Translators Note: Phan Vn Nh (aka T Nh) was formally appointed Company Commander of the 4 th
Combat Support Company by the B Ra Province Unit on 9 December 1965 CDEC Log 09-1830-66,
Item 7. He is also noted as the Companys inaugural commander see footnote 163. The local Party history
relates this action, noting that Vn Chng was also involved. - Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s
ng b tnh B Ra-Vng Tu (1930 - 1975) (The History of the B Ra-Vng Tu Party Chapter),
Chapter V, 2000. Hong Vn L of the 4th Company was awarded a Certificate of Commendation by the
B Ra Province Unit for his role in the attack on B Lang. CDEC Log 09-1830-66, Item 10.
205
Translators Note: The Vietnamese-language term used is: ng dng improvised, opportune, or
quick-reaction fire.
206
Translators Note: During Operation Abilene see the preceding footnotes 199 and 203, on 8 April the
1st Division artillery forward command post received ten rounds of mortar fire between 0406 and 0410
with negative casualties or damage. During the night 7-8 April, the ((2nd)) Brigade base received 24
rounds of 81mm mortar fire with insignificant damage or casualties. Counter-battery radar was unable to
detect the location of the enemy mortars.
207
Translators Note: Letters of Appreciation were awarded by the B Ra Province Unit to soldiers of the
1st, 2nd and 4th Companies of 445 Battalion for action in counter-sweep operations in the ng Ngc
Khi/Xun Sn area of Chu c District in the period 1-8 April 1966 see CDEC Log 09-1830-66, Items
9 and 15; CDEC Log 12-2405-66, Items 8 and 10; CDEC Log 09-1863-66, Items 8 and 10.
208
Translators Note: Most often, the Vietnamese-language term sweeping (cn qut) refers to search
and destroy operations by US, Allied, and Si Gn Government forces. In January 1968, the 1st Australian
Task Force (1 ATF) changed the terminology for such search and destroy operations to reconnaissance
in force 1 ATF, Message, G142, 24 January 1968. In April 1968, the US forces also adopted
reconnaissance in force and the terms combat sweep and spoiling attack with the USMACV
Commander, General W.C. Westmoreland noting that search and destroy equated in the ((American))
public mind with aimless searches in the jungle and destruction of property. Doughty, R.A., The
Evolution of US Tactical Doctrine, Leavenworth Papers, Fort Leavenworth - Kansas, August 1979. General
Westmoreland also stated that search and destroy a term that he had introduced in 1964, had become
tainted and unsavory and was discontinued and replaced by traditional mission statements for
Definitions, see VCAT Item No.F015800080078; and PERINTREP at VCAT Item No.2130906001.
209
Translators Note: The text uses the term bit kch a term used by the communist forces for enemy
commando/special forces-type troops, see footnote 42: eg CIDG/Mike Force elements, the 1 ATF Special

60
revolutionary movement, the Battalion swiftly concentrated and deployed to t and
coordinated with Long t Districts C.25 troops and the guerrillas of Phc Thnh
village (who were to have a forward blocking role) to strike the enemy at B K Slope on
Route 2 [sic] (t ).210
We determined that the routine activities of the Panther Skin commandos
comprised sweeping operations or raids into the base areas of the villages and the t
District area and, whenever sniped at by guerrillas or their operations were blocked, the
commandos would concentrate their forces to surround their opponents, or pursue and
wipe them out. So, the Battalion developed a plan to ambush and wipe out this enemy.
The ambush site was set about two kilometres north-east of the t Sub-Sector
and was configured in accord with our tactic of a mobile ambush surrounding the
enemy and closing the bag (as it was called by our 445 Battalion troops). This was also
the Battalions fort tactic. We deployed three companies to surround the enemy in their
Thy Ba combat base, while our 3rd Company as a deception tactic, fired mortars into
the Sub-Sector in order to lure the enemy out from the defences of their Thy Ba base to
come to the rescue of the Sub-Sector. Just as predicted, when t was attacked, the
enemy hastily organised a relief mission. As soon as they came out of the gates, they were
immediately engaged by 445 Battalions two pincers. We used suppressive fire
techniques and bravely closed with the enemy. The enemy entered the killing zone, and
the bag was closed. After nearly an hour of fighting, the enemys Panther Skin
Company was completely wiped out including its commander, a captain. We captured
16, seized 53 weapons of various types (including three AR15s an American weapon
only just supplied to the puppet troops). We also seized two PRC-25 radios and a large
quantity of other equipment while our casualties were hardly noticeable.211 The victory
at the Battle of B K Slope evidenced a new stage in the coming-of-age of the
Battalion.212 The unit had coordinated effectively with the local armed forces to form a
Air Service squadrons, the Province Reconnaissance Unit (PRU - see footnote 352). In February 1960,
President Dim established 75 150-man commando companies later to become ARVN Ranger units (ie
the Bit ng Qun). A 1st Commando Company (Lc Lng Bit Kch Nhn Dn/Lin i Tham Sat
Chng Khng B) was based in Ha Long village adjacent to 1 ATF in June 1966 and also in Bnh Ba
village these elements were later incorporated into the PRU. In the engagement related above, the ARVN
Panther Skin unit is highly likely to have been an ARVN Ranger element ie Bit ng Qun. The
ARVN Ranger insignia was a snarling black panthers head superimposed over a large yellow star.
210
Translators Note: The attack at B K Slope is related in the t District History (2006) as occuring
on 26 April 1966. The account in the earlier 1991 D445 History cites the date of the attack as 24 April 1966
see: Chamberlain, E.P., D445: Their Story, op.cit., 2011, p.33. The B K slope is not on Route 2
rather Route 52 is more likely.
211
Translators Note: The t District History (2006) relates the attack on 26 April 1966 in detail and
summarizes: The outcome was that we killed 99 commandos, seven Popular Force troops, captured 19
commandos and 16 Popular Force, seized 53 weapons (including four medium machineguns), one PRC-10
radio and two HT-1 radios, destroyed a GMC vehicle, and damaged an L-19 aircraft. Our side suffered one
killed and 18 wounded. According to a 1 ATF report: Ambushes occurred in Feb (1966) at the Ba Ka
[sic] Slope (Horseshoe). 10 Rangers KIA and their weapons were captured. However, an airstrike was
called in and D445 suffered 25 KIA and 5 WIA. In Apr, the Bn ambushed a civic action team at YS
488610 north of t YS 4860 killing 40 and wounding 18. VC losses were 9 KIA. 40 weapons were
captured by the VC. See: 1 ATF, Short History D445, 13-page briefing paper, Ni t, early 1968; and the
1 ATF Study: D445 VC Local Force Battalion (Ba Long Province), Ni t, 6 May 1971. The L-19 was
a US Cessna L-19/O-1 Bird Dog aircraft used for reconnaissance and forward air control tasks. During
the Vietnam War, 469 L-19/O-1 aircraft were lost to all causes.
212
Translators Note: Letters of Appreciation were awarded by the B Ra Province Unit to soldiers of the
of 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Companies of 445 Battalion for action in the t /Phc Thnh area in the period
24-26 April 1966 see CDEC Log 09-1830-66, Items 8, 11 and 14; Log 12-2405-66, Item 9; Log 09-186366, Items 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 11 and 14.

61
joint force combining the three types of troops, and had launched a three-pronged
attack213 on the enemy.
Prior to 445 Battalions battle at B K Slope, on 10 April 1966214, the 4th
th
((274 )) Regiment of the 5th Division joined with forces and the people of Chu c
District to fight a model battle and drove an American expeditionary battalion from the
battlefield that had launched a sweeping operation into the Regiments base area at the
Tm B Stream.215 In that battle, our forces seized a large number of weapons. After the
Tm B battle, the Province Committee assessed that the enemy would conduct large
sweeping operations into the Tam Long216 area in continuation of their operations to
search for and destroy our forces and destroy our bases in the B Ra area. Accordingly,
on the day following the attack at the B K Slope, 445 Battalion was deployed back to
the Route 2 region (east of Long Phc) to prepare to counter the sweeping operation.
There, the Battalion fought model battles against the Americans and destroyed much of
their combat potential.
The Battalions battle against the Americans in the Vn Mt (Jackfruit Gardens)
- Sng Cu area about two kilometres from Route 2 was one of 445 Battalions
outstanding engagements in confronting the American expeditionary forces.217 On 17
213
Translators Note: As noted earlier, three-pronged or three spearhead attacks - literally: ba mi gip
cng, was a commonly-used term meaning military action, political action, and propaganda/proselytising/
agitation among enemy troops. However, in this context, it probably refers to three types of armed forces: ie
local troops, militia, and guerrillas.
214
Translators Note: As noted, the 1991 D445 History cites the engagement as occurring on 24 April 1966,
and the t District History (2006) cites 26 April 1966.
215
Translators Note: This battle in the Tm B/Tm B area on 10-11 April 1966 between US forces and
the 274th Regiment (ie 4th Regiment of the 5th VC Division) is described in greater detail in the 5 th VC
Division History (2005) - H Sn i Colonel (ed), Lch S S an , op.cit., 2005; and in the Chu
c District History (2004) - Nguyn Cng Danh , Chu c District, op.cit., 2004. Both histories
relate the same US casualty figures (ie drove 300 enemy from the battlefield and seized 40 weapons
destroyed a battalion), and correctly note the US formation as anh c (The Big Red One ie the
US 1st Infantry Division). For detail of the 274th Regiments operation at Tm B (10 kilometres southwest [sic an error, it should be north-east] of c Thnh Sub-Sector on 11 April 1966) - as described
in the captured notebook of the 2ic of the 274 th Regiment (Nguyn Nam Hng), see VCAT Item No.
F03460056029 (CDEC Log 11-1253-66 Vietnamese text in CDEC Log 11-1259-66). The Battle of Tm
B is also recounted in Hngs 2006 memoir: Nguyn Nam Hng Major General, Mt i Chinh Chin
(A Life at War), Nh Xut bn Chnh tr Quc gia, H Ni, 2006: We wiped out a whole battalion of the
US 199th Brigade and seized a large quantity of weapons and equipment. A monument to the victory at
Tm B and the Kim Long and Chi ng campaigns, was inaugurated in X Bang village in January
2006. As noted, the 1st US Infantry Division (and including for a period, the Australian 1RAR Battalion)
conducted Operation Abilene in Phc Tuy and Long Khnh Provinces in the period 30 March-15 April
1966 see the preceding footnotes 199 and 203. The Tm B battle is termed by US forces as the Battle of
Cm M ie: On 11 April 1966, Charlie Company/2nd Battalion of the 16th Regiment of the 1st US Infantry
Division engaged a Vit Cng force that included 800 Battalion ((ie 1/274th Regiment)) at GR YS
540862. Initially unsupported by other companies, the 134-strong Charlie Company suffered 48 KIA and 58
WIA. Reportedly, the bodies of 41 VC were found on the battlefield and 100-150 VC were assessed as
having been killed or wounded in the engagement. See the US account at:
http://www.angelfire.com/ar3/charlierangers/Documents/Narative2.html . The Tm B engagement is
mentioned very briefly in 1 ATF, INTSUM No.1/66, Vng Tu, 21 May 1966.
216
Translators Note: Tam Long comprised the villages of Ha Long, Long Phc, Long Tn ie Tam is
Three in Sino-Vietnamese.
217
Translators Note: This battle is also related in the B Ra - Vng Tu Party History (2000) with the
enemy noted as elements of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade sweeping south from Xun Sn to Ha Long
and Long Phc, see: Trn Vn Khnh (et al), Ban Chp Hnh ng b tnh B Ra - Vng Tu, Lch s
ng b tnh B Ra - Vng Tu, Tp II, 1954-1975, Nh xut bn Chnh tr quc gia (National Political
Publishing House), H Ni, 2000. In a Directive on 19 May 1966, the B Ra Province Unit noted that the
US forces from Bin Ha had commenced a sweep operation in the Province on 16 May, and on 17

62
May 1966 - when all our military cadre (from company and battalion-level) had gone to
study and prepare the battlefield, only political cadre remained at the base developing
political study material for the Battalions cadre and soldiers. Our reconnaissance element
discovered an American battalion moving into the base area (near the 1st Companys
sector). Comrade Vn Chng (Ba Lin) the Battalion Political Officer, sought an
immediate meeting with cadre of the Partys Standing Committee, and then passed an
order for the companies to fight determinedly.
The 1st Company was the Battalions duty defence company led by Trn Vn
Chin (Su Chin) with T Dng as its Political officer.218 Our reconnaissance element
was ordered to lure the enemy towards the defensive positions manned by the 1st
Company. When the Americans were close at a distance of only 50 metres, the whole
Company suddenly opened fire. Immediately in those first volleys, dozens of Americans
fell. The firepower from the 4th Companys 57mm RCLs and 82mm mortars provided
timely support219 raining down fire on the enemy formation. The heavy machinegun
carried by rifleman Nguyn Vn Quang220 came into action, firing to the left and to the
right, and wiping out a large number of the enemy and their fire support teams. This
created the opportunity for the 2nd and 3rd Companies to assault and attack from the
flanks. Caught by surprise, the Americans had to regroup and call in artillery fire support.
From that point, the battle was waged violently with the Americans who regrouped their
forces to attack from many directions against 445 Battalions defences, and employed
bombs and artillery fire. The Battalion continued to resist staunchly and held its battle
positions until the end of the day. We drove hundreds of enemy from the battlefield
before withdrawing safely back to our reserve bases.
That first direct engagement with the American forces was a great victory and
further reinforced our confidence of 445 Battalions cadre and soldiers in particular and
of the B Ra Long Khanh Province armed forces in general, in defeating the
Americans. Immediately after military cadre had returned from studying the engagement,
the Battalion Headquarters convened a politico-military conference and drew the
following lessons on our first defeat of the Americans: The Americans firepower was
May had clashed with the Provincial Battalion at Long Phc. The Chu c, Long t and Xuyn Mc
District units were directed to interdict, respectively: Routes 15, 2 and the Bnh Ba airstrip; Routes 44 and
52; and Route 23 CDEC Log 09-2499-66. The battle is also recounted in the Chu c District History
(2004) - Nguyn Cng Danh , Chu c District, op.cit., 2004..
218
Translators Note: On 20 October 1965, the B Ra Province Unit formally promoted: Trn Vn Chin
(Su Chin) from company executive officer to company commander; and T Dng from platoon leader to
assistant political officer. Note however that the date on that document (Command Committee T.1 No.
602/TB) - CDEC Log 09-1876-66, was incorrectly written as 20 October 1966, instead of 1965. See CDEC
Bulletin No.1064, 21 September 1966.
219
Translators Note: Earlier - on 10 October 1965, 445 Battalions 4th (ie Support/Heavy Weapons)
Company was noted as being equipped with three 57mm recoilless rifles (RCL) with 50 rounds; two 81mm
mortars with 28 rounds/bombs; three MG-34 machine guns with 8,000 rounds; and 17 individual
weapons. CDEC Log 04-1322-66.
220
Translators Note: Nguyn Vn Quang (aka Quang Hm 1944-2000; see also footnotes 140, 228, 309,
and 613), was awarded a Certificate of Commendation by the B Ra Province Unit for his exploits at
Phc Thnh (Long t District) on 26 April 1966 (as a squad leader/2/3/445), and was recommended for a
Third Class Liberation Military Feats Medal for his exploits as a machinegun team leader in
engagements against ARVN forces in the period 16-24 May 1966 CDEC Log 09-1863-66. His citation
recommendation dated 3 June 1966 noted that in an engagement on 17 May 1966, his heavy machinegun
team had killed 65 Americans, and Quang had personally killed 35 Americans - CDEC Log 09-1885-66. As
noted, Nguyn Vn Quang was later declared a Hero of the Peoples Armed Forces and - after training in
North Vietnam from 1968 to 1972, returned as the second-in-command/Chief of Staff of D445 Battalion in
March 1972. See also his citation dated 3 June 1966 at CDEC Log 09-1885-66.

63
very strong including their infantry fire and that of their artillery and airpower. Their
armed helicopter the Lp Fish 221, was very dangerous. The American infantry moved
slowly, and their attacking formations were not flexible. When suffering heavy casualties,
they worried about recovering the bodies and were especially afraid of close combat. If
we want to defeat the Americans, we need to be daring, exploit surprise, take the initiative
to attack, engage in close combat, and grab their belts and strike them 222 in order to
render their firepower ineffective.
The American military launched a large sweeping operation into Long Phc
village with the aim of scooping up the people from the liberated regions.223 445
Battalion reinforced with a platoon, coordinated with Chu c Districts 21st
Company (a belt224 unit) and the Long Phc village guerrillas to strike the enemy
continuously over three days (19, 20 and 21 May 1966).225 On the morning of the third
day, faced with the enemys superior numbers and firepower, the Districts armed forces,
221

Translators Note: The fish species Ca Lp ie: Lp Fish (Parapelecus argenteus) was the
communist forces nickname for the US AH-1G Cobra helicopter, The AH-1G was equipped with
miniguns, 2.75 inch rockets, and 40mm grenade launchers.
222
Translators Note: Grabbing the enemys belt and striking them was an expression that exhorted
communist fighters to close tightly with the enemy in order to negate the enemys artillery and air support,
and was popularized by COSVN head General Nguyn Ch Thanh in his Nguyn Vnh directive ie:Take
them by the belt and kill them 17 February 1966. He reportedly borrowed the expression from General
Chu Huy Mn Bam/Nm tht lng ch m anh, Battle of Vnh Huy (MR5) in April 1965 see: i
tng Chu Huy Mn: Mnh ch huy, mnh chnh tr, http://baodatviet.vn/quoc-phong/dai-tuong-chu-huyman-manh-chi-huy-manh-chinh-tri-2219633/ . See also the statement by Nguyn Thanh Hng 5th VC
Division staff officer, in relation to the Battle of Long Tn see footnote 287, and Annex E footnote 131.
223
Translators Note: The 5th Division History relates that on 6 May, the 1st Battalion ((of the 274th
Regiment)) combined with the 445th Battalion to drive back two battalions of the US 2nd Brigade sweeping
into the Long Phc base The 4th ((274th)) Regiment was given the mission together with the 445th B
Ra Battalion and local troops to counter the enemy and defend the Long Phc War Zone. From 15 May
continuously to 15 August, the Regiment coordinated with the B Ra local forces in combat against the
Americans with its 2nd and 3rd Battalions operating in the Route 2 and 15 areas, and the 1st Battalion of the
274th Regiment fighting alongside the 445th Battalion in Long Phc from 5 May until 4 June. However,
the D445 Battalion Histories make no mention of the 274th Regiments involvement at Long Phc. For the
Australian official historys account of the fighting at Long Phc, see McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit.,
1993, pp.243-246 - ie the 173rd Airborne Brigade (Operation Abilene) attacked Long Phc on 17 May
and lost 12 KIA and 35 WIA against a Vit Cng company on the day of arrival and inflicted 16 enemy
KIA. Two days later, the clearance of Long Phc began including participation by 3/43/10th ARVN
Division (ie later retitled 18th Division) joined by the recently-arrived Australian 5RAR for Operation
Hardihood a few days later (24 May). Half of Long Phc villages 3,000 inhabitants were resettled to Ha
Long village - others to t and to Long in. Long Phc village was reported as having been
cleared on 24 May 1966.
224
Translators Note: On 22 February 1966, the Political Section of the B Ra Province Unit issued a
directive on establishing Anti-American belts (ie defensive zones) and the Killing Americans
Campaign CDEC Log 09-1879-66. A week earlier on 15 February 1966, the B Ra Province Unit
awarded 445 Battalions 1st Company and the Long t District Unit the rotating Determined to Fight and
Defeat the Americans flag CDEC Log 04-1394-66. For the criteria for the award of the title Valiant
Killer of Americans, see the Group 84 Circular dated 5 July 1966 with the attached COSVN memorandum
dated 5 February 1966 CDEC Log 12-1913-66. In September 1966, the Military Political Department of
the National Liberation Front promulgated a clarifying instruction on awards by grade, for the Valiant
Killers program that noted American vassals (ie chu hu comprising troops from Australia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, and Korea) were included in the program VCAT Item No.23119093001.
225
Translators Note: According to the Ha Long History ie The History of the Ha Long Village Party
Chapter (1930 - 2005), op.cit., 25 April 2009, elements of the Chu c District Unit under the command
of Nguyn Vn Kim, also fought the US 173rd Airborne Brigade in the Jackfruit Gardens at Sng Cu
from 18 May 1966 Nguyn Vn Kim, the commander of the District Unit led six members of the
sapper-reconnaissance element and used six home-made DH-10 mines to kill a whole group of Americans
in six collapsed houses at G Ra (Ha Long).

64
village guerrillas, and the people retreated down into their tunnels. The American forces
surrounded the area and sealed the tunnel entrances and hundreds of local cadre and
villagers were trapped underground in an extremely dangerous situation.
On the night of 21 May, on the direct orders of the deputy commander of the
Province Unit, the Battalion Headquarters organised two infantry sections and a sapper
sub-section (seven comrades led by Nguyn Vn B and L Vn Tranh226) that were
lightly-armed with only hand grenades, sub-machineguns, and parachute grenades.227
They were tasked to rescue the local troops and villagers trapped underground. However,
due to the darkness and the rain, the two infantry sections became lost and only the
sapper sub-section got close to the target. When they were only a few metres from the
entrance to the tunnels, the Americans appeared and opened fire first. Three of the four
comrades in the leading element including Comrade L Vn Tranh, were wounded at
once. The following element that included Comrade Nguyn Vn B, was able to crouch
down in time behind a tree trunk and a mound of earth, and avoided the rain of fire from
the Americans. They observed the Americans fire positions and the direction of their
attack and, having determined the enemys positions, Comrade B gave a signal to the
other two soldiers to pass him their grenades so that he alone could launch an attack.
Comrade B threw more than 20 grenades at the enemy and wiped out all of them in their
fire positions. At the same time, the comrades in the leading element although
wounded, heard the sound of the exploding grenades and knowing that the rear group
was still alive and fighting the enemy, swiftly closed with the enemy and struck as a
blossoming flower among the enemy (a very popular sapper tactic). This daring method
of attack by the sapper group created panic among the American troops and drew them
away from their encirclement of the area of the tunnel entrances. Having inflicted many
casualties on the enemy while withdrawing, the two sapper elements fired on the
Americans to attract their attention. On their withdrawal route, a further two of Comrade
Nguyn Vn Bs sapper element were wounded including Comrade B.
The effective surprise raid by 445 Battalions sappers destroyed an important part
of the enemys capability. More importantly, it had caused ferment among the enemy
ranks and created the conditions for our forces below in the tunnels to burst out through
the entrances and withdraw safely. All seven of the sappers involved in the rescue were
casualties (included two who died). That self-sacrificing engagement to free hundreds of
cadre, soldiers and villagers in the Long Phc tunnels left an impression that could never
fade in the hearts of the comrades and the people of Long Phc. At the conclusion of
that phase of operations, many comrades in the unit were awarded the title of Valiant
Killer of Americans.228
226

Translators Note: As noted in footnote 79, L VnTranh (L Tranh/Nm Tranh) was interviewed by T.
Burstall in November 1987 see Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, 1990, pp.141-145. He was reportedly
wounded on 15 July 1968 in the engagement at the Cy Vng T-Junction. L Vn Tranh claimed to have
later been the deputy commander of 445 Battalion in 1972-1974 see Annex B Senior Cadre.
227
Translators Note: The RKG anti-armour grenade this was a shaped-charge grenade with a stabilizing
drogue parachute that deployed from the grenades throwing handle once thrown - ie for a stabilized and
controlled descent onto an armoured vehicle or bunker. Sometimes referred to as a stick grenade.
228
Translators Note: Sub-units of 445 Battalion and individuals (37) were noted as being awarded Valiant
Killers of Americans status. For having successfully checked the RVNAF sweep operations in the
period 16-24 May 1966, on 14 June 1966 the B Ra Province Unit sought Liberation Military Feats medals
from T.1 Region Headquarters for 445 Battalion, for its 1st and 2nd Companies, C20 and C21 Companies
(Chu c) and for Nguyn Vn Quang (machinegun cell leader) CDEC Log 09-1863-66. C20
Company was reported to have killed 143 Americans and wounded 50 while suffering five wounded;
while C21 Company reportedly killed 180 Americans in the Long Phc battle (19-23 May). Separately,
the B Ra Province Unit Headquarters sought medals from T1 (Military Region 1) for counter-sweep
operations in the period 16-24 May 66 (including at Long Phc) comprising a Liberation Forces Military

65
In June 1966229, the 1st Royal [sic] Australian Task Force comprising 7,080
troops , deployed to conduct pacification tasks in the B Ra area (of the puppets
Phc Tuy Province).231 Its combat headquarters was established at Ni t (which
encompassed the S Cai Tam Plantation and Bu Lng Ha Long regions). The
Australian force232 under the direct command of Brigadier Herderson233* [sic]234
230

Feats Medal (Hun chng Chin cng) - First Class for 445 Battalion, Second Class Medals for its 1 st and
2nd Companies, and Third Class Medals for the C20 and C21 Chu c District Companies - see detailed
medal citations dated 3 June 1966 at CDEC Log 09-1885-66 and - for C21, at CDEC Log 09-1887-66. On
28 May 1966, a 445 Battalion bugler Nguyn Vn Lm, was killed in an attack at Cy Trng, Hi M
village see Annex F p.15 for his death certificate (Giy Bo T) and a letter of condolence.
229
Translators Note: As at 31 May 1966, USMACV assessed that - of Phc Tuy Provinces population of
102,500: 63.6% of the population were secured; 1.3% lived in hamlets that were undergoing securing;
23.6% in hamlets undergoing clearing; and 11.5% of the population were under VC control.
USMACV, Monthly Report of Rural Development Progress: Population and Area Control, 17 June 1966
VCAT Item No.F015700010098.
230
Translators Note: According to Australian records - as at 30 June 1966, the strength of 1 ATF at Ni
t was 2,830 (168 officers and 2,662 other ranks). In Saigon, Australian military personnel numbered 397
(63 officers and 313 other ranks). At Vng Tu, numbers were: 1,011 (73 officers and 938 other ranks)
plus 270 RAAF and Army Aviation personnel (43 officers and 227 other ranks). The total Australian
defence personnel in-country under the command of HQ AFV numbered 4,487 (347 officers and 4,140
other ranks (Army: 4,192; RAAF: 295) HQ AFV Monthly Report, June 1966, 8 July 1966 file AWM98,
R723/1/13, Vol I, Part I. A Royal Australian Navy (RAN) element Clearance Diving Team 3 (CDT 3
strength 7) commanded by Lieutenant M. Shotten RAN, arrived in Saigon on 6 February 1967 and was
deployed initially to Nh B and Th c before moving to Ct L (Vng Tu) in mid-February 1967.
231
Translators Note: As noted, the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) opened at Vng Tu on 20 May
1966. Following Operation Hardihood to secure the area, 5RAR occupied the Ni t area on 2 June with
elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in adjacent positions to the west across Route 2 until their departure
on 8 June. That US formation reportedly lost 23 killed and 160 wounded in helping establish the 1 st
Australian Task Force (1 ATF) - ONeill, R.J., Vietnam Task: The 5th Battalion Royal Australian
Regiment 1966/67, Cassell Australia, Melbourne, 1968, pp.48-49. See also: 173rd Airborne Brigade
(Separate), Operational Report Lessons Learned period 1 May 31 July 1966, 15 October 1966.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/388152.pdf . Headquarters 1 ATF - commanded by Brigadier O. D.
Jackson, arrived at Ni t on 5 June 1966. When deploying Australian forces from Vng Tu to Phc
Tuy Province in May 1966, 1 ATF noted the local Vit Cng battalion as 860 Battalion with Code
Names of C860 Battalion and D445 Battalion, and a strength of 550 1 ATF Intelligence Summary
(INTSUM) No.1/66, Vng Tu, 21 May 1966 (the intelligence information was based on the US 173 rd
Airborne Brigade, OPORD 7/66 - Operation Hardihood). That 1 ATF INTSUM did not mention Vit Cng
district companies nor village guerrilla elements.
232
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History also mentioned Headquarters Australian Force Vietnam (HQ
AAFV) under Major General Priro (Parasen). HQ Australian Army Force Vietnam (AAFV) moved
from Trn Hong Qun Street on 1 December 1965 to the Free World Military Assistance Forces
(FWMAF) building at 12 Trn Quc Ton Street (Si Gn). HQ Australian Force Vietnam (AFV) under
Major General K. Mackay, MBE replaced HQ AAFV on 3 May 1966. Earlier from May 1965, the
commander of AAFV had been Brigadier O.D. Jackson. The passage in the 1991 D445 Battalion History
appears to have been borrowed from Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.132 that
refers to a Major General Fraser - but Fraser was apparently corrupted to Parasen in the 1991 D445
Battalion History. Major General C.A.E. Fraser served as the commander of AFV from March 1970 to
March 1971.
233
* From March 1967, Brigadier Maidonalt [sic] took command. On 24 April 1984, Dr Brigadier
Maidonalt and his wife visited Vietnam to work with 445 Battalion war veterans at the Chu Thnh District
Peoples Committee. Nguyn Vn Kim a former commander of 445 Battalion, participated and provided
much additional detail on the Royal Australian Forces operating in B Ra Vng Tu. Nguyn Vn Kim
provided documents at the workshop on 24 May 2004 at the Headquarters of the B Ra Vng Tu
Province Military Headquarters on the history of the Heroic 445 Battalion. Translators Notes: Brigadier
B.A. MacDonald served as the 1 ATF commander from February to November 1971 and retired as a
Major General.
234
Translators Note: As noted above, the initial commander of 1 ATF from May 1966 was Brigadier O.D.
Jackson replaced by Brigadier S.C. Graham in January 1967. Brigadier W.G. Henderson served as the 1

66
comprised two battalions (the 5th and the 6th), 13 companies of the 3rd Air Force Task
Group, and two artillery batteries. Additionally, there were support elements comprising:
three air force squadrons numbered 2, 9, and 35 with 31 aircraft of different types
commanded by Air Commodore Sterucron [sic].235 The headquarters of the Australian
Logistic Group was in Vng Tu under Colonel Hoostan [sic].236 An Australian naval
group was located in Vng Tu with 56 personnel commanded by Commander Hall. A
task group of about 100 that specialised in counter-guerrilla warfare for the puppet
forces, was located at the Vn Kip Training Centre (B Ra). A New Zealand artillery
battery of 21 guns provided fire support for the Ni t base. This was a strong capability
with a rapid rate of fire that was very destructive. The people came to call it: The New
Zealand Orchestra.237
Apart from their main base at Ni t, in August 1966, the Australian military
established two additional forward bases at Da Quy (t )238 and Bu Lng (Sng
Cu)239 on Route 2 with the equivalent of a reinforced battalion in each location (about
ATF commander from June 1970 to February 1971. Similar errors on Australian commanders and
Australian forces in Vietnam appear in the ng Nai History (1986); the 5th Division History (2005); the
t District History (2006); and The History of the Ha Long Village Party Chapter (2009). The ng
Nai History (1986), op.cit., p.132 (footnote 2) adds that the Task Forces strength was 7,824 troops and
was supported by 31 Australian aircraft. The Ha Long History (2009) adds that the Task Force occupied
Ni t on 29 May 1966, and the Royal Australian Task Force comprised 8,080 troops with a New
Zealand artillery company of 20 106.7mm guns.
235
Translators Note: This passage is almost identical to text in the ng Nai History (1986) - ie Phan Ngc
Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.132, footnote 2. Air Commodore C.H. Spurgeon served at
HQ AFV in Si Gn from March 1970 to April 1971.The commander of RAAF elements in Vietnam from
mid-June 1966 was Air Commodore J. Dowling.
236
Translators Note: Colonel J.G. Hooton commanded the 1st Australian Logistic Support Group (1 ALSG)
at Vng Tu in the period November 1970 to September 1971. This error also appears in the ng Nai
History (1986). In 1966, the Australian Logistic Support Group (ALSG) in Vng Tu was commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel D. Rouse see: McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, pp.230-233.
237
Translators Note: Several Vietnamese histories refer to the New Zealand artillery orchestra or band,
and it is described in a press article: Hu Thanh (as related by H.B.), Min ng Nam B khi la (Fire
and Sword in the Eastern Region), 28 August 2008. The New Zealand artillery element ie 161st Battery
Royal New Zealand Artillery (RNZA) had earlier been attached to the US 173 rd Airborne Brigade since
June 1965. In mid-1966, it joined the Australian Task Force and was located in the 1 ATF base at Ni t
not in B Ra. Two New Zealand infantry companies were later integrated into Australian battalions the
first arriving in April 1967. For New Zealand forces in Vietnam, see Rock, J.R., Kiwis Under Fire: The
New Zealand Armed Forces in South Vietnam c.1965-1972, University of Auckland, Auckland, November
1995.
238
Translators Note: Sometimes also spelt as Gia Quy/Qui this feature was an ancient partiallycollapsed volcano about 8 kilometres south-east of the 1 ATF base, and was termed The Horseshoe, or
Horseshoe Hill or the Horseshoe Feature by the Australians. Located at YS 494620 on the northern
edge of t Town, the height of its rim was about 60 metres, and the crater floor was about 550 metres
across. The Horseshoe was first permanently occupied by D Company of 5RAR on 6 March 1967.
Artillery in The Horseshoe base extended the range of 1 ATF fire support. ARVN units were also trained
by 1 ATF elements at The Horseshoe. The Horseshoe was handed over to the 302nd RF Battalion on 10 June
1971.
239
Translators Note: Bu Lng (Lng Pool/Pond) on the Sng Cu (Cu River) is almost certainly in the
vicinity of the Route 2 bridge over the Sng Cu at YS 437692 - but is not marked on maps. It is just north
of the hamlet of An Ph which, uninhabited, was incorporated within the 1 ATF base perimeter (initially
occupied by 5RAR). There was no discrete Australian base at Bu Lng. Far less likely, Bu Lng could
possibly be a confused reference to Bu Lun where a US Special Forces element established a camp (B36) in January 1967 to train Vietnamese Mobile Strike Force (MSF - Mike Force) elements. That camp was
located on Route 44 west of the Long Hi Mountains about a kilometre north of Long Hi village. The
Long t District History (1986) relates that, in 1970, the Australians set up a battalion-level training
centre at Bu Lun for the Lon Nol troops and used them for patrolling on Routes 23-44. Australian
personnel trained Khmer Republic soldiers at the Long Hi camp from January 1972. The ng Nai

67
1,000 troops). Our forces and the people of B Ra faced a new challenge: having to deal
directly with the American expeditionary troops and their military vassals.240
------------------Confronting the American expeditionary forces and their vassals was an especially
difficult time. The Royal Australian Task Force was a mercenary force with much
experience in counter-guerrilla warfare in Malaya. They were very skilled in ambush
tactics and in small-scale attacks and commando-type operations deep into our base area
regions241 and on our trails and tracks that we used to traverse the jungle. If they
discovered us whether our force was large or small, they would attack or call for
artillery or air support to fire upon and destroy us. These perfidious tricks242 of the
Australian military created many difficulties for the revolutionary forces especially
when we had yet to gain experience of them.243
History (1986) also refers to a base at Bu Ln with more than one thousand troops. - Phan Ngc
Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.132.
240
Translators Note: On 15 June 1966, 1 ATF commenced clearing operations from its Ni t base under
OPLAN 1/66 (OPS 633) to dominate its Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) initially out to Line
ALFA. An annex to the OPLAN noted: During the 173 AB Brigade operation in Long Phc, elements
of D445 Battalion and local guerrillas fought tenaciously in the north-eastern section of Long Phc. The
OPLAN included an annex on the tunnel systems discovered in Long Phc and Long Tn villages - and an
annex detailing Vietnamese Government forces in Phc Tuy Province. See file AWM95, 1/4/3.
241
Translators Note: The local Party history described the evolving and dangerous Australian tactics
noting that in 10 months the Australian commandos [sic] had suddenly broken into our base areas 80
times. Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s ng b tnh B Ra-Vng Tu (1930 - 1975) (The History of
the B Ra-Vng Tu Party Chapter), Chapter VII, 2000.
242
Translators Note: Both the 1991 D445 History and the ng Nai History (1986) referred to the
Australians as Machiavellian (ie xo quyt), and both related the Australian troops raincoat/poncho,
piggy-back ruse. The ng Nai History noted that, as a result, many cadre and soldiers were wounded or
captured. - Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.152. The t History (2006)
includes: The Australian soldiers (most of whom were Australian aborigines) were very experienced
mercenaries having fought a counter-guerrilla war in Malaya, and were given a pilot pacification program
in Long t District. Different to the Americans, the Australian troops were very proficient in ambush
tactics, small-scale raids, operating dispersed in half-section and section groups, and striking deep into our
bases. They acclimatised to the weather and adapted to the tropical jungle terrain. They could cut through
the thick, thorny jungle and would hide in the swamps and marshes lying in ambush for many days at a
time. According to the Australian Department of Veterans Affairs, about 300 servicemen of Aboriginal or
Torres Strait Islander ethnicity served in the Australian forces in Vietnam during the War email to
author/translator, 8 December 2011; and Australian War Memorial advice, 4 June 2015.
243
The 5 Division History (2005) relates: In June 1966, the 4th ((274th)) Regiment received orders to move
to the Chu Pha-Ht Dch with the task of attacking the enemy and defending the supply areas of Group 84.
The 5th ((275th)) Regiment moved from Long Khnh to east of Route 2 to protect the offices of the
Divisional Headquarters and to prepare its forces to attack the Australian forces developing their base at
Ni t B Ra. In June 1966, the total strength of the 274th Regiments battalions was 1,128 (D1/800
Bn/H12 411 personnel; D2/265 Bn/H14 401; D3/308 Bn/H16 316) CDEC Log 09-1854-66. Several
months later on 20 October 1966, Australian 5RAR troops in an operation in the Ni Th Vi mountains
recovered the notebook/diary (completed to 7 October 1966) of Nguyn Nam Hng the second-incommand of the 274th Regiment - see CDEC Bulletins 1413 and 1418; CDEC Log 11-1253-66 and 111259-66 (translated text); 1 ATF, INTSUM No.142/66, Ni t, 21 October 66; and 1 ATF Troops
Information Sheet No.31, Ni t, 13-19 February 1967 (for a three-page commentary). The capture of the
diary and an outline of its contents is related in ONeill, R.J., Vietnam Task, op.cit., pp.48-49 and pp.155156. A 71B radio was also recovered from the cave at YS 288715 probably belonging to the 274th
Regiments C-20 Reconnaissance Company. According to Australian sources, the diary reportedly related
that, in the period 9-11 June 1966, the 274th Regiment had lain in wait to ambush an Australian sub-unit
expected to recover a US observation aircraft shot down in the Ni Ngh area. Similarly - according to the
Australian Official History, the diary indicated that the 274th Regiment had planned to ambush Australian
troops near the Ni Ngh feature in early June 1966. see McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit.,1993, p.249.

68
After developing their base at Ni t, the Australians began to launch sweeping
operations deep into our base area regions and liberated zones intending to completely
destroy our rear support areas and storehouses, and to wipe out our capabilities. At the
same time, the enemy aimed to scoop up the people from the liberated zones and base
areas to cut off the revolutionary forces from the people. On 30 June 1966, an Australian
battalion swept into our liberated zone to the west of Route 2, but was attacked by the
District forces in the ng Ngh area ((vicinity of YS 395693 about six kilometres northeast of Ha Long village)), and dozens of the enemy were killed and weapons seized. At
the same time, the Australian military joined with the puppets in the Long L area to
conduct sweeps, to lie in wait to ambush and capture our cadre, and to terrorise anyone
suspected of being part of our revolutionary infrastructure.244
Author Paul Ham interviewed Nguyn Nam Hng in Vng Tu in mid-November 2005, but Hng could
not recall the loss of his diary. Ham, P., Vietnam The Australian War, HarperCollinsPublishers,
Pymble, 2007, p.710.
244
The Vit Cng infrastructure (VCI) h tng c s, was the covert political and administrative
organisation that led the resistance movement ie distinct from armed units. It included government, Party
and Front members as well as lower-level functionaries. The VCI provided military elements with funds,
food, recruits, intelligence, refuge and guides. Politically, it prepared for an eventual assumption of power
with an organisation to replace the government of the Republic of Vietnam. VCI were defined by South
Vietnamese Presidential Decree Law 280-a/TT/SL of 20 December 1967 that formally initiated the Phng
Hong (Pheonix) program. Delayed, the program was not launched until July 1968 see footnote 437. It
was preceded by the US ICEX program - see: MACV Directive 381-41, 9 July 1967 (VCAT Item
No.2234306060) and United States Mission in Vietnam, The Viet Cong Infrastructure, Saigon, June 1970.
In mid-1968, total VCI in South Vietnam were assessed as 98,658 see MACORDS Director Pheonix
Staff, Analyzing Size of the VC Infrastructure, Saigon, 22 June 1968 VCAT Item No.F029200060426.
The VCI were monitored by the Special Collection Plan Against the Viet Cong Infrastructure and Guerrilla
Forces: Nickname - BIG MACK, see MACV instruction MACJ212-2 dated 27 August 1970 VCAT Item
No.2121015002. MACV and the CIA disagreed on the numbers of irregular forces until formal
agreement in mid-September 1967 see CIA cable at VCAT Item No.F029200050043. Following a
MACV/CIA/DIA meeting in Saigon, in October 1967, the MACV J-2 Order of Battle Summary removed
the political category (39,175 in May 1967) from the MACV enemy military threat assessments and
established a separate VCI category assessed as 84,000 country-wide in October 1967 (ie to include the
previous Self-Defense and Secret Self-Defense categories) - as these were: by definition, homeguards and low-level fifth-columnists not a fighting force and are not considered a military threat
MACV J-2 Monthly Order of Battle Summary, Saigon, 31 October 1967 VCAT Item No.250011006
see also footnote 39. However, on 31 January 1968, a senior analyst in the office of the CIAs Special
Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs complained of acquiescence to MACV half-truths, distortions, and
sometimes outright falsehoods on VC manpower figures VCAT Item No.F029200050637. Earlier, 1
ATF records indicated that in Phc Tuy in 1969, of the estimated 635 VCI 378 were identified by name.
- LEpagniol, J.L. Captain, R459-5-2 - Summary of VCI Personalities Ba Long Province, Ni t, 2
April 1969 - AWM98, 257. As at 31 January 1969, MACV had estimated VCI strength countrywide as
83,000 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Study: Improving South Vietnams Internal Security Scene,
Washington, 5 May 1970 - VCAT Item No.2121516002. The CIA v MACV disagreement on enemy
strength figures was also reported in the media Newsweek, 4 March 1968, p.13 VCAT Item
No.F029200050768. On 23 January 1971, COMUSMACV was briefed that: Nationally, there are 3.4 VCI
per 1,000 SVN population. - Sorley, L., Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes , op.cit., 2004, p.524.
In late 1970, 1 ATF reported that the infrastructure remained the key to the situation, and its strength in
Phc Tuy was assessed as: some 1,500 to 1,800 members scattered throughout the villages elusive and
difficult to isolate. - Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.476-477.
Subsequently, the MACV Summary of VCI Activities: Report 10-71 cited 658 VCI in Phc Tuy at 15
August 1971; and Report 3-72 dated 9 June 1972 reported 63,295 VCI country-wide as at 15 November
1971 - VCAT Item No.F015800190914. That Summary included 830 VCI in Phc Tuy Province. See also
Training Information Letter 14/70, Background paper to MR7 that includes Vng Tu and B Long HQ
in its VCI total of 635. In 1971, 17,690 VCI were reportedly neutralised countrywide (7,057 killed). For
Phc Tuy Province see also 1 ATFs anti-VCI Acorn operations, in Ekins, A. with McNeill, I.,
Fighting to the Finish, Allen & Unwin/Australian War Memorial, Crows Nest, 2012, pp.35-39; and in
Palazzo, A., Australian Military Operations in Vietnam, Australian Army Campaigns Series 3, Second

69
In the middle of 1966, Comrade Bi Quang Chnh (Su Chnh)245 the Battalion
Commander, and Comrade Vn Chng (Ba Lin)246 the Battalion Political Officer,
were posted to appointments at the Province Unit. Comrade V/V Quc Chanh (T
Chanh) was appointed Battalion Commander247, and Comrade Nguyn Minh Ninh
became the Political Officer248 with Comrade Lng Th Tnh249 as the Battalion
second-in-command and Chief of Staff.
On 15 June250 1966, an Australian company launched a sweeping operation to the
east of Route 2 in the direction from our L base to M M M Con251* and attacked
Edition, Army History Unit, 2009, pp.149-151. Captured or detained VCI were not classified as POWs but
were processed as civil detainees subject to Vietnamese civil law. Confirmed VCI were tried by province
security committees, whose proceedings were closed to the public, and the defendant had no right to an
attorney or to review his dossier. Security committees could release a suspect or send him to prison under
the An Tr (administrative detention) Laws or to a special court. Hard-core VCI were imprisoned on Cn
Sn Island see footnote 590. VC Supporters (ie VCS) were also subject to arrest and detention.
245
Translators Note: It is unlikely that Bi Quang Chnh was moved to the Province Unit in the middle of
1966. On 8 July 1966, he signed the Battalions Bi-Annual Political Report see Annex H. Vn
Chng (Ba Lin see the following footnote), declared that Su Chnh (Bi Quang Chnh) was the
commander of D445 at the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966 as has Nguyn Thi Bng the
probable commander of the 275th VC Regiment at the Battle of Long Tn. Subsequently, on 2 February
1968 - during the Tt 1968 Offensive, Bi Quang Chnh was noted as the Commander of the Chu c
District Unit - leading an attack on Long L Sub-Sector installations and the shelling of the Australian 1
ATF base at Ni t. A biography of Bi Quang Chnh has been included in Annex A Key Cadre.
246
Translators Note: As the Battalion Political Officer, Vn Chng ( Vn Lin/Ba Lin) wrote
formal reports on 10 July and 9 August 1966 see Annex H; and a Medal Submission on 10 July 1966
see Annex I. In a post-War interview, he also stated that he was at the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August
1966, and in the 1991 D445 History, he is noted as the political officer during the chemical attack on the
Battalion base in the last months of 1966 (see footnote 309) see his biography at Annex A. Also, Vn
Lin signed a Letter of Appreciation ie as the D445 political officer, on 12 November 1966 see the
photocopy at Annex D, p.6. Accordingly, it is highly doubtful that Vn Chng ( Vn Lin/Ba Lin)
moved to the Province Unit in the middle of 1966 as claimed in this 2004 D445 History.
247
Translators Note: See the preceding footnote 245 indicating that Bi Quang Chnh probably continued
as the Battalion Commander up until late 1966. The official Australian Army history incorrectly identifies
Nguyn Vn Kim as the commander of D445 Battalion in mid-1966 ie during Operation Hobart II in
late July 1966, see: McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit.,1993, p.283. As noted, see the biographies of the
Battalions principal cadre at Annex A including V/V Quc Chanh (T Chanh).
248
Translators Note: See the preceding footnote 246 indicating that Vn Chng ( Vn Lin, Ba
Lin) continued as the Battalions Political Officer until at least early 1967. As noted in the 1991 D445
Battalion History, Ba Lin is recorded as the Battalions Political Officer at the time of the reported
chemical attack on the Battalion base in the last months of 1966 (see footnote 309); and - as noted in the
preceding footnote 246, Vn Lin signed a Letter of Appreciation ie as the D445 political officer, on
12 November 1966 see the photocopy at Annex D, p.6. It is probable that in very early 1968, Vn
Lin was replaced as the 445 Battalion political officer by Nm Ninh (Nguyn Minh Ninh) ie about 18
months later than the date claimed in this 2004 D445 History.
249
Translators Note: Lng Th Tnh was noted on the staff of 445 Battalion in March 1967 in relation to
financial issues see CDEC Log 05-3474-67. In April 1968, captured documents identified the senior cadre
of 440 Battalion with Lng Th Tnh as the Battalion Commander see CDEC Log 04-1530-69. Born in
Nam nh, Lng Vn Tnh was killed in 1973 as included in the annexed List of 440 Battalion Martyrs,
p.258, Serial 397 see Chamberlain, E.P., D440: Their Story, op.cit., 2013.
250
Translators Note: The date is incorrect it should be July 1966, ie as in the earlier 1991 D445 History.
1 ATF records show 6RAR engaged a VC company group at YS 509682 on 25 July 1966. The VC
elements employed bugle calls, returned fire, and withdrew. 6RAR were later shelled by mortar fire. On 26
July, 6RAR regained contact with the VC elements up to 120-strong, and armed Chinook (CH-47)
helicopters provided fire support to 6RAR. The bodies of six VC killed by artillery fire were recovered 1
ATF, INTSUMs No.54 and No.55, Ni t, 25 and 26 July 1966. The 1 ATF Commander reported: He
((D445)) was found to be much more skillful than the local guerilla, capable of quick offensive action and
rapid manoeuvre. D445 appears to be a well trained and well led force. 1 ATF Commanders Diary
Narrative (AF-C2118 Adapted), Ni t, 1-31 July 1966. A report by Vn Chng/Lin (Ba Lin)

70
the Battalion base. The Australians had an unexpected and chance encounter with a
reconnaissance element. Our 1st Company was in defensive positions at the edge of the
stream one field away from M M M Con, when they heard the sound of
gunfire.They immediately deployed along the edge of the jungle to respond, blocked the
enemy, and wiped out dozens of the enemy soldiers. The 2nd and 3rd Companies attacked
the enemys flanks and killed a further number. However, the enemy then immediately
called for artillery fire support which struck our formation and wounded a number of
comrades252 including Comrade T Dng253 the Political Officer of the 1st Company,
who died on the way back to our base. That was our first engagement with the Australian
troops from the time that they established their base in the B Ra Long Khanh region.
The battle confirmed our ability to deploy swiftly254 and to employ appropriate tactical
formations when facing an enemy with superior fire support and experience in counterguerrilla warfare.255
the 445 Battalion Political Officer, shows the date of the engagement as 25 July 1966 see Annex H. In
an interview in March 1989, Vn Chng/Lin claimed to have been the commander on the ground
and stated that 445 Battalions losses had not been more than six, but one had been a company
commander Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, pp.116-117 (and connect with the following
footnote 253 on the death of T Dng). For the official Australian account, see McNeill, I., To Long Tan,
op.cit.,1993, pp.280-281: At Sui (stream) a Bang; Australian forces (B/6RAR) suffered two KIA; the
enemy reportedly suffered 6 KIA including possibly the commander of the 1 st Company of D445. In
May 1971, in an historical review of 445 Battalion, the 1 ATF Intelligence Staff noted that in June 1966,
445 Battalion had been caught in a 1 ATF counter-sweep in the Long Tn area and lost 50 KIA, 20 WIA
and 10 weapons CIA ((captured in action)). see the 1 ATF study: Peters, C.C.M. Major, D445 - Order of
Battle, 1 ATF Battle Intelligence Section, Ni t, 6 May 1971 ie a repeat of the 50 VC KIA (BC) cited
in an earlier 1 ATF study: Graham, N.F., D445 LF Battalion ORBAT, Ni t, 29 May 1970. USMACV
CICV studies of D445 were published as: D445 VC Local Force Battalion, MACJ231-6, 17 April 1970, and
11 November 1971.
251
* An area of Long Tn village, south-west of the L base.
252
Translators Note: According to a 2008 medical history, 18 comrades in 445 Battalion were wounded
and evacuated to the medical detachment including three burned by napalm bombs. - L Thanh Dng (et
al), The History of the B Ra-Long Khnh Medical Services (1945-2006), op.cit., 2008.
253
Translators Note: T Dng was noted earlier in this 445 Battalion History as the deputy political
officer of 440 Company in December 1964. He was formally promoted from platoon leader to assistant
political officer by Military Region 1/B Ra Province Unit on 20 October 1965 CDEC Log 09-1876-66.
However earlier in the 1991 445 Battalion History, T Dng is shown in May 1965 as the 1st Company
political officer. He was also noted in a captured document conducting a motivational campaign as the 1 st
Companys political officer in December 1965 - that included a quite detailed history of the then 117-strong
1st Company (85 combatants in three platoons; 31 Party and 40 Group members) - CDEC Log 05-1293-66.
In mid-1966, a T Vn Dng was recommended for promotion to political officer of the Battalions 1 st
Company CDEC Log 12-2393-66. 1 ATF reported the recovery of the body at YS 516670 of an officer
of D445 Battalion, possibly the commander of C1/445 Company who had been badly wounded and
executed by VC troops VC had searched the body and removed weapon 1 ATF, INTSUM No.55, Ni
t, 26 July 1966. According to a captured Military Region 1 (T.1) document, on 23 June 1966 the
provincial battalion shelled the t Sub-Sector Communique, 17 July 1966, CDEC Log 08-118766. A captured report by the Eastern Nam B Military Region relates counter-operations in Long t
District in the period 9-28 June 1966 against 5,000 US troops including a raid by the t unit into
t Town on the night of 28 June, and the shelling of the t Sub-Sector by the province
battalion. Ba Sinh (Chief of Staff) - Military Staff, Eastern Nam B Military Region, 17 July 1966. CDEC Log 08-1187-66.
254
Translators Note: According to a senior NVA officer who rallied in 1970: during the Dry Season, VC
units could move approx 20 to 25 kilometers in one night. Normally, they travelled four kilometers per hour
and marched for five to five and one-half hours per night; during the Rainy Season, it took the units approx
33 percent more marching time to cover the same distance. VCAT Item No.11271006005.
255
Translators Note: According to the 5th Division History (2005), see Annex K: On 15 July, the
Australian 3rd Battalion secretly attacked the base of the 445th Battalion at L stream. In this first
engagement, we lacked tactical experience against the Australians and although the cadre and soldiers of

71
In August 1966, COSVN decided to establish Long B Bin Province by
combining the three provinces of Long Khanh, B Ra, and Bin Ha. Although the
geographical extent of this new Province was larger, these were still familiar battlefields
and consequently the thought processes256 and the tactical methods of the Battalions
cadre and soldiers required no major changes.
With the aim of blocking the frenzied escalation by the Australian military and
their daily increasing threat, the COSVN Military Committee reinforced the B Ra
Long Khanh region with the 5th ((275th)) Regiment257 of the 5th Division and local armed
forces in order to counter the enemys sweeping operations.
In the Wet Season258 of 1966, the 5th Division Headquarters and the Long B
Bin Province Unit united in developing a plan259 to attack the Australian troops in the
the 445th Battalion fought very bravely, they were unable to destroy many of the enemy. Rather, the unit
suffered heavy casualties from the enemys artillery firepower. Note that the initial Australian infantry
battalions of 1 ATF were 5RAR and 6RAR - ie not 3RAR, which arrived in Vietnam in December 1967.
256
Translators Note: In mid-1966, the Liberation Armed Forces promulgated a requirement for a system of
Revolutionary Military Councils (Hi ng Qun Nhn Cach Mng) to be managed by Party Chapters
at company-level in order to democratise decision-making in units and stiffen political resolve. The
Directive issued by the 5th VC Division (Vietnamese text only - undated) is at CDEC Log 09-1749-66. A
translation of the programs main points is at CDEC Log 09-1865-66.
257
Translators Note: The earlier 1991 D445 History incorrectly cites the 4 th Regiment (ie the 274th VC
Main Force Regiment) rather than the 5th (275th Regiment), as the principal Vit Cng formation involved
in the Battle of Long Tn. The 274th Regiment is also incorrectly cited (in lieu of the 275th Regiment) in the
history of the C.12-65 Bnh Gi Victory Assault Youth Group see Annex F, Long Tn Casualties,
pp.12-13. The official histories of the 5th Division (2005) and the ng Nai History (1986) as well as the
major Vietnamese history of the War ie: Nguyn Vn Minh Colonel (ed), Lch s Khng chin chng M
cu nc The History of the Anti-American Resistance War for National Salvation, Tp 4 (Vol 4), Nh
Xut Bn Chnh Tr Quc Gi, H Ni, 1999 all correctly cite the 275th Regiment (ie the 5th Regiment) as
the principal Vit Cng formation at the Battle of Long Tn.
258
Translators Note: The Wet Season in southern Vietnam begins in April/May; and the Dry Season begins
in November. The season timings are: Spring January/February, March, April; Summer May, June,
July; Autumn August, September, October; Winter November, December, January.
259
Translators Note: In its Operational Report for the period ending 31 July 1966, the US II FFV had
assessed: it appears that the 5 th VC Division has shifted its attention to the 1st ATF north of Phuoc Le ((ie
B Ra Town)) The probable location of the 274th and 275th Regiments in Phuoc Tuy Province indicates
a possible threat to the 1st ATF. It is likely that small VC reconnaissance and intelligence groups are
maintaining surveillance of the 1st ATF while the main force regiments are awaiting a suitable opportunity
to attack. The 274th Regiment, the 860th (LF) Battalion ((ie an aka of D445 Battalion)), and possibly the
275th Regiment may attack the 1st ATF in Phuoc Tuy Province. - HQ II FFV, Operational Report for the
Quarterly Period ending 31 July 1966, 15 August 1966. However, the 1 ATF INTSUM No.60 of 31 July
only assessed a far lower level of possible threat ie: Within or immediately adjacent to 1 ATF TAOR
((Tactical Area of Operational Responsibility)), the following VC forces are operating: approximately 100
guerrillas, 2 district companies, 1 provincial battalion, 1 (possible) main force battalion (possibly from 274
Regt) 1 ATF patrols operating east and west of the Nui Dat base camp could contact up to a battalion
size force in each case. That assessment from 1 ATF INTSUM No.60, was repeated verbatim in: 6RAR,
Enemy 1 ATF Area, Ni t, 3 August 1966 (AWM95, 7/6/ 5). Subsequently, the 1 ATF INTSUM of 9
August 1966 further lessened the threat assessed in 1 ATFs INTSUM No.60 of 31 July 1966 by
significantly understating the enemy in, and adjoining, Phc Tuy Province ie: Within or immediately
adjacent to 1 ATF TAOR, the following VC forces are operating: approx 100 guerrillas, 2 district
companies, 1 provincial battalion. ie that INTSUM No.69 omitted the earlier references in INTSUM
No.60 to: 1 (possible) main force battalion (possibly from 274 Regt) and the final sentence from
INTSUM No.60 ie: 1 ATF patrols operating east and west of the Nui Dat base camp could contact up to
a battalion size force in each case. see: 1 ATF, INTSUM No.69, Ni t, 9 August 1966. Post-War, it
was asserted that, pre-Long Tn: Intelligence reports had indicated at least two main-force enemy
regiments, the 274th and the 275th, together with the local D445 battalion, were operating in the vicinity of
the Task Force base. - Rowe, J., Vietnam The Australian Experience, Time-Life Books Australia,
North Sydney, 1993, p.70. As a major, John S. Rowe had been the GSO2 (Int) at 1 ATF in mid-1966.

72
rubber plantation area of Long Tn village.260 Quite careful thought was given to the
preparation of the battlefield including: the steps in coming to grips with the enemy, the
terrain, combat rehearsals on models, a thorough understanding by the cadre and soldiers
of their tasks, the arrangements for first-aid, and the establishment of a forward surgical
team etc. 445 Battalion261 was given the mission by the Forward Headquarters262 to strike
Translators Note: The 5th Division History (2005) also relates the Battle of Long Tn in some detail
see the translated extracts at Annex K, pp.6-13. In August 1966, the Headquarters of the 5 th Division moved
three kilometres south from its base at Sui u (YS 780820 in Base Area 301) to the vicinity of YS
790785. The 1991 D455 Battalion History also related planning and reconnaissance aspects ie: Comrades
Nm Truyn ((ie: Nguyn Th Truyn - aka Nm Truyn and Nm Si Gn)), Nm Tm ((ie: Trn Minh
Tm alias S Nm, the founding commander of the 274th Regiment)), Ba t ((ie: Nguyn c Hot,
Deputy Commander of the B Ra Province Unit also reportedly known as Nguyn Vn t)), t ng
((ie: ng Hu Thun - also known as V ng and Thim B Ra-Long Khnh Province Unit))
together with the staff elements of the two units, held many meetings to carefully consider and assess the
situation - while delegating Comrade Nguyn Hu Ngha ((ie: probably more correctly L Hu Ngha either the commander or the 2ic of the reconnaissance company of the 275th Regiment)) - the second-incommand of the reconnaissance company of the 5 th Division, and the 445 Battalions reconnaissance
element to go and examine the battlefield in the Long Tn and Long Phc region of B Ra. After three
days, the reconnaissance elements of the two units had completed their study of the battlefield. For further
detail and biographic information on the cadre mentioned above, see Chamberlain, E.P., D445: Their
Story, op.cit., 2011, footnotes 124-128 inclusive. On the afternoon of 16 August 1966, A Coy of 6RAR
killed two VC about four kilometres north-east of the 1 ATF base (YS 479693 and YS 483693) - 1 ATF,
INTSUM No.76, Ni t, 16 August 1966. Captured documents indicated probable elements of the 33strong B Ra Town Unit (C.982) and possibly a Province intelligence element (C.187).
261
Translators Note: In a post-War interview, the 445 Battalion political officer Vn Lin (Ba Lin),
stated that he and Su Chnh (Bi Quang Chnh 445 Battalion Commander) coordinated with the 275 th
Regiment and the element of 5th Division headquarters Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990,
p.117. According to the official Australian history, 1 ATF assessed the strength of 445 Battalion as 550
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351, p.559 (endnote 114). Dr Ian McNeill has apparently cited
the 1 ATF estimate as at late May 1966 see footnote 231. However, 445 Battalions strength was probably
no more than about 380 see the social data on the Battalions personnel at Annex G and extracts of the
recovered 445 Battalion Command and Political Reports of July and August 1966 at Annex H.
262
Translators Note: Trn Minh Tm is noted in a major Vietnamese account of the War as leading the 5th
Division elements at Long Tn ie Nguyn Vn Minh Colonel (ed), Lch s Khng chin , Tp 4 (Vol
4), op.cit., 1999 see footnote 283. He is also noted as the commander in the account in the 5th VC
Division History (2005) - see footnotes 292 and 302; and Annex K. However, Trn Minh Tm is not
mentioned as the senior 5th Division Headquarters representative during the Battle by Nguyn Thanh Hng
(born 1932, Hi M - aka Hai Hng) a 5th Division operations officer, who has strongly implied that he ie Hng, played the premier 5th Division role at the Battle eg: claiming that it was left to him to plan the
attack at Long Tn and that he was the on-site commander throughout from Phc Hng hamlet.
NguynThanh Hng also stated that he chose a tactic for the Battle that he described as the luring of the
tiger from the mountain (see footnote 270) as related in T. Burstalls interview with Nguyn Thanh Hng
in Bin Ha City on 10 November 1987 pp.99-112 in Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns , op.cit., 1990.
According to Nguyn Thanh Hng, during the Battle, the headquarters of the 275th Regiment was on Ni
t 2 Hill under the command of Senior Captain t Thi ((ie Nguyn Thi Bng)), while he (Hng)
commanded the forward element of the 5th Division Headquarters in a small deserted hamlet just on the
eastern side of the Long Tn plantation called p Phc Hng ie about two kilometres east of the Long
Tn battlefield at YS 495670 see footnote 274. Hng made no mention of the presence of Trn Minh Tm
the Chief of Staff of the 5th Division, at the Battle Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns , op.cit., 1990,
pp.99-112. For a December 2001 statement in the Legislative Assembly of Western Australia citing Hng
as the master-mind of the Battle, see footnote 41 in Annex K the 5th Division History (2005). Post-War,
Nguyn Thanh Hng appeared in an Australian DVD/video documentary describing his role and aspects of
the Long Tn battle including his luring the tiger tactic - Horsefield, B. (Director/ Producer), Long Tan
The True Story, Australian Broadcasting Commission/Film Australia, Lindfield, 1993. The combat
headquarters would appear to have been on the southern slopes of Ni t 2 (GR YS 485676) a small
wooded hill about 126 metres in height, also called Ni Thm. For Ni Thm/Ni t 2 and Phc
Hng, see the map at page.216. During the Battle, a Vit Cng heavy machinegun and a medium/light
260

73
the enemy in the forward blocking position and in the rear blocking position. The 2nd
Company was tasked as the forward blocking group, and was reinforced with a B-40, a
57mm RCL, and a reconnaissance platoon from the 5th Division all under the direct
command of V Quc Chanh (T Chanh) the Battalion Commander.263 The 1st and 3rd
Companies were directly commanded by a company commander Nguyn c Thu (Su
Thu)264. This force265 together with the 1st Battalion of the 5th ((275th)) Regiment266, had
the rear blocking task. The 3rd Battalion of the 5th ((275th)) Regiment was positioned to

machinegun fired on Australian troops from Ni Thm, and the enemy command element was thought to
be on the forward slopes of Nui Dat 2 McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.328 and p.323.
263
Translators Note: In the 1991 D445 Battalion Historys account of the Battle of Long Tn, the name of
the 445 Battalion commander during the Battle is not specifically mentioned. The Australian Official
Histories cite Nguyn Vn Kim (see footnote 247) as the 445 Battalion commander at the Battle ie rather
than Bi Quang Chnh (Su Chnh) see Chamberlain, E. P., Research Note 23, Vietnam War:
Commander of D445 Battalion at Long Tan Not Nguyn Vn Kim but Bi Quang Chnh , 23
September 2010 (to the Australian War Memorial and the Australian Army History Unit - Canberra) - and
discussion in outline biographies at Annex A Key Cadre. Note however that an Australian intelligence
document (an organisational chart) in September 1966 included Sau Chanh as the commander of 445
Battalion reproduced in Burstall, T., Vietnam The Australian Dilemma, University of Queensland Press,
St Lucia, 1993, p.94. As noted, for further detail on Bi Quang Chnh, V Quc Chanh (T Chanh), and
Nguyn Vn Kim (Nm Kim) see their biographies at Annex A.
264
Translators Note: Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu) was previously noted as commander of the 2 nd
Company at the founding of 445 Battalion. Post-War, Nguyn cThu appeared in an Australian
television documentary and described aspects of the Battle of Long Tn - Horsefield, B. (Director/
Producer), Long Tan The True Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993; and recently in a Vietnamese video: V Vn
Cm, Coming-of-age during combat, 4 November 2014. See Thus biography at Annex A.
265
Translators Note: In briefings in Vietnam to the official Australian Army historian in June 1988,
Nguyn Vn Kim a commander of 445 Battalion from early 1968, claimed that 445 Battalion was the
prime force in the battle at Long Tn. Dr Ian McNeill noted that: the Vietnamese did not concede ((their
troops at Long Tn)) as more than two battalions, a total of some 700-800 men The total was 720
troops. see: McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.367. For discussion on Vietnamese sources in the
late 1980s minimizing the involvement of the 275th Regiment in the Battle - see Annex O, pp. 12-15.
266
Translators Note: As noted, in the 1991 D445 History, the VC Regiment at the Battle is incorrectly
cited as the 4th Regiment (ie 274th Regiment). At Long Tn, the 275th Regiment was reportedly
commanded by Nguyn Thi Bng (also known as t Thi see footnotes 135, 145, 151, 245, and Annex
O including his biography at Appendix 2) with Nguyn Vn Cc (Ba Cc) as the Regiments political
officer. The 2ic of the 274th Regiment Nguyn Nam Hng, noted in his diary on 28 September 1966: the
5th Regiment ((ie the 275th Regiment)) attacked Ni t 600 Australians were killed and 1 Australian
battalion exterminated CDEC Log 11-1259-66. For detail on the 274th Regiment activity at that time
see Annex N. Hng related that for most of August and September, the ((274 th)) Regiment was
transporting rice. Hngs statement conflicts with claims including by Nguyn Vn Kim (Commander
D445, early 1968-1969), that the 274th Regiment was tasked in mid-August 1966 to interdict any US forces
moving south on Route 2 to relieve Australian forces during the Long Tn battle see Kims statement in
Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan The True Story, DVD, 1993. On the 274th Regiments
activities, see also extracts of the 5th Division History (2005) at Annex K, footnote 34. The 275th Regiment
commander during the Battle of Long Tn - Nguyn Thi Bng, had his 275th Regiment headquarters
located on the small feature of Ni t 2 see the map at page 216, and he was accompanied by his
executive officer/2ic Major Ba Du (ie Ba c) - see the interviews in Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns,
Book 2, op.cit., 1990, p.100, p.102, pp.122-123, and p.206. According to the Australian official history: In
the final evaluation, including forces held in depth, the task force assessed the enemy as 275 Main Force
Regiment of three battalions reinforced by at least one battalion from the North Vietnamese Army together
with 445 Battalion. The total strength of 275 Regiment was 1600 The strength of the NVA battalion
was 500 and the strength of D445 Battalion was 550. McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351 and
p.559 (endnotes 113 and 114). A contemporary account reported that: At least one North Vietnamese
battalion was attached to 275 Regiment for the operation. - Townsend, C. Lieutenant Colonel, 6 RAR
After Action Report Operation SMITHFIELD: 18-21 August 1966, Ni t, 7 September 1966.

74
strike the enemy in the killing zone and our ambush site267 was about three kilometres
in length. On the night of 17 August 1966, all our combat forces268 for the battle paid
close attention to preparing the ambush site, digging positions and getting ready for
combat. The 4th Company was ordered by the Battalion to set up two 82mm mortars and a
75mm recoilless rifle (RCL) and shell the Australian military base at Ni t.269 The
267

Translators Note: Vietnamese accounts describe the engagement as a planned ambush (see footnotes
187, 270, 283, 296 and Annex Q). The 5th Division History (2005) - see Annex K, p.12, describes the tactic
as a mobile ambush to destroy the Australian force a new combat objective on the battlefield. For
mobile ambush, see the earlier footnote 187 and the title of the D445 Battalion sketch map of the Battle
of Long Tn footnote 275. Several Australian works and the writings of Major H.A. Smith, contend
that an encounter battle is a more appropriate description of the engagement see McNeill, I., To Long
Tan, op.cit., 1993, pp.362-371 (that 1993 History concludes however that: Too much information is
missing to make a conclusive assessment of the enemy intentions and motives). See also: Burstall, T., A
Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, Book 1 - p.160, Book 2 p.99, pp.109-110, pp.122-123; Ekins, A.,
Unravelling the riddles of Long Tan, Wartime, Issue 55, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, July 2011,
pp.42-47; Fairhead, F., A Duty Done: A Summary of Operations by the Royal Australian Regiment in the
Vietnam War 1965-1972, Linden Park, 2014, pp.30-33. In his report citing intelligence indications, the
Commanding Officer of 6RAR wrote that D Company contacted 275 Regiment plus elements of D445 Bn
which was moving to attack 1 ATF base on the night 18/19 Aug 66. - Townsend, C.M. Lieutenant
Colonel, 6 RAR After Action Report, op.cit., 7 September 1966. The 1 ATF Report similarly implied that
the Vit Cng force intended to attack the Ni t base - 1st Australian Task Force - Vietnam, Combat
Operations After Action Report Operation Smithfield, R723-1-5, December 1966. In recent publications,
Lieutenant Colonel (Retd) H. A. Smith SG, MC (the officer commanding D/6RAR at the Battle of Long
Tn) and David Sabben (a platoon commander at the Battle) have argued strongly that the Vit Cng force
had planned a ground attack against the 1 ATF base at Ni t - ie rather than an ambush at Long Tn
eg see Smith, H.A., Long Tan the start of a lifelong battle, Big Sky Publishing Pty Ltd, Newport, 2015 ;
Grandin, R., The Battle of Long Tan: As Told by the Commanders to Bob Grandin, Allen & Unwin, Crows
Nest, 2004, pp.275-293; and Sabben, D., Was the Battle of Long Tan a VC ambush? : A presentation,
Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1996. The state of the 1 ATF defences at Ni t including
shortfalls, is examined in Annex E, footnotes 126 and 133. For comments on ambush or attack, see
Annex E pp.26-27 and Annex O pp. 9-12. On 17 August the day of the shelling of the Ni t base, a
soldier in the 275th Regiment was awarded a Letter of Appreciation see Annex O, footnote 76.
268
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History lists the units and elements involved in the Battle in detail
see Annex M: The Battle of Long Tn: D445 History - 1991. The issue of NVA/VC participants is also
considered further in Annex L The Battle of Long Tn 18/8/66 NVA/VC Revisited; and Annex N The
274th Regiment - Not at the Battle of Long Tn.
269
Translators Note: The earlier 1991 D445 History did not mention the shelling of the Australian Ni t
base on 17th August. However, according to Vn Lin the 445 Battalion political officer, 445 Battalion
provided guides for the units that mortared the Task Force Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990,
p.117. The 5th Division History (2005) - see Annex K, p.9, relates: Continuously through 16 and 17
August, the local forces and the Divisions reconnaissance cells fired mortars into Ni t. The 1 ATF
Commanders Diary for August 1966 described the impact on 17 August of 63 VC 82mm mortar bombs
and five 70mm howitzer rounds based on crater analysis Headquarters 1 ATF - Commanders Diary,
August 1966 see also 1 ATF, INTSUM No.77, Ni t, 17 August 1966 that reported the shelling as
probably by D860 Battalion; and McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.305 that related the 22-minute
shelling that began at 0243hrs on 17 August. The shelling - from the east of the 1 ATF base, comprised 6367 82mm mortar rounds (from baseplates at YS 459671), 23 75mm RCL shells (from YS 473673, YS
469668), and five 70mm howitzer rounds. At 4.10am on 17 August, Major H.A. Smith OC D/6RAR, had
reported hearing a gun fire three rounds towards the end of the mortar firing. 6RAR, Operations Log,
17 August, Sheet 1 Serial 3, 0410hrs. An unexploded 70mm round was recovered within the Ni t base
1 ATF, INTSUM No.77, Ni t, 17 August 1966. The 70mm rounds were probably fired from an
obsolescent Japanese Model 92 howitzer most likely by an element of the Z-39 Artillery Battalion of
Group 89 which had been noted in the Xuyn Mc area in March 1966. Four weeks after the Battle of Long
Tn, 1 ATF reported the Z-39 Artillery Battalion 400-500 strong, as located at YS 6781 (about 13
kilometres north of Xuyn Mc Town). - 1 ATF, Intelligence Review No.1, Ni t, 13 September 1966.
COSVN had produced a manual for the howitzer (Hng X Dng B Binh Phao 70mm Nht) which
weighed 470lb and could be broken down into three pack-loads. 1 ATF suffered 24 wounded two
seriously. On 17 August, patrols from B Company of 6RAR found the firing site of Vit Cng 75mm RCLs

75
Australians fell for our plan to lure the tiger from the mountain 270 and early the next
morning, they mounted a sweeping operation.271
At 1500hrs on 18 August 1966272, an Australian battalion with a squadron of
armoured vehicles273 in support, split into three columns and advanced into Long Tn
where they fell into the ambush position that had been prepared by our troops. Our
forward elements in the ambush fought bravely, effectively coordinating with one

(at YS 469668) with 23 discarded 75mm shell cases, bits of bodies and blood-stained clothing; and an ox
cart destroyed by the 1 ATF artillery counter-battery fire. - Mollison, C.S., Long Tn and Beyond Alpha
Company 6 RAR in Vietnam 1966-67, Cobbs Crossing, Woombye, 2006, pp.124-125. As noted above,
mortar base-plate positions were also found in the vicinity of YS 459671. Post-War, a Vit Cng medic Chung, related that three of the Vit Cng RCL party from the 275th Regiment were killed in the 1 ATF
counter-battery fire and were buried nearby. - Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan The True
Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993. The detail of the shelling was later included in: Cubis R.M. Lieutenant Colonel,
1st Field Regiment (RAA) - Operational Report Number 3 (R569-1-2), Ni t, 14 September 1966
Annex B: Report of Enemy Artillery Action Night 16/17 Aug 66; including a map overlay showing
impact areas and assessed firing points by the enemy 82mm mortars (five: 63-67 shells), RCLs (three: 23
shells), and the 70mm howitzer (five shells). Despite the failure of 1 ATFs AN/KPQ-1 mortar locating
radars, effective suppressive counter-battery fire struck the VC firing positions in seven minutes.
270
Translators Note: The tactic is described in several Chinese and Vietnamese military documents ie:
luring the tiger from the mountain a Chinese and Vietnamese saying (Vietnamese: Dn h/cp khi ni;
Sino-Vietnamese: iu h ly sn; Chinese: ). Post-War, several Vietnamese veterans
including Nguyn Vn Kim and Nguyn Thanh Hng, have explained this as the tactic for the Long Tn
Battle rather than any attack against 1 ATFs Ni t base itself - McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit.,1993,
pp.366-367. See also Annex R. In late 2014, an article by Military Region 7 and 5th Division veterans also
cited the lure and ambush tactic as d h ly sn. Nguyn Vn Bch, Trn Phc Kch Long Tn (The
Ambush Battle at Long Tn), Cu Chin Binh (War Veterans) Thnh Ph H Ch Minh On-line,
Thnh Ph H Ch Minh (H Ch Minh City), 18 December 2014 see a full translation at Annex Q.
271
Translators Note: The Australian official account of the Battle of Long Tn including discussion of
casualties, is in McNeill, I., To Long Tan , op.cit., 1993, pp.305-375. Other relevant Australian works on
Long Tn include: Smith H.A., Long Tan: the start of a lifelong struggle, op.cit., 2015 (citing 293 VC
KIA); Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns (Book 2), op.cit.,1990, pp.92-124; McAulay, L., The Battle of Long
Tan, op.cit., 1987; Grandin, R., The Battle of Long Tan , op.cit., 2004, pp.275-293; Davies, B. with
McKay, G., Vietnam: The Complete Story of ther Australian War, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2012,
pp.207-250; Ham, P. Vietnam , op.cit., 2007, pp.219-250; and Ekins, A., Unravelling , op.cit., July
2011. A contemporary 1 ATF post-Battle summary account is at 1 ATF, Troops Information Sheet, No.5,
Ni t, 15-21 August 1966 (245 VC KIA, 3 VC PW) together with the 1 ATF Monthly Summary
(MONEVAL) for August 1966, Ni t, 5 September 1966 - to II FFV (AWM95,1/4/7). The account of the
Long Tn battle as related in the 5th Division History (2005) is included in Annex K, pp.6-13; and the
account in the 1991 D445 History is at Annex M. The 2014 account by Vietnamese war veterans is at
Annex Q. The purported 2006 account by the Chinese General is addressed in Annex F, pp.10-11.
272
According to the official Australian account of the Battle in McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993,
pp.305-375, the ground battle commenced at 4.08pm on 18 August 1966. According to the 5th Division
History (2005), the Australian force was sighted: at 3.30pm by the 2 nd Battalions reconnaissance cell
(of the 275th Regiment) and engaged soon after. A comprehensive contemporary Australian report of the
Battle is at: 1st Australian Task Force - Vietnam, Combat Operations After Action Report Operation
Smithfield, R723-1-5, December 1966 (Internet-accessible, see Bibliography). According to that Report, the
first contact between the two forces was at 1540hrs (3.40pm). Maps and sketches attached to the Report
illustrate the phases of the Battle and also note the Vit Cng shelling positions and the 1 ATF counterbattery targets.
273
Translators Note: Armoured squadron: literally chi on xe bc thp. The initial Australian force
at Long Tn ie the 108-strong D Company of 6RAR (infantry, and three artillery personnel) was not
mounted in armoured personnel carriers and was not accompanied by armoured vehicles. Australian
armoured personnel carriers (APCs - M113A1 11-tonnes) - carrying infantry reinforcements, only arrived at
Long Tn towards the end of the Battle at approximately 1850hrs (ie 6.50pm) on 18 August 1966.

76
another. They destroyed much of the enemys combat power, setting fire to many
armoured vehicles, and were able to drive the enemy into our decisive killing zone.274

Map: The Mobile Ambush at Long Tn (Chu c B Ra) by the

5th Infantry Regiment and a Company of 445 Infantry Battalion (18 August 1966)275
274

Translators Note: In the 1991 D445 History, the NVA/VC participants in the Battle are listed see
Annex M: The Battle of Long Tn; and Annex L : NVA/VC Revisited. Regarding the killing ground, the
1991 D445 History relates that the 3rd Battalion (of the 275th Regiment of the 5th VC Division ie formerly
D605 NVA Battalion) had the responsibility for the flanking thrust (the decisive point). We reinforced
the area of the killing ground with a minefield comprising 12 DH5 and DH10 mines ((DH: nh Hng directional mines)), and 42 American Mk1 mines. The decisive point literally quyt chin im,
equates to killing ground. The 5th Division History (2005) - see Annex K, footnote 38, similarly states
that: The 3rd Battalion was deployed about 800 metres to the north-west of Route 52 with the task of
attacking into the main killing zone at the Tht Pagoda. For the site of the Tht Pagoda, see Annex O
footnotes 65, 66 and 88. However, as noted earlier, Nguyn Thanh Hng (footnote 262) stated that at the
5th Division forward headquarters element in the small deserted hamlet of Phc Hng to the east of Long
Tn, he had there the third battalion of the 275th as a reserve element. - Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns,
Part 2, op.cit., 1990, p.99. According to the senior NVA defector L Xun Chuyn (Lieutenant Colonel ,
Chief of Staff of the 5th VC Division see VCAT Item No.4080124002), the 3rd Battalion of the 275th
Regiment was fairly good because it consisted entirely of North Vietnamese who had been recalled to
active duty and infiltrated into the South. The 3rd Battalion was previously the North Vietnamese Armys
D605th Battalion and had initially been raised as the 4th Battalion of the 32nd Regiment in Thanh Ha on 15
April 1965 of its 500 members, two-thirds were Southerner regroupees ie cn b hi kt (soon
joined by 200 Northern recruits). On 10 September 1965, the Battalion was redesignated D605 and began
its 2,000km/112-day infiltration on 13 September CDEC Bulletin No.3975. D605 Battalion (commanded
by Nguyn Vn/nh Thiu, and with V Ngc Khuyn as its political officer) was incorporated into the
275th Regiment in May 1966 following the Regiments heavy casualties at the second battle of V Su (Bnh
Tuy Province) in mid-March 1966 which had forced the amalgamation of the Regiments 2 nd and 3rd
Battalions to form a restructured 2nd Battalion. The Australian Official History notes that 1 ATF estimated
that the 275th Regiment of three battalions ((had been)) reinforced by at least one battalion from the North
Vietnamese Army together with D445 Battalion. - McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351. Nguyn
Vn Thiu did not command the 275th Regiments 3rd Battalion at Long Tn as he had been killed in the
ng n engagement in March 1966 in Long Khnh Province as related in the 5th Division History
(2005). V Ngc Khuyn or Nguyn Vn c probably commanded the 3rd Battalion at the Battle see
Annex O, p.11. A major Vietnamese history of the War incorrectly cites the 6 th Battalion of the 275th
Regiment ie rather than the 3rd Battalion, and a company of 445 Battalion destroying a company of
Australian soldiers at Long Tn - Nguyn Vn Minh Colonel (ed), Lch s Khng chin , Tp 4 (Vol 4),
op.cit, 1999. For futher detail on the 275th Regiment, see Annex O.

77
However, due to heavy rain276 and the enemys superior firepower and heavy
artillery shelling277, the enemy was able to block the momentum of our attack and
inflicted many casualties and losses on us. The battle concluded at 1800hrs on that same
day. Our total number of dead and wounded in the battle was more than 100 comrades
(445 Battalion and the 5th Regiment). In particular, the 2nd Company of 445 Battalion
suffered 23 wounded and three killed. Comrade Trn Vn Chin (Su Chin) the 1st
Company commander, was wounded in the battle.278 However, when he was taken by his
275

The Vietnamese military use Warsaw Pact-style map-marking symbols (with some variations) ie not
the Western NATO STANAG 2019 AAP-6A map-marking symbols. Red symbols indicate VC elements,
and blue represents 1 ATF elements. Ta is Us, and ch is Enemy. The number 5 within a
rectangular flag represents the 5th VC Regiment ie the 275th VC Main Force Regiment - with its battalions
(1, 2, and 3) shown as triangular flags. The symbols of an arrow with two cross-bars represent a company
assault. The diamond symbol represents a medium tank. The text in the 1991 D445 History literally
referred to Australian xe tng at the Battle. However, Australian tanks ie 51-tonne Centurion tanks, did
not arrive in Vietnam until February 1968 (by August 1968, the Squadron was at full strength with 28
tanks). The Australian armoured vehicles at the Battle were M113A1 armoured personnel carriers. The
Long Tn rubber plantation ie the Long Hip/B ic plantation in the t Gai area, comprised fiveyear old trees. No mortar base-plate positions are indicated on the map, and no Vietnamese communist
account mentions VC mortar fire during the Battle although D/6RAR received heavy mortar fire (60mm
and 82mm) during the Battle beginning at 1626hrs from YS 483665. Outside the plantation area, the terrain
varied between open paddy fields and thick scrubby timber with dense bamboo thickets in places. To the
north-east of the 1 ATF base, part of the Route 2/Ha Long village bypass road is shown on the sketch map.
However, that bypass was constructed later ie in the period from late January to late April 1967. In the
lower right corner of the map, The Horseshoe feature Ni Da Qui, is shown as being occupied by
Australian forces but see footnote 238: ie The Horseshoe was not occupied by Australian forces until 6
March 1967. The Battle of Long Tn took place just outside the south-eastern boundary of the Vit Cngs
Chu c District ie within the neighbouring Vit Cng Long t District. See also Annex O, f.41.
276
The Australian Official History notes the monsoon broke at 4.08 p.m, reducing visibility to 50
metres McNeill , I. To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.318. The effect of the heavy monsoonal rain was also
mentioned in the 1991 D445 History see Annex M p.9 ie: it was difficult for our infantry and artillery to
support one another. Rain began to come down in buckets. The 5th Division History (2005) related: there
was very heavy rain and the forward elements encountered difficulties. see Annex K, f.46. See also
Annex Q, f.15. The 1 ATF After Action Report included: Weather: The battle was fought in a heavy
monsoonal rain storm which reduced visibility to thirty metres or less during the late afternoon and early
evening. - 1st Australian Task Force Vietnam, Combat Operations After Action Report Operation
Smithfield, R723-1-5, December 1966, sub-par 9.e. The D Company/6RAR commander wrote: Visibility
was about 150 metres but fell to 100 metres when the heavy rain started about 1730hrs. Major H.A.
Smith, D Coy After Action Report: Operation Smithfield, Enclosure to the preceding 1 ATF After Action
Report. Second Lieutenant David Sabben a D/6RAR platoon commander at the Battle, later described the
mud mist and splash effect of the heavy monsoonal rain that created a red mist up to 50 cm high and
thick enough lower down to hide a person laying on the ground. The soldiers uniforms were also stained
red ((from the mud)) adding to the camouflage effect. The Battle of Long Tan (Powerpoint presentation),
The ANZAC Day Commemoration Committee of Queensland.
www.anzacday.org.au/history/vietnam/longtan.pps .
277
Translators Note: Artillery units in the 1 ATF base at Ni t comprised: the Australian 1st Field
Regiment RAA (105mm M2A1 howitzers maximum range 10,575 metres), the 161st Battery RNZA
(105mm), and A Battery of the US 2/35th Regiment (155mm M109 medium self-propelled guns
maximum range 14,600 metres). A total of 3,198 105mm and 242 155mm rounds were reportedly fired in
support of the Long Tn battle on 18 August 1966 McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351. In
December 2014, a Vietnamese on-line article noted that despite the heavy Australian artillery fire which
included naval gunfire support the casualties were limited because we had prepared carefully, and
when deploying to the battlefield every soldier had carried a shovel and on their shoulders they each were
bearing a bundle of about 10 branches (each as thick as a wrist and about a metre long) to make antishrapnel covers for their individual pits and shelters to protect against enemy artillery fire. Nguyn Vn
Bch, Trn Phc Kch Long Tn (The Ambush Battle at Long Tn), op.cit., 18 December 2014 see
the full translation at Annex Q.
278
Translators Note: Post-War, in June 1988, Nguyn Vn Kim stated: dead and wounded were
approximately 30, mainly from artillery fire. - McNeill, I., To Long Tn, op.cit., 1993, p.368. For a review

78
comrades to a forward aid post, it was shelled and he suffered a further wound and
died.279 Comrade Nguyn c Thu was seriously wounded (an enemy round passed
through his right ear and out through his jawbone) but luckily he avoided being
killed.280 After nearly a day and a night of staggering back, he reached near to t
where he fell unconscious. He was taken to the province hospital for treatment281, and it
took almost two months for him to recover from his wounds.282
In this first large battle with the Australian forces, 445 Battalion had inflicted
heavy casualties on the Royal Australian 6th Battalion.283 Their survivors were

of casualty claims for the Battle from a wide range of sources, see Annex F and Appendix 1 to Annex O
(including the list of 139/140 275th Regiment personnel named as KIA on 18-08-1966).
279
Translators Note: Trn Vn Chin (Su Chin) was appointed - from Executive Officer, to command
the 1st Company on 20 October 1965 - CDEC Log 09-1876-66. He was awarded a Certificate of
Commendation in March 1965 see footnote 152; and a Certificate of Commendation by the B Ra
Province Unit in mid-February 1966 - CDEC Log 04-1394-66, as an outstanding emulator of 1965CDEC Log 05-1294-66 (very unusual for such a high-ranking military cadre); and had been formally
promoted to Commander of the 1st Company on 15 February 1966 - CDEC Log 05-1294-66. Su Chins
death at Long Tn is noted in: Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s ng (The History of the Party in B
Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter V, footnote 34. For his death at Long Tn, see footnote 644.
280
Translators Note: Post-War, in an Australian television documentary, Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu)
spoke on the Long Tn battle and displayed his head wound - Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan
The True Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993 see also the biographical notes on Nguyn c Thu at Annex A.
281
Translators Note: Some Australian accounts relate that the NVA/VC forces withdrew to the My To
Mountains. However, following an interview on 18 March 1989 in Bin Ha with Vn Lin (Ba Lin)
the 445 Battalion political officer, Terry Burstall wrote that after the battle: Ba Liens part of the D445
went to the area of the Song Rai [sic] forest and moved around the area telling the people all about the big
battle in the rubber plantations. They did not go anywhere near the Nui May Taos [sic] Burstall, T., A
Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, p.117. After the battle, the 275th Regiment elements reportedly moved back
to the La Jungle base camp (ie the Rng L vicinity YT 7610 in Xun Lc District of Long Khnh
Province). The Regiment remained in camp for a week after which the entire Regiment minus the 1st
Battalion, moved to Bnh Thun Province in search of rice and returned to the L Jungle base camp in
early November 1966. NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting - CMIC No.2550, VCAT Item No.2310305007,
see Annex O, The 275th Regiment.
282
Translators Note: These casualties are also related in L Thanh Dng (et al), The History of the B RaLong Khnh Medical Services (1945-2006), op.cit., 2008.
283
Translators Note: For Vietnamese reports of Australian casualties see also Annex F, pp.15-18. As
noted, in his 53-page diary (to 7 October 1966 - recovered by Australian forces on 20 October 1966),
Nguyn Nam Hng (2ic of the 274th Regiment) related that: the 5th Regiment attacked at Ni t and
600 Australians were killed and 1 Australian Battalion was exterminated CDEC Log 11-1259-66.
The ng Nai History (1986) relates: As planned, on 19 August 445 Battalion ambushed (phc kch) the
Australian group at Vn Xoi. Their 3rd [sic] Battalion advanced with tank support from Ni t and fell
into our ambush. 275 and 445 manoeuvred to decisively strike the enemy. Our troops killed 500 Australians
and destroyed 21 tanks. - Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.132. A recent article
on the 5th Division Veterans Association website relates that: The 3rd Royal Australian Battalion came out
to break our blockade just as we had intended. The 5 th Regiment and 445 Battalion inflicted heavy
losses on the Australian battalion. - Major General Nguyn Hng Phc, Truyn thng chin u ca S
on BB5 Anh hng (The Combat History of the Heroic 5th Infantry Division), 12 May 2013. The Battle in
the Long Hip/B ic Plantation is not described in detail in the local Party History. However, it relates
that: D445s 4th Company shelled the Ni t base on 14 August; the 275th Regiment is not mentioned at
all - only D445; in the D445 ambush, 6RAR was wiped out with only about a platoon remaining; and
6RAR had to be helilifted to Vng Tu and 8RAR brought from Australia to replace it - Trn Vn Khnh
(et al/tg), Lch s ng (The History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter VII. A
major Vietnamese account of the War relates: On 18 August, the troops of the 5th Regiment of the 5th
Infantry Division led by Deputy Divisional Commander Trn Minh Tm set an ambush and attacked the
Royal Australian Battalion [sic] which was sweeping the Ni t-t area. After 30 minutes of
fighting, the 6th [sic] Battalion (of the 5th Regiment) supported by a company of the 445th Battalion (B
Ra Province Unit) destroyed a company of Australian soldiers. As a result, this Australian mercenary force

79
helicoptered back to their rear base at Vng Tu and after which they were taken back
to Australia, and the Royal Australian 8th Battalion replaced them.284* 445 Battalion was
awarded the Military Feats Medal 3rd Class ((Hun chng chin cng hng ba)) by
COSVN Headquarters.285 As a result of this battle, the Battalion was able to draw a lot of
experience286 in fighting the Australians we had to hang on to their belts287, counter
their on-call ((phn tuyn)) artillery fire, and create the conditions to mount counterassaults.288
We fought our battles with particular courage and resourcefulness, and the cadre
and soldiers of 445 Battalion came to haunt and panic the Royal Australian Forces.
Regarding the Battle of Long Tn at Ni t on 18 August 1966, J. Pimlott289 a former
Australian [sic] soldier who had fought on the Eastern Nam B battlefield, wrote the
following in a book290:
- renown for its experience in counter-guerrilla warfare, became panic-stricken and fled to t . Nguyn Vn Minh Colonel (ed), Lch s Khng chin , Tp 4 (Vol 4), op.cit., 1999.
284
* In March 1987, a group of Australian war veterans visited and worked with the Long t District
Peoples Committee. Comrade Nguyn Vn Kim a former commander of 445 Battalion, participated;
and former Lieutenant Colonel Zohhn [sic] a former commander of the Royal Australian 8th Battalion
confirmed these events. Translators Note: The 6th Battalion - ie 6RAR returned to Australia at the
conclusion of its planned 12-month tour-of-duty and was replaced by 2RAR in May-June 1967. 8RAR
served in Vietnam from November 1969 to October 1970 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel K.J.
ONeill. The identity of former Lieutenant Colonel Zohhn [sic] - mentioned above, is unknown.
285
Translators Note: This award by COSVN is also related in the earlier 1991 D445 History. Several 445
Battalion soldiers were awarded Letters of Appreciation (Giy Khen) for their exploits when fighting the
Australians on 18 Aug 66 at Long Tn including o Vn Trung section 2ic/2nd Company - CDEC Log
12-2368-66; Trn Vn Tranh section 2ic/2nd Company; Phm Vn ng - 2nd Company CDEC Log
01-1673-69, see Annex F pp.22-23. Soldiers of the 275th Regiment also received medals, letters of
appreciation and commendation certificates for their actions in the battle at Long Tn see Annex O.
286
Translators Note: 1 ATF also summarised its experience of engagements with 445 Battalion: Enemy
Local Force VC: Our experience continues to be that as a rule these will only stand and fight if they think
they have the friendly force outnumbered, or if they consider they are sure of victory. Main Force VC. Our
sole experience with Main Force, gained in the contact near Long Tanh [sic] on 18 Aug 66, was that they
are the complete opposite and will attack very aggressively when they make contact. On this occasion, they
made a series of mass attacks, reminiscent of the Chicom Force in Korea, in spite of heavy artillery and
automatic fire being directed at them. This contributed to their failure and to the large number of casualties
they suffered. Their aggressive but somewhat foolhardy tactics are attributed, at least in part, to the
indoctrination they received about their superiority over the enemy and the certainty of victory. HQ 1
ATF, 1 ATF Vietnam: Lessons Learnt, Ni t, 10 September 1966. (AWM95, 1/4/12 Part 2).
287
Translators Note: For this tactic, see footnote 222. In response to a query on 10 November 1987 by
Australian author T. Burstall to the 5th VC Division staff officer present at the Battle of Long Tn - Nguyn
Thanh Hng, on why the VC forces engaged D/6RAR within the range of 1 ATFs artillery, Hng
responded: We thought that we could grab their belts and it would be over in a couple of hours. He
said that at that time their policy was not to let a confrontation develop any longer than two hours.
Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, p.100.
288
Translators Note: 1 ATF reported on 21 August that: The 275 VC Regt, 605 Bn 250 Regt and C860 Bn
((ie D445)) withdrew east and north-east following the 18 Aug operations against 6RAR. 1 ATF, OPS204:
Annex (Intelligence) to Frag Order 1-8-66 to Op TOLEDO, Ni t, 211800H Aug 66. II FFVs Operation
Toledo attempted unsuccessfully to trap remnants of the 275 th Regiment following the Battle II FFV,
Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966, 15 November 1966. For detail on the II
Field Force Vietnam Operation Toledo, see also the 274 th Regiment study at Annex N, footnote 26.
289
Translators Note: Dr John L. Pimlott (1948-1997) was an English civilian academic who served at the
British Armys Sandhurst Military Academy from 1973. The head of the Academys War Studies
Department from 1994, he was a prolific author on military matters. He was killed by an exploding war
souvenir at his home on 24 October 1997. Dr Pimlotts obituary makes no mention of him ever having
served in the military, and he is not known to have ever visited Vietnam.
290
Translators Note: This 2004 D445 History does not cite the title of Pimlotts book. However, Pimlott
covers the Battle of Long Tn in detail in: Pimlott, J., Vietnam: The Decisive Battles, Michael Joseph,

80
Early on 17 August, the Viet Cong fired mortars and recoilless rifles into the
base killing a number of soldiers and wounding 13.291 Suspecting that the enemys
shelling was preparatory to a large attack, General Jackson ordered B Company of 6RAR
to sweep the area to the east of the base but they found no trace of the Viet Cong and
were ordered to return again on 18 August. To that time, the Australian forces still did
not know that there were seven battalions of Viet Cong (more that 4,000 troops)
advancing towards Ni t and had tightly surrounded an area of the Long Tn
plantation. D Company of 6RAR - led by Major Henry [sic] Smith and comprising108
troops divided into three platoons: 10, 11, and 12; was given the mission to continue the
sweeping operation in the Long Tn area and fell into the Viet Congs killing zone.292
Although suffering casualties 293 from the Australian artillery fire support 294, the Viet
Cong remained determined to wipe out the Australian troops and so deployed 445
Battalion to move around to the west to tightly close the encirclement and fire into the
defeated Australian remnants.
In summarising the defeat of the Australian military in the Battle of Long Tn on
18 August 1966, J. Pimlott wrote:
Ni t became an arc-shaped grave mound a tomb for the Australian Task
Forces belligerent war in Vietnam. 17 soldiers of the Australian Task Force from D
Companys 11 Platoon led by Lieutenant G. Sharp had been killed in the first clash, and
lay in an arc as in an exercise on a piece of ground about the size of three soccer fields
that had been devastated for a day and a night by bombs and artillery now desolate and
quiet
Although there are differences in points of view and estimates on the correlation
of force numbers295, those who were directly involved in the fighting have affirmed one
fact: The Australian forces suffered a big defeat at Long Tn.296
London, 1990, pp.60-71; and Chartwell Books, Edison, 2003. There is no mention of Australian military
forces or the Battle of Long Tn in: Pimlott, J., Vietnam: The History and the Tactics, Orbis, London, 1982.
291
Translators Note: See footnote 269 24 Australian personnel were wounded in the shelling attack.
292
Translators Note: The 5th Division History (2005) - see Annex K, p.9, p.10, f.42, indicates that the 275th
Regiment elements were caught off-guard by the Australian advance because Trn Minh Tm (Nm Tm)
who was directly commanding the battle, had directed the observation element to temporarily withdraw
We had committed an error in our observation of the enemy, and in arranging our formations to start to
attack from a far distance because of this, we were unable to surround and destroy the enemy battalion.
293
Translators Note: For detail and a review of casualties including POWs, see Annex F. Only one
member of 445 Battalion was captured at the Battle of Long Tn L Vn Trung (reportedly a 57mm RCL
gunner); and two members of the 275th Regiment were captured (Nguyn Vn Thanh and Nguyn Vn
Huy) who declared themselves as members of on 45 (then the principal cover designator for the
275th Regiment). Later on 19 August, 1 ATF reported that the two Northern POW were members of
NVA 45 Regiment while the other was a member of D445 Battalion Local Provincial Mobile ((Unit)). The
North Vietnamese prisoners revealed that 45 Regiment formally [sic] 23 Regiment (possibly means 33
Regiment) moved into Phuoc Tuy Province in May this year and is allied to 66 Regiment. Captured
documents revealed that D3 Battalion, D605 Battalion, and C14/D3/Q5 Regiment were in contact with
elements of 6RAR on 18 August 1 ATF INTSUM No.79, Ni t, 19 August 1966. Translators Note
(continues): Some published Australian accounts have misinterpreted the foregoing to indicate that
elements of a North Vietnamese formation or unit titled 45 ie separate to the 275th VC Regiment, was
involved at Long Tn. The foregoing designators: on 45 and 45 Regiment both relate to the 275th
Regiment of the 5th VC Division and D605 and D3 were the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment. For
an outline history of the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment (ie formerly D605 Battalion) see footnote 274;
and also Annex O for detail on the 275th Regiment (including a very brief account of the Long Tn battle by
the NVA POW Captain Trn Vn Ting).
294
Translators Note: See footnote 277 for Australian, New Zealand, and US artillery support.
295
Translators Note: The account of the Battle on the website of the Australian Department of Veterans
Affairs notes that: Captured documents and information from prisoners suggested that D Company had
faced some 2,500 Viet Cong. http://vietnam-war.commemoration.gov.au/combat/battle-of-long-tan.php .

81
In September 1966, the Americans deployed their 11th Armored Cavalry Task
Force [sic]297 with hundreds of tanks and armoured vehicles, to a base at Sui Rm, to
The official Australian history similarly relates: The total enemy strength, if just one North Vietnamese
battalion was involved, was therefore approximately 2500 men. An estimated 1,000 from this force had
directly engaged D company. McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351. However, the account in that
Official History also refers to 1 ATFs assessment of : 275 Main Force Regiment of three battalions
reinforced by at least one battalion from the North Vietnamese Army together with D445 Battalion. p.351. As related earlier, at the Battle, the 275th Regiment comprised three battalions ie with the former
D605 NVA Battalion having been incorporated as the 275th Regiments 3rd Battalion a few months
earlier. Lieutenant Colonel H.A. Smith SG, MC (Retd) has written: Headquarters tallied the reports of 245
VC bodies. We found three wounded, one VC and two from the North Vietnamese battalion reinforcing two
battalions of 275 VC Main Force Regiment. These plus D445 and D400 [sic] made around 3,000 enemy
troops. - Smith, H., No Time for Fear, Wartime Issue 35, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 2006.
Lieutenant Colonel Smith also earlier contended that D440, D445, and 860 Battalion were elements
of the enemy force at the Battle. - Grandin, R., The Battle of Long Tan , op.cit., 2004, p.85. The D440
error - and an NVA 806 [sic] Battalion, appear in the Harry Smith (Australian Soldier) item in
Wikipedia. See also: Smith H.A., Long Tan: the start of a lifelong struggle, op.cit., 2015, p.126, p.169,
p.170 and p.173. A contemporary US account reported that: two reinforced Viet Cong battalions attempted
to overrun an Australian company. USMACV, Summary of Major Developments, 3d Quarter 1966,
Saigon, October 1966. VCAT Item No.168300010718. The US Presidential Citation awarded to D
Company/6RAR states that the Company was: surrounded and attacked on all sides by an estimated
reinforced enemy battalion using automatic weapons, small arms, and mortars. - Johnson, L.B. President,
The Presidential Unit Citation (Army) for Extraordinary Heroism, The White House - Washington, 28 May
1968. For discussion of D445s strength at the Battle see footnotes 231, 261 and 266: ie the Australian
Official History assessment of 550, and the units probable strength of about 380. For a summary of
NVA/VC forces involved in the Battle, see also Annex L: The Battle of Long Tn 18/8/66 - NVA/VC
Revisited; and also Annex D: The Probable Organisation of D445 Battalion Mid-1966.
296
Translators Note: This 2004 D445 account of the Battle of Long Tn is not as detailed as that of the
1991 D445 History - nor that in the 5th Division History (2005). Extracts from those two histories on the
Battle have been included at Annexes M (D445 - 1991) and K (5th VC Division - 2005) respectively.
Neither the Long t District History (1986) nor the main text of the t District History (2006) make
any reference to the Battle of Long Tn that was fought just within the northern boundary of the VCs Long
t District. However, in the 2006 t District Historys annex on Long Tn village, the Battle is
mentioned: On 18 August 1966, Regional troops (of the 5 th Division) coordinated with Province forces and
Long Tn village guerrillas to conduct an ambush on the Australian military at Long Tn, wiping out an
Australian platoon and wounding hundreds of the enemy. This battle was a very great victory that created a
stir in the Australian Parliament and among the Australian people. The passages quoted in this 2004 D445
History as translations of writings by Dr J. Pimlott, do not appear in his books on the Vietnam War cited at
footnote 290. Rather, in his 1990 and 2003 books, Dr Pimlott concludes: Altogether the ATF lost 17 dead
at Long Tn, VC casualties were heavy: 245 bodies were found and buried, with evidence of many more
having been dragged away. The battle of Long Tan gave the initiative to the Australians in Phuoc Tuy.
They did not waste it, forcing the VC 5th Division back into the May Tao hills and gradually extending
control over the entire province. - Pimlott, J., Vietnam: The Decisive Battles, op.cit., 1990, p.71. For a
detailed review of casualties at the Battle, see Annex F. Some post-War discussion of the Battle including
casualty numbers, is included in blog postings on a Vietnamese military website: Dng nc - Gi nc
(Build the Nation, Maintain the Nation). Almost all postings are skeptical of Australian accounts of the
Battle see: http://www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php/topic,2976.10.html .
297
Translators Note: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11 ACR) arrived in Vietnam in September
1966 ie after the Battle of Long Tn. Beginning on 20 October 1966, the Regiment established its
Blackhorse base in the Sui Rm/Long Giao area on the western side of Route 2 (YS 435969)
approximately six kilometres south of Xun Lc Town in southern Long Khnh Province. The 11 ACR
base was about 30 kilometres north of the 1 ATF base at Ni t. For detail on 11 ACRs deployment in
1966, see Annex N: The 274th Regiment - Not at the Battle of Long Tn. The 11th Armored Cavalry
Regiments combat power comprised: three armoured cavalry squadrons and an air cavalry troop. Each
squadron comprised three cavalry troops, a tank company and a self-propelled (SP) 155m howitzer battery.

82
participate in their second Dry Season strategic counter-attack. This Task Force routinely
joined with Australian and puppet forces in sweeping operations into our liberated zones
and bases in the Chu c region and areas east and west of Route 2.
The Province Committee promulgated a Resolution: Focus on the Key Areas, to
counter the schemes by the Americans and their puppets to gather the people and reestablish strategic hamlets. The tasks of the Provinces armed forces were to stick close to
and attack the enemy in order to destroy their tight control, and to support the
revolutionary movements in the less developed local regions (opposing enemy sweeps,
killing oppressors, and breaking their grip).
Throughout the Wet Season ((to November 1966)), the Battalion was unable to
organise any large battle (battalion-level) operations as we had to continuously counter
sweeping operations , and the situation was very strained and tense. Our troop numbers
had declined298 and, while our morale was still good, our combat capabilities were
uneven. At the end of the Wet Season ((November 1966)), the Battalion Headquarters
decided to strike a painful blow against the puppet forces deep within their area of
control. The site selected was the n Sp post299 ((Phc Hi)) that obstructed our
movement routes from Lc An300 in the t area to our Minh m base. This was our
first attack on a Regional Forces301 post, so the Province Unit paid close attention, and
cadre came to provide direct leadership.302

Its principal equipments were: 51 M48A3 Patton medium tanks/M551 Sheridan light tanks, 296 M113
APCs and 18 M109 155 SP howitzers. - Chesney, E.J. Major, The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in
Vietnam January 1969 through June 1970, Fort Leavenworth, 2002.
298
Translators Note: A captured document showed 445 Battalions strength in November 1966 as 409
comprising: Headquarters and 1st Company 110, 2nd Company 42, 3rd Company - 41, 4th Company - 75,
th
5 Company - 81 (CDEC 05-1754-67). The official Australian history shows the Battalions strength as 350
in November 1966 - McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.48 and p.501 (endnote 56).
299
Translators Note: The n Sp post at YS 515536 on the northern edge of Phc Hi village, was
occupied by elements of the 612th Regional Forces Company. A photograph of the post is at p.57.
300
Translators Note: Lc An is not in the t area, but is located on the coast about five kilometres
north-east of Phc Hi village - see footnote 98.
301
Translators Note: The Vietnamese text uses the term Bo An ie the term for the Civil Guard/Civil
Defence Force (under the Ministry of Defence from December 1960 and which became the Regional Forces
in 1964). However, communist writings continued to call both the Civil Guard/Civil Defence Force and the
successor Regional Forces Bo An. At the end of 1966, there were 17 Regional Force (RF - a
Phng Qun) companies and 46 Popular Force (PF Ngha Qun) platoons in Phc Tuy Province
(totaling 4,500 troops) together with an understrength ARVN battalion (1/43/10 th Division ie later
retitled 18th Division) McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.403. The locations of all ARVN
including RF and PF elements, in Phc Tuy Province as at mid-June 1966 are recorded in the 1 ATF
document: OPS 633 ARVN, RF and PF Dispositions in Phc Tuy Sector (see file: AWM95, 1/4/3) and
as at 30 November 1966 in 1 ATF, R92-1-2, Ni t, 31 December 1966 (see file: AWM95, 1/4/20, folio
40) - both files are Internet accessible.
302
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History relates that Comrade t ng the Province Unit
Commander, and many of the Province cadre staff specifically came down to the Battalion to provide
guidance. ng Hu Thun was also known as t ng, V ng, ng, and Thim. He had infiltrated
into the South in 1961, and in 1965-1966 he served at Military Region 1/T.1 (Eastern Nam B Military
Staff) as the Chief of Operations and Training with the grade of regimental executive officer CDEC
Bulletin 257, Log 03-1253-66. Thun was transferred from T.1 to B Ra on 30 June 1966 CDEC Log 122459-66. ng Hu Thun (t ng) is noted in the 5th Division History (2005) as the commander of the
B Ra Province Unit. According to that History: on 10 August 1966, the Combined Battle Headquarters
comprising Trn Minh Tm and Comrade ng Hu Thun (Commander of the B Ra Unit) met to
determine the fighting tactics to destroy an Australian battalion in the Long Tn region. t ng is also
later described in the 1991 D445 History at p.67, pp.75-76 as the commander of the B Ra Province Unit
apparently replacing Nguyn Vn Mi/Nguyn Vit Hoa (Mi Th) in late June 1966 see CDEC Log
12-2459-66. He was the chief of staff of Military Region 7 in January 1969 VCAT Item No.2310510003.

83
The post was built on a small hill of white sand, with strong defences including
many bunkers with firing loop-holes, communications trenches, minefields, and barbed
wire fences up to 15 metres deep. To guarantee our success, the Battalion constructed a
sand model of the battleground, carefully rehearsed our combat plans in the Sui Rao
base, and tested our 57mm RCLs on targets. The attack was allocated to the 2nd Company
(the premier company) and a reconnaissance section of seven who were strengthened
with a 57mm RCL all under the command of Nguyn c Th [sic]303, the Battalion
second-in-command (who had just recovered from his wound and returned from the
hospital). The attack was launched exactly in accordance with the plan. At midnight on 20
November 1966, two groups from the 2nd Company guided by the reconnaissance element
moved to a concealed position close to the the perimeter fences of the n Sp post.
After firing many 57mm RCL rounds at the principal targets in the post, the
reconnaissance element led by Comrade Nguyn Vn B moved swiftly to a position
beside the mother bunker and used handgrenades to completely wipe out the enemy
manning the bunker and the loop-holes. This created the opportunity for our infantry to
assault and take control, and in only a few minutes of combat we had complete mastery of
the post. However, as we had erred by not pursuing and completely wiping them out, the
situation arose where two surviving enemy soldiers retreated into a corner of their
defensive trenches and hurled grenades at our troops while they were gathering war booty
and 12 were wounded. These losses were very regrettable.304
From that battle, the Battalion gained experience in attacking posts and strongpoints. Our employment of fire support had further repercussions with a strong negative
impact on the morale and spirit of the puppet troops around the region. Moreover, we had
been able to destroy the encirclement and isolation of our Minh m base, and to support
the local revolutionary movement in Long t District.
From the end of 1966305 to the beginning of 1967, American aircraft continuously
spread poisonous chemicals on our base areas in Long t, Xuyn Mc306 and Chu c

303

Translators Note: As note earlier, Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu) had been wounded at the Battle of Long
Tn see his biography, including a late 2014 photograph, at Annex A.
304
Translators Note: The account of the attack in the 1991 D445 History is more detailed. A captured
document shows that 445 Battalions 2nd Company lost four personnel killed on 20 November 1966 - ie the
date of the attack on the n Sp camp at Phc Hi. - CDEC Log 05-1754-67. At 0650hrs on 21
November, ARVN Phc Tuy Sector advised 1 ATF that VC elements had launched a small arms attack at
Phc Hi. At 1035hrs, Sector reported 15 KIA and 12 WIA (presumably RF), but APC-borne assistance
from 1 ATF was not required 1 ATF Operations Log, Sheets 66 and 68, 21 November 1966 (file:
AWM95, 1/4/19).
305
Translators Note: A major incident on the eastern outskirts of B Ra Town in December 1966 is not
mentioned in the 445 Battalion Histories (1991 nor 2004) ie on 9 December 1966, 180 ARVN recruits
were captured at the Vn Kip National Training Centres firing range. The VC subsequently released 62
elderly and sick ARVN POWs on 9 January 1967 see the report by the Phc Tuy Sector S-2 on 5 Feb 67
VCAT Item No.F03460044108. See also the S-2 debriefing report of POWs at VCAT Item
No.F034600441082 and 1 ATF, INTSUM No.192, Ni t, 10 December 1966 (ie: ARVN casualties: 11
KIA, 26 WIA, 184 MIA; VC: 2 KIA). VC possibly 265 Bn/274 Regiment or D445 Provincial Battalion.
According to the 5th Division History (2005), this attack on Vn Kip was conducted by the 2nd Battalion of
the 274th Regiment and the Chu c Company on 18 November 1966 resulting in 187 ARVN
captured and 71 weapons of various types seized. The 274th Regiment reportedly organised an education
program for the prisoners and chose 80 of the soldiers who had volunteered to join the revolutionary forces.
40 were incorporated into the B Ra local forces and 40 into the units of the 4th Regiment (ie the 274th
Regiment). See also further detail in the 5th Division History (2005) at Annex K. The incident is also related
in the Chu c District History (2004), and in Major General (Retd) Nguyn Nam Hngs 2006 memoir:
Nguyn Nam Hng Major General, A Life at War, op.cit., 2006. As at 31 December 1966, the strength of
US and Free World Military Assistance (FWMAF) Forces in Vietnam was 441,190 including: 388,568

84
Districts with the aim of completely destroying our bases and wearing down our forces.
The jungle was stripped of leaves, and water sources in the base areas were poisoned
giving rise to kidney and stomach ailments with some personnel dying from heavy
exposure.307
The 445 Battalion base was discovered by the enemy and shelled with chemical
rounds308. 445 Battalions 2nd Company suffered the heaviest casualties with 42
comrades poisoned and 11 who died.309 The medical personnel of both the Battalion and
the Province Unit strove day and night to treat and save our remaining troops.
After this painful event310, the Battalion Headquarters concentrated more strongly
on Party and political work including strengthening our organisational structure311,
US troops; 4,533 Australian; 30 Republic of China; 45,605 Republic of Korea; 155 New Zealand; 2,063
Philippines; 12 Spain; 224 Thailand. The FWMAF totalled 52,622. See VCAT Item No.13370149004.
306
Translators Note: For mutual self-limitation ie accommodation between communist and
government forces in Xuyn Mc District see: Race, J., "Mutual Self-limitation in Civil War, Southeast
Asia, II : 2, Spring 1973, pp. 211-230. VCAT Item No.2131902016. Jeffrey Race served with a US
advisory team in Xuyn Mc from late 1966 to early 1967. For accommodations/local dtente, see also
footnotes 111, 410, and 448.
307
Translators Note: At about this time 445 Battalions strength was approximately 415. A captured
finance report for D/445 listed the strength of the Battalions companies in December 1966 as follows: 1 st
Company: 104 personnel; 2nd Company: 88; 3rd Company: 38; 4th Company: 73; and 5th Company: 91 =
Total 394 (ie not including a discrete figure for Battalion Headquarters and some support elements - which
may have been included in the 5th Company figure). - CDEC Log 05-1724-67.
308
Translators Note: A directive from the B Ra Province Unit - signed by Deputy Chief of Staff Nguyn
Kim Tro on 9 May 1966, warned of the US use of poisonous products on the battlefield (reportedly
employed on 11 April 1966 against elements of the 274 th VC Regiment). The directive was not to be
disseminated to village militia and guerrillas fighters lest they be confused, but included advice on
protective measures. - CDEC Log 12-1826-66. Subsequently in October 1966, a circular advised personnel
in Chu c District of preventative measures and first-aid against CH and BZ chemicals CDEC Log 102443-66. Rudimentary masks were available to VC local force and guerrilla units. In September 1966,
1,000 gas masks were landed at H Trm on the Phc Tuy coast to supply the 274th VC Regiment. See the
recovered notebook of Nguyn Nam Hng the 274th Regiment 2ic at VCAT Item No.F034600560223.
309
Translators Note: These incidents including a ground attack by US and Australian forces, are related
in greater detail in the 1991 D445 History which also notes that a B-52 strike hit the Battalions base area
soon afterwards; and that Nguyn Vn Quang was awarded the title of Hero of the Peoples Armed
Forces for reportedly destroying a US tank and other achievements. The 1991 D445 History relates that:
Comrade Ba Lin (( Vn Lin /Chng)) the Battalion political officer, wept his heart out at the
enemys extremely wicked act. According to the t History (2006): In March 1967, American
warships fired chemical shells into the Sui Rao base. 42 members of the 2nd Company of 445 Battalion
were poisoned, and 11 died. The local Party History similarly relates that: In March 1967, a US warship
fired chemical shells into the Sui Rao base poisoning 42 members of the 2nd Company of D445. - Trn
Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s ng b tnh B Ra-Vng Tu (1930 - 1975) (The History of the B RaVng Tu Party Chapter), Chapter VII, 2000.
310
Translators Note: The date of this event is unclear it may have occurred in February 1967 and be
associated with the fighting against 1 ATFs 6RAR (Operation Bribie, 17-18 February) east of Hi M and
probably at L Gm on 17-18 February 1967. A 1 ATF report noted that - supporting an ARVN operation,
6RAR elements had assaulted a VC position following an airlanding at YS 542572 on 17 February 1967
and reportedly killed 35-50 VC, later identified as D445 Battalion personnel. 1 ATF Troops Information
Sheet No.44, Ni t, 15-21 May 1967. In Operation Bribie, 6RAR suffered seven killed and 27 wounded
and among the six VC bodies recovered on the battlefield were reportedly the officer commanding
D445s 3rd Company and his 2ic. In January 1968, 1 ATF reported that 445 Battalion had not operated as
a battalion since February 1967. - Discussion Point: The Enemy In and Around Phuoc Tuy, Troops
Information Sheet No.77, Ni t, 31 December 1967 - 6 January 1968, Section 3, p.4.
311
Translators Note: Within the unit - additional to the Party Chapter system, solidarity, cohesion and
control were assisted by the communist system of three-man cells within sections and self-criticism (kim
tho). The cells were intended as harmonious three-man cooperatives that fought, ate and quartered
together. For the influence of the cell system, see footnote 506. Political officers also exhorted their troops
on the basis of several codes including: Code of Discipline (12 points), Oath of Honour (12), Three

85
commending comrades who had performed well, and improving material living
conditions. The Battalion also initiated a series of activities312 entitled Remember and
Respond in order to change the deep grief into revolutionary action. As a result, after a
short time, the impetus, resolve, and the will to fight of the Battalions cadre and soldiers
was restored and maintained. Many of our wounded and disabled soldiers in the rear areas
although not yet fully recovered and along with our comrades in the Battalions
production units313, all enthusiastically rushed to return to the unit in order to directly
participate in the fighting.314
At the beginning of 1967315, the Australians sought all means to pacify the Long
t area. Their main focus in Phc Tuy was building a 11 kilometre-long concertina
barbed-wire fence from Da Quy Mountain ((The Horseshoe)) to Phc Hi with the aim
of cutting our commo-liaison routes between Province and the Districts, and isolating the
Minh m base our foothold and the location from which the revolutionary forces of
Long t District and Vng Tu City launched their attacks. This fence was destroyed for
Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points of Attention, Rule of Secrecy (15). See also: Combined
Intelligence Centre Vietnam US MACV, VC/NVA Political and Ideological Training, Study ST 67-054,
18 May 1967. VCAT Item No.F01590024072. In mid-1966, the Liberation Armed Forces promulgated a
system of Revolutionary Military Councils to be managed by Party Chapters at company-level in order to
democratise decision-making CDEC Log 09-1749-66. See also footnotes 256, 635 and The Party at
Annex G.
312
Translators Note: Neither the 1991 D445 Battalion History nor this 2004 D445 Battalion History
mentions the Battalions reported major attack on the Regional Forces outpost near Phc Hi village on 17
February 1967 nor the subsequent heavy fighting against Australian elements noted in the preceding
footnotes (ie 6RAR - Operation Bribie) that ensued east of Hi M and L Gm. As noted, 6RAR suffered
six killed and 27 wounded in Operation Bribie, while the official estimate of Vit Cng killed was
between 50 and 70 - see McNeill, I & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, pp.90-115. According to Nguyn
Thanh Hng a 5th VC Division operations staff officer interviewed in November 1987 (see footnotes 262
and 274), the initial attack at Phc Hi in February 1967 was undertaken by 445 Battalion, but he
recounted that 5th Division elements lured Australian troops into the prepared VC defensive positions east
of Hi M. Hng stated that from his recollections, the 275th Regiment was the 5th Division formation
involved Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, pp.110-111. The 5th Division History (2005) does
not mention any 5th Division participation in the engagements, nor was it mentioned in the comprehensive
POW debrief of the 3/275th Regiment political cadre, NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting see Annex O.
However, the 2nd Battalion of the 275th Regiment attacked the Popular Force outpost at L Gm several
weeks later on 20/21 March 1967 McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., pp.146-148. ,
ONeill, R.J., Vietnam Task, op.cit., 1968, pp.236-239 and VCAT Item No.F034600701813. Accordingly,
it is most probable that 445 Battalion attacked the Phc Hi RF post on 17 February and the 2nd Battalion
of the 275th Regiment attacked L Gm on 20/21 March with Nguyn Thanh Hng conflating aspects of
these engagements which were close both in time and physical location, when he was interviewed 20
years later. Nguyn Thanh Hng served as the commander of the 5th Division in Cambodia in 1979-1980.
313
Translators Note: For an April 1967 review of 445 Battalions morale, base camps in the Xuyn Mc
area, and the resupply system including a sketch map, see the debrief of Nguyn Vn Hach (G.4544
Province Ordnance Company). CDEC Log 9-0038-67, VCAT Item No.F034600701360.
314
Translators Note: Below the level of 445 Battalion and the local district companies, the Vit Cng
irregulars in Phc Tuy Province included village guerrillas, self-defense forces, and secret selfdefense forces. In early December 1966, the United States Sector S-2 (Intelligence) advisor in B Ra
Town estimated the strengths of these elements within the Province respectively as: guerrillas 467; selfdefense forces 245; secret self-defense forces 207; Total 917. The ARVN estimates were respectively
420; 1,445; 410: Total 2,275. The MACV Order-of-Battle estimates were 405; 575; 410: Total 1,390. See
- Estimate of Vit Cng Irregular Forces Strength in SVN, VCAT Item No.0240612012, 24 March 1967.
The US Central Intelligence Agency and MACV disagreed significantly on irregular forces strength
estimates until late1967 see footnotes 39, 244 and 315. See also Annex C, pp.6-7.
315
Translators Note: In January 1967, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessed communist
strength in Phc Tuy Province as: Main/Local Force: 3,800 (5th VC Division, 275 Regt); Guerrillas
1,390 Total 5,190. Central Intelligence Agency, Confirmed NVA/VC Order of Battle, 3 January 1967
VCAT Item No. F029200031071.

86
the first time by the Long t militia in May 1967 before the enemy had time to emplace
mines. Immediately thereafter, the Australians strengthened the fence with steel posts and
M16-E3 mines. The new 11-kilometre fence was completed in July 1967 and was from
50 to 100 metres wide, complex, and very difficult to destroy.316 Our forces in Long t
had to suffer the loss of dozens of comrades before they found a way to dismantle the
mined fence called the Fence of Death. A combat engineer from the local Long t
troops Nguyn Hng Mnh, was the first to find out the way that the Australians had
booby-trapped the M16-E3 mine, and the experience was widely shared. By December
1967, the Australian minefield and fence was ineffective.317
In the 1967 Wet Season ((April-May to November)), COSVN Headquarters
directed the 5th Infantry Division to deploy the 4th ((274th)) Regiment for combat on the
B Ra Vng Tu battlefield (Routes 2 and 15) and to coordinate with the local armed
forces to attack the enemy. At this time, after its combat losses, 445 Battalion had
concentrated and restructured its organisation, and trained its soldiers in the use of a range
of new weapons that had been provided from North Vietnam.
The Battalion paid immediate attention to reorganising and preparing all facets to
participate in a general attack. As reinforcements, 445 Battalion continued to receive a
number of recruits from the North318 while, at the same time, the Province Committee
withdrew personnel from a number of their organisations to provide additional forces for
445 Battalion. At this time, there were a number of changes in the Battalion
Headquarters. Comrade V Quc Chanh (T Chanh) was killed319, and we lacked a
316

Translators Note: In the 1991 D445 History, there was no mention of the 11 kilometre-long fence and
minefield until 1969. The Australian forces began constructing the 11 kilometre-long minefield and
associated fences in mid-March 1967 from The Horseshoe (ie Da Quy on the northern edge of t
Town see footnote 238) south to the coast at Phc Hi, with mines added in May. The Australian forces
laid 20,292 M16 Jumping Jack mines (lethal radius: 25 metres, dangerous out to 200 metres) of which
12,700 (about 25%) were fitted with an anti-lifting device below the mine. The anti-lifting device an M5
pressure release switch, was screwed into an M26 fragmentation grenade. There was a 4-5 kilometre gap in
the minefield - from the southern outskirts of t south to Hi M, due to the inability to lay mines
effectively in the wet and sandy soil in the area of the Sng B ap/B p Stream; and a smaller gap
immediately east of the hamlet of L Gm. For a detailed account of the minefield see: Lockhart, G., The
Minefield: An Australian tragedy in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2007. The minefield is also
comprehensively covered in the Australian Official History ie McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive,
Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2003, pp.127-145, p.155, p.169 and pp.183-184. The minefield is reported
extensively in the Long t District History (1986), and the t District History (2006). According to
the ng Nai History (1986): On 1 May 1967, COSVN ordered the Long t District Unit under L
Thnh Ba to destroy the initial minefield and fence and this was successful as no anti-lifting devices had
been attached to the mines. The Australians then rebuilt the minefield. - Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai
30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, pp.137-139.
317
Translators Note: According to the official Australian military history: the minefield proved
effective for less than six months The fence became a hazard and a burden to the task force as the
enemy lifted the mines and redeployed them. By early 1968 the minefield was considered no longer
effective and had become a liability. By 1969, mine casualties became a serious concern in the task
force, and a highly-charged political issue in Australia - McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit.,
2003, pp.183-184.
318
Translators Note: On the increasing number of NVA in the South, in September 1968, the US CIA
assessed: 46 of the 58 known enemy regiments are completely North Vietnamese, and nine of the 12 Viet
Cong regiments are believed to be 50% North Vietnamese. CIA, Research Memorandum: Increasing Role
of North Vietnamese in Viet Cong Units, 17 September 1968. VCAT Item No.F029200060548. For the
dispute between USMACV and the CIA on NVA/VC strength figures see footnotes 39 and 244.
319
Translators Note: The death of V Quc Chanh (T Chanh) as V Vn Khai (T Chanh) b.1935, is
noted at page 301 (Serial 175) in the 2004 D445 Historys annexed Martyrs List as occurring in
September 1967. According to the Australian author, Terry Burstall based on interviews in Vietnam in
1987 and 1989: The second ((D445)) battalion commander was Tu Chanh, who was ambushed by the
Australians and killed by a mine (most likely a claymore) during an engagement in 1967. It is possible that

87
Battalion Commander (Comrade Nguyn Vn Kim 320 was appointed Battalion
Commander). Comrade Nguyn Minh Ninh (Nm Ninh)321 was the Political Officer and
concurrently the Secretary of the Battalions Party Committee; Nguyn Minh Khanh (Hai
Khanh) was the Deputy Political Officer322; and Comrade Nguyn c Thu (Sau Thu)323
and Comrade L Minh Kin (Ba Kin)324 were the Battalion seconds-in-command. The
Battalion still had four companies325* and five Party chapters326. Additionally, the
Battalion passed a number of core cadre to a battalion ((D440)) of Northern recruits that

V Quc Chanh may have been killed in a contact with Australian troops on 13 September 1967 at YS
506826 during which a .45 calibre pistol was recovered. 1ATF, INTSUM No.256-67, Ni t, 13
September 1967. See V Quc Chanhs outline biography at Annex A.
320
Translators Note: As with the 1991 D445 History, this is the first mention of Nguyn Vn Kim (Nm
Kim) in this 2004 D445 History. Kim had been the commander of the Chu c District Unit since early
1966 he signed a document as the Commander of the Chu c District Unit on 28 January 1968 (CDEC
Log 01-1333-69), two days before 445 Battalions attack on B Ra Town at Tt Mu Thn in 1968. As
noted earlier, a number of published Australian works incorrectly cite Nguyn Vn Kim as the D445
Battalion commander at the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966 including the Australian Official
History which describes Nguyn Vn Kim as the most important witness among the former enemy on
the Battle - McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit, 1993, p. 365. However, Dr Ian McNeill did note that: There
were some ambiguities about the precise nature of Kiems command of D445 Battalion, though, and his
actual role in the battle at Long Tan. - Ekins, A., Unravelling , op.cit., July 2011. Subsequently, a
captured VC document has revealed that Nguyn Vn Kim signed a Directive on 19 August 1966 the
day after the Battle of Long Tn, as the Chu c District Unit Commander CDEC 10-2284-66, copied at
Annex A. Kim also appeared in a DVD/video as the purported former on-site D445 Commander at Long
Tn describing the battle in detail - see Horsefield, B., Long Tan The True Story, op.cit., 1993. For
biographical detail on Nguyn Vn Kim and discussion of his career, see Annex A Key Cadre.
321
Translators Note: Nguyn Minh Ninh (Nm Ninh) was probably not the Battalion Political Officer at
this time. Other reports indicated that Vn Lin was still 445 Battalions Political Officer in February
1968 and led the VC attack on Long in see footnote 354, and earlier footnotes 175, 246, 248, and 261.
322
Translators Note: Nguyn Minh Khanh had been formally promoted to Political Officer status from
Assistant Political Officer on 20 October 1965 see Military Region T.1, Directive 602/TB, CDEC Log 091876-66. Note however that the date on that document was incorrectly written as 20 October 1966, instead
of 1965. See CDEC Bulletin No.1064, 21 September 1966.
323
Translators Note: Nguyn c Thu had been formally promoted to Executive Officer status from
platoon commander on 20 October 1965 see Military Region T.1, Directive 602/TB, CDEC Log 09-187666. Note however that the date on that document was incorrectly written as 20 October 1966, instead of
1965. See CDEC Bulletin No.1064, 21 September 1966.
324
Translators Note: L Minh Kin had been formally promoted to Executive Officer status from platoon
commander on 20 October 1965 see Military Region T.1, Directive 602/TB, CDEC Log 09-1876-66.
Note however that the date on that document was incorrectly written as 20 October 1966, instead of 1965.
See CDEC Bulletin No.1064, 21 September 1966. L Minh Kin was later killed in action on 7 June 1968
at the Battle of Assault Youth Hill.
325
* 1st Company: Comrade Hai B as Company Commander; Chn Phn as Political Officer. 2nd Company:
Comrade Bn as Company Commander; Nguyn Vn Bo (Su Bo) as Political Officer. 3rd Company:
Comrade Qua h Vn Mi (Mi Dm) as Company Commander; Lm Phng (Su Phng) as Political
Officer. 4th Company: Comrade T c as Company Commander; Su Thng as Political Officer.
Translators Note: The foregoing appointments were also * footnoted in the 1991 D445 History. As in
that History, the Battalions 5th Company is omitted. However, the 5th Company was noted as active in 1965
(CDEC Log 04-1431-66 commendation for L Vn Li; CDEC Log 12-2451-66 promotion of H Vn
Phong); and in 1966 (see previous footnotes 165, 184, 298 and 307). The Military Affairs Committee
Roster document (CDEC Log 12-2393-66) of mid-1966 lists promotions for nine junior personnel of the 5th
Company. In December 1966, according to a captured finance report, the 5 th Companys strength was 91
CDEC Log 05-1724-67. As mentioned earlier at footnote 307, the 5 th Company appears to have
compromised the Battalion Headquarters and support elements other than firepower support (the 4th
Company).
326
Translators Note: See Annexes G and H for detail on Party membership, and the Partys organisation
and activities in 445 Battalion.

88
had just been allocated to the Province with the title of 440 Battalion (also called the 2nd
Battalion).327
After having been reinforced - and with good training and equipment, the
Battalion fought many victorious battles against the Australians bases and those of the
puppet military in Long in, Phc Long Hi and Phc Hi, and wiped out a large
amount of their capability.
On the night of 18-19 June 1967, the 3rd Company of 445 Battalion combined
with the 4th ((274th)) Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division and the local troops of Chu
c District to attack an outpost of the American mechanised infantry in the flat fields at
Kim Long. We drove hundreds of enemy from the battlefield, and destroyed dozens of
tanks and military vehicles.328
In October 1967, COSVN reorganised the battlefield, establishing five SubRegions with the aim of setting up five thrust lines to attack Si Gn. The two districts of
Long Thnh and Nhn Trch that were part of Long B Bin Province were
incorporated with Th c into the 1st District of Si Gn and became Sub-Region 4. The
remainder became B Ra Long Khanh Province. Comrade L nh Nhn (Chn L)329
327

Translators Note: In November 1967, 1 ATF at Ni t reported that on 22 May 1967 the B Bin
Province Committee had ordered 41 cadre from 445 Battalion and other local VC units to assemble on 10
June 1967 for the formation of 440 Battalion and its first Political Officer was Nguyn Hu Thi, and its
first Assistant Political Officer was Trn Vn Khi. 1 ATF Troops Information Sheet No. 69, Ni t, 511 November 1967. Recent (2008) Vietnamese sources relate that: 440 Battalions antecedent was the 2nd
Battalion of the 9th Regiment of 340B Division, and was established on 14 September 1965. see Annex P
for detail. According to a local Party History, 440 Battalion was 600-strong on its arrival in the South, and
200 of its personnel were transferred to 445 Battalion. - Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s ng (The
History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter VII. For D440 - see Annex P, and for a
comprehensive history of D440 Battalion, see: Chamberlain, E.P., D440: Their Story, op.cit., 2013.
328
Translators Note: This engagement is not mentioned in the 1991 D445 History. The Chu c District
History (2004) notes that its C-41 Company and 274th Regiment elements destroyed 16 tanks and hundreds
of enemy in a battle at Kim Long in June 1967 - Nguyn Cng Danh , Chu c District, op.cit.,
2004. The ng Nai Monograph (2001) relates: On 19 June 1967, troops of the 5 th Main Force Division
coordinated with the sappers of the B Ra-Long Khnh 445 Provincial Battalion to ambush the enemy on
Route 2 and inflicted heavy casualties on an American infantry battalion and destroyed the headquarters of
the 11th Armored Regiment.- a Ch ng Nai, op.cit., 2001. On 20 June 1967 according to the 5th
Division History (2005), the 2nd Company of 445 Battalion was employed as a reserve element for the
attack on an ARVN force at H An-Kim Long (about 5 kilometres north-west of c Thnh Sub-Sector) by
two battalions of the 274th Regiment. A recent media article relates that on 19 June 1967 at a battle at H
An [sic] Hill, the 274th VC Regiment and 445 Battalion destroyed the headquarters of the US 11 th
Armoured Cavalry Regiment, killed many Americans, set fire to or damaged 67 tanks and armoured
vehicles, and three artillery batteries (mortar, 107mm, 175mm). Nguyn Th Thin, Di Tch Lch S
Cn C Cach Mng Bu Sen, 24 April 2012. In his 2006 memoir, Nguyn Nam Hng - the former Chiefof-Staff of the 274th Regiment, relates the battle at Kim Long/H An in detail - including having wiped out
an American mechanized infantry battalion and destroying 78 vehicles of various types. However,
Hng makes no mention of D445s involvement. - Nguyn Nam Hng Major General, Mt i (A
Life at War), op.cit., 2006. The 4th ((274th)) Regiment History (2015) relates that D445s 2 nd Company a
reserve element, was blocked and did not join the engagement in time p.96. According to a US report,
very early on 19 June 1967, two battalions of the 274 th Regiment with 5th VC Division heavy weapons
support, attacked the 3rd Squadron/11 ACR. The US force was supported by artillery including 175mm
and 8 inch guns from the Australian base at Ni t, and by attack helicopters from the Sui Rm base. 56
Vit Cng were reported killed, and two prisoners taken; US forces suffered 9 killed and 32 wounded. The
engagement was referred to by 11 ACR as the Battle of Slope 30 see 3/11th ACR, Annual Historical
Summary 1967, 25 February 1968 - VCAT Item No.3400136001 and 3400149001. The boundaries of the
Slope 30 area are: YS 4681 YS 4781 YS 4784 YS 4584. The 11 ACR engagement in the c Thnh
area was noted in the 1 ATF Ops Log from 190014H see Sheets 262-278: including air missions, attack
on CP at YS 449825, and 274 Regt augmented by D445 file AWM95, 1/4/43.
329
Translators Note: L nh Nhn (Chn L/Chinh L/L Chnh) was posted from U1 (Bin Ha)/MR1 to
B Ra Province as Secretary of the Party Committee and political officer of the B Ra Province Unit. L

89
was its Secretary; ng Hu Thun (t ng) commanded the Province Unit; and
Comrades Phm Lc and Vn Chng (Ba Lin) were Deputies of the Province Unit.
At this time, the situation was serious330 the enemy was decisively scooping up
and gathering the people. Our liberated zones were being reduced331, and the Provinces
battlefield was tightly constrained. The Province Committee directed that both our forces
- A and B, were to be strengthened; and among these, the strengthening of the A forces
was to be essential with the aim of creating underground political elements to become the
springboard to guide and join with our external forces in attacking the enemy. The core
spirit of the policy was Hold-on and rise up and Expand and develop our areas with
guidelines of: one battlefield, two forces, and two ways of striking the enemy. These
guidelines were disseminated widely to our infrastructure organisations as targets for
action.
In achieving the Province Committees guidelines, 445 Battalion constantly
deployed to strike the enemy332, and strongly supporting the local revolutionary
movements in the Provinces two main areas of Long t and Chu c, achieved many
outstanding combat feats.333
Chnh was noted on 21 June 66 and 22 July 1966 as Secretary of the Province Civil Affairs Committee see CDEC Log 9-2049-66; and also later in January 1967 CDEC Log 05-2647-67. L Chnh was also
noted holding the position in 1971 and 1972 - CDEC Log 07-1132-72. See also Annex J, Higher
Headquarters.
330
Translators Note: A report by the B Bin Province Forward Supply Council dated 3 October 1967
noted that because of enemy operations, units and agencies faced a critical shortage of food supplies,
exit and entry points including at Ngi Giao, were constrained, and recruiting civilian labourers was
becoming increasingly difficult. CDEC Log 11-1560-67, VCAT Item No.2130915030.
331
Translators Note: According to the local Party History, in July 1967 in Xuyn Mc District, two cadre
were leading a large group of villagers from Bu Non when they were ambushed by Australian
commandos and 39 were killed this was the greatest crime committed by the Australians and the
Americans in Xuyn Mc District. - Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s ng (The History of the
Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter VII. The incident is similarly described in the Xuyn
Mc Resistance History (1989), p.142. The Australian Official History relates that during Operation
Paddington in the Xuyn Mc area against elements of the 274th VC Regiment: On about 11.30 p.m. on
the night of 10 July, a group of Viet Cong, screened by Vietnamese women and children carrying torches,
had managed to pass through the American 9th Divisions cordon. When another band attempted the same
tactic, the Americans opened fire, killing 13 Viet Cong and probably inflicting casualties on the escaping
women and children. - McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.205. On 10 July
against elements of the VC 274th Regt in the vicinity of YS 6580. The VC moved with their women and
children at night and were able to avoid major contact with allied forces. - 9th US Infantry Division,
Operational Report Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967, 7 November 1967.
VCAT Item No.22830106001. During the night about 100 people in three parties tried to slip out through
the two northern LZs. An ambush was sprung and 13 VC were killed and two weapons captured. 1 ATF,
Troops Information Sheet No.52, Ni t, 9-15 July 1967. The US unit involved appears to have been 4/39
Battalion, 9th Division. See also 1 ATF Ops Log, Serials 287, 289 and 292, 10 July 1967 (AWM95, 1/4/9).
332
Translators Note: On the night of 26-27 November 1967, the 3rd Company of 445 Battalion raided the
Farmers Bank and a number of government installations on the western outskirts of B Ra Town and
seized 250,000 piastres (equivalent to USD 2,119) 1 ATF, Discussion Point: The Enemy In And Around
Phuoc Tuy, Troops Information Sheet No.77, Ni t, 31 December 1967 - 6 January 1968, Section 3,
p.4.
333
Translators Note: The t District History (2006), p.210 relates: In November 1967, thanks to the
assistance in the hamlet, Comrades Ba Thun the Phc Th village unit commander, and T Thi a
secret village security cadre, guided an armed element of the Province forces (from the 1 st Company, D445)
led by Comrade L Minh Kin ((Ba Kin)), into the hamlet to attack the enemy. Our forces had just
deployed when an Australian military vehicle approached from the Cng Du intersection. An accurate
round from a B40 halted the vehicle. The whole team then attacked and killed five Australians, and
wounded another and our men withdrew safely. This incident occurred on 30 September 1967, when
according to 1 ATF records, a vehicle moving from The Horseshoe base to Route 23 was ambushed by
elements of C-25 Company and D445 Battalion in t (YS 499607) killing two Australian soldiers, and

90
Symbolic of the these outstanding battles, at the beginning of the 1967-1968 Dry
Season ((December 1967)), was the ambush of a 12-vehicle armoured column of the
Americans 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment on 31 December 1967 on Route 2 (in the
area of the Quang Minh Plantation).334 In preparation for that attack, the Battalion had
deployed a platoon to join with the Chu c local forces to attack the enemy at c
Thnh in order to lure the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment down from Sui Rm to
relieve c Thnh.
The Battalions main ambush group stretched along the road for about 1,000
metres. Both sides of this stretch of Route 2 had been bulldozed clear for about 500
metres. Accordingly, we resolved to achieve our aim of wiping out the Americans tanks
and armoured vehicles with our B40s and B41s (Soviet-made weapons with which we
had just been equipped)335, and so the firepower of these weapons - and the skill levels of
our soldiers and cadre in their use, were tested. The Battalion mobilised our troops to
overcome any difficulties by digging trenches and pits in order to disappear into the
earth, in order to bear the heat of the sun throughout the day, and to hold their ground
there until 4am the next day in order to attack the enemy.
Exploiting a stretch of the paved road at the beginning of our battle positions that
had been heavily damaged - and where the ground was rough, we planted two very
powerful mines. At 4am, the whole squadron of American armoured vehicles fell into our
ambush. When the mines detonated and destroyed an armoured vehicle, our B40 and B41
teams at the head of the ambush - in the main position and at the end of the ambush, all
attacked to wipe out the enemy. The momentum of the attack was very high everyone
wanted to become a Valiant killer of armoured vehicles, and so many of our soldiers
forgot the order for coordinated action and mutual support in order to pursue the enemy
tanks and destroy them at all costs. After about an hour of fighting, we had complete
control of the battlefield and had completely wiped out a squadron of enemy armoured
vehicles. With this great victory, the soldiers and cadre of 445 Battalion were very elated
and becoming complacent, exposed themselves while withdrawing. Consequently, they

wounding one Australian and two ARVN soldiers. 1 ATF, INTSUM No.273-69, Ni t, 30 September
1967; 1 ATF, Intelligence Review No.13, Ni t, 1 October 1967.
334
Translators Note: This was highly likely to have been the attack at 0300-0400hrs on 31 December 1967
also related in greater detail in the 1991 D445 History including the exploits of the 1st Company
commander: o Vn Tng (Tm Tng) and its political officer: Nguyn Vn Bo (Su Bo), against a US
armoured column (two troops of the 3rd Squadron of the 5th Cavalry Regiment/9th US Infantry Division
comprising two M48 tanks, 12 APCs) moving south on Route 2 just north of X Bang at YS 454864
resulting in ten US killed and up to 25 wounded. Two US tanks and five APCs were reportedly gutted or
put out of action. No VC casualties were reported. 1 ATF assessed that the VC unit involved was likely
the Cm M District Company, possibly strengthened either by sub-units of the 274th Regiment or D445
Battalion. - 1 ATF Intelligence Review No.16, Ni t, 3 January 1968. The US 3/5th Cavalry Squadron
was stationed at the Blackhorse base of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11th ACR - see footnote 297)
while 11th ACR conducted Operation Fargo in War Zone C north of Lai Kh from late December 1967 to
mid-January 1968. Email advice from Don Snedeker (Lt Col, US Cavalry, Retd) - Historian, 11th Armored
Cavalry Regiment, 30 January 2016, see also http://www.3-5cav-blackknights.org/Timeline-024.html
335
Translators Note: The NVA/VC employed two types of Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). The RPG-2
(B40) was an 80mm (warhead), 1.84kg (warhead weight), shoulder-fired RPG with a maximum effective
range against stationary targets of 150m and capable of penetrating 180mm of armour see the photograph
at page 10 in the Preface. The RPG-7 (B41) was an 85mm (warhead), 2.25kg (warhead weight), shoulderfired RPG with a maximum effective range of 500 metres and capable of penetrating 300mm of armour.
The RPG-7 was first noted by US forces in Vietnam on 21 April 1967 III MAF Perintrep 21-67. Both
RPGs were also effective anti-personnel weapons ie by fragmentation.

91
were discovered by the enemys aircraft and suffered a number of casualties. Two key
cadre of the 1st Company were wounded, and Comrade Hng a medic, was killed.336
That was our first battle against American tanks, and 445 Battalions largest
engagement up to that time. The battle evidenced the very high resolve and will of our
Battalions cadre and soldiers. Our performance and the outcome of the battle, made our
cadre and soldiers very enthusiastic, even more zealous, and increased their belief in the
new range of fire support weapons before we moved into the General Offensive and
Uprising of Tt Mu Thn in 1968.
Over the two years of fighting, the Battalion had overcome many difficulties and
challenges, had grown further, and had come-of-age in many aspects. Our combat
capabilities and skills had increased day-by-day. The Battalion had always completed its
tasks in an outstanding manner as the main-force punch of the Provinces armed forces
striking the enemy; supporting the local revolutionary movement; holding our ground and
base areas; and defeating the many plots and schemes of the enemy especially their
pacification program and the building of their strategic hamlets in the B Ra Vng Tu
region.
In preparation for the strategic General Offensive in the Spring of 1968, the
Province Committee and the Province Unit paid attention to restructuring the Battalion
and its weapons and equipment. With this quite strong build-up and reinforcement, the
Battalions numbers reach their highest levels since its founding.337 At this time, the
Battalion Commander was Comrade Nguyn Vn Kim, and the Political officer was
Comrade Nguyn Minh Ninh.
3. PARTICIPATING IN THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE AND UPRISING
AT TT MU THN IN 1968 IN B RA LONG KHAN .
At the end of 1967, the situation on the battlefields in the South evidenced basic
advantages for us and on this basis, the Partys Politburo promulgated new guidelines
for the revolution in the South: Mobilise the greatest strength of the whole Party, our
whole forces, and all the people of the two regions to bring our nations revolutionary war
to its highest level through a General Offensive and Uprising and to achieve a decisive
victory. The Politburo clearly indicated: The important and urgent task of the whole
Party, all the armed forces, and the whole people of both of the two regions of our
country is to conduct the General Offensive and Uprising across the whole of the South
and to win a new strategic victory.
To implement the Politburos directions, the B Ra Long Khanh Party
Committee convened a conference extending over two days (26 and 27 January 1968) at a
location north of the Sui Th Stream (near the Sng Ray River).338 The Conference
336

Translators Note: As noted above, the engagement is described in greater detail in the 1991 D445
History including: the Battalion set fire to and destroyed 12 tanks and armoured vehicles and completely
destroyed an armoured squadron of the American 11 th Armored Regiment; and that: Tm Tng a
company commander, was wounded.
337
Translators Note: According to the 1991 D445 History: The strength of the Battalion reached 608. This
was the highest strength figure for the Battalion from its inception to its coming-of-age. When interviewed
by Dr I. McNeill in Vng Tu in June 1988, Nguyn Vn Kim stated that 445 Battalion had an effective
strength at Tt 1968 of over 600 soldiers- McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.305.
For a listing of the strengths of D445 Battalion over-time, see Annex C.
338
Translators Note: According to the ng Nai Monograph (2001): On 26-27 January 1968 preparatory
to the Tt 1968 Offensive, a Command Committee was established for the B Ra-Long Khnh Front. For
B Ra Town and the districts of B Ra: L nh Nhn the Secretary of the Province Committee (since

92
listened to the COSVN representative339 transmit the resolve and guidance of COSVN
and, at the same time, confirm the planning tasks for the attacks and uprising in the
Province. The key elements were that the attacks and uprising were to take control of two
towns: B Ra and Long Khanh.340
445 Battalion was given the mission together with the armed forces of B Ra
Town341, to attack the enemy in B Ra Town. The Secretary of the Province Committee
and the Commander of the Province Unit gave direct instructions.342 The specific tasks of
the Battalion were: to attack and seize the Province base of the Regional Forces, the
police logistics area, the military Sub-Sector, the prison, and a number of large
commanding positions in B Ra Town. This higher direction by the Province Committee
and the Battalions combat tasks were quickly and thoroughly disseminated down to
every cadre and soldier in order to create a great spirit and single-minded determination.
Everyone was enthusiastic. Many comrades - although still suffering painful wounds and
illnesses, still insistently requested that they be allowed to join the fighting. Many of the
troops were also extremely optimistic. They wore their new uniforms and rolled up the
remainder and threw them into a corner of their weapon pits - together with their personal
military equipment - including their bowls and pots that they had pierced with their
bayonets. Everyone believed that this time they would enter the towns and never return
to their bases. Everyone said a farewell to the jungle.343*

late 1966) was appointed political commissar (chnh y); and ng Vn [sic] Thun (t ng) the
commander of the B RaLong Khnh Province Unit, was made the commander (t lnh). For Long
Khnh Town: Phm Lc (T Lc the deputy commander of the B RaLong Khnh Province Unit) was
made commander (t lnh) with L Sc Nghi of the B RaLong Khnh Standing Committee as the
political commissar (chnh y). The towns and districts all established command committees led by their
secretaries. - a Ch ng Nai (ng Nai Monograph), Tp 3 (Vol 3) Chng 6 (Chapter 6), op.cit.,
2001, footnote 21. In January 1968 just before the Tt Offensive, the US MACV Headquarters in Saigon
estimated that the total communist strength in the South was over 225,000 - of whom 55,744 were NVA
(about 25%) - USMACV, Order of Battle Summary: 1 January thru 31 January 1968, Saigon, 31 January
1968.
339
Translators Note: According to the History of the Armed Forces of ng Nai, the COSVN
representative was Nguyn Ngc Tn (Hai Lc): On 26 and 27 January 1968 at the Sui Th base (Sng
Ray), Comrade Hai Lc disseminated the plan to the B Ra Long Khanh Province Committee. Trn Th
Minh Hong (foreword), The History of the Armed Forces of ng Nai Province 1945-1995 (Lch s Lc
Lng V Trang Tnh ng Nai 1945-1995), Nh Xut Bn Qun i Nhn Dn, H Ni, 1999, p.146.
340
Translators Note: Detail on the Tt Mu Thn (1968) attacks on the Long Khnh Province capital - ie
Xun Lc Town, can be found in Annex I (III Corps Advisory Group) to Tt Offensive After Action Report
(not dated) VCAT Item No.13680112021. See also Annex P - and Chamberlain, E.P., D440: Their
Story, op.cit., 2013.
341
Translators Note: In the 1991 D445 History, this element is noted as: the B Ra Town Special Action
Unit - literally the bit dng th x B Ra. The US III Corps Advisory Group After Action Report (see
the footnote above VCAT Item No.13680112021) referred to the C610 Baria City Company.
342
Translators Note: According to the 1991 D445 History, on the last day of January Comrade L
nh Nhn (Chn L) the secretary of the Province Party Committee, and Comrade t ng - the
Commander of the Province Unit, came down directly to 445 Battalion to thoroughly brief on the orders for
the fighting. According to the ng Nai History (1986): t ng ((ng Hu Thun)) the Province
Unit Commander, directed the political officer L nh Nhn ((Chn L)) to directly control the attack on
B Ra City. - Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.142. For the Australian Official
Historys account of the attack on B Ra at Tt Mu Thn, see McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive,
op.cit., 2003, pp.304-320.
343
* This excessive romanticism had a deep influence on the psychology and spirit of the cadre and soldiers
of 445 Battalion when the prospects and a treaty did not eventuate and the war became progressively more
violent.

93
At the time that 445 Battalion deployed to its concentration area344, the sound of
gunfire attacking the enemy in B Ra Town could be heard. This was more than one day
and one night later than the H-hour that had been ordered for the General Offensive and
Uprising in the South. The reason for this was that the Chief-of-Staff of the Province Unit
had mislaid the key to codes and consequently was unable to decode the combat orders
from above.345
Only at 1600hrs on the first day of Tt ((30 January 1968)), did the Battalion
receive an order from the Province Unit to cook rice rations preparatory to deploying. At
1700hrs, the whole Battalion assembled at the M Base in Chu c District on the northwestern [sic] slopes of the Dinh Mountains. Comrade ng Hu Thun the Commander
of the Province Unit, directly communicated the combat orders. At 2100hrs, the complete
Battalion began to deploy across the slopes of the Ni Dinh Mountain, down the Chu
Pha, across the Sng Xoi River, and arrived adjacent to our positions from which to
launch the assaults.346 As there had been obstacles along this difficult route and the rocky
344

Translators Note: A D445 POW subsequently related a briefing on the attack plan to platoon
commanders by By Sang on a sand model on 31 January 1968, and the move later that day of the
Battalion from a camp about three kilometres north of Bnh Gi village. 1 ATF, Short History D445, 13page briefing paper, early 1968 (from the Directorate of Military Intelligence - Canberra archives), para 40.
345
Translators Note: According to the D445 History (1991): The whole ((D445)) Battalion was in
readiness and awaiting the order to deploy, but we waited and waited and still received no word. It was past
the first day of Tt and approaching the afternoon of the second when we heard a radio broadcast and knew
that the attacks had begun almost everywhere else. Chamberlain, E. P., D445: Their Story, op.cit.,
2011, pp.56-57. The Chu c District History (2004) relates: On 31 January 1968, 445 Battalion and the
Chu c District armed forces assembled in the base east of Ni Dinh Mountain in readiness to receive
orders. However, because the General Staff Section of the Province Unit had mislaid the key to our codes,
the B Ra forces started their operations later than other provinces. - Nguyn Cng Danh , Chu
c District, op.cit., 2004, p.164. An official media article following the 2008 conference presided over by
the former Deputy Secretary of B Ra - Long Khnh Province Phm Vn Hy to commemorate the 40th
anniversary of the Tt 1968 Offensive, included the following: H-hour on D-Day for the whole of the
South was set as 0000hrs (giao tha) of the Lunar New Year (Tt Nguyn an). The calendar calculation in
the North that year was one day earlier than that in the South. The Nam B Region opened fire according to
the Southern calendar one day late, and so the B2 battlefield did not have the element of surprise as the
enemy was forewarned, had organised their defences, and had ordered all their troops to remain in camp. In
B Ra Long Khnh, as the key to the codes had been lost, we began our attacks a further day later, losing
the surprise factor. - Nguyn nh Thng, Nhng k c khng th no qun Memories that can never
be forgotten, Communist Party of Vietnam - B Ra-Vng Tu Agency, Vng Tu,1 February 2008.
According to the US historian Merle Pribbenow: According to the calendar issued by the Saigon regime,
the first day of the Tet Lunar New Year in 1968 was 30 January on the Western calendar, one day later than
the date for Tet given in the calendars used in North Vietnam. On the afternoon of 29 January 1968,
Military Region 5 received a cable postponing the attack until the night of 30-31 January. Military Region 5
only had time to alert the 2nd and 3rd Divisions, the 10th Regiment, and Quang Nam and Quang Ngai
provinces of the postponement. The provinces of Quang Da, Phu Yen, Binh Dinh and Khanh Hoa did not
receive the postponement order, so they opened fire during the night of 29-30 January, according to the
schedule in our initial plan. - Pribbenow, M.L., Victory in Vietnam, University Press of Kansas, 2002,
p.466, endnote 15. See also the account in the Long Dt District History (1986). A recent Vietnamese
account relates that: Across all the regions it was decided that H-hour on D-Day was from 0000hrs to
0200hrs on 31 January 1968, that is the night of 1-2 of Tt in the old calendar. The Military Regions and the
special forces groups were advised 48hrs prior to H-hour. It was regrettable that because of the change of
the calendar in the North that MR5 and the Central Highlands opened fire beforehand according to the new
calendar (The order to postpone was received but the troops had already taken up their concealed positions
and asked to be able to attack before time). The B2 Front received the order to postpone action, and opened
fire in accord with the old calendar. - Nguyn n T - Major General, Mu Thn 1968 - Cuc i chin
lch s , Nh Xut Bn Lao ng, H Ni, 2008.
http://www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php?action=printpage;topic=26599.0.
346
Translators Note: According to the Chu c District History (2004): At first light on 2 February
1968, the Battalion commander - Nguyn Vn Kim, and the political officer - Nguyn Minh Ninh, swiftly

94
slopes of the Mountain were difficult to traverse and the troops were unable to use
torches and were carrying heavy loads, the pace of our approach march was very slow.
Consequently, it was only at 4am on the morning of the second day of Tt ((31 January))
that we reached our assembly area. When it had just become light in accordance with
with the Battalions combat plan, the 1st Company attacked the base of the enemys selfpropelled artillery. The 2nd Company fought from the Red and White Light intersection,
seized the American interrogation centre, and continued to seize all of the New Market
(B Ra) area. Our 3rd Company took the Province Regional Forces Group, and the
Battalions reconnaissance element seized the B Ra jail and then the Province
administrative building.347
The attack went advantageously for us initially with the 3rd Companys attack
seizing its target of the Province Regional Forces Group. There after 10 minutes, we
had seized and held three-quarters of the objectives in that base. We continued to hold our
positions while driving back many counter-attacking waves from the 52nd Ranger
Battalion from Ha Long and a squadron of Australian armoured vehicles from Ni
t348 until the Battalion ordered a withdrawal.
Our attacking groups from the 1st Company, the 2nd Company, and our
reconnaissance platoon had opened fire later but, due to the morning light, they were
unable to maintain surprise and were discovered by the enemy and blocked before they
could get close to their objectives. The 2nd Company deployed relatively more
successfully and struck deep into the Commando349 Training Centre (at the T-Junction of
todays Nguyn Thanh ng and Hai B Trng streets).
The Reconnaissance Platoon led by Comrade Nguyn Vn B was given the task
of attacking and seizing the area of the jail, the Province administration buildings, and the
self-propelled artillery base. However, due to a lack of troops, passive attitudes, and the
enemy there having had time to harden their defences, the reconnaissance elements were
unable to seize their nominated objectives - and could only pin the enemy down and
prevent them from supporting one another.
While the 2nd Company was able to overcome the enemy resistance pockets at the
crossroads and seize a number of positions in the New Market, they were unable to wipe
out the pockets of enemy resistance in the Li Hamlet area where the enemys
opposition was determined. Casualties among the cadre and soldiers of the 2nd Company
were quite considerable.
The enemy launched determined counter-attacks including with helicopters and
F-5 fighter aircraft. Their fire overpowered our Headquarters and created the conditions

led 445 Battalion from the slopes of the hills in the area of Phc Ha (Route 15) across the hills to Chu
Pha, and - in a very fast march, approached the B Ra Sub-Sector very close to their objective."
347
Translators Note: In a 22 June 1988 interview in B Ra, Nguyn Vn Kim the D445 Commander,
related that the Battalion couldnt manage to capture the other targets - ie including the jail, the Province
Headquarters building, and the market area. McNeill, I., Major, Post Script to the Battle of Ba Ria,
Australian Infantry Magazine, Part 2 (April 2012 October 2012), Singleton, 2012, pp.80-81.
348
Translators Note: At this time, the tactical headquarters of 1 ATF and its 2RAR and 7RAR infantry
battalions - and a company from 3RAR, were deployed about 55 kilometres to the north-west of Ni t on
the approaches to the Bin Ha and Long Bnh base areas (Operation Coburg: 24 January mid-February).
In early February, 3RAR (-) and APC elements engaged in the fighting in B Ra and Long in. In an
interview on 18 March 1989 in Bin Ha, Vn Lin (Ba Lin) the 445 Battalion political officer,
stated that D445 were unaware that most of the Task Force was away at Long Bnh in Bin Ha province,
but Ba Lin said that would hardly have mattered. - Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, p.117.
349
Translators Note: The text uses the term bit kch a term used by the communist forces for enemy
commando/special forces-type troops see footnotes 42 and 209.

95
for 52nd Ranger Battalion and the Australian troops350 to launch assaults. In the area of the
Electricity Power House, our forces set fire to six tanks351. Our troops defending the
Headquarters suffered heavy casualties, and were no longer combat effective. Facing such
a situation, the 445 Battalion Headquarters ordered the hero Nguyn Vn Quang to
reorganise our forces. Our anti-aircraft defence elements armed with two 12.7mm
machineguns and one Maxim heavy machinegun, responded with very effective fire
against the teams of rocket-firing helicopters that had been firing on the Battalion
Headquarters. Many of the enemy helicopters were hit and forced to move far away.
Nguyn Vn Quang continued to fire the heavy machinegun and destroyed groups of the
enemy, and together with his companions, drove back many of the enemys counterattacks, defending the Headquarters and holding the battlefield until dark.352
350

Translators Note: For a detailed account of the fighting written by the Australian on-site commander,
see: Howard, B.W. Major General AO, MC, ESM (Retd), The Battle for Ba Ria: 1-2 February 1968,
Australian Infantry Magazine, Part 1 (October 2011 April 2012), pp.76-83; and Part 2 (April 2012
October 2012), pp.72-81, Singleton, 2012. The engagements in B Ra Town including at the Vn Kip
camp, reportedly involving 445 Battalion, C41 Company, Ha Long village guerrillas, and the B Ra
Town Platoon were summarised in a 1 ATF report as: Baria City attack began 010500H, two VC
companies, 54 VC KIA (BC); Van Kiep - attack 010700-1030H, approx 50 VC in two platoons, 47 VC
KIA (BC). 1 ATF, INTSUM No.33-68, Ni t, 2 February 1968. A captured Chu c District PRP
Party Committee report on their attacks in the period 31 January-10 February 1968 including against
Australian troops at Ha Long, is at CDEC Log 02-1882-68, VCAT Item No.2131111007. On 10 February
1968, the Peoples Liberation Front of Chu c published a lengthier account of the fighting in Phc Tuy
and Long Khnh Provinces in the period 1-5 February 1968 1 ATF, Troops Information Sheet 82, Ni
t, 4-11 February 1968. See footnote 352 for US reports (including the III Corps Advisory Group), and
footnote 362 for a USMACV account ie an After Action report.
351
Translators Note: In an interview in B Ra on 22 June 1988, Nguyn Vn Kim claimed that the 608strong D445 had set on fire and destroyed six Australian tanks later amended to six Australian
APCs. See: McNeill, I., Major, Post Script to the Battle of Ba Ria, op.cit., 2012, pp.80-81.
352
Translators Note: A detailed US summary of the fighting in B Ra and Vn Kip includes: In B Ra,
D445 and C610 numbering about 140, attacked JUSPAO, PRU HQ, MSS Adv HQ, MP Station,
National Police HQ, and the Vietnam Information Service offices one platoon occupied the Province
hospital, Catholic church and the Town theater. After C1/D445 seized the airstrip at the Vn Kip
Training Center, the then resident 11th Airborne Battalion counter-attacked together with the 4/48th
Battalion (from Long in) and the 910 RF Company. Subsequently, the 2/52 Gia Ray Battalion and the
52nd Ranger Battalion was airlifted into the area and secured the Town. With daylight on 2 February, the
52nd Ranger, 3/52 Inf Bn and RAR ((3RAR)) conducted search and clear operations in Ba Ria. 206 VC
were killed and 61 weapons found in the Town and in the vicinity of the A & L Coy. At the Van Kiep
Training Center, 52 VC were killed, 2 VC and 53 weapons were captured. On 4 February, in the Ba Ria
area an additional 44 VC bodies were found and four more VC were captured. - Annex I (III Corps
Advisory Group) to Tet Offensive After Action Report (not dated) VCAT Item No.13680112021. A cable
from US Ambassador Bunker to the US Secretary of State on the Situation in Phuoc Tuy Province (11
February 1968) reported comments by the Province Chief (Major Nguyn Ba Trc see footnote 593)
and noted plenty of popular support for the VC in Long in where townspeople allegedly showed
enemy troops where GVN civil servants, cadre and soldiers lived, and hid the Viet Cong when Australian
troops entered Long Dien. The same sources suggest that misrule by a succession of corrupt District chiefs
had done much to foster anti-government sentiment in the town. VCAT Item No.0010244001, see also
footnote 354. The Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU - formerly Counter Terror Teams), were units
managed by the US CIA, that operated principally against the communist political infrastructure. In Phc
Tuy Province, the Unit was headquartered in B Ra Town at the OSA House (OSA = Office of the
Special Assistant to the US Ambassador - ie a euphemism for the CIA station; and also as the Combined
Studies Division). The CIA left the program in July 1972, and the PRU passed to the Vietnamese as the
Special Reconnaissance Group - then as the D-7 Section of the National Police Special Branch. Australian
advisors (AATTV) served with the PRU including in B Ra. In 1970, PRU strength country-wide was
5,170 indigenous personnel. It was Clearly identified as an American program despite the cover
arrangements paid and basically led by the US. - Office of the Secretary of Defence South Vietnams
Internal Security Capabilities, Washington, May 1970. VCAT Item No.2121516002. For the PRU program,
see also: Valentine, D., The Pheonix Program, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1990 and 2000.

96
At about 4am on the third day of Tt ((1 February 1968)), the Battalion withdrew
its troops to Phc Chanh hamlet (the present-day Phc Hng village in B Ra Town)
and, having buried our martyrs, returned to the base in the Ni Dinh Mountains.
Three days later, on the orders of the Province Commander, 445 Battalion split
into two groups. The first group comprising the 1st Company and the 2nd Company led
by Comrade Nguyn Minh Ninh (the Battalion Political Officer) and Nguyn c Thu
(the Battalion second-in-command) went with the Province Commander to provide
support for Long t District and attack the enemy353 attempting to break our blockade of
Long in.354 The second group comprising the 3rd Company, the 4th Company, and the
Reconnaissance Platoon, was led by the Battalion Commander (Comrade Nguyn Vn
Kim) and the Deputy Political Officer (Comrade Nguyn Minh Khanh) remained to
support Chu c District355 by attacking the enemy post at the Rch Vang Bridge356. A
week later, the whole of the Battalion assembled back in the area of Xa Bridge of Hi M
village (Long t) to reorganise, restructure, and restore our forces.
The General Offensive and Uprising of Tt Mu Thn in 1968 was a decisive
blow against the enemys strategy of a Limited War and displayed the strength of the
Peoples Liberation Armed Forces. For the first time, the Peoples Liberation Armed
353

Translators Note: At 0205hrs on 2 February 1968, the VC Long t Districts C25 Company attacked
objectives in Long in Town (District HQ, National Police HQ, the Vietnam Information Service offices),
but local RF/PF forces repulsed the attacks. The Town was cleared by the ARVN 3/25 th Battalion, the
2/52nd and 3/52nd Battalions of the 18th Division, and A Company of 1 ATFs 3rd Battalion (3RAR) Annex
I (III Corps Advisory Group) to Tet Offensive After Action Report (no date) VCAT Item
No.136801112021.
354
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History relates that: We fought the enemy at Long in for a full
week. According to the ng Nai History (1986): For the attack on Long in, the Standing Committee
strengthened our forces which were led by Ba Lin (445 Battalion political officer) and the Secretary of the
District Committee. - Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.142. The three-platoon
attack on Long in led by the Long t District Secretary - L Thnh Ba, together with Vn Chng
(( Vn Lin/Ba Lin)), Nguyn Vn Hot and Nguyn Hoan, was related in a 2008 media article - H
Nhn, B Ra-Long Khnh v k c khng th qun - B Ra-Long Khnh and Unforgettable
Memories, Communist Party of Vietnam - B Ra-Vng Tu Agency, 29 January 2008. That account
notes the attack commencing on 3 February. The Australian Official History noted a pro-Viet Cong
attitude in Long in - McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.309 and p.315.
355
Translators Note: As noted, the official Australian account of VC attacks at Tt Mu Thn in 1968 in
Phc Tuy Province is in McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, pp.304-320. Dr I.
McNeill interviewed the former 445 Battalion commander Nguyn Vn Kim in Vng Tu on 18 June 1988
and some information from Kim is included at p.305 of the Official History. As noted earlier, Kim
stated 445 Battalion had an effective strength of over 600 soldiers. Neither the 1991 D445 History - nor
this 2004 D445 History account, mentions that at 5am on 2 February 1968, Comrade Bi Quang Chnh
((the former D445 Battalion Commander)) - the commander of the Chu c District Unit, led the
Districts armed forces to attack the Long L Sub-Sector Headquarters ((in Ha Long village)) and the
enemys post at the Long Xuyn T-Junction. The History of the Ha Long Village Party Chapter (1930 2005), op.cit., 2009. Bi Quang Chnh is also reported as leading the Chu c District Unit in attacks in
the first days of February 1968 on Ha Long and shelling the Australian base at Ni t with 82mm
mortars - H Nhn, B Ra-Long Khnh v k c , op.cit, 29 January 2008. Those actions involving
Bi Quang Chnh are also described in a local Party history. - Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s ng
(The History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter VII. 1 ATF records show that
about 50 82mm mortar rounds fired from YS 395658 impacted near the perimeter of the 1 ATF base
(location of the US 1/83rd Artillery Regiment) before dawn on 1 February (of which 25 with delay fuses did
not detonate) - with a further pre-dawn shelling and small-arms fire on 2 February 1968. - 1 ATF,
INTSUMs No.32-68, No.33-68, Ni t, 1 and 2 February 1968. As noted, Chu c District reported on
VC attacks in this period see footnote 350. In particular, At Ni t, our troops fired hundreds of
mortars to contain the Australian vassals, and we silenced their guns for the night of 1 February 1968. The Peoples Liberation Front of Chu c, 10 February 1968.
356
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History relates that: The 3 rd Company attacked the enemy at the
Rch Vn [sic] bridge on Route 15.

97
Forces had simultaneously attacked more that 40 cities and towns striking deep into the
lairs of the Americans and their puppets, including places where for a long time they
believed were inviolable. The enemy was forced to de-escalate the War and commence
the Four-Sided357 Peace Conference in Paris.
Within the Province, this was the first time that the whole of the Battalion had
attacked objectives within a town and had to develop new complex methods of combat.
We faced sudden changes as the enemys strength was more than ten times our number,
and we lacked the factor of surprise. However, the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion
fought doggedly, and we wiped out much of the enemys capability (over 300 of the
enemy), and set fire to 14 tanks and armoured vehicles. The Battalion fulfilled its mission
of attacking into the centre of the town, crippling the enemys nerve-centre in Phc Tuy
Province, destroying a large quantity of their weapons and means of waging war. We
shared the battlefield with the whole Southern Front and contributed to the great victory
of the historic General Offensive and Uprising of Tt Mu Thn.358
In the General Spring Offensive, the Battalion suffered up to 38 comrades killed
and a further 81 comrades were wounded.359 The 2nd Company had two commanders
killed the Company Commander Trn Vn G (also known as Nm Lu n) who had
only just moved from the Chu c District Unit); and the Company second-incommand, Ba Lng. A very large number of cadre and soldiers of the 2nd Company were
casualties, including Nguyn Vn Bo (Sau Bo) its Political Officer.360*
Many examples of valiant combat highlighted our heroic and lofty revolutionary
ideology and our honourable sacrifice. One is that of Comrade Phm Vn ng who
with his B40, had attacked to the left and attacked to the right and set fire to four enemy
tanks at the one time. This Section Commander had fired seven rounds in a row to destroy
enemy pockets of resistance and the blast of the firing had made our Comrades ears
bleed, and he was deaf after that battle. Comrade Nguyn Su of Phc Hi (t
), the Deputy Political Officer of the 3rd Company, used his medium machinegun to
hold back the enemy, and forced the retreat of dozens of the enemys counter-attacks
during the day. Although wounded, he still did not leave the battlefield. Until late
afternoon, the enemy concentrated their fire at his bunker but he still held on
determined to fight to his very last breath. These lofty examples will forever be a source
of pride for the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion.
During the General Spring Offensive of Mu Thn itself, the Rear Services of 445
Battalion used the occasion to advantage while the enemy was forced to huddle together
357

Translators Note: Four Sides: the US, Republic of Vietnam (ie South Vietnam), North Vietnam, and the
NLF. At the Paris negotiations on 15 and 16 January 1969, a compromise was reached with: a round table
with two smaller rectangular tables at opposite sides, and no flags or name-plates.
358
Translators Note: As noted, for the activities of the Chu c District Unit during the Tt 1968
Offensive, see its Recapitulation report 01/TB dated 10 February 1968 - CDEC Log 02-1882-68, VCAT
Item No.2131111007. Also - as noted at footnote 350, The Peoples Liberation Front of Chu c
published a lengthier account of the fighting in Phc Tuy and Long Khanh Provinces in the period 1-5
February 1968 1 ATF, Troops Information Sheet 82, Ni t, 4-11 February 1968.
359
Translators Note: According to the ng Nai History (1986): after one day of fighting in B Ra, we
had suffered 50 casualties. - Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.142. For 1 ATF
and US reports on total Vit Cng casualties during the Tt 1968 attacks on B Ra, Vn Kip and Long
in, see footnotes 340, 350, 352 and 353. In a post-War interview in B Ra on 22 June 1988, Nguyn
Vn Kim the D445 Commander in the attack, claimed that D445 had suffered 80, killed and wounded
but many of them only suffered minor wounds, so they could walk and fight. See: McNeill, I. Major,
Post Script to the Battle of Ba Ria, op.cit., 2012, p.81.
360
* Political Officer Nguyn Vn Bo (Sau Bo) was wounded in the side and the hand. Commo-liaison
soldier Phm Nh Tu carried him to the rear, across the Dinh River, and took him back to our rear base for
treatment.

98
and was too afraid to confront our attacks militarily. Our Rear Services personnel spread
out into the local areas to gather, collect, and purchase a large amount of food supplies for
our combat troops - and also established large reserves. These active preparations had
great significance when violent conditions again returned and the enemy counter-attacked
determinedly following Tt.
Faced by a situation where the units resolve had a tendency to develop badly after
that period of combat, the Partys Current Affairs Committee in the Battalion held an
urgent meeting of the leaders and focused on ideology. This was followed by a Party
Committee conference broadened to include all of the political cadre in the Battalion. The
conference unanimously agreed on the key ideological aspects put forward by the
leadership : to wipe out the atmosphere of introspection, pessimistic thoughts, and a
decline in confidence. Discipline must continue for each stage of the war, and the enemy
must not be under-estimated. The belief had to be reinforced that, while the war would
continue to be arduous and protracted victory was certain. The activities of the Youth
Group361 Chapters had to be increased. In each unit, art and cultural events had to be
accentuated, and the initiative taken to improve the mental and material lives of the
troops. In a short time, the resolve of the unit was raised to a new level in preparation for
the tasks to come.
Any victory in battle however entails losses, sacrifices and death.362 Any soldier
who takes up arms for the battlefield must also accept this. The most optimistic thing and final hope, is that a battle or a campaign will be successful. And, if success is not
achieved, then thats very harmful to the combatants psychology. The attack on B Ra
Town was not the final battle. The victory at Tt Mu Thn was not yet the final victory !
To implement the resolution of the Party Committee, the Battalions leadership
focused every effort on the political and ideological work before them. The Battalions
leaders regularly went down to the companies, participated in their daily routine, joined in
cultural activities, listened to them closely, grasped the inner most feelings and sentiments
of the cadre and soldiers, and - in a timely manner, resolved any knotty problems and
requests. Funds were increased and provided to the companies to purchase guitars,
Croky paper with which to make posters and news bulletins to hang in their units, and
volley balls for internal competitions etc. On another front, the Battalion continued to
guide the companies in organising hunting and fishing; and growing, collecting and
harvesting vegetables and fruit to improve the troops daily meals. Spirits and material
conditions improved - and along with the political and ideological education, the
361

Translators Note: The communist Peoples Revolutionary Party organisation had Party Labour Youth
Groups (on) at all levels whose members aspired to Party membership. Selected members could
graduate to probationary membership of the Party (at about age 24) then full membership of the People's
Revolutionary Party. See details at Annex G - The Party ; and Annex H Reports for official
numbers of Party and Group members in mid-1966, before the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966.
362
Translators Note: As noted, for a USMACV report noting 445 Battalions activities during the Tt 1968
Offensive, see Weyand, F.C. Lieutenant General, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Combat
Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACJ3-32) (K-1) - Tet Offensive After Action Report (31 January
18 February 1968), Saigon, 1968 VCAT Item No.13680112021 or 168300010351. As noted at footnote
352, Annex I (II Corps ), p. I-14 related: 206 VC were killed and 61 weapons found in the town ((B
Ra)). At the Van Kiep Training Center, 52 VC were killed, 2 VC and 53 weapons were captured. On
4 February, in the Ba Ria area an additional 44 VC bodies were found and four more VC were
captured. 1 ATF reported the total Vit Cng casualties during the Tt attacks on B Ra, Vn Kip and
Long in as: 43 enemy KIA (BC) and 17 possible. 1 ATF, Intelligence Review No.17, Ni t, 23
February 1968. According to the analysis in the USMACV After Action Report, the pre-Tt Offensive
strength of D445 Battalion was estimated as 350, and the post-Offensive strength was 225. see Weyand,
F.G., Combat Operations , op.cit 1968, VC Order of Battle, Appendix I to Annex A, p.A-1-4, VCAT
Item No.13680112004.

99
atmosphere in the Battalions units was again very ebullient. The will, morale, and
ideology of our cadre and soldiers were quite satisfactory. In April 1968 (before the
beginning of Phase II of the General Offensive363) that is after almost two months of
consolidation, structural reorganisation, and conducting a complete review of all
ideological aspects, the ideological and organisational situation of the Battalion had been
basically stabilized and our combat capability had been restored. However, it was not yet
as fully capable as before the first phase of the General Offensive.
At the end of April 1968, the Battalion divided into four groups to attack the
enemy, and to support the local units to destroy the grip of the enemy that had tightened
since Tt Mu Thn. Each comrade on the Battalion Headquarters was allocated to each
of these four groups:
- Battalion Commander Nguyn Vn Kim and the Deputy Political Officer
Nguyn Minh Khanh went with the 3rd Company commanded by Quach Vn
Mi (Mi Dm) and joined with a company of the Chu c District
troops to attack the Post 64 in Bnh Ba village.364
- Political Officer Nguyn Minh Ninh went with the 4th Company (the
Battalions support company) with the task of employing a 75mm RCL and
two 82mm mortars to shell the c Thnh Sub-Sector.
- One of the Battalion seconds-in-command Nguyn c Thu, joined the 2nd
Company led by Comrade Nm V to attack the ng Qu post (in Long
Khanh).
- The other Battalion second-in-command (and concurrently Chief-of-Staff)
L Minh Kin (Ba Kin) remained behind with the 1st Company led by
Comrade Nguyn Vn Thnh (Thnh R) to join with the 25th Company in
attacks on the enemy in Long t.
The attacks by these 445 Battalion groups at about this time apart from their aim
of wiping out part of the enemys capability and supporting the political struggle
movement and the local guerrillas, were aimed at creating in the cadre and soldiers of the
Battalion a will to fight and win at a time when we were countering the extremely fierce
pacification campaign.365
At daybreak on 5 May 1968, our forces across the whole Province received the
orders for Phase 2 of the attack and uprising. Beforehand, the Province Committee had
convened a conference to review and assess the results of our activities in the first phase
and to discuss operational methods for the second phase. The conference praised the great
Translators Note: According to US intelligence staffs, the 1st Phase of the Tt 1968 Offensive concluded
on 6 April; the 2nd Phase - lasting 36 days, ended on 14 June; and the 3rd Phase lasted 33 days (18 August
until early September 1968). - Sorley, L., Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, op.cit., 2004, p.173.
364
Translators Note: The Chu c District History (2004) records that: On 19 April 1968, 445
Battalions 3rd Company joined with Chu c District local troops to conduct a mortar attack on the c
Thnh Sub-Sector and at the same time attacked the 604th Regional Force Company in Bnh Ba. That
Chu c District History also notes attacking: Building 64, the main offices of Bnh Ba, and that:
Comrade Trn Trung Be the company commander of the Chu c District troops, was killed. 1 ATF
records do not include such an engagement in April 1968.
365
Translators Note: The dispersal and activities of D445 noted above were not described in the 1991
D445 History. In late April 1968, the only significant Vit Cng-initiated activities in Phc Tuy and
surrounds noted in 1 ATF records were a brief mortar attack (17 x 82mm) on a RF post (YS 376615) in B
Ra; and the shelling from Long Sn Island of Vng Tu (12 x 122mm rockets, nine 75mm RCL rounds) on
the night of 22/23 April 1968. 1 ATF, INTSUM No.114/68, Ni t, 23 April 1968. As noted earlier, in
January 1968, 1 ATF intelligence staff reported that: D445 has not operated as a battalion since February
1967. 1 ATF, Discussion Point: The Enemy In and Around Phc Tuy, Troops Information Sheet No.
77, 31 December 1967 - 6 January 1968, Section 3, p.4.
363

100
victories won by our armed forces and the people of the whole Province during the
General Offensive and Uprising at Tt. We had strongly employed the three-pronged
attack strategy366, victoriously struck into the enemys lairs and dens, wiped out and worn
down much of the enemys war-making capability and means, and given a deadly hiding
to the aggressive desires of the American imperialists and their lackeys. However, this
victory was not complete it had been limited by negligence and subjectivity.
Moving into Phase 2, the Province Unit tasked 445 Battalion to coordinate with
440 Battalion367 to wipe out the enemys capabilities along Route 2, and block the enemy
and not allow them to relieve their companions in the main areas of attack. This was the
first time that the Province Unit directed coordination between the Provinces two mainforce battalions and also the first time that the Province deployed a large force in a
tactical encirclement operation to attack a position and wipe out relief forces. The
Province Committee ordered the concentration of weapons from peoples militia elements
principally to provide additional equipment for the two battalions. 440 Battalion was to
strike the enemy at their strongpoint on Con Chim Hill Cm M, and 445 Battalion was
to ambush the enemys relief forces at the edge of the rubber plantation at the foot of Con
Chim Hill,
When 440 Battalion opened fire on the enemy on Con Chim Hill, the American
forces immediately deployed the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment from its base at Sui
Rm. They left their base and concentrated in the Hong Qun rubber plantation
preparatory to coming to the relief of the puppet troops on Con Chim Hill. As we had
been focused on attacking enemy troops landing from helicopters, our reconnaisssance
elements did not pay attention to, guard against or discover, the advancing American
relief forces with their tanks and armoured vehicles. Only when they approached close to
our Battalions positions, did we discover them. Faced with that surprise, 445 Battalion
Headquarters was not perplexed - but immediately applied its methods of countering airlanded troops to attacking the American tanks. The battle was waged decisively from the
very first minutes. The enemy had the considerable firepower superiority of their tanks,
and also had maximum artillery and air support. On the other hand, 445 Battalions cadre
and soldiers fought extremely bravely taking advantage of every tree trunk and ditch in
the rubber plantation, and moved quick-mindedly to employ our B40s, B41s and 75mm
RCLs to wipe out the enemys tanks and armoured vehicles. From our very first volleys,
we set fire to many tanks and alarmed the American forces.
An assault team led by Comrade Ti a platoon commander, which was
supported by Comrade Li a B40 grenadier, and Comrade Nht - armed with an AK47, attacked and pursued the enemy tanks. An American on a tank seeing the danger,
suddenly jumped down and struggled with Comrade Li and tried to draw and fire his
revolver. However, Comrade Li bit his hand, forcing him to drop the pistol. At the same
time, Comrade Ti leapt up, came to the rescue just in time, and shot the American
dead.368
At that time, our other attacking groups were repelling dozens of enemy counterattacks and held the battlefield from early morning until 3pm. At one time, the American
366

Translators Note: As noted earlier, three-pronged or three spearhead attacks - literally: ba mi giap
cng, was a commonly-used term meaning military action, political action, and propaganda/proselytising/
agitation among enemy troops. See also page 108 for three types of forces.
367
Translators Note: In late April 1968, a US report noted: D440 MF Bn Strength 320, Marginally
Combat Effective, majority equipped with new series of weapons. 9th US Infantry Division, Operational
Report - Lessons Learned - to 30 April 1968 - dated 21 August 1968.
368
Translators Note: In the account in the 1991 D445 History, the American soldier is not killed rather
Li breaks free from the American and: still had time to grab his B40 and disappear into the jungle.

101
forces were able to penetrate the fighting positions of the 1st Company. However, the
outcome of the battle was that the Battalion set fire to and destroyed 16 M41 and M113
tanks [sic], and killed dozens of Americans. As for our Battalion, 11 comrades were
killed with the heaviest losses in the 1st Company. This victory over the American
forces - with their tanks and armoured vehicles, at the foot of Con Chim Hill was a
significant morale boost for all the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion after the very
great sacrifices and losses at the time of Tt Mu Thn.369
Following this victory, the Battalion continued to receive orders for countersweeping operations in the Route 2 area.370 One of the Battalions most outstanding
counter-sweeping operations in this phase was the attack on an external post of a battalion
of the enemys 18th Division at the Cy Vng ((Sesame Bushes)) T-Junction (adjacent to
Xun Lc District) as they prepared to sweep into the base of the Province Unit.
On the morning of 15 July 1968 (at about 7am), having heard a lot of gunfire in
the direction of the base of the Province Unit and the Province Committee, the whole
Battalion swiftly deployed from the Assault Youth371 Hill to recover the situation. The 1st
369

Translators Note: The battles at Cm M, Con Chim Hill, and Route 20 are related in further detail in
the 2011 D440 Battalion History see Chamberlain, E.P., D440: Their Story, op.cit., 2013, pp.45-47.
That account relates that we wiped out much of the enemys capability setting fire to 24 tanks and
armoured vehicles. Contemporary Australian military records relate that on 5 May 1968, the US 11th
Armored Cavalry Regiment (11 ACR) reported heavy contact with elements of 440 Battalion in the vicinity
of Cm M (YS 4888) 1 ATF, INTSUM No.126/68, Ni t, 5 May 1968. 1 ATF reported that in the
attack by 445 and 440 Battalions at Cm M (YS 4692) on 5 May 1968, Vit Cng casualties were 36
killed (by body count), a further 57 killed by artillery, and five prisoners taken. US losses were five killed
and nine wounded, one M48 tank destroyed and two damaged 1 ATF, INTSUM No.127/68, Ni t, 6
May 1968. According to CICV Report MACJ231-6, op.cit., 14 July 1969: On 5 May 1968, ARVN
elements at Cm M were attacked by the 6th Company of 440 Battalion and 445 Battalion six ARVN
were killed and 21 wounded. 440 Battalion reportedly suffered 35 killed and 445 Battalion suffered 72
killed. Also according to the US CICV Report, on 6 May 1968, a 2/43 rd Regiment convoy on Route 20 from
nh Qun to Xun Lc was ambushed by 440 Battalion and elements of the 274 th and 275th Regiments.
The 11 ACR History relates that: Elements of the D440 LF Bn and the D445 LF Bn attacked Cm M
Village in the early morning hours of 5 May, penetrating the perimeter and briefly occupying positions
within. E/2/11th Cav, F/2/11th Cav reinforced and routed the enemy, killing 75 VC/NVA and capturing four
VC and one NVA. Assorted weapons and equipment were also captured The attack on Cm M Village
was the second major effort against this remote hamlet since 9 Mar. The psychological or military
objective to be attained from a successful attack on this target is minor at best. More likely, this assault was
designed as a diversionary tactic from the suspected increase of enemy activity. In the Slope 30 Cm
M Village was again harassed on 9 May with light RPG, AW and mortar fire. See: 11 ACR, INTSUM
132-68, Annex A (11th Armd Cav Regt SUPINTREP 7-68), Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry
Regiment, 11 May 1968, pp. 1, 2-3. Further reporting by 11 ACR summarised casualties as: 4 US KIA, 11
US WIA, 1 ARVN interpreter KIA, 3 RF/PF KIA, 8 RF/PF MIA, 11 RF/PF WIA, 75 VC KIA, and 5 VC
POW email advice to the author/translator (Chamberlain E.P.) from Snedeker, D.C. Lieutenant Colonel
(Retd) 11 ACR Historian, 21 May 2014. In May 1968 - under HQ 1 ATF (Fwd), 1RAR, 3RAR, 12 Fd
Regt and minor units deployed into Bin Ha and Bnh Dng Provinces and fought the Battle of Coral (13
May Tn Uyn District, Bin Ha ) and the subsequent Battle of Balmoral (26 May Ph Giao District,
Bnh Dng) as part of Operation Ton Thng.
370
Translators Note: 1 ATF records indicate that on 7 June 1968 445 Battalion attacked a night defensive
position of the 43rd ARVN Regiment (at YS 580931 about 2 kilometres north of the Phc Tuy/Long
Khanh border) and suffered 58 killed (by ARVN body count) four enemy weapons were recovered.
ARVN casualties were reported as three killed and 26 wounded 1 ATF, INTSUM No.158-68, Ni t, 7
June 1968. In early June 1968, intelligence staff at 1 ATF reported: D445 LF Bn should now be
regarded as a Main Force unit which is well armed, well led, and well motivated and possesses expert
knowledge of the terrain and its target areas. - Cameron, G.C. Major, Enemy Situation Phc Tuy
Province (as at 11 June 1968).
371
Translators Note: Assault Youth were discrete elements comprising mostly full-time males and
females in the age bracket 16-35, that assisted NVA/VC forces principally in liaison and logistic tasks such
as portering and battlefield clearance for detail, see footnotes 125 and 257.

102
Company and the Reconnaissance Platoon led the Battalions deployment together with
Comrade L Minh Kin, the Battalions second-in-command. This group was followed by
the 2nd Company and the 3rd Company. However - before the tail of our column had
moved, massive enemy artillery fire impacted in the base area. In the very first volley,
Comrade Kin and Comrade Tin (reconnaissance) were killed; and Comrade L Vn
Tranh and a number of other comrades were wounded.
The Battalion had to halt and divide into two elements. One stopped to treat the
wounded, take them back to the medical unit for treatment, and to bury our dead. This
element was led by the Battalion Political Officer Nguyn Minh Ninh, and the Battalion
second-in-command Nguyn c Thu. The other group commanded by the Battalion
Commander Nguyn Vn Kim, and the Deputy Political Officer Nguyn Minh
Khanh, continued with the operation. At 5pm, the Battalion reconnaissance group came
upon the enemy where the enemy had halted to set up a tactical camp. Having heard the
report of the reconnaissance group, the Battalion Headquarters resolved to attack
immediately, and the companies moved into their assembly areas for the assault, waiting
for the order to open fire. It was not yet completely dark when all of the Battalion opened
fire at once. The enemy was struck by surprise, panicked, and suffered casualties.
However, as the Battalion fought from the first trenches to the second trenches, the enemy
had time to recover - and they regrouped, dug in, and organised a counter-attack. After a
few minutes of fighting and seeing that our forces were unequal (with the enemy being
three times stronger than the Battalions combat elements), the Battalion gave the order to
withdraw in order to husband our forces.
As a result of that battle, 445 Battalion inflicted heavy casualties on a battalion of
the 52nd Regiment of the puppet 18th Division - forcing them to abandon their sweeping
operation that had sought to wipe out the Province nerve-centre. In the battle, L Minh
Kin the Battalion second-in-command, and a number of comrades died (including
Comrade Phm Vn Giao of Long in a platoon commander in the 1st Company; and
Comrade Tin a Battalion reconnaissance soldier; and two soldiers from the 2nd
Company). However, the morale and the fighting spirit of the Battalion did not weaken
because of this. Comrade Nguyn Vn Tm ((Hai Tm)) replaced the deceased Comrade
L Minh Kin (Ba Kin).
Within the territory of Long t District, in the second phase of the General
Offensive and Uprising, the Districts armed forces comprising C25 Company and
village guerrillas, had fought a number of battles deep in the t and Long in SubSectors, and wiped out and worn down an important part of the enemys capabilities
there. They had shaken the morale of the enemy soldiers and their leaders. However,
after discovering that our forces were thin on the ground and without main-force support,
the Australians and the puppet military counter-attacked fiercely, launched sweeping
operations, and struck deep into our base areas especially the Districts base area in the
Minh m, forcing the Districts forces to again counter their sweeps in the spirit of
Resolving to hold the Minh m.
Facing this very critical and urgent situation, 445 Battalion was directed by the
Province Committee to move to Long t to share the burden of defending the Minh
m and to provide support for the local revolutionary movement. Continuously
throughout three months, 445 Battalion fought the enemy side-by-side with the Long t
District forces warding off the enemys sweeping operations and inflicting a large
number of heavy casualties on them.372 They were forced to abandon their sweeping
372

Translators Note: The t District History (2006) relates that: The main-force 445 Battalion was
deployed back to Long t to take part in the fighting in the Minh m. On 26 June, aided by our
infrastructure agents, the Battalion secretly deployed its troops close to the t Sub-Sector and

103
operations and withdraw from the Minh m base after 100 days of investing and striking
into the base.373
With the assistance of the people in the hamlets of the three villages of Phc
Th, Phc Thnh and Phc Ha Long, 445 Battalion struck the enemy on Provincial
Route 52. The ambush site was only about 300 metres from the Phc Ha Long Post (a
place that the enemy would not suspect). We completely wiped out the Thunder and
Lightning Battalion ((1st Battalion, 48th Regiment)) - the premier battalion of the puppet
18th Division.374*
Prior to the ambush, the Battalions troops were concealed in the villagers
houses. The 2nd Company commanded by Comrade Hai B, was tasked as the forward
blocking force and covered the killing zone (opposite the Cao i temple to the west) and
the 1st Company led by Comrade Nguyn Vn V (the uncle of Comrade Hai B) had the
responsibility as the rear blocking element. At 8am on 8 August 1968, the Thunder and
Lightning Battalion led by two American advisors swept down into the Long M, Hi M
area to find and wipe out 445 Battalion. There, they were held up for a full day by attacks
by the guerrillas of those two villages. Having to fight back, extended and tired the
enemy. At about 5pm, when they were only about 300 metres from the Regional Forces
post at Phc Ha Long, the enemy were blocked and attacked by 445 Battalion.
Exhausted and surprised and attacked from three sides, the enemy were quickly
destroyed, and only about a platoon was able to flee helter-skelter. The two American
advisors met a similar fate and were killed. Having won the battle, 445 Battalion
quickly cleared the battlefield, treated the wounded, and organised elements to recover
the many weapons and equipment.375
completely wiped out a puppet company of the enemys 18 th Infantry Division. In July 1968, one of the
Battalions elements struck deep into Long Sn hamlet of Long Bnh (Long in) and killed a group of
Regional Force and Popular Force troops based there. The Long in village guerrillas and an element of
the District troops ambushed a platoon of Regional Forces at the memorial in Long Phng hamlet killing
15, and seizing 15 weapons and a PRC-25 radio.
373
Translators Note: In the second half of 1968 in VC Long t District, 1 ATF conducted the following
operations: Operation Blue Mountains (6-10 July 1st Armoured Regiment); Operation Albany (12-16 July
1RAR); Operation Nowra (8 August-24 September 1RAR, 3RAR); Operation Goodwood (3 December
1968 - 19 February 1969 1RAR, 4RAR/NZ, 9RAR); Operation King Hit (10-11 December 9RAR);
Operation Boundary Rider (27-31 December 9RAR); and land clearing operations by the 1 st Field
Squadron (Beaver Dam III, VII, and VIII) see the operational summaries in Ekins, A. with McNeill, I.,
Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.715-729.
374
* On 8 August 1968, the commander of the Thunder and Lightning Battalion had written a provocative
letter to 445 Battalion challenging 445 Battalion to enter t and face annihilation.
375
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History notes that on 8 August 1968 following a provocative letter
from the commander of the 18th Divisions Crazy Buffalo Battalion , 445 Battalion wiped out the Crazy
Buffalo Battalion killing two US advisors, in an ambush on Route 52 about 300 metres from the Phc
Long Hi camp. That 1991 History subsequently recounts that: almost a month later, the 18 th Puppet
Division sent the Thunder and Lightning Battalion of its 52nd Task Force [sic] to t to exact revenge.
However, as soon as they set foot there, they were ambushed by 445 Battalion and two of the enemys
companies were wiped out. According to the Long t District History (1986), At the beginning of
August 1968, Phc Tuy Sector deployed the Thunderbolt Battalion of the 18 th Division to Phc Ha
Long to support pacification. ... On Route 52, we ((D445)) ambushed them between Phc Li and Trin
Vn the battalion was destroyed in 30 minutes. The later t District History (2006) relates: At the
end of July 1968, the Thunderbolt Battalion of the puppet 18 th Division was deployed and stationed at
Phc Ha Long 445 Battalion completely wiped out the Thunderbolt Battalion at Trin Vn.
Such engagements by 445 Battalion in the t area are not recorded in 1 ATF records. These actions
might possibly be a reference to the Vit Cng attack farther north later in August ie: on the afternoon of 23
August 1968 in southern Long Khnh Province (Courtenay Plantation area YS 579958), a Vit Cng
force attacked the Headquarters of the 43rd ARVN Regiment, 3rd Battalion/43rd Regiment and 3rd
Battalion/52nd Regiment. The ARVN force was reportedly surrounded, and their casualties were reported as

104
A few days after the ambush that wiped out the Thunder and Lightning
Battalion, 445 Battalion - led by the An Nht guerrillas, tasked the 3rd Company
(reinforced with fire support from the 4th Company) to join with the local troops of Long
t District to attack a Rural Development (RD) Cadre376 group stationed in An Nht and
to pin down a nearby Popular Force377 element. The enemy was completely taken by
surprise when we opened fire to attack. After about ten minutes, our forces had taken
control of the battlefield, seized a large quantity of weapons, military equipment, and
military materiel. Dozens of RD cadre were killed, and two were captured. Directed and
initiated by the Long t District Committee, this victorious battle evidenced strong
support for the revolutionary movement of the masses, the development of guerrilla
warfare, the destruction of the enemys communications, and the killing of the enemy
oppressors.378
In August 1968, the Standing Committee of the Province Committee met following which the Executive Committee of the Province Party Chapter (the Province
Committee) convened a plenary meeting to review and evaluate the results of work
undertaken and yet to be achieved during the two phases of the General Offensive and
Uprising. The Province Committee concluded that: the greatest victories were the
destruction of the enemys capability, creating an advantageous position, and the
resounding attack on the enemys nerve-centres and lairs. We had held-on and had been
able to strike the enemy right in the cities and the towns. However, there were still many
shortcomings such as a need to strengthen the revolutionary ideology of the cadre and
soldiers who were tending towards subjectivism and not yet giving sufficient importance
to the mobilisation of the masses to rise up. A particular focus was defining our
objectives.
Regarding our direction: The Province Committee affirmed our capability for
Project 1 (the Project to Win) - in that we were unable to achieve this in 1968. Moving to
Project 2, the Province Committee advocated a continuation of attacks and uprisings but
that the preparation of the mass organisations must be good, and uprisings coordinated
with our armed elements in order to liberate the hamlets and villages whenever to our
advantage. At the same time, there was a need to actively strengthen the infrastructure,
avoid exposing our forces, maintain clandestine forces, and overcome excessively
optimistic thoughts when preparing for operations as well as pessimistic thoughts and
alarm when the enemy counter-attacked strongly. The Province Committee directed a
continuation of the strengthening of our base areas, a continuation of production
activities, and coordination between the three-prongs of the attack for timely strikes on
the enemy.
14 killed and 80 wounded. Vit Cng casualties were reportedly 13 killed (by body count) 1 ATF,
INTSUM No.236/68, Ni t, 24 August 1968.
376
Translators Note: The Rural Development (RD) Cadre - earlier termed the Revolutionary Development
Cadre, were established on 4 January 1966 in New Life hamlets to train village self-defence elements - see
VCAT Items No.13510124002 and No.13510123005. The 59-man RD Cadre teams in the villages first
deployed in May 1966, progressed the Si Gn Governments political, social and economic programs. See:
The R.D. Cadre System 9/66 including directives and re-organisation at VCAT Item No.2120613006. The
original RD Cadre group of 59 was scaled down to 30 during the Accelerated Pacification Program (ACP),
and then to 10 at the beginning of 1971. For RD Cadre organisation, numbers and activities in Phc Tuy
Province to the end of 1966, see McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, pp.420-422.
377
Translators Note: The Vietnamese text uses the obsolescent term Dn V ie: Self-Defence Corps.
As noted, the Dn V - together with the Hamlet Combat Youth, were replaced by the Popular Forces (PF
ie: Ngha Qun) in 1964.
378
Translators Note: This engagement at An Nht village (YS 4559) is not related in the 1991 D445
History, nor in the t District History (2006), nor in the Long t History (1986).

105
Following the instructions from the Province Unit, the 445 Battalion Headquarters
drew lessons from our experiences, and thoroughly grasped the requirements and the
directions of the Province Committee. We acknowledged that the mission had changed to
Project 2. Consequently, the Battalion Headquarters produced an operational plan to the
end of the year with the Long t District as our principal battlefield.
After our effective attacks on the enemy in t , at the request of the Long t
District Committee, the Battalion moved to attack the enemy on the Long in battlefield
with the aim of wearing down the Australian and puppet forces and destroying their grip
while supporting the local movement and the people in that region. To achieve the tasks
of these requests from Long t, at 2am on the morning of 30 September 1968, 445
Battalions 2nd Company attacked Ph Nm Cn and a number of Popular Force outposts
in Long in Town in order to lure and then strike, the enemy relief forces. The
Battalion organised its remaining elements as an ambush force at the Long in TJunction (in the area of Long Bnh hamlet).
Just as we had planned, when the positions in Long in were attacked, the
enemy rapidly deployed two squadrons of tanks and armoured vehicles (about 50
vehicles) together with a platoon of Australian soldiers from Ni t; a main-force
battalion of the 18th Division stationed in the Vn Kip Training Centre; and two Ranger
battalions (the Mai Phoc and Tp Phoc Battalions)379 to surround and attack 445
Battalions defensive positions. The force comprising the tanks, armoured vehicles and
the Australian company came from the direction of Long Phng hamlet and fell into the
Battalions ambush sites in the area of Xm Bn and Cu c. The battle was waged
decisively. Although our forces were unequal to those of the enemy - as we had the
initiative and the advantage of initial surprise, our combat results were quite good. The
companies of 445 Battalion struck the enemy in this area and set fire to eight tanks and
armoured vehicles, and inflicted heavy casualties on the Australian infantry company.
Elated at our victory, the Battalion decided to stick together with the aim of striking
strongly and fighting to the utmost. However, the terrain was exposed, the enemy was
numerous, we were being bombed by aircraft and being fired upon fiercely, and the
enemy tanks were firing intensely from a distance into our defences and wounding and
killing many comrades. Facing such a situation, the Battalion Headquarters decided to
withdraw. In this battle, we had 21 comrades wounded or killed (comprising a guerrilla
from Long in village and 20 soldiers and cadre of 445 Battalion).380
379

Translators Note: Earlier, this 2004 D445 History related 440 Company ambushing enemy Mai
Phoc and Tp Phoc troops on Route 44 at Ging on 25 December 1964 see footnote 148. In that
ambush in late 1964, those ARVN troops were described as comprising junior NCO trainees from the Long
Hi camp.
380
Translators Note: These passages of the D445 History probably refer to engagements in August 1968
not 30 September as stated above. On 11 August 1968, a company-sized Vit Cng force attacked Long
in Town 1 ATF, INTSUM No.223/68, Ni t, 11 August 1968. On 22 August 1968, t Town
was shelled by forty 82mm mortar rounds and RPG rounds by an estimated two Vit Cng platoons
Long in was attacked by about 100 enemy of C2, C3 - and probably C4, Companies of D445 Battalion
on 22 August. 1RAR assisted RVNAF forces and reported 29 enemy killed. 1 ATF, Enemy Situation Phc Tuy Province, Ni t, 23 August 1968. According to the Long t District History (1986): on 22
August 1968, D445 attacked Long in and inflicted heavy casualties on a relieving Australian company
D445 lost 11 killed. The t District History (2006) relates that: on 22 August, 445 Battalion took
the initiative and attacked Long in Town to draw off the enemy forces preparing a new sweep into the
Minh m base. The enemy forces comprised two battalions of Australian infantry, an infantry battalion
from the 18th puppet Division, a Regional Forces battalion from Vn Kip, a commando company from
Long Hi - with a squadron of tanks in support, that swept immediately into the base and split into many
attacking columns. The balance of forces was extremely uneven. However, 445 Battalion took the initiative
and attacked the enemy, concentrating its firepower to set fire to eight tanks and inflict heavy casualties on

106
After the Thunder and Lighting Battalion had been driven from the battlefield,
the puppet 18th Division deployed its Mad Buffalo Battalion of the 52nd Task Force
down to t to restore the situation. However, as soon as they arrived, they were
struck by 445 Battalion and two of the enemys companies were wiped out. The puppet
18th Divisions intention to seek out and destroy 445 Battalion had gone up in smoke.381
On the Long t battlefield, the Battalion had coordinated with the local District
troops and the village guerrillas in the t region, sabotaged lines of communication,
killed oppressors, and supported the development of guerrilla warfare and the political
struggle of the masses as directed by the Long t District Committee. The series of
victories by 445 Battalion in t at that time frightened and dismayed the wicked
thugs, the Regional Forces and the Popular Forces and all were forced to stay their
hand. Exploiting this psychology, the guerrillas in the villages of t whenever they
contacted the enemy, would usually declare themselves loudly as 445 Battalion troops
in order to threaten the enemy and make them flee.
In October 1968, the Battalion was ordered to withdraw back to Lang C Thi
(Bng [sic] Ring Xuyn Mc) in order to consolidate, study, and train after almost a
year of continuous combat, and to prepare for missions to attack the enemy during the
1968-1969 Dry Season.382 In this period, we gave priority to conducting Party and
political work with the aim of creating Party Chapters and Four Good Qualities Youth
Groups (good in combat; good in political ideology; good in study, training, and labour;
and good in unity). The training program strove to produce Four Good Party members,
Four Good Party Chapters, and Four Good Youth Groups which would
subsequently continue their activities in an orderly routine of Party and political work in
445 Battalion. At the same time, cadre activities were given special importance,
strengthened, and arranged to be in accord with the Battalions practical situation.
One phase of the recreational and rebuilding period for the troops was that while
some cadre and soldiers were undertaking political studies, others would be transporting
rice, catching fish, hunting animals, or harvesting vegetables to improve their conditions.
The Battalions Party Committee met to develop missions and to prepare all aspects for
the Battalions upcoming operations. Suddenly, there was the sound of a lot of gunfire
and rounds flying in the direction of the Headquarters. Recognising that the enemy could
be sweeping into the base, the Battalion quickly organised its forces (those elements still
in the base area) to deploy for combat in accordance with the previously-arranged tactical
plan to defend the base. The units deployed to surround and counter-attack the enemy.
After a few minutes of decisive fighting, we had complete control of the battlefield, and
the enemy had left dozens of bodies behind. Subsequently, according to the reports of our
an Australian company. The Australian commando force was overwhelmed near An Ngi, and the battalion
from the 18th puppet Division was forced to retreat to Long in and call on aircraft to fire rockets into the
battlefield. Our 445 Battalion withdrew swiftly into the base area. The bodies of the 11 445 Battalion
soldiers who were killed during the withdrawal were recovered by the people and buried at the base of the
cast-iron bridge at Long in. On the night of 22 August, on the orders of the District Committee, Long t
Districts C25 unit and village guerrillas coordinated with the people to simultaneously attack and rise up in
t . The 1991 D445 History recounted the attack on Long in and concluded pessimistically: The
Battalion learnt a bloody lesson in the battle at Long in: Be daring - but you must seek advantageous
terrain and prepare everything with circumspection to ensure success in combat. Hanging-on in open
terrain, that is sandy and water-logged - against a heavily-armed enemy with air and artillery support, is a
road leading only to defeat.
381
Translators Note: This passage appears to be somewhat out-of-place ie it probably belongs earlier
with the engagements described in early August 1968.
382
Translators Note: Lang (Waterfall) C Thi is in the vicinity of YS 6966. The 1991 D445 History
similarly relates the Battalion withdrawing in November 1968 to Bu Nhm (Xuyn Mc) to consolidate
and train preparatory to to attacking the enemy in the 1968-1969 Dry Season.

107
agents, we became aware that among the enemy killed in this engagement was Captain
c, the District Chief of Xuyn Mc. That day, he had led a wicked District Regional
Forces platoon on a sweep aimed at finding and wiping out the Xuyn Mc village
guerrillas. They came across two of the Battalions soldiers - who had been carrying rice,
and were having a rest break and shot them dead and cut off the ear of Comrade Quang.
District Chief c was a widely notorious and wicked thug so on hearing that he had
been killed by 445 Battalion, the people and our revolutionary infrastructure personnel in
the Xuyn Mc region were very elated. Conversely, the enemy in the Xuyn Mc SubSector were like headless snakes alarmed and fearful.383
After that engagement, 445 Battalion moved to Bu Lm384 (Xuyn Mc) to
conduct political training, rejuvenate our forces, and consolidate in accord with our plans.
From the end of 1968, the situation on the B Ra Long Khanh battlefield
became extremely difficult and decisive. The Americans and their puppets adjusted the
implementation of their Accelerated Pacification Program385 with the aim of winning
back the populated areas, plotting to dislodge our revolutionary organisations, and
consolidating the enemys oppressive machinery and infrastructure. They began testing
this program from July 1968 and conducted it comprehensively from December 1968 concentrating on critical areas, populated regions, and along the key axes and lines of
communication. To implement their program in the B Ra Long Khanh region, they
brought in 11 Rural Development Cadre groups (with each group numbering from 30 to
60 personnel), and employed all their mobile forces in the Military Region including the
2nd Airborne Brigade, the 18th Division, the Royal Australian Task Force, local Sector
Regional Forces, and mobile police elements386 to conduct their pacification operations.
With superior forces and maximum support from artillery and air assets, the enemy was
able to launch many large sweeping operations in October and November ((1968)),
striking deep into our base areas in the My To Mountains, east and west of Route 2, the
383
Translators Note: According to the Xuyn Mc District History (1989), Captain c ((ie L Vn
c)) the District Chief, was killed in an engagement with 445 Battalion in the Lang C Thi area at the
end of 1969, and almost a platoon of Regional Forces were killed on the spot. A whole enemy
battalion was deployed to sweep the area and recover the bodies. - V Kim Hanh (et al), Xuyn Mc
Khng Chin 1945-1975, op.cit., 1989, pp.158-159.
384
Translators Note: The Bu/Bu Lm Base Area 33 was in the vicinity of YS 6180 west of the
abandoned village of Tha Tch which was about 13 kilometres directly north-west of Xuyn Mc District
Town. Bu Lm was the preferred Vit Cng title for the Tha Tch area. A captured document dated 18
August 1967 related that there were 118 families in the Bu Lm locality of whom 92 with a total of
371 members, are suffering from a shortage of food supplies. CDEC Log 11-2289-67. In mid-1970, about
170 civilians remained under communist control in the Bu Lm and nearby Bnh Chu (YS 632859) areas
CDEC Log 10-1993-70, VCAT Item No.2311013003. See also: V Kim Hanh (et al), Xuyn Mc Khng
Chin 1945-1975, op.cit., 1989.
385
Translators Note: In early November 1968 - with significant US support, President Nguyn Vn Thiu
launched the Accelerated Pacification Program/Campaign with the objective of expanding government
control over 1,200 villages and eliminating the communist infrastructure. Initially, it was programed for 90
days. The D440 History (2011- Vietnamese language) noted that in late November 1968, the Military
Region 7 Conference also confirmed and directed that: the important task now faced by B Ra-Long
Khanh Province was the need to concentrate on the destruction of the enemys Accelerated Pacification
plan. To provide support, the Military Region assigned the 33 rd Infantry Regiment (E33) to cooperate in
combat actions with the local armed forces. ng y B Ch Huy Qun S Tnh B Ra-Vng Tu,
Lch S Tiu on 440 Anh Hng - B Ra-Long Khnh (1967-1979), Nh Xut bn Chnh tr Quc gia S Tht, H Ni, 2011, p.80 in English with commentary and additional annexed information see:
Chamberlain, E.P., D440: Their Story, op.cit., 2013, p.53.
386
Translators Note: This appears to be a reference to the National Police Field Force (NPFF). That Force founded in January 1966, was organised similarly to infantry sub-units, was armed with M-16 rifles, trained
in infantry minor tactics and a company was assigned to each of the 44 provinces. Its strength in 1970 was
about 16,000. The NPFF was also the primary riot-control element of the National Police.

108
Ni Dinh Mountains area, the Minh m Mountains, and they tightly blockaded the exit
and entry points for our logistic supplies. The Districts of Cao Su and Xuyn Mc were
unable to purchase food, supplies, or medicines. Our cadre and troops routinely had to
oppose the enemys sweeping operations. Life was difficult, there was much illness and
many casualties including deaths, and our combat capabilities declined markedly.
While the Battalion was consolidating and training at Bu Lm (Xuyn Mc), we
heard that the enemy was conducting a sweeping operation supported by B-52 bomber
strikes387, in the Minh m Mountains. Many cadre, soldiers, and villagers in the area
around the base became casualties. To assist our fellow countrymen and comrades, the
Battalion Headquarters deployed back to the territory of Long t to both block and
attack the enemy, coordinate with the local forces, and evacuate our wounded in a timely
manner back to the rear services area at the Sng Ray River for treatment. Beforehand
however, we received news that our people in the Phc Bu liberated zone ((Xuyn
Mc)) were suffering serious hunger following enemy sweeping operations. Although we
were still in very difficult circumstances with our rations mixed with vegetables and
roots more than the rice, the Battalion Headquarters still decided to scrape 800 litres of
rice from our stores to give to the people. Comrade Nguyn Tn Gii (Mi Gii) the
Political Officer of the 4th Company, and 14 soldiers carried the rice and gave it to
them.388 With such great magnanimity and sentiment, the timely action of the Battalions
cadre and soldiers further portrayed our image as the Troops of the Great Grandfather
H in the hearts of the local Party Chapter and the people. It also created further trust
and love towards the troops and the revolutionary movement, while helping the people
and the local area.
At the end of November and December 1968, we were faced by the poisonous
pacification schemes of the Americans and their puppets as well as the ferocious
destruction by the enemy of the local revolutionary movement. Following the directions
of COSVN, the B Ra Long Khanh Province Committee directed a policy to:
concentrate our three kinds of forces, coordinate with COSVNs main-forces, and
actively conduct operations to oppose and destroy the Accelerated Pacification schemes
of the enemy. A series of high points was launched from 5 to 20 December 1968 to
counter the enemys sweeping operations while striking directly at the enemys towns,
cities, rear areas, and important principal communications axes. Beforehand, the COSVN
Headquarters reinforced us with the 33rd Regiment389 to join in the fighting together with
our local troops.
* * *
Emerging during the progress of the war and as a requirement to be a pillar of the
local revolutionary movment, 445 Battalion developed by leaps and bounds in both its
organisation and its standard of combat effectiveness. The Battalions most outstanding
387

Translators Note: B-52 sorties comprised either four or six aircraft, with the usual bomb load of 51
750lb bombs per aircraft. For a ground eye-witness description of the effect of a B-52 strike (late March
1970), see Trng Nh Tng, Journal of a Viet Cong, Jonathan Cape, London, 1986, p.160.
388
Translators Note: As noted, a captured document dated 18 August 1967 related that there were 118
families in the Bu Lm locality of whom 92 with a total of 371 members, are suffering from a
shortage of food supplies. CDEC Log 11-2289-67.
389
Translators Note: The 33rd Regiment of the North Vietnamese Army entered South Vietnam on 20 July
1965 and fought initially in the Central Highlands at the battles of Plei Me and the Ia Drang Valley in
October- November 1965. The Regiment moved into the III Corps Tactical Zone in June 1968 and fought in
Phc Tuy Province from early-mid 1969. See footnotes: 385, 389, 405, 491, 505, 509, 511, 528, 532, 546,
549, 550, 553, 556, 572, and 643. For further detail see: Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment - North
Vietnamese Army: Their Story (and the Battle of Binh Ba), Point Lonsdale, 2014.

109
aspect in this period was its attacking spirit against the Americans and their military
vassals (the Australian troops) and defeating them. We overcame a large number of their
plots, schemes, and the wicked and poisonous tactics that they applied for the first time in
Vietnam on the B Ra Long Khanh battlefield. As the Provinces concentrated mainforce unit, the Battalion always deployed to attack the enemy in the most difficult and
critical places and provided effective, close and timely support to the local revolutionary
movement. We had the absolute trust of the Party and the local people who helped and
protected us wholeheartedly, and created favourable conditions for our unit to overcome
difficulties and successfully achieve our given missions in an outstanding manner. The
combat feats of the Battalion contributed significantly to the defeat of the Americans
Limited War on the B Ra battlefield.

110
Chapter 2

445 Battalion in the period of opposing the strategy of the

Vietnamization of the War (1969 1972).
1. Supporting the local forces in the destruction of the Accelerated Pacification
Program of the Americans and their puppets; Defeating the bunker and barrier
shield390 of the Australian forces.
The great victory of the General Offensive and Uprising at Tt Mu Thn in 1968
and the Spring-Summer Campaign that followed, combined with the defeat of the
Americans first destructive war against the North, had forced the Americans to sit down
at the peace negotiations table and de-escalate the War. However, they still never
abandoned their wicked intention of invading Vietnam. Following the occupation of the
White House by Nixon and his clique, they developed the wicked strategy of the
Vietnamization of the War391 and tried to train the puppet forces with the aim of
replacing the American expeditionary troops and their vassals on the battlefield.
To achieve their scheme on the battlefields of B Ra Long Khanh apart from
increasing the destruction from bombing and artillery fire, the enemy forces used many
types of chemical poisons which they spread to wipe out areas of mature jungle and
dropped on our base areas. They bulldozed the verges on both sides of Routes 2, 44, 52,
and 15 (clearing each side to a depth of 300 - 500 metres) particularly in the region of
the Hc Dch base. The invading professional armies of the Americans such as: The Big
Red One392, the 9th Infantry Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and the 11th Armored
Cavalry Regiment all launched operations continuously to destroy our bases.
To counter these destructive activities of the Americans and their vassals while
at the same time implementing COSVNs Directive 71393, from the very first days of
1969394 the Province Committee convened a conference to develop the spirit of the
Directive with the District Committees and to provide guidance to the armed forces in the
390

Translators Note: Literally, in Vietnamese: chin thut ngm v hng ro l chn. The barriertactic/human barrier-shield fence is described in the Long t District History (1986) see translated
extracts in Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit., 2011: in 1970: The Australians continued their chin
thut hng ro l chn ((barrier shield tactic)), but in a more limited fashion. This is also explained in a
footnote to p.186 of the Long t District History (1986) as a tactic in which the Australians used tanks
and commandos [sic] to make a fence/barrier to block the Vit Cng moving from their bases into the
hamlets and villages. The later t District History (2006) relates: By night, they ((the Australians))
would deploy their tanks and commandos to create a barrier shield outside t .
391
Translators Note: The term Vietnamizing reportedly emerged in late January 1969; and President
Richard Nixon used the term Vietnamization in his Silent Majority speech on 2 November 1969.
392
Translators Note: The US 1st Infantry Division see Operation Abilene (principally in Phc Tuy
Province) at footnotes 199, 203, 206, 215, and 223.
393
Translators Note: For COSVN Directive 71, see VCAT Item No.23130007064. For Directive 72/CTNT
dated 2 February 1969 that discusses problems with Directive 71, see VCAT Item No.2121209014. For a
discussion of finances, see also Directive 70 (19 January 1969) at CDEC Log 05-2407-70, VCAT Item
No.2311201003.
394
Translators Note: In January 1969, 1 ATF produced a 13-page history of 445 Battalion ie: De Cure,
P.F. Major, D445 Local Force Battalion, HQ 1ATF Ni t, 18 January 1969, that assessed the
Battalions actual strength to be in the vicinity of 350. The study did not include any detail on 445
Battalion personalities. Reviewing 1966, that study also related: Combined with elements of 5 VC Div, the
Battalion attempted to ambush Australian forces at Long Tn ((18 August 1966)). They were surprised by
an encircling movement and suffered very heavy casualties in the order of 70 KIA and 100 WIA.

111
Province. The conference directed that: the three-pronged attacks were to be pressed
strongly with a priority against the Accelerated Pacification scheme of the Americans and
their puppets.
445 Battalion had been through a phase of consolidation and training. Its strength,
equipment, and tactical standards had all been increased. However, when the time came
to move into the Spring 1969 phase, the ideological spirit, resolve and will of the
Battalion was still not equal to that as at Tt Mu Thn 1968.
Before entering this next phase, the command organisation of 445 Battalion had
changed. Comrade Nguyn c Thu was the Battalion Commander - having replaced
Comrade Nguyn Vn Kim (Nm Kim) who was appointed to command the Chu c
District Unit; and Comrade Nguyn Minh Khanh held the position of Political Officer
replacing Comrade Nguyn Minh Ninh who was appointed the Deputy Political Officer
of the Province Unit. Nguyn Vn Kim and Nguyn Minh Ninh were moved to Province
to fill new appointments.395 The Deputy Political Officer of the Battalion was Comrade
Nguyn Vn Bo (Sau Bo) and the Battalion seconds-in-command were Comrade o
Vn Tng (Tam Tng) and Comrade Chn Long.396*
When on the march in Spring 1969, 445 Battalion was ordered to simultaneously
attack four objectives in B Ra Town: the Regional Forces Group base, the self-propelled
artillery base, the Province Chiefs palace, and the Vn Kip Training Centre. Different to
our attacks at Tt Mu Thn in 1968, this time 445 Battalion attacked principally by
indirect fire in coordination with our infantry. However, at the conclusion of the attack,
we withdrew immediately and did not hold on.
At 1am on the third day of Tt397, the Battalions firepower fell simultaneously on
its objectives the enemys important bases in B Ra Town. Following the shelling
attacks398, our infantry group assaulted and seized a number of important pre-determined
targets - most importantly, the base of the Regional Forces battalion. Having learnt the
lessons of Tt Mu Thn (1968), the enemy in B Ra Town were more vigilant and had
taken tight defensive measures around the important objectives. Accordingly, when our
infantry attacked the targets, they floundered against the enemys fierce resistance. The
enemys firepower fell like rain and stopped short our attacks. Australian tanks from Ni
t came to their aid and assisted the puppet infantry to counter-attack the Battalion from
the rear and into our positions. The Battalions formation was split by the enemy. The
battle became more decisive with every minute, and our casualties increased by the
moment. The Battalion Headquarters concluded that we did not have the capability to
strike any deeper, so gave the order to withdraw immediately during the night in order to
395

Translators Note: This sentence is repetitive and contradictory; it appears to be an editorial error.
*At the end of 1969/beginning of 1970, Comrade Chn Long was moved to the Province Military
Intelligence Unit; Comrade Nguyn Anh V was appointed Battalion second-in-command; Comrade
Nguyn Vn Bo (Su Bo) was appointed Political Officer of 440 Battalion; and Comrade Nguyn Vn
Oanh was appointed as the Battalion Deputy Political Officer. After Comrade Nguyn Vn Tm (Ba Tm)
was killed at Lang C Thi (1970), Comrade o Vn Tng (Tam Tng) was appointed as the Battalions
Deputy Commander.
397
Translators Note: According to 1 ATF records, 445 Battalion attacked B Ra Town on 23 February
1969 and suffered 10 killed and 12 wounded. 445 Battalion elements noted in the attack included the 1 st and
rd
3 Companies and a reconnaissance element 1 ATF, INTSUM 54-69, Ni t, 23 February 1969; and
Graham, N.F. Major, D445 - Order of Battle, 1 ATF Battle Intelligence Section, Ni t, 29 May 1970.
398
Translators Note: On 26 February 1969, over-calibre 107mm rockets were fired into the Vn Kip
National Training Centre on B Ra Towns eastern outskirts the 4th Company of 445 Battalion was
believed to have been responsible 1 ATF, Enemy Situation in Phc Tuy Province, Ni t, 11 March
1969. H12 was the nomenclature for the H12 Type 63 multiple rocket launcher - ie a 12-tube 107mm
rocket launcher. It is highly probable that over-calibre 107mm rockets were fired from a single tube
launcher or a field-expedient launcher.
396

112
husband our forces. The outcome of the 1969 attack was not on the scale as the attack at
Tt Mu Thn, but was still quite resounding and affirmed the existence of the B Ra
Long Khanh armed forces and their capability to attack deep into the enemys rear areas,
administrative facilities, and military nerve-centres at any time.399
In 1969, when the Americans and their puppets were forced to change the
direction of their strategy and de-escalate the War, B Ra Long Khanh Province was a
base from which to withdraw their troops. Chu c and Long t Districts became
principal areas for the development of their Accelerated Pacification Program. An
extreme test of strength between us and the enemy ensued.400
The enemy launched a series of sweeping operations, clearing along Routes 2, 15
and 23. They used bombs and chemical poisons to destroy the mature jungle where they
suspected that we had bases and stationed our troops. The enemy employed bulldozers to
clear the land along the roads and deep into our bases in the Minh m, Chu Pha, and
the Hc Dch. Australian commandos and puppets in teams and sections, continuously
scoured deep into the jungle for many days at a time. Almost all the tracks and junctions
to and from the jungle were ambushed by the enemy.
Together with the increase in sweeping operations and attacks in those areas, in
the populated zones the enemy urgently advanced their pacification schemes. They
divided up the territory, increased their oppression and blockades, separating the people
from the revolution in order to block supplies isolating the necessities of life from our
forces on the outside. The enemy organised intelligence networks (secret agents) to
follow all activities among the people associated with the revolution. They arrested and
beat anyone that they suspected of being involved in supply activities for the revolution.
They strictly forbade the people from storing rice in their houses and taking rice out into
the fields. Pictures of our cadre were pasted up everywhere with monetary rewards for
informing the enemy of their location or capturing or killing our cadre. The reward for
capturing a District Committee member was 10,000 piastres ((USD 85)), and if shot and
killed 5,000 puppet piastres. The Australian and puppet troops would regularly lie in
wait, patrol, prod the ground searching for tunnels - all trying to discover any external
infiltration, and scare the people. More dangerously, the enemy used psychological
warfare White Swan401 agents - and also traitors who had surrendered broadcasting
from aircraft both night and day, to call upon our cadre and soldiers to surrender or to

399

Translators Note: According to the 1991 D445 History: In this attack on the enemy in B Ra Town,
the Battalion destroyed 13 tanks and armoured vehicles, two artillery pieces, and a large quantity of
ammunition - and removed from the battlefield almost 100 puppet soldiers. A 1985 ng Nai Province
publication relates that D445 wiped out 330 enemy in B Ra Town on 22 February 1969 - H Sn i &
Trn Quang Toi, ng Nai (The Heroic Units of ng Nai), op.cit., 1985, pp.14-20.
400
Translators Note: On 16 May 1969, the Commander of the US II Field Force Vietnam (IIFFV) at Long
Bnh issued a new directive to the Commander 1 ATF that changed the operational priorities of the Task
Force. The first priority was now to be pacification, the second upgrading of the South Vietnamese forces,
and the third was to be military operations see Horner, D.M., Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam
War, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.40, Australian National University, Canberra, 1986. See
also Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.132-133. For a useful review of
Pacification to the end of 1968, see Young, E.J., Stability in Rural Vietnam, December 1968, VCAT Item
No.13510141001.
401
Translators Note: The Bit i Thin Nga (White Swan Special Unit) comprised female Republic of
Vietnam police personnel tasked to covertly infiltrate the Vit Cng infrastructure organisation and base
areas. Formed in August 1968, in 1972 the units title was changed to Special Mission Group G4231g. See
Nguyn Thanh Thy (a former unit commander), Nh n Bit i Thin Nga Remembering the
White Swan Special Unit, 17 June 2008.

113
rally402 to the enemy. They disseminated distorted information from our units cadre and
soldiers and infrastructure members, who had given up etc in order to shake the
morale, will, and psychology of our remaining personnel.
To restore the adverse situation on the battlefield, the Province Committee
directed an increase in our forces in the two critical districts. Chu c District was
directly supported by COSVNs main-force 33rd Regiment, and 445 Battalion was alloted
to support the Long t battlefield. Consequently, immediately following our attack on
B Ra Town, the whole of the Battalion swiftly deployed to t to coordinate with
the local forces and continue attacks on the enemy, blocking their sweeping operations,
and defending the liberated zones and the revolutionary bases. In the Spring Summer
phase in 1969403, 445 Battalion fought three large battles that had resounding results.
In the first battle, we joined with 440 Battalion to attack the post at Phc Ha
Long on 16 May 1969.404 We wiped out a Regional Force company at the post and held it
402

Translators Note: Begun in 1963, the Chiu Hi (Open Arms) program encouraged North Vietnamese
and Vit Cng forces and infrastructure members to rally ie to defect to the Si Gn Government. For
Chiu Hi statistics for all provinces see VCAT Item No.2234403020. Phc Tuy Province statistics
were: 1965 77 ralliers/defectors/returnees (hi chnh); 1966 278; 1967 317; 1968 45; 1969 121;
1970 196; 1971 37: for seven years 1,071 (National: 176,756). The 1963 and 1964 rallier figures were
not broken up by province. There were reportedly 20,242 ralliers in 1966, and a US cost-benefit analysis
reported an assessed overall cost of USD 125 for each rallier that had saved the lives 3,000 Free World
Forces. Williams, O., Some Salient Facts , 14 February 1967. - VCAT Item No.19600209008. The t
District History (2006) related that: The enemys poisonous psychological warfare practices caused us
considerable damage. In the Province in the first six months of 1966 - in Chu c District alone, there
were 22 cases of surrendering to the enemy. From January to October 1966 in the whole of the Province,
66 cadre and soldiers surrendered abandoning their duty ie to return and make their living with their
families Report of the Province Committee dated October 1966, Party Central Office Archives, Office of
the Eastern Nam B Regional Committee. However, in May 1972 after the withdrawal of 1 ATF, the US
Province Senior Advisor in Phc Tuy Province declared the program was largely moribund, and was
inducing few VC to defect. - Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.648, p.1054
endnote 33. See also Koch, J.A., The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam 1963-1971, Rand
Corporation, Santa Monica, January 1973.
403
Translators Note: COSVN directed a 1969 Summer-Autumn Campaign beginning on 5 May 1969
with the principal front in Ty Ninh and Bnh Long Provinces, and a secondary front against the 18th ARVN
Division and areas east of Si Gn. see H Sn i (ed), History of the 5th Infantry Division, Armed
Forces Publishing House, H Ni, 2005 ie the 5th Division History (2005), see extracts at Annex K.
404
Translators Note: Several communist histories including the D440 History (2011), relate an attack on
the Phc Ha Long post and the t Sub-Sector on 15 May 1969. The D445 History (1991) does not
specifically relate a Vit Cng company-strength attack on t Town on 15 May 1969. However, a
captured report - signed by the 445 Battalion Political Officer (Nguyn Minh Khanh), related an attack by
445 Battalion on t on 14-15 May 1969 by all four companies and with elements of 440 Battalion
(as D2), resulting in six D445 personnel killed and 31 wounded. The report claimed to have put out of
action 107 enemy, seized five weapons and captured a PW. - CDEC Log 07-2146-69. On the morning of
15 May, 1 ATF ready-reaction elements (9RAR) deployed to assist the Regional Forces at t . A
consolidated report on the morning of 16 May by 1 ATF on the engagements in t listed the
friendly losses as: ARVN KIA: 7, ARVN WIA: 26, ARVN MIA: 12 12 M-16 rifles missing; and the
enemy losses as: 2 KIA (possible), one M2 rifle and one pistol captured. 1 ATF, INTSUM No.13669, Ni t, 16 May 1969. 1 ATF assessed that the company-strength attack comprised elements of 445
Battalion and the C25 Long t District Company. 1 ATF also later reported that 440 Battalion had
combined with D445 to attack t results 3 WIA. Annex A to de Cure, P.F. Major, D440 LF
Battalion, HQ 1 ATF Ni t, 29 September 1969. According to the 2012 volume of the Official
Australian Army History: D445 Battalion and part of D440 Battalion occupied part of t in midMay 1969. p.154; and at broad daylight, a large group of Viet Cong (estimated at a composite company
of D445 Battalion and C25 Company) infiltrated t and occupied part of the village., Ekins, A. with
McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.160. The attack is not mentioned in the Long t District
History (1986), nor in the later t District History (2006). For 440 Battalions involvement in the
attack on t , see Chamberlain, E.P., D440: Their Story, op.cit., 2013, footnotes 134, 137, and 194.

114
for a day and a night. Our forces suffered 17 wounded. The Battalions medical element
led by Comrade Nm Hiu, worked tirelessly both day and night to wholeheartedly care
for and treat the wounded soldiers.
The second battle occurred on 12 June 1969405 when the 1st Company of 445
Battalion independently attacked an Australian commando company at the Cy Vng
p Thu T-Junction. That attack did not go well as the element of surprise was soon lost
- we were unable to seize our objectives, and the Australians counter-attacked decisively.
Comrade B Nm the commander of the 1st Company was killed.406
In the third battle on 13 August, an element of 445 Battalion slipped into t
and attacked the enemy at the Phc Thi communal hall. The engagement was drawn
out, and the gunfire only ceased in the afternoon. Although not many of the enemy were
killed, that attack deep into the enemys rear area evidenced and affirmed the existence of
the Battalion and the revolution. It also created faith and belief among the people in the
revolutionary movement at a time regarded as the darkest.407
Also at this time, although the Battalion had to routinely deal with large sweeping
operations conducted by the Australians and puppet forces, we still launched effective
operations in support of local elements. However, having to oppose many of these large
and violent sweeping operations that lasted over many consecutive days, our strength
numbers underwent some loss. The most difficult aspect was food and supplies and our
reserves and rear service stocks were gradually emptied. Towards the end of 1969, there
were serious deficiencies, and rice was essentially reserved to cook gruel for the
wounded. On many days, the troops had to eat yams, sprouting tubers, and vegetable
leaves instead of rice and then even eat types of vegetable roots and fruits (both
common and scarce). Many people ate these despite damage by the bombs and the
chemical poisons of the Americans and their puppets.
Those were the days of the greatest hunger ever since the Battalion had been
founded. However, our situation was more favourable if compared with the circumstances
of our infrastructure and our Party agents. The Battalion was always close to the people
and so had assistance and protection from them. The source of rear services supplies for
the Battalion for some time was principally from the people, especially from the people of
the Route 2 region (Chu c) and Long t District. These sources of supply were like
405

Translators Note: Neither the 1991 D455 History nor this 2004 D445 History mentions the 6-8 June
1969 Battle of Bnh Ba between the 33rd NVA Regiment and 1 ATF elements probably because 445
Battalion did not participate in that engagement. 440 Battalion participated briefly in the fighting at Bnh Ba
in early June 1969. For detail, see: Chamberlain, E.P., The 33 rd Regiment : Their Story, op.cit., 2014, pp.
47-84; and Chamberlain, E.P., D440: Their Story, op.cit., 2013, pp.61-70. At 0015hrs on 6 June 1969,
about 20 kilometres south-southeast of Bnh Ba village, 25-30 82mm mortars rounds were fired into
9RARs Fire Support Base Thrust at YS 500550 near the Long Hi Mountains one Australian soldier was
killed and seven wounded. This appeared to be in support of an attack by elements of D445 Battalion on a
Rural Development Cadre compound (YS 512544) and an ARVN outpost (of the 2nd Battalion/52nd
Regiment) in the Hi M area. On 7 June 1969, Chu c Districts C- 41 Company attacked Ha Long
village. These attacks were part of a COSVN-directed High Point campaign intended to impact on the
Midway meeting on 8 June between Presidents Thiu and Nixon and to herald the founding of the
Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) on 8 June 1969.
406
Translators Note: This engagement in the t area is not noted in either the 1991 D445 History nor
1 ATF records covering mid-June 1969. The t District History (2006) relates that: In the two months
of June and July 1969, our secret infrastructure agents in Phc Hi guided the Provinces 445 Battalion
into the village where they concealed themselves among the peoples houses before attacking the enemys
pacification group and the Peoples Self-Defence Force. In Hi Trung hamlet (the area of the present-day
market), they killed six of the Rural Development Cadre and the group leader of the Peoples Self-Defence
Force. They also captured and lectured 30 other enemy before releasing them.
407
Translators Note: This engagement is not related in the 1991 D445 History - nor in the t District
History (2006), nor in 1 ATF records.

115
never-dry mothers milk that nourished the Battalion and ensured that we could
continue to fight and win. However, from the beginning of 1969, the enemy employed
every scheme and means to ensure a stifling blockade. Supplying us whether overtly or
covertly, became extremely difficult, and there were times it seemed not possible.
In this difficult situation, the Battalion Headquarters and our comrades in the rear
services element lost many nights sleep thinking of measures, but were unable to find a
suitable solution. Subsequently, it was agreed to withdraw a number of our soldiers and
cadre who were in poor health and allocate them to the Battalions self-sufficiency
production units in the rear areas, and expand the cultivation and production of quickgrowing food plants. They also actively hunted and caught jungle animals to ward off
hunger. Parallel solutions included our rear services personnel connecting with
infrastructure cadre and opening up exchange points farther afield - where the enemys
surveillance and blockades were less tight. Here, they could purchase rice, necessities,
and medicine etc to supply us. However, these methods were manpower-intensive and
included loss of lives, as the farther they travelled the greater was the risk of ambush by
enemy commandos.
The Battalion Headquarters concluded that the most basic way to resolve our food
difficulties was to destroy the enemys control by concentrating on the destruction of their
bunker systems so that we could contact our infrastructure agents, open local supply
points, and take advantage of the local people as a plentiful source to supply our rear
services. This approach was to be complemented by attacks on the enemy, the support of
the revolutionary movement by the Province Committee, and attacks on the enemys
Accelerated Pacification Program. Preparations were made - and swiftly and actively
progressed.
Daily, the enemys control of rice became even more strict, and with our troops
unable to enter the hamlets, the villagers sought every way of bringing food and grain into
the jungle. Rice was hidden under baskets of faeces. Salt was dissolved in water and
carried in cans. Rice was hidden in buckets of rubber latex. Sodium glutamate and
medicine were hidden in blouses and shirts and in the hems of trousers etc. But slowly
the enemy also discovered these measures. They checked the blouses and trousers of all
women as they left the hamlet gates. It was very difficult, and only a few people got
through. Mr Su Cht of Long Phc was carrying very large handfuls of food into the
jungle for the 445 troops, when he was stopped by the enemy. He told them that it was for
his own consumption but a soldier forced him to sit down and eat the lot. Su Cht tried
to eat it all - to the point where he couldnt get up and fainted, and he nearly died from
over-eating. If a handful or a small can408 of rice was slipped out by the villagers in
1969-1970, it was paid for in blood.
At that time when the situation in the rear services areas was very difficult, the
Province Economic and Finance Committee made many efforts to gather contributions to
guarantee supply to the Province Committee and provide a portion for the soldiers. The
Trade Sub-Committee was also further strengthened, re-organised and given additional
tasks. Relying on the vehicles controlled by the forestry workers, our trade cadre gave
them the task of purchasing merchandise detailing which products were to be purchased
by each individual vehicle. The Province trade cadre organised a purchasing network for
these products in response to the requirements of each unit.409 The Province Unit directed
408

Translators Note: Literally: Lon a re-usable aluminium powdered milk can (capacity 275 grams or
1/3 litre) usually Guigoz brand, that was routinely used for measuring quantities/volumes of rice and
also for storage.
409
Translators Note: Large quantities of rice and other foodstuffs were acquired by the Province Forward
Supply Council through purchasing agents. For example in the first half of 1969, the Council reported: -

116
our armed forces to control the enemy posts in the area of the T L exchange point (the
enemys Base 4 on Route 1) to support our trade efforts. By offering a price higher than
normal, through the wives and children of the puppet officers, we could purchase food in
large quantities as well as a large amount of necessary combat-related material such as
batteries, electric wire, medicine, and medical equipment. The wives and children of the
puppet officers even colluded with us to steal military Jeeps and Honda vehicles and sold
these to us very cheaply as no paperwork was required.410
2. The Defeat of the Bunker Strategy
The direct and dangerous combat opponents of 445 Battalion in this period were
still the Australian and American forces, the 18th puppet Division, and the Phc Tuy
Province Regional Forces.
At this time the M16-E3 mine fence was completely ineffective. Not only had it
been breached and unable to block our forces infilitrating, but the M16-E3 minefield had
become a mine warehouse from which 445 Battalion and the local armed forces were
able to lift mines and deploy these against the enemy. Within the minefield, the Party
Chapter and the guerrillas of the villages of Phc Thnh, Phc Th, and Phc Ha
Long built many secret tunnels in which to store food, rice, provisions, and medicines
and also to guide our troops in their attacks on the enemy. This was where the troops,
cadre, guerrillas and the cadre of the District Committee met, reviewed the situation, and
developed plans to strike the enemy. Our guerrillas and secret Party members of the three
villages of Phc Thnh, Phc Th, and Phc Ha Long also daringly came in and out
of the minefield with our troops although crawling through was more difficult for them
than the troops because their hair and clothing would catch on the wire (our troops only
wore short trousers when crawling through the fence). Many young women had to wear
short trousers and short-sleeved shirts, and smear mud all over their bodies in order to
cross through the minefield on missions to fight beside our troops (because their skin was
very white and easy to see).
The M16-E3 minefield could not block the attacks by 445 Battalion and the armed
forces of Long t District on the t battlefield at the beginning of 1969. With the
aim of strengthening their minefield which had proved ineffective, from the beginning of
1969, the Australians developed a bunker tactic.411 Along with the minefield, the
on 25 August 1969, having purchased or requisitioned: 66,000 litres of rice in Long t, 18,775 in Chu
c; 1,630 in Xuyn Mc - CDEC Log 02-1480-70. With effect from 1 November 1969, the B Ra-Long
Khnh Province Unit directed that the ration entitlements for 445 and 440 Battalions were 27 litres of rice
per man/month when on operations and 25 litres when in base areas or training CDEC Log 06-2911-70.
For detail on NVA/VC rice and salt rations, see 1 ATF, Troops Information Sheet No.33, Ni t, 21
February-5 March 1967: VC rations combat troops 750gm of rice per day, but 875gm for artillery troops.
For a unit-level report, see 6RAR/NZ, VC/NVA Food Supplies, Ni t, February 1970 including use of
tapioca/cassava, bread fruit, bananas, and bamboo shoots (AWM95, 7/6/30). For NVA/VC use of flour as a
food staple, see Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM No.166/71, Ni t, 16 June 1971.
410
Translators Note: For other examples of accommodation with the VC, see: footnote 111 for claims of
Major Nguyn Vn Phc the ARVN officer responsible for Route 15 security, being involved in an
accommodation/local dtente (ha hon) in 1964 with the local communist forces - including providing
grenades and ammunition; footnote 306 on mutual self-limitation in Xuyn Mc District; footnote 448 on
the VC penetration of the Regional Forces and the 1 ATF response; and the Chu c District History
(2004) on the VCs suborning of ARVN Captain B of c Thnh Sub-Sector who the VC claim to have
used as a crux to purchase and transport food and supplies.
411
Translators Note: Construction of bunkers for the 1 ATF project around t village began on 21
May 1969. The 38 bunkers included seven 15-man bunkers and 30 four-man bunkers with 10,500 metres
of wire obstacles. An artillery observation tower was constructed at Fire Support Base Thrust (YS 499549)

117
Australian military emplaced a system of bunkers - comprising 36 bunkers, around three
villages in the t area: Phc Thnh, Phc Th and Phc Ha Long.412 Twothirds of each bunker was constructed below ground level. On top, and surrounding the
bunker, the enemy placed thick sand-bags. Each bunker had many firing loop-holes at
ground level facing the direction from which our revolutionary forces would come.
Surrounding the large bunkers were protective concertina barbed-wire fences, while the
small bunkers had single-strand barbed-wire fences. In front of the bunkers was an 8metre wide track to allow tanks to deploy in support when necessary which was also
used for inspection and control by their commanders. Outside the track, the enemy
constructed a 20-metre wide fence with a communications trench 1.5 metres wide. On the
bund of the trench and beneath the wire, mines were planted to block our attacks on the
bunkers. Each large bunker was manned by a section, and the small bunkers were manned
by a half-section. They were armed with heavy machineguns, light rapid-fire
machineguns, and M79 grenade launchers.413 The bunkers were connected by telephone
lines and ready to provide mutual support. This bunker tactic was built urgently in a
period of six months and by July 1969 it was basically complete.
Along with their fenced minefield and system of bunkers, the Australians proved
to be extremely dangerous, creating a barrier with solid defensive works and heavy
firepower to interdict all routes and to inflict heavy casualties on 445 Battalion and our
forces operating in Long t District.
445 Battalion found it very difficult to operate against the Australians new
tactical scheme. For many months, there was no way to enter the hamlets to collect
information, or to purchase food, necessities, or medicine. Our reserve stocks were
empty, and we were hit by a situation of hunger never before experienced. Contacts
between the unit and the people were completely severed, the local revolutionary
movement was cut off and we entered a period of decline. In the hamlets, the enemy
divided into teams and sought out our secret tunnels and terrorized those families that
they suspected of being in contact with the revolution.
Enduring hardship and violence was the yardstick of a persons spirit and
integrity. At the time that the great majority of the Battalions cadre and soldiers held
their ground, overcame difficulties, and staunchly fought on, there were a small nunber
who feared the hardship and sacrifice and whose confidence had declined and there
were even a number who were traitors414 and surrendered. This was not only a painful
blow to the morale of the cadre and soldiers of the unit, but in a number of circumstances
also resulted in serious losses for us. The defection of the deputy commander of the 2nd
Company415 and the Battalions personnel staff officer were major blows.416 Several times
four kilometres south of t to command the whole area. - Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the
Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.161. In that work, there is a detailed sketch map (Map 6.2) of the 38 bunker
locations at p.162; and Sketch 6.1 at p.164 illustrates the bunkers construction.
412
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History adds that: The large bunkers were about 300-500 metres
apart, and interspersed between them were the small bunkers about 100-200 metres apart. The t
District History (2006) relates: by night, a system of brilliant searchlights operated.
413
Translators Note: The M79 grenade launcher is a single-shot, shoulder-fired, break-action grenade
launcher that fires a 40mm x 46mm grenade. With an effective range of 350 metres, the M79 can fire a
wide variety of 40mm rounds, including explosive, anti-personnel, smoke, buckshot, flechette, and
illumination.
414
Translators Note: Traitors were reportedly colloquially termed by the communists as: tt (to have
slipped), or tt (to have turned). Bi Tn, From Enemy to Friend, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2002,
p.98.
415
Translators Note: In the 1991 D445 History, this passage is followed by a harsh criticism of traitors
Battalion personnel who defected to the enemy ie: This hardship and the violence was also the travelling
companion of betrayal. 445 Battalion had traitors who surrendered to the enemy. These included Lc ((ie:

118
they guided the enemy on sweeping operations that attacked and destroyed many of the
Battalions rear service installations and storehouses.
On one occasion, they led two puppet battalions in coordination with Australian
troops, to strike into the Battalions base at Long Tn causing a number of losses to the
Battalion. The Battalion had to withdraw back to the Hi M area to consolidate. Due to
the urgency of the situation, we were unable to inform the Province authorities. At the
time, Comrade Nguyn Minh Khanh the Battalion Political Officer, was at a meeting at
the Province Headquarters and unaware of the situation in our base. Only when Comrade
Nguyn Minh Khanh was escorting Comrade T Hng Sinh ((Mi Sinh)) back to the
base did the Province Committee receive the radio417 message from the Battalion
informing them that the enemy had seized our base.418 The Province Committee was
extremely worried about the fate of the key cadre and the protective troops escorting
them, and despatched people to follow the group but they did not catch up with them in
time.
Nguyn Vn Nhng - aka Lc, the commander/deputy of the 2nd Company, rallied on 29 July 1969 and
was debriefed by Lieutenant E.P. Chamberlain, see AWM photographs)); and Quc Hng the Battalions
political adjutant. They guided enemy battalions on sweeping operations that destroyed many of the
Battalions bases and storehouses. For detail on the defection and activities of Nguyn Vn Nhng, see
Annex B Senior Cadre, footnote 18 and p.9. For Chiu Hi (Open Arms) statistics, see footnote 402.
416
Translators Note: As noted in the footnote above, the personnel staff officer was probably either:
Quc Hng the Battalions political adjutant, see Annex B Senior Cadre, p.6; or Trn Vn Kinh a
445 Battalion Assistant Political Officer, who rallied on 8 September 1969 see: Graham, N.F. Major,
D445 - Order of Battle, 1 ATF Battle Intelligence Section, Ni t, 29 May 1970.
417
Translators Note: NVA/VC communications were intercepted by 1 ATFs signals intelligence
(SIGINT) unit - 547 Signal Troop. The radio message (HF morse code) from 445 Battalion to the Province
Unit was probably encrypted and transmitted on one of the following radio types: Chicom 102E (15w HF),
US AN/GRC-9, Chicom K-63 (2w, AM with CW capability that had replaced by the Chicom 71B) or
less likely, by voice (VHF) using the US AN/PRC-25 (VHF) set. A 1 ATF study in early 1969 reported that
D445 possibly had a US-manufactured SCR-694 HF radio (AM, 17w). De Cure, P.F. Major, D445 Local
Force Battalion, HQ 1ATF Ni t, 18 January 1969. In February 1970, a rallier related that each
company of 445 Battalion had one PRC-25 and section headquarters have PRC-10s. 1 ATF, INTSUM
No.56/70, Ni t, 25 February 1970. A 445 Battalion rallier in mid-September 1970 stated the Battalions
communications equipment comprised: a 15w set using only morse ((ie: a Chicom 102E or a US
AN/GRC-9)), three PRC-25 sets, one PRC-10 set, and three field telephones with 2,000 metres of cable. - 1
ATF, INTSUM No.263/70, Ni t, 20 September 1970. The encrypted HF morse communications of 445
Battalion were in a four figure (one-time letter) code, with five figure and five letter ((code)) mainly used
in traffic to higher formations that was in a higher encryption. email to author from Major R.J. Hartley,
AM (Retd) 29 April 2012. For 1 ATF SIGINT operations in mid-1966 related to the Battle of Long Tn,
see Annex E. The location of NVA/VC radio transmitters were fixed by direction-finding (DF)
techniques with both ground-based and airborne equipment. For security, SIGINT reports were
euphemistically referred to as Special Agent Reports (SPARs). Battalion commanders in 1 ATF
considered these fixes as as extremely useful but accurate only to approx 1,500 metres. ONeill, K.J.
Lieutenant Colonel, 8RAR Combat After Action Report - Operation Cung Chung I and Operation Petrie,
Ni t, 10 August 1970, paras 16, 26. Units of 1 ATF, were enjoined to forward any captured signal or
cryptologic documents quickly to 1 ATF Headquarters for exploitation and advised related key words
and key abbreviations to assist in identifying such 1 ATF, Troops Information Sheet No.79, Ni t,
14-20 January 1968.
418
Translators Note: The more detailed account in the 1991 D445 History relates that Nguyn Minh Khanh
(Hai Khanh) was escorting T Hng Sinh (Mi Sinh - who had just been appointed as the Party Secretary
of the Long t District Committee) and Sinhs predecessor: L Thnh Ba (Ba Bi) then a provincial
cadre dispatched to give direct on-the-spot guidance. In mid-1971, when Xuyn Mc District was
absorbed into Long t District - ie to become Long Xuyn District, T Hng Sinh (Mi Sinh) was
appointed Secretary of Long Xuyn District see The Minh m Base History (2006) see the translated
extracts at Annex M to Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit, 2011. Mi Sinh may also have served as
the Chief of Staff of 440 Battalion in early 1970 - Appendix II to Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.84/70,
Ni t, 25 March 1970.

119
When the group was about 40 metres from the Battalion base at T Lon, a series
of the enemys Claymore mines419 exploded with dozens of mines exploding at once.
The four leading soldiers were killed on the spot. Comrade Nguyn Minh Khanh was
wounded in the stomach and the arm, while Comrade T Hng Sinh was wounded in the
thigh and in the stomach, and another comrade was seriously wounded. Comrade Hai
Khanh, Comrade Mi Sinh, and two liaison comrades buried their companions in an old
trench. Early the next morning, Comrade L Thnh Ba (Ba Bi) and the two liaison
comrades cut their way through the jungle to the new base, to inform the Battalion.
Remaining behind, Comrades Nguyn Minh Khanh and T Hng Sinh and the two liaison
comrades did not passively lie down and wait for the unit to come to them, rather the four
comrades helped each other through the jungle despite their wounds, hunger and thirst,
and while not knowing the way. 11 days later, the four comrades reached the unit
thanks to the help of our countrymen. A Claymore mine ((mn mo)) satchel containing
300,000 piastres420 had been retained intact by the comrades and was handed over to the
unit as planned. This money had been allocated to the unit by the Province Rear Services
to resolve our difficulties at a time of serious shortages and hunger.421
Comrade Nguyn Minh Khanhs wounds were quite serious, but he decided to be
treated in the unit so that he could implement the Province Committees guidance in our
new circumstances. The whole Battalion thoroughly grasped the Province Committees
spirit of holding-on. In particular, they understood its direction to destroy the Australian
militarys bunkers, and the Province Committees absolute faith in the Battalion for that
task. However, ideas on the method and means of destroying the bunkers were divided with many having opinions. At the time, the most important task given to the unit by the
Province Committee and the Province Unit was to swiftly destroy the bunkers by every
means possible and to cut the enemys close control in the t region.422 Our supply
routes had to be re-established, and communications between areas in Long t with
other areas and battlefields in the Province had to be re-opened. The Battalions Party
Committee and Headquarters began planning to defeat the Australian militarys bunkers,
to restore the units momentum, and to contribute to getting the District and the villages
back on their feet.
From 30 August to 5 September 1969, the Province Committee held a conference
to study the issues and produce a resolution on destroying the strategic hamlets and the
Accelerated Pacification Program. At the conference, Comrade Phm Vn Hy was elected
as the Secretary of the Party Committee replacing Comrade L nh Nhn423 who was

419

Translators Note: M18 Claymore a US directional mine with a lethal range of 50 metres, remotely
detonated by wire.
Translators Note: At the official exchange rate (in 1969, 118 piastres = 1 USD), the 300,000 piastres
was equivalent to USD 2,542.
421
Translators Note: Food and monetary allowances were outlined earlier at footnote 409.
422
Translators Note: A captured 28-page Vit Cng notebook (entries: August-October 1969) by a D1
cadre revealed that 445 Battalion received instructions in August 1969 from the B Ra-Long Khnh
Province Party Committee Attacks on t to foil the enemys accelerated pacification effort in the
Province, and three villages in the t area (Phc Thnh, Phc Th and Phc Vnh Long) were
chosen as the pilot area for counter-pacification to destroy the enemy blockhouse network thereby to
boost the local revolutionary movement. CDEC Log 11-2585-69, VCAT Item No.2131409011. That
CDEC document incorrectly linked D1 with 440 Battalion. D1 was a cover designator for 445
Battalion, and D2 was a cover designator for 440 Battalion.
423
Translators Note: L nh Nhn (Chn L/Chinh L/L Chnh) had earlier been posted from U1 (Bin
Ha)/MR1 to B Ra Province as Secretary of the Party Committee and political officer of the B Ra
Province Unit. L Chnh was noted on 21 June 66 and 22 July 1966 as Secretary of the Province Civil
Affairs Committee - see CDEC Log 9-2049-66; and also later in January 1967 CDEC Log 05-2647-67.
420

120
given other tasks. While the conference was meeting, news was received that the beloved
Chairman H Ch Minh had passed away (2 September 1969). The Province Committee
held a solemn memorial service for Him [sic] and launched a movement to turn the
deeply-felt grief into revolutionary action. One of the components was to render
ineffective the enemys bunker strategy. The Province Committee re-affirmed its
direction to strongly attack the Accelerated Pacification Program and the enemys system
of bunkers and weapon pits in Long t, and gave 445 Battalion the mission to attack
them.
To implement that direction, the Party Committee and the Battalion Headquarters
organised a series of studies and political activities to re-educate the troops with the aim
of creating a large change in the thinking and ideology of the cadre and soldiers before
embarking on these special and important attacks. Apart from training in sapper tactics
for the companies and democratic discussions on ideas for ways of attack, we initiated a
comprehensive emulation program among the elements of the Battalion. Converting the
deep grief into revolutionary action was concretized in the slogan Strike the enemy and
open the way forward.
Through that series of re-education activities, the ideology and combat standards
of the cadre and soldiers in the Battalion was raised. Overcoming the supply and rear
services difficulties after the enemy attacks into our base areas, the Battalions Party
Committee was determined to find all ways to cross Route 23, contact the people, and get
close to the storehouses of our combat rice supplies that the unit had buried in tin
containers all over B Bn Hill and the Cu Sa area of Hi M so that we had rice to eat
while implementing the plan to attack the bunkers.
Understanding the Party Committees direction, each of our companies organised
political activities to thoroughly review the situation and build the resolve of the cadre
and soldiers through ideological means. Through such political action, the cadre and
soldiers agreed to contribute their ideas democratically in order to implement the
measures to overcome the difficulties. Over many years, the Battalion had created our
rear services organisation widely across and around the Minh m Mountains. If unable
to enter Long in or t , we opened routes into Phc Tnh. If we could not enter
An Ngi or An Nht, we would go into Hi M424, Long M, and Phc Hi. If we were
struck on the edge of the hamlets and were unable to enter, then we would wade through
the water along the beaches.
When there was no access, we would Strike the enemy and open the way
forward. Attacking the enemy in order to get rice, the cadre and the soldiers of 445
Battalion were not content to just sit in the hills and give up because of hunger and the
enemys blockade.
The unit had scraped up the last grains of rice in our reserves to enable our first
section to go into battle. One element - our elite troops of the 1st Company, was
deployed to attack the Regional Forces at Cng Du. The 1st Company was reinforced
with a 57mm RCL, two B40s, a B41, and a 12.7mm machinegun.425 Fighting from
L Chnh was also noted holding the position in 1971 and 1972 - CDEC Log 07-1132-72. See also Annex J,
Higher Headquarters.
424
Translators Note: In 2012, former RD cadre stated that the D445 Battalion Commander Trn Hng,
was killed during an attack on Hi Cu hamlet, Hi M village on 5/6 September 1969. He was reportedly
identified by documents on his recovered body. RD cadre suffered three killed and six wounded in the
attack see: Hng Qu & Hong V,Hi k ca cn b xy dng nng thn vng xi u, Ngi Vit,
13 March 2012, http://www.nguoi-viet.com/absolutenm2/templates/?a=145830 . The incident is not
recorded in the 1 ATF Operations Logs or INTSUMs.
425
Translators Note: The Minh m Base History (2006), p.55 (see translated extracts at Annex M to
Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit, 2011) relates the attack by an elite force from 445 Battalions 1st

121
midnight to 4am, they fired all 10 RCL rounds and more that ten B40s and B41s as well
as several magazines [sic] of 12.7mm ammunition. However, they were still not
successful, and moreover, a further number of cadre and soldiers were wounded at a time
when each of our companies only had a little more than 10 riflemen.
After the attack, the Province Committee and the Battalion Headquarters
continued meetings to determine a best way to attack. Finally, a method to destroy the
bunkers with sapper tactics was approved. The Province Committee wholeheartedly
welcomed this approach and designated Comrade T Li a sapper cadre, to come down
and instruct the Battalion. After more than two weeks, Comrade T Li and the
Battalions reconnaissance element had completed training in the basic techniques in
particular, the sapper infiltration approach, to a number of the Battalions cadre and
soldiers.
On 21 September 1969426, the Battalion organised a section of 25 soldiers427 led
by the Battalions second-in-command Nguyn Vn Tm (Hai Tm) to go forth and
attack the bunkers. On this operation, the Battalion employed the sapper techniques that
had only recently been studied. The force - comprising 25 soldiers, all had good
infiltration skills, were brave, and its core element was the Battalion reconnaissance
troops. They were armed principally with grenades and B40s. To avoid being seen by the
enemy on open ground and also because of the obstructing wire in front of the enemy
defences, our group relied on guerrillas and underground Party members from Phc Th
village to guide them to their concealed positions in Phc Sn hamlet very close to Da
Quy ((The Horseshoe)). From behind the enemys bunkers in the area of Phc Sn
hamlet of Phc Th village, they would then move closer to their objectives.
Our reconnaissance element crawled forward and secretly cut the telephone lines
between the bunkers. Hearing a sound, a guard called out to see who was there. Comrade
Company that included the use of 122mm rockets: Our attacking force fired 10 DKB ((122mm)) rocket
rounds, more than ten B.40-B.41 rounds and several cases of 12.7mm heavy machinegun rounds - but we
were unable to finish off the bunkers. That History records the second attack on 21 September 1969, and
a subsequent attack on 28 September.
426
Translators Note: Rather than 21 September, according to the captured notebook (see footnote 422
above), the first attack was made at 2200hrs on 4 September 1969 and carried out by 34 selected
outstanding cadre including the 445 Battalion executive officer (presumably Hai Khanh). They
reportedly killed 20 enemy while suffering one killed and one wounded. The second attack was mounted by
24 hard-core 445 Battalion personnel at 2400hrs on 2 October 1969 in which they reportedly killed 25
enemy and captured 11 AR-15 rifles. The third attack occurred on the night of 21 October 1969 in which
14 bunkers were reportedly destroyed. While the dates in the notebook do not exactly match the dates in the
445 Battalion Historys account above, the notebook detail being a contemporary record, is likely to be
more accurate. CDEC Log 11-2585-69, VCAT Item No.2131409011. 445 Battalions attacks on the
bunkers are also related in the Minh m Base History (2006) ie Phm Ch Thn (ed), Cn C Minh m
, op.cit., 2006 - which records attacks on 21 September (the second) and on 28 September. Regarding the
early September 1969 attacks, 1 ATF reported that in the Vit Cng attacks on bunkers north-east of t
on 5-6 and 6-7 September 1969, three bunkers were over-run and four soldiers of 613 RF Company
were killed and four wounded. One Vit Cng was killed the leader of a sapper/reconnaissance platoon
1 ATF, INTSUM No.252-69, Ni t, 9 September 1969. The Australian Official History relates: On the
night 4/5 September, D445 Battalion penetrated the perimeter fence and attacked the north-eastern bunker
line from the rear. They killed two RF soldiers, wounded three Australians and destroyed three bunkers by
fire. - Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.166. Subsequently, a captured Vit
Cng letter dated 11 September from Ba Anh (a Long t District cadre) discussing these attacks noted
that, in t , they: hit four bunkers and about one enemy squad was wiped out and five M-16s
were seized, but in t , we lost one of our platoon commanders due to one of our shells. Ba Anhs
assessment on the availability of rice from the villages was very sanguine ie: The food situation in the
villages had gone back to normal ((our people were)) going in-out all the time. Annex A to 1 ATF
INTSUM No.262-69, Ni t, 19 September 1969.
427
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History cites this group as being 15-strong.

122
Hai Tm quickly replied: Theyve ((derogatory term)) got into the rice. As soon as he
had answered, the enemy in the main bunker responded: The mn have got into it.428
With the telephone wires cut, our troops placed explosives against the walls of the
bunkers and threw hand grenades through the loop-holes. A series of large explosions
rang out, and the six enemy bunkers collapsed.
Surprised by our daring method of attack, the enemy immediately fired
illuminating rounds from Da Quy Hill and the t Sub-Sector. Australian tanks from
Da Quy tightly blocked the ways out of t . Our infrastructure agents and the
guerrillas of Phc Th village swiftly guided our 25 soldiers to withdraw to Phc Thi
hamlet. From there, they returned safely to the base. By attacking in this way, the enemy
was caught completely by surprise, and was unable to react in time. Our unit wiped out
six bunkers and only lost one comrade killed. The Battalions second-in-command
Comrade Nguyn Vn Tm, was afterwards called the king of bunker attacks.429
Immediately after the attack, the Battalion held a meeting and shared the
experiences of that bunker attack broadly among the whole unit and the units of Long t
District. The sapper technique was chosen as the optimum form of attack. The Battalion
advised methods to distract the enemy and to conceal our attacking force where the
ground was open and enemy defences were strong.
Almost a week later, when we heard that the enemy had refurbished the bunkers
attacked by the Battalion in Phc Sn hamlet, the Battalion Headquarters specifically
Political Officer Nguyn Minh Khanh, directly tasked Comrade Nguyn Vn B (Hai B)
to lead a Battalion reconnaissance group to study and devise a method of attack. At that
time, Comrade Hai B was a combat cadre of the Province Unit reinforcing the Battalion
while a large number of the Battalions military cadre were undergoing training.
Accepting the mission, Comrade Nguyn Vn B and the reconnaissance group led by
Comrade Thanh (Thanh Chm) went and studied the terrain of the bunkers at Phc Sn
over two nights and confirmed that the enemy had re-occupied five. The two comrades
discussed the matter and came up with an acceptable plan which they reported to the
Headquarters. Following approval by the Battalion Political Officer Nguyn Minh
Khanh, orders were given for the attack. While preparing the weapons and explosives,
Comrade Thanh (Thanh Chm) was injured - so Political Officer Nguyn Minh Khanh
directed that he be replaced by his deputy, Comrade Nht.
At 5pm on 28 September 1969, Comrade Nguyn Vn B led 15 reconnaissance
troops organised in five groups, from the L base (Long Tn) across Route 23 to
launch a surprise attack on Phc Sn hamlet at 7pm. As Comrade Nht had not had an
opportunity to reconnoitre the terrain, Comrade Nguyn Vn B tasked Comrade Nht
and two other soldiers to crawl towards the target and identify it in order to ensure a
satisfactory attack. On returning, Comrade Nht did not retrace the path that they had
used and detonating a grenade trap laid by the enemy, he was killed. This worried a
number of the cadre and soldiers in the reconnaissance group who were then afraid that
the enemy would have discovered them and having lost the element of surprise, the
enemy would have increased their defences.

428

* Mn are a type of small animal there were many in that region. Translators Note: Mn are small
deer also known as Hong Nam B (Muntiacus muntjak annamensis) weighing up to 30 kilograms.
Translators Note: This attack on the bunkers led by Nguyn Vn Tm on 21 September 1969 is also
described in the 1991 D445 History. However, that work relates: However, the explosive charges only
detonated outside the wire, and no enemy troops were killed. Rather, they returned fire fiercely. Without
any defences, we suffered casualties. Although we fought throughout the night, only one of the teams was
able to destroy one bunker the other two teams were unsuccessful. Once more, we had been defeated.

429

123
Facing this situation and based on his own experience and judgement, Comrade
Nguyn Vn B assessed that they had not yet been discovered and urged his men to
attack and revenge Nht. To be more certain, Comrade Nguyn Vn B ordered the
reconnaissance soldiers to crawl forward and confirm the situation. Just as he had judged,
the enemy had abandoned two bunkers (including a command bunker), while the other
three bunkers were still firmly occupied by the enemy. Having re-organised his force, at
exactly 12-midnight on 25 [sic] September, the whole group moved close to their target.
There was a sudden sound as all of the grenades that had been crammed into the firing
loop-holes exploded, and the whole enemy force within the bunkers was wiped out. The
results of that night were that we destroyed three bunkers, killed 19 of the enemy on the
spot, and seized 14 weapons. Our group swiftly swept the battlefield, buried our dead, and
then withdrew safely to the base before dawn.430
At the beginning of October 1969431, in implementing the directive of the
Province Committee, 445 Battalion coordinated with Long t District and launched a
general attack on the Australians bunker system. The Battalion was aware of the
alarmed psychological state of the bunkers defenders, and that the enemy had no
solutions apart from increased patrolling and closer liaison between their bunkers.
Accordingly, on the night of 7 October 1969, the Battalion launched a third series of
attacks in the area of Phc Ha Long village. In those attacks, our 12 teams attacked 12
bunkers. That night, we were again successful the 12 bunkers were flattened.432
So, in a period of over two weeks with the determination to convert our deep
grief into revolutionary action, the Battalion had deployed its troops in three series of
attacks and destroyed 21 bunkers. In coordination with 445 Battalion, the local forces of
Long t District had supported the people and the underground infrastructure to take
advantage of the enemys fear - to the extent that the enemy would not sleep overnight in
the bunkers. We blew up a further four bunkers, raising the total of destroyed bunkers to
25 of the 36 bunkers. After our general attack, the remaining bunkers numbered 11 but
neither the Australians nor the puppet troops dared stay in them overnight. Basically, the
bunker tactic that had been regarded as the most effective defensive tactic by the
Australians in t , had failed completely.
Our great victory in attacking the bunkers had broken the enemys blockade and
encirclement, destroyed their tight control of the three villages of t , and created the
conditions for the local movement to develop. Immediately after the bunker system had
been destroyed, each night the Battalion could arrange for its companies to enter the
hamlets, meet the people, purchase food and provisions, and make contact to get
430

Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History also described a bunker attack on 28 September in which
Comrade Nht was killed and 14 weapons seized. That account also related that Nht had crawled up to
the loop-hole and saw that the enemy in the bunker were playing cards. The account in the t District
History (2006) related: Having studied the lessons of the first attack, on 28 September, two secret Party
members Miss Tu and Miss ang, guided 445 Battalion into Phc Ha Long village. Using five
explosive charges, we collapsed three bunkers, killed 19 enemy, seized 14 weapons, and withdrew safely.
431
Translators Note: During October 1969, a B-52 strike was targeted against D445 Battalion in the Long
Hi area resulted in 46 secondary explosions, suggesting that the area was probably being used for the
storage of vast quantities of munitions. II FFV, Operational Report: Lessons Learned - Period Ending 31
October 1969, 17 November 1969, see: DTIC AD507319. For B-52 strikes, see also footnote 387.
432
Translators Note: The official Australian Army history notes that on 3 October 1969, an element of
D445 Battalion assaulted four bunkers from within t ; they killed five RF soldiers, wounded two and
seized M16 mines and weapons before withdrawing, leaving the bunkers partially destroyed. On the night
16/17 October, Viet Cong sapper teams destroyed another four bunkers. Four days later, in the early hours
of 20 October, the enemy attacked again with small arms and RPGs. They blew up three bunkers using
large petrol charges that completely destroyed them. On the following night, they attacked and destroyed
two more. - Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.167.

124
information from our infrastructure cadre. Following in the footsteps of the 445
Battalions troops, the Party political cadre of Long t District and Vng Tu City
located in the t and Minh m base areas also re-established contact in order to
rebuild their agent networks, and to purchase food, provisions, and medicines etc. Having
made contact with the people, the hunger issue was basically resolved, and the strength of
our troops was gradually restored.
With the system of bunkers at t destroyed and the enemys steel defensive
net punctured, our communications, command and liaison networks from Province to the
districts and from the districts to the villages was now open again. In particular, the local
revolutionary movement in Long t District especially in t and the nearby
region, had the opportunity to consolidate and recover. Our guerrillas launched many
armed propaganda activities, and the people rose up and took control - even family
members of puppet soldiers in the Peoples Self Defence Force (PSDF)433 were involved.
They gathered at the posts and at the Sub-Sectors demanding that their husbands and
children leave the PSDF and not bear weapons as mercenaries for the Americans. As a
result of such good military proselytising against the enemy, in a short period of time we
had forced the disintegration of 400 [sic] PSDF in Phc Hi and 80 PSDF in the villages
of Hi M, t , and Phc Li.
Exploiting our success, 445 Battalion organised an attack on a post at Phc Ha
Long. With the defensive bunkers in Phc Ha Long village now destroyed, the
Battalion launched an attack on the post while, at the same time, ambushing the enemy
relief force. In that battle, the Battalion wiped out a Regional Forces company and
killed Major B, the Sector second-in-command, who had led the enemys relief force.434
The cadre and soldiers of the Battalion together with the Long t District
troops, infiltrated into the minefield, and for many nights de-activated and lifted mines435,
and took them back to use in the defence of our bases thus using the enemys weapons
against them. Following many clearing operations into the Minh m base area - in
which the Australians lost many killed by the E3 mines that we had lifted and replanted,
433

Translators Note: The Si Gn Governments Peoples Self-Defence Force (PSDF- Nhn Dn T V and termed Phng V Dn S by the communist side) was established in July 1968 after the mid-year
General Mobilisation (ie post-Tt 1968). The PSDF superseded earlier militia ie the Combat Youth, the
Popular Militia, and the Revolutionary Development Peoples Group. Operating under the village chief, the
PSDF encompassed able-bodied males aged 16-17 and 39-50 years. See the PSDF Handbook 1969,
VCAT Item No.14040111001. Women were also allowed to volunteer. PSDF comprised combat defence
(phng v xung kch) and support elements, with Combat PSDF organised in 134-strong groups
consisting of three inter-teams of 44. In three-man cells, the principal tasks of the PSDF were static
guard-type duties. At the end of 1970, the PSDF reportedly had 3.8 million members country-wide,
comprising 1.4 combat defence members (37%) armed with 463,750 weapons, and 2.4 million support
members (63%).
434
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History similarly related that: The Battalion destroyed the camp at
Phc Ha Long and wiped out a 70-strong Regional Forces company including Major B, the deputy
commander of the Sector, who was killed while leading a relief force. Although not mentioned in the t
District History (2006), according to the D440 Battalion History (2011) pp.105-106: At the end of
November or the beginning of December 1969, the Battalion ((440)) joined with 445 Battalion in an
excellent coordinated attack on the Phc Ha Long post at the t Sub-Sector Just as our tactical
plan had anticipated, at 9am an enemy relief force ((from B Ra Sector)) was deployed and fell into the
ambush set by our two battalions. In only 15 minutes of combat, we wiped out one company completely
. However, neither the 1991 nor the 2004 D445 Histories cite the participation of 440 Battalion in the
attack on the Phc Ha Long post.
435
Translators Note: On the disabling and lifting of these mines, the official Australian Army history
relates: According to various estimates, the Viet Cong eventually lifted between 5,000 and 10,000 mines
and thousands of M26 anti-lift grenades. - Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012,
pp.247-251.

125
they had to abandon their M.16-E3 minefield. At the end of 1969, the Australians brought
M41436 tanks to sweep away their mines and destroyed the 11-kilometre long M.16-E3
minefield that they had built in 1967. The tracks on their M41 mine-sweeping tanks were
damaged, and they had to replace these with M48 tanks which they drove at a higher
speed to completely clear the minefield.
At the end of 1969, the enemy had perfected their Pheonix437 machinery at all
levels, while at the same time hectically implementing their Accelerated Pacification
Program and their Supplementary Pacification Program with many new schemes. On
the basis of its operations and organisation, Pheonix operations were the centre of
gravity of pacification. Combined with these determined internal attacks against us and
their continuous external sweeping operations, the enemy increasingly employed
commando tactics. With these types of attacks, the enemy inflicted many losses on us
our agents continued to be thinned out, and our cadre could not maintain their grip on the
people.438
436

Translators Note: 1 ATF was equipped with a squadron of British-made 50-tonne Centurion tanks and
did not operate either M41 or M48 tanks. For the clearance by 1 ATF of the minefield see Lifting the
Minefield Chapter 8 in Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.241-275.
437
Translators Note: The Pheonix (Phng Hong) program was targeted against the communists
political infrastructure - ie termed the Vit Cng Infrastructure (VCI), see footnote 244 and USMACV,
Phung Hoang Advisor Handbook, Saigon, 20 November 1970. As noted, in mid-1968, total VCI in South
Vietnam were assessed as 98,658 see MACORDS Director Pheonix Staff, Analyzing Size of the VC
Infrastructure, Saigon, 22 June 1968 VCAT Item No.F029200060426. The US author Stanley Karnow
on the effectiveness of the Pheonix program, quotes Nguyn Th nh, (Major General Communist Party
Central Committee) and General Trn (a dissident, 1923-2002) eg: extremely destructive; Nguyn C
Thch (Vietnam Foreign Minister 1980-91) it wiped out many of our bases see Andrad, D., Ashes to
Ashes The Pheonix Program , Lexington, 1990, pp.278-279. Our side also suffered seriously from the
subsequent pacification dreamed up by the Americans, such as Operation Pheonix and the Chieu Hoi
campaign which was designed to induce our troops and supporters to defect. - Bi Tn, Following Ho Chi
Minh: The Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel, op.cit., 1995, p.63. However, distrust, lack of
cooperation and over-lap between Vietnamese intelligence agencies in the Pheonix program were a major
difficulty, and in Phc Tuy Province it had only marginal impact. In April 1970, 1 ATF reported that the
Pheonix program was achieving very little results there had been a reduction in the VCI as a result of
((1 ATF)) ambushes, contacts, air strikes and hoi chanhs ((ralliers)) , but remarkably little that can be
attributed to the Phung Hoang Programme. - Pacification Review: Jun 69 Jul 70, Annex A to HQAFV
R723-1-13, 23 June 1970. Most VCI eliminations are a direct product of Task Force operations and
identification from captured documents, Hoi Chanhs and PW. Few of those eliminated have been
important cadres at village level, most being low level supply organisers The intelligence community is
fragmented and uncoordinated. VC/VCI Activities and Capabilities in Phuoc Tuy May 1970, Annex B
to HQAFV R723-1-13 of 23 June 1970. For an assessment of the VCI and 1 ATF counter-VCI operations,
see also Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.35-39. For a critical review of
the Pheonix program, see also: Valentine, D., The Pheonix Program, William Morrow and Company, New
York, 1990 and 2000; and, as noted above, Andrad, D., Ashes to Ashes the Pheonix Program, Lexington
Books, Massachusetts, 1990.
438
Translators Note: In a review dated 10 December 1969, VC Military Region 7 declared that
Australian troops also suffered bitter failures in 1969. They are no longer as aggressive in their sweeping
operations as before, and they have often told the people that they will withdraw their troops as soon as the
US forces leave, and they have requested the Vit Cng not to attack them. During the year
approximately 2,509 Australian troops were killed, resulting in six companies and five platoons destroyed.
Five other companies and six platoons were depleted. They admitted that the 5 th Australian Battalion has
lost its combat effectiveness. We successfully eliminated enemy control in Long t (B Ra) We
thwarted the Australian tactic of planting M16 mines and completely destroyed the bunker and watchtower
networks in the areas surrounding strategic hamlets in Long t. - CDEC Log 07-1632-70/CDEC Report
No. 6 028 0700 70 (note also footnote 465 Military Region 7 cited 2,701 Australians killed in 1969).
Earlier in 1969 on 3-4 April 1969, 5RAR elements had attacked the Military Region 7 Headquarters at YS
312984 (west of the ng Qu Plantation) killing 14, wounding 16, and capturing important documents
including codes see Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.146-69, 26 May 1969.

126
While the enemy were making a fuss about having pushed us away from the
villages - and our forces no longer had the capability to infiltrate into the zones that they
controlled, 445 Battalion organised a night-time armed propaganda operation that excited
the people of the t area.
On Christmas Eve 24 December 1969, the Battalion selected a group of strong
comrades stalwart, well-built, and well turned out; equivalent in number to a company,
to suddenly break into the church at t and conduct an armed propaganda activity.
Having sited soldiers to protect against an enemy approach, the Battalion second-incommand Nguyn Thanh Tm (Hai [sic]439 Tm), led a section into the densely
crowded church. Having requested permission from the priest, our Comrade Sau Lin (a
cadre of the Farmers Association of Long t District) and Comrade Mi Cng spoke
directly to their countrymen for about an hour. They explained the policies of the
National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, accused the Americans and their puppets for
persistently waging war through their new schemes and plots, and called on the people to
support the revolution, and to oppose the invading American imperialists and their
reactionary clique of lackeys. Comrade T Oanh the leader of 445 Battalions political
cadre, called upon the puppet soldiers present at the service to hand over their weapons.
The results of that armed propaganda at the t church were wholly successful. The
religious villagers in t were impressed by the image of our revolutionary cadre who
dealt with them in a close, worldly, confident, and dignified manner. Our liberation
soldiers were good-natured, polite, fresh-faced, likeable, and nice quite unlike that
depicted in the governments propaganda. This armed propaganda action had a deep
effect on the psychology of the soldiers and officers of the puppet military and the puppet
authorities in the whole of t District - and more broadly across the whole of Phc
Tuy Province.440
3. Defeating the Barrier Shield Tactic
After the armed propaganda action at the t church, the unit regrouped back
in the Rng La and Sng Ray area, and 445 Battalion continued to fight against the
Australian commandos who entered our base areas. The Australians sought us out and
launched section-strength sudden attacks into our bases. At 2pm on 31 December 1969 at
Lang B (Rng La, Sng Ray), our 1st Company struck an Australian force and inflicted
heavy casualties on a Royal Australian company. We seized three automatic Malaysian
guns441, an AR15442, a M19 [sic]443, and shot down five combat helicopters.444
439

Translators Note: Nguyn Thanh Tm had the aka/nickname Ba Tm; and Nguyn Vn Tm had the
aka/nickname Hai Tm. There also appears to have been a Nguyn Vn Tm (Hai Mo) noted as a
platoon commander in 445 Companys attack on the Sng Cu strategic hamlet (Ha Long) in October
1964.
440
Translators Note: This armed propaganda action by 445 Battalion is related similarly in the 1991 D445
History and the t District History (2006), but those accounts only cite Nguyn Thanh Tm as
addressing the congregation. see Chamberlain, E.P., D445: Their Story, op.cit., 2011, p.74. 1 ATF
reported that at 2155hrs on 24 December 1969, the ARVN t Sub-Sector reported that about 60 Vit
Cng comprising C25 Long t Company elements and local guerrillas, surrounded a church and spread
propaganda to the people in the northern part of the Town 1 ATF, INTSUM No.359/69, Ni t, 25
December 1969. See also Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.363.
441
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History also refers to the unit being equipped with a Malaysian
heavy machinegun (an American weapon). A captured report by a Bnh Thun Party Committee referred
to Popular Forces troops possessing a Malayan machine gun in mid-1970 VCAT Item No.
23130011001. The Malayan/Malaysian weapon may have been a Bren light machinegun used by the
CIA-managed PRU (see footnotes 209 and 352); and a number were also home-made by the VC see

127
At the beginning of 1970, in order to confront the enemys new destructive
schemes and plots, and to restore the disadvantageous situation on the battlefield, the
Province Committee decided to establish the 1st Key Area Vanguard Headquarters445 with
the aim of strongly attacking the special pacification program of the Americans and their
puppets on the Long t battlefield. Comrade Nguyn c Thu the 445 Battalion
Commander, was appointed as the Second Deputy Commander of the Vanguard
Headquarters. The mission of the Vanguard Headquarters was: to mobilise and organise
the activities of the District armed forces in coordination with elements of the Province
forces to undertake armed propaganda operations, to destroy the PSDF system in the
District, and to mobilise the people to rise up and take control. The Province Committee
directed the Province Unit to create a plan to attack the enemy and recover territory and
people, and regain control of the B Ra battlefield especially in the critical area of
Long t. Under the leadership of the Vanguard Headquarters446, a series of attacks was
initiated, striking forcefully at the special programs of the Americans and their puppets.
The peoples war on the Long t battlefield was firmly consolidated.447
VCAT VAA03036. It is unlikely to have been a L4A4 Bren gun (with chrome barrel) as these weapons was
first issued to 1 ATF troops in February 1971.
442
Translators Note: Initially, Australian personnel were equipped with the 5.56mm AR-15 rifle, and later
with the very similar - but improved with a Forward Assist Device, M-16 rifle. One AR-15 was not
recovered after the August 1966 Battle of Long Tn. In mid-1967, the established strength of an Australian
infantry battalion was 876. The ratio of M-16s to Australian-made Self Loading Rifles (SLRs) in a battalion
was 32% M-16s, 68% SLRs and a battalion had 79 GPMG M60 medium machine guns. On ARVN use of
the M-16, see footnote 131 and: USMACV, An Evaluation of the Impact of Arming the Vietnamese Army
with the M-16 Rifle, 30 June 1968. VCAT Item No.F015800240227.
443
Translators Note: Probably a typographical error it is highly likely to have been a M79 grenade
launcher, see footnote 413.
444
Translators Note: No such action is related in the 1991 D445 History - nor referred to in 1 ATF records
of late December 1969/early January 1970.
445
Translators Note: While not mentiioned in the 1991 D445 History, the formation of this 1 st Key Area
Vanguard Headquarters is also related in the D440 History (2011), p.111: The Headquarters comprised:
Comrade L Vn Vit the deputy commander of the Province Unit as its commander; Comrade Phan
Thanh H the chief of staff of the Province Unit, as the first deputy commander; Comrade Nguyn c
Thu the commander of 445 Battalion, as the second deputy commander; Comrade Trn Cng Khnh a
member of the Standing Committee of the Province Committee, as political commissar; and Comrade
Hunh Vn Sinh the secretary of the Long t District Committee, as the deputy political commissar.
Referring to the establishment of the Headquarters, the t District History (2006) included the
footnote: Document No.3/Q, 4 January 1970 signed by Comrade Phm Vn Hy, secretary of the
Province Committee from the archives of the Party History Office, Propaganda Section of the B RaVng Tu Province Committee. That Document No.03/QD on the formation of the Headquarters citing
akas, is illustrated in Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s ng (The History of the Party in B RaVng Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter VIII. In the t District History (2006) account, Hunh Vn Sinh is
shown as T Hng Sinh - ng Tn Hng, Lch S u Tranh Huyn t (1930-2005), op.cit.,
2006.
446
Translators Note: 1 ATF appears not to have been fully aware of this re-organisation see Ekins, A.
with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.428-432; and it is not specifically reflected in
contemporary 1 ATF intelligence reports and studies. However, 1 ATF did know of the dispersal of D445s
companies see the following footnote 447.
447
Translators Note: According to a rallier (4th Company of 445 Battalion), on about 22 February 1970, the
Chief of Staff of the B Ra-Long Khnh Province Unit Phan Thanh H (Hai H), visited 445 Battalion
and together with Hai Khanh (Nguyn Minh Khanh) the Battalions Political Officer, conducted a 1-day
political re-orientation course in the Battalions Sui Rau base (YS 555694). For the coming rainy season
(ie beginning about April 1970), the Battalion was to stay in the Minh m area to support the people in
Long t, and the Battalion was to split up and operate in company-strength for these missions. The 1st
Company was to operate in Long in District [sic], the 2nd Company was to cooperate with the village
guerrillas and operate in Phc Hi village and Can Ba Mia hamlet (Hi M), the 3rd Company was to join
with the village guerrillas for operations in t Distrct, and the 4th Company was to receive its

128
At the beginning of 1970, the Australian military448 implemented a new form of
tactics the barrier shield449 tactic in lieu of the bunker tactic that had failed
completely.450 Based on the arc of old bunkers, when night came the Australians
coordinated with the puppet soldiers to site ambushes in clusters around this belt. There
were clusters in close, and others farther out. Every three to five metres, there was a
soldier in an ambush position and every one was armed with dozens of Claymore mines
arranged to form a wide defensive zone facing the direction of approach of our
revolutionary forces. About 10 to 20 metres away, the enemy sited a strong fire support
group ready to provide support to anywhere that there was a clash or a mine was
detonated. Additionally, in areas that were difficult to ambush, they used sound-sensitive
sensors451 to discover us.
The barrier shield was even more dangerous than the bunkers as their
ambushes could move during the night, and it was difficult to determine their exact
position. At this time, there was no night when our local forces did not have people
wounded, captured, or killed and we usually were unable to recover the bodies of those
killed. One night, the Long t District Committee organised seven groups to go into the
hamlets, but all seven fell into ambushes. On the night of 15 January 1970, a group of
cadre from Long t District entered Long in to set up an infrastructure cell, and seven
were killed and three committee members were missing-in-action. The next day (16
January452), 445 Battalion together with Long t District and village troops, entered
the hamlets to get food but hit the Australian barrier shield, and 12 comrades were killed.
On the night of 27 February, a group of District infrastructure agents moving out of a
hamlet back to the base with information were ambushed and eight comrades were
killed.453
missions from the Battalion Headquarters and the Long t District Unit for mortar attacks. - Appendix II
to Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.127/70, Ni t, 7 May 1970. See also the earlier footnote 365 for the
division of D445 into four groups in April 1968.
448
Translators Note: Joint operations begun in May 1969 with RF were terminated in November 1969
because of clear VC penetration of the RF and difficulty to ensure the security of individuals attached to RF
Companies. In May 1970, 15 RF/PF companies were redeployed with the aim of disrupting accommodation
with the VC. - Pacification Review: Jun 69 Jul 70, Annex A to HQAFV R723-1-13, 23 June 1970. For
accommodation and mutual self-limitation, see also the preceding footnotes 111, 306 and 410.
449
Translators Note: For this fresh concept of close ambushing and village barriers by 1 ATF under
Operation Phi Hp initially near Ha Long village and then in late April 1970 in the t area, see
p.405 (Ha Long) and p.437 (t ) in Ekins, A. with McNeill, A., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012.
450
Translators Note: In a footnote in the 1991 D445 Battalion history, the Vietnamese authors noted:
From first arriving in the B Ra region up until their withdrawal, the Australians implemented three basic
tactics all of which caused us difficulties and losses:
1. The 16-E3 minefield; 2. The bunkers; and 3. The barrier-shield fence.
451
Translators Note: 1 ATF employed Patrol Seismic Intrusion Devices (PSID) to cover dead ground - ie
ground not covered by direct sight. A PSID set comprised four conical-shaped detectors each with a 20metre detection radius, and a receiver. Additionally, Duffel Bag sensors ground-based personnelsensing strings: motion, seismic and magnetic, were controlled by the Artillery Headquarters at 1 ATF.
452
Translators Note: In the 1991 D445 History and the t District History (2006), the incident is
recorded as occurring on 16 February 1970.
453
Translators Note: These losses on 15 January, 16 February, and 27 February 1970 are also noted in the
the 1991 D445 History see Chamberlain, E.P., D445: Their Story, op.cit., 2011, p.75 ; in the Long t
History (1986), p.15; and in Phm Ch Thn (ed), Cn C Minh m 1945-1975 - The Minh m Base
1945-1975, op.cit., 2006, p.4. However, the ambush on 15 January 1970 is not reflected in 1 ATF reporting.
The ambush on 16 February is probably the ambush by 8RAR elements at YS 458564 on 15 and 16
February 1970 resulting in 10 Vit Cng killed (including a D445 Battalion company commander (C-1): H
Thanh Phong; and Dng Quang Ngha: Party Committee member Propaganda and Training, Long t).
1 ATF, INTSUM No.47/70, Ni t, 16 February 1970; Ekins, A. with McNeill, A., Fighting to the
Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.371-372. A H Vn Phong (b. 1939, Phc Hi Company Commander) is

129
These were days of misery and hunger and extreme violence. The Long t
District454 and Vng Tu City forces were isolated in the Minh m Mountains by the
Australian commando barrier and belt coordinated with the puppet forces. Our guerrilla
bases were pushed deep into the jungle, and our guerrillas were unable to maintain
contact with the villagers.455 During the day, 445 Battalion continued to send cadre and
soldiers to search for and dig up bamboo shoots and sprouting tubers and even types of
edible leaves, in order to supplement their meals. At nightfall, they entered the hamlets to
attack the enemy, but each time they were ambushed by the enemy and suffered
casualties. At this time, every grain of rice had to be paid for in blood.456
Faced by this situation, the B Ra Long Khanh Province Committee and the
Province Unit directed that 445 Battalion had to destroy the Australian militarys barrier
shield by any means. After much discussion and changing of plans and methods and
means of attack, the Battalion Headquarters unanimously agreed on a plan to attack the
enemy through a counter-ambush tactic. The difficult problems in implementing this
tactic were how to compel the enemy to reveal his force and their ambush position; and
how to create the conditions for us to then bring our supporting firepower to bear
accurately and to wipe out the enemy.
noted in the martyrs list of this 2004 D445 History as having been killed on 9 March 1970) p.314,
Serial 403. The ambush on 27 February is probably the two 8RAR ambushes on the morning of 28
February 1970 at YS 453536 resulting in a total of seven Vit Cng killed (three KIA at 0723hrs, and four
KIA at 1045hrs) 1 ATF, INTSUM No.59/70, Ni t, 28 February 1970. Post-War, on 8 November 2011,
the remains of 10 Vit Cng soldiers were re-interred in the Long in cemetery nine were reportedly
members of the 1st Platoon of C-25 Company who returning from Long in, were 200 metres from
their base in the Minh m, when ambushed near Chop Rock by Australian troops on at 4am on 26
March 1970. Huyn t an tng 10 hi ct lit s (t District buries the remains of 10
martyrs), 21 December 2011. Three of the martyrs noted in the article Trn Vn Chin, Nguyn Vn
, and Trn Minh Hng, were identified from captured documents as among the seven killed in the two
8RAR ambushes on 28 February 1970. The positions of those three KIA were identified respectively as:
section commander - sapper/recce platoon; medic C-25 Company; and platoon commander - C-25 Long
t District Company. 1 ATF, INTSUM No.59/70, Ni t, 28 February 1970. As a martyr, Trn Vn
Chin was awarded the title: Hero of the Peoples Armed Forces vide Decision 212/Q -CTN, 23
February 2010.
454
Translators Note: In June 1970, the 1 ATF Intelligence Staff assessed that the total strength of Long t
District was 444 personnel comprising: 202 personnel in the District-level organisation and its associated
cells and sections (eg including postal, medical, detention, finance, supply and front associations); 42
personnel in C25 District Company; 122 in 15 village Party Chapters; and 78 in 15 village guerrilla units. Graham, N.F. Major, Long t Order of Battle, 1 ATF Battle Intelligence Section, Ni t, 24 June 1970
(28 pages: including history, organisation, tactics, personalities, cover names and cover designators etc).
455
Translators Note: The t District History (2006) relates: The Australians barrier shield tactic
created an extremely tense situation. Up to 245 Long t cadre and soldiers were killed. In the hamlets, 188
of our patriotic infrastructure members were arrested and imprisoned, and 162 youth were forcibly
recruited. There was a critical shortage of food, and the cadre and the soldiers had to eat bamboo shoots and
aeroplane leaves with thin watery gruel reserved for the wounded.
456
Translators Note: The t District History (2006) records several additional engagements by D445
with Australian troops in the first half of 1970 as follows. On 30 April, 445 Battalion guided by our
secret infrastructure in Phc Li, entered the hamlet and attacked the Australians on a sweeping operation.
An Australian platoon fell into an ambush and six were killed and a further 14 were wounded.
Translators Comment: On 30 April 1970, an Australian 7RAR element contacted a small Vit Cng group
at YS 487570 (one kilometre west of Phc Li village) resulting in one Australian killed and four
wounded. 1 ATF, INTSUM No.120/70, Ni t, 30 April 1970. On the night of 3 May 1970 445
Battalion attacked a group of Australians stationed in t . Our Battalions elements surrounded and
cut-off the enemy, wiping out an Australian platoon, and wearing down another platoon. Translators
Comment: On the evening of 3 May 1970, an 8RAR platoon ambush position at YS 475585 (on the
southern outskirts of t Town) was attacked by 40-50 Vit Cng resulting in six Australian soldiers
wounded, two Vit Cng killed and three wounded 1 ATF, SITREP, Ni t, 5 May 1970.

130
The decision and the thinking of the Headquarters was swiftly passed to the whole
Battalion and democratically discussed. Many of the cadre and soldiers of our
reconnaissance group and in the companies wanted to participate in attacks on the
enemys ambush positions, but the Battalions Party Committee chose only a section for
the operation in order to gain experience. The Political Officer, Nguyn Minh Khanh was
selected to command this suicide operation.457
One afternoon in June 1970, the group left the base in the Minh m Mountains
for the attack. Led by Comrade Nguyn Minh Khanh (Hai Khanh), the seven soldiers
were divided into three teams one leading assault team, and followed by two fire
support teams. On reaching the fields between Phc Li and Phc Ha Long villages,
the leading team was ambushed by the enemy, and three comrades were killed. The
enemys fire support fell like rain. Following our plan, the following elements calmly
went to ground, taking advantage of the bunds of the paddy fields for protection from the
enemys fire while, at the same time, taking the opportunity to determine the location of
the enemy ambush. Having accurately fixed the enemys ambush site and their fire
support positions, the Battalions Political Officer Nguyn Minh Khanh, crawled
forward and ordered the two B40 grenadiers to wipe out the enemys two closest fire
support positions and then ordered the whole group to counter-attack the enemy fire
support positions that had been exposed. After fighting for 10 minutes, our soldiers had
breached the enemys barrier shield, killed a number of the enemy, destroyed two
heavy machineguns, and seized three AR15 rifles etc.
While assisting a wounded comrade, the four remaining comrades carried our
three dead back to Thanh Tn hamlet of Phc Thnh village. There, the villagers
bandaged the wounded comrade and buried those killed. Close to dawn, the Battalions
Political Officer Nguyn Minh Khanh, and the three remaining comrades swiftly
gathered supplies from the villagers. With their arms fully loaded with rice, medicine,
torch batteries, sodium glutamate etc, they returned back safely to the base.458
The blood of our four soldiers who fell in that battle helped the Battalion gain
experience in counter-ambush engagements. Immediately after the battle, the
Battalions Party Committee used that experience to replicate the model and resolved to
conduct a Battalion-level counter-ambush attack.
Three days after the initial attack, 445 Battalion decided to use two companies
(but in strength only a bit more than two platoons because not all were chosen to go) and
the reconnaissance group to deploy from the Minh m Mountains base to t to
destroy the Australian militarys barrier shield defensive line. The Battalions force was
divided into three groups: Group 1 (the 1st Company) led by Comrade Hong; Group 2
(the 2nd Company) led by Comrade Sau Thu; and Group 3 (the reconnaissance element).
When they had reached the edge of the stream beside the ng Long dam (the border
between An Nht village and the Sub-Sector), they met the barrier shield, and the
Australians fired intensely at our suspected positions. Our leading element lost one
comrade killed and one wounded. With our experience and a ready plan, the Battalion
quickly adopted a combat formation: with the 1st Company lining up to attack frontally,
while the 2nd Company attacked from the right flank, and the reconnaissance group
deploying to the enemys rear to open fire and attack the Australians.
457

Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History relates at length a discussion between Su Thu (the
Battalion commander) and Hai Khanh (the political officer) with each wishing to lead the suicide
group.
458
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History claims that 15 Australians were killed, two heavy
machineguns were destroyed, and three AR-15 rifles were seized. 1 ATF records for June 1970 do not
include any such engagement.

131
Attacked from three sides, the Australian commandos were alarmed and
dispirited, and fled down the dam wall calling for their tanks and aircraft to come to their
rescue. 445 Battalion fought exhaustingly with an Australian battalion throughout the
night, using all its B40 rounds. We wiped out dozens of enemy and set fire to a Sioux
helicopter459. The Battalion then withdrew into the hamlet to collect food and provisions
which we carried safely back to the base. The reconnaissance group was stuck in the
hamlet, and the next morning the enemy poured in troops to tightly encircle the area.
Hard-pressed, the reconnaissance section had to hide in a stack of straw (in Mr T Ngns
house) and hold their breaths while awaiting a fight to the death with the enemy at
daybreak. Finally however, thanks to their remaining silent and the resourcefulness of the
house-owner, the enemy did not discover anything and were forced to abandon their
searching. At nightfall, the reconnaissance section returned safely to the base, carrying a
number of armloads of rice, food, medicines and indeed even coffee and cigarettes, to
celebrate our victory. In this battle, the Battalion only had one comrade wounded and one
comrade killed.460
Our great victory with the Battalions counter-ambush tactics resounded across
all the Districts, the Province, and the Military Region. The Battalions combat
experiences were studied, widely disseminated, and became a symbol for the counterpacification movement across the whole Military Region.461 With this combat success,
the Battalion was awarded the Military Feats Medal 2nd Class.462
After that battle, the enemy almost abandoned its barrier shield tactic as they
were unable to withstand the pressure of the continuous attacks by our forces. Afraid of
being attacked, and afraid of being killed the enemy was forced to huddle in defensive
groups. If enemy ambushes were discovered, our cadre and soldiers could simply find
another route avoiding casualties and unnecessary bloodshed.463
We had destroyed their defensive belt and tight control over the three villages464
of t and over a number of other regions in the Province. The 1st Phase of the
Accelerated Pacification Program in Long t District in particular and in B Ra
Long Khanh Province in general, had been challenged and was forced to slow down.
According to the Province Committees report for the 3rd Quarter of 1970, in September
459

Translators Note: Literally a lng km (zinc wire cage) aircraft. The D440 History (2011)
specifically used that term to refer to Australian Army Bell H-13 (47G-3B1) Sioux helicopters.
460
Translators Note: 1 ATF records for June 1970 do not include any such action. In the 1991 D445
History and the t History (2006), the D445 force only comprises: 1 st Company together with a
reconnaissance section ie the 2nd Company is not mentioned. In the 1991 D445 History, Comrade On
a reconnaissance soldier participates in the engagement. In the List of Martyrs annexed to this 2004
D445 History, Nguyn Vn On a section 2ic, is noted as being killed on 16 June 1970 ie probably the
one comrade killed above. In the 1991 D445 History, T Ngn is described as Comrade Hai Khanhs
uncle. On this engagement, the t District History (2006) related: According to the enemys
messages that we intercepted, they lost 80 killed, and two aircraft were shot down. For radio interception
by the NVA/VC and 1 ATF COMSEC awareness, see Annex E, footnotes 6, 7, 29 and 76.
461
Translators Note: In the 1991 D445 History, the influence of 445 Battalions reported tactic only
extended to across the Province.
462
Translators Note: Literally: Hun chng Chin cng hng hai. This award is not mentioned in the
1991 D445 History. However, a Party History states that the Battalion was awarded the higher medal: Hun
chng Qun cng hng hai (Military Exploits Medal 2nd Class) - Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s
ng (The History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter VIII.
463
Translators Note: On 16 July 1970, Trn Vn c the acting platoon commander of B3/C3/445,
rallied at An Nht (Long in), and provided detailed information on 445 Battalions movements from
May to mid-July 1970 as well as information on collecting supplies from Hi M and t . 1 ATF,
Annex A to INTSUM No.197/70, Ni t, 16 July 1970.
464
Translators Note: The three villages in the t area were: Phc Thnh, Phc Th, and Phc Ha
Long.

132
1970, the Provinces armed forces had engaged in 50 counter-attack battles, and driven
636 enemy from the battlefield including 291 Americans and 51 Australians.465 We had
attacked 18 strategic hamlets, eight targets in the suburbs of towns and cities, killed 31
evil oppressors include a quisling administrator, a cell of intelligence informants, 17
Popular Force personnel, six police, and five RD cadre.466 We continued to attack and
disperse the PSDF in several places, and the remainder were but a shell - existing in name
only, and their activities were ineffective. We had control over many villages in the t
, Route 44, and Route 52 areas. Having been strengthened, the liaison systems within
the Province and between Provinces and back to the Region, operated smoothly, and
our supply stations were operating quite effectively.
4. The Destruction of the Supplementary Pacification Program of the Americans
and their Puppets.
From July 1970, in the face of our enduring strength in holding our ground and
continuously attacking with our three-pronged attacks in all areas of the Province, the
enemy concluded the first phase of their Accelerated Pacification Program and moved to
implement the second phase of their Program with more subtle and poisonous means.
They were determined to be more brazen and to also employ larger forces in conducting
their Program. A report from the Province Committee advised that Phase 2 of the
enemys Accelerated Pacification Program (the Supplementary Pacification) had five
principal components:
- Urgently restoring the machinery of quisling administrators in the villages,
strengthening the PSDF, guaranteeing the security of the strategic hamlets, and
preventing our infiltration.
- Increasing their network of spies and their information service, discovering
and wiping out our secret infrastructure in the strategic hamlets.
- Employing the Regional Forces and Popular Forces in coordination with the
National Police Field Force467, to strengthen operations in support of
pacification and defensive operations instead of using main-force units which
would be employed on external operations.
- Encouraging the building and reform of the economy, expanding animal
husbandry, lending funds to develop production, and constructing new villages
and hamlets.
465
Translators Note: On Australian casualties, a Military Region 7 (ie on 12-B) communique dated 5
February 1970 had earlier claimed that 2,701 Australians were killed in 1969 in the Region and included
a lieutenant colonel see CDEC Log 05-1067-70. See also the earlier MR7 claim at footnote 438 of 2,509
Australians killed in calendar year 1969; and the claim of Australian casualties at footnote 514 of 10,000
wounded and killed during the Vietnam War. For Australian official casualty figures, see footnote 515 ie:
414 killed in action and 2,348 wounded see McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003,
Appendix F, "Statistics.
466
Translators Note: Early on 13 April 1970, the RD Cadre Team 1 at YS 515533 (Phc Hi) was
attacked by a Vit Cng company-sized force. One RD cadre was killed, five wounded, and one reported
missing-in-action - and five carbines, two HT-1 radios and a typewriter were lost to the attacking force. 1
ATF, INTSUM No.103/70, Ni t, 13 April 1970. On the evening of 15 April 1970, the Mobile Strike
Force (MSF) base at YS 436516 (Long Hi) was impacted by 18-20 82mm mortar rounds resulting in one
Cambodian soldier killed, seven wounded, and damage to all buildings. 1 ATF, INTSUM No.105/70, Ni
t, 15 April 1970.
467
Translators Note: As noted, the National Police Field Force (NPFF) founded in January 1966, were
organised similarly to infantry sub-units, armed with M-16 rifles, trained in infantry minor tactics and
with a company assigned to each of the 44 provinces. With a strength of about 16,000 in 1970, it was also
the primary riot-control element of the National Police.

133
-

Putting effort into declarations of love-of-country and of ones village,

boosting information on the rallier program and promoting that in many ways.

The most dangerous aspect of this second phase program was that it was not
begun wholly in areas where the enemy had tight control and terrorised the people, but in
places where the enemy had implemented its demagogic policy quite smoothly, thus
making the people - including our infrastructure agents among the masses, to mistakenly
believe that the enemy were good, had changed their ways, were concerned for the
people, and were lenient and kind etc. There were even a few families that had previously
been sympathetic to the revolution who wrote letters calling upon their children in the
resistance to return from the jungle in order to enjoy the advantages of this leniency, and
to move forward quickly towards a reconciliation and concord of the populace.
The enemys second phase of their pacification program was developed across a
wide geographic area in the last months of 1970468, causing us many new difficulties and
complications. Elements of the masses and our infrastructure agents were alarmed and
wavering.
At the end of 1970 469, Xuyn Mc District was incorporated into Long t
District which was one of the Provinces weak regions. To implement the Province

468

Translators Note: In September 1970, there were major changes in 445 Battalion that are not related in
this 2004 D445 History. Earlier, in August-September 1969, personnel had been withdrawn from 445 and
440 Battalions to form a B Ra-Long Khnh province reconnaissance company Annex A to 1 ATF
INTSUM No.51-70, Ni t, 23 February 1970. In July 1970, the Province Headquarters directed that all
units including the two battalions of the Province become trained as sappers as soon as possible.
Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM No.40/71, Ni t, 9 February 1971. In August 1970, the 1 st and 3 Companies
of 445 Battalion and probably the 2nd Company, undertook sapper training; and in September almost all of
the 3rd Company joined with 40 personnel from the K6 Company of 440 Battalion to form the B Ra-Long
Khnh provincial sapper/reconnaissance company ie the C36 Company, under Hai B (ie probably
Nguyn Vn B, a former commander of 445 Battalions 1 st Company) Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM
No.51/71, Ni t, 20 February 1971. On 11 January 1971, the Chief of Staff of the Province Unit Phan
Thanh H, sent a congratulatory letter to the C36 Sapper Company for its 5 January achievements
(probably the attack on La Van hamlet, c Thnh) and praised the Company as the Provinces punch
and as a never-lose sapper unit - Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM No.35/71, Ni t, 9 February 1971. With
removal of the 3rd Company personnel to form C36 Company, in September 1970 a new 3 rd Company of
445 Battalion was created by the integration of 440 Battalions K9 Company (all North Vietnamese) together with some members of other 440 Battalion companies, into 445 Battalion. Annex A to 1 ATF
INTSUM No.17/71, Ni t, 17 January 1971. The 3rd Company then 27-strong, reportedly retained its
former company commander. - 1 ATF Battle Intelligence Section, D445 Order of Battle, Ni t, 6 May
1971. On 17 September 1970, Nm V (Nguyn Vn Nm) the second-in-command and acting
commander of 445 Battalion was reportedly killed in an Australian (7RAR) ambush in t . Reportedly
a northern NVA cadre who had served in Cambodia, Nm V had been assigned to 445 Battalion as its
Chief of Staff and acting Commander on 19 June 1970 OBrien, M., Conscripts and Regulars with the
Seventh Battalion in Vietnam, op.cit., 1995, pp.219-220. See also Annex B to 1 ATF, INTSUM No.262/70,
Ni t, 19 September 1970; and for a summary of his diary entries: Annex B to 1 ATF, INTSUM
No.264/70, Ni t, 21 September 1970. A diary entry of 28 August 1970 detailed the strengths of D445
elements, totally 176 see Annex C. According to the Martyrs List in this 2004 D445 History, Nguyn
Vn Nm Battalion Deputy Commander, b.1940 in Phc Hi (Long t), was killed on 31 August
1970 List II, p.315, Serial 426. See also his outline biography at Annex A.
469
Translators Note: According to the Long t District History (1986), At the end of 1970, D445
ambushed the Australians at Phc Ha Long, killing 80. At Phc Li, village guerrillas used E3 mines to
wipe out an Australian section moving into their base. - p.184. The t District History (2006)
similarly relates: In Phc Li village on the night of 5 November 1970, our village guerrillas used an E3
mine to completely wipe out an Australian section on a sweeping operation into our base. In 1 ATF
records, there are no indications of such incidents.

134
Committees policy of Move to focus on the weak areas470, 445 Battalion deployed
from Long t to Xuyn Mc to support the local revolutionary movement. This was also
undertaken to consolidate the Battalions structure and its political and ideological
aspects, and for training to heighten our technical and tactical capabilities. We needed to
raise the combat strength of the Battalion by a level following the many months of
continuous fighting against the enemy in Long t that had markedly reduced our
numbers.
To prepare for the battle that would lift the curtain on the Dry Season in the
Xuyn Mc area, the two Battalion seconds-in-command Comrades o Vn Tng and
Lm Phng, went and studied the enemy at the old Sub-Sector on the road to B T. The
aim was to draw out the Sub-Sectors Regional Forces and then attack them. Our force
observing the enemy discovered a puppet special forces company 471 stationed in the Cy
Da area on the edge of the strategic hamlet at Xuyn Mc village. As it was a field
position, the enemy had dug a quite large system of communication trenches and fighting
bunkers with firing loop-holes etc. On the night of 30 November to daybreak on 1
December 1970, the Battalion rehearsed the attack on the enemy at Cy Da. This was
based on thorough case studies, training in combat techniques, striving collectively to a
common aim, and practising on a model. The forces utilized in this attack comprised two
companies and the reconnaissance section (but the total only numbered about 25
comrades) divided into three groups, with all to fight as sappers. The reconnaissance
section crawled forward first and slipped through behind the enemys position. They were
followed by three infantry groups who took up positions less than 100 metres from the
objective. At exactly the planned time the sound of the exploding grenades thrown by
the reconnaissance section as a command signal and other firepower from 445 Battalions
three infantry groups, all resounded simultaneously. Being their pay day, the enemy were
quite drunk and, completely caught by surprise, were unable to react in time. As a
result, after four minutes of fighting, the Battalion had won complete control of the
battlefield, wiped out an enemy company, killed 45 on the spot (including the lieutenant
commanding the company), captured six (including a second lieutenant the company
second-in-command), seized 48 weapons of various types, three PRC-25 radios, two
telephones, and a large quantity of military equipment and food etc. The Battalion only
had one comrade slightly wounded.472
470

Translators Note: Literally: Chuyn vng yu. This policy had earlier been promulgated by the
Province Committee in mid-1966 see: ng b x Ha Long, Lch s ng b x Ha Long (1930-2005)
(The History of the Ha Long Village Party Chapter 1930-2005), Chapter VI, 25 April 2009. For the 106page B Bin Province booklet on the policy dated October 1966, see VCAT Item No.23125038001.
471
Translators Note: Literally bit kch usually a reference to a Mobile Strike Force (Mike Force) or
an ARVN Ranger element. However, the unit was an RF company see footnote 472.
472
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History similarly relates an attack on a commando company at Cy
Da on an unspecified date in December 1970 in which: The Battalion had wiped out an enemy company,
killed over 80 enemy, seized 59 weapons, and captured 11 of the enemy. We only suffered one comrade
slightly wounded. The ng Nai Monograph includes: In December 1970, the 445 section [sic]
concentrated its forces and destroyed a Regional Forces company at the Cy Da post in Xuyn Mc.- a
Ch ng Nai, op.cit, 2001. The Xuyn Mc Resistance War History briefly relates the attack on Cy Da
on 30 November 1970 by 30 D445 personnel and District troops killing 45 RF and seizing 48
weapons. - V Kim Hanh (et al), Xuyn Mc Khang Chin 1945-1975, op.cit., 1989, p.160. According to
Australian accounts, on 29 November 1970, 440 Battalion elements joined with 445 Battalion to attack the
Sub-Sector Headquarters and the 386th Regional Force Company compound in Xuyn Mc Town. The
attack - reportedly guided by the Xuyn Mc C70 Company, involved the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Companies of
D445 reinforced by K8 the heavy weapons company of 440 Battalion and their attack precipitated the
deployment of the 1 ATF Ready Reaction Force from The Horseshoe see Anderson, P., When the
Scorpion Stings, op.cit., 2002, pp. 243-244; OBrien, M., Conscripts and Regulars , op.cit., 1995, p.226;
and CDEC Log 01-1468-71. The 1 ATF intelligence staff reported the attack in detail ie: an RF Company

135
The Battalions sudden attack using sapper tactics on the enemy in the Cy Da
area (Xuyn Mc) was a complete victory that had a great significance for both our
tactics and our ideology particularly for our ideology. The Battalion had undertaken this
battle in extremely difficult circumstances the unit had lost a significant part of its
fighting strength, had to suffer many days of insufficient food, had been pursued by the
enemy, had to move constantly, and our numbers had diminished. However, the cadre and
soldiers of 445 Battalion still always successfully completed their mission exactly in
accordance with the Battalions tradition that: when ordered we go; if there are enemy,
we attack and we win. This victory created great enthusiasm among the revolutionary
movement of the masses and the guerrilla warfare movement in the villages in the Xuyn
Mc area who rose up to attack and break up the enemys control mechanisms.
Following the deadly attack on the enemy in the Cy Da area, the Australian
military were able to assess the operational direction of the Battalion. On one hand, they
decisively increased their attacks and pacification efforts in the Long t region - and on
the other, they threw their forces into searching for, discovering, and trying to wipe out
445 Battalion. Once, 445 Battalion was surrounded by the Australian forces but thanks
to the protection and assistance of the people, the Battalion was able to continue to stay
close to the villagers and the armed forces of Xuyn Mc, accelerate the political and
armed struggle to wipe out and wreck the enemys tight control, and make changes in the
weak zone.
445 Battalion next moved to its base area to the south of Bng Ring ((YS
715685)). Before we had time to establish ourselves there, on 2 December 1970, an
Australian company moved to within about 100 metres of our camp. Having discovered
our well-worn trail, the Australians sited an ambush along that route. Hearing the
enemys helicopters landing troops, the Headquarters tasked the reconnaissance element
to hold-on and to determine the Australians next moves. Subsequently, listening to the
reconnaissance sections report that the Australians had placed mines along the tracks into
our base, we were still unsure but were calculating an appropriate response, when an
order was received from Comrade T Lc (commander of the Province Unit) directing
that we must use all means to attack and destroy the enemy. To be more certain of the
choice of a method of attack, Lm Phng (Sau Phng) the Battalion second-incommand, tasked Comrade Tun the commander of the reconnaissance section, to
return and again check on the enemys activities. Having gathered firmer information on
the enemy, the Battalion Headquarters decisively ordered an attack to wipe out the
Australians. The 4th Company employed its 82mm mortars in concentrated fire and its
12.7mm heavy machineguns to fire directly into the enemys ranks, wiping our their fire
support elements and frightening the Australian troops to death. This created the
opportunity for two of our infantry groups from the 1st and 2nd Companies to attack from
the flank and the rear and destroy much of the enemys combat capability. The battle
lasted for almost an hour, after which the Battalion withdrew from the battlefield. The
post (YS 650673) was over-run and their casualties were six RF/PF killed, five wounded, 10 RF MIA
with ten .45 calibre pistols, 39 M-16 rifles, one M-60 machine-gun, and other weapons and equipment lost
including two AN/PRC-25 radios. Seven 90kg bags of rice, approximately 100 cans of food, medical
supplies and money were also taken by the attackers. see 1 ATF, INTSUM No.334/70, Ni t, 30
November 1970; 1 ATF, SUPINTREP No.47/70, Ni t, 1 December 1970; Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM
No.17/71, Ni t, 17 January 1971; Peters, C.C.M. Major, D445 - Order of Battle, 1 ATF Battle
Intelligence Section, Ni t, 6 May 1971 including a sketch map of the attack on the 386th RF Company.
That detailed Order of Battle study also relates with a sketch map at p.C-7, a subsequent attack on 9
December by 445 Battalion elements believed to be 25-30 strong, on a 7RAR platoon seven kilometres
east of Xuyn Mc (YS 731694) in which one VC was killed and two Australians were wounded. see
also 1 ATF, SUPINTREP No.49/70, Ni t, 15 December 1970.

136
outcome was that we had worn down two Australian companies that had been on a
sweeping mission, and had been able to preserve our force strength without any
casualties.473
In the following days, 445 Battalion was forced to move several times, but
remained in the jungle to the south of Bng Ring until the end of 1970 when it received
orders to withdraw back to the base at Ni B Mountain (My To)474 to re-organise its
structure and its forces, and to prepare for an important new future task.
On the afternoon of 22 [sic]475 December 1970, the Battalion moved from south of
Bng Ring back to Ni B. At about 2am - when the unit was in the middle of Lang C
Thi ((YS 690668))476, two-thirds of the Battalion fell into an Australian ambush. After the
explosions of a series of the enemys Claymore mines, grenades, and a range of weapons,
445 Battalion suffered 19 killed on the spot and another 22 wounded including many
comrades who were seriously wounded.477 The heaviest casualties were suffered by the

473

Translators Note: This engagement is not recorded in the 1991 D445 History. It is highly likely to have
been the engagement on 9 December 1970 at YS 731694 (about two kilometres north-east of the abandoned
Bng Ring hamlet at YS 715684 about five kilometres east of Xuyn Mc Town) with a platoon of B
Company/7RAR. The 7RAR platoon was shelled by 12 60mm mortar rounds followed by a ground assault
by 25-30 enemy. The enemy engaged a supporting Australian fire support UH-1H Bushranger helicopter
that was forced to land. One VC was killed in the engagement (Nguyn Vn Sang, formerly of K9/D440
serving in D445s 3rd Company) and two Australians were wounded. Nguyn Vn Sangs ring was
returned by Australian veterans to Vietnamese officials in July 2013 under the Wandering Souls project
see: Tm cac thn nhn lit s c cac k vt CCB Australia lu gi. During the 9 December 1970
engagement, a large bunker system (1000 metres x 300 metres) including over 120 weapon pits and
12.7mm firing positions, was discovered nearby. 1 ATF assessed that the VC force probably comprised
D445 and K9 Company of D440 which was believed to have been under command of D445 since late
August/early September 1970. 1 ATF, INTSUM No.343/70, Ni t, 9 December 1970. The 9 December
1970 engagement including a sketch map, was featured in the Tactics annex in the 1 ATF study:
Peters, C.C.M. Major - 1 ATF Battle Intelligence Section, D445 VC Local Force Battalion (Ba Long
Province), Ni t, 6 May 1971. Subsequently, 1 ATF assessed that: It now appears a possibility that both
the K8 Heavy Weapons Company and K9 Company may have been subordinated to D445. However,
further information is required before any definite conclusions can be made. 1 ATF, SUPINTREP
No.49/70, period 7 Dec 13 Dec 70, Ni t, 15 December 1970. A few weeks later, 1 ATF assessed that
- with the removal of the 3rd Company personnel from 445 Battalion to form the C36 B Ra-Long Khnh
Province Sapper/ Reconnaissance Company in September 1970, a new 3rd Company of 445 Battalion
was created by the integration of 440 Battalions K9 Company (all North Vietnamese) - together with some
members of other 440 Battalion companies, into 445 Battalion. Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.17/71,
Ni t, 17 January 1971. For the reorganisation and dispersal of D440 Battalion and the formation of C36
Company under Hai B (ie probably Nguyn Vn B, a former commander of D445s 1st Company), see
Chamberlain, E.P., . D440: Their Story, 2013, including footnotes 188, 204, and 209.
474
Translators Note: The Ni B Mountains (summit 874 metres - YS 8690, Base Area 302) are in southeastern Bnh Tuy Province, about 10 kilometres east of the My To Mountains that straddle the Phc
Tuy/Long Khnh/Bnh Tuy tri-border area.
475
Translators Note: This date is incorrect. The 1991 D445 History states more generally: One afternoon
at the end of 1970 . 1 ATF records cite 31 December 1970. Rather, according to 1 ATF records on 22
December 1970 at 0030hrs, 445 Battalions 1st Company assisted by Long t District elements, attacked
a post (YS 479598) in Phc Thnh village (t ). That 22 December 1970 attack by D445 elements
was featured in the Tactics annex in the 1 ATF study: Peters, C.C.M. Major - 1 ATF Battle Intelligence
Section, D445 VC Local Force Battalion (Ba Long Province), Ni t, 6 May 1971.
476
Translators Note: Termed by the Australians as the Waterfall Clearing, Lang (Waterfall) C Thi (YS
690668) was about six kilometres south-east of Xuyn Mc Town. According to the account in a Party
history, when made aware that a cadre Nam, had rallied and reported the presence of the Battalion in the
Cy Da base, the Battalion then left Cy Da and was moving to their a Bn base. - Trn Vn Khnh (et
al/tg), Lch s ng (The History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter VIII.
477
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History adds: at that time, the personnel strength of a company was
only about 20 riflemen. This implies a significant decline in 445 Battalions personnel strength in the

137
2nd Company. Senior company cadre were casualties: Comrade Trnh Vn Lim the
Company Political Officer (from Long Phc), and Comrade Trn Vn Long the
Company Commander (from Long Tn village). Comrades Hong Thanh and Nm both
Company seconds-in-command, were killed. These were the largest casualties yet
suffered since the Batttalion was established. The 2nd Company was almost wiped out. It
was an expensive lesson resulting from a perfunctory attitude and a subjective underestimation of the enemy by a number of cadre and soldiers. Even now, the painful
memories of the engagement at Lang C Thi are still deep scars in the hearts of all the
cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion.478
After the Battalion had returned to its base, the ideological situation of a number
of cadre and soldiers was not good. In these circumstances, the Battalion Headquarters
acted in time, organising a review, drawing upon our experiences, and remedying all
facets of political and ideological work such as putting effort into treating the wounded
and respectfully burying the dead. At the same time, they encouraged a vindictive hate for
the enemy, aroused feelings and a resolve to convert deep grief into concrete
revolutionary action in fighting, studying, duty, training, and the rebuilding of the unit.
second half of 1970. In early July 1970, based on captured documents, 1 ATF had assessed D445s strength
as 182 in five companies see OBrien, M., Conscripts and Regulars , op.cit, 1995, p.204.
478
Translators Note: The Lang (Waterfall) C Thi ambush (at 0353hrs on 31 December 1970) - conducted
by B Company/7RAR and 1/1/ 3rd Cavalry Regiment, is related in detail in OBrien, M., Conscripts and
Regulars , op.cit., 1995, pp.232-234; and also in Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish,
op.cit., 2012, pp.482-483 (that also relates the earlier 7/B/7RAR clash with D445s 2nd Company on the
morning of 30 December). The Vit Cng casualties are also identified in 1 ATF INTSUM 365/70, Ni
t, 31 December 1970. In 1994, (then) Colonel M. OBrien interviewed a former 445 Battalion
commander - Nguyn Vn Kim, in Vng Tu, and Kim commented that 445 Battalion was dealt a heavy
blow at C Thi. In the days immediately preceding the C Thi ambush, troops of the 1 ATFs 7RAR had
forced 445 Battalion elements from a bunker system five kilometres south-west of C Thi. The bodies of 21
members of 445 Battalion were recovered by 7RAR from the C Thi ambush site and a further two were
found nearby several days later. All were buried on-site. Several senior cadre were identified among the 445
Battalion personnel killed, including: Nguyn Thanh Tm (Ba Tm) the Battalion second-in-command;
Nguyn Thnh Long the 2nd Company Commander; Trnh Vn Lim the 2nd Company Political Officer;
as well as Phan Thanh Chin (Mi Chin) the Secretary of the Long in District Party Chapter. The
1991 D445 History does not name any of the Lang C Thi casualties, but cites the political officer of the
2nd Company for failing to have checked the route carefully and implies his: perfunctory attitude,
subjective thinking and under-estimating of the enemy. The Martyrs Annex to the 2004 D445 History
only lists two personnel killed on 22 December 1970 including Trn Vn Long; one on 23 December; and
five on 25 December. In accord with a MACV Directive, 1 ATF had ordered the cessation of offensive
operations over the New Year period ie: from 1800hrs on 31 December 1970 to 1800hrs on 1 January 1971.
The 1 ATF Directive (1ATF OPS 1719 of 23 Dec 70) noted that defensive ambushing on routes to
defensive positions was to continue. 1 ATF, OPS1719, Ni t, 23 December 1970. As noted at footnote
476, the ambush is described in the B Ra-Vng Tu Party History that relates that, following the defection
of a cadre - Nam, 445 Battalion was warned to leave its base at Cy Da and move to the a Bn base
and was ambushed by the Australians at Lng C Thi while enroute. - Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s
ng (The History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter VIII. The ambush is also
briefly mentioned in the Xuyn Mc History (1989) - V Kim Hanh (et al), Xuyn Mc Khang Chin 19451975, op.cit.,1989, pp.160-161: 24 comrades killed and many others wounded. An Australian report
noted that D445 elements returned fire with RPDs and small arms, and remained in contact for 2 and
hours. They consistently attempted to withdraw their dead and wounded, suffering additional heavy
casualties in the process. - 2RAR/NZ, Weekly Intelligence Review 718/14, Ni t, 17 March 1971, p.1A-4. On 2 August 2013, Australian veterans visiting Vietnam provided D445 veterans with a detailed
post-ambush sketch map of the Lang C Thi ambush ie drawn by Major G. P. Warland - OC B Coy
7RAR, and extracted from the contemporary Contact/Incident After Action Report in file AWM 95, 7/7/72
- see also the email by the author/translator (Chamberlain) to Dr R.A. (Bob) Hall - Lieutenant Colonel
(Retd), 2 August 2013. On 15 November 2014, Dr R.A. Hall discussed the C Thi ambush with several
D445 veterans in Saigon who believed, incorrectly, that the Australian M113s at the ambush site had been
dug-in. Email: Dr R.A. Hall to author/translator (Chamberlain), 16 November 2014.

138
The headquarters of the 2nd Company was the first to be rebuilt - with Comrade Qu
appointed as the Company Commander, and Comrade T as its Political Officer.
With this timely re-organisation, the Battalion was then able to achieve an
outstanding feat when we broke up a large American sweeping operation into the Ni B
base, driving from the battlefield a company of the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry
Division. We seized 11 weapons of various types and a large quantity of military
equipment. The engagement occurred while the Battalion was actively engaged in
preparations to move and attack the enemy in Long t (following orders from the
Province Unit).479
At the end of 1970480 and the beginning of 1971, across the whole of B Ra
Long Khanh Province - including Xuyn Mc, the enemy simultaneously launched many
operations with the aim of strangling the life out of the population and forcing the
people in the liberated zones and in the base area regions into the enemys strategic
hamlets far from the revolutionary forces. The enemys scheme was to blockade our
forces in the jungle, including 445 Battalion. Medicines, food, and provisions all became
scarce and almost exhausted.481 Guaranteeing food and clothing and medical treatment
for our soldiers and those sick or wounded, now rated as highly as our combat tasks.
Indeed, at times, those non-combat demands were regarded as even more important and
consumed more manpower.
Starting from the general situation and the specific characteristics of our rear
services to guarantee self-sufficiency for quite some time (through the supply of money
and not by commodities), the Battalion Headquarters482 and our rear service elements
needed to thoroughly consider and discuss other ways to overcome these difficulties. The
requirement was that we needed to worry about sustaining the troops (albeit only at a
minimal level) at a time of consolidating our forces while still giving special importance
to conserving our strength. We also needed to allocate time and effort to study, to
training, and to swiftly recovering and increasing the Battalions fighting strength. In
479
Translators Note: According to the 1991 D445 History: Two days later ((ie presumably after the Lang
C Thi ambush)), while the Battalion was reconstituting in the Ni B base, an American unit launched a
sweeping operation into the area. The Battalion hung on to the base and, fighting determinedly, eliminated
nearly 100 Americans in the engagement and was able to firmly defend the base area. However, this
appears to be a reference to the operation launched by the 3 rd Brigade/1st US Air Cavalry Division into the
Ni B area in south-eastern Bnh Tuy Province in late January 1971 that seized over 19 tons of flour and
foodstuffs in the period late January-early February (in the vicinity of YS 832937 445 Battalions camp in
the western Ni B area was reportedly in the area of YS 7990). In a subsequent engagement nearby on 7
February 1971, US forces suffered six killed and 10 wounded 1 ATF, SUPINTREP No.6/71, Ni t, 8
February 1971. For detail on the US 3rd Brigade operations in the Ni B/My To area in the period 26
December 1970 13 January 1971 see 1 ATF, INTSUM No.88/71, Ni t, 29 March 1971.
480
Translators Note: According to the Long t District History (1986), At the end of 1970, D445
ambushed the Australians at Phc Ha Long, killing 80. At Phc Li, village guerrillas used E3 mines to
wipe out an Australian section moving into their base. p.184. The t District History (2006)
similarly relates: In Phc Li village on the night of 5 November 1970, our village guerrillas used an E3
mine to completely wipe out an Australian section on a sweeping operation into our base. In 1 ATF
records, there is no indication of such an incident.
481
Translators Note: The captured diary of L Thanh Khoan (platoon commander, 3rd Company/D445)
related that on 3 January 1971 the day before deploying north to Ni B, rations had been reduced to
Scale 15 - ie each soldiers ration was reduced to a subsistence level of 1 cans of rice gruel per day. L
Thanh Khoan (ex-D440) was killed by 3RAR troops at YS 634734 on 17 March 1971 1 ATF, INTSUM
No.76/71, Ni t, 17 March 1971; and 2RAR/NZ, Weekly Intelligence Review 718/14, Ni t, 17
March 1971.
482
Translators Note: Trn Tn Huy has been incorrectly cited as a former Lieutenant Colonel
commanding 445 Battalion in 1971 see the interview by Lieutenant Colonel G. McKay MC (Retd), 23
September 1993 - Australian War Memorial ID Number SO1932. For background on Trn Tn Huy, see
Annex B - Senior Cadre.

139
order to satisfactorily resolve these requirements, the Battalions Rear Services Section on one hand, made contacts and purchased rice and foodstuffs from distant sources (on
Route 1, in the Hm Tn, Hm Thun, and Tanh Linh areas etc) and on the other hand,
organised hunting and fishing activities. With all these solutions, the Battalion did not
suffer severe hunger like other units, but rather was able to provide even a little
confectionery and medicinal tea for our cadre and soldiers to celebrate Spring and Tt for
1970-1971.483
On 31 March 1971 (two days after the engagement with the Americans at Ni B
484
), when deploying back to the Minh m, the Battalion halted at the Lang B base
(west of the Sng Ray River, north of Ni L nowadays within the territory of Phc
Tn village in Xuyn Mc District). Following a review indicating that we did not have
sufficient foodstuffs to reach our new camp site, the Battalion Headquarters assigned an
element to move through the jungle around Xm Cat hamlet and collect additional food.
On the morning of the third day, when that element emerged near the bank of the Sng
Ray River, it was ambushed by the Australians with both sides opening fire. Our
element broke through the Australian encirclement, returned to the Battalion, and
reported to our Headquarters that the Australians were on a sweeping operation.
Assessing that the Australians could attack our base, the Battalion Headquarters ordered
our companies and elements to swiftly strengthen their fighting positions, shelters, and
trenches. When it was almost midday, an Australian company crossed the Sng Ray
River and attacked the Battalions defensive positions from the rear flank - the area
occupied by the 2nd Company. The Headquarters ordered the 2nd Company to wait until
the enemy was really close before opening fire and then to decisively resist the enemy
in order to lure the enemy forward. When the Australians were about 8-10 metres distant,
our troops opened fire and wiped out each of the enemy groups.
At the same time, the 3rd Company and our reconnaissance group moved along the
Sng Ray and came around to the rear of the advancing Australians. In the face of this
type of attack by the Battalion, the Australian force was soon in disarray and had to call
for the assistance of artillery and air support and then withdrew. In this battle, the
Battalion inflicted heavy casualties on an Australian company, killing many on the spot
and wounding many others.485 We seized nine AR15 rifles, a heavy machinegun, two
M79s, two PRC-25 radios, and shot down three Lp Fish helicopters.486 In this battle,
we seized more weapons from the Australians than ever before. For the Battalion, the
Political Officer of the 2nd Company was wounded and - when the enemys artillery fired

483

Translators Note: At a Pacification Conference held at Ni t on 15 February 1971, it was reported:

Throughout February, the main elements of D445 remained in the Nui Be area north-east of the Province
border. The Battalion had a series of contacts with US troops in Nui Be on 7 February (YS 807906). C1
Company with the Battalion Commander, remained in the Long Hais. Pacification Conference Phuoc
Tuy Province: Period 1-28 February 1971 (AWM95, 1/4/215). As noted, the Ni B Mountains (summit
874 metres - YS 8690, Base Area 302) are in south-western Bnh Tuy Province.
484
Translators Note: This implies that the clash with the Americans had occurred on 29 March 1971 not
in late January/early February 1971 as indicated in US reports see the preceding footnotes.
485
Translators Note: According to a 1985 ng Nai Province publication, in an engagement on 31 March
1971, D445 killed 57 Australians, seized nine weapons, and set fire to 10 aircraft at Lang B (Long Ni
t). - H Sn i & Trn Quang Toi, ng Nai (The Heroic Units of ng Nai), op.cit., 1985, p.17.
486
Translators Note: Literally Ca Lp ie the Parapelecus argenteus fish species. As noted, this was the
communist forces common nickname for the US AH-1G Cobra helicopter. The AH-1G was equipped with
miniguns, 2.75 inch rockets and 40mm grenade launchers. However, the armed helicopters in this
engagement were three RAAF UH-1H Bushranger gunships. One RAAF crewman was hit by ground fire
and subsequently died of wounds. A Bell Sioux helicopter (carrying the Commanding Officer of 3RAR)
was hit by ground fire and forced to make an emergency landing it was later recovered and repaired.

140
into our base during the night, one of the 4th Companys shelters collapsed and a further
number of comrades were wounded.487
The following morning, the Battalion left the Lang B base and continued its
deployment to the Minh m as previously planned. During the move, the 4th Company
carried our wounded escorted by our reconnaissance element and Nguyn Vn Tm (the
Battalion Second-in-Command), but they lost their way and became separated from the
Battalion. Following the directions of the Province Unit, that group then returned to the
base at Bo Bnh (Xun Lc). The 2nd and 3rd Companies - with Comrades o Vn Tng
(Tam Tng) and Lm Phng (Sau Phng) moved during the night to the Sui (Stream)
Nc Nh base (Long Tn). At 2pm the next afternoon, as ordered by the Province Unit,
the Battalion moved north to Bo Bnh to join up with the elements led by Comrade
Nguyn Vn Tm. However, it was another three days before the Battalion reached there
as the route was very tough, and we continuously encountered enemy sweeping
operations.
In the Bo Bnh (Xun Lc) base, we concentrated on reorganising the Battalion
and resting the troops for close to one month. The Battalion was then ordered to deploy to
Long t to attack the enemy, and to support and lessen the pressure on the local guerrilla
forces in that critical area.488 There, the Battalion actively coordinated with C25 Company

487

Translators Note: This engagement is not related in the 1991 D445 History. It is almost certainly the
engagement when elements of 1 ATFs 2RAR/NZ and 3RAR (Operation Briar Patch) encountered a VC
force near a large camp of 32 bunkers on the afternoon of 31 March 1971 at YS 584722 near the Sng Ray
River. The base was occupied by D445 elements less its 1st Company then located in the Minh m/Long
Hi hills. An Australian platoon was counter-attacked from three sides and supporting tanks were unable
to cross the Sng Ray River to assist. Withdrawing under heavy fire, the Australians abandoned the
weapons of their wounded including: three SLR rifles, one M60 machinegun, two M72 LAWs, and 30
Claymore mines. Nine Australians were wounded in the engagement: one soldier and one helicopter
crewman died from their wounds. 1 ATF, INTSUM No.90/71, Ni t, 31 March 1971; Ekins, A. with
McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp. 543-545; Church. J.M., Second to None, Army
Doctrine Centre, Mosman, 1995, pp.135-136; Annex F to 2RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion, After Action
Report, Ni t, 16 May 1971 (AWM95, 7/2/86); and 3RAR, Appendix 4 to Annex Q to After Action
Report Op Briar Patch 1, Ni t, 29 April 1971 (AWM95, 7/3/74). That engagement also appears to
have been related in the D440 History (2011): Also in that Wet Season, K8 joined with K9 and the 1 st
Company of 445 Battalion to wipe out an Australian company on an ambush operation in Xuyn Mc
District. Having first discovered the enemy, we used two 12.8mm machineguns to fire right into the middle
of the enemy overpowering them with the fire from two ammunition magazines. The enemy were still
stunned when K9 and the 1st Company attacked them from a flank and completely paralysed them. A
number were able to flee, but the remainder were wiped out. This engagement was a complete success, and
while withdrawing we were able to shoot down three Australian helicopters that had arrived to extract the
enemys dead. see Chamberlain, E.P., D440: Their Story, op.cit., 2013, p.91. Documents captured by
3RAR on 2 April 1971 nearby at YS 554723 included a D445 tactical aide memoire written on 20 March
1971 and a D445 strength state for January 1971 totalling 160 (HQ 24, Sapper/Recce 11, Sig Sect 20,
Med Sect 90, C1 24, C2 22, C3 26, C4 18) ie compared to the 1 ATF assessment of approx
148. 1 ATF, INTSUM No.92/71, Ni t, 2 April 1971. Another captured document included the names
of five soldiers of C3/D445 who had been wounded in the engagement on 31 March 1971. 1 ATF,
INTSUM No.93/71, Ni t, 3 April 1971.
488
Translators Note: According to the t District History (2006): The B Ra Sub-Region deployed
two companies of 445 Battalion and a combat reconnaissance team to the Long t battlefield. The 1st
Company of 445 Battalion was responsible for the t area (south-west of Routes 23 and 52) and
linking with and supporting the sandy areas of Phc Li, Long Hi M and Phc Hi. The 3rd Company
of 445 Battalion was responsible for the area north of Route 23 joining with and supporting the Xuyn
Mc and Phc Bu areas. The combat reconnaissance team (four comrades) had responsibility for the
villages of Phc Li, Long Hi M, and Phc M and Route 44 Lower. The Districts 25th Company
operated in the Long in area, and linked with and supported the villages of An Ngi, An Nht, Tam
Phc, and Phc Tnh.

141
the local District unit, to launch dozens of daring attacks on Route 23 and Route 44
(Upper).489
The attack on the PSDF in Long in Town on the night of 25 May 1971 was an
interesting attack that symbolized the effective combined tactical operations between
Province and District forces at that time. With our fort tactic of a sudden assault, 10
comrades of 445 Battalion joined with eight comrades from C25 to thread their way in
two groups through many obstacles to get close to the objective (close to the Long in
market). We opened fire simultaneously, overpowering the enemy with heavy firepower.
The enemy were alarmed and passive - and fled in panic. So, after only 11 minutes of
fighting, we took control of the whole market area, captured 21, seized 19 weapons and
all their military equipment, and then withdrew safely to our rear base area.490
5. Holding on Tightly in the Main Battlefield.
In May 1971, COSVN decided to establish the B Ra Sub-Region491 comprising
nine districts (Xun Lc, Cao Su, Chu c, Long t, Xuyn Mc, Long Thnh, Nhn
Trch, Duyn Hi, and Th c) and the three towns of: Long Khnh, B Ra, and Vng
Tu.492 The B Ra Sub-Region Committee consolidated its organisation and declared the
489

Translators Note: According to the 1991 D445 History: 445 Battalion was temporarily divided-up in
order to reinforce the Districts: the 1st Company and the 2nd Company returned to Long t, the 3rd
Company moved to Chu c, and the principal Battalion cadre strengthened the two Districts of Chu
c and Long t. A number of comrades were withdrawn to Province control and sent for study and
training. According to the ng Nai History (1986), with the dispersal of 445 Battalion: the 1st Company
went to Long t, the 2nd Company to Xuyn Mc, and the 3rd Company to Chu c. - Phan Ngc Danh
..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.164. According to 1 ATF records, 445 Battalion had continued to
operate as a mobile battalion until July 1971. 1ATF first became aware of the break-up of 445 Battalion
from captured documents in early September 1971: a captured Vit Cng document dated 3 July 1971
related that 445 Battalions 2nd Company, 3rd Company, Surgical Platoon, Signals Platoon and Recce
Platoon had been sent to reinforce the local forces of Long t and Xuyn Mc Districts 1 ATF,
INTSUM No.273/71, Ni t, 30 September 1971. For detail on the 1 ATF assessment of the DeActivation of D445, see Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM No.302/71, Ni t, 29 October 1971; and the 70page booklet: Headquarters 1st Australian Task Force, B Ra Sub-Region, Vng Tu, 10 December 1971,
pp.3-4 and p.7 that noted however that the fate of C4 and C5 is unknown.
490
Translators Note: On the night 25/26 May 1971, D445 and C25 elements estimated at two squads,
attacked the 54th Popular Force (PF) Platoon in Long in Town near the market at YS 427598 before
withdrawing at about 0240hrs. 19 of the 26 PF were captured, and 18 carbines and a machinegun (BAR)
were seized by the attackers. 1 ATF, INTSUM No.146/71, Ni t, 26 May 1971.
491
Translators Note: In May 1971, COSVN Headquarters decided to disband Military Region 5 and U1
(the cover designator for the Bin Ha Province Unit) and establish two Sub-Regions directly subordinate
to COSVN - ie the B Ra Sub-Region and the Th Bin Sub-Region. The 1991 D445 History related that:
The B Ra Sub-Region comprised nine districts (in the provinces of B RaLong Khnh, and Long
Thnh, Duyn Hi, Th c and the three towns of Long Khnh, B Ra and Vng Tu). See also Annex J
Higher Headquarters. The Long Khnh Town Party History relates that the Sub-Regions local forces
comprised three infantry battalions: 445, 440, and 240. The 4 th ((274th)) Regiment, the 33rd Regiment and
the 6th Engineer Battalion (MR7) reinforced the B Ra and Th Bin Sub-Regions. 814 Rear Services
Group operated along National Routes 1, 15 and 20; and Inter-Provincial Route 2. - Trn Quang Toi &
Phan nh Dng, Lch s ng b Th x Long Khnh (1930 2007) (The History of the Party in Long
Khnh Town 1930-2007), Nh Xut Bn ng Nai, Bin Ha, 2009, p.135.
492
Translators Note: Through a document captured on 16 June 1971, 1 ATF became aware of the
formation of the B Ra Sub-Region 1 ATF, INTSUM No.169/71, Ni t, 18 June 1971. On 29 October
1971, 1 ATF formally published a report on the formation of the B Ra Sub-Region. Earlier on 10 October
1971, a captured document identified the units subordinate to the B Ra Sub-Region and their cover
designators - Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM No.302/71, Vng Tu, 29 October 1971. Subsequently, as noted
above, 1 ATF published a comprehensive 70-page booklet: B Ra Sub-Region, Vng Tu, 10 December
1971.

142
following mission: The main-force element will concentrate on coordinating with the
local troops, militia, and guerrillas to strongly attack the enemy in the main areas: Xun
Lc and Long t and wipe out a important proportion of the enemys combat power
and means of waging war; liberate a number of hamlets and villages; and expand the
liberated zones beginning with the Route 23 and Route 2 areas.493
To achieve success in this mission, the Sub-Region Headquarters ordered a 15-day
series of high points comprising attacks on the puppet troops in the territory of Xuyn
Mc and Long t to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy. In particular, we were to
conduct armed propaganda and combined three-pronged attacks in a series of villages and
in Long in Town of Long t District to alarm the enemy especially the PSDF, and
to undermine their morale. We would create the circumstances in these two Districts that
would slow down the second phase of the enemys Pacification program.494
At the beginning of August 1971495, 445 Battalion was deployed by the SubRegion to attack the enemy and support the main Long t area. The Battalions task was
to coordinate with the village guerrillas around the base and launch attacks on enemy
engaged in sweeping operations and support our forces in the Minh m War Zone at a
time when the enemy had concentrated a combined American Australian Puppet force
for a large sweeping operation to wipe out the Minh m War Zone.496
Having heard that 445 Battalion had returned to Long t, the enemy deployed 53
tanks together with a combined force of Americans, Australians, and puppets (totalling
almost three battalions), to sweep from Route 44 down to the a Vang [sic] Pagoda
(Phc Trinh hamlet) with the intention of wiping out 445 Battalion. When they reached

493

Translators Note: A captured document detailed the strength of 445 Battalion totalling 166 as at 27
June 1971. - Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM No.273/71, Ni t, 30 September 1971. See also Annex C.
494
Translators Note: The official Australian history relates: By mid July it was evident that elements of
D445 Battalion had slipped past the widely dispersed companies of 3RAR. Signals intelligence indicated
that they had joined up with the remainder of D445 Battalion and the Long Dat District Headquarters in the
Long Hai hills. - Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.585.
495
Translators Note: In a letter dated August 1971 captured by Australian forces, a member of 445
Battalions signals platoon in the Minh m area wrote to a 445 Battalion colleague: personnel (in Long
t) were able to purchase most items easily, including drugs, milk and fabrics. The situation was similar to
that of peace time. The rice ration was 20 litres per person per month. Some members of the signal unit
had married local girls although the unit had plenty of food, they still felt homesick since all of them
were natives of North Vietnam. - Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM No.253/71, 10 September 1971. Tensions
and lack of cooperation between Southerners and Northerners in units and between 445 and 440
Battalions, were reported by a rallier - Appendix II to Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.84/70, Ni t, 25
March 1970. For comment on Discord between Northerner and Southerner cadre by a senior NVA officer
who rallied in 1970, see VCAT Item No.11271006005. More generally, see also North South Divisiveness
in the PAVN/PLAF April 1974 (within the 9th VC Division) VCAT Item No.2310513021, and Division
in Communist Ranks in 1974 VCAT Item No.2122902006. On personal letters, see Annex G ie: the
mail system included letters to North Vietnam and for detailed regulations on the postal system, see
CDEC Log 01-1367-69. On 15 July 1966, the B Ra Province Units Command Committee promulgated
regulations for the exchange of personal letters between North and South Vietnam and within South
Vietnam (signed by the Assistant Political Officer, Nguyn Thanh Cn) - CDEC Log 09-1974-66. For a
July 1966, MR 1 Directive on letters between North and South Vietnam, see also CDEC Log 08-1555-66.
All letters were subject to censorship, and no more than one letter a month to close relatives and friends in
North Vietnam was allowed.
496
Translators Note: No such operation is noted in Australian records see however, footnote 498.

143
Area 13 - S Bng 497*, the enemy split into two columns to sweep deep into the base of
the mountains. Here, they came up against the defences of 445 Battalion.498
Map: The Counter-Sweep Operation at Long M Hamlet (Phc Long Hi, Long
t, B Ra Vng Tu) by D445 and Province Local Troops. 18 May 1970 [sic].499

497

* Base 13 was a geographical area that we established after 13 cadre and soldiers of the 5 th Division had
been hit by a B-52 strike and killed while on a operation in that location. Translators Note: S Bng can be
translated as Cotton Plantation. See also footnote 501 for a different ie D440s, explanation of the
origin of Base 13s title ie: the region of the 13 tank graves.
498
Translators Note: The t History (2006) records that: In June 1971, the enemy launched a large
sweeping operation into the Minh m base with a combined battalion [sic] of Americans, Australians, and
a Regional Forces Group. Similarly, the Minh m Base History records such a combined operation in the
period 14-18 June 1971 with over 20 tanks and bulldozers destroyed after the 25-day sweeping
operation and suffering heavy casualties, the Australians and the Americans were forced to withdraw. Phm Ch Thn (ed), The Minh m Base 1945-1975, op.cit., 2006. pp.60-61 see translated extracts at
Annex M to Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit., 2011. The D440 History (2011) relates a battle
occuring in June 1971 in the Minh m in some detail, including the involvement of D440 elements:
The enemy force comprised an American battalion, vassal troops, and a Regional Forces Group The
6th Company was ordered to block and attack the enemy group advancing on the Medical Services Cave
In the first day of the fighting, the 6th Company lost one killed and one wounded. In the D440 History,
that passage is followed by the description of a battle together with D445, in August 1971 against 40
tanks in an enemy sweeping operation comprising American and Australian forces into the Minh m base
(August 1971) - see also footnote 501.
499
This map is titled 18 May 1970 but no such engagement is described in the text of this 2004 D445
History in that period. Rather, the map seems to represent the engagements described in the text as occuring
on the edge of the Minh m Secret Zone in June 1970 or August 1971. The map shows D445 defensive
positions (in red) for its 1st and 3rd Companies being attacked by tanks on 18 May 1970. This could
possibly be a reference to Operation Hammersley conducted in the period 10-21 February 1970 Ekins, A.
with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.370-389.

144
Before the day of the battle, the Battalion had gone into t to collect rice.
Returning close to dawn, the group collecting the rice had almost reached our base but
there were still a number of our comrades who had not yet returned. Hearing the sound of
engines getting closer and clearer, Nguyn c Thu the Battalion Commander, had our
reconnaissance men climb two tall trees to observe their approach. They discovered many
lamps shining in the area of the a Vng Pagoda at S Bng. Associated with this, as a
soldier from the 1st Company had rallied, the Battalion Headquarters assessed that the
enemy would sweep into our base and so orders were quickly given to deploy for
counter-sweep defence. At dawn, an enemy column led by tanks attacked the defences of
the 1st Company. Two B40 teams from the Company were sited off the track and set fire
to two enemy tanks. The enemy then changed direction and advanced towards the 3rd
Company commanded by L Vn Tranh. Nguyn Vn Oanh, the Deputy Political Officer
of the Battalion was sent to command that area. As our defences had been coordinated,
Deputy Political Officer Nguyn Vn Oanh directed our firepower at the track as the
enemy approached and set fire to a further five tanks.500 However, because of their
overwhelming superior forces both tanks and infantry, the enemy was able to seize a
section of the 3rd Companys defences.
Faced with a situation where we could be defeated, the Battalion Headquarters
quickly organised a group of reconnaissance troops with B41s to reinforce the 3rd
Company together with Comrade Lm Phng (Sau Phng), the Battalion second-incommand. Now reinforced, the 3rd Company reorganised its deployments and repelled
several enemy attacks, setting fire to a further three tanks bring the total number of
tanks destroyed in that area to eight. The battle waged fiercely back and forth until days
end. Enemy aircraft provided fire support, but the Battalion shot one down. The result of
the battle was that the Battalion forced back the assaults by enemy tanks and armoured
vehicles, and set fire to 13. These included three destroyed by Comrade Ha a platoon
commander of 440 Battalion, who had led a section on a rice-collecting mission and had
been forced to remain with 445 Battalion during the battle.501 We also shot down a
500

Translators Note: These August 1971 engagements are not included in the 1991 D445 History see the
preceding footnote. However, the t District History (2006) relates that: 445 Battalion was ordered to
return to fight the enemy and support the important t area in Long t District. The enemy deployed
a column of 45 tanks from Dinh C and swept down to Cu Tum, clearing the jungle on both sides of the
road. 445 Battalion fought the enemy for a full day, forcing back many assaults by the enemy forces and
setting fire to 13 tanks and shooting down a helicopter. The Battalion foiled the enemys plan of clearing
the jungle and surrounding and isolating the Minh m base. For the D440 account, see the following
footnote. As mentioned above, no Australian forces were engaged in the activities in August 1971 described
in this section of the 2004 D445 History. No Australian tanks were involved in operations in the area of the
Long Hi Hills in the second half of 1971. The Australian Centurion tanks were last employed in Operation
Iron Fox in northern Phc Tuy and southern Long Khanh in August 1971 - with all 28 tanks withdrawn to
Ni t by early September 1971.
501
Translators Note: As noted, the D440 History (2011) relates the battle in August 1971 in some detail:
At this time, the most representative of the 6th Companys battles in coordination with 445 Battalion,
was the engagement that opposed 40 tanks in an enemy sweeping operation comprising American and
Australian forces into the Minh m base (August 1971 [sic]). The engagement ensued when the 6th
Company was completing the process of incorporation back into 440 Battalion. The night before the clash,
a platoon of the 6th Company led by its platoon commander Ha (code name: Ha Con), transported the
Companys wounded to the District infirmary. When returning to 445 Battalions location, Australian
troops struck. The whole platoon under its commander Comrade Ha, quickly joined 445 Battalions
combat formation, blocking the enemys approach in the north. Following the battle, the combat exploits
of Comrades Ha and the 6th Company were noted by the 445 Battalion Headquarters and proposed to
higher authorities for commendation. The area of the battle was later immortalized in history books and
became an historic place-name in Long t District (the region of the 13 tank graves). see the earlier
footnote 497 for a different ie D445, explanation for the title of the area. For the D440 account of the

145
helicopter. We lost three comrades killed (including Comrade Khanh of the 1st Company,
and Comrade Ti the second-in-command of the 3rd Company), and one wounded and
a heavy machinegun was damaged.
The enemy continue their blockade until night, with their infantry and tanks
pressing 445 Battalion close to the base of the mountain. Above, flights of Dakota
aircraft502 fired their four-barrelled machineguns intensely, blocking our withdrawal
routes. Also overhead, enemy helicopters used loudspeakers calling for our surrender.
Their psychological warfare personnel told villagers along Route 52 that they had
decapitated 445 Battalion and buried us all. Many of the people of Phc Hi, Hi M,
and Long M looked up at the Minh m Mountains and, seeing the smoke and flames,
cried and worried for the fate of the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion. At that time, the
unit secretly sent reconnaissance teams to find the enemys weak spots, and the whole
Battalion was led across the Long Ph rice fields into the hamlets of p Cu and Hi
Trng. All the villagers were extremely happy, and greeted their children who had
safely returned from the violent battlefield. All the women and girls made rice for our
troops to eat. At 3am, the whole Battalion moved back to our field base in the clay
lagoons south of Route 23 (nowadays part of Lang Di village) and prepared for further
counter-sweep operations etc.
445 Battalions victory at S Bng was welcomed enthusiatically by the people
and the militia of Long t District. With the Minh m War Zone firmly secured, the
confidence and fighting resolve of the armed forces of Long t District was
consolidated. Following this, a series of effective attacks were made by the District troops
(C25 Company) and the village guerrillas that wiped out a considerable part of the
enemys capabilities. This boosted the spirits and the power of the political struggle teams
and the military proselytising elements. Also at this time on the Chu c District503
battlefield, Sub-Region forces such as the 33rd Regiment and the 6th Sapper Battalion504,
coordinated with local District troops and village guerrillas to deliver many painful blows
on the enemy. 505 However despite their painful defeats, the enemy remained vengeful increasing their pacification efforts in Long t and Chu c Districts, and using them
as testing areas for pacification in other regions. In these two Districts, our revolutionary
forces continued to suffer heavy casualties. The infrastructure in a number of hamlets and
villages was completely wiped out, our base areas were routinely attacked, and there were
even a number of cadre who wavering in their ideology and unable to bear the hunger
August 1971 engagement including the exploits of the decorated tank-destroying hero o Ngc Ha
see Chamberlain, E.P., D440: Their Story, op.cit., 2013, pp.85-86 and pp.132-133.
502
Translators Note: The US Dakota gunship the AC-47D aircraft equipped with mini-guns, was
nicknamed Spooky and Puff, the Magic Dragon. By the end of 1969, the AC-47Ds had been transferred
to the Vietnamese Air Force under Vietnamization. The US Air Force also operated Spectre gunships
ie: AC-130A and AC-119 aircraft.
503
Translators Note: On 23 October 1970, 1 ATF issued a comprehensive 27-page report: Chu c
Order of Battle. The report assessed the total strength of Chu c District as at late October 1970 as 180
personnel comprising: Village Party Chapters and Guerrilla Units 60; Chu c (less C41) 94; C41
20. Of the 180, only 86 personnel (48%) were considered to be combat effective.
504
Translators Note: For the foundation of the 6th Sapper Battalion, see Dng Thanh Tn (ed), Lch s
ng b ((ng Cng Sn Vit Nam)) tnh ng Nai (1930-2000), Tp (Volume) II (1954-1975), Chng
(Chapter) IV, 2003.
505
Translators Note: Following engagements with 1 ATF battalions in northern Phc Tuy in late
September 1971, C9 Company of 33rd Regiments 3rd Battalion was reportedly detached to support Chu
c District for one month but, unable to contact the District Unit, only briefly assisted the Ngi Giao
village guerrilla element for three weeks before withdrawing to the north. 33 rd Regiment and 6th Sapper
Battalion operations in support of Chu c District did not commence until 1972. Chamberlain, E.P.,
The 33rd Regiment North Vietnamese Army: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2014.

146
and privations, surrendered to the enemy.506 This was the third wave of rallying since Tt
Mu Thn in 1968.
Based on the reality of the battlefield situation, at the beginning of September
1971, the Sub-Region decided to disperse 445 Battalion, breaking it into three companies
and allocating these as core elements for our campaign in the two critical regions. The 1st
and 2nd Companies reinforced Long t District507; and the 3rd Company and part of the
4th Company reinforced Chu c District.508 Battalion cadre also strengthened these two
Districts, and a number of comrades were withdrawn to the Sub-Region to undergo study.
The Battalion was dispersed and attached to the revolutionary forces in the two Districts
in the vital regions.509
Although dispersed, the companies still operated under the title of 445 Battalion
including: mobilizing the people; attacking the enemy; writing pamphlets calling upon the
enemy officers and soldiers to surrender and throw away their weapons; sending letters to

506

Translators Note: For 445 Battalions morale in April 1967, see the debrief of Nguyn Vn Hach
(G.4544 Ordnance Company) that notes the 3-man team ((cell)) system, whereby one checks on the other
two prevents them from taking the chance to rally. CDEC Log 9-0038-67, VCAT Item
No.F034600701360, and F034600701784. For the communist three-man cell system, see footnote 311 and
also: Combined Intelligence Centre Vietnam (CICV) US MACV, VC/NVA Political and Ideological
Training, Study ST 67-054, 18 May 1967. VCAT Item No.F015900240721. For the Chiu Hi (Open
Arms) program, see footnotes 402 and 415.
507
Translators Note: According to the Long t District History (1986): Two companies of the D445
Battalion were allocated to Long t District together with a battlefield reconnaissance cell. In 1971
the forces were organised as follows: The 1st Company of D445 was responsible for t (south-west of
Routes 23, 52) and to support the coastal areas of Phc Li, Long Hi M, and Phc Hi. The 3rd
Company of D445 was responsible for the area north of Route 23 and to support Xuyn Mc and Phc
Bu. The Long t District Company C25 operated in the area of Long in and supported the villages of
An Nht, Tam Phc, Phc Tnh and An Ngi. The four-comrade battlefield reconnaissance team was
responsible for activity in the villages of Phc Li, Long Hi M, Phc Hi and lower Route 44. The
account in The Minh m Base History, op.cit., 2006 of 445 Battalions dispersal is different it states that
Long Xuyn District was confirmed by the Sub-Region as the critical area and was strengthened with
two companies from 445 Battalion. The Battalion Headquarters also supplemented Long Xuyn and
Chu c Districts p.59.
508
Translators Note: The Chu c District History (2004) relates: In September 1971, Province
reinforced Chu c District with the 3rd Company of 445 Battalion with a strength of 36 cadre and
soldiers. - Nguyn Cng Danh , Chu c District, op.cit., 2004.
509
Translators Note: The Battalions dispersal is similarly related in the 1991 D445 History but without
mention of part of the 4th Company being allocated to Chu c District, and included: The 3rd
Company coordinated with the 33rd Regiment, the 4th ((274th)) Regiment and the local forces of Chu c
District to take control along Route 2. 1 ATFs knowledge of D445 Battalions dispersal/disbandment was
confirmed by Nguyn Vn ang (a former 2ic of the Chu c District medical section, captured on 19
October 1971) who revealed that in September 1971, D445 Battalion had been disbanded and its C2 [sic]
Company sent to reinforce Chu cs C-41 Company. ang also revealed that Su Thu (ie Nguyn c
Thu the 445 Battalion Commander) operated as the Commander of the Chu c District Unit - Annex A
to 1 ATF INTSUM No.294/71, Vng Tu, 21 October 1971. According to the ng Nai History (1986),
with the dispersal of 445 Battalion: the 1st Company went to Long t, the 2nd Company to Xuyn Mc,
and the 3rd Company to Chu c. - Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm (The 30-year Liberation
Struggle in ng Nai), 1986, p.164. As noted earlier, for detail on the 1 ATF assessment of the DeActivation of D445, see Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM No.302/71, Vng Tu, 29 October 1971; and the 70page booklet: Headquarters 1st Australian Task Force, B Ra Sub Region, Vng Tu, 10 December 1971,
pp.3-4 and p.7 that noted however that the fate of C4 and C5 is unknown. For 445 Battalion earlier
being divided into four groups in April 1968, see pp.99-100 and footnote 365. For a rallier reporting higher
direction for the Battalion to split up and operate in company-strength for missions to support the people
in Long t during the 1970 Wet Season, see footnote 447.

147
each of their families homes, to their outposts, and to the people.510* During this period,
the companies regularly participated with local forces in mobilising the masses,
infiltrating the hamlets to organise meetings, warning the evil oppressors, and
propagandising the policies of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.
In almost a year of dispersed operations under the leadership and direct command
of the Districts, the companies of the Battalion still successfully continued their historic
and dogged holding-on and continued their attacks. They remained outstandingly brave in
the face of every enemy, playing their role effectively as the pillar in wiping out thugs
and oppression, and attacking the enemy in the vital areas. The 1st Company and the 2nd
Company coordinated closely with the troops of Long t Districts local C25 Company
and the village guerrillas to destroy groups of the PSDF, many evil oppressors, quisling
spies, and the tight control of the system of strategic hamlets. They were able to build up
the infrastructure, many underground bases, and to expand our control in the areas of
Long in, t , the Route 44 and Route 23 regions, and Xuyn Mc.
The 3rd Company coordinated with the 33rd Regiment511, the 4th ((274th))
Regiment512 (Sub-Region main-force units), and the local forces of Chu c District to
attack the enemy and gain control over Route 2 and thereby connecting up the strategic
corridor from War Zone D513 to Long t, Xuyn Mc, Vng Tu, and the Rng Sc.
The biggest achievement of 445 Battalions 3rd Company during this time operating in a
dispersed mode in Chu c District was the building-up of the District companies to
become solidly-based units. The constructive activities of 445 Battalions companies in
this period with Chu c and Long t Districts contributed to advancing the
revolutionary movement in these two areas to a new higher level.
* Comrade Nguyn Tun Gii the political officer of the 4th Company, still holds a letter written by
Comrade Nguyn Minh Ninh signed as the 445 Battalion Political Officer of that period. In 2003, Comrade
Nguyn Tun Gii presented the letter to the history collection of the B Ra Vng Tu Province Unit.
511
Translators Note: The 33rd NVA Regiment had participated in the Battle of Bnh Ba in early June 1969
see footnote 405, together with elements of 440 Battalion but, as noted, that engagement is not
mentioned in this 2004 D445 History nor the 1991 D445 History. On 20-21 September 1971, the Australian
4RAR/NZ Battalion (Operation Ivanhoe) engaged the 3rd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment north-east of c
Thnh in the Ni Sao/Ni L area (YS 513857) five Australians were killed, and 33rd Regiment suffered
16 confirmed KIA see 1 ATF SUPINTREP No.39/71, Ni t, 27 September 1971. Subsequently, the 7th
Company of the 33rd Regiment joined 445 Battalion in the fighting in the Long Tn area in February 1974.
The 33rd Regiment was reportedly formed in Tuyn Ha District (Qung Bnh Province, North Vietnam) in
May 1965 based on 101B Regiment of the 325 th NVA Division and including a composite battalion from
the 308th NVA Division (The 101st Regiment of 325th Division had earlier moved to South Vietnam in
September 1964). The Regiment departed for South Vietnam in the second half of July 1965 and fought in
the Plei Me/Ia Drang battles in the Central Highlands in late October 1965. The 33 rd Regiment joined the
5th VC Division in July 1968 in Ty Ninh Province and moved into the Long Khanh-B Ra-Bin Ha area.
In June 1970, the 33rd Regiment became a subordinate formation of Military Region 7. A 12-page report
33 NVA Regiment, was produced by 1 ATF see Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM No.264/71, Ni t, 21
September 1971. For a history of the 33 rd NVA Regiment, see: Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment
North Vietnamese Army: Their Story (and the Battle of Binh Ba), op.cit., 2014.
512
Translators Note: the 274th VC Regiment (known as the 4th Regiment, Q764, Q4, on 94, and on
49) had been the inaugural regiment of the 5th VC Division. For the Regiments early operations, see Annex
N; for its later operations, see Annex K, the 5th Division History (2005) including its failed attack on the
Thai Armed Forces base at Lc An in mid-June 1969. From April 1968, the 274th Regiment continued to
operate independently on the B Ra-Long Khanh-Bin Ha battlefield strengthening the fighting
formations of the Eastern Military Region. The 275th Regiment and units directly commanded by the
Division were ordered to operate as mobile elements on the front north-west of Si Gn - see Annex K,
p.18 - the 5th Division History (2005).
513
Translators Note: War Zone D was a long-time communist base area located about 32 kilometres northeast of Saigon - covering about 325 square kilometres, and including portions of Bin Ha, Bnh Dng,
Phc Long, Long Khanh, and Hu Ngha Provinces.
510

148
In November 1971, after seven years as mercenaries514 for the Americans, the
Royal Australian Task Force and the New Zealand force were forced to furl their flags
and return home.515 American units on the B Ra Long Khanh battlefield were also
gradually reduced, and consequently the threat and pressure of their bombing and artillery
fire also declined.
At the beginning of 1972, the enemy assessed that we would again attack as at Tt
Mu Thn (1968). Accordingly, on one hand they strengthened their defences
concentrating on defending the vital areas in the Sector and the Sub-Sectors of Long
in, t , Long L, c Thnh, and Xuyn Mc - and the two Special Sectors516 of
Ph M and Vng Tu. On the other hand, they launched a large number of police
operations in the towns of Vng Tu, B Ra, and Long Khanh. They coordinated their
sweeping operations and bulldozed clear the terrain east and west of Routes 2 and 15, and
continued their program of uprooting the people (principally Catholics) and moving them
to the areas of B T (Xuyn Mc), Sui Ngh (Chu c), and Tam Phc (Long t).
On our side, the Sub-Region Headquarters began a series of attacks to destroy
pacification (from 18 February to 5 March 1972), coordinating three-pronged attacks to
destroy evil oppressors, mobilising the peoples struggle, and launching simultaneous
attacks on the Sub-Sectors of Xuyn Mc517 and c Thnh, the t police offices,
514

Translators Note: The ng Nai History (1986) had earlier related that the Australians withdrew in
December 1971: after seven years as mercenaries (1965-1971) - with three generals directly
commanding the Task Force, and causing misery and loss to the people. However, they had to pay a price
of over 10,000 wounded and killed. - Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.167.
515
Translators Note: 1 ATF elements withdrew from Phc Tuy Province to Vng Tu with the Main
Headquarters closing in Ni t and opening at Vng Tu on 16 October 1971. 4RAR/NZ moved from Ni
t to Vng Tu on 7 November - and on 9 November 1971, 1 ATF ceased to be under the operational
control of the US Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC) which had replaced the US II Field Force
Vietnam (II FFV) on 2 May 1971. However, Phc Tuy Province remained within the 1 ATF Tactical Area
of Interest (TAOI). Headquarters 1 ATF closed at Vng Tu on the afternoon of 29 February 1972 and the
residual Australian military training element (Australian Army Advisory Group Vietnam AAAGV)
opened in Vn Kip camp (on the eastern edge of B Ra Town) on 6 March 1972. Australian trainers also
served in the two centres near Long Hi village including the former B-36 3rd Mike Force camp (see
footnote 239). AATTV Report: Jan 72, 1 February 1972 (AWM95, 1/2/80). After the Australian
Government formally declared a cessation of hostilities in January 1973, the AAAGV returned to Australia.
The Embassy guard platoon returned to Australia in July 1973. For a US media report on the withdrawal,
see: Braddick, K.J., Jade Warriors Aussies Leaving But Legend Stays, Stars and Stripes, Saigon, 22
January 1972. According to the Australian Official History, Australian Army casualties in Vietnam were
414 killed in action and 2,348 wounded see McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003,
Appendix F, "Statistics. The Australian Army History Unit website records that: Army casualties in
Vietnam were 413 KIA/DoW, two MIA, 2026 WIA, 64 non-battle deaths and 999 other casualties. Note
however, that the last two Australian Defence Force MIA (RAAF officers) were recovered in mid-2009. An
analysis of 1 ATF engagements (six major battles and over 3,900 contacts) can be found in Hall, R.A. Dr,
1st Australian Task Force A new operational analysis 1966-1971, Vietnam Center & Archives Seventh
Triennial Symposium, Session 5A, Lubbock Texas, 11 March 2011. VCAT Item No.999VI3155. See also
the website: Hall, R.A. Dr (et al), Australias Vietnam War: Exploring the combat actions of the 1st
Australian Task Force, University of NSW/Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 2015.
516
Translators Note: Special Sectors (yu khu) were established by the government of the Republic of
Vietnam for several key areas including: Ph M, Cm M, Trng Bom, Tc Trng, Gia Ray, Tn Sn
Nht etc.
517
Translators Note: The t District History (2006) relates that: On 19 February 1972, in three
successive engagements on Route 23, the 4th ((274th)) Main-Force Regiment wiped out three enemy
platoons, captured three enemy, and set fire to an armoured vehicle and an aircraft. According to 1 ATF
reporting, the Vit Cng ambush on Route 23 on 19 February 1972 - and associated engagements in the
following days, involved a multi-company enemy force that included elements of C3 Company/D445
Battalion, C25 Long t District Company, 2nd Battalion/274th VC Regiment, and the C70 Xuyn Mc
District Company 1 ATF, SUPINTREP No.7/72, Vng Tu, 24 February 1972. The t District

149
and the offices of the quisling administrators in An Ngi and Bnh Ba villages.518 The
wave of attacks that broke out at the beginning of 1972 in B Ra achieved many
successes, and brought forth requests to strongly develop the local revolutionary forces.
As for the enemy, although many in number, they were weak their morale declined
daily, and their psychological defeat was clearly evident.
With opportunities arising for us in this situation, at the end of March 1972, the
B Ra Sub-Region Standing Committee met and reviewed the situation, drew on
experiences, evaluated our strengths and capabilities, and approved a Plan II for the
expansion of our territory. The Regional Committee directed the: Coordination of
three-pronged attacks, mobilisation for an uprising in 1972, the opening of an active front
south of Si Gn, a broad-ranging attack, encirclement of the enemys posts, the
destruction of a significant element of the enemys war fighting potential, destruction of
pacification by all three of our types of forces, the strengthening of the guerrilla warfare
movement, and the development of our revolutionary forces.
From 12 April 1972, the Province armed forces began a series of new operations
with the important mission of expanding our territory in the critical areas of Route 2
and Route 23.519 The first operations aimed at achieving the objectives of the Nguyn
Hu Campaign520 as directed by COSVN and its Military Headquarters. The Region
deployed the 4th ((274th)) Regiment (Q4) to operate on Route 2 and Route 23, and in
Xuyn Mc and Long Khanh, in order to support the local revolutionary movements in
implementing the territorial expansion plan.
6. Concentrating Our Forces and Supporting the Territorial Expansion Plan.
In May 1972, the Sub-Region Headquarters decided to re-concentrate 445
Battalion after almost a year of dispersed operations and reinforcing the Districts.521
Comrade Nguyn c Thu was re-appointed as Battalion Commander; Nguyn Minh
Ninh - the Deputy Political Officer of the Province Unit, became concurrently the
Battalion Political Officer522*; Comrade Lm Phng became the Battalion second-incommand and concurrently the Chief-of-Staff; Comrades L Tranh (replacing Comrade
History (2006) also relates: In late February, Long t Districts C25 unit coordinated with 445 Battalion
to ambush the enemy opening the road from Nc Ngt to their post at the Hang Lu pagoda, killing 11
enemy and seizing nine weapons and a PRC-25 radio. Australian military records note that on 27
February 1972, there was a major engagement between the 2 nd Battalion of the Vit Cng main-force 274th
Regiment and the ARVN 2nd Battalion/52nd Regiment/18th Division in the area east of t to Xuyn
Mc. - AATTV, Monthly Report of RF/PF Adviser February 1972, 20 March 1972.
518
Translators Note: According to the ng Nai Monograph (2001): On 15 February 1972, 445 Battalion
ambushed the enemy at Bu Su (Long t) and wiped out the 4th Company of the 356th Regional Forces
Battalion and captured 24 enemy and seized 34 weapons.- a Ch ng Nai, op.cit., 2001.
519
Translators Note: The series of attacks along Route 23 are detailed in V Kim Hanh (et al), Xuyn Mc
Khng Chin 1945-1975 (The Resistance War in Xuyn Mc 1945-1975) , op.cit., 1989.
520
Translators Note: The Nguyn Hu Offensive by the communist forces (also known as the Easter
Offensive) began on 30 March 1972 with conventional war attacks across the Demilitarized Zone on 30
March 1972 Qung Tr City fell to the NVA on 3 May. The heaviest battles in Military Region 3 were
north of Si Gn on northern Route 13 where communist forces seized the district town of Lc Ninh
about 97 kilometres north of Si Gn on 7 April, but their attacks against An Lc Town (mid-April to midJune) were unsuccessful. Lc Ninh Town became the capital of the Provisional Revolutionary Government.
521
Translators Note: According to the 1991 D445 History: At the beginning of 1972, 445 Battalion was
reconstituted - with Comrade Sa Thu continuing as the Battalion commander. Comrade Nm Ninh was the
deputy political officer of the Province Unit and concurrently the political officer of the Battalion (having
replaced Comrade Hai Khanh who had gone for training and had not yet returned).
522
* At this time, Comrade L [sic - probably Nguyn] Minh Khanh (the former Battalion Political Officer)
had left for study duty.

150
o Vn Tng who left for study duties) and Nguyn Anh V were Battalion seconds-incommand; and Comrade Ba Ci was appointed as the Deputy Political Officer of the
Battalion. The personnel strength of the re-concentrated Battalion was over 300. The
reason that our strength had increased so much was because the Sub-Region had provided
as reinforcements a company of recently-arrived new troops from the North.523
This company of new troops was led by Comrade Tun as the Company
Commander and Comrade Thiu as its Political Officer. The majority of the troops had
been teachers, school principals, and deputy principals of Level III schools and one had
been the deputy of the Education Office for Thch Tht in Ba V District of H Ty
Province.524* As the Battalion now had many new soldiers, a series of training activities
was quickly organised. The training method adopted at that time was linked closely to the
practical requirements of weapon-handling techniques, leadership, and our established
and fort combat methods - with the aim of attaining the highest levels of combat
effectiveness. The content of the training was comprehensive, but concentrated on attack
methods against strong defensive positions in cities, towns, hamlets and villages.
Reconnaissance skills were practised, as well as obstacle crossing, blocking tactics, and
attacking and seizing enemy posts and strongpoints etc. The troops participated in the
training and studies seriously and in an atmosphere of strict discipline. The psychological
state and the spirits of the cadre and the soldiers of 445 Battalion were very enthusiatic all were eagerly awaiting going into battle with a new posture and momentum.
At the beginning of Summer 1972, the Region ordered the liberation of Route 23 with the aim of creating the best conditions for our local forces along Route 23 from t
to Xuyn Mc in order to strongly attack the enemys pacification program and to
achieve territorial expansion. To achieve this, the Sub-Region used the whole of the 4th
((ie 274th)) Regiment to encircle the Xuyn Mc Sub-Sector and Ni Nhn ready to
attack the enemy relief forces moving along Route 23 from t to Xuyn Mc. In this
operation, the 2nd Battalion of the 4th ((274th)) Regiment was ordered together with 445
Battalion, to attack the enemy within t and force them to disperse and break up
their forces so that they would not be able to concentrate elements to come to the rescue
of Xuyn Mc or other locations.
Implementing the Sub-Regions orders, on the morning of 17 May 1972, the 2nd
Company of 445 Battalion opened fire and attacked the enemy at Cng Du; and the 2nd
Battalion of the 4th ((274th)) Regiment attacked the enemy at Da Qui.525 Heavy casualties
523

Translators Note: In May 1972, 445 Battalion received reinforcements from North Vietnam. One group
from the 325th NVA Division commenced infiltration from its base north of H Ni in December 1971 and
arrived in the B Ra Province area in May 1972. Their journey down the Trail ie Military Region 559,
through Laos and Cambodia, and then across the Liberation Corridor Line is detailed in the diary of
Corporal ng Li ch - CDEC Report 6 028 0368 72, Log 06-1049-72, VCAT Item No.2132010057; and
Lieutenant Nguyn Vn Phc, CDEC Log 06-1050-72, VCAT Item No.2132010056 for detail, see also
footnote 30 in Annex C. For detailed Vietnamese accounts of the Trail from the North, see ng S
Nguyn, The Trans-Trng Sn Route, Th Gii Publishers, H Ni, 2005 and V Bm (et al), ng V
Thnh Ph Mang Tn Bc (The Road Back to the City Named After Uncle H), Nh Xut Bn Qun i
Nhn Dn, H Ni, 2005. The recovered item noted above ie CDEC Log 06-1050-72, VCAT Item No.
2132010056; also included a detailed personnel listing of 36 troops probably a newly-established
company of 445 Battalion (comprising three personnel born in Phc Tuy Province, 32 in North Vietnam,
and one not listed).
524
* Comrade Tin Khi a Level III teacher, born in H Ty, was a member of this company.
Nowadays, he is a member of the Province Committee and Head of the Office of the ng Nai Province
Committee.
525
Translators Note: Also as Da Quy and Gia Quy, ie the The Horseshoe Hill feature at YS 494620
on the northern edge of t Town - previously occupied by 1 ATF from March 1967, see footnotes 238,
275, and 316. In the 1991 D445 History, 445 Battalion is related as having attacked and inflicted heavy

151
were inflicted on the enemy, and they were forced to withdraw from these two
strongpoints. During the night of the same day, our two forces entered and seized t
.526
445 Battalion was to surround the t police offices - with our Headquarters
sited one kilometre to the south of the objective.527 The 4th Company would deploy its 1st
Platoon into four groups with heavy firepower to encircle the enemy. Meanwhile, the 2nd
and 3rd Platoons dug blocking positions to attack enemy relief forces advancing from the
Sub-Sector [sic] (to the west). The 1st and the 2nd Companies were in blocking positions
about one kilometre to the south with the task of striking any enemy relief forces coming
from the Phc Ha Long post.
At first light on 19 May 1972 the first day of the operation, 445 Battalion
opened fire and attacked the t police offices (nowadays the site of the memorial to
V Th Sau). Panic-stricken, the enemy fought back weakly while urgently calling for
rescue. At 5pm that day, the enemy deployed the 302nd Regional Forces Battalion from
Long Hi M as a relief force. However, when still one kilometre from their objective,
they were attacked by our 1st and 2nd Companies and, suffering heavy casualties, were
forced to withdraw to Long Hi M. The next day, the 43rd Brigade [sic] of the 18th
Division replaced them to relieve the blockade deploying a force that was five to six
times larger than our forces in t . With maximum firepower support, the enemys
tanks pushed forward. Over three to four days, they strove to get through from many
different directions to retake their objective and relieve their comrades-in-arms. However,
they were unsuccessful due to the resolute defence of 445 Battalion and the 2nd Battalion
(4th Regiment) ((ie 274th Regiment)) in the multi-storied buildings north of Route 23 near
the t T-Junction.
After many days of fighting, the enemy in the police offices found a way to
escape, abandoning dozens of bodies, and all their equipment and stores. 445 Battalion
and the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Regiment still occupied t ready to block any further
attempts at relief. The enemy next deployed the 5th Ranger Group to replace the 43rd
Brigade of the 18th Division that had lost its combat effectiveness. Continuously over the
next five days and nights, two Ranger battalions (the 30th and the 31st) alternately attacked
us while enemy aircraft constantly fired into our defensive positions (occupied by 445
Battalion and the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Regiment). Our forces became increasingly
weary and over-stretched. However, the enemy could still find no way to enter t
even though our blocking group on one approach (the 3rd Company of 445 Battalion) at
times had less than ten riflemen.
On orders from the Sub-Region, our forces in t withdrew to consolidate our
strength only leaving behind three companies comprising a company of 445 Battalion
led by Comrade T Chu the Company Commander, and two companies of the 2nd
casualties on a Regional Forces company located at the base of Da Quy Mountain on 17 May 1972. In that
account, the 274th Regiment is not mentioned as having participated in the attack.
526
Translators Note: The attack is also recounted in the Long t District History (1986), p.204: D445
and the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Regiment and the t guerrilla unit attacked the Sub-Sector and the t
police centre and we held the town of t for 13 days before withdrawing to regroup in our base
area. The later t District History (2006) indicates that the fighting in t took place in the first
half of April 1972, not May ie After 13 days of controlling t Town, on 14 April [sic] 1972, our
forces withdrew from t to consolidate our formations and to prepare for new attacks.
527
Translators Note: The diary (recovered on 21 May 1972) of Nguyn Vn Phc see footnote 523,
described the plan for the attack on t . Phc an NVA Lieutenant (or Corporal) formerly of the 18 th
Regiment of the 325th Division, joined 445 Battalion in about March 1972 following a three-month
movement from North Vietnam via Laos and Cambodia. The Letter Box Number (LBN) for 445 Battalion
was disclosed as LBN 702993 - CDEC Log 06-1050-72, VCAT Item No.2132010056.

152
Battalion of the 4th Regiment. These forces were under the command of Comrade Lm
Phng (Sau Phng) the Battalion second-in-command/Chief-of-Staff of 445
Battalion, and sited at Chm Du (t ) to hold ground and to deceive the enemy.
The following day (the 12th day of the operation), our forces staunchly repelled 14
counter-attacks by the Rangers and continued to hold the battlefield. That night, as
ordered by the Sub-Region, we withdrew to prepare to attack the enemy attempting to
relieve the blockade on Route 23. 445 Battalion concentrated back in our p Thu base
at Hi M and awaited further orders.528
Having rested for less than a full night, 445 Battalion received an urgent radio
message from the Sub-Region529*, directing that the unit reorganise quickly and
coordinate with the forces of the 4th Regiment to attack the enemy attempting to relieve
Xuyn Mc on Route 23. The order was received at a time when the Battalions all-up
combat-capable strength was 17 comrades as the majority of our troops were exhausted
after 14 days of continuous day and night fighting against an enemy five to six times
stronger, and our troops had not had any chance to sleep or to wash etc. Regardless,
Comrade Lm Phng the Battalion second-in-command, led the Battalion to Route 23.
On reaching the culvert at B La and taking advantage of the enemy being off-guard,
we opened fire and attacked immediately, killing a number of the enemy on the spot. The
Battalion set up defences and continued to fight the enemy once more that day, killing a
further number. The remaining enemy fled in panic. Next, the Battalion joined with the
forces of the 4th ((274th)) Regiment to repel many enemy counter-attacks as they tried to
break through.
The Battalion had performed its tasks outstandingly, and had taken control of the
t Sub-Sector for many days. It had cut and taken control of a stretch of Route 23
from t to Xuyn Mc, and created the conditions for the local troops, the village
guerrillas, and our covert forces in the villages along Route 23 in the districts of Long t
and Xuyn Mc to enter the villages to conduct armed propaganda, mobilise the people,
gather finances, recruit new personnel, and strike the enemy more effectively. As a result
of that series of operations, 445 Battalion was awarded the Military Feats Medal 3rd
Class.530* The 4th Company and many cadre and soldiers in the Battalion were also
awarded the Military Feats Medal 3rd Class.
The first phase of the 1972 Summer campaign in the B Ra Sub-Region
subsequently halted temporarily to summarise, we had completely achieved the
objectives given to us for that phase. Specifically, over 14 days and nights of that phase,
445 Battalion had fought 79 engagements large and small, worn down almost 500
enemy, set fire to four tanks, seized 71 weapons of various types and much military
equipment and materiel. This wave of attacks was particularly decisive and drawn out.
528

Translators Note: A USMACV report summarised that: On 20 May, one-third of the town of t in
southern Phc Tuy Province was lost to the 33rd NVA Regiment [sic]. The Phc Tuy Province Chief
was replaced on 21 May. On the 22nd in a contact to east of t , an ARVN battalion killed 31 enemy
On the 24th May, the 6th Ranger Group with three battalions was deployed and began conducting
operations in the vicinity of t the Ranger Group killed 75 enemy one kilometre west of t on
28th May, and on the 29th in the same area killed 31 . - USMACV, 1972-73 Command History, Volume
I, 15 July 1973, p.59 see DTIC ADA955103, or VCAT Item No.168300010829; and Davies, B. with
McKay, G., Vietnam: The Complete Story , 2012, p.547. As noted earlier , the t District History
(2006) relates that the fighting in t took place in the first half of April 1972, not May ie After 13
days of controlling t Town, on 14 April 1972, our forces withdrew from t to consolidate our
formations and to prepare for new attacks.
529
* The message was signed by Nguyn Vit Hoa the Deputy Commander.
530
* The BBC commented on this decisive battle in t during the fiery Summer Campaign in 1972,
the battle at t was like an earthquake.

153
The Battalion suffered many comrades wounded and killed. The Battalions strength which had been reinforced and re-consolidated, continued to be deficient.
Moving into the second period of the phase, the 4th ((274th)) Regiment continued
its operations in the area to the north of Route 23. 445 Battalion swiftly consolidated its
forces; coordinated with the local District armed forces; successfully completed its
counter-sweep tasks, and maintained the liberated zone on Route 23 - while at the same
time attacking the enemy deeply in Long in, t , Long Hi, and Phc Hi. We
liberated many hamlets in important locations close to the Sub-Sectors of t , Long
in, and Xuyn Mc making the jagged sawtooth-patterned line between us and the
enemy in the Sub-Regions vital areas even tighter.531
Following the orders of the Sub-Region to exploit the strength of the Provinces
local forces with the aim of wiping out part of the enemys war-making potential as they
regularly conducted sweeps in the area of Route 2 (nowadays Route 56), in the middle of
August 1972 445 Battalion joined with the 500th Battalion to ambush the enemy moving
to relieve a blockade at the Letter-S Bend (near the Sui Ca Stream) at Cm M village in
the Hong Qun Plantation area. We inflicted losses on the puppets 324th Regional
Forces Battalion of Long Khanh Sector, seizing many weapons. Our force comprised 445
Battalion and the Sub-Regions 500th Battalion.532* Our plan was to ambush enemy forces
coming to the rescue. Our tactical intention was to shell the enemy in the Con Rn post,
draw out the 324th Regional Force Battalion a Long Khanh Sector reaction unit, and
destroy it. In implementing our plan, 445 Battalion sited an ambush west of Route 2, and
the 500th Battalion set their ambush to the east of Route 2 (in the area of the Hong Qun
Plantation) all with the intention that when the enemys relief operation reached that
area, our two battalions would strike from both the east and the west and draw the enemy
into the killing zone and wipe them out.
Exactly as we had assessed, when 445 Battalions 4th Company began shelling,
the enemy in the Con Rn post (Cm M) rapidly radioed the Sub-Sector requesting aid.
At 1pm that afternoon, the 324th Regional Forces Battalion of the Long Khanh Sub-Sector
was deployed to give assistance. Reaching the Long Giao area, the enemy left Route 2
and cut across the jungle to the rear of the Hong Qun Plantation and approached Cm
M. With the enemy having gone off at an angle, the 500th Battalion was forced to

531

Translators Note: In July 1972, COSVN severely criticised the cadre in the B Ra Sub-Region for their
poor performance in the mid-May 1972 attempts to over-run Phc Tuy Province. COSVN cited a lack of
effective civilian proselytizing and cadre ineptness in assuming control of the populace in areas over-run by
military elements that caused the near defeat of the revolutionary forces in Phc Tuy - VCAT Item
No.2122407002.
532
* The 500th Battalion was founded in the middle of June 1972 from the 500th Rear Services Group as a
direct command unit of the B Ra Sub-Region with Comrade Phm Vn Cn (Tam Cn) as the Battalion
Commander and Comrade Nguyn Vn Bnh as the Battalions Political Officer. Translators Note: The
Military Region 7 History relates: From August 1972, the 33 rd Regiment and the 274th Regiment
coordinated with the two newly-formed B Ra-Long Khnh battalions (the 500th and 246th Battalions) and
local armed forces to liberate four hamlets on Route 15 and threaten Route 1. Military Region 7
Headquarters, 50 Nm (50 Years), op. cit., 1995, p.46. According to the ng Nai History (1986), in
mid-1973: 500 Battalion of the B Ra-Long Khnh Province was absorbed into 445 Battalion. - Phan
Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.182. The Long Khanh Town Party Party History
relates that in mid-1973, 500th Battalion was incorporated into the 445th Battalion; and the 246th Engineer
Battalion and the 634th Sapper Battalion were reduced to companies. - Trn Quang Toi & Phan nh
Dng, Lch s (The History of the Party in Long Khnh Town 1930-2007), op.cit., 2009, p.145. As
noted in the following footnote 539, the US Defense Attache Office (USDAO) had estimated the strength of
D.500 Battalion MR1 in Phc Tuy Province as 55 NVA and 445 Bn Ba Ria Long Khanh Province
Unit as 180.

154
withdraw and reconfigure. 445 Battalion remained in its ambush positions and awaited
the enemys approach.
On the morning of the third day (calculated from the day that the enemy left their
base as a relief force), the enemy began to return but did not retrace their previous route
back to Long Khanh following Route 2. Having received intelligence from technical
sources533, the Sub-Region ordered 445 Battalion to block and attack the enemy. 445
Battalion swiftly adjusted its ambush formation, deploying the 3rd Company led by
Comrade Tun the Company Commander, to positions east of Route 2 (in the area of
the Hong Qun Plantation) so that they could achieve their task of striking the enemy
and rolling them up. The 1st Company had the task of attacking the enemy tail. The 2nd
Company led by Comrade Khi, the Company Commander, was to strike the enemy on
the main front from west of Route 2 creating the decisive killing zone on Route 2 in a
stretch of the Hong Qun Plantation.
Comrade Thiu the Political Officer of the 3rd Company, was killed immediately
the battle commenced (20 September 1972). Comrade Nguyn Tun Gii the Political
Officer of the 4th Company was assigned across to the 3rd Company as its Political
Officer.
At 1pm on the third day, the enemy battalion left Cm M along Route 2 to return
to Long Khanh and approached the 445 Battalion ambush area. From the west, the
leading element of the 2nd Company moved forward to strike at the same time as the 2nd
[sic] Company, and the 3rd Company also attacked from the east of Route 2. When the
order to start was given, Comrade Tun the 3rd Company Commander, was lightly
wounded and had to withdraw to the rear. Comrade Ngha took the responsibility as
Company Commander - together with Comrade Nguyn Tun Gii, and led the Company
from the Hong Qun Plantation to strike across the rubber plantation to combine with the
2nd Company led by Comrade Khi as the Company Commander, and joined with the 4th
Companys assault in the killing zone (the Hong Qun Plantation). Comrade Lm
Phng the Battalion second-in-command and Chief-of-Staff also moved forward with
this group. As the enemys returning column was long, it could not be completely rolled
up - and so we were only able to attack the leading company of the enemy battalion. The
battle lasted for more than an hour, with the result that we inflicted heavy losses on the
leading company seizing four PRC-25 radios, three M79 grenade launchers, together
with a large number of other weapons and personal equipment. On our side, Comrade
Nguyn Vn Thiu the Political Officer of the 3rd Company (born in Thai Bnh) was
killed. The enemy fled in panic, withdrawing back to Cm M and only returned back
to Long Khanh a few days later.
In August 1972, COSVN decided to disband the Sub-Regions and to re-establish
B Ra Long Khanh Province comprising the districts of nh Quan, Long Khanh, Cao
Su, Chu c, Long t, Xuyn Mc and the three cities of Xun Lc, Vng Tu, and
B Ra. Comrade Phm Lc was appointed as Province Commander.
In implementing the Directive of the Province Committee, the Provinces armed
forces including 445 Battalion constantly launched attacks against the enemy across the
whole territory, wiping out much of the enemys combat capability, liberating many
hamlets, creating additional springboards, and increasing the jagged lines between
contested areas. The attacking blows of our Provinces armed forces at this time
illustrated that our diversity and effectiveness was not just limited to Long t, Chu
c, and Xuyn Mc but also wider across the regions that until now the enemy had
533

Translators Note: This is highly probably a reference to the signals intelligence intercept of South
Vietnamese communications. For detail on the communists B-28 Technical Reconnaissance Unit, see
VCAT Item No.2311214015; and 1 ATF, Vietnam Digest, Issue No.26-69, Ni t, 28 June to 5 July 1969.

155
regarded as their base areas and restricted zones.That momentum developed into a climax
in the final months of 1972 when the Province Committee and the Province Unit
ordered a series of actions to rise up and seize control. According to the Province
Committees report, by the end of 1972, across the whole Province, we had completely
liberated 80 hamlets, 6 villages, a number of rubber plantations - and expanded our
regions of control in the countryside, including many stretches along National Route 15
and Inter-Provincial Routes 2 and 23.
These victories were won by the Provinces armed forces during our wave of
territorial expansion followed by the rising up and seizing control phase. The
outstanding contribution of 445 Battalion both before and after it had been reconcentrated, was one of the important factors in creating a new posture and power for
the local revolutionary movement, contributing together with the whole nation, in
creating the new situation and forcing the Americans and their lackeys to sign the Paris
Peace Accords on Vietnam.

156
Chapter 3

Attacking the Encroaching Enemy, Participating in the Campaign to

Liberate B Ra Long Khanh (1973 1975)
1. Attacking the Encroaching Enemy, and their Sabotaging of the Paris Agreement.
On 27 January 1973, the Agreement on concluding the War and restoring peace in
Vietnam was signed in Paris.534 According to the Agreement, the American imperialists
had to: withdraw all American forces and those of their vassals, from the South535;
promise to honour the basic human rights of our people to independence, sovereignty, and
the unity of the whole territory; promise to honour the right of self-determination for the
people of the South; end all American military connections with - and interference in, the
South; and acknowledge two administrative authorities, two armed forces, two areas of
control, and three political forces536 in the South. This was an extremely great victory,
creating an important turning-point, changing the forces on the battlefield, and providing
a basic advantage for our people on the decisive road to liberate the South and unify the
country.
The signing of the Paris Agreement had a great impact on the sentiments and
feelings of all levels and classes of the people in the Province. The majority of the people
were enthusiastic, and the most enthusiastic were the people in the liberated zones and the
contested zones. In many places, very solemn ceremonies were held to welcome peace but these were hidden from enemys view. Our cadre and soldiers in the Provinces armed
forces (including the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion) greeted the news with different
emotions and feelings but, in general, were optimistic. There were some who thought
that the war would be less violent once the American military withdrew from the South.

534

Translators Note: For a comprehensive discussion of the development of the Agreement, see Nguyen,
Lien-Hang T., Hanois War, op.cit., 2012. After the Paris Peace Accords and the withdrawal of the Free
World Forces (see the following footnote), the number of NVA in the South had increased markedly
(three-fold over its estimated 55,744 strength in late January 1968 see footnote 337) to 174,000 - ie then
representing 56% of the total NVA/VC estimated strength of 311,524 - US Defense Attache Office
(USDAO), Enemy Strengths May 1973, Saigon, 4 July 1973. VCAT Item No.2311006085. A month
earlier, USMACV and CIA figures were respectively: Regular Combat: 128,000/154,000; Administrative
Support: 63,000/71,000; and Guerrilla: 26,000/50,000; Total: 217,000/275,000 - and Dry Season
((armoured vehicles)) deployed into the South: 314/450 tanks; 27/50 APCs CIA Memorandum:
Comments on Differences Between MACV and CIA/OER Data on Communist Strength in South Vietnam,
9 April 1973. VCAT Item No.F029200060825.
535
Translators Note: US and Allied troops were to be withdrawn within 60 days. Allied forces comprised
US and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF). In mid-1969, US forces had reportedly
numbered 538,933 (111 infantry battalions). FMWAF comprised: Australia 7,649 (three infantry
battalions); New Zealand 556 personnel (including an artillery battery), Republic of Korea - 50,289 (22
battalions); Thailand 11,596 (six battalions); Philippines 1,506; Republic of China 31 personnel;
Spain 12 personnel. The Republic of Vietnam Army/Marines totalled 168 battalions. COMUSMACV,
Quarterly Evaluation Report (Second Quarter 1969: 1 April 1969 30 June 1969), MACJ3-051, Annex E,
Saigon, 20 August 1969. http://www.458seatiger.info/vietnam1969_report.PDF . For FWMAF, see also:
Larsen, S.R. Lieutenant General & Collins J.L. Brigadier, Allied Participation in Vietnam, Vietnam Studies
Department of the Army, Washington, 1975 VCAT Item No.1039042201. For earlier US and FWMAF
strengths at 31 December 1966, see footnote 305.
536
Translators Note: Three political forces were not specifically cited in the Agreement, but implied in
Article 12 of the Agreement that provided for consultations to establish a National Council of National
Reconciliation and Concord (NCNRC) of three equal segments. In May 1974, the Provisional
Revolutionary Government (PRG) unilaterally broke off talks on the establishment of a NCNRC.

157
However, after studying the document: The situation and tasks in front of us
produced by the Central Secretariat of the Party, they clearly understood the political path
and the guidelines and direction of the struggle in this new period of the revolution. Next
came orders and directions on the new struggle guidelines from the Province Committee,
and the political consciousness of the cadre and soldiers of the Province armed forces
including those of 445 Battalion, became constructive and positive.
While we strictly observed the Paris Agreement, the puppet troops and the puppet
authorities severely sabotaged the Agreement. The enemy forces stationed in B Ra
Long Khanh were quite strong. They occupied 271 positions: posts, strong-points, bases
and rear bases in the Province, and check-points on the important routes and in the
populated areas. Moreover, the enemys machinery of tight control was almost as intact
as ever.
On 28 January 1973 only one hour after the ceasefire came into effect, the
puppet forces fiercely counter-attacked and encroached into many of our areas that we
had only recently occupied before the signing of the Agreement and even a number of
our areas that we had previously controlled. Their most savage incursions were into Ha
Long and Phc Hi villages. The puppet 18th Division together with Rangers,
Regional Forces and air and artillery support, had blatantly attacked many of our liberated
zones in Xuyn Mc, Chu c, and Long t.
445 Battalion continued undertaking its tasks in the t region. In particular,
the 4th Company was based in Phc Hi. There had been changes in the Battalion
Headquarters: Comrade o Vn Tng (Tam Tng) was appointed Battalion
Commander, replacing Comrade Nguyn c Thu (Sau Thu) who had been posted to the
position of Commander of Long t District. Comrade Nguyn Minh Khanh returned to
become the Battalion Political Officer replacing Comrade Nguyn Minh Ninh (who had
become the Commander of the Four Party Joint Group in Xun Lc).537 Comrade Nguyn
Anh V (Hai V) had been appointed as the Commander of Chu c District Unit;
Comrade Lm Phng was the Commander of the Xun Lc District Unit; and Comrades
Nguyn Vn Quang (Hero of the Peoples Liberation Armed Forces), L Vn Tranh, and
V Thnh Khi were appointed as Battalion seconds-in-command. Comrade Nguyn
Tun Gii (Mi Gii) was the Deputy Political Officer. Subsequently, Comrade Nguyn
Minh Khanh (Hai Khanh) returned to the Province Unit, and Comrade T Thut became
the Battalions Political Officer.
Immediately from the first day, the Battalion opposed the enemys encroachments
and suffered casualties with two comrades being killed and one being wounded. The 4th
Company at Phc Hi after half a day of fighting against the encroaching enemy, were
forced out and had to withdraw to t . A week later, the enemy concentrated a large
force dozens of times larger than our forces in Long t, and were able to drive 445
Battalion from the t region inflicting many losses and casualties on the Battalion.

537

Translators Note: Articles 10 and 11 of a Protocol to the Paris Agreement detailed the functioning of a
Four Party Joint Military Commission (the US; the Democratic Republic of Vietnam ie North Vietnam;
the Republic of Vietnam ie South Vietnam; and the Provisional Revolutionary Government - established
on 8 June 1969) to monitor the provisions of the Agreement. There were seven Regional Joint Military
Commissions with a total of 26 local Joint Military Teams including one at Xun Lc. Each party was to
provide four qualified persons for each Joint Military Team with the senior officer of each Party to be at
the rank of major or lieutenant colonel level. Similarly, the Agreement provided for 26 local teams of an
International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) comprising Canada, Hungary, Indonesia
and Poland (Canada withdrew and was replaced by Iran on 31 July 1973). For detail - including annotated
maps, see: Vietnam Agreement II, Commanders Digest, Department of Defense, Washington D.C., 22
February 1973 VCAT Item No.2861224006.

158
From 16 March 1973, the enemy launched a series of mass encroaching
operations into our liberated zones in the Route 2 area (Chu c), at B T (Xuyn
Mc), at Cu Tum, and at Nc Ngt (Long t) with the intention of returning us back
to the situation that existed before 1972. Parallel with these mass encroachments, across a
wide area from the end of March 1975, the enemy sped up the implementation of their
new pacification plan, and strengthened their machinery of tight control in those areas
that they had just seized - with the aim of confronting the uprisings by the masses and
wiping out our infrastructure. They also established additional military posts.
According to a report from the Province Committee, in the three months of the
Second Quarter of 1973, the puppet military had set up an additional 22 posts and towers;
restored 763 PSDF personnel; and set up an additional Regional Forces battalion and a
company. They brought many military personnel and police to set up village quisling
administrations, and to strengthen their machinery of tight control. Up to June 1973, the
enemy announced that they had completed elections for their quisling machinery across
the whole of Phc Tuy (B Ra). Additionally, they laid thick minefields around hamlets
and along the main communication routes, and destroyed the terrain when cutting into our
base areas and our liaison and movement corridors. The situation had again become
violent and difficult.
In facing this situation, the Party Committee of the Battalion Headquarters
provided timely leadership and guidance by putting forward different solutions to remedy
a number of biased and negative manifestations among the cadre and soldiers.
From March 1973, 445 Battalion was deployed at Long Tn and Long Phc to
secure these two liberated villages. There, the Battalion coordinated with the village
guerrillas and the people to build a Fighting Village, and to practise coordinated combat
methods. We strengthened the defensive system of positions, and set spiked traps and
minefields etc all ready to resist the encroaching enemy.
At the end of March, the enemy concentrated two Regional Force battalions
with strong artillery and air support, to advance and seize the two villages of Long Tn
and Long Phc. For 15 days, the enemy continuously launched decisive attacks but were
unable to penetrate the defensive lines of 445 Battalion. Hundreds of enemy were driven
from the battlefield, and the enemy was forced to withdraw. This was a great victory, the
first in the Province since the Paris Agreement.
In opposing the enemys mass encroachments and their new pacification plan, the
Province armed forces coordinated with two battalions of the 4th ((274th)) Regiment and
launched many punishing attacks on the encroaching enemy. Calculated to the end of
April 1973, we had driven 208 of their troops from the battlefield; destroyed 108 RF and
PF elements, 58 PSDF elements; seized a large number of weapons; destroyed three
tanks; shot down one aircraft; and wiped out many wicked thugs and pacification officers.
However, the results of the Battalions strikes in reaction to the enemys encroachments
since the signing of the Paris Agreement were still not sufficient. The principal reason for
this was subjectivism, vague perceptions, and a lack of vigilance.
On 4 April 1973, 445 Battalion joined with the 500th Battalion to ambush the
enemy at c M hamlet of Sui Ngh village inflicting heavy casualties on a company
of the puppet 302nd Regional Force Battalion, and contributing together with the forces
and people of Chu c District, to block the encroachment activities and the new
pacification program of the Americans and their puppets in the Route 2 area.538
538

Translators Note: The Chu c District History (2004) relates: On 15 March 1973, the enemy
deployed the 48th Task Force and the 3rd Battalion of the 43rd Task Force of the 18th Division together
with three companies of armoured vehicles, to invade the villages along Inter-Provincial Route 2. The
445th Battalion and the 500th Battalion both B Ra-Long Khnh provincial units, also deployed to Inter-

159
Facing these new developments in encroachment activities and the poisonous
schemes of the enemy, the Province Committee directed the armed forces of the Province
and the Districts to change their combat methods from passively resisting incursions to
actively attacking the enemy.539 We coordinated with the struggle movement of the
masses to protect their crops, resist the seizure of rice, and were resolved to inflict defeat
on the enemys plans. Beforehand, the Province Unit had also convened a military
conference to discuss and agree on ways of opposing the enemys encroachments. The
agreed policy of the Province Committee and the Province Unit was to change our
resistance to enemy incursions to more active means. Following this policy, 445 Battalion
was deployed back to t to join with the local armed forces and attack the
encroaching enemy. Next, our cadre and soldiers thoroughly studied the situation, the
policy, and our new mission.
The Province Committee chose the villages of t (Long t), Hc Dch
(Chu c), and Cm ng (Cao Su) as specific areas; and the Province and District
armed forces were concentrated in these areas to fight back against the enemys
incursions, support the peoples struggle movement, and drive back the enemys
pacification and resettlement plans. To support the movement, the Province Committee
deployed 445 Battalion back to t . A series of political study activities raised the
consciousness of the whole unit before we undertook our new mission. The whole
community of cadre and soldiers of the Battalion were resolved to punish the enemys
encroachment operations.540
In the two months (November and December 1973), the Province armed forces
with the active support of the 33rd Regiment (Military Region 7), attacked the enemy and
- operating effectively, switched the initiative into the hands of the revolutionary forces.
Half-way through the first phase, our forces had principally blocked the enemys
pacification and incursion operations, and in the second half we moved to more offensive
activity by attacking the enemy-controlled zone and strongpoints from which they
Provincial Route 2 and attacked the enemy south of the c Thnh Sub-Sector. Nguyn Cng Danh ,
Chu c District, op.cit., 2004.
539
Translators Note: In May 1973, the US Defense Attaches Office (USDAO) in Si Gn assessed
NVA/VC organisation and strength in B Ra-Long Khnh Province as: Independent Regiment (HQ
SVNLA) - 33 NVA: strength 700. Independent Companies: Cao Su Company B Ra-Long Khnh: 40;
C.1 and C.2 Engineer-Sapper Companies, B Ra-Long Khnh: both 30; C.203 Company Xun Lc
District: 36. Phc Tuy Province: 274 Regiment: 810; comprising - HQ and specialized units: 300; 1st Bn:
230; 2nd Bn: 200, 3rd Bn: 80. Independent Battalions 274 Arty Battalion, MR1: 100 NVA; 445 Bn B
Ra-Long Khnh Province Unit: 180; 634 Battalion B Ra-Long Khnh Province Unit: 50 VC; D.500
Battalion MR1: 55 NVA. Independent Platoons and Companies: C.41 (Chu c Group 400): 26 VC;
C.20 Company Chu c: 22; C.25 Company Long Xuyn: 15; C.29 Company Long Xuyen: 18; C.30
Company Long Xuyn: 17; Special Action Company Xuyn Mc: 9; A.31 Company Area 3: 20; A.32
Company Area 3: 19; C.610 Special Action Company: 15. 10th Rng Sc Bn, MR1 (Bin Ha): 300; 6th
Sapper Bn, MR1: 130. The RSSZ ((Rng Sc Special Zone)) Regiment under B Ra-Long Khnh in
1972. - USDAO - Saigon, PLAF/PAVN Troop Strength by Unit - May 1973 , Saigon, 31 May 1973 VCAT Item No.2311006085. These USDAO figures were also been cited in 2009 on a Vietnamese military
history website: Rongxanh, Phn b - qun s cac n v Qun Gii phng min Nam trn lnh th min
Nam Vit Nam n 31/5/1973 (Deployment and Strengths of the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces
with the Territory of South Vietnam 31 May 1973), Qun S Vit Nam, 6 February 2009.
540
Translators Note: This 2004 D445 History does not relate any specific combat activities in the period
April-November 1973. However, the t District History (2006) states: On 13 June 1973, the enemy
deployed a Regional Force battalion with air and artillery support to sweep into Long Phc and Long Tn.
Our 445 Battalion together with District troops and village guerrillas blocked the enemy and attacked
them from 13 June to 20 June 1973. We defeated many of their advances - killing 76, wounding 79, and
seizing 13 weapons of various types. The Hi M and Phc Hi guerrillas with District troop
reinforcements, attacked the enemy four times, killing 6.

160
launched their operations. 445 Battalion joined successfully with the forces of our higher
headquarters and the armed forces of Long t District to recover liberated areas on
Route 23 connecting the Minh m base with the expanding liberated zones in the
Province.
On 24 December 1973, the B Ra Long Khanh Province Unit organised a
conference to review the situation following our resistance to the enemys incursions
during 1973, and produced a Resolution for our missions in 1973. That Resolution clearly
explained that: we had conducted a struggle movement of three-pronged attacks, but in
each area we had at times encountered difficulties and suffered casualties. Basically
however, we had held firm and risen up across the whole Province - especially towards
the end of 1973. We had been able to block each of the enemys encroachment schemes,
their destruction of jungle areas, and their resettlement efforts. Our base areas had been
held and expanded, creating a chain: Bnh Chu Phc Bu Bu Lm Hc Dch
Lang Ln.
For our action guidelines in the two years 1974-1975, the Resolution confirmed
that we were to: Step up three-pronged attacks in all three strategic areas and within
the legal requirements of the Paris Agreement, thoroughly destroy the enemys
pacification and incursion efforts, and recover ground, people and control.
2. Creating a New Posture and Power for the Revolutionary Movement in the
Countryside.
Moving into 1974, there were many changes in the complexion of the battlefield.
After nearly a year of sabotaging the Paris Agreement, the puppet military and authorities
fell into economic and political crises. There were internal conflicts, contradictions, the
morale of the enemys forces declined, and hopeful thoughts of a peaceful life increased
daily among the combat units of the puppet forces. However, the government of Nguyn
Vn Thiu remained obstinate and - maintaining a hope that battlefield circumstances
might change, continued its plans throughout the two years of 1973-1974. The enemy
increased their pacification efforts - in concert with incursions, as their principal
objectives. They strengthened a number of new pacification activities such as
establishing military Sub-Sectors541 in the villages, and setting up integrated committees
and Pheonix centres542 to expand their intelligence networks and terrorism. The enemy
misrepresented events and accused us of violating the Agreement.
At the beginning of 1974, fighting with the enemy continued at an extremely
violent level. The enemy had established a large number of additional posts, bulldozed
the terrain, taken the people to strategic hamlets, and set up agricultural worksites along
541

Translators Note: The Vietnamese text uses literally chi khu ie Sub-Sector when phn chi khu ie
Sub-Sub Sector is more accurate for the village level. The system of village-level Sub-Sub-Sectors (phn
chi khu) was implemented across the Si Gn Governments Military Region 3 in early 1973 and a
conference was held at Vn Kip (B Ra) to launch the program. The Sub-Sub-Sectors were established at
village level and commanded by a junior ARVN officer as the assistant village chief for security. That
officer was responsible for the PF, PSDF and the National Police see Ng Quang Trng Lieutenant
General, Territorial Forces, Indochina Monographs, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington
D.C., 1981, p.19. By late 1974, the ARVN staff had been increased to two officers and four NCOs; and
2,200 Sub-Sub-Sectors had reportedly been established. US Defense Attache, RVNAF Quarterly
Assessment 1st Qtr FY 75, Saigon, 1 November 1974.
542
Translators Note: For the Pheonix (Phng Hong) program, see footnotes 244 and 437. The
Pheonix centres were the Province Intelligence Operations Coordination Centres (PIOCCs) and at District
level, DIOCCs. see USMACV, Phung Hoang Advisor Handbook, Saigon, 20 November 1970, VCAT
Item No.1370406001; and Silverstein, D., A Solution was at Hand, 11 December 1989, VCAT Item No.
8850608001.

161
the roads and corridors that we regularly used to go back and forth. They also frequently
burst out to attack, to encroach, and to trap us in ambushes in these areas. According to a
report of the Province Committee, in the first quarter of 1974, the enemy had achieved
some results in their incursion and pacification operations. The enemys frenzied
operations during the period at the beginning of the year caused us a number of
difficulties and losses in both personnel and property.
Faced with this situation, the Province Committee gave timely guidance to the
armed forces in the Province to actively and resolutely attack the enemy incursions. At
the same time, we thoroughly and deeply studied Resolution 12 543 and Directives 01, 04,
06 and 08 issued by COSVN. All Party members and cadre in the Province including
cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion, underwent this study.
As directed by the Province Committee and the Province Unit, we thoroughly
grasped the spirit of Seizing the initiative and attacking !. 445 Battalion launched
effective attacks in the critical area of Long t, firmly held the remaining liberated
zones, and blocked the enemys sweeping operations in that area.
On 15 February [sic] 1974, in accordance with their usual practice, a company of
the 365th [sic] White Elephant Regional Forces Battalion conducted a sweeping
operation into Long M. Understanding the enemys operational procedures, 445
Battalion sited an ambush to attack this company. However, that day, the enemy did not
advance on its usual route. Faced with this unpredicted approach, the Battalion
Headquarters very swiftly re-arranged its deployment using the our reconnaissance
element to fire upon the enemy and lure them to the jungle fringe, while the companies of
our Battalion deployed to new ambush positions at the Long M crossroads.
When the enemy realized that they were surrounded, it was too late and our
firepower blocked off their escape routes from the crossroads area. The enemy was forced
to huddle together, but in a situation of utmost panic their resistance was quite weak.
Exploiting the situation, our group simultaneously attacked and wiped out the enemy. The
battle concluded after about one and a half hours and an enemy company was wiped out
on the spot with 27 killed, 23 captured, and 33 weapons of various types seized, together
with four PRC-25 radios. The Battalion quickly cleared the battlefield and withdrew
safely to its base before the enemy could call down destructive artillery fire. In this battle,
the Battalion lost three comrades killed. This was the most outstanding engagement
against the enemy by our armed forces and 445 Battalion since the Paris Agreement was
signed, and our victory had a very significant impact on the psychology of the enemy
troops.544

543

Translators Note: COSVN Resolution 12 was an adaptation of the Lao ng Party Plenums Resolution
21 of 15 October 1973. In January 1975, the USDAO in Saigon assessed Resolution 12 as having a
somewhat conservative outlook and emphasising building Communist strength, rather than exercising it
on the battlefield. COSVN Directive 1 indicated that it would take about two years to rebuild communist
forces to the point that they would be capable of destroying the enemy. COSVN Directive 8 was
subsequently issued in mid-1974 and reviewed the first half of that year see US Embassy, Communist
Assessment and Strategy for 1975, Saigon, late 1974 VCAT Item No.2123010002.
544
Translators Note: The t District History (2006) relates: In this phase of operations, 445 Battalion
conducted an exemplary mobile ambush at Long M, wiping out a company of the 356th [sic] puppet
Battalion, killing 100 of the enemy, seizing 60 weapons including six pistols and five PRC-25 radios.
After this battle, the enemy did not dare to operate into our liberated zone.

162
Map: The Conduct of the Ambush at Long M Hamlet (Phc Long Hi Village,
Long t, B Ra Vng Tu) by 445 Battalion and Province Local Forces (15
March [sic] 1974).545

After this battle, the enemy forces in t were more guarded in their sweeping
operations deep into the areas bordering the zones controlled by our revolutionary forces.
While we were preparing for the Campaign, we noted indications that the enemy
was concentrating forces for an incursion operation into Long Tn and Long Phc. The
Military Region Headquarters ((7)) tasked the Province to use its current forces to
constrain the puppet main-forces advancing on those two locations in order to allow the
Route 2 Campaign546 to occur exactly as planned and to surprise the enemy. The Province
545

Translators Note: The sketch map shows three companies of D445 Battalion (red) attacking a company
of the 365th Regional Forces Battalion (BA Bo An) south of Long M on 15 March 1974. This
mobile ambush is also related in the local Party history as occurring on 15 February 1974 - Trn Vn
Khnh (et al/tg), The History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu, op.cit., 2000, Chapter VIII. A photograph
of the Long M Victory wiping out the 4th Company of 356 on 15 March 1973 is at p.179.
546
Translators Note: According to the Military Region 7 (MR7) History, the following elements
subsequently participated in the Route 2 Campaign that began on 27 March 1974: 33rd Regiment, 44th
Regiment, 18th Sapper Battalion, 445th Battalion, 25th Company (Long t) and 43rd [sic] Company (Chu

163
Unit gave the task of waging a defensive battle at Long Tn against the enemy to 445
Battalion together with Chu cs 34th Company547, Long ts 25th Company548, two
artillery companies of the 24th Battalion549, and a company of the 9th Battalion of the 33rd
NVA Regiment.550
Our defensive battle positions at Long Tn Long Phc were oriented towards
three directions and approaches. The principal direction was to the west-northwest of
Long Tn and was occupied by the 1st Company of 445 Battalion and the 7th Company of
the 33rd Regiment supported by an artillery company and a section of 82mm mortars
from the Military Regions 274th Battalion551. The first secondary position - to the eastsoutheast of Long Tn, was occupied by the 3rd Company of 445 Battalion. The second of
the secondary positions faced to the south-southwest of Long Phc and was held by 445
Battalions 2nd Company and the 34th Chu c Company. The Headquarters was sited
on Ni Thm552 (Long Tn).
On 13 March 1974, the enemy force divided into two columns to encroach into
Long Tn Long Phc. The first column - the 302nd Regional Forces Battalion,
advanced from Long in up to Long Phc along Route 52 towards the positions of our
2nd Company and the 34th Company. The 355th Regional Forces Battalion as the second
column, moved from t astride both sides of Route 52 into Long Tn to the positions
of our 3rd Company. Our forces in the two secondary positions: I and II, fought with
stamina throughout three days and nights and blocked all enemy attacks on those two
axes.

c). The Campaign began on 27 March 1974 and after three months of fighting, the first campaign by
Military Region 7 in the resistance war against the Americans achieved great victories completely
liberating 100 [sic should be 10] kilometres of Route 2 from north of c Thnh to Cm M and
restoring the situation on the B Ra-Long Khnh battlefield to the situation before 28 January 1973. The
Campaign was led by Colonel L Vn Ngc, the MR7 Commander. Disbanded in 1971, MR7 had been
reformed in 1972.
547
Translators Note: The Chu c District History (2004) relates that: With the aim of strengthening the
combat capabilities of the Districts concentrated forces, in April 1973, our C20 unit (code-named C300)
and our C41 unit (code-named C400) were combined as C34 (taking the first number of their respective
code-names). - Nguyn Cng Danh , Chu c District, op.cit., 2004. That History however does
not mention the engagements at Long Tn and Long Phc in February 1974 but relates an attack against
an RF Company at ng Ngh (probably in the vicinity of YS 3972) by Chu c elements in April 1974.
A 34th Company is noted in the t District History (2006) in December 1974 fighting alongside the
Districts 25th Company at Phc Hi see also footnote 565. For April 1975, see footnote 575.
548
Translators Note: The t District History (2006) relates the engagements as occuring in June 1973,
not March 1974 ie: On 13 June 1973, the enemy deployed a Regional Force battalion with air and artillery
support to sweep into Long Phc and Long Tn. Our 445 Battalion together with District troops and
village guerrillas blocked the enemy and attacked them from 13 June to 20 June 1973. We defeated many of
their advances, killing 76, wounding 79, and seizing 13 weapons of various types. The Hi M and Phc
Hi guerrillas with District troop reinforcements, attacked the enemy four times, killing 6.
549
Translators Note: These elements of the 24th Battalion are also noted in the 33rd Regiment History (see
the following footnote). The 1991 D445 History states that these were anti-aircraft artillery companies. A
24th Battalion was an element of the 7th NVA Division in 1971.
550
Translators Note: The participation of the 7th Company of the 33rd NVA Regiments 9th (ie 3rd) Battalion
in the battle is detailed in: Chamberlain, E.P., 33 rd Regiment Their Story, op.cit., 2014, pp.111-112.
551
Translators Note: A 274th Artillery Battalion (MR1) NVA strength 100 is noted operating in Phc
Tuy Province in USMACV, Enemy Strengths May 1973, 31 May 1973 listed VCAT Item
No.2311006085.
552
Translators Note: The Australian forces referred to the 126 metre-high Ni Thm Hill as Ni t 2.
Ni Thm was immediately north of the site of the Battle of Long Tn fought on 18 August 1966.

164
Map: The Conduct of the Defensive Battle at Long Tn Long Phc, B Ra
Involving 445 Battalion and B Ra Local Forces (14-28 February 1974 [sic]).553

553

Translators Note: While the map title shows the dates of the engagement as 14-28 February, the text
states that it began on 13 March 1974. The sketch map shows a 445 Battalion defensive position north of
Route 52. The 445 Battalion Headquarters is shown as a triangular flag marked 445 on a staff and is
located at YS 482668, almost exactly at the site of the Battle of Long Tn against Australian forces on 18
August 1966. 445 Battalions four companies are indicated as cBB followed by the respective company
number. A local Chu c battalion [sic] ie dP/C is indicated immediately north-east of Long
Phc (however the symbol is for a company headquarters). On the left of the map, a Regional Force
battalion the 302nd, with armour, is shown advancing north-east up Route 52 - past Long Phc and the
Chu c unit positions, towards the D445 Battalion positions. On the right of the map, another Regional
Force battalion the 355th, is shown advancing up Route 52 from the south towards the D445 Battalion
positions. From the north-west, another battalion from either the 43rd or 48th Regiment/18th ARVN
Division, is shown attacking the positions of the 7th Company of the 33rd Regiment (cBB7). Both The 33rd
Regiment : Their Story , op.cit., 2014 (Chamberlain, E.P.); and the Chu c History (2004) also
detail the involvement of the 33rd NVA Regiment in the defence of Long Tn and Long Phc.

165

On 17 March, the enemy deployed a further two task forces [sic] (the 43rd and the
48th) from the 18th Division as reinforcements for the two Regional Force battalions from
Phc Tuy Sector in an effort to open up a third attacking drive into Long Tn from the
north-west. They were determined to completely seize our two liberated villages and wipe
out our forces there focusing on 445 Battalion. Immediately from the first day, the
recently-arrived enemy were halted decisively on their two axes from the north-west
and from the south-east, and were forced to suffer many casualties and heavy losses.
Dozens of their assaults were blocked, nearly one hundred of the enemy were killed and
wounded, and three tanks were burnt out on Route 52. In the following days, the enemy
launched further assaults and used even denser artillery and air support against our
positions. However, the cadre and soldiers of our 445 Battalion together with the local
force companies of Chu c and Long t Districts, held on doggedly using the battle
positions in the combat villages that had been prepared by the people. Using the
advantageous terrain, the shelters and trenches, and the defensive works, we effectively
repelled all the enemys assaults from every direction. There were days when one of our
sections about 20-strong, had to contend with many attacks from two enemy battalions
and still firmly held their ground. We did not rely just on our defensive positions - our
forces still remained flexible and attacked the enemy during the night exploiting the
time when the enemy halted and huddled together. Principally as a result of our defending
by day and attacking by night, the 1st Company of 445 Battalion and the 7th Company of
the 33rd Regiment were able to firmly hold the battlefield on the main axis of the attack
against an enemy force nearly ten times our size.554
On 26 March 1974, the curtain rose on the Route 2 Campaign.555 In response, the
enemy hurriedly re-deployed their 18th Division elements in Long Phc Long Tn
back to break the blockade on Route 2. The Phc Tuy Regional Forces were in a losing
position and also abandoned their operations encroaching into Long Tn and Long Phc.
Throughout a whole half-month, in all three of our defensive areas in Long Tn and Long
Phc, our Battalion had fought staunchly against an enemy more than ten times our size;
broken almost every enemy assault; driven hundreds of enemy from the battlefield
(including a major, a captain, and two lieutenants); defeated a battalion of the 18th
Division and several Regional Force companies; captured many prisoners; and set fire to
three M41 tanks etc. Our greatest victories were driving the enemy back from Long Tn;
tightly encircling two enemy groups in Long Phc; hobbling a large portion of the
puppet main-forces; and creating the conditions for the Military Regions forces to strike
the enemy and achieve victory on Route 2.556
554

Translators Note: The fighting is described in greater detail in the 1991 D445 History.
Translators Note: The Route 2 Campaign Headquarters was established in an area of over-grown
rubber to the east of Cm M village (Xun Lc) and was led by Colonel L Vn Ngc of the Military
Region Headquarters as commander. Comrade Phm Vn Hy - the Secretary of B Ra Long Khnh
Province, was the political commissar (chnh y) and Comrade Phm Lc the Province Unit Commander,
was the deputy commander. - See a Ch ng Nai (ng Nai Monograph), Tp 3 (Vol 3) Chng 6,
op.cit., 2001. Phm Vn Hy (T Hy) was also known as Phm Vn Hiu; and Phm Lc was also known as
T Lc.
556
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History summarised: After more than a month of vicious fighting
(from 26 March to 31 April 1974), Military Region 7s Campaign on Route 2 was a resounding victory. We
had over-run 12 of the enemys posts on Route 2, retaken the liberated zone from Kim Long to the B Ci
Plantation, and destroyed much of the enemys war materiel and strength. These victories had the power to
greatly encourage the fighting spirit and will of 445 Battalion as well as the other local armed forces in that
new revolutionary phase. The Route 2 Campaign from 26 March 1974 to mid-May 1974, is detailed in
the Chu c District History (2004) - Nguyn Cng Danh , Chu c District, op.cit., 2004, pp.275278. That work summarised: After nearly two months of continuous fighting with the close cooperation
555

166
With a thorough understanding of the Eastern Region Committees Resolution, in
March 1974 the B Ra Long Khanh Province Committee produced a Resolution to
strike and defeat the enemys incursions. That Resolution clearly enunciated a plan to:
exploit the combined strengths of the three-pronged attacks, strike deeply into the main
areas, increase the killing of evil thugs and oppressors, and recover control of the people
and secure areas while at the same time developing our policy of participating in
agriculture and resisting the enemys schemes to destroy the crops and steal the peoples
rice. The Provinces armed forces attacked the enemy in the Campaign to liberate Route 2
[sic] with t 557 as the crux, in order to over-stretch the enemy and liberate a
number of hamlets deep in the base areas and to expand our footholds.
In this phase, on the Long t battlefield, 445 Battalion joined with the local
District forces (the 25th Company) and our underground infrastructure in the villages of
Phc Li and Hi M together with the support of the Military Regions 18th Sapper
Battalion558, to constantly attack along Routes 44 and 52. As a result, in over a month of
fighting the enemy and participating in the Military Regions Campaign, the Battalion
and the local armed forces of Long t District had attacked and seized three outposts on
Route 44; recovered the Cu Tum and Nc Ngt liberated zones; liberated six
kilometres of the Route; supported the local forces to convert 20 hamlets in the weak
category to contested status559; enlisted nearly 100 youths both male and female, into
our revolutionary armed forces; and assisted our Long t District infrastructure to create
an additional local company with the title of the 26th Company.560 Following this
phase, the enemys system of tight control became almost ineffective and no longer as
between all three types of our military forces, Chu c Districts revolutionary forces had recovered the
liberated zones from Kim Long to the B Ci Plantation, either wiped out or forced the withdrawal from 12
enemy posts, stopped enemy forces from breaking through, and retained the liberated zones. The ng Nai
Monograph relates: At the conclusion of the Route 2 Campaign, we had killed 890 enemy, captured 37
prisoners including a full colonel, six lieutenants/captains, seized 200 weapons and 20 radios, shot down
17 aircraft, destroyed 16 tanks, and liberated Route 2 forcing the withdrawal of 12 enemy posts. The
liberated areas of B RaLong KhnhBin Ha were now connected. See: a Ch ng Nai, Tp 3
(Vol 3) Chng 6, op.cit., 2001. As noted in the earlier footnote 546, according to the Military Region 7
History - 1995, p.49, the following elements participated in the Campaign: 33 rd Regiment, 44th Regiment,
18th Sapper Battalion, 445th Battalion, 25th Company (Long t) and the 43rd [sic] Company (Chu c).
That History related that the Campaign began on 27 March 1974 and after three months of fighting, the
first campaign by Military Region 7 in the resistance war against the Americans achieved great victories
completely liberating 100 [sic] kilometres of Route 2 from north of c Thnh to Cm M and restoring
the situation on the B Ra-Long Khnh battlefield to the situation before 28 January 1973. The Campaign
is also related in Chamberlain, E.P., The 33 rd Regiment Their Story, op.cit., 2014, pp.112-113.
557
Translators Note: t is not on, nor near, Route 2 rather it is on Route 23 and Route 52.
558
Translators Note: The 18th Sapper Battalions participation is mentioned in the Military Region 7
History ie Military Region 7 Headquarters, 50 Nm (50 Years), op. cit., 1995, p.49; the t District
History (2006) see the following footnote; and the 1991 D445 History.
559
Translators Note: The t District History (2006) relates: In implementation of the District
Committees Resolution, on 27 March 1974 the District troops and the guerrillas entered the hamlets to
attack the enemy and together with the people, destroy and take control of sections of Route 52. On the
night of 20-21 April, the Military Regions 18th Sapper Battalion coordinated with District troops to attack
and wipe out two platoon-level posts in p Cu hamlet (Hi M) and Cu Tum (Phc Hi). On the same
night, District troops attacked the Dinh C post occupied by a company of the 355th Regional Forces
Battalion - wiping out the company headquarters and inflicting heavy casualties on a Regional Forces
company. In May, with the support of 445 Battalion, the District troops concentrated on the task of
attacking the enemys bunkers along Route 52 in coordination with the military proselytising activities of
our covert Party Chapters and secret infrastructure. In this series of operations, the Districts armed
forces and guerrillas surrounded and forced the withdrawal from the Cu Tum post and four enemy outposts
at Nc Ngt liberating six kilometres of Route 44 from Phc Hi to Long Hi. p.280.
560
Translators Note: While a 26th Company is similarly mentioned in the 1991 D445 History, it is not
mentioned in the t History (2006) nor in the earlier Long t District History (1986).

167
closely coordinated as before. The number of people who had the opportunity to break
out of the liberated zones to make their living was increasingly expanded. There were
families that stored their produce in huts in their slash-and-burn fields and returned to
sleep in the contested zones. By day, they were the enemys - but when night fell, they
were ours.
At the beginning of July 1974, in implementing the Regional Committees
Resolution, the B Ra Long Khanh Province Committee launched a series of Wet
Season operations with the mission of liberating a number of hamlets deep within the
base areas of the Province, expanding our footholds, defeating an enemy system of
bunkers and ambushes, extending our three-pronged attacks to destroy the cruel
oppressors, and increasing our areas of control. 445 Battalion was tasked to strike the
enemy in the principal areas of action.
In commencing the Wet Season campaign in Long t District, 445 Battalion was
strengthened with the 25th Company of the District local forces to attack the enemy
operating in Long Ph hamlet (Phc Hi village). Long Ph was a sandy area near the
seaside, with open terrain and only a few stunted trees. The enemy regularly moved
through there to maintain security for the region that they controlled or to site ambushes
against us. In order for us to ambush the enemy, the Battalion modified the terrain by
digging positions to conceal our troops (by disappearing into the earth).
On 11 July 1974, the 1st Company of the 356th Regional Forces Battalion fell into
445 Battalions ambush at Long Ph hamlet. Our soldiers leapt from their camouflaged
shelters, opened fire simultaneously wiping out the enemy, and swiftly driving them from
the battlefield. We killed 30 enemy on the spot (including a captain, a second lieutenant,
and three aspirant officers), wounded 15, captured 10, and seized 28 weapons of various
types (including four M79s and four conbats weapons), two PRC-25 radios, and a large
quantity of military materiel and equipment. For this combat victory, the Battalion was
awarded a Military Feats ((Chin Cng)) Medal 3rd Class.561
Inspired by 445 Battalions victory and the active support of the Battalion, the
District troops joined with the village guerrillas to press on strongly with their operations,
attacking the enemy at many of their strongpoints, breaking up their resettlement area at
Tam Phc, blocking the puppet forces attempting to bulldoze and encroach along Routes
23 and 44, and destroying the enemys checking and controlling systems. At the same
time, they defeated the enemys plan to steal the villagers rice.
In August 1974, COSVN re-organised the battlefield, with the Eastern Region still
comprising four provinces: Th Du Mt, B Ra Long Khanh, Tn Ph, and Bin Ha.
In September 1974, COSVN held a conference for the whole COSVN area to review the
experiences of attacking the enemys pacification program and to agree on the plan for
the 1974-1975 Dry Season.
The Party Committee of 445 Battalion routinely ensured its cadre and soldiers
understood the policies and resolutions of the Province Committee; strongly upheld the
Partys views on revolutionary violence; asserted as correct our combat tasks in the new
circumstances; exploited a revolutionary spirit of attack; struck against the incursions of
the enemy; supported their countrymen to rise up in the struggle to force the enemys
surrender and withdrawal from a series of outposts; and firmly held and further expanded
the liberated zones. Additionally, the Party Committee of the Battalion - and all levels of
561

Translators Note: The t District History (2006) relates: on 11 July 1974, 445 Battalion
coordinated with Long t Districts C25 troops to attack the enemy at Long Ph (Long Hi) and wiped out
a Regional Force company, killing 30 enemy (including a captain, a second lieutenant, and three aspirant
officers), wounding 15, capturing 10, seizing 28 weapons of various types including four M79s, and a
PRC-25 radio. The Battalion was awarded the Military Feats Medal, Class III.

168
our Party Committees in the units, paid attention to strongly advancing the emulation
movements, and lauded good workers as symbols and models for study. The Committees
also coordinated to maintain an orderly routine of Party, administrative, and communal
activities. They aimed at exploiting the positive attributes of each person - and in all the
communities within a unit, to create a determined resolve to fight and to fulfil their tasks
outstandingly during this period of the revolutions transition.
On 9 October 1974, 445 Battalion fought an outstanding mobile ambush
operation, defeating the enemys operational scheme to break the blockade on Route 23.
In order to achieve this victory, the Battalion had to successfully resolve two core
problems of a mobile ambush these were: the open terrain, and the intensity of the
enemys heavy air and artillery support. As the enemy approached, we opened fire and
surprised them wiping out a company of their 326th Regional Forces Battalion and
inflicting heavy casualties on another company. We captured two enemy personnel, and
seized 17 weapons and four PRC-25 radios. Our Battalion only suffered three men
wounded including Comrade Khi, the Battalion second-in-command. Following this
battle, 445 Battalion was awarded a Military Feats Medal 3rd Class.562
It was a year of fighting against the enemys incursions and their sabotaging of the
Paris Agreement. However, with the light of the Resolution by the B Ra Long Khanh
Party Committee and Party Unit, 445 Battalion rapidly overcame all the difficulties and
challenges. We held on resolutely, ready to fight on the most difficult and violent
battlefields. We coordinated with the local forces to take the initiative and effectively
repel the enemys encroachment operations. The Battalions achievements in forcing
back their incursions created the conditions for the local elements - and those in the Route
2 area, to transition from a passive stance to being able to take the initiative against
pacification and incursions; to consolidate and build their infrastructure; to maintain the
revolutionary movement; and to prepare themselves for a new posture and power in the
stages to follow.
3. Participating in the H Ch Minh Campaign and Liberating B Ra Long Khanh.
At the end of 1974, the battlefield circumstances in the South had changed
quickly, opening up opportunities to end the war. From 30 September to 8 October 1974,
the Partys Politburo had met to comprehensively assess the ripening strategic
opportunities and the business of preparations. The meeting produced important
conclusions, and precipitated the bringing forth of a strategic resolution to conclude the
anti-American resistance that had been waged by our people for more than 20 years. This
resolution declared: Mobilize the greatest strength of the whole Party, the whole
military, and the whole of the people in the two regions in the period 1975 and 1976 to
prepare all aspects and create ripe conditions for a simultaneous General Offensive and
General Uprising to wipe out and disintegrate the puppet forces, to strike down the puppet
authorities from their centre to the local level, and place the power in the hands of the
people, and liberate the South of Vietnam.563

562

Translators Note: The t District History (2006) similarly relates: On 9 October 1974, 445
Battalion fought an exemplary battle on Route 23 wiping out the 1 st Company of the 326th Regional Forces
Battalion and inflicting heavy casualties on another company. Enemy dead and wounded numbered nearly
100, five were captured, and 17 weapons and four PRC-25 radios were seized.
563
Translators Note: For the development of the plan, the Politburo meeting, and L Duns speech
summarizing the Politburos thinking, see Veith, G.J., Black April, Encounter Books, New York, 2012,
pp.85-89.

169
After attending the conference of the Eastern Region Committee to thoroughly
grasp the Politburo Resolution, on 2 November 1974 the B Ra Long Khanh Province
Committee quickly met and produced a Resolution on: Methods, tasks, and measures for
1975 and the final months of 1974. The Resolution affirmed: Mobilize the resolve and
the utmost strength of all the Party Chapters, the military and the people of the Province
to firmly grasp the ideology of attacking, speed up three-pronged operations, overthrow
the enemys positions and destroy their capability, liberate a number of hamlets and
villages, defeat the enemys new pacification and encroachment plans, develop our forces
in every way, completely change the current situation, and achieve the greatest victory in
1975.
At this time, the puppet Si Gn authorities still continued to strengthen their
military, political, and international relations positions, and to wage psychological
warfare activities with the aim of saving the situation. In B Ra Long Khanh Province,
they strengthened their military police, special police, Police Field Force, and all types of
intelligence elements. They also established teams and groups to tightly guard
government offices, factories, enterprises, churches, pagodas, markets, and schools in
order to block any infiltration activities by our revolutionary forces and to prevent any
uprisings by the people from within. In particular, on the main battlefield of Long t, the
puppet military and the puppet authorities coordinated to create a large force to bulldoze
the terrain and make encroachments along Route 23 and to relocate villagers back to Lang
Di that had gradually moved into our base areas.
From 8 December 1974 to 10 March 1975, the whole Province began to undertake
a series of operations for the 1974-1975 Dry Season. Following the directions of the
Province Committee and Province Unit, 445 Battalion continued its deployment in Long
t and coordinated activities with the local District armed forces in that important area.
In implementing the directions of the Committee of the Eastern Nam B Region,
B Ra Long Khanh Province established a Headquarters to resist and attack the
enemys incursions on Route 23. This was led by Comrade Phm Lc the Commander
of the Province Unit, as its Commander; with Comrade Phm Vn Hy the Secretary of
the Province Committee, as its Political Commissar; and Comrade L Vn Vit the
Commander of the Long t District Unit as its Deputy Commander. The Vanguard
Headquarters for the Campaign was sited at B p. Our forces employed in the
Campaign comprised main-force troops from Province, local District troops, and village
guerrillas. Complying with the Province orders, 445 Battalion concentrated its forces in
Area II (in the territory of Phc Long Hi, Long t District) with the task of attacking,
surrounding, and forcing the withdrawal of the puppets from the post in Long M village
(Hi M) with the aim of expanding the liberated zone to join with the Minh m base
area (Long t).564
At this time, there were changes in the organisation of 445 Battalion. Comrade
Khi the Battalion second-in-command had been killed. Comrades T Thut (the
Battalion Political Officer) and Comrade Ba Ci (a Battalion second-in-command) had
been appointed to the Province Unit. Comrades Nguyn Tun Gii (the Battalion Political
Officer), L Vn Tranh, and Sau nh had gone for training. The Battalion Headquarters
then comprised Comrades : o Vn Tng (Tam Tng) the Battalion Commander; Bi
Chn [sic] the Battalion Political Officer; Phan Thanh Bnh (By Bnh) the Deputy
564

Translators Note: According to the t District History (2006): On 5 December 1974, the
Vanguard Headquarters and our forces moved secretly to a concentration area in Area 2 (Hi M, Phc
Li). On the afternoon of 7 December, the Headquarters held a pre-operational activity, carefully studied a
terrain model, and read the operational order from the COSVN Military Committee and Headquarters.

170
Political Officer; Nguyn Vn Quang a Battalion second-in-command; and T Phat a
Battalion second-in-command.
On the night of 8 December 1974, the Battalion prepared to attack the n Sp
post and the n Ln post at Phc Hi village. However, on the first day, we were
unlucky as we were discovered by the enemy before we opened fire. At n Sp, when
our forces were still about 40-50 metres from the enemy, we were discovered and their
firepower rained down on the troops of our 2nd Platoon disabling the Platoon from the
very first minutes. We suffered five wounded and three comrades killed. At the Phc
Hi post, we were also discovered by the enemy from the start. The engagement dragged
on fiercely until dawn, and many comrades were wounded. Afterwards, the Battalion
reviewed these experiences and sought explanations. It appeared that two nights
previously - when our cadre had gone to examine the site and had infiltrated the position,
they had not swept away their tracks. The enemy had found these and taken defensive
measures and so we had lost any surprise factor for that engagement.565
On the night of 12-13 December 1974, the Battalion infiltrated into Phc Li
village to drive away the puppet quislings, to hold the village by day, and strike the
puppet Regional Forces battalion that would come to break through to save the Popular
Forces platoon in the Phc Li post. Just as the Battalion had planned, our companies
occupied the village and awaited the enemys approach. The 2nd Platoon of the 2nd
Company was assigned to block access at the beginning of the hamlet - about 300 metres
from the Phc Li post. As it was getting light (at about 5.30am) the 2nd Platoon fired a
B40 rocket straight into the puppet Popular Forces platoon that was assembling its troops
for a reconnaissance patrol. In the fight against us, they lost 10 killed and wounded
including the hamlet chief of Phc Li.
On the morning of 13 December 1974, the puppet Regional Forces battalion from
t came to relieve the blockade. The engagement unfolded as we had expected, and
the enemy withdrew and huddled together in the peoples houses while calling down
heavy artillery fire. Many of the villagers houses caught fire and collapsed. Our
companies withdrew into our defences, and exchanged fire back-and-forth until 10am the
next day when we withdrew.566
After more than 20 days of fighting against the enemys sweeping and incursion
operations into our liberated zones, 445 Battalion had completed its assigned tasks in an
outstanding manner. In series of large and smaller engagements, the Battalion had
565

Translators Note: The t District History (2006) relates the engagement in greater detail and
somewhat differently - including: On 8 December 1974, the armed forces in Long t opened fire and
attacked the enemy in coordination with the Dry Season Campaign across the whole of the COSVN area.
445 Battalion together with the 34th Company, attacked the n Ln and n Sp (Phc Hi) posts. The
25th Company and the Long Hi M guerrillas attacked the B p post, The Provinces 246 th Independent
Company deployed to block enemy reinforcements on Route 52 in the Phc Li area. On the
morning of 8 December, the enemy deployed three Regional Force companies (of the 308 th and 371st
Battalions) and a platoon of armour down Route 52 to relieve their position. When the enemys relief
column had reached the stretch of road between Phc Ha Long and Phc Li, they fell into an ambush
by the Provinces 246th [sic] Company and were fiercely attacked. It was only at midday that day that the
enemy finally reached the posts at B p, n Ln, and n Sp.
566
Translators Note: The t District History (2006) relates: On 12 December, the District troops
(C25) again launched an attack on the B p post. At the same time, 445 Battalion attacked the Phc Li
Sub-Sub-Sector ((phn chi khu)) in order to lure out and destroy the enemy relief forces. As we had
anticipated, the enemy rushed to deploy its 355th Regional Force Battalion and two companies from the
308th Battalion led by the B Ra Sector Commander, to lift the siege. 445 Battalion swiftly split into
several groups to attack the enemy at Phc Li, inflicting heavy casualties on the 1st Company of the
enemys 308th Regional Force Battalion. On 13 December, due to an imbalance of forces, our elements had
to withdraw towards Hi M and Phc Hi to prepare for other engagements.

171
inflicted many losses on the enemy. In a battle at 10am on 15 December 1974, the
Battalion surrounded and wiped out a company of the 326th Battalion in Long M village
led by Major in which we seized four PRC-25 radios, 50 weapons of various types,
and captured four of the enemy. The enemy was forced to abandon a number of key
towers along Routes 23 and 52. We drove hundreds of the enemy from the battlefield,
destroyed dozens of bulldozers, and destroyed the organisation of the puppet quisling
administrators in the villages and hamlets, creating the conditions for the people to break
out, work their fields and provide food for the revolution.567
In the campaign against the enemys incursions at Lang Di although our forces
were unequal in number, 445 Battalion fought against three of the enemys Regional
Forces battalions: the 325th, the 355th, and the 302nd. However, due to our courageous
spirit and stamina, 445 Battalion repelled many of the enemys sweeping and
encroachment operations, and punished them with a deserved thrashing. With their three
battalions having suffered a series of heavy losses, the enemy was forced to abandon its
intention to make incursions into our liberated zones and our base areas.
In the last days of 1974, the puppet military and civil authorities in Phc Tuy
Province frenetically implemented their resettlement and encroachment operations. They
brought bulldozers and mechanised ploughs and laid waste to the Lang Di area
(nowadays Lang Di village of Long t District); moved refugees from other places to
establish hamlets; built new posts; and created a defensive belt to block our revolutionary
forces in Area I (south of Route 23, in the area of present-day Long M and Hi M
villages). Every day, a puppet Regional Forces battalion cleared the Route for the
enemys mechanised vehicles to conduct their bulldozing of the terrain. In a period of two
weeks, they had bulldozed flat tens of thousands of acres568 of jungle.
To destroy the enemys plans for incursions and resettlement, 445 Battalion
alternately deployed the 2nd and 3rd Companies to organise attacks on the enemy or
conduct section-level harassments using their firepower against the enemys bulldozers
and causing them to bring their land-clearing to a stand-still. The enemy strengthened
their forces against us, bringing the 308th Regional Forces Battalion from Long An
Province to scour the area and wipe out our blocking positions along the edge of the
jungle in order to protect their bulldozers that continued to flatten the terrain. We were
determined not to allow the enemy to achieve their objective of bulldozing, making
incursions, resettling the people, and setting up posts in violation of the Paris Agreement.
445 Battalion implemented a plan of ambushing and attacking the newly-arrived and
reckless enemy.569
On 16 February 1975, in accord with its usual practice, the puppet 308th Regional
Forces Battalion (Long An) deployed to clear routes and protect the vehicles clearing the
terrain. At 10am, the enemy over-confidently regrouped at the jungle fringe to rest and
eat. 445 Battalion deployed for an attack and surrounded the surprised enemy. The
ensuing engagement was business-like and effective. We wiped out an enemy company,
567

Translators Note: The account in the t District History (2006) is somewhat different: On the
night of 16-17 December 1974, the 25th Company again attacked the n Ln post (Phc Hi), and seized
control of two hamlets: Hi Lc and Hi Trung. From Phc Li, the enemy deployed a Regional Force
company as a relieving element, but fell into 445 Battalions ambush at p Cu hamlet and suffered heavy
casualties.
568
Translators Note: Literally mu a Vietnamese acre (3,600 square metres).
569
Translators Note: The t District History (2006) relates an engagement in mid-January 1975: On
two days - 12 and 16 January 1975, 445 Battalion had attacked the enemy clearing Route 23 and inflicted
heavy casualties on the 355th Battalion and two companies of the 308th Battalion. A movement to hunt
enemy armoured vehicles was begun across the whole Battalion. The enemys plan to clear Route 23 was
discontinued on some days they didnt clear one metre.

172
captured 10, and seized many enemy weapons and two PRC-25 radios. The remainder of
the enemy fled back to Route 23 and then to their base and then withdrew straight back
to Long An. From that time, the puppet authorities completely abandoned their intentions
of land-clearing, setting up resettlement hamlets, and building posts in the Lang Di area.
With the continuous victories of our forces and the people across the whole of the
South in the 1974-1975 Dry Season Campaign and, in particular, the victory of Phc
Long570 (on 6 January 1975) when for the first time we liberated a province and took
control of a city from a weakening enemy, the Politburo concluded that the balance of
forces on the battlefield had basically changed, had swung towards the side of the
revolution, and we now had the capability to achieve a final victory. They then issued a
strategic resolution: Completely liberate the South within 1975-1976. The Politburo
also foresaw that if opportunities arose, then the South could be liberated immediately in
1975.
The Central Highlands Campaign opened victoriously.571 Exploiting our victory,
we continued with a series of campaigns to liberate the delta provinces of Central
Vietnam. In the face of this strategic opportunity, on 25 March 1975, the Partys
Politburo held a meeting and issued a resolution to liberate the South before the Wet
Season ((April-May)) in 1975.
On 29 March 1975, COSVNs 15th Conference released their special resolution
that ordered direct and urgent tasks for its whole command. The Resolution affirmed:
The revolution in the South is evolving in leaps and bounds, developing into a General
Offensive and General Uprising that can bring the whole government into the hands of
the people. We need to exploit the time available - District Committees must focus on
their Districts; Province Committees must concentrate against the Province capitals; and
Regional Committees must direct their efforts against the cities.
At the beginning of April 1975, the Eastern Region Committee tasked the B Ra
Long Khanh Province Committee to prepare its forces to coordinate with the 6th
Division572 (of the Eastern Military Region) and the Fourth (IV) Corps to liberate Xun
Lc Long Khanh, and to open the gateway from the north-east to Si Gn. Following
this, we were to liberate B Ra and Vng Tu and block the enemys withdrawal route
to the sea. Having received the mission from the Regional Committee and fully
understanding COSVNs Resolution 15, the B Ra Long Khanh Committee directed
the Party Chapters and the militias within the Province to prepare their forces, supplies,
and their areas to receive the main-force troops and coordinate with these main-force
elements to attack and rise up with the guidelines of: Districts liberate Districts, and
villages liberate villages.
570

Translators Note: The battle for Phc Long Province about 120 kilometres north of Si Gn and
bordering Cambodia, was waged from 13 December 1974 to 6 January 1975 see Veith, G.J., Black April,
op.cit., 2012, pp.100-111. The Province capital Phc Binh, fell on 6 January 1975. The 4th NVA Corps
was the major NVA formation in that Campaign that aimed to test US support to the Republic of Vietnam
following the January 1973 Paris Accords - and when in December 1974, the US Congress passed the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 that cut-off all military aid to the Republic of Vietnam.
571
Translators Note: The communists 2/75 Campaign in the Central Highlands began on 4 March 1975,
and Ban M Thut was seized on 11 March, for detail, see Veith, G.J., Black April, op.cit., 2012, pp.142170. On 25 March 1975, the North Vietnamese Politburo decided to conquer Saigon in May, before the
onset of the rainy season. Hu fell to PAVN forces on 25 March 1975 p.317; and Nng - South
Vietnams second-largest city, fell on 29 March 1975 p.328.
572
Translators Note: The 6th Division under Military Region 7 - and commanded by ng Ngc S, was
formed in November 1974 (or August 1974) and comprised the 33rd NVA Regiment, the 4th ((ie 274th))
VC Regiment, and artillery, sapper and engineer battalions. - Military Region 7 Headquarters, 50 Nm
(50 Years), op. cit., 1995.

173
In accordance with the plan of the Province Unit, 445 Battalion struck the enemy
in the area south of Xun Lc.573 From 18 to 21 March 1975, 445 Battalion employed
encirclement and encroachment tactics to attack and wipe out a Regional Forces company
located in the post at the ng Qu rubber plantation (about 10 kilometres west of the 12kilometre mark on Route 2). However, as our encirclement was not tight enough, the
enemy were able to secretly abandon their post and escape in the direction of Route 1.
Although their flight was discovered by 445 Battalion and we pursued them, we were not
able to inflict heavy casualties on them. ng Qu village became the first village to have
been liberated in the 1975 Spring Campaign on the B Ra Long Khanh battlefield.574
With the momentum of that victory, 445 Battalion advanced across Route 2 and
liberated the hamlets of Bo Bnh 1 and Bo Bnh 2, and wiped out the enemy at L Than
Hill. We continued the attack towards Route 1 and liberated the hamlet of Bo Ha.575
In the following days in the middle of April 1975, 445 Battalion attacked the
enemy at Bo Th, Bo Lit, and the Gia Liu Bridge etc on Route 1.576 445 Battalions
Translators Note: PAVN General Trn Vn Tra related that in the period 15-18 March 1975, the 6th
Division of Military Region 7 extended the liberated area along Route 2 from Xun Lc to B Ra and
((moving north-east)) completely liberated Route 3 from Hoi c to Gia Ray. On 20 March, it took the
ng n intersection and Sui Ct, and by 28 March it had mastered a 50 kilometers-long segment of
Route 1 from Sui Ct to Rng L, thus cutting the lifeline connecting the central Vietnam coast with Bin
Ha - Si Gn. - Trn Vn Tra, Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre Vol 5: Concluding the 30Years War, Vn Ngh Publishing House, H Ch Minh City, 1982, p.148.
574
Translators Note: The D440 Battalion History (2011) relates: On 22 March 1975, the Cao Su District
troops coordinated with the 3rd Company of 445 Battalion and continued to surround and attack the enemy
in the ng Qu post. That History also adds that: On 8 April 1975, the Standing Committee of the Region
Committee decided to divide the B Ra-Long Khnh Party Chapter into three Party Chapters ie: B Ra,
Long Kha h, and the Vng Tu City Committee (directly subordinate to the Region Committee). Comrade
Phm Vn Hy was appointed as the Secretary of the Vng Tu City Committee, with Comrade L Minh H
as the B Ra Secretary. 445 Battalions liberation of ng Qu on 21 March with Cao Su District
elements, is also related in ng Tn Hng (ed), Lch S u Tranh Cach Mng Ca Huyn Xun Lc
(The History of the Revolutionary Struggle in Xun Lc District), Nh Xut Bn ng Nai, Bin Ha,
1985, p.98.
575
Translators Note: According to a memoir, on 9 April 1975, 445 Battalion joined with the 9 th Battalion
(209th Regiment of the 7th Division) to attack and destroy two enemy battalions (3 rd/48th Regiment, 209th RF
Battalion) at Sui Ct. Phm Thanh Quang , p tan cnh ca thp Xun Lc 1975 - K s lch s.
The 1991 D445 History relates the early part of the Campaign in greater detail: 445 Battalion together
with K8 (Xun Lc), the 34th Company, the 41st Company (both of Chu c), and the 207th Company
(Cao Su District) formed a force equivalent to a regiment and - led personally by Comrade Phm Vn Cn
(the deputy chief-of-staff of the Province Unit), joined the attack to liberate Xun Lc from the south. At
5am on 9 April 1975, our main column began its attack on Xun Lc. To the north and west, we had won
great victories. In the east however, we were blocked by the enemy and suffered many casualties. In the
south, 445 Battalion significantly wore down two enemy battalions from Sui Ct (the 3rd Battalion of the
48th Regiment and the 234th [sic] Regional Forces Battalion) that had tried to break through to the Town. At
the same time, we seized the hamlet of Bo Ton. Each day, the encirclement of Xun Lc tightened. After
four days of unsuccessful attacks on Xun Lc, our forces in the north and the east were ordered to
withdraw from the Town and to change our methods of attack. Phm Vn Cn is also referred to as the
Chief of Staff of the B Ra-Long Khnh Province Unit commanding the Southern Front Headquarters at
Cm M - see Mai Thanh Xun, Bt i T Tnh Trng Ngy Phm Vn Phc (Capturing the Puppet
Province Chief Colonel Phm Vn Phc), in Military Region 7 (Qun Khu 7), Chin Thng Xun Lc Long Khnh (The Xun Lc-Long Khnh Victory), Nh Xut Bn Tng Hp ng Nai, Bin Ha, 2004,
pp.185-189. He is possibly Phm Vn Cn b. Long Phc 1941, probationary Party member 1963,
platoon 2ic/1st Company/445 Battalion in May 1965 CDEC Log 12-2394-66.
576
Translators Note: According to the History of the Armed Forces of ng Nai: To the south of the
Town, 445 Battalion firmly held the area of Bo Ha and Bo Ton and drove back the enemys counterattacks at the Gia Liu Bridge and Bo Th capturing 117 and seizing a large quantity of weapons and
military equipment. Trn Th Minh Hong (foreword), The History of the Armed Forces of ng Nai
Province, op.cit. 1999.
573

174
principal task was to block the east-southeast flank of Xun Lc from the Sui Cat Bridge
to the Tn Phong crossroads and not allow the enemy fleeing from Central Vietnam join
up with the enemy who were making a last-ditch defence at Xun Lc. In this series of
operations, 445 Battalion attacked and significantly wore down two enemy battalions (the
234th Regional Forces Battalion, and the 3rd Battalion of the 48th Task Force of the
puppets main-force 18th Division). Apart from the enemy killed, 445 Battalion captured
117 of the defeated remnants, and seized 43 radios of various types. These victories had
great significance for the Campaign, hobbling the enemy so that our great army577 on the
main axis was able to take the tactical advantage and concentrate its forces to break up the
puppet militarys strong defensive line in the north-east and to then advance to liberate
Si Gn.578
Judging that the enemy had the capability to withdraw and abandon Long Khanh,
the Province Unit sent a radio message to 445 Battalion directing the Battalion to deploy
back to Route 2 and block the fleeing enemy. To block the enemy in time, the cadre and
soldiers of 445 Battalion had to both walk and run for tens of kilometres through the
rain.579 This was difficult and strenuous, but everyone was enthusiastic and determined to
contribute to the common victory of the whole of the Province, the whole of the Region,
and the whole of the country. On the afternoon of 20 April 1975, the complete Battalion
had fully regrouped at its determined positions and set an ambush to block the enemy at
the Letter-C and Letter-S locations ((on Route 2)).
Our blocking positions on Route 2 which incorporated the local District troops,
stretched over 10 kilometres from the area of the Letter-S bends to the Quang Minh
Plantation. At 11pm on 21 April 1975, a convoy of mixed vehicles comprising hundreds
of vehicles with tanks and armoured vehicles leading, escaped from Long Khanh down
Route 2. Because our troops were over-tired and fell asleep, the Battalion allowed the first

577

Translators Note: In a footnote, the 1991 D445 History summarises: For the attack on Xun Lc, our
participating forces were more than a corps in strength and attacked the enemy from four directions:
from the east: the 7th Division (of 4 Corps);
from the north: the 341st Division (of 4 Corps);
from the west: the 6th Division (of Military Region 7); and
from the south: the armed forces of B RaLong Khnh.
578
Translators Note: For the 1975 Xun Lc Campaign see: Veith, G.J., Black April, op.cit., 2012, pp.455461; and Phm Vn Hy, Tnh y B Ra-Long Khnh Vi Chin Trng Xun Lc-Long Khnh (The
B Ra-Long Khnh Province Committee and the Xun Lc-Long Khnh Battlefield), pp.161-164 in
Military Region 7 (Qun Khu 7), Chin Thng Xun Lc-Long Khnh (The Xun Lc-Long Khnh
Victory), op.cit., 2004. Phm Vn Hy was the Secretary of the B Ra-Long Khnh Province Committee in
the period September 1972-1975 (b. Phm Bng, 1931, Nam nh; died Vng Tu 30 April 2010). For the
defence of Xun Lc, see: Veith, G.J. and Pribbenow, M.L. II, Fighting is an Art: The Army of the
Republic of Vietnams Defense of Xun Lc - 9-21 April 1975, The Journal of Military History, Vol 8,
No.1, January 2004, pp.163-213. The article includes clear annotated maps of key locations and
deployments. 445 Battalions participation in the Xun Lc campaign is also related in Xun Thanh, Tiu
on 445 Trong Tn Cng Xun Lc-Long Khnh (445 Battalion in the Attack on Xun Lc-Long
Khnh), in Military Region 7 (Qun Khu 7), Chin Thng Xun Lc ..., op.cit., 2004., pp.161-164.
579
Translators Note: According to the Long Khnh Town Party History, it rained heavily on the afternoon
of 19 April ((1975)). Captain Phm Vn Cn ((see footnotes 532 and 575)) commanding the local forces,
deployed the K8 Xun Lc unit and the 2nd Company of 445 Battalion from Bo Bnh back to Route 2. On
20 April, our forces destroyed two Regional Force units at the Letter-S and Letter-C locations (Route 2) and
then deployed to block the fleeing enemy. The 3rd Company of 445 Battalion had to move tens of
kilometres [sic] from Bo Ha to strike the enemy at Con Rn Mountain. Faced by the 3rd Companys
strong attack, the enemy ran helter-skelter. We killed 83 enemy, and seized two 105mm artillery pieces. Trn Quang Toi & Phan nh Dng, Lch s (The History of the Party in Long Khnh Town 19302007), op.cit., 2009, p.159.

175
groups of the withdrawing enemy to pass and could only use the Battalions mortars to
fire into the ranks of the withdrawing enemy.580
At 4am on 21 [sic] April 1975, the large fleeing enemy group reached the area of
the Quang Minh Plantation. Chu c Districts C41 Company581 the forward element
of our ambush, set fire to two tanks and captured a number of the enemy including
Phm Vn Phc, the Long Khanh Province Chief.582 Next, 445 Battalion together with the
C41 Company of Chu c District continued to pursue and attack the fleeing enemy,
capturing some of the remnants and seizing weapons and equipment etc. We took
complete control of a stretch of Route 2 from Xun Lc to X Bang which we held until
the launch of the H Ch Minh Campaign. The steel gate583 of Xun Lc had been
shattered completely, and the gateway from the east into Si Gn had been opened.584
President Nguyn Vn Thiu was forced to resign and to pass power to Trn Vn Hng.
The puppet government and authorities were in chaos. Their General Staff was crippled
with the general officers abandoning their responsibilities and their units to find a way to
flee overseas. A psychology of despair overwhelmed the whole of the puppet forces and
puppet administration.
At this time, in B Ra and in Vng Tu, the enemys forces were still almost
intact. Apart from the Regional Forces, the police, the soldiers at the Vn Kip Training
Center and the Tri Nhai camp ((Vng Tu)), and the troops of the Region 3 Coastal
Headquarters, there were still a large number of their remnants from several places that
580

Translators Note: On 21 April, the South Vietnamese forces abandoned Xun Lc Town and withdrew
southward down Route 2 through Phc Tuy Province. PAVN General Trn Vn Tra related: We were
able to wipe out only part of the fleeing troops because our unit ((to)) which the B Ra Military Command
had assigned responsibility for blocking Route 2 was careless and failed to prevent the enemy from
fleeing. Trn Vn Tra, Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre, op.cit., 1982, p.176.
581
Translators Note: According to the Chu c District History (2004): On 6 April 1975 in the Hc
Dch base, in response to requests and a new task, Chu c Districts 41st Company was re-formed with
Comrade By Cao as the company commander, and Comrade Chu as its political officer. - Nguyn Cng
Danh , Chu c District, op.cit., 2004. The consolidation of C41 Company on 6 April 1975 in the
Hc Dch area - under Aspirant Officer Lng Vn Cao (By Cao) - and detail on the fighting on Route 2,
is related in Mai Thanh Xun, Bt i T , op.cit., 2004.
582
Translators Note: According to the 1991 D445 History: The fate of Colonel (Ranger) Phm Vn Phc
the Province Chief of Long Khnh, was also decided immediately in the field by those whom he had
oppressed. - Chamberlain, E.P., D445: Their Story, op.cit., 2011, p.95. The capture of Colonel Phc
including a photograph, is related in an article that also includes detail on the fighting on Route 2. - Danh
Trng, Bt Sng Tnh Trng Long Khnh 1975 (Long Khanh Province Chief captured alive),
ng Nai, 19 April 2010; and also related in Mai Thanh Xun, Bt i T , op.cit., 2004. Following
several years of post-War re-education, Colonel Phc immigrated to the US in about 2002.
583
Translators Note: The term - steel gate/door (cnh ca thp) ie blocking the NVA/VCs northeastern approaches to Si Gn, was apparently coined by the commander of the 18 th ARVN Division,
Brigadier General L Minh o. The 1991 D445 History included a D445 soldiers poem: We stand
dauntless and dignified beneath the Xun Lc sky. The steel gate was burst wide-open with lightning
speed by our feet.
584
Translators Note: For an ARVN account of the withdrawal on Route 2, see Ha Yn Ln, Colonel
(Chief of Staff, 18th ARVN Division), The Line of Steel at Xun Lc (Long Khnh), Seattle, 5 February
1988 - ie: On 20 April 1975, the headquarters and elements of the 18 th ARVN Division successfully
withdrew south down Route 2 to an assembly area at c Thnh and enroute - easily brushed aside the
enemy road-blocks and ambushes and arrived the next morning. They were soon joined by the 1 st
Airborne Brigade and the 2nd Battalion of the 43rd Regiment that had suffered only light losses. After two
days of regrouping and re-organizing our units at the c Thnh assembly area, the entire 18th Infantry
Division was transported by trucks to its rear base at Long Bnh to receive new equipment and
replacements. According to Colonel Ln, during the 12-day battle at Xun Lc, ARVN losses were 30%
for all units participating in the battle, except for the 52nd Task Force which suffered 60% losses; North
Vietnamese casualties were reportedly: 5,000-6,000 killed or wounded, and 37 armoured vehicles
destroyed. VCAT Item No.3670101001.

176
had come from Central Vietnam and from Xun Lc with the total numbering about
22,000. All of these forces were under the command of a brigadier the commander of
the puppet Marines, Bi Th Lan, who had established a defensive line and last-ditch
defence while they sought opportunities to flee by sea.
On 23 April 1975, at the Cm M base, Comrade L Minh Nguyn (the Deputy
Secretary of the Province Committee) and Comrade Nguyn Minh Ninh (the Deputy
Commander of the Province Unit) representing the B Ra Long Khanh Province
Committee and the Province Unit met with the Headquarters of the 3rd Sao Vng
((Yellow Star)) Division to produce a coordinated plan to liberate Phc Tuy Province
and Vng Tu. The agreed plan was in two phases: Phase I was to liberate the town of B
Ra and the whole of Phc Tuy, and to seize the C May Bridge585; and Phase 2 was to
liberate Vng Tu. The Commander of the 3rd Sao Vng Division gave his orders for the
fighting at 1200hrs on 26 April 1975 at exactly the same time the campaign to liberate
Si Gn Gia nh was titled as The H Ch Minh Campaign.
After deferring H-hour three times to allow units time to get closer to their targets,
at 1700hrs on 26 April 1975, 19 heavy artillery guns of the Division simultaneously fired
at targets in the Phc Tuy Sector and the training centre at Vn Kip at the same time,
this was the signal to begin the attack to liberate B Ra and Vng Tu.
While the 3rd Division attacked the Sub-Sector at c Thnh586 and B Ra
587
Town , the Provinces armed forces were given the task of launching the main attacks in
the two districts of Long in and t . In accord with the tactical plan of the B Ra
Province Unit, 445 Battalion divided into two forces. The first comprising two of our
companies (the 1st and the 3rd Companies) and an element of our 4th Company combined
with Chu c Districts C41 Company, attacked Long in Town. The second
comprising 445 Battalions 2nd Company and the remaining elements of the 4th Company,
coordinated with two companies of Long t District to attack and liberate t .
At about 1800hrs on 26 April, the 1st and 3rd Companies of 445 Battalion attacked
Long in at the Long in T-Junction and the District Headquarters centre. After about
20 minutes of overpowering fire, our infantry simultaneously assaulted. The enemys
resistance was weak, so by 0900hrs in the morning our troops had taken complete control
of Long in Town capturing hundreds of prisoners and seizing weapons. Our second
group was to attack the District Headquarters centre and the t police station.
However, when they reached An Nht they heard that the enemy in t had
disintegrated - so that group turned around and returned to Long in.
Both of the Battalions groups in coordination with the local force companies of
Chu c and Long t Districts, had outstandingly completed the Phase I tasks of the
Campaign as assigned to us by the Province Unit and the Province Committee. Two
companies of 445 Battalion (the 1st and 2nd Companies) occupying the Long in T585

Translators Note: The C May Bridge located at YS 379572, was a major bridge on Route 15 from B
Ra Town to Vng Tu City. About five kilometres south of B Ra, it crossed a river estuary surrounded by
mangroves. Post-War, a major PAVN/PLAF memorial was erected at the C May Bridge.
586
Translators Note: The Chu c District History (2004) notes: At dawn on 27 April 1975, the 12 th
Regiment (of the 3rd Division) took control of the c Thnh Sub-Sector, and then continued to advance
south and seized the Long L Sub-Sector. Nguyn Cng Danh , Chu c District, op.cit., 2004.
587
Translators Note: The D440 Battalion History (2011) notes: The 3 rd Divisions 141st Regiment
reinforced with the 4th Tank Company and the 5th Battalion also completed its task of seizing B Ra Town
at 5.30am on 27 April 1975. According to the t District History (2006): The 141st Regiment was
strengthened with the 4th Tank Company and the 5th Infantry Battalion to move through the jungle to Hc
Dch and then attack straight into B Ra Town and the Vn Kip Training Centre after which a column
drove along Route 15 (present-day National Route 51) and seized the C May Bridge. ng Tn Hng,
Lch S u Tranh Huyn t (1930-2005), op.cit., 2006, p.287.

177
Junction had completely destroyed the enemy remnants fleeing from Vn Kip and B
Ra Town who had intended to regroup and resist in that area. We held that
communications zone firmly (Route 44 and Route 23), ensuring that the 3rd Divisions
units were able to continue their advance down to Long Hi and Phc Tnh and create a
springboard for the liberation of Vng Tu.
Having completely liberated the B Ra area, on 28 April 1975 the Campaign
Headquarters decided to use the 3rd Sao Vng Division and 445 Battalion to achieve
Phase II of the Campaign by liberating Vng Tu from two directions: by land, and by
sea.
The enemy had destroyed the C May Bridge on 27 April and developed a
defensive line there with the aim of blocking our attacks. The 3rd Sao Vng Division
Headquarters decided to advance by: secretly crossing the Ca Lp River into Vng Tu
and also breaking through frontally on Route 51 ((ie Route 15)) with the Divisions fire
support. While the group crossing the C May River struck difficulties and suffered
casualties from a determined enemy counter-attack, the group crossing the Ca Lp River
had quite favourable circumstances as they were assisted by local villagers who guided
them. The people mobilised 50 fishing boats from Phc Tnh village to ferry the troops
across the river. After the 12th [sic] Regiment of the 3rd Division had crossed the river, a
detachment attacked Phc Thnh village isolating the enemys defensive line from the
C May Bridge to Cy Kh, and creating the conditions for the 3rd Battalion of the Sao
Vngs 2nd [sic] Regiment to attack and destroy the enemys defences to the south of the
C May Bridge, forcing the enemy to flee in panic back into Vng Tu.
With the momentum of the attack by the 3rd Sao Vng Division, the 445 Battalion
Headquarters swiftly took the opportunity for part of the Headquarters and its 1st
Company to cross the C May River and advance into Vng Tu. The Battalion
coordinated with Party, militia, and political elements to seize and occupy the abandoned
enemy bases and installations, to mobilize the people to rise up and take control, pursue
and capture the enemy remnants, to seize weapons and military equipment, and to protect
the vital installations of Vng Tu City (such as the Electricity Generating Station, the
Central Hospital, and the water reticulation system).588 At 1130am on 30 April 1975, the
town of Vng Tu had essentially been liberated, and there were only a number of
stubborn enemy groups still resisting. The most difficult and determined resistance was
by a group in a strongpoint in the Palace Hotel. There, about 450 enemy had assembled as
a last resort both officers and soldiers. These defeated thugs - in a last-ditch effort, were
still hoping to find a way to escape. The enemy were very wicked and had detained
refugees as hostages in the Hotels lower floors as a barrier and had constructed final
defences on the upper floors that included heavy machineguns, M79 grenade launchers,
and grenades. These weapons were sited in strongpoints, bunkers, and windows and
caused us many casualties.
At midday on 30 April 1975 when President Dng Vn Minh announced the
unconditional surrender and called upon the puppet officers and soldiers to lay down their
weapons, the enemy in the Palace Hotel continued to stubbornly resist. The 6th Battalion
of the 3rd Sao Vng Division focused its firepower on the enemy on the upper floors. This
created the conditions for an element to fire through the windows on the lower floors,
wiping out the enemy there, and - using explosives to break through the entrances on the
lower floors, to escort the people out. It was only at 13.30hrs on 30 April 1975, that the
588

Translators Note: The 1991 D445 Battalion History includes only a very brief mention of the
Battalions participation in operations to seize Vng Tu ie: On 29 April, 445 Battalion joined with the 3 rd
Division to liberate Vng Tu. The Battalion attacked the puppets 4 th Marine Battalion - and at 10am on 30
April, the liberation flag flew over the enemys Hong Hoa Thm base at Vng Tu .

178
enemy at the Hotel decided to put down their weapons, fly a white flag, and surrender.
The town of Vng Tu was then completely liberated.
On 1 May 1975, Major General L Trng Tn589 the representative of the
General Staff and the Commander of the Coastal Zone, met with the representatives of
the Eastern Region Committee, the 3rd Sao Vng Division, the Forward Headquarters of
the Vietnamese Navy, and the Vng Tu City Military Administration Committee to
discuss ways of liberating the island of Cn o.590 Accepting this task, 445 Battalion
assigned Comrade Nguyn Vn Quang the Battalion second-in-command, to lead our
1st Company to participate in the operation, together with the 6th Battalion of the Sao
Vng Division. The force embarked on three naval vessels to liberate Cn o.
After three days at sea, the vessels carrying the liberation group landed on Cn
o. At this stage, the situation on the Island had stabilized as the political prisoners had
risen up and liberated themselves during the night of 30 April with the assistance of a
number of civil officials and prison guards who had long been sympathetic to the
revolution and the communists. Cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalions 1st Company were
ordered to remain and defend the Island and the people, and to organise for boats to
transport the political prisoners back to the mainland.
*

15 years of fighting in the resistance war of salvation against the Americans was a
long road full of tough challenges for the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion. Having
been raised as a Province concentrated unit with a mobile role to attack the enemy in the
main areas - and facing the most violent difficulties, 445 Battalion always had to contend
with battle-tested American forces, Australian vassal troops, and a great number of
puppet forces in our area of operations. Nevertheless, with an extra-ordinary and resolute
firmness of purpose and unsurpassable and courageous sacrifices by all levels of cadre
and soldiers, the Battalion combined with higher-level main-force units, District armed
forces, and village guerrillas, to successively defeat: the dangerous tactical tricks of the
Australian military; the strategic hamlet and pacification programs of the Americans and
their puppets throughout their strategies of Limited War and the Vietnamization of the
War; and the stubborn encroachment operations of the puppet forces after 1973. In
particular, the Battalion knew to rely on the people, and exploited the peoples strength to
multiply our own strengths. The great combat feats of the Battalion in the fighting
contributed importantly to maintaining the revolutions bases, liberated zones, and the
local revolutionary movement. It created the conditions to expand the local peoples war
to a higher level that became the General Offensive. The General Offensive and Uprising
contributed together with the militia of the whole country, to achieving the very great
victory of the General Offensive and Uprising of Spring 1975 that completely liberated
589

Translators Note: During the Spring 1975 Offensive, L Trng Tn (d. 1986) was the commander of the
Hu - Nng Campaign and then commander of the 2nd Corps/Coastal Zone force that swept southwards
towards Xun Lc and Si Gn.
590
Translators Note: As noted, Cn o is a small archipelago in the South China Sea about 185
kilometres south of Vng Tu - with its largest island being Cn Sn (Poulo Condore 52 sq km). The
islands were used as a prison by the French for political prisoners from 1861 - and subsequently by
successive South Vietnamese Governments, see footnote 244. In September 1973, the Spratly Islands
(Trng Sa) and Cn o were incorporated into Phc Tuy Province Sector, and Regional Force
companies were stationed on several of the islands. In April 1975, there were about 7,000 prisoners on Cn
o. The prisoners broke out and seized most of the Island on 1 May 1975. On 5 May, units of the 3rd Sao
Vng Division landed on Cn o, completing its occupation.

179
B Ra Long Khanh Province. This contributed towards the liberation of the South and
the unification of the country.591
*
*

The Victory at Long M Wiping Out the 4th Company/356th RF Battalion 15-2-1973
(see f.544, f.545) Source: V Vn Cm - Director, Trng thnh t trong chin u Coming-of-age during combat, B Ra - Vng Tu Television, 4 November 2014.

591

Translators Note: A 2006 media article summarised 445 Battalions combat achievements: In the
resistance war against the Americans, 445 Battalion wiped out more than 10,000 of the enemy (including
1,700 American and vassal troops), destroyed 120 military vehicles, shot down 20 aircraft, and seized more
than 1,800 weapons of various types B Ra-Vng Tu Communist Party Magazine, Mt Ngy Tiu
on 445 (A Day at 445 Battalion), 21 June 2006. Note: 445 Battalion was formally deactivated in 2008.

180

PART TWO
445 Battalion in the Task of Building and Defending the Fatherland
(1975-2004)
Chapter 1

Defending the Government and the Revolution; Pursuing and Driving

Away the Puppet Remnants; and our International Duty (1975-1989)
1. Pursuing and Driving Away the Enemy Military Remnants, Defending the
Government, Stabilising Order and Security.
After 30 April 1975, the Districts of the old B Ra Province (Chu Thnh, Long
t, Chu c, and Xuyn Mc) remained within the battlefield organisation of B Ra
Long Khanh apart from Vng Tu which was a city directly subordinate to the Eastern
Military Region.
At the beginning of 1976, B Ra and Vng Tu were incorporated together with
Long Khanh and Bin Ha, as part of ng Nai Province. The island District of Cn o
came under the administrative control of Hu Giang Province.592
This division of administrative control had a direct influence on 445 Battalions
combat missions and its work in building the local armed forces in general and the
Battalion in particular.
With a high sense of responsibility, the cadre and soldiers of the Battalion
rigorously implemented the instructions and orders from the higher authorities in matters
of taking over, recovering, and protecting the economic agencies, the system of
warehouses, and the rear bases left by the enemy. The most important of these were the
electricity installations, water reticulation systems, hospitals, and public offices in the
cities and the situation was very complicated. A large number of the puppet military and
puppet authorities had surrendered in-place, some had arrived from other places and were
still in hiding, others had not yet reported for study and re-education and there were
even still many organising armed resistance. Accordingly, the responsibilities of the
Province armed forces were very onerous. 445 Battalion was tasked as the Province
concentrated mobile force to be the nucleus to engage the stubborn puppet military and
puppet authorities who still held a desire to oppose the people and were bent on
resistance. The Battalion was to establish firm bases for the revolutionary administration
and the people in order that they might concentrate on building upon and protecting the
fruits of the recently-won revolution. 445 Battalion actively participated in the building
and training of the District militia forces and guerrillas in the local areas in which the
Battalion was located with the aim of protecting the infrastructure.
On 8 June 1975, the COSVN Military Committee promulgated Directive No. 27CT-75 on the pursuit and re-education of enemy officers and soldiers. That Directive
clearly stated: We must resolutely attack and wipe out the ringleader groups of the
enemy that are still stubbornly hiding among the people and in the jungle. At the same
time, in accordance with the lenient policy of the revolution, we will establish re592

Translators Note: In January 1976, Phc Tuy (B Ra) Province was incorporated into ng Nai
Province with the Province capital at Bin Ha. On 12 August 1991, several districts were detached and
the current B Ra-Vng Tu Province was established.

181
education camps for the puppet officers and soldiers and puppet authorities who had erred
and lost their way so that they can become honest citizens.
Accordingly, the task of pursuing the enemys military remnants, and gathering
and managing individuals for re-education593 was the priority and most important task for
the armed forces in general and for 445 Battalion in particular.
Before 30 April 1975, B Ra Long Khanh contained a large number of the Si
Gn regimes special forces and their most well-trained troops such as the 18th Division
stationed in Long Khanh, the Special Forces Training Centre (Ch Linh), and the NonCommissioned Officers Training Centre (Vn Kip) etc. Additionally, there were still
the quisling spy organisations, the police, the Pheonix and White Swan intelligence
groups, and the Rural Development Cadre who had defended the south-eastern gateway
to Si Gn and the communications life-lines to the sea at Vng Tu. For these reasons,
the number of puppet soldiers and authorities who had surrendered in-place was quite
large (about 100,000). In that number, there was still a large proportion who had not
reported to the revolutionary administration (the majority of whom were wicked officers
who had a blood debt to the people). These people took the opportunity to hide in
religious zones and places that were difficult to access such as jungle areas in Xuyn
Mc, the Minh m Mountains (Long t), the Ni Nh Mountain (Vng Tu), the Ni
Dinh Ni Th Vi Mountains (B Ra), and the island of Long Sn. The enemys
operational scheme was to make contact and consolidate their forces in order to conduct
activities to cause trouble, conduct sabotage, and to disrupt public order. They would also
conduct propaganda activities to discredit the regime etc. Most common were
indiscriminate shootings and sniping, stealing property, throwing grenades into crowded
places, and assassinating our cadre by poisoning their food.594*
In implementing the Directive of the COSVN Military Committee, the COSVN
Headquarters and Military Region 7 Headquarters reinforced the units of B Ra Long
Khanh in order to begin a campaign to pursue the enemys military remnants. The forces
conducting pursuit operations in the Vng Tu area comprised: an element of the 33rd
Regiment (a main-force Military Region formation); 445 Battalion (B Ra Long Khanh
Province), a company of military police, a reconnaissance section of the Vng Tu City
Unit, and a guerrilla militia force from the quarters and the wards595 of the City.
The pursuit phase in Vng Tu was conducted in June 1975 in the following
areas: Ni Ln Mountain, Ni Nh Mountain, and the jungle areas of Ch Linh and G
Gng etc.
445 Battalion had only just emerged from a violent war, and while its mood was
very elated, personnel desired to return to their families and home villages after many

593

Translators Note: Colonel Nguyn Ba Trc (b. 1922) the Phc Tuy Province Chief from September
1967 to September 1970, underwent re-education in a camp in H Nam Ninh Province (northern Vietnam)
from early June 1975 until his release on 9 September 1987. Soon after, he left Vietnam under the
UNHCRs Orderly Departure Program (ODP). VCAT Item No.1849048040000. The ODP was initiated in
1979, and by 1998 about 623,000 Vietnamese had reportedly left Vietnam under the Program (about 74% to
the US, 3.1% to France and 7.5% to Australia). Phc Tuy Province Chiefs from 1964 to April 1975 were
successively: L c t, Nguyn Ba Trc, Nguyn Vn T, Trn nh Bch, Hunh Bu Sn, and Phm
Ngc Ln. Colonel L c t was killed in action on 24 April 1972 in Kontum Province while serving as
the commander of the 22nd Infantry Regiment/commander of the Tn Cnh Front.
594
* On 18 May 1975, the enemy used poison to assassinate cadre in Vng Tu killing one person and
seriously poisoning two others.
595
Translators Note: In urban or built-areas, administrative divisions were termed: Khm equivalent to a
rural hamlet, and Phng or Khu Ph (Ward or Quarter) equivalent to a village. Qun (District) was
common to towns and the countryside.

182
years away. However, because of the duty requirements, they had to continue to carry
their weapons into battle.
In a period of only one month, 445 Battalion combined with allotted
reinforcements and local District troops to conduct 18 armed pursuit operations in the
main areas, capturing 118 individuals, seizing a 60mm mortar, an M79, seven light
machineguns, two pistols, and a mine. Following those pursuit operations, the
revolutionary administration quickly assessed those detained immediately releasing 60
of the 118 suspects, to avoid creating any alarm among the people.
In the first pursuit phase in B Ra Long Khanh, quite successful results were
achieved. However, the armed resistance was not completely wiped out, and they
continued minor activities. They continued to exploit our weak spots and oppose the
revolution.
At the end of 1975, COSVN Headquarters, Military Region 7 Headquarters, and
the Military Headquarters of the Provinces of Bin Ha and B Ra Long Khanh
launched three campaigns against the military remnants. The Provinces of Bin Ha and
B Ra Long Khanh were divided into four main areas:
- Area 1: H Nai, Du Giy, Gia Kim.
- Area 2: Route 2, Long Khanh, the ng n T-Junction.
- Area 3: Lc An, i An, Tn Uyn, B Stream.
- Area 4: Ni Dinh, Th Vi, Vng Tu.
In Area 4, we deployed our forces from 31 October 1975 (apart from in Vng Tu
where we began on 3 November as our preparations were not yet complete). 445
Battalion together with the militia and guerrillas of the hamlets and villages, sought out
the enemy in the areas of the Ni Dinh Mountains, the Ni Th Vi Mountains, and the
Minh m Mountains. Next, we changed direction to sweep the region of the Sng Vnh
River agricultural worksite - including both within that area and outside in the jungle, but
we did not discover any enemy remnants. According to a number of Military Region 7
reports, from 7 to 10 November 1975 in Area 4, we captured 26 enemy who had hidden
themselves among the people.
To summarise the series of pursuit operations from 30 April to 15 December
1975, in the whole of B Ra Long Khanh, 445 Battalion combined with higher units
and our militia and guerrillas of the villages and the town wards to conduct hundreds of
pursuit operations both large and small, capturing hundreds of surrendered soldiers and
seizing a large quantity of military equipment. 21,274 puppet soldiers were rounded up together with 9,490 puppet administrators, and all were taken to undergo study and reeducation.596
At the end of 1975, we implemented the Directive of the COSVN Military
Committee and the Military Region 7 Headquarters ordering the Provinces to boost the
mobilisation of the people to participate in the pursuit operations. Working groups were
established within 445 Battalion and a broad series of propaganda activities were
conducted among the people in areas where the Battalion was stationed. We actively
participated in building strong administrative organisations and called upon the people to
find under-cover counter-revolutionary individuals who aimed to hide within the ranks of
596

Translators Note: According to the D440 Battalion History (2011): In B Ra-Long Khnh, there was
one combined camp comprising four camps in the area of Hong Diu (the rear base of the 43rd Regiment
of the 18th Division) and a camp in the area behind Cha Chan Mountain and the Rng L area (Xun Ha
village beside Bnh Trung and the Sui Rm area). There were also apparently study and re-education
camps (tri hc tp ci to) farther south in the former Phc Tuy Province principally in Xuyn Mc
District, including at Bu Lm (ie the Tha Tch area), H Trm, Sau Ac, T345, and TH6.

183
revolutionary cadre and were awaiting the opportunity for internal sabotage. The
Battalion managed areas597, purging individuals and resolutely trying and punishing
stubborn individuals unwilling to repent. On the other hand, we successfully mobilised
the Soldiers of Uncle H Movement with 445 Battalion working groups implementing
a policy of civilian proselytising to help the local people in the areas of Long in and
t to reclaim waste land, restore their fields and gardens, and focus on production
all with the aim of stabilising their lives. Together with mine-clearing units, we rendered
safe many types of mines and explosives - and expanded the areas under cultivation in
order that families could work safely, produce their crops, and build new lives.
Through the propaganda activities of 445 Battalions cadre, soldiers, and the
peoples mass organisations, the great majority of families with children who were
remnants of the puppet forces and had opposed the revolution truly understood the
humanitarian and lenient policy of the revolution and voluntarily brought their children to
give themselves up and report to the authorities. At the same time as continuing with its
task of pursuing the defeated enemy remnants, in September 1975, 445 Battalions cadre
and soldiers participated in the X2 Campaign (re-educating the bourgeoisie and
comprador class); and the X3 Campaign (currency exchange involving cancellation of the
monetary system of the old Si Gn government and issuing the currency of the Vietnam
National Bank).598 We also contributed to the creation of a productive socialist
ideological system in the area. Together with the armed forces of all levels, 445 Battalion
satisfactorily fulfilled its mission of maintaining security and order while continuing its
combat training in readiness to deal with all situations that might occur within the B Ra
area throughout the conduct of the Campaigns. As a result of the close cooperation
between all the forces, the X2 and X3 Campaigns were successfully completed.
Implementing Resolution 24 of the Partys Central Executive Committee (January
1976), ng Nai Province was established on the basis of encompassing the three former
provinces of Bin Ha, B Ra Long Khanh, and Tn Ph. In accord with that decision,
the armed forces in B Ra Long Khanh Vng Tu came under the leadership and
direct command of the ng Nai Province Unit.599*
In implementing the ng Nai Province Unit plans on pursuing the enemy
military remnants, 445 Battalion focused on strengthening its structure and organisation
and accelerated its self-sufficiency in production, looked after its weapons and
equipment, and prepared everything to join with its fraternal units in a large pursuit
operation over an area of 120 square kilometres covering the districts of: Chu Thnh,
Long t, Vng Tu, Duyn Hi and most importantly the Sng Vnh River area.
The Sng Vnh area was part of the two villages of Phc Ha and Ph M
(nowadays in Tn Thnh District) and comprised 16 hamlets with about 36,000 people.
This area included Route 15 (nowadays Route 51) and was bordered to the east by the
Ni Th Vi Mountain and Ni ng Trnh Mountain. The terrain was difficult to access,
cloaked in jungle, and there were many caves running deep into the mountains. To the
south were the Th Vi River, the ng Tranh River, the Lng Tu River, and the salt597

Translators Note: Military Management Committees (MMC) were gradually replaced by the civiliandominated Peoples Revolutionary Councils (PRC). The Si Gn/Gia nh MMC was replaced by the H
Ch Minh City PRC on 21 January 1976. see Thayer, C.A., The Vietnam Peoples Army: Victory at
Home (1975), Success in Cambodia (1989), pp.149-175 in: Victory or Defeat, The 2010 Chief of Army
Military History Conference, Big Sky Publishing, 2010, p.151.
598
Translators Note: In late September 1975, the currency in South Vietnam the Republic of Vietnam
piastre (ng), was changed to a "liberation ng" worth 500 former Southern ng.
599
* The Headquarters of the ng Nai Province Unit comprised: Comrade L Vn Ngc the
Commander; Comrade Nguyn ng Mai the Political Commissar; Comrade Phm Lc a Deputy
Commander; and Comrade Nguyn Vit Hoa a Deputy Commander.

184
water Rng Sc600 jungle. This was a very suitable area in which the enemy military
remnants could hide.
In accordance with the plan, 445 Battalion set up a blocking position within B
Ra Town at the Long Hng Bridge. The pursuit operations lasted unit April 1976. This
was the very largest pursuit and sweeping operation within the territory of Eastern Nam
B. 445 Battalion601* was reinforced with reconnaissance capabilities to search for the
enemy elements and equipped with heavy firepower to undertake its tasks: mobilising the
people to participate in the pursuit operations; recovering and closely managing all types
of weapons; consolidating and creating local authorities; and assigning a number of cadre
as a nucleus to strengthen the local machinery. Following each pursuit phase, the
Battalion conducted studies to gain further experience, to raise the level of joint
cooperation with our fraternal units, and to develop combat plans for all situations in
order to defend our territory, the borders, and the islands.
By June 1976, almost all of the large and stubborn armed groups of the enemys
remnants in the B Ra Vng Tu area had been wiped out. The continuous pursuit
operations in the area had defeated their plots and their intention to organise groupings
and activities against us both then - and in the long-term.
The report of the ng Nai Province Unit clearly directed that the tasks of the
local armed forces in 1977 were to focus on the pursuit mission, put down counterrevolutionaries, and participate in activities to mobilise the masses to maintain security
and public order. We were also to stabilise the local situation in stages; and guarantee the
security of important targets, festival days, the Party Conference, and the voting days for
the elections of the Peoples Committees that were conducted during the year.
The report of the ng Nai Province Unit also clearly advised that: in the Chu
Thnh area there were groups and counter-revolutionary organisations such as: The
Front to Destroy Communism, The National Front to Liberate the People, and The
Joint Anti-Communist Front. Armed groups had the titles of the 318th Regiment (in
the Dinh Th Vi Mountains) and the Special Task Regiment (in the Phc Thng
road area). There were also the ng Sn, the Hong Qunh and the Qu Sn
ng Secret Zones etc. These counter-revolutionary groups operated clandestinely making contacts and building their forces, and awaiting for the time to overthrow the
government.
In the first six months of 1977, the armed forces of ng Nai concentrated on
pursuit operations in the areas of Tn Ph, Thng Nht, and Xun Lc Districts. 445
Battalion was reinforced to operate in the main areas of Tn Ph and Thng Nht. The
Battalion Headquarters ordered our recconaissance element to coordinate with the
Military Regions reconnaissance force to develop information on the area and produce a
specific tactical plan. Our 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Companies and the combat support platoons,
were all divided into platoons and sections with heavy firepower and mounted mobile
ambushes in the areas in which the enemy remnants usually conducted robberies,
destroyed property, assassinated cadre, and assembled to distort our policies and arouse
hatreds.
In September 1977, 445 Battalion coordinated with the 6th Company (the armed
force of Tn Ph District) on a pursuit operation against the bandit group led by L Pha
Sang602 in the area of the Lintaba Falls on the ng Nai River (in the area of modern-day
600

Translators Note: For detail on the Rng Sc, see footnote 10.
* The Battalion was conferred with the title of Heroic Unit of the Peoples Armed Forces on 3 June 1976.
Translators Note: L Pha Sang had reportedly been an ARVN captain on the intelligence staff of Long
Khanh Sector. Following the fall of Si Gn, he was reportedly appointed Defence Minister by Trn Vn

601
602

185
nh Quan, about 12 kilometres to the west of the Kilometre 18 mark on Route 20). This
bandit group was quite strong, numbering about 30. They operated quite brazenly.
Previously, they had been hunted by 445 Battalion and the troops of Tn Ph Districts 6th
Company several times in the area of the two villages along the border of Hoai
District (Lm ng Province) and c Linh District (Bnh Thun Province) ie: the
villages of Ph Bnh and Phng Lm. Pursued relentlessly in the north of the District,
the bandit group fled to the lower end of the District, exploiting the difficult terrain at the
end of the Nam Cat Tin jungle to hide and coordinate with other small counterrevolutionary groups in the regions of Dc M, Gia Kim and Trang Bm where they
continued their sabotage activities. On their way, they fled past the village of T Li a
village of the minority Chu Ro people. The bandit group stole food, chickens, and pigs
and shot dead two people and captured a number of others. The village guerrillas
followed them closely and found them grouped at C Lao at the Lin Ta Pa
Waterfall.603 Hearing this, the Military Headquarters of Tn Ph District sent a message
by signal and made a joint tactical plan to wipe out the L Pha Sang bandit group together
with 445 Battalion. According to the plan, 445 Battalion would use its 1st Company and
its reconnaissance platoon led by the Battalion second-in-command Hero Nguyn Vn
Quang, to surround and attack the bandit group from the east. Meanwhile, the 6th
Company of Tn Ph District would strike the enemy from the north-west.
At about 2100hrs (on the day set for the attack), both forces departed from their
base positions. However, as they had the advantage of familiarity with the terrain, the Tn
Ph Districts 6th Company was able to reach the location of the bandit group first.
Regrettably, because of carelessness (a soldier accidentally pulled the trigger of his
weapon), the bandit group was warned and opened fire first, wounding one of our
soldiers. Having lost the factor of surprise, the attacking group was unable to continue the
operation.
When they heard gunfire from the western group, our Battalion was still about one
to one-and-a-half kilometres from the objective. Crossing quickly through the jungle, we
reached the objective from the east of the ng Nai River, coordinating with the 6th
Company to tightly encircle the area of the Waterfall.
The area of the Lin Ta Pa Waterfall was very difficult to access. C Lao the
area in which the bandit group was based, was right at the head of the waterfall. In this
part of the river, the ng Nai splits into two branches.
The branch flowing to the west was wide and so deep that there were places where
it was thigh-deep and chest-deep. The branch flowing to the east where the engagement
occurred was tens of metres deep, about 70-100 metres wide, flowing swiftly, and with
whirlpools due to C Lao blocking the rivers flow.
From morning on the second day, the Battalion organised many crossings of the
river - but all these were unsuccessful. At about 10am, the Battalion together with the
6th Company, opened fire to attract the attention of the bandit group, while at the same
time organising a force of about two sections to cross the river using floats at a position
about 150-200 metres above C Lao. However, as they approached close to C Lao they
were discovered by the bandits and fired upon intensively. One of our men trying to cross
was killed, and another two were swept over the Waterfall and later died. The remainder
were forced to turn around and return to the eastern bank. This situation forced the
Knh the Chairman of the resistance group: The Patriotic Militia Force ("Lc Lng Dn Qun i
Quc). A large number of the group were reportedly captured in May 1976 including Trn Vn Knh.
603
Translators Note: The Lin Ta Pa Waterfall on the ng Nai River is in northern Long Khanh Province
about 45 kilometres in a direct line north of Xun Lc Town. C Lao means island.

186
Battalion to change its tactics, hold its positions, surround the enemy in coordination with
sniping and fire from our mortars and M79s, and to threaten and wipe out the bandits.
A further 24 hours were lost, and only on the third day, was the Battalion able to
cross the river and get close to its objective. However, the bandit group had fled on the
previous night after leaving behind the bodies of 13 who had been killed on the spot.
That was the pursuit engagement that resulted in the most enemy remnants and
reactionaries killed by 445 Battalion since having received its mission as a mobile unit
operating against armed reactionary groups within the Province. It was also our most
difficult and lengthy engagement (four days), and the one in which we suffered the most
killed (three comrades in one engagement) since the liberation of the South on 30 April
1975.
The recent deaths in 445 Battalion especially as they occurred when our country
was at peace, more clearly affirmed the spirit of dedication and sacrifice to their mission
by the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion in response to the requirements and the heavy
responsibilities that the Party and the people had confidently given to us.
By successfully controlling the situation in the area and mobilising the people, in
1977 we had wiped out and captured more than 100 enemy troops, cut their liaison and
information networks and their movement of food from the hamlets into the jungle.
Being encircled and constantly pursued, a greater number of them surrendered
including three deputy commanders of the L Pha Sang commando group.604 The
remainder fled to the H Nai and Gia Kim areas, or to H Ch Minh City.
At the end of 1977, exploiting the strained situation on the South-Western
Border605, the enemy increased their activities across several areas: Thng Nht, Xun
Lc, Chu Thnh, Long t etc. They assassinated a number of cadre in Phc Th
(Long t), Phc Ha, and Phc L (Chu Thnh). At the end of 1977 and the
beginning of 1978, in B Ra Long Khanh there were still about 23 groups of enemy
military remnants with a total strength of about 250 and armed with a range of weapons.
Their principal areas of activity were in Chu Thnh and Long t. Accordingly, as we
entered 1978, the pursuit of these enemy remnants was still an important task for the
armed forces of the Province in general and for 445 Battalion in particular.
For the pursuit task in 1978, the ng Nai Province Military Headquarters clearly
defined that we were to: continue to conduct pursuit operations to wipe out the external
armed counter-revolutionary groups (ie in the jungle); expose and break up the political
counter-revolutionary organisations hiding among the people and within our own
organisations; pursue and capture evil-doers and professional robbers; pursue infiltrators
conducting commando operations and crossing our borders; seize all types of illegal
604

Translators Note: According to a ng Nai Province Party website: By the end of 1980, we had
completely wiped out the enemy remnants including the reactionaries led by L Ph Sng and Vinh Sn
and the FULRO forces comprised of some tens of puppet officers and soldiers that had been driven down
from Lm ng Province. c Vit,Vng bc xy dng v bo v T quc, ng Nai, 4 May 2011.
605
Translators Note: This is an allusion to serious border tensions with Democratic Kampuchea (ie the
Khmer Rouge government of Cambodia) that began almost immediately post-War. On 3 May 1975, Khmer
Rouge forces attacked Ph Quc Island in the Gulf of Thailand long-claimed by the Cambodians as Koh
Tia, followed on 10 May 1975 with the Cambodian seizure of the island of Th Cho. 520 Vietnamese
civilians were reportedly killed in the attacks. The 5th Division History (2005) notes that there were 18
cross-border violations by Pol Pot-Ieng Sary troops in 1975, and 191 in 82 separate locations in 1976.
Major Cambodian ground attacks occurred in the period mid-March to May 1977 in Kin Giang and An
Giang Provinces, precipitating significant Vietnamese military deployments. Subsequently, the Vietnamese
military drive into Cambodia was launched on Christmas Day 1978 - with Phnom Penh liberated on 7
January 1979 H Sn i Colonel (ed), Lch S S an B Binh 5 (History of the 5th Infantry
Division, op.cit., 2005.

187
weapons; participate in the building and consolidation of government authorities
stabilizing the security and political situation and social order; develop plans in readiness
to defend our territory, the coast, and airspace; and prevent any riots and subversive
activities.
To implement these tasks, the Province created two mobile regiments: one
regiment for inland operations and one regiment to defend the coast. One half of the
strength of the 5th Regiment606 that was engaged on economic and national defence tasks
in Vnh An was moved down to Long Hi (Long t) to create the coastal regiment (but
still retained the title of the 5th Regiment). The inland regiment titled the 746th
Regiment, was stationed at B T (Xuyn Mc)607 and comprised the 9th La Ng
Regiment, 445 Battalion, and 440 Battalion.608*
As part of the 746th Regiment, 445 Battalion was given the task of operating in the
principal areas of B Ra Long Khanh Province. The Battalion directly participated in
five pursuit operations together with District forces, village and hamlet militia and
guerrilla elements, and higher-level forces. In 1978, within B Ra Long Khanh, we
captured and forced the surrender of 1,217, seized 151 weapons of various types, seven
grenades, more than 2,000 rounds of ammunition, and a number of documents. We also
stopped 193 illegal attempts to leave the country by sea, detaining 4,731 people, and
seizing 14 weapons, 11 grenades etc. Regarding the maintenance of social order, we
captured 774 criminals and violators of the social order. Together with the Province
armed forces, 445 Battalion contributed to the firm maintenance of political stability and
the social order in the countryside in circumstances where the nation had just emerged
from a 30-year long war, and had to face a border war as well as armed and political
resistance from within. This was also the most difficult time for our country in political,
economic, cultural, social and security/national defence terms.
Moving into 1979, both the internal and external situations became extremely
complicated. While we were striving to resolve the basic problems of the South-West
Border War609 and help the Cambodian people escape from genocide and assist our
friends to protect the fruits of their revolution, a war to defend the Northern Border610
broke out. Our country was in an economic crisis, the lives of all classes of the people and
our armed forces faced many difficulties and straitened circumstances. Further, the
natural disaster of floods affected agriculture, and the loss of crops led to shortages of
food and supplies. However, with a resolutely courageous spirit and a self-reliant and
Translators Note: This 5th Regiment is not the 5th Regiment (ie 275th Regiment) of the 5th VC Division
that had fought at the Battle of Long Tn in 1966 and other major engagements. The 5th VC Divisions 5th
(275th) Regiment was re-organised in June 1970 during combat in Cambodia and retitled the 1 st Regiment
see The 275th Regiment - Annex O, pp.29-30.
607
Translators Note: According to the 440 Battalion History (2011), The inland regiment was stationed at
H Nai 2 until August 1979 and then moved to B T (Xuyn Mc) with the title of the 746th Regiment. see Chamberlain, E.P., D440: Their Story , op.cit., 2013.
608
* 440 Battalion had been formed in 1968 in the North and came to the B Ra Long Khanh battlefield
as a reinforcement. It was later disbanded and reformed in 1978. Translators Note: See Annex P.
609
Translators Note: See the preceding footnote 605. The Vietnamese military drive into Cambodia was
launched on Christmas Day 1978 - with Phnom Penh liberated on 7 January 1979. According to the 5 th
Infantry Division History (2005): The campaign pursuing the enemy ((the Khmer Rouge)) concluded on
20 March 1979. The General Offensive and Uprising of the Cambodian people achieved complete victory.
610
Translators Note: The Sino-Vietnamese border war began with the attack by Chinese forces on
Vietnams northern border on 17 February 1979 and concluded with the withdrawal of the Chinese forces in
mid-March 1979. In earlier centuries, the Chinese had occupied Vietnam on several occasions the longest
being from 111 BC to 939 AD, see Bc-Thuc Thi-i (The Period of Northern Occupation) in Trn
Trng Kim, Vit-Nam S-Lc - A Summary of Vietnams History , Edition 7, Tn Vit, Si Gn, 1964,
pp.45-81.
606

188
strong will, the community of cadre and soldiers of the Heroic 445 Battalion still held
tightly to their weapons and strictly executed the combat orders of Military Region 7.
With the direct leadership and guidance of the Province Committee and the
Military Headquarters of ng Nai Province, 445 Battalion fought jointly with 440
Battalion in 62 pursuit operations in the Chu Thnh area in many different types and
sizes of operations extending to the areas bordering Long Thnh and Long t. As a
result, we wiped out or captured 549 (killing 27, capturing more than 400, and forcing 46
to surrender etc). These included FULRO611, armed robbers, and armed counterrevolutionary groups etc. We destroyed many counter-revolutionary political groups and
cells such as the National Restoration Front, Vietnam Restoration and the Military
Resistance Force.612 Additionally the Heroic 445 Battalion coordinated with fraternal
forces (such as the Public Security and Border Defence Force) to capture more than 5,000
individual law-breakers (including 3,766 who had crossed the border illegally) and 1,745
criminal offenders.
*
* *
After four consecutive years (1975-1979) of implementing our mission of
pursuing the enemy military remnants, wiping out the groups of counter-revolutionaries,
and contributing to the creation and the consolidation of the revolutionary administration,
445 Battalion had satisfactorily completed all the tasks given to it in an outstanding
manner and was bestowed with the title of Heroic Battalion of the Resistance War of
National Salvation against the Americans by the Party and the Nation.613* Although the
lives of our cadre and soldiers still faced hardships, and our installations and material
circumstances were poor and makeshift (in circumstances of constantly being on
operations in the field and fighting over a wide area) the Party Committee and the
Military Headquarters of ng Nai Province routinely focused their leadership and
guidance on the Battalion. With the dynamism, initiative and the seasoned combat
experience of our ranks of Battalion cadre, the Heroic 445 Battalion overcame every
611

Translators Note: FULRO (Front Unifi de Lutte Des Races Opprimes: The United Front for the
Liberation of Oppressed Races - 1964-1992) sought independence for ethnic minorities in Vietnam and
Cambodia. In September 1979, D445 troops were engaged in operations against armed FULRO elements
in the Cha Chan Mountain/La Ng River area east of Xun Lc Nhm PV, Lt li nhng v n do Cng
an ng Nai trit ph K 5: p tan m mu gy bo lon ca Fulro ( Over-turning of the charges by
the ng Nai Public Security Service wiped out Instalment 5: The FULRO plot for violent disorder
completely destroyed), Bo ng Nai, Bin Ha, 13 August 2010.
612
Translators Note: The D440 Battalion History (2011) similarly relates operations and activities against
named resistance groups including: theSpecial Task Regiment (Trung on c nhim) of the
Peoples Restoration Militia (Dn Qun Phc Quc); the C22 Special Guard part of the Peoples
Self-Determination Front organisation; and FULRO elements from Bun Ma Thut that had spread down
to Sng B. See: Chamberlain, E.P., ... D440: Their Story, op.cit., 2013, pp.117-120, including: The
Province Unit deployed 445 Battalion to Tn Ph to join with 440 Battalion to pursue reactionary groups.
613
* On 3 June 1976, the Nation bestowed 445 Battalion with the title: Heroic Unit of the Peoples Armed
Forces. Translators Note: A 1985 ng Nai Province publication summarised D445 Battalions awards as:
Unit: one Military Exploits Medal 1st Class (Hun Chng qun cng hng ba), one Military Feats Medal
1st Class (Hun Chng chin cng hng nht), 10 Military Feats Medals 2nd & 3rd Class, four Companies
designated as Victorious Bulwark Units (Thnh ng Quyt Thng); Personal: One comrade cited as a
Hero ((ie Nguyn Vn Quang)), 46 Military Feats Medals various classes, and 1,777 Letters of
Appreciation (Giy Khen). - H Sn i & Trn Quang Toi, ng Nai (The Heroic Units of ng
Nai), op.cit., 1985, p.11. Translators Comment: The listing did not separately include Bng Khen
(Certificates of Commendation) ie a higher award than Giy Khen (Letters of Appreciation), many of
which were awarded to D445 personnel.

189
obstacle and challenge, and concentrated on training, political study, and combat training.
We fought cleverly and contributed to the common achievements of the B Ra Vng
Tu armed forces in the early period of building and defending the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, maintaining political security and social order across our region, and
consolidating the revolutionary administration in the countryside in our countrys most
difficult time.
2. Raising the Quality of all Facets of our Performance, and Participating in
International Duty.
After 30 April 1975, in the territory of B Ra Long Khanh Vng Tu, our
local armed forces still comprised: 445 Battalion, a reconnaissance section, and the armed
forces of the Districts and the towns. The majority of these units were in a situation where
they lacked personnel as they had fought continuously and not had opportunities to
rebuild. Faced with the requirements of our new tasks, B Ra Long Khanh Province
provided more than 100 recruits to 445 Battalion from a total of 183 new troops recruited
from the Vng Tu area (in June 1975). The remainder were assigned to the Province
military school, reconnaissance elements, and direct command agencies.
The Battalions tasks at the time were to re-organise and bring the unit to full
strength for the new situation, and to consolidate the Party structures from Battalion-level
down to the companies. Political studies and education were stringently maintained, and
through that, almost all of the cadre and soldiers were ideologically of one mind and
satisfactorily completed their tasks. However, due to stationing our troops in the field and
not yet having a concentrated camp, maintaining the discipline of the soldiers did have
some difficulties. In the soldiers activities, there still occurred a few breaches of
discipline that influenced the quality of administration and the internal development of
the unit.
At the end of 1975, to achieve the directive of the General Staff on resolving the
issue of demobilisation for soldiers and corporals whose health circumstances were not
adequate for service in the military, the Province allowed a number of cadre and soldiers
to demobilise or to transfer from their corps (about 20 percent of our troops). A further
number - because of difficult family circumstances, also abandoned the unit on their own
volition and returned home without waiting to complete the formalities. These factors had
a direct influence on the lives, attitudes, feelings, and aspirations of the cadre and soldiers
in the armed forces. In particular, units had a shortage of command cadre at section level
who had practical battlefield experience of fighting and combat duties.
At the beginning of 1976, 445 Battalion was part of the armed forces of ng Nai
Province and under the command and leadership of the ng Nai Province Unit. The
Battalions principal task in this period was the training of recruits, coordinating in the
pursuit of the enemy military remnants, wiping out the reactionaries resisting the
revolution, and contributing to the stabilisation of the peoples lives in recently liberated
regions. Additionally, 445 Battalion participated in protecting the elections for the
National Assembly (conducted in April 1976), and also participated in the campaign to
transform bourgeois commercial enterprises (X2) and the currency exchange campaign
(X3).
20 June 1976 was an unforgettable day for the community of cadre and soldiers in
445 Battalion. In the assembly hall of the ng Nai Province Committee, the Province
Committee and the ng Nai Peoples Committee solemnly held a ceremony to bestow
the title of: Heroic Unit of the Peoples Armed Forces - by the Party and the Nation, on
445 Battalion in public recognition of its outstanding dedication during the resistance war

190
against the Americans, and its contribution to the liberation of our homeland and the
nation. The blood of countless cadre and soldiers had stained the Battalions historic flag!
The awe-inspiring military feats and the resolutely courageous sacrifices of the 445 troops
were recognised by the Party, the Nation, and the people ! Representing the Battalion,
Comrade Nguyn Vn Bo the Battalions Political Commissar 614, pledged our resolve
to bring into play the history of our heroic unit, and to successfully complete all assigned
tasks. He also swore that the unit would continue to fight, study, and train in order to
remain worthy of the faith of the Party, the Government, and the local people.
In 1976, 445 Battalion participated in activities to render safe mines and bombs, in
order to free-up land for the people and enable them to boost their production and
stabilise their lives. We also helped the people of the Long in-t area to repair
their houses, gardens, and the roads that had been damaged during the war. Additionally,
the cadre and soldiers of the Battalion also focused on production work including in the
rear service areas of the Battalion that had been established during the resistance war
against the Americans, thereby improving self-sufficiency and their living conditions.
In more than a year of fighting, working, studying, and training in the new
conditions of peace and unity in our country, 445 Battalion had successfully fulfilled its
role in the Vietnam Peoples Armed Forces as both a fighting unit and a working unit,
exploiting its tradition as a Heroic Unit in the new conditions and context.
In 1977, the consolidation work continued in all of the Battalions activities as we
entered a period of stabilisation and orderly routine with central and uniform guidance.
Specifically:
- We progressed the training of more than 100 new recruits allocated to the unit
(in 1975) in accordance with the regulations and achieved good results.
- The total training period for the soldiers in the second year was four months
for a total of 350 comrades.
- In terms of structure and organisation: The Province instituted a reorganisation and restructure of the Battalion so that it comprised: a Battalion
Headquarters, three companies under direct command (fully manned), combat
support platoons, and functional sections (medical, rear services, and technical
sections). The units total strength was 350 comrades.
Having satisfactorily completed all its tasks, 445 Battalion had the power to
successfully complete its essential mission of pursuing the enemy military remnants, and
wiping out the reactionary groups during continuous pursuit operations in difficult terrain
and in the jungle and mountainous areas. The units fighting strength was always kept
complete, and any casualties were treated in a timely manner and moved safely to the
rear.
On 30 April 1977, the Khmer Rouge authorities deployed five battalions of
infantry to attack 14 of our border posts in 13 villages along the border of An Giang
Province where they commited bloody crimes against the people of Vietnam. Even more
wickedly, on the night of 24-25 September 1977, exploiting our weak spot, a group of the
Pol Pot-Ieng Sary reactionaries deployed two divisions in a surprise attack into Bn Cu
and Tn Bin Districts (Ty Ninh Province). Military Region 7 and the 4th Corps had to

614

Translators Note: The term commissar (chnh y), is routinely applied to political officers from
the regimental level (inclusive) upwards. At battalion level and below, the term political officer (chnh
tr vin) is almost solely used.

191
employ a force of divisional strength to force the enemy to withdraw back across the
border.615
To implement the orders of the Party Politburo, the Ministry of National Defence,
and Military Region 7, the Military Headquarters of ng Nai Province urgently
organised an infantry battalion with combat experience, appropriate weapons and
equipment and strong firepower, to support Sng B Province and directly fight to defend
the border.
In June 1978616, the 1st ng Nai Battalion was formed and deployed to Sng
617
B with the task of defending the South-West Border of the Fatherland. As ordered by
the Province Headquarters, 445 Battalion contributed a company as the nucleus of the 1st
ng Nai Battalion. The Battalion was structured with three companies and two combat
support platoons. The strength of this Battalion was 300 comrades. Its Headquarters
comprised: Comrade Major Hunh Vn Tam (Tam Quyt) as Battalion Commander;
Comrade Captain Nguyn Vn Bo (Sau Bo) as the Battalion Political Officer;
Comrades Nguyn Thanh Bnh (T Bnh) and Lm Phuong (Sau Phng) as Battalion
seconds-in-command; and Comrade By Gip as the Deputy Political Officer.
The 1st Company was comprised of a nucleus of cadre and soldiers from 445
Battalion; the 2nd Company was selected from the armed forces of Xun Lc District; and
the 3rd Company was from the Vng Tu City Unit. The two support platoons (firepower
and communications) were taken from 445 Battalion, the Bin Ha City Unit, and the
Province Military Headquarters.618
The mission of the 1st ng Nai Battalion in Sng B was to join the 4th Regiment
th
((274 )) of the 5th Division to attack and wipe out the Pol Pot forces that had made
incursions across the border. The area of operations for the Battalion was to the westnorthwest of B p619 stretching from the White Bridge ((Cu Trng)) to the T615
Translators Note: As related earlier in footnote 605, on 3 May 1975, Khmer Rouge forces attacked Ph
Quc Island in the Gulf of Thailand long-claimed by the Cambodians as Koh Tia, followed on 10 May
1975 with the Cambodian seizure of the island of Th Cho. 520 Vietnamese civilians were reportedly killed
in the attacks. The 5th Division History (2005) notes that there were 18 cross-border violations by Pol PotIeng Sary troops in 1975, and 191 in 82 separate locations in 1976. - H Sn i Colonel (ed), Lch S
S an B Binh 5 (History of the 5th Infantry Division), op.cit., 2005. Major Cambodian ground attacks
occurred in the period mid-March to May 1977 in Kin Giang and An Giang Provinces, precipitating
significant Vietnamese military deployments.
616
Translators Note: The following eight paragraphs are almost identical to the text in: Trn Th Minh
Hong (foreword), The History of the Armed Forces of ng Nai Province, op.cit., 1999.
617
Translators Note: Bordering Cambodia to its north, Sng B Province was founded in 1976 by
combining the provinces of Bnh Dng, Bnh Long and Phc Long. In 1997, Sng B became the
provinces of Bnh Dng and Bnh Phc. The ng Nai Party History (2007) adds that the 1st ng Nai
Battalion deployed to the border on 8 June 1978 and was subordinated to the 4 th Regiment operating
west-northwest of B p District L Hong Qun (ed), Lch s ng b ng Cng sn Vit Nam Tnh
ng Nai (1975-2000) The History of the Vietnam Communist Party in ng Nai Province (1975-2000),
Nh Xut Bn Tng Hp ng Nai, Bin Ha, 2007. See also the following footnote 618.
618
Translators Note: According to the D440 Battalion History (2011): Beginning in June 1978 [sic], the
Province Unit deployed a well-armed battalion for its task - titled the 1st ng Nai Battalion. The
Battalions structure comprised three companies with the 1st Company (of 445 Battalion) as its core, and
the District-level companies were reinforced with personnel from 440 Battalion and two combat support
platoons. ((p.185)): The Battalions total strength was 300. Subsequently, the Province Unit created the
2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Battalions with structures and strengths equivalent to those of the 1 st ng Nai Battalion
that, on rotation, were deployed to defend the Fatherlands borders. see Chamberlain, E.P., D440:
Their Story, op.cit., 2013.
619
Translators Note: Located about 90 kilometres north of Si Gn - and formerly a district capital, from
1977, B p (known also as B c) was within Phc Long District of Sng B Province. From May
2003, B p became a district of Bnh Phc Province. As noted, according to the ng Nai History
(1986 and 2007), 445 Battalion left for the border area on 8 June 1978 as the core of the 1st ng Nai

192
Junction on Route 10 (bordering the Sng Mng River). The Battalion Headquarters was
sited at Hamlet 6 in B p. On 15 June 1978, the Battalion employed raid tactics to
attack and disperse a company of the Pol Pot forces in the Hm a area (at the Route 10
T-Junction).
Exploiting that battlefield success, the Battalion proposed to the 4th Regiment
Headquarters that the Battalion employ tactics of attacking while in defence (that is, to
use small forces of elite troops to infiltrate deep into the enemys rear areas and, when
enemy forces are discovered, to use heavy firepower to wipe them out).
In July 1978, the Battalion organised a half-section of reconnaissance troops
(about 20 comrades) - equipped with a PRC-25 walkie-talkie620 operated by Comrade
Tng (the Commander of the 1st Company), to cross the Sng Mng River and move deep
into the enemys rear area for a distance of about four-to-five kilometres to get close to
the enemy. Discovering a Pol Pot battalion at the Cng Trn T-Junction, the
reconnaissance troops radioed our rear area. The 3rd Company under the direct
command of Lm Phuong (Sau Phng), a Battalion second-in-command, rapidly moved
to an advantageous position, opened fire, and wiped out the enemy.
Having suffered a surprise attack, the enemy did not have the time to flee back to
the Sng Mng River. Our forces pursued the enemy, and the half-section reconnaissance
element from the 1st Company also clashed with a Pol Pot company preparing positions in
a strong defensive system. Although they were less in number, our troops fought very
doggedly, defeated the enemy and drove them from their positions. The enemy fled from
their base. While they were returning, the enemy discovered the tracks of our forces and
prepared a trap to lure our troops into a mined area and wipe them out. Having discovered
the enemys intention, Comrade Tng guided our troops back to the enemy base and used
their system of shelters, trenches and defensive positions to set up a defence. Then,
having determined the grid reference of the location of the enemy troops, he called down
105mm artillery support from the higher headquarters onto the battleground. As the
enemy were outside their defensive positions, over 30 of the enemy were killed and the
remainder fled helter-skelter. After clearing the battlefield, our troops moved back safely
to the B p base. In this battle, the Battalion suffered six comrades killed, with a
further 10 comrades wounded.
After this battle, the 1st ng Nai Battalion deployed its 1st Company to a post at
the border. The 2nd and 3rd Companies returned to the rear area and conducted training in
preparation to replace the 1st Company occupying the border post.
In August 1978, ng Nai Province established the 2nd ng Nai Battalion with
the task of replacing the 1st ng Nai Battalion. 445 Battalion continued to provide a
company as the core of the newly-established 2nd ng Nai Battalion. Comrade Lm
Phuong (Sau Phng) and Comrade T Bnh were again appointed to the command
positions in the 2nd ng Nai Battalion. The 1st ng Nai Battalion transferred a
reconaissance section to the new battalion. The remainder returned to their former units.
The 2nd Battalion successfully completed its task of defending the border and preventing
the Pol Pot forces from making incursions into our territory.

Battalion. The ng Nai Monograph (2001) also relates that: the Battalion was subordinated to the 4 th
Regiment operating to the west and north-west of B p (from the White Bridge to the Route 10 Tjunction beside the Sng Mng River). - Volume III, Chapter VII, 1.4.9: Bo v bin gii Ty Nam.
620
Translators Note: The US-manufactured AN/PRC-25 VHF radio is significantly larger and more
powerful than a walkie-talkie (may b m). The VHF FM AN/PRC-25 manpack radio had a range of
up to eight kilometres (using the short steel-tape aerial) and up to about 17 kilometres (using the long whip
aerial).

193
From the end of 1978, ng Nai Province had established four battalions (with
the titles: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th ng Nai Battalions) with a total strength of 1,300
comrades. On rotation, these battalions fought to defend the Fatherlands South-West
Border. As each battalion was set up, 445 Battalion contributed a company as its nucleus.
Cadre and soldiers who had been transferred to the 1st ng Nai Battalion had proudly
maintained and employed their heroic tradition and had been central to every activity of
their new unit - always leading the disciplined training, and - planning combat operations
with initiative, achieved many outstanding battle feats.
At the beginning of 1979, we had essentially resolved the war on the South-West
Border.621 At the request of the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation622, we
assisted our friends to liberate Cambodia, save the Cambodian people from the genocidal
disaster of the reactionary Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, and helped our friends to create a
revolutionary government and organise the building of a new life for their people.
Although they had been wiped out and disintegrated, Pol Pots military remnants
stubbornly fled to the Thailand-Cambodia border and re-organised their forces to oppose
the Cambodian Nation. During this time, the situation on our Northern Border623 and the
Eastern Sea624 was becoming complicated.
For this reason, our local forces were urgently re-adjusted, and our force structure
consolidated in response to the requirements of missions in this new situation.
Subsequently, ng Nai Province swiftly assigned the task of defending the B Ra
Vng Tu coast to the 5th Regiment. The 5th Regiment was restructured with 440
Battalion being incorporated into the 5th Regiment while at the same time, 445 Battalion
became the Provinces mobile battalion.
Parallel with the Provinces urgent tasks both within the Province and along the
coast, in implementing the directive of the Military Region 7 Headquarters, the ng Nai
Province Military Headquarters established a ng Nai Forward Headquarters in
Kompong Thom625 Province (Cambodia) under Colonel Nguyn Thanh Tng the
Deputy Commander of the Province Military Headquarters, as the Commander of the
ng Nai Forward Headquarters. Colonel Nguyn Thanh Tng had the responsibility to
coordinate with the 317th Division and provide assistance to our friends in creating
administrative organisations, building their armed forces, and pursuing and wiping out the
enemy in that area. Our forces were deployed as three battalions: the 5th ng Nai
Battalion was stationed in the Ba Ri District - with Lm Phng as its Commander and
concurrently the Ba Ri District Commander.626* The 6th ng Nai Battalion was
stationed in Sn Tc District, and the 3rd Battalion in Sau Dan District. The 5th Battalion
was fully-manned with four companies and stationed in Rm Lung village (one
company), Tht Nt village (one company), Bacsana village (one company), and K Ky
621

Translators Note: On 25 December 1978, 150,000 Vietnamese troops invaded Democratic Kampuchea
and overran the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army in just two weeks. On 8 January 1979, a pro-Vietnamese
People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was established in Phnom Penh. Wikipedia.
622
Translators Note: Led by the Kampuchean Peoples Revolutionary Party, the Kampuchean United Front
for National Salvation was founded in the Kratie area on 2 December 1978. Heng Samrin was its first
Chairman.
623
Translators Note: As noted, the Sino-Vietnamese Border War began with the attack by Chinese forces
on Vietnams northern border on 17 February 1979, and concluded with the withdrawal of the Chinese
forces in mid-March 1979.
624
Translators Note: Literally: Bin ng (Eastern Sea). While referred to internationally as the
South China Sea, that term is eschewed by Vietnam (using Eastern Sea or National Sea).
625
Translators Note: Kompong Thom Town the capital of Kompong Thom Province, is about 175
kilometres north of Phnom Penh on Route 6 about half-way to Siem Reap to the north-west.
626
* When established, the battalions each had a core company provided from 445 Battalion.

194
village (one company). This region was a base area for the Pol Pot forces. Apart from
deploying troops to watch the area, our forces also pursued the enemys military
remnants. The 5th Battalion also organised 10 task groups (each of six comrades) who
were carefully trained to mobilise the people and conduct propaganda activities in the
Khmer language (organised and trained by the 779th Front). These task groups were
stationed deep in the hamlets in distant areas where there were still two-faced elements
in the local administration (who both worked for us, and also for the enemy). By
effectively conducting civil proselytising and three-pronged activities among the
people, in only a short time, we were able to expel those reactionary elements in our
friends administration, strengthen our friends administration, and create village militias.
Consequently, the villages became stronger day-by-day. The Battalion also routinely
conducted pursuit operations against the Pol Pot military remnants who had taken refuge
in the area so that they no longer had hiding places in the villages and hamlets. The 5th
Battalion became expert in assisting our friends in setting up infrastructure organisations
(creating the Ba Ra [sic] Peoples Committee); initiating and actively fostering plans to
present to our friends for them to develop; and admitting four of the best villagers into the
ranks of the Cambodian Revolutionary Peoples Party. We also organised the structure of
the District Military Headquarters and created the District armed forces (a 100-strong
company). In 1982, as our mission required, the ng Nai Forward Headquarters
returned to Vietnam, transferring the local battalions to Group 7701 including the 5th
Battalion. The 5th Battalion was re-titled by Group 7701 as the 14th [sic] Battalion.
Because of its outstanding achievements in helping our Cambodian friends, in 1983 the
14th [sic] Battalion was awarded the title of Hero of the Peoples Armed Forces by our
Nation.627
Due to the wholehearted and sincere assistance of the Vietnamese military
volunteers in those four years (from 1981 to 1983), the political and security situation in
Kompong Thom Province was stabilised and maintained. The civilian administration at
all levels and our friends armed forces had grown stronger day-by-day. In coordination
with our friends forces, the Vietnamese military volunteers had continuously launched a
large number of attacks and pursuit operations against the Pol Pot military remnants
outside the area (in the jungle), and destroyed many of the enemys important bases that
they had built in regions that were difficult to access. On the other hand, we had
mobilised the people to clear and improve the land, and prevent the enemy forces getting
close to the people. Pursued by us, the enemy was forced to avoid contact in order to
preserve their forces.
Moving into 1984, the activities of the Pol Pot military remnants became rather
serious. They attacked a number of important places, conducted ambushes, emplaced
mines, and attacked positions where our friends in the far countryside were still weak.
These sabotage activities by the enemy inflicted a number of casualties on our friends. At
the request of our friends, ng Nai Province deployed 445 Battalion which had been
operating as the Province independent mobile unit, to Kratie to assist them.
At this time, the Headquarters of the Battalion comprised: Comrade L Minh
Quang (Sau Quang) as the Battalion Commander; Comrade Ho as the Battalion Deputy
Political Commander; and Comrade Tung as the Battalion Deputy Military Commander
(an element of the Battalion remained at its rear base area to continue training tasks). The
strength of the Battalion was 350. It had the task of protecting the security of Route 13
627

According to a 2007 ng Nai Party History, for their service in Cambodia: both 445 Battalion and 141
[sic] Battalion were bestowed with the title of Heroic Unit of the Peoples Armed Forces. - L Hong
Qun (ed), Lch s , The History of the Vietnam Communist Party in ng Nai Province (1975-2000),
op.cit., 2007.

195
from Lc Ninh to Kratie an axis for the transport of weapons, food, and supplies for our
friends. Together with our friends, we pursued and wiped out the Pol Pot military
remnants within Kratie Province, and helped our friends create a strong civilian
administration. The Heroic 445 Battalion fought beside the Kratie armed forces and the
local people to pursue the enemy military remnants, and stabilised the lives of the people.
In that area, we helped our friends civil administration to boost production activities;
reclaim waste land; recover agricultural areas; and restore schools, hospitals, postal
services etc that had been destroyed during the war.
In 1984, the enemys base areas were destroyed, and our forces conducted more
than 800 pursuit operations - driving thousands of the enemy from the battlefield, and
forcing the surrender of 369 enemy. As for our friends, we had closely controlled the
situation; destroyed many of the enemys underground elements hiding among the people
and within administrative organisations; and sought out; captured, and purged 400
reactionaries.
In the following years, the Battalion both conducted operations and deployed
work teams to the countryside to assist our friends to conduct civil proselytising, and to
help the people in rebuilding their homes and gardens that had been destroyed by the Pol
Pot clique. By stringently implementing military discipline within the unit, there were no
circumstances in which the civil proselytising rules were violated. 445 Battalion was
regarded highly by the civil administration of our friends, and Front 779 (Military Region
7) awarded the Battalion a Certificate of Commendation for its oustanding achievements
in completing all of its assigned missions.
*

As part of the armed forces of ng Nai Province, the Heroic 445 Battalion had
completed all its assigned missions in an outstanding manner. This was achieved despite
the Battalion having to manage changes in its organisation and title as required by its
specific tasks. Overcoming all difficulties and hardships, 445 Battalion became stronger
day-by-day in all aspects, and continued to achieve many military feats during its tasks of
defending the South-West Border of the Fatherland and in completing its lofty
international mission. This was indeed a priceless spiritual asset for 445 Battalion to carry
with it and continue to dedicate to the building and defence of the Fatherland in the new
period.

196
Chapter 2

High Combat Readiness, Effective Training, and Developing a Solid and

Complete Unit (1989 2004)
1. Consolidating the Structure and Organisation, High Combat Effectiveness, and
Effective Training.
To implement the Directive of the ng Nai Province Peoples Committee, the
Province Military Headquarters promulgated a resolution disbanding the Officer Cadet
School and implementing the procedures to receive the returning 141st Battalion from
Front 779 628*. The 16th Regiment of Front 479 629* and two artillery battalions of the
Military Regions 75th Artillery Regiment returned to the Province. Following this, the
ng Nai Province Military Headquarters settled the policy aspects (demobilisation,
corps transfer, retirement etc) for 1,000 cadre, soldiers, and officers in the 5th Regiment,
the 19th Regiment, the 16th Regiment, and the 141st Battalion. Following this reduction in
forces, the Military Region established the ng Nai Regiment, with a standing force
structure at regiment and battalion level, reserve forces ready for mobilisation, and
organised to become fighting units and to serve in combat if contingencies arose.
In November 1989, the ng Nai Province Military Headquarters disbanded the
7th, 8th, and 9th Battalions (of the 16th Regiment) and focused its forces on creating a
battalion titled 445 Battalion. Accordingly, the ng Nai Regiment had two battalions:
the 445th and the 141st.
Having fulfilled its lofty International Duty in Cambodia, the Heroic 445 Battalion
returned to our country with a mission as the ng Nai Province concentrated mobile
battalion, and was stationed at H.20 in B Ra Town.
Having essentially determined the base locations of its units, the ng Nai
Province Military Headquarters directed the Battalion to restructure its organisation. The
Battalion Headquarters comprised: Captain Nguyn Vn Sn Battalion Commander;
Captain Bi Xun Hng Battalion Political Deputy; Captain Chu Vn Huyn
Battalion Military Deputy; and Senior Captain Bi Thanh Ho Battalion Military
Deputy. The Battalion had three directly subordinate companies (1st, 2nd, and 3rd); and the
strength of the whole Battalion was 360 comrades. In 1989, the Battalion had the task of
training its soldiers in the second year.
In December 1989, the Battalion was tasked to prepare all facets of training,
including training installations and areas for drill grounds in order to train the new
soldiers in 1990. According to the plan of the ng Nai Province Military Headquarters,
the total military strength of the Battalion (360 comrades) was moved to the 141st
Battalion (stationed in Xun Lc District).
Beginning from 25 February 1989 [sic], our unit was tasked to train new soldiers
in Phase I of 1990. The training lasted from March to 10 May. The total number of troops
was 280 - from the areas of Long Thnh, Bin Ha, Tn Ph, and nh Quan. In the tests
at the conclusion of the course, 100 percent achieved the requirements of the training. In
the live-firing (AK rifle and grenade-throwing) 100 percent met the requirements, with
62 percent of them being assessed as quite skilled.
628

* Volunteer military forces subordinate to Military Region 7 that had served their international duty in
Cambodia.
* Volunteer military forces subordinate to Military Region 7 that had served their international duty in
Cambodia.

629

197
After concluding the Phase 1 training, the Battalion organised study, examined
lessons learned, and implemented the necessary solutions aimed at correcting training
issues and combat readiness.
From September to November 1990, 445 Battalion trained its new soldiers (Phase
2) with 300 recruits participating in the training from: Bin Ha, Tn Ph, nh Quan,
and Chu Thnh. The results of the final tests for the course were: 100 percent met the
requirements. The unit was complete in terms of personnel, weapons, and equipment.
Following the training, all the new soldiers were assigned to units within the Province.
In this period, the ng Nai Province Military Headquarters made changes within
the ranks of our Battalion cadre: Captain Nguyn Vn Sn the Battalion Commander,
was assigned as the General Staff Assistant in the ng Nai Regiment; and he was
replaced by Captain Nguyn Vn Hiu the Battalion second-in-command. Continuing
with internal changes, the Province Military Headquarters assigned Captain Nguyn Vn
Th to take up the position of Battalion Commander.
In 1991, the ng Nai Province Military Headquarters deployed 445 Battalion to
be stationed in the Ni Th Vi Mountains area (Chu Thnh).
The Ni Tc Tin - Ni Th Vi area is a remote area, and the lives of the local
people there are very difficult. The Battalion occupied the facilities of the 19th Regiment
(which had been disbanded). With its solid leadership and guidance, the Battalion set up
living and eating facilities, made a plan for the defence of the base, and completed all
necessary arrangements. During the year, the Battalion organised the training of secondyear soldiers (250 comrades) and also trained new soldiers (who had enlisted in
September 1991) from the regions of: Long t, Xuyn Mc, Bin Ha, and Chu Thnh
with 300 participating in the training. The results were: 100 percent met the
requirements, with 60 percent assessed as quite proficient. Additionally, the Battalion
increased its production activities, improved living conditions, and participated in civilian
proselytising in the local area.
*
* *
In response to the requirements of economic and societal developments in the
region, on 12 August 1991 B Ra Vng Tu Province was established in accord with
the Resolution of the 9th Session of the VIII National Congress. In implementing that
Resolution, the Ministry of Defence promulgated a decision establishing the B Ra
Vng Tu Military Headquarters.
1992 was the first year of operations of the B Ra Vng Tu armed forces
under the new Province organisation. The establishment of B Ra Vng Tu Province
created advantages in organisation, command, and unified management for the armed
forces in B Ra Vng Tu, and responded to the requirements of our tasks in the new
situation. In the concluding months of 1991, the ng Nai Province Military
Headquarters prepared all aspects to transfer the local forces and units to the B Ra
Vng Tu Province Headquarters. The B Ra Vng Tu Province Military
Headquarters was established within the structure of the Vng Tu Cn o Special
Zone Headquarters. The B Ra Vng Tu Province Military Headquarters senior
personnel comprised:
- Major General Nguyn Nam Hng630: Commander.
630

Translators Note: In 1966, Nguyn Nam Hng served as the 2ic/Chief of Staff of the 274 th VC
Regiment. His diary/notebook was recovered by 5RAR in the Ni Th Vi Mountains on 20 October 1966
VCAT Item No.F034600560223, see footnotes 215, 243, 266, 283, 305, 308, and 328 and Annex N.

198
-

Colonel Nguyn Vn c: Deputy Commander and concurrently Commander

of the Vng Tu City Military Headquarters.
Colonel Phan Chin: Deputy Commander Political.
Colonel Nguyn Minh Tr: Deputy Commander.

The subordinate military agencies comprised the Vng Tu City Military Unit,
and the District Units of: Cn o District, Long t District, Xuyn Mc District, and
Chu Thnh District.
The report of the B Ra Vng Tu Province Military Headquarters clearly
affirmed: In the first five months of 1992, the mission of B Ra - Vng Tu Province is
to continue to consolidate and strengthen the whole Party organisation, the
administration, and the armed forces. Party conferences will be held at all levels, and all
aspects of the situation in the Province will be studied in order to determine plans for the
following years.
In general, social life still faced difficulties and complications. The nations new
renovation program631 was initiated and led by our Party, but the country had still not
emerged from a social and economic crisis. Taking advantage of the situation, hostile
forces continued to implement their schemes to develop peace with the aim of
eradicating the leadership role of the Communist Party and wiping out the socialist
ideological system.
In implementing the Polituros Resolution 02-BCT on the two strategic tasks of
building and defending our Vietnamese Socialist Fatherland, in the first six months of
1992, the armed forces of B Ra Vng Tu Province strove to complete their tasks on
all fronts: in training and combat readiness, by speeding up local military activities to
contribute towards the maintenance of political stability and public order, and preparing
all aspects for the Battalion to return to its original base.
445 Battalion was a unit that came into being and had grown up in the territory of
B Ra Vng Tu during the resistance war against the Americans. Most of the
Battalions cadre and soldiers were the children of citizens of B Ra Vng Tu. In the
process of development, coming-of-age, and fighting although the battlefield and
leadership structures had changed many times, our basic advantage was that 445 Battalion
fought in its well-known terrain of B Ra Vng Tu Long Khanh.
Over 10 years (1979-1989), the Heroic 445 Battalion was the representative of the
people and the military of B Ra Vng Tu, participating in the fighting to defend the
South-Western Border and undertaking its International Duty by helping our Cambodian
friends. 445 Battalion was deployed back to its familiar terrain when B Ra Vng Tu
Province was established. From that time, 445 Battalion was the Provinces concentrated
mobile unit and maintained its role as the nucleus of the B Ra Vng Tu armed forces.
In July 1992, in fulfilling its assigned mission, the Battalion conducted training for
second-year soldiers, totalling 216 comrades. We also trained new soldiers from the
Phase 1 cohort of 1992, numbering 240 personnel. The Battalion deployed the 1st Infantry
Company into the field, and conducted civil proselytising and activities in Xun Sn
village (Chu c District).
In September 1992, the Battalion received training tasks, deployed into the field,
and conducted civil proselytising and activities in Long Phc village (B Ra Town).
631

Translators Note: Renovation (i Mi) was the title of the Governments economic program
initiated in 1986 with the aim of creating a socialist-oriented market economy. In this policy, the state
played a decisive role in the economy, but private enterprise and cooperatives played a significant role in
commodity production.

199
Summarising our civil proselytising and activities in 1992, the Battalion spent
more than 4,000 days of labour assisting the people harvest their crops, and repaired and
built thousands of metres of roads between the hamlets and between the villages. The
Battalions medical unit examined and treated the people on 50 occasions, conducted
charity school classes for 25 children of needy families in difficult circumstances who did
not have any opportunities to study. These classes were conducted over four years teaching from Class 1 to Class 4, and followed the syllabus of the Ministry for Education
and Training. Qualified cadre who were both responsible and enthusiastic, conducted
these classes.
During 1993 and 1994, the Battalion continued its training mission and remained
combat-ready as the Provinces mobile unit. Major ng Vn Bnh was the Deputy
Military Commander. The Party organisation within the Battalion comprised a Party
Chapter and three subordinate cells. Comrade Mai Chn was the Party Chapter Secretary,
Comrade Nguyn Vn Sn was the Deputy Secretary, and Comrades Nguyn Tun
Cng, L Quang Ngha, and Nguyn nh Quang were Committee members.
The Battalion trained 500 new soldiers (enlisted in Vng Tu, Long An, B Ra
Town, and Chu c etc). While training these new soldiers, the Battalion deployed the
2nd Infantry Company into the field in coordination with civil proselytising and activities
in Sui Ngh village (Chu c) assisting the people with 2,500 days of labour, and
organising medical examinations for hundreds of local people.
In June 1993, the Battalion deployed the 1st Company of 43 personnel on a special
mission to Xun Sn village of Chu c District (V693). The unit stringently
implemented its civil proselytising task and successfully completed its assigned mission.
Afterwards, the unit remained in the local area to undertake military proselytising, and
coordinated with the local authorities to stabilise the situation. In 1993, the Province
completed the construction of a permanent camp for the Battalion, so that the Battalion
could establish itself as a regular and comprehensive unit.
In 1995, the Battalion solemnly commemorated the 30th anniversary of its
founding as a Battalion (1965-1995). Participants included representatives of the Province
Committee - the B Ra Province Peoples Committee, the Province Committee - the
ng Nai Province Peoples Committee, the local agencies and groups from places where
the Battalion had served during the resistance war, the Heroic Vietnam Mothers
Association, relatives and families of the Battalions martyrs, and hundreds of former
Battalion personnel. Over the 30 years of building, fighting, and coming-of-age, the
Battalion had overcome many difficulties and hardships, and had defeated every difficulty
in order to fulfill its tasks of creating peace as the Provinces outstanding mobile
concentrated battalion.
1996 was a year marked by stability and economic and social development in the
Province. The 2nd B Ra Vng Tu Province Party Congress presented the direction
and tasks for the Party, the military, and the people of B Ra Vng Tu over the five
years (1996-2000). The following conferences were next held: the 2nd Province Party
Military Affairs Conference, the Military Region 7 Party Conference, and the Partys VIII
National Conference.
Trained and combat-ready, and having just trained 240 recruits from the local
areas of Chu c and B Ra Town, the unit established a training and combat-readiness
plan, prepared a drill and exercise ground, and sent cadre to study training methods.
Those undergoing training achieved 97 percent. In the tests, 100 percent met the standard,
and 65 percent were assessed as quite effective. The new soldiers were well trained in
tactical deployment in combat in both attack and defence, movement on the battlefield,
and exploiting the terrain and ground.

200
Group632 work: We admitted 60 youths into the Group, and organised exchange
activities with the local areas in which 100 percent of the Group members participated.
These included organising youth forums titled: Our youth follow the words taught by
Uncle H. Large numbers of Group youths in the unit participated in these forums. In
that way, we reviewed and learnt from our experiences in building up the unit, creating a
new cultural environment, and managing and educating the soldiers.
However, at this time, the management of the cadre and unit finances was
insufficiently disciplined, and this led to a number of incidences of violation of discipline
and violation of management and financial principles that impacted on our internal unity
and our fighting strength. Based on the reality of the situation in the unit, the Party
Committee and the Province Military Headquarters gave immediate attention to
developing solutions in order to consolidate the units structure and stablilise the situation
within the unit.
In 1997633, there were changes in the units structure and personnel strength.
There was a large turn-over of 70 percent of the cadre (including: at Battalion level
three comrades; at company level three comrades; at platoon level seven comrades).
The masses organisations were also consolidated such as the Peoples Assembly and the
Emulation Section. Regarding the principal cadre, the Battalion Commander was Major
ng Vn Bnh (replacing Comrade Sn who was assigned to other duties); the Deputy
Commander Political was Major Mai Chn; and the Deputy Commander Military was
Captain Nguyn Tun Cng. From November 1998, Captain L Quang Ngha the
Commander of the 1st Company, replaced Comrade Mai Chn as Deputy Commander
(Comrade Mai Chn was assigned to other duties).
Although there were changes in the Battalion Headquarters and also in the
companies and in the platoons, the unit remained focused on stabilising its organisation,
and maintaining its successful system of alert leadership, duties, combat-readiness, and
mobility according to regulations. The training system for the soldiers was maintained
with combat-readiness marches over long distances carrying heavy loads (three marches
were conducted at battalion-level involving 235 comrades; 15 at company-level with 175
comrades; and 40 at platoon-level with 225 comrades).
The Battalion always completed its combat-readiness training tasks well. Military
Region 7 and the Province Military Headquarters awarded many Certificates of
Commendation and Letters of Appreciation for our training achievements. In particular,
from 1997, the Battalion was one of the two units conducting training for new soldiers
(together with the Cn o District Unit). With the attention of the higher headquarters,
the Battalions material circumstances and equipment then included: a camp, training
areas, messes, drill grounds, and an historical museum all of which were newly-built
with a total cost of up to billions of ng.634 This guaranteed our status as a regular unit,
and responded to our mission in the new situation. The Battalion had received and trained
275 new soldiers (from Tn Thnh, Long t, Xuyn Mc, and B Ra Town); deployed
the 1st Company on a field exercise - and conducted combat-readiness training in concert
with civil proselytising work. In the period, training comprised: 160 days 1,120 hours,
632

Translators Note: For the Partys Labour Youth Groups (on), see footnotes 31 and 361.
Translators Note: A media report noted that: In mid-May 1997, the 445th Battalion was assigned by
the provincial military command to operate in X District counter-revolutionaries have taken
advantage of the situation to mingle with new resettlers the Battalion lost no time in engaging in mass
motivation work completely destroyed two reactionary groups annihilated on the spot four
reactionaries, captured 17 and persuaded 12 to surrender. V Vn De, ng Nai Nai Battalion Praised for
Work Against Counter-Revolutionaries, Qun i Nhn dn, H Ni, 16 September 1997.
634
Translators Note: The exchange rate in 1997 was approximately 12,300 ng to one US dollar.
633

201
and those participating achieved a rate of 98.5 percent. The test results also noted that 65
percent achieved a quite effective standard. The unit completed its military training to an
effective standard.
In 1997 was also the year that B Ra Vng Tu suffered the heavy impact of
Typhoon No.5 ((Typhoon Linda)). The typhoon also inflicted damage on the units
increasing production (only 41.5 percent was achieved compared with our target). Despite
this, the Battalion deployed a company as a work-force to assist the people and restore the
situation impacted by this natural calamity in Long t District. Nearly 100 cadre and
soldiers and thousands of days of labour were involved. A collection of money of 5
million ng, was given to support our countrymen suffering the floods; and, to support
our countrymen impacted by Typhoon 5, a contribution of 2 million ng was made.
From 1998 to 2002, the Battalion focused on developing as a regular unit. This
was one of the important tasks of a provincial armed force. The unit conducted education
for all the cadre and soldiers in the unit, and we rigorously maintained our daily and
weekly work schedules in accord with our work style. In this way, the bases internal
hygiene was neat and tidy, and the phenomenon of violations of discipline reduced
completely.
In cadre and organisational work: before 1997, the Partys organisational structure
in 445 Battalion was at Party Chapter level and beneath that were directly-subordinate
Party cells. From March 1998, the Province Party Military Committee decided that the
Party in 445 Battalion would have two levels comprising three directly subordinate Party
Chapters. Also in 1998, the 445 Battalion Party Congress for the 1998-2000 period was
held and elected a new Executive Committee comprising the following comrades: Major
L Quang Ngha the Deputy Commander - Political, as the Party Committee Secretary;
and Major ng Vn Bnh the Battalion Commander as the Deputy Secretary. In 1999,
Comrade Bnh was assigned to a new unit, and Comrade Phan Chim Thnh was
appointed as the 445 Battalion Commander. Comrade Major Nguyn Tun Cng the
Deputy Commander (Military), and Comrades Nguyn Quang Thun and Nguyn Hong
Tun were appointed Committee members.
The Report by the leadership on the implementation of the Resolution of the
1996-1997 Term of the Party Chapter Congress and the leadership guidelines to
implement the 2nd 1998-2000 Session clearly declared: The Battalion was to achieve its
mission in respect of cadre by regular transfers of cadre (in two years of transfers, 80
percent of cadre changed their positions); and, for this reason, there were routinely
changes in our structure with impacts on the social life that had affected the leadership in
implementing the units mission. However, under the direct leadership of the Party
Committee and the Province Military Headquarters, the tight guidelines of the higher
responsible authorities, the assistance of our fraternal units, the local authorities, the local
people, and the efforts of the community of Party members, cadre and soldiers, 455
Battalion completed its assigned tasks including, notably, its tasks in combat-readiness,
deployability, and training. In the tests, 100 percent of the tactical and technical subjects
were assessed as quite effective and above. Our live-firing field combat exercises from
platoon to company level were all assessed as effective. In that previous Term, the
Battalion Party Chapter rigorously implemented Directive 37 of the Partys Central
Military Committee on our mission to build our base as a regular unit; execute military
regulations; and to closely manage personnel strengths, weapons and equipment; and to
achieve open democracy in all facets. In the 1996-1997 Term, 100 percent of our Party
members had full status (apart from one with 98 percent). For two consecutive years, the
Party Chapters were assessed as transparent, honest and pure; and there were no Party
members who violated discipline and had to be punished.

202
On the leaderships guidelines on implementing our mission in the 1998-2000
Term, the Report clearly noted: Training and combat-readiness activities - and mobility,
were principal political [sic] tasks. The unit rigorously executed all directives and orders
from above. We stringently observed the system of an alert leadership, alert duties, and
combat-readiness. We coordinated closely with units in the area in patrolling and guard
activities, and maintaining political security and social security and order. We routinely
trained in tactical methods, and raised the combat-readiness of the troops to create a
transparent, honest, pure and strong Party, with unity - and with every Party member as a
nucleus in a unified whole. Analysing Party members each year, we strove for 98.5
percent of our Party members to be classified as Type 1 and there were no violations of
discipline. The Party organisation was transparent, honest, pure and solidly-based.
In implementing the Resolution of 445 Battalions First Party Conference (19982000), the community of cadre and Party members of 445 Battalion actively overcame
difficulties and satisfactorily achieved their assigned tasks. Specifically:
On the basis that this was the usual central mission of the unit and the Party, the
leadership at all levels focused the command and leadership echelons to effectively
conduct combat-readiness training with the guidelines that such be: basic, practical, and
solid. The training for three classes of new soldiers was completed successfully in terms
of its content, program, and within the regulated time. The quality of the training for the
new soldiers in the following year was higher than that of the preceding year. The content
was 100 percent in accordance with the requirement (in 2001) with 76 percent assessed
as quite effective. In 2002, there were 78, with seven [sic] percent assessed as quite
effective. During that Term, no new soldier deserted - and the incidences of absences
without permission and common violations of discipline progressively declined (in 2001:
1.4 percent; and in 2002: 0.8 percent). The units leadership constantly ensured that the
unit was at full strength, and successfully applied the national laws, military discipline,
and local regulations. From this, the unit affected changes in the certification and
activities of each cadre and soldier. The general quality and fighting strength of the unit
was comprehensively and basically improved and strengthened - as a key force that was
relied upon by the higher Party executive, the authorities, and the local people.
With regard to the leadership process, the Party always maintained the principle of
democratic centralism, constantly paying attention to nurturing political certification and
the capabilities of the ranks of cadre and soldiers. Through classification tests, the quality
of our cadre and Party members was increased daily (In 2001: 84.6 percent of our cadre
achieved Level 1; 11.5 percent achieved Level 2; and 3.8 percent achieved Level 3. In
2002, 89.3 percent achieved Level 1; and 10.7 percent achieved Level 2).
Management and ideological leadership progressively developed into a routine
and deepened. The Party constantly provided leadership and guidance for the whole Party
to implement the Politburos 6th Resolution (the 2nd). We implemented the Party
Politburos Regulation 76, and studied and abided by the 19 clauses that forbade certain
actions by Party members and the 10 clauses of prohibition applicable to Party members
in the armed forces.
Executing the Resolution of the Partys Province Military Committee, from 2002
the Battalion had 03-03 Party Chapters with Chapter Committees, and the number of
Party members in company Party Chapters was regularly nine Party members. In 2001,
the Party expanded and admitted four new members; in 2002, it admitted 10 new
members - 143 percent of the allocated target. In the years 2000, 2001 and 2002, the Party
in the Battalion was recognised as being transparent, honest, pure and solidly-based.
For Term II of the Battalions Party Conference (2002-2003), Major Phm Quang
Phng the Deputy Commander (Political), was elected as Secretary of the Party

203
Committee; and Comrade Phm Ph the Deputy Commander (Military), was elected
as the Deputy Secretary. Committee Members were: Major Nguyn Tun Cng the
acting Battalion Commander; and Comrades Nguyn Quang Thun and Nguyn Xun
Cng.
In evaluating the results in achieving our mission in Term II (2000-2003), the
report of the Battalions Party Committee at the Conference clearly pointed out that: the
whole Battalion was united and victorious in achieving its assigned mission and had
basically completed the targets that had been set. The unit had made progress in its
coming-of-age and had satisfied its task requirements in the new situation. It had fulfilled
its training and combat-readiness tasks quite satisfactorily, created a regular and orderly
routine, and contributed to maintaining political security and social security and order in
the area. The ideological situation of the cadre and the soldiers was stable; and the Party,
the leadership, and the masses had played their roles. All aspects of Party, political, rear
services, financial, and technical work had continued to support the mission through the
phases of renovation, and activities had been effective. The material and spiritual lives of
the cadre and the soldiers had improved day-by-day; and relations with the people and the
militia in coordinating activities and brotherly relations had been progressively more
effective. The general quality and fighting strength of the unit had improved, and had
been strong enough to complete all tasks in all situations. These results were very
commendable and encouraged the Party in 445 Battalion to strive to satisfactorily
complete its mission in the new Term (2003-2005).
In regard to civil proselytising activities, in implementing the Partys ideological
position on civil proselytising work in the new circumstances, the Party Committee and
the 445 Battalion Headquarters affirmed that: Civil proselytising was one of the important
tasks for the whole unit. Accordingly, civil proselytising work needed to have a specific
plan and - to coincide with each phase of activity, routinely foster cultural knowledge and
customs particular to the local situation, and cadre and soldiers had to apply approaches
that would achieve maximum results. Principally for these reasons, the Battalion had
achieved quite good results from conducting field exercises that included civil
proselytising in a Bc village (Chu c District), in Ha Hi and Ha Hip villages
(Xuyn Mc District), and in Lc An village (Long t District). By such practical work,
the cadre and soldiers in the unit had assisted the local regions both nearby and more
distant, to construct roads, schools, and public projects. They also assisted worthy and
poor families to improve their houses and their gardens, and to bring in their crops etc
involving, in total, 3,694 days of labour. In coordination with local community
committees, they presented gifts to worthy families, organised many cultural evenings,
sports events, informal talks, and meetings etc. During the year, with funding from the
cadre and soldiers and support from higher authorities, the Battalion had built five
charitable houses for deserving families. All these works related above exemplified the
tradition of Soldiers of Uncle H and the close connection between the unit and the
region in which it served. From this practical engagement, the unit gained the following
lessons and experience: civil proselyting work must align with the units political mission
and must suit the real situation in the local area. A further important point was that
through such practical work, the policies of the Party and the Nation can be promoted
among the people, and a faith and belief created in the people for the Party, the civil
authorities, and the armed forces.
The Battalion contributed more than 3,000 days of labour to assist the people, and
successfully implemented the guideline of: When away, think of the people when with
them, cherish them. We helped the local agencies with 200 days of building social

204
welfare facilities, contributed tens of millions of ng to the movement to wipe out
poverty, and repay people for their favours.
In implementing our program of training and combat readiness in 2002, in two
months (September and October) 445 Battalion conducted two live-firing tactical
exercises. The Party Committee and the Battalion Headquarters paid attention to
leadership and guidance aspects including producing specialist resolutions and plans to
be implemented. The cadre and soldiers of the whole unit had a strong will and intention
to overcome the difficulties of climate during our field exercises. In particular, the unit
was closely watched by the Province Committee and the Province Military Headquarters
and was assisted by their specialist organisations and also by the military elements of
Xuyn Mc and Chu c Districts etc. The Executive Committees, the civil authorities,
and the people of Bu Lm village (Xuyn Mc), and Xun Sn and Sui Rao villages
(Chu c) also assisted.
The results achieved in the infantry platoon defensive exercises (over five days)
involving three platoons of first-year soldiers, were good and the unit had no
difficulties. In the general field exercise (lasting 10 days), the unit marched for more than
150 kilometres in very hot weather and across difficult terrain. We had to deal with
situations in three tactical scenarios at battalion level and achieve the aims as laid down
by the Exercise Steering Committee. In particular, in an infantry attack by the Battalion,
one of the companies (second-year soldiers) did a live-firing exercise in the My To
Mountains that the Military Region assessed as well-done without any safety concerns.
In summary, in the two phases of exercises, six groups and 31 individuals received
Letters of Appreciation from the Province Military Headquarters.
445 Battalion was a fully-manned unit that apart from combat-readiness training
in accordance with Province requirements, participated in flood-relief operations during
the storms and the spring tides in the local area, and also other activities initiated by the
local authorities. The Battalions community of cadre and soldiers always brought into
play its traditions as an Heroic Battalion, and performed outstandingly as the nucleus of
the B Ra Vng Tu Province armed forces.
2. Boosting the Determined to Win Emulation Movement, Building a Solid
and Complete Unit, Fulfilling Every Given Mission.
445 Battalion was one of the units in the emulation group under the Province
Military Headquarters. Each year, there was an emulation movement initiated by the B
Ra Vng Tu Military Headquarters based on the specific situations in the units. The
Party Committee and the Battalion Headquarters promulgated a resolution to guide 445
Battalion in the competition that covered four emulation objectives, as follows:
- Building a solid unit politically, ideologically, and organisationally.
- Fulfilling every assigned mission.
- Maintaining and effectively utilising weapons, technical equipment, and
material installations.
- Looking after the material and spiritual lives of the troops.
Considering these emulation objectives, since 445 Battalions regular camp had
been completed (1993-2002), the Battalion had successfully fulfilled all the targets
recorded in the emulation listing for the units. It was the leading unit among the group of
subordinate units. The Battalion was awarded a Certificate of Commendation and the
Challenge Banner in the emulation movements titled: Successfully maintaining and

205
making full use of equipment and technical assets in a secure and economical manner;
and The Rear Services of the Armed Forces follow the words of Uncle H.
In summary, in those ten years (1992-2002) of building a cultural environment as
well as a united peoples movement to create cultural lives, 445 Battalions report clearly
declared: After receiving the guiding directive and resolutions from above on creating a
cultural environment and linking with the united peoples movement to create cultural
lives, the Party Committee and the Battalion Headquarters affirmed that this was a large
activity with long-term and practical aspects. To successfully conduct the activity, there
were definite outlays in creating a transparent, honest, and solidly-based Party and unit.
Having accepted the correctness and importance of the activity, each year the Party
Committee affirmed the policy and issued specific plans and targets - together with tasks
for each period. A range of activities was initiated such as: youth forums, informal talks,
and knowledge quizzes. The emulation movement also organised cultural activities and
sports. All were aimed at helping the cadre and soldiers in the unit strive during their
training and create standards, cultural and spiritual values in their lives in general - and
for the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion in particular. This was closely connected to the
Determined to Win emulation movement under the titles: Effective training and high
combat-readiness, Strive to become a model citizen, Tight unity, strict discipline, and
improved lives, and Military comrades help one another to overcome difficulties. The
Youth Group was the shock force in the movements to: Scale the three high summits and
determine to win, The five exemplary regulations, and The three nos and the three
goods.
Through its Military Members Council, the Battalion had created a democratic
regime and an organ of conversation with the corporals and soldiers (at battalion-level
once every quarter; and at company-level once every month). Principally because of this,
the very great majority of the cadre and soldiers minds and thoughts were at peace, their
faith was solid, and they were ready to accept and fulfill all tasks assigned to them. The
unit did not have any circumstance where a soldier went absent without permission, and
the proportion of violations of discipline was under 0.4 percent. On the development of
the Party and its Youth Group, 98.5 percent of the soldiers had been accepted into the
Youth Group and there were many quality Group members who were admitted into the
Party. In the first nine months of 2002 alone, the unit admitted eight new Party members
achieving 44.3 percent of its planned target. For many years, the Party in 445 Battalion
was recognised as one of the most transparent, honest, pure and solidly-based. Based on
the achievements in all facets of its work, the Battalion was awarded many Letters of
Appreciation and Certificates of Commendation by Military Region 7, the Province
Peoples Committee, and the Province Military Headquarters. In 2001 alone, 445
Battalion was awarded the title of Determined to Win Unit by the Military Region.
The unit arranged and successfully maintained an activity plan for two days of
recreation at the weekend, creating a happy and healthy atmosphere among our
community in which the mass of the cadre and soldiers participated. The accommodation
and messing arrangements for the troops were always being improved, and their hygiene
facilities were always neat, tidy, well-ordered, clean, and spacious. The companies and
other subordinate elements of the Battalion had gardens and trees that were carefully
tended. The areas for raising livestock were well-planned with a guaranteed hygienic
environment. All these facilities contributed to improving the lives of the troops.
In our civil proselytising activities, the Battalion worked in a brotherly alliance
with many units and agencies. Exchanges were routinely organised with, for example: the
Province Postal Units Youth Group, the Groups from the villages of Ha Long and Long
Phc, the Womens Associations of the villages and towns, and the secondary schools in

206
the area. Every year, the Battalion conducted from two to three field exercises that
involved civil proselytising work and activities and tens of thousands of days of labour.
Such included building eight houses as a charitable act for deserving families. The
community of cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion were always proud of the cultural life
in the unit. They strove to train to the standard of new men within the armed forces of
Military Region 7, and were determined not to allow anti-cultural thoughts and ideology
to infiltrate into the unit. Such guaranteed that every cadre and soldier was a cultural
pillar, with ethics and an honest way of life that was wholesome and outstanding in the
tradition of Soldiers of Uncle H a title awarded to them by the people.
The unit routinely obeyed all regulations, and created and maintained alertness in
leadership, its duties, and in its combat-readiness. The Battalions tactical plans and those
of its subordinate companies were practised in the field during exercises and during civil
proselytising activities. We actively coordinated with the local entities to ensure security
during Tt celebrations. The military and political training activities were fully conducted
according to regulations for all members. Quite good results were achieved in
examinations and tests and absolute safety was achieved both for personnel and
equipment.
As a unit, 445 Battalion always gave special importance to ensuring and
maintaining the effective operation of its weapons and technical equipment. 100 percent
of the cadre and soldiers were thoroughly trained in the maintenance of our weapons and
equipment. Each year, the unit conducted inspections of its weapons and equipment,
ensuring that the weapons and equipment were at a high state of combat-readiness.
In looking after the material and spiritual lives of the troops, the Battalion
arranged for each company to have a football team, a volleyball team, and a cultural
group. Their activities were funded by the Battalion that provided five million ng to
purchase sports equipment, construct and repair a football field, a volleyball court, and
two table-tennis tables. As a consequence, the fitness level of the unit was assessed as
98.5 percent. Our program to increase production was boosted, with its output
contributing to the troops meals at the scale planned.
The report of 18 December 2000 summarising the Party and political work of 445
Battalion in the five-year training schedule (1996-2000) focused on a general assessment
of the results achieved in training and combat-readiness as follows: Under the direct
leadership of the Party Committee and the B Ra - Vng Tu Military Headquarters and with the assistance of the functional offices of the Province Military Headquarters
and the executive committees of the local authorities, the Party Committee and
Headquarters of 445 Battalion constantly, thoroughly, and rigorously executed its training
and combat-readiness mission. The Battalion regularly reviewed and studied its
experiences in organising and implementing its training activities. The great majority of
the cadre and soldiers had peace of mind, were at ease, and addressed their tasks well.
The ranks of our cadre were supplemented in a timely way, and fulfilled the requirements
of the units training mission.
The unit employed an approach to training and combat-readiness that was basic,
practical, and solidly-based. This was always closely aligned with the actual content of
the programs. The Battalion effectively achieved the Three Points, Eight Principles, and
Six Coordination Elements on the basis of always seeking to increase the level of
initiative and creativity of its trainees; focusing on night-training; changes in situations
and terrain; and exercising in the field with the aim of improving the combat-readiness
capabilities of the unit. The notable strongpoints were: The unit focused on and
successfully implemented staff training. It maintained and stringently implemented a
system of approvals through instructions and training plans. Training was always

207
increasingly comprehensive. The training was coordinated with education to raise the
understanding and the fighting resolve of the troops, and went in hand with the
development of the consciousness and the discipline of the cadre and soldiers in the unit.
The results of the training and combat-readiness in the five years (1996-2000) were
assessed by our higher authority as quite good and good (especially in the years 1998,
1999, and 2000). In achieving our tactical live-firing exercise tasks with participants at
two levels (platoon and company) that were conducted on the Area 3 firing range, the unit
deployed on foot for nearly 70 kilometres carrying heavy packs and in inclement weather
(the Wet Season) - but the unit completed the tasks in an outstanding manner.
With regard to the leadership and direction from our higher authorities for our
training activities, the Battalions report clearly noted: The Party Committee always
thoroughly and stringently followed the resolutions and directives from our higher
authorities in training matters and in a timely manner, produced resolutions annually to
direct the training tasks, and specialist resolutions for live-firing exercises and the training
of new soldiers. The Party Committee and the Battalion Headquarters routinely checked
and supervised the implementation of the resolutions by each cadre and soldier. This
enabled the monitoring of quality, the assessment of capabilities, and the extent of the
completion of tasks by the cadre elements. It also instructed, reminded, and encouraged
the cadre and soldiers to uphold their own roles and responsibilities in the training. Each
year, the unit organised coaching in training matters for the cadre - from section
commander upwards, so that the high standards would not decline, and to ensure the
capabilities, organisational methods, and the training techniques of our cadre remained
high at all levels.
The Youth Groups and the Military Members Council635 always successfully
fulfilled their roles and responsibilities. The Group Chapters and the Youth Groups
always took the initiative to organise emulation competitions, and cultural, literature, and
sporting activities in order to create a happy and enthusiastic atmosphere throughout the
training process. Consequently, the quality and the results of the training continued to be
high. To achieve good democratic outcomes, our cadre and soldiers contributed critiques
on each program and lesson.
In our field exercises to conduct civilian proselytising activities and in our livefiring exercises, the higher headquarters and the Battalion Headquarters focused on
leading and guiding the units to ensure strict discipline in civilian proselytising, that there
were no acts of indiscipline, and that the unified relationships between the people and the
military were maintained. Our higher headquarters and the local civilian authorities
assessed our performance in this area as high.
In 2000, the Battalion organised the 35th anniversary of the founding of the unit
(1965-2000). Following in the footsteps of their fathers and brothers since the liberation
of the South more than 20 years beforehand, the young soldiers of the Battalion continued
to train and to overcome new difficulties and challenges. They continued to carry their
weapons and defend a safe, sound, and peaceful existence for their native land. Apart
from combat-readiness training, in past years the Battalion had also performed its
function as a military unit that sent thousands of cadre and soldiers to assist the people in
their labours, conducted civilian proselytising missions, participated in the construction of
635

Translators Note: Military Members Council literally: Hi ng qun nhn. As noted earlier, in
mid-1966, the Liberation Armed Forces promulgated a system of Revolutionary Military Councils (Hi
ng Qun Nhn Cach Mng) to be managed by Party Chapters at company-level in order to
democratise decision-making in units and stiffen political resolve see footnotes 256, 311 and The
Party at Annex G. The Directive issued by the 5th VC Division (Vietnamese text only - undated) is at
CDEC Log 09-1749-66. A translation of that programs main points is at CDEC Log 09-1865-66.

208
charitable housing for deserving families and poor countrymen, and joined in the
movements to wipe out poverty and to repay people for their favours that the local
authorities had initiated. Our troops contributed up to hundreds of millions of ng and
thousands of days of labour.
In the years 2001-2002, the Battalions Determined to Win emulation
movement continued to be promoted. We strove to create a regular and orderly routine
and a solidly-based and complete unit. The Battalion created Party structures that were
honest, pure, and solid. The unit routinely reported on the enemy situation, and the
political and security situation in the area while at the same time not ceasing to deeply
educate its cadre and soldiers to be vigilant and guard the revolution, to maintain a
resolve to fight, and to defend the Fatherland in the new period.
The Battalion exploited its cleverness in creating combat plans and deployment
plans suitable to the local terrain and the units mission and capabilities. It focused on
creating ways of leadership and guidance with the aim of raising the standard of
management within the unit and stringently maintained the system of alert leadership,
alert duties, and a system of guard patrols.
In 2002, with the aim of ensuring security for the XI National Assembly, the unit
actively coordinated with the local authorities (Ha Long, Long Phc) and the Phong
Ph Agricultural Worksite to conduct 170 patrols, and established guard posts to
guarantee political security and social order in the the area. We organised a 24-hour aerial
observation tower, and a system of aerial defence was continuously maintained. In regard
to rear services and financial tasks, the Battalion arranged to safely receive and issue
hundreds of tonnes of merchandise and food to ensure a system of allowances for the
troops. This provided an additional 2,000 ng per-person per-day for the troops. The unit
provided 100 percent of the green vegetables, 70 percent of the spices, and 40 percent of
the various types of fish.
Participating in the military skills competition, the Battalion selected and entered a
group of 53 comrades to participate in the combined military event organised by the
Province Military Headquarters. The results were that the Battalion won 23 group and
individual awards. These included the first prize in the 12.7mm air defence machinegun
competition for specialist units.
The unit conducted civilian proselytising field exercises in the three villages of
Lc An (Long t), Ha Hip (Xuyn Mc) and Chu Pha (Tn Thnh) and assisted the
villagers to harvest their crops, and to repair roads and houses. This entailed 2,000 mandays of labour, and over 10 million ng from the unit funds to worthy families and
military families in difficult circumstances. The unit also assisted crippled children and
students with learning difficulties in the local area at a cost of 800,000 ng.
The results achieved in 445 Battalions emulation program truly illustrated that
the Battalion had developed to be a solidly-based and complete unit that strove to bring to
an end any desertions or incidences of punishable violations of discipline, and reduced the
ratio of common violations to under 1 percent. The unit improved its standards of
management in all facets, and successfully fulfilled all its given political tasks. The
Determined to Win emulation program reflected that the quality of every aspect of the
Battalions work had constantly improved especially in combat-readiness training and
in its civilian proselytising work. All this was principally a continuation of the great
traditions of our Armed Forces and the application of the traditions of being Soldiers of
Uncle H that our generations of fathers and brothers had taken great pains to foster
and that the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion honoured, maintained and applied each
day.

209

CONCLUSION
445 Battalions predecessors came into being very early after the US and Dim
revealed their true natures as betrayers of the Geneva Conference and mercilessly
oppressed the revolutionary movement in the South in general - and the revolutionary
movement in B Ra in particular, in a sea of blood. From the time of their establishment,
there were innumerable difficulties for our forces that had come together from many
sources. Weapons were lacking, and we were principally responsible for our own rear
services support but we had a patriotism and deep hatred for the enemy. However, with
the attention of the Partys leadership as directly represented and led by the Province
Committee, and the protection and mutual assistance of the people, our forces developed
unceasingly from their first unit (C.40) - with only a few dozen armed soldiers, to become
two companies (with a strength of hundreds in each company) in the period before the
Battalion itself was founded. Parallel with this growth, the combat skills of the Battalions
predecessor units increased day-by-day (in all three facets: applying tactics, engaging in
larger-scale battles, and combat effectiveness). In the beginning, engagements were small,
and the principal tactics were camouflage, deception, ambushes, and raids on the enemys
weak points and on lone enemy groups with the aim of killing the enemy, destroying the
oppressors, wearing down the enemys activities, and supporting the vanguard of the
political struggle a principal task. This led to larger annihilation battles (against enemy
platoon-level objectives), direct attacks on posts, strategic hamlets, and locations where
the enemy took stringent defensive measures. At the same time, the area of tactical
deployment to strike against the enemy became larger across almost all the countryside
in the districts and the province up to Long Thnh and down to Cn Gi 636, in order to
support the local revolutionary and guerrilla movements, protect the bases, expand the
liberated zones, and to contribute to the defeat of the national strategic hamlet policy of
the US and Dim in the territory of B Ra.
445 Battalion came into being at the time when the US and their puppets moved
from their failed special warfare strategy to a limited war strategy with the direct
involvement of American troops and those of their vassal countries. That was also
synonymous with a war that would be tougher and longer - and that would be more cruel
and devastating. In B Ra Province, the enemy constantly maintained a collosal machine
(hundreds of times larger that ours) with the aim of suppressing the revolutionary
movement which originally had been very strong locally, and protecting a foothold in
an area that was very important to the Americans and their puppets in relation to
increasing their troop numbers, facilities, and weapons in order to strengthen the war
and while withdrawing troops. In particular, they deployed a complete force of Australian
troops into the South (about 8,000-strong 637). These troops were very experienced in
anti-guerrilla warfare and had successfully countered guerrillas in Malaya. To achieve
their aims, they were prepared to conduct any poisonous scheme including: increasing
their sweeping operations; terrorising; killings in the hamlets; laying minefields; and
building bunkers and barrier fences to block information and supplies reaching us from
636

Translators Note: Long Thnh District of Bin Ha Province bordered north-western Phc Tuy
Province. Cn Gi District of Gia nh Province bordered western Phc Tuy and included part of the
Rng Sc/Sc/Rng St (see footnote 10). For a detailed Area Study of Cn Gi District and the Rng Sc,
see: Haines, E.B., Rung Sat Special Zone Intelligence Study, 1968 - VCAT Item No.4000105007.
637
Translators Note: Earlier, this D445 History has stated: In June 1966, the 1st Royal Australian Task
Force comprising 7,080 troops. see footnote 230. Australian records show the strength of 1 ATF at Ni
t as at 30 June 1966 was 2,830 - comprising 168 officers and 2,662 other ranks, see also footnote 230.

210
inside the villages and to prevent our revolutionary personnel from accessing the villages.
Further, they spread chemical poisons to destroy water sources and jungle areas where
they suspected our revolutionary forces were hiding, and attempted to destroy us. 445
Battalion was always the number one priority target for those annihilation attempts.
Facing such difficulties and challenges from the Americans, their puppets and the
Australians for 10 years, it appeared as if we would be unable to overcome them. The
cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion always had a sense of the traditional, dogged
revolutionary struggle of the local people, and continued to inherit the successful
traditions of its forebear units. The Battalion had achieved many great combat feats that
both frightened the enemy and earned the trust and love of the people. As a main-force
battalion that deployed for combat across B Ra Long Khanh Province, 445 Battalion
stubbornly held its ground and remained close to the people. We fought to protect the
people, to defend our bases and liberated zones, and to support the development of the
guerrilla movement and the revolutionary struggle of the local people as well as
regularly deploying to strike the enemy and open up areas, operating in both strong and
weak areas, and expanding our corridors in the liberated zones etc. The Battalions area of
operations was very extensive across almost all the terrain of the Province, and
especially in those areas that were the most important and most difficult. It can be said
that in 10 years of resistance against the Americans, there were no difficulties or violent
situations that the cadre and soldiers of the Battalion had not experienced. There were no
opponents be they Australians, Americans or puppets, in our area with whom 445
Battalion did not engage and defeat.
In 10 years with nearly a thousand battles638 both large and small, we suffered
losses and deaths, and hundreds of comrades were wounded. One rank fell and another
always then stood up. Each, in turn, defeated the many different types of dangerous
enemy tactics (most representative being our defeat of the enemys minefield tactics, their
bunkers, barrier shield defences, and their encroachment operations). We destroyed many
Australian, American and puppet units; we killed and wounded tens of thousands of
enemy of all types, and seized a large amount of weapons and equipment etc. The combat
achievements of the Battalion in the resistance war against the Americans always had a
major political significance. In every period, this contributed an important part in
achieving a victory for our policies. The resolve of the Province Committee in response to
the local requirements, and the combat achievements of 445 Battalion in these periods
were the major elements that the Nation acknowledged when awarding to us the title of
Heroic Unit of the Peoples Armed Forces.
After the South was completely liberated, without one day of rest, the cadre and
soldiers of 445 Battalion continued forward into a new battle participating directly in
the pursuit of the enemy military remnants; and wiping out reactionary organisations, and
armed cells and groups in Vng Tu, Chu Thnh, Long t, and Xuyn Mc and even
in the Hi Nai and Tn Phu areas. We contributed to the maintenance of stability for the
lives of the people, and supported the then young revolutionary administrations. A war to
defend the Fatherland broke out on the South-Western Border. 445 Battalion
representing the military and the people of B Ra-Vng Tu, participated in the defence
638

Translators Note: According to a 1985 ng Nai Province publication: From 1965 to 1975, 445
Battalion had participated in 1,000 battles both large and small; wiped out 12,000 enemy (including
almost 2,000 Americans and Australians), wounded 7,000, and captured more than 1,000; destroyed 138
military vehicles (including 89 tanks and armoured vehicles); shot down and destroyed 23 aircraft and
many military posts, houses, storehouses, bunkers, fences etc; seized 2,500 weapons of all types, 100,000
rounds of ammunition, and 25 radios. H Sn i & Trn Quang Toi, ng Nai (The Heroic Units of
ng Nai), op.cit., 1985, p.11.

211
of the Fatherland and did its International Duty in Cambodia. Having completed that
mission in our friends country, the cadre and the soldiers of 445 Battalion joined hands
in creating a regular, comprehensive, and solidly-based unit always ready for combat,
participating in the training of recruits, and conducting civilian proselytising etc.
Regardless of the tasks, they were always completed by the Battalion and completed in
an outstanding manner, and we were highly commended by our higher headquarters.
445 Battalions 40-year long road (1965-2004) of building, fighting and comingof-age was a road of difficulties and sacrifice but it was also glorious and awe-inspiring
with un-ending combat feats. The blood and the feats-of-arms of the ranks of cadre and
soldiers of 445 Battalion have piled up to create our traditions and our history as an
Heroic Battalion.
Those traditions are:
1. Absolute loyalty to the Party and to the people.
At the beginning of the anti-American resistance war at a time when we were
strictly implementing the Geneva Agreement, the enemy blatantly violated the Agreement
and used violence to oppress the people and the revolutionary movement. Facing the need
to protect and develop the revolutionary movement under the leadership of the Party, the
work of building the armed forces and the armed struggle again took shape in stages so
that the Politburos Resolution 15 - together with the people rising up in the ng Khi
Movement 639, became the nucleus of the revolutionary movement in the countryside.
Continuing our tradition as Soldiers of Uncle H with the leadership,
attention, and guidance of the Party and the local authorities, and the love, protection and
help of the people, the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion in their constant and absolute
loyalty to the Party and the people in any and all types of difficulties, stringently executed
the orders of our higher authorities and completed all assigned tasks in an outstanding
manner.
Inspired by patriotism and a hatred of the enemy, 445 was always prepared to
fight and to sacrifice, to stringently execute all orders from above, to stick with the
people, and to play its role as a pillar of the political struggle, military proselytising, and
the armed struggle across the whole of the extremely violent B Ra Long Khanh
battlefield.
Whenever needed by the Party, 445 Battalion was there. Whenever and whereever
the people needed us, 445 Battalion was there! We applied the motto: When away, think
of the people when with them, love them. At the same time, the enemy was terrified of
us while we were cherished and believed in by the Party and our fraternal units.
445 Battalion had truly become the pillar of the whole people fighting the
enemy movement, and it was relied upon by the local revolutionary movement in the
violent war against the overwhelmingly stronger enemy. The Battalion had come through
many difficulties, hardships, losses and sacrifices. Hundreds of cadre and soldiers from
all parts of the country had heroically fallen to the ground in B Ra - Long Khanh
including the 2nd Company that had twice almost been wiped out by heavy casualties

639

Translators Note: As noted earlier, the ng Khi Movement or Simultaneous/Concerted Uprising

against the Dim regime (beginning in very late 1959 and peaking in 1960), is cited by communist sources
as the start of the armed struggle in the South. The Uprising reportedly began in M Cy District of Ben Tr
Province in mid- January 1960.

212
(once by poisoning at the T Lon Stream640, and once when ambushed at the C Thi
Waterfall641 in Xuyn Mc). There were also the losses in the General Offensive and
Uprising of Tt Mu Thn in 1968, and Phase I in 1969 in B Ra, Long in and t
etc. That does not include times when surrounded by the enemy; countering their daylong sweeping operations; enduring shortages of food, supplies and medicines; and
occasions when the resupply of weapons and personnel reinforcements could not be
achieved in time. All those difficulties further increased our hatred of the enemy and our
resolve and will to fight to defend our homeland and to protect the people.
The cadre, Party members and the soldiers of 445 Battalion created a strong
political spirit and skills in the face of all difficulties, hardships and sacrifices. We had
built a revolutionary spirit, a sense of self-reliance on our own strengths, had survived and
developed strongly, and completed all given tasks on all occasions. Wherever the enemy
conducted their pacification, 445 Battalion stood its ground and fought against them.
Wherever 445 Battalion held its ground and fought the enemy, the local revolutionary
movement expanded strongly. In that decisive and tough fighting, 445 Battalion was still
able to train and create many skilled cadre who became the mainstay of the local area and
of the Province. A number of these comrades later developed to become high-level Party
and national cadre.
2. Constantly taking the initiative to attack the enemy, creatively deploying and
attacking the enemy in many different ways, overcoming all difficulties, and
completing all our tasks in an outstanding manner.
We were prompted by an ideology of taking the initiative in attacking the enemy
and by the units many creative methods of attack by daring to employ a small force to
attack a larger enemy, daring to attack many opponents, striking the enemy in the three
strategic areas, attacking the enemy in exposed terrain, and fighting by both day and
night. Not only did we dare to confront elite puppet units, but we also fought the
American expeditionary forces and their Australian and Thai vassals. We dared to attack
the enemy, knew how to enter their weak areas - but even also struck their strong points
with raids. We set ambushes and mobile ambushes, attacked posts, and destroyed enemy
relief forces. The unit attacked their defensive positions, resisted the enemys sweeping
operations, and employed deception and sapper tactics etc. The Battalions cadre and
soldiers used all these methods successfully.
The coming-of-age of 445 Battalion was closely connected with the development
of the peoples war and the local revolutionary movement. 445 Battalions fort method
of attack was to use appropriate forces and exploiting secrecy and surprise, attacking
the enemys weak points while at the same time encircling the enemy and blocking any
relief forces. We would then converge on the killing ground and wipe them out
completely (or, put more simply, by employing the tactic of drawing the enemy into a
pocket). Such required leaders who paid absolute attention to detail, soldiers with
courage and stringent discipline, a standard of technical combat proficiency, and
employing close coordination as the decisive factor for victory.
Every battle and every victory of the Battalion had its own different characteristics
and outcome. However, each proved the initiative and attacking spirit of the cadre and
soldiers of the Heroic 445 Battalion to wipe out the enemy. It also denoted our
640

Translators Note: This is probably a reference to the incident in the area of the Sui Rao base in March
1967 see footnote 309.
Translators Note: For the ambush of 445 Battalion at the C Thi Waterfall on 31 December 1970, see
footnotes 165, 396, 476, 478, and 479 and pp.136-137.

641

213
capabilities to use our cadre and leaders - at all levels, to always grasp tightly and to
creatively apply our tactical plans, and to confront all manner of enemies. We were
mobile and flexible at times dispersed in small teams in the countryside as the nucleus
of the local revolutionary movement and organising the elimination of wicked oppressors.
At other times, our forces were concentrated and joined with higher main-force elements
in larger annihilation battles that contributed towards changing the complexion of the
battlefield. Many of the poisonous tactical schemes of the enemy expeditionary forces
were trialled on the B Ra Vng Tu battlefield but all were defeated.
3. Staunchly holding-on, holding our ground, and staying close to the people.
Fighting for and serving the people.
The B Ra Long Khanh battlefield had always been a main area for violent
combat against the enemy. That area had to suffer millions of tonnes of bombs, and had to
contend directly with all sorts of enemy troops puppets, Australian vassals, New
Zealanders, and Thais. In particular, the Royal Australian Armed Forces were belligerent,
and their counter-guerrilla methods in the B Ra area caused many difficulties for - and
casualties among, our local revolutionary movement. Having only just been founded, 445
Battalion had to confront military professionals with modern weapons and means of
waging war. However, with its courageous spirit and perseverance, the Battalion still held
on resolutely, remained close to the people and fought for the people, defeating every
enemy opponent. Even in those battles in which we suffered quite heavy casualties, the
units spirit and initiative to attack never declined. We always found a way to restore the
unit so that we could continuously attack the enemy.
Comparing the balance of forces, the enemy was stronger than us in many aspects
outnumbering us by up to 100 times. Throughout the length of the war, at all times the
enemy constantly sought to wipe out the 445 unit. Most of all, they tried a large number
of wicked and fiendish schemes to separate the people from 445 with the aim of driving
445 Battalion far from the important and critical areas so that they could easily annihilate
445 and isolate, tightly control, and stamp out the revolutionary struggle movement of the
people in B Ra Long Khanh.
Despite the foregoing, 445 was not only never wiped out and neither were the
people cut off, isolated nor weakened. Rather, in all situations, we continued to hold-on
and stand firm in those important areas. Most of all, we stood firm in the peoples
confidence, and stood firm in the Provinces critical strategic belt. The Battalion always
held fast to the policies and line of the Party, and doggedly held-on to achieve the
missions assigned to us by the Province. We resolutely and courageously fought
decisively with the enemy and were always close to the people. There were times when
we were not with them for a day or for a battle - but we came back and attacked dozens of
the enemy for dozens of continuous days and nights. Not only did we hang-on in the field
from one campaign to the next, but we held-on and fought the enemy in difficult and
isolated terrain, and in waterways. The unit had to overcome the practical difficulties
engendered by unimagined violence, hardships and sacrifice.
Born and bred in the homeland of B Ra - Vng Tu and as the children of the
people of the local region, what could make us more happy than being able to carry a rifle
into battle to defend our homeland and nation in order to repay with gratitude the
assistance and fostering of the people. Holding our ground, staying close to the people
and our principal infrastructure elements was the Battalions way and method of
operation in all circumstances - no matter how difficult. Every one of the Battalions
victories was firmly founded on the movement of the masses; the leadership, direction

214
and deep understanding of the Province Committee; and knowledge of the local area in
which the Battalion was located. The aim of our fighting was to serve the people - as
they were both the ideal of, and the motivation for, the soldiers of 445 Battalion. This was
also one of the valuable lessons and experiences that 445 Battalion studied and applied in
the new circumstances and situations that is: the creation of a complete and solidlybased unit went together with creating the infrastructure of a strong and honest Party in
order to successfully achieve our function as an operating army that contributed to the
building of a political system with comprehensive and solidly-based agencies.
4. Strong solidarity, strict discipline, living righteously with loyalty and empathy,
and successfully completing all assigned tasks.
These were the special features that were the essence of the courageous
revolutionary actions by 445 Battalion. No matter what the circumstances or difficulties,
the cadre and soldiers of the Battalion always created an internal solidarity and a deeplyattached unity with the militia in order to successfully complete every assigned task. In
the resistance war - just as in peace, the ranks of the cadre and soldiers of the Battalion
were the children of the people from every region of our country ever constant and
deeply-attached to the common mission to serve the Fatherland and the people. The
invaluable and endless nurturing, assistance, and help provided by the people for the "445
troops was indeed relied on by the Battalion to enable it to win its battle victories and
overcome every difficulty and challenge. That was also one of the invaluable experiences
drawn from the Partys work and political work that aimed at creating a solidarity, a
unity, and a fighting resolve in the unit - and building a deeply-attached and constant
unity with the militia.
Throughout the fighting, in almost any battle, 445 Battalion achieved a spirit of
solidarity by implementing all combined tactical plans that had been determined. In
particular, when encountering difficulties we shared the burden, stormed into combat
and self-sacrificed for our companions-in-arms. Every day, we shared our rice and our
clothing. When on operations, the troops shared the burdens of carrying heavy loads, and
looked after one another when ill. They assisted each other in spiritual and material ways
cadres helped the soldiers, unit veterans helped newcomers. Without any
discrimination642 between Northerners and Southerners, they always gave the impression
of being in harmony and affection like brothers by birth. Indeed, at times, they were even
closer that blood brothers in circumstances of casualties or sickness among the soldiers.
The cadre and soldiers of the Battalion constantly and stringently executed
regulations and rules, maintained proper military bearing and military discipline - and
were always disciplined in their relations with the people and enemy soldiers who had
surrendered. In particular, they absolutely obeyed the laws of war. There merely only
needed to be a radio message of a few words from the Province Committee or the
Province Unit or a short message by hand, or a codeword, a bugle signal, or a command
642

Translators Note: As noted earlier, tensions and lack of cooperation between Southerners and
Northerners in units and between 445 and 440 Battalions, were reported by a rallier - Appendix II to
Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.84/70, Ni t, 25 March 1970. More generally, see also comments on
Discord between Northerner and Southerner cadre by a senior NVA officer who rallied in 1970 - VCAT
Item No.11271006005; North South Divisiveness in the PAVN/PLAF April 1974 (within the 9th VC
Division) VCAT Item No.2310513021; Division in Communist Ranks in 1974 VCAT Item
No.2122902006; Frictions between Northern & Southern Cadre in Rear Service MR C-50, May 1974
VCAT Item No.2122905001; Exploitation of Divisiveness in the Ranks of the Viet Cong, JUSPAO
Guidance, No.12, 18 December 1965 VCAT Item No.2171306026; and: Divisiveness in Ranks of
Communists in South Vietnam, 1965 - VCAT Item No.2310109004.

215
signal from a higher-level leader (from section-level cadre up to battalion-level) issued,
and the cadre and soldiers would execute the instruction immediately in full and without
qualification. No matter how difficult, the unit always successfully completed every task
in combat and elsewhere. In both war and in peace and including when our elements
were undertaking their International Duty or when our cadre and soldiers had changed
corps or retired, they always displayed that exemplary nature and tradition.
The reason why 445 Battalion was able to function and perform like that was
because it had a system of official Party and political organisations, and was led
throughout by the Party in every situation. In particular, the Battalions Party Committee
always thoroughly grasped the wise principle that: The Party leads absolutely, directly,
and completely. The role of political officers at all times was also the embodiment and
soul of the unit that constantly was able to mobilise a fighting spirit and a will for
courageous self-sacrifice in dangerous missions. In the innermost heart of the cadre and
soldiers of the Battalion were such fiery slogans as: Wherever there are enemy, thats
where well go !; Off to victory well score a goal !; Unity is strength !; When
away, think of the people when with them, cherish them; and Not even a sewing
needle belonging to the people can be taken.
The 40-year long road of building the Battalion, fighting, and coming-of-age was
a road of difficulties and hardships but also full of great and glorious military feats
achieved by the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion so that the name of the Heroic 445
Battalion would live forever in its homeland of B Ra Vng Tu. In the 10 years of its
coming-of-age during the resistance war against the Americans, the toil and blood of the
cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion contributed to our victory in the resistance war of
national salvation against the Americans. 10 years after that day of liberation, 445
Battalion had the honour of representing the people of B Ra Vng Tu in our
international mission of assisting our Cambodian friends. This was the brilliant history of
the Heroic 445 Battalion.
The four historical aspects related above are the revolutionary essence and the
traditions of Soldiers of Uncle H and the reality of 445 Battalion giving its energy to
build and train over many years of combat, duty, and coming-of-age a history that is
both commendable and praiseworthy.
This was also an invaluable lesson for the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion both for today and going forward on the road into the future. In the work of building and
defending the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the community of cadre and soldiers of the
Heroic 445 Battalion will strive to be worthy of the trust and affection of the Party, the
authorities, and of the people of B Ra Vng Tu; and deserving of the guidance of the
preceding generation of our fathers and brothers to: Fight for our nation and people, live
righteously with loyalty and empathy, and maintain the traditions of the Heroic 445
Battalion.643
643

Translators Note: On 23 February 2011, at a formal meeting to discuss arrangements for a memorial for
445 Battalion by the Battalions veterans committee and government officials, it was stated that during the
War the Battalion had wiped out more than 10,000 enemy soldiers, destroyed 120 military vehicles, shot
down 20 aircraft, and seized more that 1,800 weapons of different types. More than 1,000 cadre and
soldiers of the Battalion had heroically sacrificed themselves. A stela and memorial for the Battalion was
planned to be completed by December 2011 - Bi Xun, Xy dng tng i v bia tng nim cn b,
chin s D445 Erecting a Memorial and Commemorative Stela for the Cadre and Soldiers of D445, B
Ra-Vng Tu (C quan ng b ng cng sn Vietnam BR-VT), 24 February 2011. On 22 July 2015, a
Committee determined that the D445 Memorial would be built on a two hectare site in B RaTown
adjacent to the Province Administrative Offices and Public Security Headquarters. In recent years, a small
group of Australian military historians in Canberra has conducted an analytical study of about 3,900
engagements by 1 ATF during the War against NVA and VC forces (see footnote 515) and produced a

216
Translators Endnote: Long Tn Map

Scale: each grid square is 1km x 1km.

Note: The site of the engagement on 18 August 1966 is indicated by the dotted lines
based on Major H. A. Smiths sketches (see Annex F footnote 17; and the preceding
footnotes 269, 271 and 272). There were no maps of the Long Tn area in either the 1991
D445 History or the 5th Division History (2005). The 2004 D445 History however
included a sketch map depicting the engagement see p.76 and footnote 275.
The 1ATF base at Ni t was about five kilometres to the west of the site of the
Battle of Long Tn.

Vietnamese Missing In Action Database. The Database identifies the approximate burial site of more
than 3,790 NVA and VC soldiers killed in action by elements of 1 ATF. The Database includes cadre and
soldiers of units other than 445 Battalion eg other provincial elements, district forces, village guerrillas,
personnel from the 274th, 275th and 33rd Regiments, rear services personnel, and those killed in engagements
outside Phc Tuy Province by 1 ATF forces. This data was formally passed to Vietnamese authorities in
March 2010 - see: Hall, R. Dr, Operation Wandering Souls, Wartime, Issue 55, Australian War
Memorial, Canberra, July 2011, pp.25-29. The Australian historians developed their study, and in late May
2015 launched a website: Hall, R.A. Dr (Lieutenant Colonel Retd); Ross, A. Dr; Kimberley, P.; Griffin,
A. Dr; De Heer, D.V.; Turner, T. Dr; Smith B.L. Australias Vietnam War: Exploring the combat actions
of the 1st Australian Task Force, University of NSW/Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 2015.

217
ADDENDUM ((Ph Lc))644
LIST I
Cadre, Leaders and Commanders of 445 Battalion 645
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
644

Name
L Minh Thnh
Nguyn Quc Thanh
Ba i
By Ph
Nguyn Quc Thanh
Ba H
Nguyn Vn Thanh
(T Thanh)
V Quc Chanh
o Vn Xun
(Hai Xun)
Nguyn Minh Ninh
Ba Quang
V Quc Chanh
L Minh Vit
Nm nh
Nguyn Minh Ninh
Nm Dng
Trn Vn Chin
V Quc Chanh
L Minh Vit
Nguyn Vn Xun
Hunh Sinh
Bi Quang Chanh
(Sau Chanh)
L Thnh Ba
V Quc Chanh
Vn Chng
Nguyn Minh Ninh

Position

Unit

Rank

Period

Commander
Deputy Comd
Political Offr
Dep Pol Offr
Coy Comd
Political Offr
Coy Comd

C40
C40
C40
C40
C45
C45
C445

6-1958
6-1958
4-1960
4-1960
4-1960
5-1961
5-1961

Coy 2ic
Coy 2ic

C445
C445

5-1961
5-1961

Political Offr
Dep Pol Offr
Coy Comd
Political Offr
Coy Comd
Political Offr
Dep Pol Offr
Coy 2ic
Coy Comd
Political Offr
Coy 2ic
Dep Pol Offr
Bn Comd

C445
C445
C445
C445
C440
C440
C440
C440
C445
C445
C445
C445
D445

5-1961
5-1961
1963
1963
10-1964
10-1964
10-1964
10-1964
10-1964
10-1964
10-1964
10-1964
5-1965

Bn Pol Offr
Bn 2ic
Bn Pol Offr
Dep Pol Offr

D445
D445
D445
D445

5-1965
8-1965
8-1965
12-1965

Translators Note: The Addendum in the The History of 445 Battalion: An Heroic Unit of the Peoples
Armed Forces 1965-2004, (2004) comprises three Lists. List I: Cadre, Leaders and Commanders of 445
Battalion (Danh Sach Can B Lnh o, Ch Huy Tiu on 445 Qua Cac Thi K) is at its pp.288-291;
List II: List of 445 Battalion Martyrs (Danh Sach Lit S Tiu on 445) - pp.292-322 of 539 names.
Only one casualty is noted for 18-08-1966 ie the Battle of Long Tn: Trn Vn Chin, b.1936 at Phc
Bu, Xuyn Mc District, Company Commander. A 2011 publication, lists (by name, date, function) 57
personnel of D445 Battalion born in Long in District, who were killed in the Anti-American
Resistance War. - L Thanh Dng, K Yu Lit S Huyn Long in (The Summary Record of the Martyrs
of Long in District), Long in District Peoples Committee, 2011. The 2004 D445 History also
included as List III: The List of Heroic Vietnamese Mothers (Danh Sach B M Vit Nam Anh Hng) women whose husbands and/or children were 445 Battalion martyrs as soldiers or cadre) pp.323-325 39
names. Translations of Lists II and III have not been included in this 2016 English-language publication. In
August 2014, Province officials announced that 821 women had been bestowed with the title of Heroic
Mother in the Province of whom 46 were still alive.
645
Translators Note: See also the more comprehensive data on Senior Cadre as at mid-1966, at Annex
B; and the biographies of nine Key Cadre at Annex A.

218
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Hai Tnh
V Quc Chanh
Nguyn c Thu
Nguyn Minh Ninh
L Minh Kin
(Ba Kin)
Nguyn Vn Kim
Nguyn c Thu
Nguyn Vn Tm
Nguyn Minh Khanh
o Vn Tng
Lm Phng
Nguyn Vn Oanh
Nguyn c Thu
Nguyn Minh Ninh
Lm Phng
Nguyn Anh V
Ba Ci
Nguyn Minh Khanh
L Vn Tranh
(Nm Tranh)
T Phat
ng Ch (Comrade) Khi
L Thng Thut
ng Ch (Comrade) nh
T Thc
Phan Thanh Bnh
(By Bnh)
o Vn Tng
Bi Chnh
Sau Kho
Nguyn Vn Quang
ng Cng Quang
Nguyn Vn Bo
Hai Vn
Nguyn Vn Quang
Hunh Vn Quyt
Nguyn Vn Bo
Nguyn Thanh Bnh
Lm Phng
By Gip
L Minh Quang
ng Ch (Comrade) Quyt
ng Ch (Comrade) Ho
ng Ch (Comrade) Tung
Nguyn Vn Sn
Bi Vn Hng
Nguyn Thanh Bnh
Chu Vn Huyn
Bi Thanh Ho

Bn 2ic, CofS
Bn Comd
Bn 2ic
Bn Pol Offr
Bn 2ic, CofS

D445
D445
D445
D445
D445

12-1965
1966
1966
1967
1968

Bn Comd
Bn 2ic
Bn 2ic
Bn Pol Offr
Bn Comd
Bn 2ic
Dep Pol Offr
Bn Comd
Bn Pol Offr
Bn 2ic, CofS
Bn 2ic
Bn 2ic
Political Offr
Bn 2ic

D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445

1968
1968
1969
1969
1970
1970
1971
1972
1972
1972
1972
1972
1972
1973

--Bn 2ic
Dep Pol Offr
Dep Pol Offr
Political Offr
Bn 2ic

D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445

1973
1973-74
1973-74
1973
1973-74
1974-75

Bn Comd
Political Offr
Bn 2ic
Bn 2ic
Political Offr
Political Offr
Bn Comd
Bn Comd
Bn Comd
Political Offr
Bn 2ic
Bn 2ic
Dep Pol Offr
Bn Comd
Dep Pol Offr
Bn 2ic
Bn 2ic Mil
Bn Comd
Bn 2ic Pol
Bn 2ic Mil
Bn 2ic
Bn 2ic

D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445

1974-75
1974-75
1974
1974-75
1975-76
1976
1976-77
1977-78
1978
1978
1978
1980-83
1980-83
1984-89
1984-89
1984-89
1984-89
1989-90
1990
1991
1991
1991

Snr Captain
Snr Captain
Snr Captain
Captain
Snr Captain

219
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Hunh Vn Hin
Hunh Vn Hin
Nguyn Vn Thin
Lm Quc Ton
Nguyn Vn Bnh
Bi Thanh Ho
L Vn Th
Phan nh Phng
Nguyn Vn Bnh
Lm Quc Ton
Nguyn Vn Sn
Mai Chn
ng Vn Bnh
ng Vn Bnh
Mai Chn
Nguyn Tun Cng
Phan Chim Thnh
L Quang Ngha
Nguyn Tun Cng
Nguyn Tun Cng
Phm Quang Phng
Nguyn Hong Tn
Phm Ph
Nguyn Vn Nhng
Nguyn Ngc Thun
Nguyn Vn Non

Bn 2ic
Bn Comd
Bn 2ic Pol
Bn 2ic
Bn 2ic
Bn 2ic
Bn Comd
Bn 2ic Pol
Bn 2ic Mil
Bn 2ic
Bn Comd
Bn 2ic Pol
Bn 2ic Mil
Bn Comd
Bn 2ic Pol
Bn 2ic Mil
Bn Comd
Bn 2ic Pol
Bn 2ic Mil
Bn Comd
Bn 2ic Pol
Bn 2ic
Bn Comd
Bn Comd
Bn 2ic Pol
Bn 2ic Mil

D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445
D445

Captain
Snr Captain
Snr Captain
Captain
Snr Captain
Snr Captain
Snr Captain
Snr Captain
Snr Captain
Snr Captain
Major
Snr Captain
Snr Captain
Major
Major
Snr Captain
Major
Major
Major
Major
Major
Snr Captain
Snr Captain
Snr Captain
Snr Captain
Snr Captain

1991
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1993-96
1993-96
1993-96
1997-98
1997-98
1997-98
1998-99
1998-99
1998-99
2001-02
2001-02
2001-02
2002-03
2003
2003
2003

220
Readers Notes:

Annex A
KEY CADRE (nine)1 : D445 BATTALION OUTLINE BIOGRAPHIES2
Bi Quang Chnh (Su Chnh); Nguyn Vn Kim (Nm Kim); Vn Lin/
Vn Chng (Ba Lin); Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu); Nguyn Minh Khanh (Hai
Khanh); Nguyn Minh Ninh (Nm Ninh); V/V Quc Chanh (T Chanh);
Nguyn Quc Thanh (Ba Thanh); Nguyn Vn Nm (Nm V)
Bi Quang Chnh (Su Chnh) - Commmanding Officer D445: February 1965
December 1967/January 1968.
Bi Quang Chnh with the cover-name Nguyn Quang Chnh and the nickname
Su Chnh, was appointed on 23 February 19653 to the B Ra Province Concentrated
Unit4 to assume the Battalion Commanders position. Thereafter, over the next
eighteen months, his name (ie as Bi Quang Chnh aka Su Chnh) is recorded as
the initial Battalion Commander in the 1991 and 2004 D445 Battalion Histories5 and
noted in over a dozen captured documents as the D445 Battalion Commander.6 A
captured 445 Battalion Cadre Status Report in mid-1966 while not naming the Battalion
1

Almost all NVA/VC cadre, soldiers and infrastructure personnel had two-word nicknames/aliases/
pseudonyms (t, b danh). Invariably, these comprised a number as the first word (from 2 to 10 with the
father being 1) or occasionally t (meaning youngest), followed by their given name eg Su (Six)
Chnh. Party members sometimes also had a secure cover-name ie an additional full Vietnamese
name of three words. Vit Cng personnel did not have formal military ranks or insignia. Rather, they were
referred to by the functional title of their position. Generically, they were also referred to as cn b (cadre
ie officer-ranking, ie section commander and higher) or chin s (combatant or soldier).
2
Note that in the Addendum at pp.217-219, the 2004 D445 History includes: List 1 - Cadre, Leaders and
Commanders of 445 Battalion, with 99 serials including Bi Quang Chnh (Su Chnh) at Serial 22.
3
T.1 Region Headquarters ((ie Military Region 1 later Military Region 7)), Decision 015/Q, 23
February 1965 CDEC Log 09-1863-66, Bulletin 1063.
4
The predecessors to D445 Battalion were successively: a Bnh Xuyn company (see the following
footnote 126), C40 Company (1958), C45 Company, the combined C40/C45 companies as C445 Company
(1962), and the B Ra Province Concentrated Unit (ie Battalion) in February 1965. D445 Battalions
official founding date was 19 May 1965 ie President H Ch Minhs birthday.
5
Bi Quang Chnh is noted as the inaugural Battalion Commander in the 1991 D445 History at p.43; and in
the 2004 D445 History at p.47. However, according to the ng Nai History 1986: On 19 May 1965 in
the Long Tn base (Long t), the B Ra Province Committee established the Provincial Main Force [sic]
Battalion with the title of 445 with Comrade T Chnh as the Battalion Commander and Comrade L
Thnh Ba as its political officer. Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.123. It
appears that the 1991 and 2004 Battalion Histories have corrected the name of the Battalions inaugural
commander to Bi Quang Chnh (Su Chnh). However, a number of other publications have cited T
Chnh as the 445 Battalion Commander probably influenced by the ng Nai History (1986) eg: the
ng Nai Monograph - a Ch ng Nai, Nh Xut Bn Tng Hp ng Nai, Bin Ha, 2001; see also
Annex B - Senior Cadre.
6
Bi Quang Chnhs appointment as the inaugural Battalion Commander is also noted in the local Party
history - Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Ban Chp Hnh ng b tnh B Ra - Vng Tu (Executive
Committee of the B Ra - Vng Tu Party), Lch s ng b tnh B Ra-Vng Tu 1930 - 1975) (The
History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), Nh Xut bn Chnh tr Quc gia (National Political Publishing
House), H Ni, 2000.

A-2

Commander, noted that the Commander was: single, had four years of schooling, was of
the lower social class, aged above 41 years, his health was graded as B, he had joined
the Party in the period 1945-1950, and joined the Army in the period 1945-1947.7
In his D445 Political Report January to June 1966 8 - signed on 8 July 1966,
Bi Quang Chnh (as the 445 Battalion Commander) noted D445s strength as 395.
About six weeks later, Bi Quang Chnh was the D445 commander at the Battle of Long
Tn against Australian forces on 18 August 1966 although he is not specifically
mentioned in either the 1991 or 2004 D445 Histories accounts of that Battle.9 The D445
7

CDEC Log 09-2121-66. In May 1966, 1 ATF had named the D445 Commander as ng Vn Sach
and D445 as D860 - 5RAR, Intelligence Estimate No.1 Phuoc Tuy Province, 21 May 1966.
8
The document see Annex H, was recovered by the US 173rd Airborne Brigade on 26 August 1966. In the
six-months period of the Report, Chnh related that D445 Battalion had suffered losses of 39 killed, six
deserted, and one captured. A few weeks later, a report by D445s Political Officer Vn Lin (Ba Lin)
dated 9 August 1966 (see also Annex H), noted that D445 had lost 14 soldiers in July 1966 and the
Battalions strength was 392.
9
The commander of D445 at the Battle of Long Tn is not specifically named in the 1991 D445 Battalion
History; nor in the 5th Division History (2005) ie - Phm Quang inh, Lch S , op.cit., 2005 (see the
translated extracts at Annex K). This omission may have been intended to support the post-War subterfuge
and artifice that Nguyn Vn Kim (see the following outline biography) had commanded 445 Battalion at
Long Tn and to allow Kim to be presented as an authoritative figure in relating the Vietnamese
account of the Battle particularly to foreign visitors. The official Australian histories ie McNeill, I., To
Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, pp. 221-222; and McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.501
(endnote 56) have recorded Captain Nguyn Vn Kim as the first commander of 445 Battalion in May
1965; and the 445 Battalion Commander at Long Tn as Lieutenant Colonel Nguyn Vn Kim - based on
Dr I. McNeills mid-1988 interviews of Kim in Vietnam. Subsequently, other records have made similar
erroneous claims including : the Wikipedia entry until corrected in 2012; several Australian War Memorial
records, website pages and photographs; the Department of Veterans Affairs website (corrected in August
2012 to cite Bui Quang Chanh as the D445 commander caption to AWM photo P01293.010); items in
the National Library of Australia; the Australian Government Hansard Report Senate, 11 September 1996,
p.3285; Cleggett, R. Viet Cong Battalion D445 1945-1975, Duty First, Spring 2004, p.21. - and
several others. Post-War, Nguyn Vn Kim was presented to visiting Australian dignitaries as the 445
Battalion commander at the Battle of Long Tn and has also appeared in television documentaries on the
Battle as the D445 Commander - in which Kim has described D445 Battalion rehearsing the ambush plan
with the 275th Regiment on a earth model in the My To Mountains, and related the Battle in detail
(although he was not present) eg see Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan The True Story,
Australian Broadcasting Commission/Film Australia, Lindfield, 1993. In an endnote in the official
Australian history To Long Tan (p.532 endnote 46), Dr I. McNeill acknowledged: Australian
intelligence notes indicate that the first commander of D445 was Sau Chanh - ie Bi Quang Chnh. Dr
McNeill also recorded that: He ((Kim)) was recognised as the commanding officer of D445 Battalion at
the time of the battle in August 1966, but witnesses were reticent to confirm whether he actually led the
troops in battle. (op.cit., p.562 - endnote 29). The foregoing was examined in detail in Chamberlain, E. P.,
Research Note 23, Vietnam War: Commander of D445 Battalion at Long Tan Not Nguyen Van Kiem
but Bui Quang Chanh, 23 September 2010 (to the Australian War Memorial and the Australian Army
History Unit). In July 2011, the Australian War Memorial published an article that reviewed the Australian
official historians interviews in 1988 with Nguyn Vn Kim - Ekins, A., Unravelling the riddles of Long
Tan, Wartime, Issue 55, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, July 2011, pp.42-47. That article noted that,
in his record-of-interview, Dr McNeill had cited ambiguities in Kims role in the battle see the
following footnote 31. However, the article did not amend the account in the Australian official history ie
to correctly note Bi Quang Chnh as the 445 Battalion commander at the Battle of Long Tn. As at early

A-3

political officer at the Battle of Long Tn - Vn Lin (Ba Lin), declared that Su
Chnh (Bi Quang Chnh) was the commander of D445 at Long Tn.10 An Australian
intelligence organisational chart of 445 Battalion produced in September 1966 reported
Sau Chanh as the commanding officer of the Battalion.11 As noted, this 2004 D445
History relates that: In the middle of 1966, Comrade Bi Quang Chnh the Battalion
Commander ((was)) posted to an appointment at the Province Unit. Comrade V/V
Quc Chnh (T Chnh) was appointed Battalion Commander and cites V Quc Chnh
as commanding the Battalion at the Battle of Long Tn however, that change of
command is highly unlikely to have occurred at that time. According to Nguyn Thi
Bng the commander of the 275th VC Regiment at the Battle of Long Tn, Su Chnh
was the Battalion Commander of D445 until the end of 1966, and was then promoted
and became the deputy commander of the B Ra-Long Khnh-Bin Ha area. He ((Su
Chnh)) became ill in 1972 and died the following year.12 In February 1967, a 445
Battalion rallier declared that Su Chnh was the Battalion commander.13 In March 1967,
1 ATF reported that Tu Chanh (445 Battalion 2ic) had replaced Sau Chanh (Su
Chnh - ie Bi Quang Chnh) as 445 Battalion Commander, and that Su Chnh had
taken command of the Long t District Unit.14 However, captured documents indicate
that L Thnh Ba (Ba Bi) was the Commander of the Long t District Unit in AprilMay 196715. It is possible that Bi Quang Chnh was replaced as D445 Battalion
commander in the first half of 1967 by his deputy - V Quc Chnh (ie T Chnh), who
was killed in action in about September 1967. With Nguyn Vn Kim as the commander
of the Chu c District Unit throughout almost all of 1967, Bi Quang Chnh may have
served at the Province Headquarters until moving to command the Chu c District
Unit District at the end of 1967 or in very early 1968 ie when Nguyn Vn Kim may
have replaced V Quc Chnh as the Battalion commander.

2015, Nguyn Vn Kim continued to be identified on the Australian War Memorial website as the
commander of the Viet Cong D445 Battalion during the Battle of Long Tan eg photo captions on AWM
P01509.001; P01293.008, and P01293.010. For a discussion of V Quc Chnh (T Chnh) as the D445
commander at the Battle of Long Tn as cited in the 2004 D445 History, see his biography later in this
Annex.
10
Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, p.117.
11
Cited in: Burstall, T., Vietnam The Australian Dilemma, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia,
1993, p.94 ie with Tu Chanh shown as the XO (ie 2ic) and Ba Lien as the Political Officer of the
Battalion. Subsequently, in a November 1966 1 ATF operational document, Sau Chanh is also shown as
the CO, Tu Chanh as the XO, Ba Lien as the PO, and Nam Ninh as the Asst PO - in the
6RAR, Op Plan 1-11-66 (Operation Ingham), Ni t, 14 November 1966 (AWM95, 7/6/8).
12
Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, pp.123-124.
13
V Vn Long an assistant section commander in the 445 Battalions 2nd Company, rallied in February
1967 and described Su Chnh as a Northerner CDEC Log 02-031-67.
14
1 ATF Intelligence Review No.6, Ni t, 10 March 1967. In March 1967 and later, 1 ATF did not
appear to have known Su Chnhs full name - ie Bi Quang Chnh.
15
See the Long t District History (1986), footnotes 30 and 31 - Annex L in Chamberlain, E.P., D445
, op.cit., 2011.

A-4

Letter of Appreciation to the Mortar Squad of D445s 2nd Company

Signed by Bi Quang Chnh 31 January 1966 (CDEC Log 12-2404-66)
On 2 February 1968 - during the Tt 1968 Offensive, Bi Quang Chnh was noted
as the Commander of the Chu c District Unit and leading an attack on Long L SubSector installations16 and the shelling of the Australian 1 ATF base at Ni t with 82mm
mortars.17 In May 1968, Bi Quang Chnh (Hai [sic] Chnh) was noted in a medical
history as the deputy commander of the Province Unit visiting the Chu c District
Unit.18 Subsequently however, in late June 1968, as the Commander of the Chu c
16

At 5am on 2 February 1968, Comrade Bi Quang Chnh ((the former 445 Battalion Commander)) - the
commander of the Chu c District Unit, led the Districts armed forces to attack the Long L Sub-Sector
Headquarters and the enemys post at the Long Xuyn T-Junction. - The Ha Long Village Party Chapter
History (1930-2005) ie - Lch s ng b x Ha Long (1930-2005), April 2009. However,Bi Quang
Chnh is not mentioned in a Chu c District report by Secretary Nm Tin on the Districts offensive
activities during Tt 1968 see CDEC Item No.2131111007, CDEC Log 02-1882-68. The Australian
official history notes that in March 1967: C25 Company, with a strength of approximately 100 personnel
and now led by the commander of D445 Battalion ie presumably a reference to Bi Quang Chnh
McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.141. Nguyn Vn Kim (Nm Kim) had
commanded the Chu c District Unit until December 1967-January 1968 see the following biography.
17
H Nhn, B Ra-Long Khnh v k c khng th qun, Communist Party of Vietnam - B Ra-Vng
Tu Agency, Vng Tu, 29 January 2008. The Chu c District History (2004) relates that Bi Quang
Chnh the commander of the District Unit, led a group that mortared the 1 ATF base at Ni t
having been reinforced with two 82mm mortars from D445 Battalion under the direct command of its 4 th
Company 2ic, Nguyn Tm. - Nguyn Cng Danh , Chu c District, op.cit., 2004, p.166. Those
actions involving Bi Quang Chnh are also described in a local Party history. - Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg),
Lch s ng (The History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter VII. 1 ATF
documents record that 40 82mm mortar rounds were fired into the 1 ATF base at Ni t on 1 February
1968, with a further shelling on 2 February 1968 - 1 ATF, INTSUMs No.32-68, 33-68, Ni t, 1 and 2
February 1968. See also footnote 355 in the main text.
18
L Thanh Dng & Phm Quang Khi (et al), Lch S Ngnh Y T B Ra-Long Khnh (1945-2006) The History of the B Ra-Long Khnh Medical Services (1945-2006), Vng Tu, 2008.

A-5

District Unit, Bi Quang Chnh signed a formal order.19 In the period from mid-1968 to
late 1969, Bi Quang Chnh may have been injured, wounded or become ill and moved
from Chu c District to a staff appointment and he was reportedly killed in the My
To Mountains on 7 October 1969.20
Nguyn Vn Kim (Nm Kim) Commanding Officer D445: December
1967/January 1968 - May 1969.
According to his Party personal history declaration21, Kims birth name was
Nguyn Vn Ph and he used the cover-name Nguyn B Thanh, the nickname B
Thanh, and also the common name/frequently-used name of Nguyn Vn Kim. In the
1991 and 2004 D445 Battalion Histories and Chu c District documents, he is also
often referred to by his nickname Nm Kim. According to his Party declaration,
Kim was born in Thng Nht village, Vng Tu in 193022. In 1945, Kim joined the
communist Vanguard Youth Group. He enlisted in the communist forces on 5 February
1949 in Vng Tu, and was admitted to the Communist Party of Vietnam23 on 6 January
1950 initially as a probationary member, and as a full member on 24 April 1950. In
August 1951, he was a squad leader in the 397th c Lp ((Independent)) Company in
Vng Tu.24 In the period 1954-1960, Kim declared that he was an officer in the 656th
19

Order 22/QB dated 27 June 1968 - counter-signed by Nguyn Trung Hiu as the Assistant Political
Officer - CDEC Log 01-1333-69.
20
Bi Quang Chnh is an unusual Vietnamese name. A Captain Bi Quang Chnh - born 1925, Ngc
L, Military Region (Qun Khu) Hu Ngan (ie in North Vietnam) - noted as the Tr L Chnh Tr Tnh
i (Staff Assistant for Political Affairs, Province Unit), was reportedly killed on 7 October 1969 in the
My To Mountains - Giy bo t ca Qun khu Hu Ngn do trung t Nguyn Huy Riu k ngy
1/6/1976 - Khi hi sinh l tr l chnh tr tnh i; Cp bc: i y a relative in H Ch Minh City 2008.
21
Kims personal data related above is based principally on the detail in his personal history declaration
statement (L Lch Chi B) dated 5 August 1966 for his Party Chapter the document was captured with
other documents in Phc Tuy Province on 26 August 1966 by the US 173rd Airborne Brigade CDEC
Log 09-1860-66. In a meeting with Dr I. McNeill in mid-1988, Kim provided some information on his
personal background ie: born in Vng Tu in 1930, regrouped to the North in September 1954 with the 300strong 97th [sic] Regiment to Thnh Hoa Province, was commissioned, returned to the South via the H Ch
Minh Trail (October 1960-April 1961), was chief of the operations staff of Bin Ha-B Ra-Long Khnh
Province, and promoted to captain to command D445 Battalion McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993,
pp.221-222.
22
Kim apparently understated his age. In 2011, his wife advised that he had been born in 1927 email to
author from M. OBrien (Major General, Rtd), Vng Tu, 31 March 2011.
23
Kim was a member of the Vietnam Communist Party - ie re-titled the Vietnam Workers' Party (ng
Lao ng Vit Nam) from early 1950. Subsequently, from 1962, party members in the South were usually
members of the Peoples Revolutionary Party (ng Nhn dn Cch mng) the southern arm of the
Vietnam Workers Party.
24
The 307th Regiment was formed in B Ra in 1948. In December 1949, it joined with the 309 th Regiment
to create the 397th Regiment. At the end of 1950, the 397th Regiment was reportedly incorporated into the
B Ra Province Peoples Armed Force - Lu Dng, Nhng chng ng pht trin ca lc lng v
trang B Ra-Vng Tu, C Quan ca ng B ng Cng Sn Vit Nam Tnh B Ra-Vng Tu, Vng
Tu, 17 December 2009.

A-6

Regiment of F.338 ((in North Vietnam)).25 Kim was promoted to senior lieutenant on
10 October 1960 (in the 1st Battalion of 656th Regiment) and to company commander in
August 1961 in the same unit. In February 1963, having returned to the South, he was
posted to Phc Long Province as commander of the 10th Company. In 1964 he was on
the Province Staff and then moved to the Region staff in February 1965.26 Kim
was posted to B Ra Province in November 1965 as the Chief of the Training and
Operations Section of the B Ra Province Military Command with Company
Commander rank.27 In early March 1966, he was transferred to Chu c District as the
Commander of the Chu c District Military Forces.28 According to the Ha Long

25

While Kims personal history statement does not specifically declare that he regrouped to the North, the
338th North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Division was essentially a regroupee (ngi lnh tp kt)
formation for former Vit Minh troops who had moved (ie regrouped) from the South to the North in
1954-1955. The 656th Regiment was a component of the 338th Division.
26
According to a political/labour history, when B Bin Province was created by COSVN in early 1963, the
Province Secretary was noted as Nguyn Vn Kim (a different tonal spelling ie: Kim low broken
tone, rather than Kim low falling tone) - Lin on Lao ng , Lch s , op.cit., 2011, p.116,
footnote 147 and this is also related in the Ha Long Village Party Chapter History 1930-2005 (2009) ;
and in a medical history - L Thanh Dng (et al), Lch S Ngnh Y T , op.cit., 2008, footnote 34. The
Chu c District History (2004) notes: In March 1963, Comrade Nguyn Vn Kim [sic] (aka
Nguyn Sn H) was the secretary of the Province Committee. Also, a Nguyen Van Kiem signed a Bin
Ha Province Party Committee circular on 20 December 1963 CDEC Log 02-1221-66. The foregoing
indicates that Kims service on the Province/Region staff preceded that of Kim. Kims service on the
Region staff ie T.1 (Headquarters Military Region 1), is confirmed by his Party Introduction
Certificate (see Annex G, p.7) - a captured document, forwarded between T.1 and U2 (B Ra Province
Unit) in October 1965 that shows his name as Nguyn B Thanh and his real name as Nguyn Vn
Kim a probationary Party member from 6 January 1950 etc CDEC Log 12-2423-66. Dr I. McNeill
notes that a Nguyen Van Kiem was the U1 Committee Secretary (ie for Bin Ha Province) in 1965 McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.141 citing Phan Ngc Danh & Trn Quang Toi, ng Nai 30
Nm Chin Tranh Gii Phng (1945-1975), Nh Xut Bn ng Nai, ng Nai, 1986, Chapter 6, pp.6-7.
According to the ng Nai History (1986): In September 1965, COSVN decided to combine its
organisations in Bin Ha City and in Vnh Cu and Trng Bom Districts into a province-level unit with the
title of U1 and directly subordinate to COSVN and with Comrade Nguyn Vn Kim [sic] (Nm Kim), a
member of the Regional Committee, as its secretary. The U1 base was at Gang Ti (i An - Vnh Cu).
- Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.126.
27
As noted in footnote 26 above, Nguyn Vn Kims transfer from Military Region 1 to the B Ra
Provincial Unit is evidenced by his Peoples Revolutionary Party proforma Letter of Introduction for
Party Activity (Giy Gii Thiu Sinh Hot ng) dated 7 October 1965 - CDEC Log 12-2423-66.
28
B Ra Province Military Command, Transfer Order 103/Q, 7 March 1966 CDEC Log 09-1853-66.
Kim appears to have replaced Nguyn Vn Minh as the commander of the District Unit with Minh
remaining as a deputy. Kim was also noted in the Ha Long Village Party Chapter History 1930-2005
(2009): From 5 to 8 March 1966, in Bng Lng (ng Ngh Mountain), the leadership of Chu c
District comprising ng Vn Tin (Nm Tin) as the District Committee Secretary, Trn Vn Lng
(see footnote 41) as the Political Officer and Nguyn Vn Kim as Commander of the District Unit,
promulgated COSVN Directive No.4 on the new situation and missions (region changes) to more than 50
cadre from the District and the villages.

A-7

Village Party Chapter History29, elements of the Chu c District Unit under the
command of Nguyn Vn Kim, fought the US 173rd Airborne Brigade in the Jackfruit
Gardens at Sng Cu from 18 May 1966.
In the official Australian histories of the Vietnam conflict and several other
subsequent materials, Nguyn Vn Kim is recorded as the Commander of 445 Battalion
at the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966 and is described as the most important
witness of that Battle among the former enemy.30 However, Dr I. McNeill the
Official Historian, also noted that during interviews in June 1988: He ((Kim)) was
recognised as the commanding officer of D445 Battalion at the time of the battle in
August 1966, but witnesses were reticent to confirm whether he actually led the troops in
battle.31 In the period April to late October 1966, several captured documents show
29

In the Ha Long Village Party Chapter History (2009), Kim is mentioned several times in the period
March-May 1966 as the Commander of the Chu c District Unit see Annex N in Chamberlain, E.P.,
D445 , op.cit., 2011.
30
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit, 1993, p.365 Kim as the most important witness; p.283 the
commander of D445 ie during 1ATF Operation Hobart II on 29 July 1966. See also p.221, p.532 (endnote
46): The first commander ((of D445)) was Captain Nguyen Van Kiem; p.559 (endnote 118): Lieutenant
Colonel Nguyen Van Kiem (former commander D445 Battalion, 1966); and p.567 (endnote 61):
Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Van Kiem (former commander D445 Battalion, 1966). However, also note
Dr Ian McNeills acknowledgement that: Australian intelligence notes indicate that the first commander of
D445 was Sau Chanh, and p.562 (endnote 29); McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003,
p.48 - p.501 (endnote 56) also refers to: Contemporary Australian intelligence sources identifying Sau
Chanh as the D445 commander. However in both these references based on Dr I. McNeills June 1988
interviews of Kim, Kims evidence is accepted that he (Kim ) was the the commanding officer from
the inception of the battalion in 1965 to 1969. Consequently, many other subsequent books, reports and
electronic media items have also incorrectly cited Nguyn Vn Kim as the D445 commander at the Battle
of Long Tn eg: the Wikipedia entry; several Australian War Memorial records, website pages and a
number of photographs (eg AWM P01509.001, P01293.008 and P01293.010); Stewart, E., Return to
Vietnam, Wartime, Issue 33, 2006, p.57: the photograph of Dr I. McNeill with the former commander of
the Viet Cong battalion that had opposed the Australians on that day.; the Australian Government Hansard
Report Senate, 11 September 1996, p.3285; Cleggett, R. Viet Cong Battalion D445 1945-1975,
Duty First, Spring 2004, p.21. - and several others. As noted earlier in footnote 9, the commander of 445
Battalion at the Battle of Long Tn is not specifically named in the 1991 D445 History. That omission was
probably to support the subterfuge and artifice that Kim had been the commander in August 1966 and
allow him to continue as an authoritative spokesman on the Battle particularly to foreign visitors. The
2004 D445 History however, cited V Quc Chnh as the D445 commander at the Battle although this is
assessed as unlikely. As noted earlier, post-War, Kim also appeared in several television documentaries on
the Battle of Long Tn as the D445 Commander in which he described the battle in detail (although he was
not present) see Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan The True Story, op.cit., 1993. As early
2015, Nguyn Vn Kim continued to be identified on the Australian War Memorial website and several
others, as the commander of the Viet Cong D445 Battalion during the Battle of Long Tan see the
preceding footnote 9 also. Following letters from the author (Chamberlain) to the Department of Veterans
Affairs (DVA) on 10 August 2011 and 27 August 2012, their website was corrected ie Kim was removed
as the D445 commander at the Battle of Long Tn (as advised by DVA emails: 31 August, 7 September
2012).
31
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.562 - endnote 29. As noted earlier at footnote 9, Dr I.
McNeills interviews with Nguyn Vn Kim were examined recently in a 2011 article - Ekins, A.,
Unravelling the riddles of Long Tan, op.cit., July 2011, pp.42-47. In particular, Ashley Ekins noted that

A-8

Nguyn Vn Kim as the Commander of the Chu c District Unit.32 Documents

captured by 1 ATF included a Directive signed by Nguyn Vn Kim on 19 August 1966
as the Chu c District Unit Commander - ie the day after the Long Tn battle (see
below),33 and POWs who had served in the Chu c District Unit declared that Kim
was the Unit Commander in February 1967.34

A captured D445 document also indicates that Kim does not match the status
profile of the D445 commander in 1966.35 In Vietnamese accounts of the Battle of Long
Tn, Kim is not mentioned (nor are any of his pseudonyms or cover-names evident)36
and there is no mention of any participation in the Battle by the Chu c District Unit.
However, Kim may have heard the sounds of the battle ie the artillery fire from Ni
t. Also - following the battle, the Chu c District Unit may have been involved in
the clearance of the battlefield and the evacuation of casualties but to date there are no
in Dr Ian McNeills record-of-interview, Dr McNeill stated: There were some ambiguities about the
precise nature of Kiems command of D445 Battalion, though, and his actual role in the battle at Long
Tan. p.43.
32
Among the latest: a promotion order ie Quyt nh 17/Q signed on 29 October 1966 by Nguyn Vn
Kim as Commander of the District Unit CDEC Log 12-2403-66; and a transfer order (HQ District
Unit to C41) dated 31 October 1966 - CDEC Log 01-1612-67.
33
Ch Th (Instruction) #25/CT, 19 August 1966 (three pages typed, see the summary from CDEC
Bulletin No.1348 above) to local village military units directing a reporting format, and instructing that
reports be submitted to the District Unit and not the District Party Committee CDEC Log 10-2284-66.
34
Nm Km [sic] was noted by the POW V Vn Quang (Long Tn village guerrilla) as Commander of
the Chu Thnh District Unit (Cover Designator 10P-353) in February 1967 CDEC Item
No.F03460079163. Phm Vn Mo 2ic Ha Long Guerrilla Unit - captured on 9 February 1967, stated
Nm Kim aged 37 was the Chu c District Unit Chief see VCAT Item No.F034600770673 .
For Kims continued service in Chu c District in late 1967, see footnote 49.
35
The D445 Biannual Report on Cadre Status prepared in mid-1966 - a captured document (see footnote
7), noted the 445 Battalion Commander was aged over 41 years and had joined the Party in the period
1945-1947. This does not match Kims personal details ie - Kim was aged 36 in 1966 and had joined
the Party in 1950. As noted however, that profile matches Bi Quang Chnh.
36
Kim is not mentioned in the 1991 D445 History before early 1968; nor in the description of the Battle of
Long Tn in the 5th Division History (2005) see the translated extracts at Annex K. In the 2004 D445
History, Kim is first mentioned in about mid-late 1967.

A-9

records of such.37 Nguyn Vn Kim is not formally noted as associated with D445
Battalion until he was appointed as the D445 Commander in December 1967 or very
early 1968.38 Apart from Dr I. McNeill, several Australian visitors to Vietnam in the postWar period met with Kim who was presented to them as the D445 Commander at Long
Tan.39 Kim also appeared in several film and television documentaries as the D445
commander at the Long Tn battle, in which he described in detail the preparations for,
and the fighting at, Long Tn.40
In June 1967, Kim was noted in a Chu c District biannual political report as
the deputy secretary of the District Operations and Coordination Committee.41 Kim
signed documents Letters of Appreciation, for the Chu c District Command
Committee in November and December 1967.42 On 22 December 1967, he signed a
promotion document for a member of 445 Battalion implying he had moved to
command the Battalion.43 However, on 28 January 1968, Kim as the Commander of
the Chu c District Unit, signed a Letter of Appreciation.44 Nguyn Vn Kim (Nm
Kim) is first noted in the text of the 2004 D445 History as assuming command of the
Battalion in the second half of 1967 while that Historys annexed List I of senior
appointments states 1968. The earlier 1991 D445 History noted Kim as the
37

The site of the Battle of Long Tn is in the far north of VC Long t District. However, the Battle is not
mentioned at all in the official history of Long t District - ie Phan Ngc Danh , Lch S , op.cit.,
1986 Annex L in Chamberlain, E.P. D445 , op.cit., 2011. In March 1989, Terry Burstall interviewed
Trn Chng - the then Deputy Chairman of Chu Thnh District (ie that encompassed Chu c District
in 1966), who related manning an aid station 2 kilometres from the Long Tan battle area but as a
medic in the D445 battalion. - Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit.,1990, p.206.
38
Nguyn Thanh Tng (ed), The Heroic D445 Battalion, op.cit.,1991, p.75.
39
As noted at footnote 30, Kim is incorrectly cited in the official Australian histories of the Vietnam War
as the D445 Commander at the Battle of Long Tn. In an interview in 1998, Kim reportedly also told Mr
B. Day a visiting Australian Vietnam War veteran, that he (Kim) was the company commander in
D445 in mid-May 1966 - see Cleggett, R. Viet Cong Battalion D445 1945-1975, Duty First, Spring
2004, p.21. On an official visit to Vietnam in early September 2001, the Chief of the Australian Army
Lieutenant General P.J. Cosgrove, met Colonel Nguyen Van Kiem, 74, who commanded Battalion D445
and led his men into battle at Long Tan - Baker, M. (Asia Editor), Cosgrove goes back to Vietnam to find
foes are now his friends, The Age, Melbourne, 10 September 2001 see also Baker, M., Stilling the
ghosts of battle, Sydney Morning Herald, 17 August 1996. p.28.
40
Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan The True Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993. Kim related the
prelude to the Battle and its later conduct in three passages, and he is sub-titled as the D445 Battalion
Commander in 1966.
41
Trn Vn Lng (Ba Lng) - the political officer of Chu c District, was the secretary of the
Committee. The report noted declining morale and related that Party members numbered 71 and Group
members 91 - VCAT Item No.2130907094. Trn Vn Lng was killed in an ambush by Australian troops
in April 1970 at Ha Long The Ha Long Village Party Chapter History, op.cit, 2009.
42
On 30 November and 30 December 1967 CDEC Log 01-1949-69.
43
For: L Vn De of the 3rd Company, 445 Battalion - Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM No.164/71, Ni t, 13
June 1971. see the following footnote.
44
CDEC Log 01-1333-69. This document related to a counter-ambush on 14 January 1968, suggests that
while Kim may have been the 445 Battalion Commander in late December 1967 he was still responsible
for some command and staff work with the Chu c District Unit in January 1968. Trn Vn Lng (see
footnote 41) counter-signed the document.

A-10

Commander of 445 Battalion in very early 196845, and he is related as having led the
Battalions attacks at B Ra during the Tt Mu Thn Offensive in early February.46 As
noted above however, Kim appears to have probably only been in command of 445
Battalion for a short time before the Tt attack on B Ra Town began in the early
morning hours of 1 February 1968.
In June 1969, Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu) is mentioned as 445 Battalions
commander47 having replaced Kim; and the 1991 D445 History notes Su Thu as the
Battalion commander in September 1969. The 2004 D445 History states that before
Spring 1969: Comrade Nguyn Vn Kim (Nm Kim) was appointed to command
the Chu c District Unit. On 13 May 1969, Kim signed a Directive on internal
security as the Assistant Chief of Staff of the B Ra-Long Khnh Province Unit.48 The
Chu c History (2004) relates that: In September 1969, Comrade Nguyn Vn Kim
the Chief of Staff of the Province Unit was appointed as the deputy secretary of the
District Committee and concurrently commander of the Chu c District Unit.49 In
January and February 1970, Kim was noted as leading the Chu c District Unit50 and in May 1970, Kim signed three documents as the Commander of the Unit.51 Earlier
in mid-April 1970 following the death of Trn Vn Lng (secretary of the District
Committee) in an Australian ambush, Nguyn Vn Kim the deputy secretary of the
District Committee - and concurrently the commander of the District Unit, was appointed
secretary of the District Committee.52 In mid-August 1970, a rallier reported that
Nguyn Vn Kim was ill coughing up blood, and was scheduled to leave Chu c
District for convalescence.53 In September 1970, Kim was mentioned in a 1 ATF
psychological operations pamphlet as the commander of the Chu c District Unit ie:
45

Nguyn Thanh Tng (ed), The Heroic D445 Battalion, op.cit.,1991, p.75 ie translated as: Chamberlain ,
E.P., D445 , op.cit., 2011. Nm Kim was recorded as his nickname.
46
Ba Lin ( Vn Lin/ Vn Chng) the 445 Battalion political officer, is noted as leading the 445
Battalion elements during the Tt 1968 attacks on Long in in early February 1968 see footnote 77.
47
CDEC Log 06-2183-70.
48
CDEC Log 07-1283-69 Bulletin 22,959. According to a 1 ATF report, Kim had become 2ic of the Ba
Long Provincial Unit in early 1971 Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.165/71, Ni t, 14 June 1971.
49
Nguyn Cng Danh & L Minh Ngha et al, Lch s u Tranh Cch Mng Ca ng B V Nhn Dn
Huyn Chu c (1930-2000) - The History of the Revolutionary Struggle of the Party Chapter and the
People of Chu c District (1930-2000), Nh Xut Bn Chnh Tr Quc Gi, H Ni, 2004, p.175. This
implies that Kim may have relinquished command of 445 Battalion in about June 1969 and served for
several months to September 1969 on the staff of the Province Unit before returning to his pre-D445
appointment at Chu c District. Kim signed a Directive on 8 December 1969 on the preparation of
desertion reports; a Circular on 15 December 1969; and a war news circular on combat achievements in
the period 10-17 December 1969 CDEC Log 01-1928-70, VCAT Item No.2131501010. See also Kims
letter of 12 January 1970 as Appendix 1 to Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM No.15/70, Ni t, 15 January
1970.
50
CDEC Log 04-1614-71 (January 1970); CDEC Log 05-3167-70 (February 1970).
51
VCAT Item No.2171406044 and CDEC Log 04-1613-71. As noted above at footnote 41, Trn Vn
Lng the Chu c District Party Secretary, was killed in mid-April 1970.
52
Translators Note: Nguyn Cng Danh & L Minh Ngha et al, The History of the Revolutionary Struggle
of the Party Chapter and the People of Chu c District (1930-2000), op.cit., 2004, p.178.
53
Appendix 1 to Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.241/70, Ni t, 29 August 1970.

A-11

Will the replacement for Nam Kiem arrive soon ? It is necessary for Nam Kiem to be
treated for tuberculosis in hospital .54 In November 1970, Kim was cited in an
Australian Army training publication as an example of thinned VC ranks requiring
personnel to fill two appointments.55 In January 1971, Nguyn Vn Kim was reportedly
replaced as Commander of the Chu c District Unit by Trn Vn B (T B aka B
Gi a former 2ic of 445 Battalion).56 On 7 January 1971, Kims wife L Th ip, a
member of the Chu c District Committee, was wounded in an ambush by 7RAR on
the south-western edge of t Town and captured.57 According to the Chu c
History (2004), In January 1971, the Province authorities withdrew Comrade Nguyn
Vn Kim and appointed Comrade L Minh Nguyn (Su Nguyn) as the secretary of the
District Committee.58
In 1988, Nguyn Vn Kim was noted as the hiu nh (ie checker) on a draft
history of Chu Thnh District ie that preceded the 2004 Chu c District History.59
Dr I. McNeill the official Australian military historian, interviewed Nguyn Vn Kim
in Vng Tu in June 1988.60 Subsequently, in 1994, Kim was interviewed in Vng Tu
54

ATF-036-70, Newsletter for Soldiers of the Chu c District Unit, 1 ATF, Ni t, 20 September 1970
- Purpose: to demoralize by our intimate knowledge of personalities - Australian War Memorial, ID
Number RC02853, Canberra.
55
Kim, aged 40, was cited as the present Secretary of the Chu c District Party Committee,
Secretary of the District Current Affairs Committee, and Chief of the Military Affairs Committee - see
Director of Military Training, Training Information Letter 14/70 Background Paper to the Viet Cong
Military Region 7 (Notice 4), Canberra, November 1970, pp.4-31.
56
For Nguyn Vn Kims return to the Province Headquarters in January 1971 see also footnote 58. 1
ATF, INTSUM No.13/71, Ni t, 13 January 1971 reports that Trn Vn B (T B) was killed by
Australian forces on 4 February 1971 - Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM No.35/71, Ni t, 4 February 1971.
57
L Th ip (aka Hng Minh - usually known as L Th Minh Loan, L Minh Loan or Th Hai Loan) was
initially identified as a member of the Chu c District Womens Association, but was the Party Chapter
Secretary of Ha Long village Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.10/71, Ni t, 10 January 1971. She
was noted by 1 ATF as not as yet prepared to divulge valuable tactical information 1 ATF SUPINTREP
2/71, Ni t, 11 January 1971; and as seriously ill, remaining exceptionally stubborn and stalling
during her interrogation - Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.13/71, Ni t, 13 January 1971. L Th
ip/L Minh Loan was classified as a POW and moved from the US 24th Evacuation Hospital to the III
CTZ Interrogation Centre 1 ATF INTSUM No.20/71, Ni t, 20 January 1971. See also OBrien, M.,
Conscripts and Regulars, op.cit., 1995, p.236. The Ha Long Village Party Chapter History (2009)
recorded: our female comrade L Minh Loan (Hai Loan a member of the District Committee) was
seriously wounded and captured.
58
Nguyn Cng Danh & L Minh Ngha et al, Lch s - The History of the Revolutionary Struggle of
the Party Chapter and the People of Chu c District (1930-2000), op.cit., 2005, p.184. Similarly, the Tn
Thnh District History (2014 ?) relates that Nguyn Vn Kim returned to the Province Headquarters in
January 1971 and was replaced as the Secretary of the Chu c District Committee by L Minh Nguyn
and by Comrade B as the commander of the Chu c District Unit.
59
Trn Vn Cng (et al/tg) Nguyn Vn Kim (hiu nh: checker), Chu Thnh u Tranh v Xy
Dng (1945-1985) S Tho (Chu Thnh District The Struggle and Development 1945-1985 - Draft),
Nh Xut Bn ng Nai/Nh In Thanh Nin, 1988.
60
Dr I. McNeill interviewed Nguyn Vn Kim on 17, 18 and 26 June 1988 (AWM file S450/19).
Information provided by Kim is included in McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit. 1993 particularly in
relation to the Battle of Long Tn (in which as noted above, Kim did not directly participate).

A-12

by Colonel M. P. J. OBrien who also met Kims wife.61 As related in footnotes 30 and
39, in the post-War period, Kim purportedly as the 445 Battalion Commander at the
Battle of Long Tn, met with several senior Australian visitors to Vietnam, including the
Australian Deputy Prime Minister Hon T. Fischer (a Vietnam War veteran) in August
199662 and the Chief of the Army Lieutenant General P.J. Cosgrove (also a Vietnam
War veteran) in 2001.63 He was interviewed by ABC Radio on the 40th anniversary of
Battle of Long Tn as the D445 commander at the Battle.64 Nguyn Vn Kim died in
Vng Tu in August 2009 and is buried near B Ra.65

Nguyn Vn Kim 2006

Vn Lin (Ba Lin) Political Officer D445: December 1965 - January 1968.
Vn Lin (Ba Lin) was reportedly born in 1924 in Ninh Ha (Hi Hng
Province, North Vietnam) and his real name was reportedly / Vn Chng
(sometimes incorrectly as ng [sic] Vn Chng). He joined the revolutionary forces
in 1944 and in 1955 came south to join the volunteer forces in B Ra. In 1957, he
joined one of the predecessor companies to 445 Battalion.66 According to the 1991 and
2004 D445 Histories, in December 1956 Ba Lin was among a small group of
communist cadre who had escaped from the Tn Hip Prison (Bin Ha) and joined the
Bnh Xuyn unit (see the following footnote 126) - then located in the Chu Pha area in
61

OBrien, M., Conscripts and Regulars , op.cit., 1995, p.234. As noted, M.P.J. OBrien (late Major
General, Rtd) also met with Kims wife in Vng Tu on 31 March 2011.
62
Australian Government Hansard Report Senate, 11 September 1996, p.3285.
63
Baker, M., Cosgrove goes back to Vietnam to find foes are now his friends, The Age, Melbourne, 10
September 2001.
64
ABC Radio National Long Tan 40 years on, August 2006 interviewed by Cathy Peters. Nguyn
Vn Kim described the Australian troops as more skillful than US troops, and related the story about
Australian troops deploying from helicopters and using the piggy-back/poncho ruse to deceive the Vit
Cng see Annex Q footnote 6.
65
Email to author from M. OBrien (Major General, Rtd), Vng Tu, 31 March 2011.
66
On 18 March 1989, Terry Burstall interviewed Ba Lin ( Vn Lin) in Bin Ha City who declared his
real name as ng Vn Chng (more probably Vn Chng, see also footnote 75 below), and
Burstall records Lins involvement in the Long Tn battle - Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990,
pp.113-118; Burstall, T., Vietnam The Australian Dilemma, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia,
1993, pp.91-95.

A-13

western Phc Tuy, in May 1957. Soon after, in mid-1958, he reportedly was a member
of the 40-strong C.40 units Party Chapter Committee.67 Vn Lin was involved in
actively proselytizing the rubber workers in the area, and participated in the attacks at
Bnh Ba beginning in early March 1960. He later participated in the major battles at at
Bnh Gi in the period December 1964/January 1965.68 On 22 March 1965, Vn
Chng the Chief of the Province Proselytising Section was awarded a Certificate of
Commendation by the Eastern Nam B Military Region Headquarters.69
On 21 September 1965 following a mid-September conference, a report on
morale problems within the elements of the B Ra Province Unit was signed by B [sic]
Lin Head of the Political Section of the B Ra Province Unit the signature was
identical to that of Vn Lin.70 Soon after following the battle at Lng Ct, he was
appointed as the Political officer of 445 Battalion, replacing L Thnh Ba. On 23
December 1965, 445 Battalion attacked the police complex in the town of Long in (B
Ra), and the 1991 D445 History noted that: Comrade Su Chnh and Comrade Ba Lin
were in direct command (Comrade Ba Lin had just replaced Comrade Ba Bi as the
political officer).71 For his efforts during an ambush on Route 44 in December 1965,
Comrade Vn Chng was awarded the Liberation Military Combat Exploits Medal
Class III. t District History (2006).

Letter of Appreciation to Nguyn Thanh Hng 2nd Company, D445 Battalion

Signed by Vn Lin on 25 January 1966 (CDEC Log 12-2404-66
67

1991 D445 History, pp.11-12. He is noted as one of the three Party Chapter members of C.40 in early
1958 along with L Minh Thnh and Nguyn Quc Thanh . At that time, he also wrote training material
ie: Chin u v ai, Kh khn khc phc see: Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s ng b tnh B
Ra-Vng Tu 1930 1975 (The History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000.
68
Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, pp.114-116.
69
CDEC Log 03-1342-66.
70
Report on the Provincial Political Conference: 15 September 1965 - CDEC Log 09-2601-66. For the
content of the Report, see the 1991 D445 History Part I, footnote 74 and Annex F The Party.
71
Throughout the text of the 1991 D445 History, Vn Lin is referred to as Ba Lin. In the 2004
D445 History, he is routinely referred to as Comrade Vn Chng (Ba Lin). However, in documents
and correspondence as the 445 Battalion political officer, he regularly signed as Vn Lin. Ba Bi (L
Thnh Ba) the departing 445 Battalion political officer, appears to have been posted to Long t District.

A-14

On 7-8 January 1966, Vn Lin played a prominent role in the 445 Battalion
attack on ARVN elements at Ging on Route 44.72 As the 445 Battalion political
officer, Vn Lin appears as the signatory on several captured 445 Battalion
documents particularly Letters of Appreciation associated with that engagement.
In mid-July 1966, Lin was reportedly the commander on the ground in the
engagement in the area of the L stream against the newly-arrived Australian B
Company, 6RAR.73 At about this time, he also submitted recommendations for medals for
three of 445 Battalions companies (the 1st , 2nd and 4th Companies) see Annex I; and in
early August 1966 about one week before the Battle of Long Tn, Vn Lin wrote a
19page report covering the Battalions activities for July 1966.74 However, according to
the text of the 2004 D445 History: In the middle of 1966, Comrade Vn Chng (Ba
Lin) - the Battalion Political Officer ((was)) posted to an appointment at the Province
Unit, Comrade Nguyn Minh Ninh became the Political Officer. However, such a
change of command in mid-1966 is considered highly unlikely to have occurred.
Although Vn Lin is not mentioned in the 1991 D445 Battalion Historys
account of the Long Tn battle, in a post-War interview, he stated that he was involved
in the Long Tan battle. He and the commander of D445, Sau Chanh, co-ordinated with
the 275 Regiment and the element of 5 Division Headquarters . He was not directly
involved in the ((Long Tn)) fighting75. In the 1991 D445 Battalion History, Ba Lin is
noted as the Battalions political officer at the time of the reported chemical attack on the
Battalion base at the end of 1966/early 1967 (ie at the T Lon Stream in the Sui Rao
base). Also, Vn Lin signed a Letter of Appreciation ie as the D445 political
officer, on 12 November 1966 see the photocopy at Annex D, p.6. Accordingly, it is
highly doubtful that Vn Chng ( Vn Lin/Ba Lin) moved to the Provincial
Unit in the middle of 1966 as claimed in the 2004 D445 History. Later, in very early
1968, Vn Lin was apparently replaced as the 445 Battalion political officer by Nm
Ninh (Nguyn Minh Ninh).76 Beforehand, at Tt 1968, Lin is noted as playing a leading
72

As related in the 1991 D445 History at pp.48-50, Vn Lin sent a condolence letter to the family of
Nguyn Quc Thng who was killed in the Route 44 engagement on 8 January 1966 - CDEC Log 011032-67.
73
Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, pp.116-117. For the Australian account of this engagement
at Sui (stream) Bng, see McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., pp.280-281.
74
Vn Lin, Knh gi, B ch huy Tnh i, 10 July 1966 see Annex I; and Vn Lin Political
Report for July 1966, 9 August 1966 see Annex H ie D445 Command and Political Reports; and also
Annex G for Party matters in 445 Battalion. In his Political Report for July 1966, Lin noted his regret at
the killing by 445 Battalion personnel of several seriously wounded ARVN soldiers contrary to VC
policy, as no porters were available for their evacuation. Lin recorded the incident as a deficiency.
75
Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, p.117 as noted, Terry Burstall interviewed Vn Lin in
Bin Ha on 18 March 1989.
76
In 2011, in the D440 History, Vn Chng was noted as one of two deputy commanders of the B
Ra-Long Khnh Province Unit in January/February 1968, see: ng y B Ch Huy Qun S Tnh B
Ra-Vng Tu, Lch S Tiu on 440 Anh Hng - B Ra-Long Khnh (1967-1979), Nh xut bn Chnh
tr Quc gia - S tht, H Ni, 2011, p.50. For Nguyn Minh Ninh (Nm Ninh), see his outline biography
later in this Annex.

A-15

role in the attack on Long in Town on 3 February 1968.77 In October 1968, Lin was
noted as the Assistant Political Officer of B Ra-Long Khnh Province.78 In 1969 Ba
Lin was promoted to deputy director of Political Affairs in Military Region 7.79
Reportedly, In 1970, he was promoted again and went back to B Ra and Long Khnh
provinces as deputy political commissar.80 In 1973, Ba Lien, then a lieutenant-colonel,
was again deputy director of political affairs in Military Region 7. On leaving the Army
in 1978, he became director of the Department of Disabled Veterans and Social Affairs in
ng Nai ((Province)) and retired from public office in late 1988. He now ((1989)) lives
with his family in Bien Hoa City.81
As noted, Vn Lin was interviewed by Mr Terry Burstall in Bin Ha on 18
March 1989.82
Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu) Commanding Officer D445: June 1969 1973.
Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu) was first noted in both the 1991 and 2004 D445
Histories as the cadre member commanding the 2nd Company at the Battalions founding
in May 1965. A few weeks later on 20 October 1965, the B Ra Provincial Unit formally
promoted Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu) from his status as platoon leader to executive
officer.83 In August 1966 at the Battle of Long Tn according to the 1991 D445
Battalion History: Comrade Su Thu (the Battalion second-in-command) directly
commanded the 1st and 3rd Companies of 445 Battalion. During the Battle, Nguyn c
Thu was seriously wounded in the head by a bullet from an AR15 rifle.84 In early
77

According to the ng Nai History (1986): For the attack on Long in, the Standing Committee
strengthened our forces which were led by Ba Lin (445 Battalion political officer) and the Secretary of the
District Committee. - Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.142. The leading role of
Ba Lin ( Vn Lin/ Vn Chng) in the attack on Long in together with L Thnh Ba, Nguyn
Vn Hot and Nguyn Hoan, was also related in a 2008 media article - H Nhn, B Ra-Long Khnh v
k c khng th qun, B Ra-Vng Tu Communist Party Agency, Vng Tu , 29 January 2008.
78
CDEC Log 07-1334-69.
79
On 16 September 1970, Vn Liu [sic] signed Directive No.11/CT as the Assistant Chief of Staff of
Military Region 7 VCAT Item No.2311505008. A captured document shows Vn Lin as the
Assistant Chief of the Political Staff of on 12B (VC Military Region 7) on 25 December 1970 VCAT
Report 6 028 0375 71.
80
Vn Lin is shown as the Assistant Political Chief in Military Region 7 in 1970, then as the
Assistant Field Grade Political Officer of the B Ra Sub-Region in 1971 see Communist Territorial
Organization in the "Eastern Nam Bo" and Saigon Cho Lon - Gia-Dinh from 1966 to Date, June 1973
VCAT Item No.2310510003. B Ra Sub-Region was established in November 1971 to include Long
Khnh, and reverted to B Ra-Long Khnh Province in November 1972 see Annex J Higher
Headquarters. However, Vn Lin was still the Assistant Chief of the Military Region 7 Political Staff
on 19 April 1971 when he signed a Directive on military proselytising against US and satellite troops CDEC Log 08-1008-71.
81
Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, p.118.
82
Ibid, pp.113-118.
83
See CDEC Log 09-1876-66. The date on the document (Command Committee T.1 No. 602/TB) was
incorrectly translated as 20 October 1966, instead of 1965.
84
A number of the Australian troops at Long Tn were equipped with the 5.56mm AR15 rifle and also the
improved M16 model. In the 1991 D445 History, Nguyn c Thu is noted as being wounded in the head

A-16

February 1968, he was noted as the Battalion second-in-command in the 2004 D445
History.
Nguyn c Thu was recorded in the 2004 D445 History as the Battalion
Commander before the Spring 1969/Tet 1969 attacks in February 1969. In late June 1969,
Nguyn c Thu was noted in a captured document as the Commander of 445
Battalion.85 Subsequently, in about September 1969, Nguyn c Thu was recorded in
the 1991 D445 History (p.70) as its commanding officer. In February 1970, a 445
Battalion rallier (a former platoon commander) described Su Thu as a popular
commander who was well respected for his leadership qualities and bravery, but
morale in 445 Battalion was low.86 In May 1970, 1 ATF noted that ralliers had reported
Su Thu had been killed in February 1970, and this was supported by collateral.87
However, in early 1970, Comrade Nguyn c Thu the 445 Battalion Commander,
was appointed as the Second Deputy Commander of the Vanguard Headquarters that
operated in the Province principally in Long t.88 During the period from mid-1971 to
early 1972, 445 Battalion was disbanded/dispersed (ie temporarily divided-up
according to the 1991 D445 History). In mid-1971, Nguyn c Thu - the commander
of 445 Battalion became the commander of the Chu c District Unit89, and 445
Battalions 2nd Company was integrated into Chu c Districts C41 Company.90
According to the Chu c District History (2004), at the beginning of 1972, Thu was
assigned to the critical area of Long t.91 Subsequently, according to the 1991 D445
History, at the beginning of 1972, 445 Battalion was reconstituted - with Comrade Su
Thu continuing as the Battalion commander. The 2004 D445 History dates that event as
at Long Tn with the round passing through one ear lobe and out the other. In the 2004 D445 History, his
wound is described more accurately as: an enemy round passed through his right ear and out through his
jawbone. In a post-War Australian television documentary, Thu displayed the extent of his head wounds
see the following footnotes 93, 94, 97, and 98. According to a passage in the 1991 D445 History, in 1970
Su Thu was deaf and in late 2014, he wore a hearing aid in his right ear (see footnote 98).
85
CDEC Log 06-2183-70.
86
Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.55/71, Ni t, 24 February 1971.
87
Graham, N.F. Major, D445 - Order of Battle, 1 ATF Battle Intelligence Section, Ni t, 29 May 1970.
However, earlier in May 1970, 1 ATF reported that the earlier assessment that: Sau Thu was killed in early
February 1970(ie by 5RAR troops on 6 February) was incorrect; and noted that Hai Khanh is the present
CO of D445 Battalion Annex B to1 ATF INTSUM No.121/70, Ni t, 1 May 1970.
88
Su Thus position was also described as: the 2nd deputy commander of the 1st Key Area Vanguard
Leadership Committee. - t District History (2006).
89
Nguyn Cng Danh & L Minh Ngha et al, Lch s - The History of the Revolutionary Struggle of
the Party Chapter and the People of Chu c District (1930-2000), op.cit., 2004, p.188.
90
According to the 1991 D445 Battalion History: the 3rd Company moved to Chu c and the principal
Battalion cadre strengthened the two Districts of Chu c and Long t - Chamberlain, E.P., D445
, op.cit., 2011, pp.80-81. The strengthening of Chu c District was also related by a POW (Nguyn
Vn ang) captured on 19 October 1971 Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.294/71, Ni t, 21 October
1971.
91
Also, according to the t District History (2006): The Sub-Region Committee had assigned
Comrade Nguyn c Thu the commander of the Chu c District Unit, as the commander of the Long
t District Unit. - Trn Quang Toi & ng Tn Hng (eds), The History of t District (19302005), op.cit., 2006, p.257.

A-17

May 1972. In early 1973, Nguyn c Thu was replaced as the commander of 445
Battalion by o Vn Tng (Tm Tng), and Nguyn c Thu was posted to the
position of Commander of Long t District.92
Post-War, Nguyn c Thu met with visiting dignitaries, historians and
journalists several times and also featured in television and film documentaries.93 In
August 1987, he met with the author Terry Burstall in Long Hi village, and remarked
that after being wounded in the Battle of Long Tn, he had been left for dead on the
battlefield and regained consciousness sometime during the night. Disoriented and in
agony, he slowly and painfully pulled himself along on his stomach out of the plantation
and toward Long Tan village. His people found him in the morning and quickly took him
away to the hospital complex in the May Tao [sic] mountains.94 In mid-late June 1988,
he accompanied Nguyn Vn Kim in meetings with Dr I. McNeill in which Kim was
presented (falsely) as the 445 Battalion Commander at the Battle of Long Tn in August
1966, and Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Nguyn c Thu was (accurately) described as
the commander the Battalions C2 Company at the Long Tn battle.95
In May 2004, Nguyn c Thu was elected as a member of the B Ra Vng
Tu Peoples Committee. In August 2006 together with Nguyn Minh Ninh, Nguyn
c Thu met with Australian 6RAR Long Tn veterans David Sabben and Bob Buick at
the Long Tn battlefield site and both Thu and Ninh were cited as former vice
commanders of 445 Battalion and Long Tn combatants.96 In 2006, Nguyn c Thu
met with Australian film-makers (Animax/Red Dune) in Vng Tu.97
On 28 January 2011, Nguyn c Thu of Ha Long village, was noted
participating in Tt Tn Mo (New Year) celebrations. Captain (i U) Nguyn c
Thu featured in a 20-minute television program a documentary film, on the history of
D445 produced by B Ra-Vng Tu Television in November 2014 see the following
92

1991 D445 History, p.114; 2004 D445 History, p.183.

Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan The True Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993. Nguyn c Thu
related opening fire on the Australian troops at Long Tn at a range of 50 metres and displayed his head
wound.
94
Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, p.70. Burstall related that Nguyn c Thu did not say
much and the interpreter said that he could not concentrate for too long. He had been shot in the head
during the battle in the Long Tan plantation and was lucky to be alive. The bullet had gone in just below
his cheekbone, travelled up across the roof of his mouth, coming out on the other side of his face just under
the temple.
95
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, pp.365-369. Nguyn Vn Kim and Nguyn c Thu feature in
a photograph at p.365. That photograph also appears in the Internet-accessible collection of the Australian
War Memorial as photograph AWM P1293/25/10. Thu also features in Australian War Memorial
photographs PO1293.008 to 012; and PO1509.001, 006 and 007.
96
Cameron, S. (Stewart), The Ghosts of Long Tan, The Australian, 8 August 2006.
97
The Animax Pty Ltd/Red Dune film-makers reportedly met with: Former Vice Commander D445
Battalion - Major General [sic] Nguyn Minh Ninh; Former Commander of Company 3, D445 Battalion Colonel Phan Thanh Bnh; Former Commander of Company 2, D445 Battalion - Colonel Nguyn c Thu;
Chairman of Vng Tu Province Veterans Association - Phan Chien. That DVD does not include an
interview with Nguyn c Thu, but - with the others, he is cited in the end-credits - Lay, D.
(Director/Producer), The Battle of Long Tan, Animax Films Pty Ltd, Red Dune Films, Sydney, 2006.
93

A-18

photograph.98 In that program, Nguyn c Thu displayed his award certificate for the
Glorious Soldier Medal (Hun chng Chin s V vang).

Major Nguyn c Thu, Vng Tu, 2014

Nguyn Minh Khanh (Hai Khanh) - Political Officer, D445 Battalion: September
1969 1973.
At the founding of 445 Battalion in May 1965, Nguyn Minh Khanh (Hai Khanh)
was the political officer of the 2nd Company commanded by Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu).
On 20 October 1965, Nguyn Minh Khanh was formally promoted from assistant
political officer to political officer.99 According to a rallier, Hai Khanh was transferred
from the 2nd Company to Battalion headquarters in about December 1966.100 In the
2004 D445 History, Khanh is noted as the Deputy Political Officer in mid-1967 and in
April and July 1968. According to the 2004 D445 History, in early 1969: Comrade
Nguyn Minh Khanh held the position of Political Officer replacing Comrade Nguyn
Minh Ninh who was appointed the Deputy Political Officer of the Province Unit. In mid1969 Khanh was seriously wounded. In September 1969, he was noted as having been
appointed 445 Battalion political officer and Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu) was the
Battalion commander. In late 1971/early 1972, Nguyn Minh Khanh - who had gone for
training and had not yet returned, was replaced by Nguyn Minh Ninh (Nm Ninh) as
the Battalions political officer. In early 1973, Khanh was again appointed Battalion
98

V Vn Cm - Director, Trng thnh t trong chin u (Coming-of-age during combat), B Ra Vng Tu Television, 4 November 2014. Commentators included Colonel H Sn i (author/historian)
and Associate Professor Dr H Minh Hng. Nguyn c Thu wears the rank of major in the program. See:
http://www.btv.org.vn/vi/c803i53728/Truong-thanh-tu-trong-chien-dau.html .
99
CDEC Log 09-1876-66. Note however, that the date on the document (Command Committee T.1 No.
602/TB) was incorrectly translated at CDEC as 20 October 1966, instead of 1965.
100
V Vn Long assistant section commander in the 2nd Company, rallied in February 1967 CDEC Log
02-031-67.

A-19

political officer with o Vn Tng as the 445 Battalion commander: Comrade

Nguyn Minh Khanh returned to become the Battalion Political Officer replacing
Comrade Nguyn Minh Ninh (who had become the Commander of the Four Party Joint
Group in Xun Lc). Subsequently, Comrade Nguyn Minh Khanh (Hai Khanh)
returned to the Province Unit, and Comrade T Thut became the Battalions Political
Officer.
Nguyn Minh Khanh (Hai Khanh) features prominently and positively, in the
both the 1991 and 2004 editions of the D445 Battalion History eg the attack on Long
in on 23 December 1965; the defence of the 445 Battalion base area on 18 May 1966;
surviving an ambush in about September 1969; the September-October 1969 campaign
against the bunkers in the t area; and the ambush by Australian forces on 1 January
1971 at C Thi. A portrait by Vn Lng of the 445 Battalion Hero Nguyn Minh
Khanh hangs in the B Ra - Vng Tu Museum.
Nguyn Minh Khanh born in Xuyn Mc in 1939, died in 2003. His epitaph
states that he fought and led in 120 engagements, and was awarded the title of Hero of
the Peoples Armed Forces.
Nguyn Minh Ninh (Nm Ninh) Assistant Political Officer/Political Officer, D445
Battalion.
As Nm Ninh, Nguyn Minh Ninh is first mentioned in the 1991 D445 Battalion
History in mid-December 1955 (p.9) when he was one of the first three revolutionary
soldiers to be incorporated into the Bnh Xuyn force (see the following footnote 126)
that preceded the establishment of the VC 40th Company.101 In a 2006 interview, Nguyn
Minh Ninh declared that he had first joined a guerrilla unit in 1957 and had engaged in
his first battle only 15 days after joining the unit.102 In April 1959, he became a member
of the Party in the C.40 unit.103 In early 1961, he was appointed the political officer of
the 445th Company104 - and concurrently operated as the secretary of its Party Chapter;
and in 1963 was involved in the battles at the Long Phc tunnels. In early 1964, Nguyn
Minh Ninh was appointed political officer of the then newly-raised 440th Company. At
the founding of 445 Battalion in May 1965, Nguyn Minh Ninh is not listed in the 1991
445 Battalion History in any senior appointment - ie not as a company commander nor as
a company political officer. Nor is he specifically noted in any Vietnamese descriptions
101

See: Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit. 2011, p.2.

Lay, D. (Director/Producer), The Battle of Long Tan, Animax Films Pty Ltd, Red Dune Films, DVD,
Sydney, 2006.
103
Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s ng b tnh B Ra-Vng Tu (1930 - 1975) (The History of the
Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000, endnote 25.
104
His appointment as the political officer of the 445th Company is related in the text of the 2004 D445
History. However, a ng Nai History states that: the 445th Company the concentrated Province Unit,
was established with three platoons (120 troops) and sufficient weapons and led by Nm Ninh ((Nguyn
Minh Ninh)) and T Chnh ((V Quc Chnh)). - Phan Ngc Danh , ng Nai 30 Nm ,
op.cit.,1986, p.101.
102

A-20

of the Battle of Long Tn, and it is unclear whether he was a participant. However, the
2004 D445 History relates that: In the middle of 1966, Comrade Vn Chng (Ba
Lin) - the Battalion Political Officer ((was)) posted to an appointment at the Province
Unit, Comrade Nguyn Minh Ninh became the Political Officer. However, such a
change of appointments in mid-1966 is considered highly unlikely as Vn
Chng/Lin (Ba Lin) appears to have remained the D445 Political Officer until at least
late 1966 ie as Ba Lin was noted in the 1991 D445 History as the political officer at
the time of a chemical attack on the Battalion in late 1966; and he signed a Letter of
Appreciation as the political officer on 12 November 1966 (see the photcopy at Annex D,
p.6). In late 1966, 1 ATF intelligence staff listed Nguyn Minh Ninh as the Assistant
Political Officer in 445 Battalion; and in March 1967, Nguyn Minh Ninh was also noted
as an Assistant Political Officer in a personal letter.105 The 2004 D445 History relates
that, in about mid-1967: Nguyn Minh Ninh was the Political Officer and concurrently
the Secretary of the Battalions Party Committee. In early 1968, the 1991 445 Battalion
History reports him as the 445 Battalion Political Officer and concurrently the secretary
of the Battalions Party Committee (under Nguyn Vn Kim) and Nguyn Minh Ninh
was also noted as the Battalions political officer in a captured document dated mid-May
1968.106 According to the 2004 D445 History, in early 1969: Comrade Nguyn Minh
Khanh held the position of Political Officer replacing Comrade Nguyn Minh Ninh who
was appointed the Deputy Political Officer of the Province Unit. In late March 1969, he
was noted as the Chief of the Political Section of the B Ra-Long Khnh Province
Unit.107 At the beginning of 1972 when 445 Battalion was reconstituted, Nguyn Minh
Ninh was the deputy political officer of the Province Unit and concurrently the political
officer of 445 Battalion (having replaced Nguyn Minh Khanh - ie Hai Khanh).
According to the 2004 D445 History, in early 1973, Comrade Nguyn Minh Khanh
returned to become the Battalion Political Officer replacing Comrade Nguyn Minh Ninh
(who had become the Commander of the Four Party Joint Group in Xun Lc).108 In
early 1975, he was the Deputy Commander of the Province Unit.
105

An Australian intelligence organisational chart of 445 Battalion - produced in September 1966,

reported Tu Chanh as the XO (ie 2ic) and Ba Lien as the Political Officer of the Battalion. cited in:
Burstall, T., Vietnam The Australian Dilemma, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1993, p.94. In
November 1966, a 1 ATF report shows Sau Chanh as the 445 Battalion CO, Tu Chanh as the XO,
Ba Lien as the PO, and Nam Ninh as the Asst PO - 6RAR, Op Plan 1-11-66 (Operation Ingham),
Ni t, 14 November 1966 (AWM95, 7/6/8). Nguyn Minh Ninh wrote a letter on 10 March 1967 to the
Command Committee of 55C seeking information on his brother-in-law, t Ln CDEC Log 05-2790-67.
106
CDEC Log 05-1498-70; CDEC Log 07-1312-69 Nguyn Minh Ninh signed a Letter of Appreciation
related to an attack on Cm M by 445 Battalion elements on 5 May 1968.
107
CDEC Log 06-1123-69. See also: Communist Territorial Organization in the "Eastern Nam Bo" and
Saigon Cho Lon - Gia-Dinh from 1966 to Date, June 1973 VCAT Item No.2310510003.
108
Articles 10 and 11 of a Protocol to the Paris Agreement detailed the functioning of a Four Party Joint
Military Commission (the US; the Democratic Republic of Vietnam ie North Vietnam; the Republic of
Vietnam ie South Vietnam; and the Provisional Revolutionary Government - established on 8 June 1969)
to monitor the provisions of the Agreement. There were seven Regional Joint Military Commissions with a
total of 26 local Joint Military Teams including one at Xun Lc. Each party was to provide four
qualified persons for each Joint Military Team with the senior officer of each Party to be at the rank of

A-21

On retirement from the active military, Nguyn Minh Ninh held the rank of major
general (thiu tng). In an interview with a former 1 ATF Civil Affairs officer - Barry
Smith, in 1990, Nguyn Minh Ninh declared that he had been the deputy commander of
D445 battalion at the battle of Long Tan.109 In the early 1990s, Nguyn Minh Ninh
served as the Chairman of the B Ra - Vng Tu Province Peoples Committee but was
not re-appointed following an investigation in 1993.
In 2004, Major General Nguyn Minh Ninh was recorded as assisting with the
compilation of the 2004 D455 History.110 In November 2005, Nguyn Minh Ninh as a
retired brigadier-general [sic], was interviewed by Paul Ham in Vng Tu.111 In August
2006, Nguyn Minh Ninh together with Nguyn c Thu, met with Australian Long
Tn veterans David Sabben and Bob Buick at the Long Tn battlefield site and both
Ninh and Thu were cited as former vice commanders of 445 Battalion and former
Long Tn combatants.112 On Long Tn casualties, in 2006 Major General Nguyn Minh
Ninh stated: I do not remember the casualties on our side, we never sat down and took
stock of the final figure.113 In 2006, the Animax Pty Ltd/Red Dune film-makers met
with: Former Vice Commander D445 Battalion - Major General Nguyn Minh Ninh,
and he appeared briefly in their 2006 video production and was cited in the end-credits.114
In June 2014, he was the honorary chairman of the Vietnam Martyrs Family
Support Association (Hi H Tr Gia nh Lit s Vit Nam) of B Ra - Vng Tu
Province. In November 2014, Major General Nguyn Minh Ninh as a former
commander of 440 Company participated in a 50th anniversary history workshop to
review the Battle of Bnh Gi. In 2015, Nguyn Minh Ninh was still active in veterans

major or lieutenant colonel level. Similarly, the Agreement provided for 26 local teams of an International
Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) comprising Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland
(Canada withdrew and was replaced by Iran on 31 July 1973). For detail including annotated maps, see:
Vietnam Agreement II, Commanders Digest, Department of Defense, Washington D.C., 22 February 1973
VCAT Item No.2861224006.
109
Smith, B., The Role and Impact of Civil Affairs in South Vietnam 1965-1971, The Australian Army and
the Vietnam War 1962-1972, Army History Unit, Canberra, 2002. VCAT Item No.24910101001.
110
L Chnh & Lu Thnh Lun (eds), Lch S Tiu an 445: on V Anh Hng Lc Lng V Trang
Nhn Dn (1965-2004) (The History of 445 Battalion: An Heroic Unit of the Peoples Armed Forces
1965-2004), Nh Xut bn Qun i Nhn dn (Armed Forces Publishing House), H Ni, 2004.
111
Ham, P., Vietnam , op.cit., 2007, p.223, pp.246-247 - Nguyn Minh Ninh implied that he was at the
Battle of Long Tn, and is cited incorrectly as a commander of D445 Battalion see also p.531 and
p.662.
112
Cameron, S. (Stewart), The Ghosts of Long Tan, The Australian, 8 August 2006. Nguyn Minh Ninh
reportedly stated that at the Battle of Long Tn: You won But we won also. Tactically and militarily
you won - but politically, we won. Ninh continues his assessment, admitting that the Australians in effect
defeated the Vietnamese on the battlefield: In this battle you acted out of our control - you (escaped) from
our trap.
113
Greenland, H., The Battle Through the Eyes of the Viet Cong The Other Side, The Bulletin, Vol.
124 Issue 6533, Sydney, 15 August 2006.
114
Lay, D. (Director/Producer), The Battle of Long Tan, Animax Films Pty Ltd, Red Dune Films, DVD,
Sydney, 2006.

A-22

affairs in Vng Tu, and spoke at the 445 Battalion 50th Anniversary commemoration
gathering on 19 May 2015.
V/V Quc Chanh (T Chanh) - Commanding Officer D445 Battalion: mid-1966 ?
V Quc Chnh (T Chnh) is first noted in the texts of the 1991 and the 2004
D445 Histories as a machinegunner in C.45 Companys attack in July 1960 at Bn Tu in
the Hc Dch area. Subsequently, he is related as the Company 2ic of C.445 Company in
early 1961, and at the battle of the Long Phc tunnels in April 1963 as the Company
Commander. At the founding of 445 Battalion in May 1965, he was appointed the Deputy
Commander of the Battalion.115 According to the text of 2004 D445 History, he was
appointed 445 Battalion Commander in the middle of 1966116 and is related as the
Battalion Commander at the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966.117 However, in the
earlier 1991 D445 History, T Chnh is noted as the Battalion 2ic during the post-Long
Tn attack on the n Sp Regional Forces post on 20 November 1966 at Phc Hi.118
In March 1967, 1 ATF reported that T Chnh (445 Battalion 2ic) had replaced Sau
Chanh (Su Chnh - ie Bi Quang Chnh) as 445 Battalion Commander, and that Su
Chnh had taken command of the Long t District Unit.119 In the text of the 2004
D445 History, V Quc Chnh (T Chnh) is recorded as being killed in the 1967 Wet
Season (April-May to November), and being replaced by Nguyn Vn Kim. An annex to
the 2004 D445 History, states that V Vn Khai (T Chnh) - Battalion Commander,
b.1935, Long Thnh District, ng Nai, was killed in September 1967.120 According to
115

V/V Quc Chnh (T Chnh) was appointed as deputy battalion commander of the B Ra
Province Concentrated Unit ie D445 vide: Military Region 1 (ie Military Region 7s predecessor)
Decision #015/QD dated 23 February 1965 see CDEC Bulletin #1063, Item 12. However, according to
the ng Nai History (1986): On 19 May 1965 in the Long Tn base (Long t), the B Ra Province
Committee established the Province Main Force [sic] Battalion with the title of 445 with Comrade T
Chnh as the Battalion Commander and Comrade L Thnh Ba as its political officer. Phan Ngc Danh
..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.123. It appears that both the 1991 and 2004 D445 Histories have
corrected the name of 445 Battalions inaugural commander to Bi Quang Chnh (Su Chnh).
However, a number of other publications have cited T Chnh as the initial 445 Battalion Commander
probably influenced by the ng Nai History (1986) eg: the ng Nai Monograph (2001) ie: a Ch ng
Nai, Nh Xut Bn Tng Hp ng Nai, Bin Ha, 2001.
116
He is included in the 2004 D445 Historys annexed list of senior cadre (see footnote 2 in this Annex) at
Serial 28 as the D445 Battalion Commander in 1966.
117
See pages 69 and 73 in the main text the appointment is not related in the earlier 1991 D445 History.
118
See p.67 in the 1991 D445 History (p.49 in the 2011 English translation). As noted at footnote 11,
according to the Australian author and veteran T. Burstall in: Vietnam The Australian Dilemma, 1993,
op.cit., p.94: in an Australian intelligence document (an organisational chart) dated September 1966 , Tu
Chanh is shown as the XO and Ba Lien as the Political Officer of D445 Battalion. Also,Sau Chanh
is reported as the CO, Tu Chanh as the XO, Ba Lien as the PO, and Nam Ninh as the Asst
PO in the 6RAR, Op Plan 1-11-66 (Operation Ingham), Ni t, 14 November 1966 (AWM95, 7/6/8).
119
1 ATF, Intelligence Review No.6, Ni t, 10 March 1967. In March 1967 and later, 1 ATF did not
appear to have known Su Chnhs full name - ie Bi Quang Chnh; nor T Chnhs ie V Quc Chnh.
120
While the 2004 D445 Historys annexed List II List of 445 Battalion Martyrs, p.301, Serial 175
reports the death of V Vn Khai (T Chnh) Battalion Commander, the preceding List I Cadre,

A-23

the Australian author, Terry Burstall based on interviews in Vietnam in 1987 and 1989:
The second ((D445)) battalion commander was Tu Chanh, who was ambushed by the
Australians and killed by a mine (most likely a claymore) during an engagement in
1967.121 It is possible that T Chnh may have been killed in a contact with Australian
troops on 13 September 1967 at YS 506826 during which a .45 calibre pistol was
recovered.122. In 2010, the martyr V Vn Khai former Commander of 445 Battalion
(B Ra Vng Tu Province) awarded the title: Hero of the Peoples Armed Forces.123
Neither V Quc Chnh nor V Vn Khai are mentioned in the 2000 B Ra - Vng
Tu Party History.124
Nguyn Quc Thanh (Ba Thanh).
In December 1955, Nguyn Quc Thanh (Ba Thanh) a member of the
Communist Party125, was directed to operate within a Bnh Xuyn126 unit. Comrade
Nguyn Quc Thanh was appointed as a company second-in-command. When Nguyn
Vn Ph was killed in an engagement, Nguyn Quc Thanh took control as the unit
commander with more than 30 men under arms to build a secret base and to operate in
the Rng Sc area.127 At the beginning of 1957, the Eastern Region Inter-Provincial
Committee deployed the unit led by Nguyn Quc Thanh from the Rng Sc (Long
Thnh) to the Ging Jungle (Hc Dch) to build a base - and to receive and protect the
group of political prisoners who had broken out and fled into the countryside. In June
1958, C.40 was established in the Sui Qut region with Comrade L Minh Thnh as its

Leaders and Commanders of 445 Battalion does not include a V Vn Khai (T Chnh) but, as noted,
does include V Quc Chnh as the Battalion Commander in 1966.
121
Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, p.124.
122
Elements of the 4th Company/D445 were identified among those killed. 1 ATF, INTSUM No.256-67,
Ni t, 13 September 1967. The 2004 D445 History notes that in an engagement at Bnh Ba in early 1964,
V Quc Chnh had killed five of the enemy with his familiar .45 Colt pistol.
123
Vide: Decision 21/Q-CTN, 23 February 2010 reported as Serial 98 in: Danh sch truy tng danh
hiu Anh hng Lc lng v trang nhn dn, Peoples Armed Forces Internet, 26 March 2010..
http://qdnd.vn/qdndsite/vi-vn/61/43/trong-nuoc/danh-sach-truy-tang-danh-hieu-anh-hung-luc-luong-vutrang-nhan-dan/107247.html .
124
Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s ng b tnh B Ra-Vng Tu (1930 - 1975) (The History of the
Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000.
125
In the 1991 D445 History, Nguyn Quc Thanh (Ba Thanh) is described as the first member of the
Communist Party to join the Bnh Xuyn unit. Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit, 2011, p.2.
126
The Bnh Xuyn gangster group first emerged in the early 1920s in Si Gn. In the 1950s - under
General L Vn Vin (aka "By Vin"), the Bnh Xuyn was an independent military force within the
Vietnamese National Army the Bnh Xuyn leaders had earlier lived outside the law and had sided with
the Vit Minh. During its heyday, the Bnh Xuyn funded itself with organized crime activities in Si
Gn/Ch Ln while effectively battling communist forces. For the early history of the Bnh Xuyn ie to
late 1955, see Chapter 19 in Department of Army, Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam, op.cit.,
1966 VCAT Item No.13450205001.
127
Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s ng b tnh B Ra-Vng Tu (1930 - 1975) (The History of the
Party in B Ra-Vng Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter V. 2004 D445 History, p.10 and footnotes 31 and 32.

A-24

commander, and with Comrade Nguyn Quc Thanh as its deputy commander.128
Nguyn Quc Thanh led an attack by C.40 Company on Bnh Ba village in March 1960.
In April 1960, C.45 became a Province unit with Comrade Nguyn Quc Thanh as its
Commander and Comrade Ba H as the Political Officer. As the C.45 commander - and
concurrently the deputy commander of the Province Unit, Nguyn Quc Thanh led the
attack at Bn Tu (Hc Dch) in July 1960.129 In February 1961, The Province Military
Committee was established with Comrade L Minh Thnh as the Head of the Province
Military Committee with Comrades Nguyn Quc Thanh and Nguyn Vn i as
deputies. In a Letter of Introduction dated 12 July 1966, Nguyn Quc Thanh was noted
as having been newly reassigned to the Province Military School.130 Nguyn Quc
Thanhs appointments in the following years are unclear.
Nguyn Vn Nm aka Nm V, Nguyn Vn V, Nguyn Anh V Battalion 2ic.
Nguyn Vn Nm/Vs (Nm V) recovered Personal History Statement (PHS) dated 25 August 1965, shows that he was born in 1941 in Phc Hi village, was a
platoon commander in the 1st Company of 445 Battalion in May 1965 and the Group
Chapter Secretary.131 Nguyn Vn Nm probably served as a platoon commander in
D445s 1st Company at the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966 see Annex D.
According to the 2004 D445 History, in mid-1968, its 1st Company was led by Comrade
Nguyn Vn V. That History later relates that: At the end of 1969/beginning of 1970
Comrade Nguyn Anh V was appointed Battalion second-in-command.132 In early
1970 - according to a rallier, he was the 2ic of 445 Battalion.133
As an NVA cadre [sic], Nguyn Vn Nm (Nm V) reportedly had served in
Cambodia and was assigned to 445 Battalion as its Chief of Staff on 19 June 1970.134

128

The Commander of the 40th Unit was L Thnh Cng and Nguyn Quc Thanh was the Deputy
Commander. - Phan Ngc Danh, Trn Quang Toi & Phm Van Hy, ng Nai 30 Nm Chin Tranh Gii
Phng (1945-1975) - The 30-year Liberation Struggle in ng Nai (1945-1975), Nh Xut Bn ng Nai,
ng Nai, 1986, pp.86-87.
129
The activities of Nguyn Quc Thanh (Ba Thanh) are described in greater detail in the 1991 D445
History. Su Thnh was appointed the commander of C40 ie replacing Nguyn Quc Thanh. L Thnh
Cng (Su Thnh) was also known as L Minh Thnh.
130
CDEC Log 09-1864-66. On 15 August 2013, the t Town Party Committee awarded a certificate to
a Nguyn Quc Thanh for his 40 years service in the Party. However, the recipient is highly unlikely to
have been the Nguyn Quc Thanh described above as a key cadre.
131
He declared Nguyn Vn V as his commonly used name, and was admitted to the Party on 28 May
1965. He signed his PHS as Hong V. His PHS was recovered with 19 others by 1 ATF elements at YS
5570 on 22 November 1966. CDEC Bulletin No.1761, 19 December 1966; CDEC Log 12-2394-66, VCAT
Item No.F034601051996.
132
A separate Nguyn Anh V (Hai V) was later appointed a 445 Battalion 2ic in May 1972 and
subsequently appointed as the Commander of Chu c District Unit in February 1973 see p.158.
Nguyn Anh V is listed in the 2004 D445 Historys Addendum listing the Battalions senior cadre as a
Battalion 2ic in 1972 p.290, Serial 42.
133
1 ATF, INTSUM No.56-70, Ni t, 25 February 1970.
134
OBrien, M., Conscripts and Regulars , op.cit., 1995, pp.219-220.

A-25

On 17 September 1970 at 0430hrs, Nm V (Nguyn Vn Nm - aka Nguyn Vn

V ) then second-in-command and acting commander of 445 Battalion was killed in an
Australian (7RAR) ambush at YS 503600 when his small party was leaving Phc Th
village (t ) portering rice and potatoes.135 The following day - in a second ambush
at YS 516582, documents were recovered including Nm Vs diary.136 According to
the annexed Martyrs List in the 2004 D445 History, Nguyn Vn Nm Battalion
Deputy Commander, b.1940 in Phc Hi (Long t), was killed on 31 August 1970
List II, p.315, Serial 426. However, Nguyn Vn Nm (Nm V) is not included as a
Battalion 2ic in the annexed 2004 D445 Historys List II ie that lists the Battalions
senior cadre.

Veterans at the 445 Battalion 50th Anniversary commemoration gathering

Vng Tu, 19 May 2015.

135

1 ATF, INTSUM No.260/70, Ni t, 17 September 1970.

1 ATF, INTSUM No.261/70, Ni t, 18 September 1970 and INTSUM, No.262/70, Ni t, 19
September 1970. See also: Annex A to 7RAR, After Action Report, Operation Cung Chung II & III, 24
September 1970; and Contact/Incident After Action Report (Sergeant T.S. Bourke) including a sketch
map is at file AWM9, 7/7/58. For a summary of Nm Vs diary entries see: Annex B to 1 ATF, INTSUM
No.264/70, Ni t, 21 September 1970; and see also Ham, P., Vietnam, op.cit., 2007, p.515. Nm Vs
diary and other documents captured in the ambush on 18 September detailed the strength of D445s
elements - totalling 176; and a comprehensive list of 445 Battalions weapons: including two 82mm mortars
(with 42 rounds), two 60mm mortars (31 rounds) and a 75mm RCL (10 rounds).

136

A-26

Readers Notes and Comments

Annex B

SENIOR CADRE1 D445 BATTALION2

D445 Battalion Senior Command and Staff Appointments3:
Mid-1956: Bnh Xuyn Company - Nguyn Quc Thanh (late in 1956, the unit title
changed to an armed self-defence force, then an armed propaganda unit).
1957: V Tm commands a second armed propaganda unit (previously led by the Bnh
Xuyn Commander - Mi i).
August 1958: 40th Company (C40 two armed propaganda units combined) commanded by L Thnh Cng (Su Thnh also as L Minh Thnh); with Nguyn Quc
Thanh as its Political Officer.
April 1960: 40th Company - commanded by L Thnh Cng (Su Thnh); Ba i as
Political Officer. 45th Company commanded by Nguyn Quc Thanh; Ba H as Political
Officer. December 1960: C40 platoon commanders: L Hng Sn, Hng.
1961: 40th and 45th Companies combined as 445 Company: T as Commander; Nm
Ninh4 as Political Officer and Secretary of its Party Chapter. T Chnh (V Quc
Chnh)5 as second-in-command; Ba Qung appointed Deputy Political Officer.
October 1963: 445 Company Political Officer and Party Chapter Secretary: L Minh
Vit (Su Vit). Nguyn Thanh Hiu (T Hiu) as medic (y t).

Almost all NVA/VC cadre, soldiers and infrastructure personnel had two-word nicknames/aliases/
pseudonyms (t, b danh). Invariably, these comprised a number the first word (from 2 to 10 ie with the
father as 1) or occasionally t (meaning youngest), followed by their given name eg Su (Six)
Thnh. Party members sometimes also had a secure cover-name ie an additional full Vietnamese name
of three words. Vit Cng personnel did not have formal military ranks or insignia. Rather, they were
referred to by the functional title of their position. Generically, they were also referred to as cn b (cadre
ie officer-ranking, ie section commander and higher) or chin s (combatant or soldier).
2
The 2004 D445 History includes as an annex at its pp.288-291: List I: Cadre, Leaders and Commanders
of 445 Battalion (Danh Sach Can B Lnh o, Ch Huy Tiu on 445 Qua Cac Thi K) and an
English-language translation of List I is provided as an Addendum to this exegesis of the 2004 History.
3
These appointments are based primarily on the texts of the 1991 and 2004 D445 Battalion Histories. On
21 March 2010, V Vn Khai a former D445 Commander, was declared to be a Hero of the Peoples
Armed Forces. While, no clarifying data on his service is available he is highly probably V Quc Chanh
(T Chanh) see the biography at Annex A. Phan Thanh Bnh has been declared as a deputy commander of
445 Battalion in a 2005 press item, but he is not noted in any Vietnamese histories Vnh Tng, Giao
Lu K c Ma Xun i Thng, C Quan ca ng B ng Cng Sn Vit Nam Tnh B Ra-Vng
Tu, Vng Tu, 25 April 2005. In 2006, he was noted as Colonel Phan Thanh Bnh; Former Commander
of Company 2, D445 Battalion, 5 VC Division in an interview/end credits of an Australian film on the 18
August 1966 Battle of Long Tn: Lay, D. (Director/Producer), The Battle of Long Tan, Animax Films Pty
Ltd, Red Dune Films, Sydney, 2006. See also Annex A - Key Cadre, footnote 97.
4
This is highly likely to be Nguyn Minh Ninh the following footnotes 15 and 29; and his biography in
Annex A: Key Cadre.
5
V Quc Chnh see also his biography in Annex A: Key Cadre.

B-2

Early 1964: 445 Company - T Chan (V Quc Chnh) as Company Commander; L

Minh Vit (Su Vit) as its Political Officer. 440 Company raised: Nm nh as
Commander, Nm Ninh as Political Officer.
December 1964: 445 Company - L Minh Vit (Su Vit) as Political Officer; o Thanh
Xun (Hai Xun) as Company 2ic; T Dng as Deputy Political Officer; Ba Lng and Ba
Kin as a platoon commanders.
23 February 1965: With his cover-name of Nguyn Quang Chnh, Bi Quang Chnh
(see footnotes 8, 14 and his biography at Annex A) was assigned to the B Ra Province
Concentrated Unit as the Battalion Commander.6 Concurrently, T Ngha7 was
assigned as the Battalions Political Officer and V Quc Chnh was assigned as the
Deputy Battalion Commander. Nguyn Vn Cho (aka Minh ?) assumed the position of
Assistant Political Officer.
19 May 1965: Founding of D445 Battalion . Commander - Bi Quang Chnh (Su
Chnh)8 (to December 1967/January 1968); Political Officer - L Thnh Ba (Ba Bi)9.
Company cadre: 1st Company: Trn Vn Chin (Su Chin) as Company Commander and
T Dng as Political Officer; 2nd Company: Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu) as Commander
and Nguyn Minh Khanh (Hai Khanh) as Political Officer; 3rd Company: Nm Thnh as
Commander, Trn Vn Khi (Khi) as Political Officer; 4th Company Phan Vn Nh
(T Nh) as Commander, Nguyn c/Vn Thng (Su Thng) as its Political Officer.

Vide: Decision 015/Q, T.1 Region Headquarters (ie Military Region 1), 23 February 1965 CDEC Log
09-1863-66, Bulletin 1063.
7
T Ngha reportedly became the Secretary of the Vng Tu Party Committee and was killed in action in
June 1966 see Phm Ch Thn, Cn C Minh m 1945-1975 (The Minh m Base 1945-1975), B RaVng Tu Province Information and Cultural Office, Vng Tu, 2006, p.48.
8
The 1991 and 2004 D445 Histories cite Bi Quang Chnh (Su Chnh) as the inaugural commander of
445 Battalion. However, according to the ng Nai History (1986): On 19 May 1965 in the Long Tn
base (Long t), the B Ra Provincial Committee established the Province Main Force [sic] Battalion with
the title of 445 with Comrade T Chnh [sic] as the Battalion Commander and Comrade L Thnh Ba as
its political officer. Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.123. It appears that the
1991 and 2004 D445 Histories have corrected the name of 445 Battalions inaugural commander to Bi
Quang Chnh (Su Chnh). However, a number of other publications have cited T Chnh as the 445
Battalion Commander probably influenced by the ng Nai History (1986). For example, according to
the ng Nai Monograph (2001), in May 1965: The B Ra Province Committee established the Province
main force [sic] battalion with the title of 445 Battalion led by Comrade T Chang [sic] with Comrade L
Thnh Ba as the political officer. - a Ch ng Nai, Nh Xut Bn Tng Hp ng Nai, Bin Ha,
2001.
9
L Thnh Ba (Ba Bi) the 1991 and 2004 D445 Histories relate his participation in the ambush at Bn
Tu in May 1960; see also footnote 8 above. For his subsequent service in Long t District see also
Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , 2011, Annex L, footnotes 30 and 31. L Thnh Ba was interviewed by the
Australian official military historian (Dr Ian McNeill) on 7 September 1990 in Kuranda (Queensland) see
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, pp.562-563 and Annex O (the 275th Regiment), footnote 49; and
Walker, J., Long Tan doubts left in peace, The Australian, September 1990.

B-3

Staff officer (Rear Services): Nguyn Thanh Tm (Ba Tm)10; Adjutant: Nguyn Tun
Gii (Mi Gii); Surgical Section: Nguyn Thanh Hiu (T Hiu) as chief medic (y
s).11
December 1965: D445 Political Officer - Vn Lin (Ba Lin).
Mid-1966: See Annex D The Probable Organisation of D445 Battalion, mid-1966.
August 1966: Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu) as Battalion 2ic.
September 1966: Nguyn Tun Gii (Mi Gii) as Battalion Adjutant.12
November 1966: Vn Lin (Ba Lin) as Political officer; Ba Kin as 2ic/Deputy
Commander.
Late 1966: Probable company commanders: o Vn Tng (Tm Tng) 1st Company,
Thu 2nd Company, c 3rd Company, T Nh 4th Company, Long 5th Company.13
1967 (?): T Chanh (V Quc Chnh - see footnotes 5 and 14) as 2ic 445 Battalion (?)
killed by 1 ATF forces in 1967 (?).14
Nguyn Thanh Tm (Ba Tm) as the Battalion 2ic, was killed in an ambush by the Australian 7 th
Battalion (7RAR) together with several other senior cadre, on 31 December 1970 at C Thi in the Xuyn
Mc area. For the C Thi ambush, see pages 136-137 in the main text and its footnotes 475-478.
11
L Thanh Dng (et al), Lch S Ngnh Y T B Ra-Long Khnh (1945-2006), Vng Tu, 2008.
However in several captured documents, the D445 senior medic in mid-1966 is noted as Nguyn Vn Hiu
(Nm Hiu) - CDEC Log 12-2427-66 (lists D445s medical supply holdings as at 8 August 1966).
12
Nguyn Tun Gii (Mi Gii - b. Qung Ngi, North Vietnam), was noted in the 1991 D445 History as
the units adjutant at its founding. However, captured documents indicate that he served as a platoon
commander in the 5th Company of 445 Battalion in January 1966 probably the Headquarters Company.
As the Battalion adjutant, Gii attended a COSVN/SVNLA rear services training course at the SVNLA H21
Rear Services School in February-early August 1966 his detailed course report is at CDEC Log 05-172767 and his diary/notebook is at CDEC Log 06-1673-67. He was enroute from H21 returning to Phc Tuy
in mid-August 1966 ie he did not participate in the Battle of Long Tn. Gii was formally appointed
adjutant (qun l) of 445 Battalion in September 1966. The Battalion adjutant was responsible for managing
aspects of rear services support including finances. In late 1968, Nguyn Tun Gii was noted as the
political officer of the 4th Company; in January 1973 as the Battalions deputy political officer; and in late
1974 as its political officer. 2004 D445 History. A footnote in the 2004 D445 History indicated that he
was still active in 2004.
13
Diary of Nguyn Tun Gii - Adjutant 445 Battalion, CDEC Log 06-1673-67.
14
In March 1967, 1 ATF reported that T Cha h (445 Battalion 2ic) had replaced Su Chnh (ie Bi Quang
Chnh) as the 445 Battalion Commander, and that Su Chnh had moved to command the Long t District
Unit 1 ATF, Intelligence Review No.6, Ni t, 10 March 1967. However, the Ha Long History - and
other sources, note Bi Quang Chnh as the Commander of the Chu c District Unit in February 1968
and captured documents indicate that Nguyn Vn Kim (Nm Kim) had commanded the Chu c
District Unit until December 1967-January 1968 after which Kim commanded 445 Battalion. T Cha h is
also reported to have replaced Su Chnh (ie Bi Quang Chnh) and become 445 Battalions second
commander until he was killed in an Australian ambush in 1967 Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit.,
1990, p.124. For a discussion of Bi Quang Chnh (Su Chnh), V Quc Chnh (T Chanh), and Nguyn
10

B-4

March 1967: Nguyn Minh Ninh (Nm Ninh) as Assistant Political Officer.15
December 1967: 1st Company - Commander: o Vn Tng (Tm Tng) - with
Company Political Officer Nguyn Vn Bo (Su Bo)16.
December 1967-January 1968 (late): Commander - Nguyn Vn Kim (Nm Kim) for
discussion, see his biography at Annex A.
February 1968: Political Officer Vn Lin - followed by Nm Ninh (Nguyn Minh
Ninh). Ba Tm (Nguyn Thanh Tm) Adjutant (Qun L). See also footnote 325* in the
main text for a listing of company commanders and company political officers ie 1st
Company: Comrade Hai B as Company Commander, Chn Phn as Political Officer; 2nd
Company: Comrade ((H Vn ?)) Bn ((T Bn ?)) as Company Commander, Su Bo
as Political Officer; 3rd Company: Comrade Quach Vn Mi (Mi Dm) as Company
Commander, Lm Phng (Su Phng) as Political Officer; 4th Company: Comrade T
c as Company Commander, Su Thng as Political Officer.
July 1968: Deputy Battalion Commander L Minh Kin (Ba Kin) was killed in an
engagement with 18th ARVN Division elements on Route 2. He was replaced as Battalion
2ic by Nguyn Vn Tm (Hai Tm).
June 1969: Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu) noted as Battalion Commander.17

Vn Kim (Nm Kim) as commanders of 445 Battalion in the period 1965 mid-1969, see their
biographies at Annex A.
15
Nguyn Minh Ninh (Nm Ninh) is not mentioned in any Vietnamese histories as participating in the
Battle of Long Tn see footnote 29. However, in Ham, P., Vietnam , op.cit., 2007, pp.246-257,
Nguyn Minh Ninh implies that he was at the Long Tn battle, and is cited incorrectly as a commander of
D445 Battalion, see also p.531. Nguyn Minh Ninh wrote a letter on 10 March 1967 to the Command
Committee of 55C seeking information on his brother-in-law, t Ln CDEC Log 05-2790-67. See also
his biography at Annex A - Key Cadre.
16
Nguyn Vn Bo (Su Bo) was interviewed by T. Burstall in August 1987. Bo b. 1943 near Long
M, declared that he had joined the guerrilla army at 16, and had been a company commander in 445
Battalion in the period 1966-1968 (but had not been involved personally in the Battle of Long Tn) then
posted to 5th VC Division - Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, pp.65-66, p.206. In 1963, Su Bo
was accepted into the Party on the field of battle see 2004 D445 History, main text: f.92 and f.96. He
was wounded in action during the 1968 Tet Offensive when the political officer of the 2 nd Company and
soon after was appointed the Battalions deputy political officer. Nguyn Vn Bo (Su Bo) was
subsequently appointed political officer of 440 Battalion. In 1976, he was 445 Battalions political
commissar ie (chnh y), and served in Cambodia with the 1st ng Nai Battalion which included
elements from D445 Battalion.
17
It appears that Nguyn c Thu may have replaced Nguyn Vn Kim (Nm Kim) as 445 Battalion
commander in June 1969 see CDEC Log 06-2183-70, after which Kim served on the headquarters of the
Province Unit as its chief-of-staff before returning to his pre-445 Battalion appointment as the commander
of the Chu c District Unit - Nguyn Cng Danh & L Minh Ngha et al, Lch s u Tranh Cch Mng
Ca ng B V Nhn Dn Huyn Chu c (1930-2000) The History of the Revolutionary Struggle of
the Party and the People of Chu c District (1930-2000), Nh Xut Bn Chnh Tr Quc Gi, H Ni,
2004, p.175.

B-5

29 July 1969: Nguyn Vn Nhng (aka Lc)18 - the Commander/Deputy Commander of

the 2nd Company/445 Battalion, rallied; and Quc Hng (probably Trn Vn Kinh) the
Battalions political adjutant, rallied (the date of Hngs defection is uncertain). At that
time, L Tranh was reportedly the 3rd Company Commander.19
18

A document captured in August 1966 indicated that Nguyn Vn Nhng (aka Lc) had probably earlier
been a member of the Long t District Unit - ie b. 1942 who joined the Army in June 1961, joined the
Group in June 1962 middle farmer. Nhngs father and mother were recorded as having been killed by
the enemy nine years ago. Three uncles joined the Army, one regrouped to North and two died. - CDEC
Bulletin 1088, CDEC Log 09-2095-66. Nguyn Vn Nhng (aka Lc see also footnote 415 in the main
text) rallied under the Chiu Hi programme on 29 July 1969 (as Nguyn Vn Lc/Loi) at an RF post at
Phc Li, and that evening revealed the locations of the headquarters of 445 Battalion and four of its
companies 1 ATF, INTSUM No.211-69, Ni t, 30 July 1969. The 6RAR Ops Log of 29 July 1969
records that C2 Company Commander D445 surrendered at Phc Li - 2149hrs: Orders given for
blocking operation on Route 23. Whisky Company with APCs and tanks to block along Route 23. 2/48
ARVN to block West. Task: to capture C2 D445 in West of Long Green.. The 6RAR Ops Log recorded
information from HQ 1 ATF: 0002hrs (30 July). From ATF: Loc HQ D445 YS557676, C1/D445
YS557682, C/2D445 YS557678, C4/D445 YS565674, C3/D445 YS586619. A 6RAR report noted that at
1430hrs (30 July 1969) W Coy returned the Hoi Chanh they had hoped would lead them to cache in Phuoc
Loi. 6RAR, Op Mundingburra, 30 July 1969 (AWM95, 7/6/21). Nhng claimed to have been the
commander of the 2nd Company of 445 Battalion see AWM photographs for the author (Lieutenant E.P.
Chamberlain 1TALU) in discussions/debriefing with Nhng in B Ra on 31 July 1969 see page 9.
Nhng was also debriefed in Bin Ha on 17 August 1969 - see Report FVS-19,822 of 18 August 1969
(he declared that he had been a full Party member from 4 August 1967) ; and his debrief by 1 ATF
intelligence staff was related in - Pannell, B.W., Postscript to Long Tan, Australian Infantry, 16, No.2,
May 1970, p.180. Nhng assisted 6RAR operations during August 1969: in AO West End where camps
were found in the vicinity of YS 525559 on 8 August 1969 - 1 ATF, INTSUM No.220/69, Ni t, 8
August 1969; and on 9 August 1969 in AO WIANGAREE (Nhng was recorded still as Loi) - 1 ATF,
INTSUM No.221, Ni t, 9 August 1969. Subsequently, 1 ATF intelligence staff referred to Nhngs
information as from: Nguyen Van Loc 1 ATF, INTSUM No.232-69, Ni t, 20 August 1969. Based
on Nhngs information, 1 ATF intelligence staff promulgated D445 Bases and Tactics Annex A to 1
ATF SUPINTREP 4/69, Ni t, 4 November 1969. As a Vit Cng Local Force company commander,
Nhng was entitled to a returnee cash reward of 35,000 piastres (about USD 297) - plus a reward for
his weapon. Nhng was later employed in 1969 as a Bushman Scout with the Australian 6RAR infantry
battalion, and subsequently was a member of a Chiu Hi Armed Propaganda Team in B Ra see
Burstall, T., The Soldiers Story, op.cit., 1986, p.162. For comments by Nguyn Vn Kim (445 Battalion
Commander) on Nhng (misspelt as Nuong) to the Australian official historian in June 1988, see
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.367 ie: He knew Loc well, he said. He had been a squad leader
at the Long Tan battle and Kiem had later promoted him to the level of company commander. He had
defected, said Kiem, because his girlfriend, a member of the communist infrastructure in Dat Do, had been
captured by the Task Force and he wanted to keep contact with her.- and see also comments at pp.362-365,
367, 370. Nhng was reportedly a 445 Battalion platoon 2ic at the Long Tn battle, but at p.362 in To
Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, he is incorrectly reported as having rallied in The year following the battle
(ie 1967); and p.364 notes on Long Tn: The evidence given by Loc closely accorded with information
known or suspected by the task force. Note also that a separate Senior Captain Nguyn Vn Nhng
(PAVN) is listed as the 445 Battalion Commander in 2003 ie as Serial 97 in the List I Addendum to the
2004 D445 History.
19
In both the 1991 and 2004 D445 Histories, L Tranh (L Vn Tranh, aka Nm Tranh) was cited for his
exploits in the defence of the Long Phc base on 21 May 1966. He was interviewed by T. Burstall in
November 1987 see Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns A Long Tan veteran discovers the other side of

B-6

5/6 September 1969: Trn Hng purportedly the D445 Battalion commander, killed
during an attack on Hi M village.20
September 1969: Commander - Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu); Political Officer - Nguyn
Minh Khanh (Hai Khanh).
September 1969: Trn Vn Kinh the Battalions political adjutant/Assistant Political
Officer reportedly defected on 10 September 1969 see footnote 416 in the main text.
October 1969: Quc Hng the Battalions political adjutant/Assistant Political
Officer, rallied and guided 6RAR to recover a large weapons cache on 22 October 1969.
Quc Hng may have been a cover-name of Trn Vn Kinh see above.
February 1970:21 Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu) Commander, T Oanh 2ic, Nguyn
Vn Nm (Nm V) 2ic, Nguyn Minh Khanh (Hai Khanh) Political Officer, Lm
Phng (Su Phng) Assistant Political Officer, T Quy Assistant Political Officer,
Chief of Staff T B22, OC 1st Company Tm Tng, OC 2nd Company Trn Vn
Long, OC 4th Company Ba Lim, OC K8 Company (mortars - attached) Ba Tm.
May 1970: Nguyn Vn Nm (Nm V) as Chief of Staff.23
Vietnam, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1990, pp.141-145. L Tranh b. Long Tn, 1945,
claimed to have been a deputy platoon commander in 1966 in 445 Battalion and participated in the Battle of
Long Tn and was wounded by artillery fire. He related that his platoon was equipped with a 57mm RCL
and one of the crew -Thom, was captured by the Australian forces. Only one member of 445 Battalion
was captured at the Battle of Long Tn - L Vn Trung (reportedly a 57mm RCL gunner) see footnote
293 in the main text. L Tranh was appointed 3rd Company Commander in 1969. He claimed to have later
been the deputy commander of 445 Battalion in 1972-1974. In the 2004 D445 History, he is noted as one of
two Battalion 2ics in May 1972 and included in that editions annexed List I as a Battalion 2ic in
1973.
20
In 2012, a former RD cadre stated that the D445 Battalion Commander Trn Hng, was killed during
an attack on Hi Cu hamlet, Hi M village on 5/6 September 1969. He was reportedly identified by
documents on his recovered body. The RD cadre suffered three killed and six wounded in the attack see
Hng Qu & Hong V, Hi k ca cn b xy dng nng thn vng xi u, Ngi Vit, 13 March
2012, http://www.nguoi-viet.com/absolutenm2/templates/?a=145830 . The incident is not recorded in the 1
ATF Operations Log nor INTSUMs.
21
Debrief of Hunh Vn Lin (rallier, former section commander 445 Battalion) - Appendix 1 to Annex
A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.56-70, Ni t, 26 February 1970.
22
Trn Vn B (T B, aka B Gi) enlisted on 9 January 1961, and participated in the attack by 445
Company on Bu Lm strategic hamlet on 15 January 1964. In mid-1967, he commanded D445s 5th
Company. Subsequently, from 21 July 1968, Trn Vn B was a company commander in 440 Battalion;
and appointed a 2ic of 445 Battalion on 4 November 1969 Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM No. 35/71, Ni
t, 4 February 1971. He was scheduled to replace Nguyn Vn Kim as Commander of the Chu c
District Unit in mid-August 1970, but such probably did not occur until later in 1970. 1 ATF, INTSUM
No.13/71, Ni t, 13 January 1971. Trn Vn B (T B) as Commander of the Chu c District Unit,
was killed by Australian forces on 4 February 1971 - Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM No.35/71, Ni t, 4
February 1971.
23
Reportedly an NVA cadre who had served in Cambodia, Nguyn Vn Nm (Nm V) was assigned to
445 Battalion as its Chief of Staff on 19 June 1970 OBrien, M., Conscripts and Regulars , op.cit.,

B-7

September 1970: Nguyn Vn Nm (Nm V) as 2ic and acting Commander killed in

an Australian ambush at t .24
31 December 1970: Several senior cadre were killed in an Australian ambush including:
Nguyn Thanh Tm (Ba Tm) the Battalion 2ic; Nguyn Thnh Long25 2nd Company
Commander; Trnh Vn Lim26 2nd Company Political Officer.
1971: Hai Tm (Nguyen Van Tm) as Chief of Staff, 445 Battalion.27 Trn Tn Huy 28

1995, pp.219-220. Nguyn Vn Nm (Nm V) also used the aka of: Nguyn Vn V. His recovered
Personal History Statement (25 August 1965) shows that he was: b. 1941, Phc Hi village, was a platoon
commander in the 1st Company of 445 Battalion in May 1965 and the Group Chapter Secretary CDEC
Log 12-2394-66. See also the following footnote and his outline biography in Annex A.
24
On 17 September 1970 at 0430hrs, Nm V (Nguyn Vn Nm - aka Nguyn Vn V ) the second-incommand and acting commander of 445 Battalion was killed in an Australian (7RAR) ambush at YS
503600 when his small party was leaving Phc Th village (t ) portering rice and potatoes 1 ATF,
INTSUM No.260/70, Ni t, 17 September 1970. The following day - in a second ambush at YS 516582,
documents were recovered including Nm Vs diary 1 ATF, INTSUM No.261/70, Ni t, 18
September 1970 and INTSUM, No.262/70, Ni t, 19 September 1970. See also: Annex A to 7RAR,
After Action Report, Operation Cung Chung II & III, 24 September 1970; and Contact/Incident After
Action Report (Sergeant T.S. Bourke) including a sketch map, is at file AWM9, 7/7/58. For a summary of
Nm Vs diary entries see: Annex B to 1 ATF, INTSUM No.264/70, Ni t, 21 September 1970; and see
also Ham, P., Vietnam, op.cit., 2007, p.515. Nm Vs diary and other documents captured in the ambush
on 18 September detailed the strength of D445s elements - totalling 176; and included a comprehensive list
of 445 Battalions weapons: including two 82mm mortars (with 42 rounds), two 60mm mortars (31 rounds)
and a 75mm RCL (10 rounds). According to the annexed Martyrs List (List II) in the 2004 D445 History,
Nguyn Vn Nm Battalion Deputy Commander, b.1940 in Phc Hi (Long t), was killed on 31
August 1970 List II, p.315, Serial 426. However, Nguyn Vn Nm (Nm V) is not included as a
Battalion 2ic in the 2004 D445 Historys annexed List I that lists the Battalions senior cadre although a
Nguyn Anh V is listed as a Battalion 2ic in 1972.
25
Nguyn Thnh Long (real name: Nguyn Vn B b. 1936) see his Personal History Statement dated
25 August 1965 at CDEC Log 12-2394-66.
26
In January 1966, Trnh Vn Lim was a section commander in the 2nd Company and was awarded a
Letter of Appreciation (Giy Khen) for his achievements in an engagement at Phc Hi CDEC Log 051407-67.
27
1 ATF, INTSUM No.244/71, Ni t, 1 September 1971 also noted in March 1970 in a 1 ATF report.
28
Trn Tn Huy has been incorrectly cited as a former Lieutenant Colonel commanding 445 Battalion in
1971 see Interview by Lieutenant Colonel (Retd) G. McKay MC, 23 September 1993 - Australian War
Memorial ID Number SO1932. Trn Tn Huy was reportedly a member of C-25 District Unit (Long t)
and, post-War, was the Chairman of the Long t District Committee when interviewed by Dr I. McNeill in
mid-June 1988 (To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.368, p.532) and earlier by Terry Burstall in November 1987.
Huy did not suggest to either McNeill or Burstall that he (Huy) had ever served in 445 Battalion. Rather, he
declared to Burstall that he had been a member of C-25 Company (Long t) until wounded in an
Australian ambush in 1968 - Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, pp.80-81. A document captured
in August 1966 recorded a Trn H. Tn aka Binh, b.1941: joined the Army in October 1960, date of
admission to the Group - 18 April 1962 - CDEC Bulletin 1088, CDEC Log 09-2095-66. This indicated
that Huy was a member of the Long t District Unit - ie along with Nguyn Vn Nhng see footnote
18 above. Trn Tn Huy b. 1947, was elected to the ng Nai Province Peoples Council and Committee
for the period 1989-1994 (Electoral Unit 4, Long t District). Trn Tn Huy also appeared in a 1993

B-8

1972: Commander - Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu); Political Officer - Nm Ninh (Nguyn
Minh Ninh)29; 2ic/Chief of Staff Lm Phng (Su Phng)30; Deputy Political Officer
- T Thut.
March 1972: Nguyn Vn Quang as Battalion 2ic. L Tranh (L Vn Tranh aka Nm
Tranh) as Deputy Commander 445 Battalion to 1974.31
1973: Commander - o Vn Tng (Tm Tng); Political Officer - Nguyn Minh
Khanh (Hai Khanh); Deputy Political Officer - Nguyn Tun Gii (Mi Gii).
1975: o Vn Tng (Tm Tng) as Commander; Bi Chnh as Political Officer; Nguyn
Vn Quang 32 as 2ic and Chief of Staff.
1976: Hai Vn Battalion Commander.
1977: Nguyn Vn Quang - Battalion Commander.
1978: Hunh Vn Quyt - Battalion Commander.
1984-1989: L Minh Quang - Battalion Commander.
1989-1990: Captain Nguyn Vn Sn - Battalion Commander.

television documentary Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan The True Story, Australian
Broadcasting Commission/Film Australia (DVD/video), Lindfield, 1993.
29
Nguyn Minh Ninh (Nm Ninh) had been the Assistant Political Officer in 445 Battalion in early 1967,
and the Political Officer in 1968 and again in 1972 and was the B Ra Province Unit Commander in
1975. In an interview with former 1 ATF Civil Affairs officer Barry Smith in 1990, Nguyn Minh Ninh
declared that he had been the deputy commander of D445 battalion at the battle of Long Tan - Smith, B.,
The Role and Impact of Civil Affairs in South Vietnam 1965-1971, The Australian Army and the Vietnam
War 1962-1972, Army History Unit, 2002. Nguyn Minh Ninh as a retired brigadier-general, was
interviewed by Paul Ham in Vng Tu in November 2005 Ham, P., Vietnam , op.cit., 2007, p.223,
pp.246-247, p.662. As a former vice commander of D445 Battalion and a former Long Tan combatant,
Nguyn Minh Ninh met with Australian 6RAR Long Tn veterans David Sabben and Bob Buick at Long
Tn on 4 August 2006 - Cameron, S. (Stewart), The Ghosts of Long Tan, The Australian, 8 August 2006.
It is unclear whether Nguyn Minh Ninh was a combatant at Long Tn in 1966 as his presence in the Battle
is not mentioned in any Vietnamese account except implicitly in the text of the 2004 D445 History when
he is noted as having replaced Vn Chng ( Vn Lin, Ba Lin) as the Battalions political officer
in the middle of 1966 (although such probably occurred towards the end of 1966). In the early 1990s,
Nguyn Minh Ninh served as the Chairman of the Provincial Peoples Committee and was still active in
veterans affairs in Vng Tu in mid-May 2015 see also Nguyn Minh Ninhs biography at Annex A.
30
From early 1973, Lm Phng was the Commander of the Xun Lc District Unit.
31
1991 D445 Battalion History. See also footnote 19 and: Interview with Le Tranh (L Vn Tranh, aka
Nm Tranh) ex-VC D445 Battalion Company Commander of C3 Company. Deputy Battalion
Commander from 1972 to 1974 - Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, Book 2, op.cit., 1990, p.206.
32
The biography of Nguyn Vn Quang is included among the Heroes of ng Nai, see http://www.dostdongnai.gov.vn/ahung/english/ah_ngvanquang_e.html . and:
https://dost-dongnai.gov.vn/Pages/kechuyenvebac-noidung.aspx?NewsID=302&TopicID=5&CoLookup=1
That biography indicates that he did not participate in the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966.

B-9

1992: Captain Hunh Vn Hin - Battalion Commander.

1992: Captain L Vn Th - Battalion Commander.
1993-1996: Major Nguyn Vn Sn - Battalion Commander.
1997-1998: Major ng Vn Bnh - Battalion Commander.
1998-1999: Major Phan Chim Thnh - Battalion Commander.
2001-2002: Major Nguyn Tun Cng - Battalion Commander.
2002-2003: Captain Phm Ph - Battalion Commander.
2003: Captain Nguyn Vn Nhng - Battalion Commander.
*

Photograph by the late Dr Denis Stanley Gibbons, AM 30 July 1969.33 AWM caption:
The Viet Cong soldier talking with the Australian is Lieutenant (Lt) Nguyen Van
Nhuong34, the ex Company Commander of Company 2, D445 Battalion, who Chieu
Hoid to the Aussies and gave the locations of the D445 Companies. The Australian
officer is 215835 Lt. Ernest Patrick Chamberlain ((Vietnamese linguist)) of
Balgowlah Heights, NSW, and he is the liaison Officer at the Phuoc Tuy Province
Military Headquarters. ((Phc Tuy Province Chiu Hi Centre, B Ra)).
33

Translators Note: Copyright held by Shaun Gibbons granted for this publication on 23 January 2015.
Translators Note: Nguyn Vn Nhng (aka Lc) had earlier fought as a D445 section commander at the
Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966 for his biographical details, see footnote 18.

34

B-10

D445 Personnel Photographs

D445 Personnel ?
The photograph above is commonly used and purported to be of D445 soldiers
Australian War Memorial (AWM) photograph P01934.033. The photograph was among
several photographs in a portfolio of photographs (see AWM P01934.001 to .042)
recovered by 7RAR (Major E.J. ODonnell) during Operation Santa Fe at YS 561825
about 10 kilometres north-east of Bnh Gi village on 8 November 1967. The photographs
have been labelled by the AWM as used by propaganda purposes, probably by a political
officers from D445, and two of the photographs are noted by the AWM as D445 ie
P01934.033 and P01934.041. However, the portfolio included several photographs of
meetings and rallies in Bnh Dng Province (eg: P01934.038). Accordingly, it is
probable that photograph P01934.033 - shown above, is not of D445 personnel.
A set of photographs was also recovered on 23 November 1969 by 12/D/5RAR
during Operation Kings Cross in the north-western Hc Dch area at YS 359811 which
are sometimes referred to as D445 photographs and are displayed on the 5RAR
Association website and on the Surplus Sammy website on the Internet. These Kings
Cross photographs appear to be of personnel from the VCs 10th Rng Sc Regiment or
reconnaissance soldiers of the 5th VC Division. A 1 ATF INTSUM noted that - regarding
the large number of photographs recovered by D/5RAR by D/5RAR at YS 359811 on 23
November 1969: Ident of Doan 10. Le Dinh Long - rallied from the Ba Long HQ,
recognised a member of the 5th Div Recce Coy. 1 ATF, INTSUM No.337/69, Ni t,
3 December 1969, para 6.b. The AWM website also has a series of photographs including Vit Cng soldiers (P01003.001 P01003.026) that are noted as having been
recovered in Phc Tuy Province in November 1971. However, there are
commonalities with the Kings Cross photographs, so it is highly probable that most

B-11

of that series of photographs were seized at the same time. Some of the photographs in
that AWM series also show large quantities of Vit Cng weapons captured in May 1970
near the Cambodian border and Vit Cng bunkers ie photographs taken by ARVN or
US military photographers, not by the Vit Cng.
Two photographs recovered during Operation Kings Cross November 1969

B-12

Readers Comments and Notes

Annex C

D445 BATTALION STRENGTH FIGURES1

19 May 1965 350; 450: on the founding of 445 Battalion combining 440 and 445
Companies (1991 D445 History). The total force numbered about 450 comrades (2004
D445 History).
Mid-December 1965 117: strength of the 1st Company only.2
21 May 1966 550: ie as 860 Battalion - 1 ATF, INTSUM No.1/66, Vng Tu, 21
May 1966 ie prior to 1 ATFs deployment into Phc Tuy Province in early June.3
6 June 1966 421 [sic]: Companies 1-5: strengths 102, 94, 51, 78, 28 = 353 the unit
was unidentified, but highly probably 445 Battalion - CDEC Log 09-1987-66.
July 1966 395: Bi Quang Chnh - Commander, 445 Battalion, Bi-Annual Political
Report, 8 July 1966 (see Annex H).

For a break-up of 445 Battalions personnel as at mid-1966 ie by rank/function; age; length of service;
Party, marital and social status; health and education see Annex G, The Party in 445 Battalion. The
following figures in Annex C are predominantly declared strength figures for units. Unit personnel would
routinely be absent on detachment or courses, or non-effectives - eg personnel who through illness, injury
or wounds, were not available for combat duty. All NVA/VC units suffered severely from malaria see
Annex O for data on the 275th VC Regiment on the impact of malaria and other indicative combat
effectiveness calculations. However, the 1991 and 2004 D445 Battalion Histories make no specific
mention of malaria (but see footnote 146 in the Main Text for reference to malarial prophylaxis).
Additionally, in considering a units bayonet strength ie those directly engaged in combat, it should be
noted that a number of personnel in any unit are in echelons that would not necessarily be directly involved
in combat actions again, see Annex O, 275th Regiment. For a Vietnam-wide analysis see Combined
Intelligence Center Vietnam, Medical Causes on Non-Effectiveness among VC/NVA Troops (Third
Update), St 69 II, MACJ231-7, Saigon, 31 August 1969 CICV Item No.2250112029. That study indicates
44% of NVA/VC troops had malaria at any one time and 20% would be hospitalized for an average of
12.7 days. On combat casualties, the study indicates 5% of wounded NVA/VC died during evacuation, 35% died once hospitalized, and 25-30% of those hospitalized were permanently disabled see also Annex
F.
2
The strength of the 1st Company of 445 Battalion in mid-December 1965 was 117 (this included 31 Party
members and 40 Group members) CDEC Log 05-1293-66.
3
As 860/D445 Battalion, its strength was assessed as 500 in 1st Infantry Division, Combat Operations
After Action Report Operation Abilene at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/387599.pdf ; and 1
RAR, OpOrd - Operation Memphis, 29 April 1966 (and the 1RAR draft OPORD of 29 March 1966 see
AWM95, 7/1/69). Note also that in August 1966, reports by the 1 ATF intelligence staff cited C860 Bn as
having been engaged by 6RAR at the Battle of Long Tn ie rather than D445 see Annex A to Op Toledo
Frag Order 1-8-66, OPS204, 211600H Aug 60. 1 ATF regularly promulgated estimates of 445 Battalions
strength in Intelligence Summaries (INTSUMs) and Intelligence Reviews. 860 Battalion (or C860
Battalion) was still included on the US MACV Order of Battle as an aka for D445 Battalion see
COMUSMACV J2 INTSUM 102-67, Saigon, 12 April 1967 VCAT Item No. F034600881060; and
MACV, Monthly Order of Battle Summary July 1968, Saigon VCAT Item No. 2500111003.

C-2

23 July 1966 403: Vn Lien - Political officer, 445 Battalion - see CDEC Log 092136-66 (including: 116 Party members; 142 Group members) see footnote 1 below and
analysis at Annex H.
August 1966 392: Vn Lien - Political officer, 445 Battalion, Political Report for
July 1966, 9 August 1966 (see Annex H)
August 1966 550: 1 ATF assessed the strength of 445 Battalion as 550 according to
the Australian official history, McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351, p.559
(endnote 114).
Late August 1966 300: 1 ATF: D445 probably had a fighting strength of about 300
having lost between 30-40 KIA at Long Tn.4
31 August 1966 500: (as 860th Province Organic Mobile Bn by USMACV).5
September 1966 450: An Australian intelligence document.6
October 1966 300: McNeill, To Long Tan, op.cit, 1993, p.351, p.558 (endnote 111).
October 1966 403: Nguyn Tun Gii Adjutant, 445 Battalion.7
31 October 1966 300: (as 860 Bn aka D445) by 11th ACR.8
November 1966 350: McNeill, To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.48 and p.501 (endnote
56).
November 1966 375: Nguyn Tun Gii Adjutant, 445 Battalion (see footnote 7).
November 1966 409: Headquarters and 1st Company 110, 2nd Company 42, 3rd
Company 41, 4th Company- 75, 5th Company 81: captured document - CDEC 05-175467.
December 1966 about 415: A captured finance report for D/445 listed the strength of
the Battalions companies in December 1966 as follows: 1st Company: 104, 2nd Company:
4

1 ATF, Intelligence Review No.1, Ni t, 13 September 1966, para 4.c.

USMACV/CDEC, Summary of VC Order of Battle South of the 17 th Parallel, 31 August 1966, CDEC Log
#9-0793-66, VCAT Item No.034600301272 (principally RVNAF JGS figures).
6
An outline organisation of 445 Battalion produced by Australian intelligence is at p.94 in Burstall, T.,
Vietnam The Australian Dilemma, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1993.
7
Diary of Nguyn Tun (Vn) Gii (Mi Gii) CDEC Log 06-1673-67.
8
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Operational Report Lessons Learned to 31 October 1966, 21 April
1967 DTIC AD386101
5

C-3

88, 3rd Company: 38, 4th Company: 73, 5th Company 91 = Total 394 (Battalion
headquarters personnel might be included in the 5th Company figure) - CDEC Log 051724-67.
December 1966 404: Nguyn Tun Gii Adjutant, 445 Battalion (see footnote 7).
January 1967 300: 1 ATF Intelligence Review No.4, 11 January 1967.
February 1967 300: 1 ATF Intelligence Review No.5, 14 February 1967.9
June 1967 400: 1 ATF Intelligence Review No.9, 8 June 1967.
August 1967 400: 1 ATF Intelligence Review No.11, 2 August 1967.
September 1967 400: 1 ATF Intelligence Review No.12, 5 September 1967.
September 1967 350: USMACV Order of Battle Summary, October 1967 VCAT Item
No.0240801005.
October 1967 400: 1 ATF Intelligence Review No.13, 1 October 1967.
November 1967 400: 1 ATF Intelligence Review No.14, November 1967.
December 1967 400: 1 ATF Intelligence Review No.15, 2 December 1967.
January 1968 400: 1 ATF Intelligence Review No.16, 3 January 1968.
January 1968 608: highest strength since the Battalions founding: 1991 D445
Battalion History, p.55 f.193. See also f.337 in the 2004 D445 History.
February 1968 350: (Pre-Tt US estimate); 225 (Post-Tt US estimate).10
January 1969 350: in the vicinity of 350: 1 ATF estimate.11
September 1969 each of our companies only had a little more than 10 riflemen.12
October 1969 220: 1 ATF estimate.13
January 1970 Combat strength probably not more than 100 men: 1 ATF
estimate.14

Also 300 in February 1967 McNeill, I & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.49.
Weyand, F.C. Lieutenant General, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Combat Operations After
Action Report (RCS: MACJ3-32) (K-1) - Tet Offensive After Action Report (31 January 18 February
1968), Saigon, 1968, p.A-1-4. VCAT Item No.168300010351 and 13680112004.
11
HQ 1 ATF, D445 Local Force Battalion (History), Ni t, 18 January 1969.
12
2004 D445 History, p.120.
13
Annex A to 1 ATF SUPINTREP 2/69, Ni t, 6 October 1969.
10

C-4

February 1970 210: Rallier section commander, 1st Company 445 Battalion.15
10 July 1970 182: 1st Company 30, 2nd Company 29, 3rd Company 25, 4th
Company 30, Headquarters and 5th Company 68. 1 ATF estimate.16
28 August 1970 - 176: 1st Company 33, 2nd Company 27, 3rd Company 26, 4th
Company 23 (OC Su Lc), Reconnaissance (Recce) Platoon 16, Signals Platoon 19,
Medical Section 9, Battalion Headquarters 23. Captured diary acting Battalion
Commander.17
30 December 1970 201: Headquarters/admin 30, 1st Company 21, 2nd Company
30, 3rd Company 28, 4th Company 22, Signals Platoon 22, Sapper/Recce Platoon
13, K8 Company 35. Captured documents.18
1 January 1971 160: Captured documents.19
1 January 1971 at that time, the personnel strength of a company was only about
20 riflemen 445 Battalion History (1991): ie following the Australian ambush of 445
Battalion at C Thi on 31 December 1970 see pp.475-478 in the 2004 Main Text.
February 1971 150; March 1971 approximately 139.20
2 April 1971 148: 445 Battalion Headquarters - 28, Sapper/Recce element - 9, Signals 22, Medical - 9, 1st Company - 25, 2nd Company - 10, 3rd Company - 27, 4th Company
18.21
1 May 1971 - 142: 1 ATF Estimate22:
14

Combat strength of D445 probably not more than 100 men 1 ATF, SUPINTREP 4/70, Ni t, 27
January 1970.
15
Appendix 1 to Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.56/70, Ni t, 25 February 1970. The ralliers debrief
provided an extensive list of the nicknames of a large number of the 445 Battalion cadre.
16
Graham, N.F. Major, D445 - Order of Battle, 1 ATF Battle Intelligence Section, Ni t, 29 May 1970,
Annex B. Also in OBrien, M., Conscripts and Regulars , op.cit., 1995, p.205 - as reported by 1 ATF.
17
Captured diary of Nm V 2ic 445 Battalion - Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM No. 264/70, Ni t, 21
September 1970. See the biography at Annex A, pp.23-24.
18
These figures are from captured 445 Battalion documents after the ambush by 7RAR at C Thi on 31
December 1970 Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM No.2/71, Ni t, 2 January 1971. 445 Battalion weapons
included two 60mm mortars (1st and 2nd Companies) and one 82mm mortar (4th Company) plus K8
Company (ex-440 Battalion): one 75mm RCL and one 82mm mortar.
19
445 Battalion strength figures as at 1 January 1971 from a document captured on 2 March 1971: 445
Battalion Headquarters - 24, Sapper/Recce element - 11, Signals - 20, Medical - 9, 1st Company - 24, 2nd
Company - 22, 3rd Company - 26, 4th Company - 18 = Total 160 1 ATF, INTSUM No.92/71, Ni t, 2
April 1971.
20
2RAR/NZ, D445 Local Force Battalion, Weekly Intelligence Review 718/14, Ni t, 17 March 1971.
21
Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM No.92/71, Ni t, 2 April 1971.

C-5

6 May 1971 159: 1 ATF estimate.23

27 June 1971 166: Captured 445 Battalion document.24
June 1971 135 [sic]: 1 ATF estimate errors in addition, actual total: 148.25
July 1971 158: 1 ATF estimate.26
August 1971 135 [sic]: 1 ATF estimate errors in addition, actual total: 157.27
September 1971 165: 1 ATF estimate errors in addition, actual total: 157.28
Based on the reality of the battlefield situation, at the beginning of September 1971,
the Sub-Region decided to disperse 445 Battalion, breaking it into three companies
and allocating these as core elements for our campaign in the two critical regions.29
May 1972 NVA reinforcements arrived at 445 Battalion.30

22

Headquarters & 5th Company 64, 1st Company 24, 2nd Company 9, 3rd Company 27, 4th Company
18, Total: 142 Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM No.121/71, Ni t, 1 May 1971.
23 st
1 Company - 24, 2nd Company - 22, 3rd Company - 27, 4th Company - 18, 5th Company (including
Headquarters 445 Battalion) 68 : Peters, C.C.M. Major, D445 - Order of Battle, 1 ATF Battle Intelligence
Section, Ni t, 6 May 1971; Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM No.137/71, Ni t, 17 May 1971.
24
As at 27 June 1971: Headquarters 30, 2nd Company - 33, 3rd Company - 35, 4th Company 20, Recce
Platoon 16, Signals Platoon - 20, Surgical Platoon - 12: Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM No.273/71, Ni
t, 30 September 1971.
25
Headquarters 445 Battalion & 5th Company 58, 1st Company 24, 2nd Company 22, 3rd Company
27, 4th Company 17: Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM No.179/71, Ni t, 28 June 1971.
26
Headquarters 445 Battalion & 5th Company 68, 1st Company - 24, 2nd Company - 22, 3rd Company - 27,
4th Company 17: Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM No.207/71, Ni t, 26 July 1971.
27
Headquarters 445 Battalion & 5th Company 68, 1st Company 24, 2nd Company 22, 3rd Company
26, 4th Company 17: Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM No.243/71, Ni t, 31 August 1971.
28
Headquarters 445 Battalion & 5th Company 68, 1st Company 24, 2nd Company 22, 3rd Company
26, 4th Company 17: Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM No.271/71, Ni t, 28 September 1971.
29
2004 D445 History, p.167. 1991 D445 History, temporarily divided up Chamberlain, E.P., D445
, op.cit., 2011, p.80. However, in January 1968, 1 ATF reported that 445 Battalion had not operated as a
battalion since February 1967. - Discussion Point: The Enemy In and Around Phuoc Tuy, Troops
Information Sheet No.77, Ni t, 31 December 1967 - 6 January 1968, Section 3, p.4.
30
In early May 1972, a group of 36 NVA soldiers members the 111-strong 4th Company/4/18/325th
Division reached the B Ra Sub-Region and were allocated to 445 Battalion. The group left their unit base
north of H Ni on 3 December 1971 and were on the Trail to the South from 19 December 1971 to 30
April 1972 (over four months) ie via Military Region 559, then, within the South, via the Liberation
Corridor Line. The detail of their infiltration via the way-stations (binh trm) and their personal particulars
are at CDEC Log 06-1049-72, VCAT Item No.2132010057, Report 6 028 0368 72 (see the diary of
Corporal ng Li ch). For information on the Trail (the Trans-Trng Sn Route), see also footnote
523 in the main text of the 2004 D445 History.

C-6

May 1972 over 300: when re-concentrated see 2004 D445 History, main text p.149.
May 1973 180: estimate by the US Defense Attache Office (DAO), Saigon.31
January 1975 250: As included in a US estimate: Units, Strengths, and Locations in
Military Regions.32
Vit Cng Irregular Forces and the CIA v MACV Dispute
During the War, CIA analysts were critical of USMACV estimates of enemy
strengths believing that USMACV under-estimated and incorrectly categorised some
enemy force elements. Initially, the CIA challenged MACV estimates of communist
irregular and political forces.
A 1967 US MACV analysis33 of Viet Cong Irregular Forces ie below the level
of Local Force battalions and District companies, described Irregular Forces in three
categories:
- Guerrillas - Du Kch: full-time forces organized into squads and platoons which
do not always stay in their home village or hamlet. Typical missions for the guerrillas are
collection of taxes, propaganda, protection of village Party committees, and terrorist and
sabotage activities.
- Self-Defense Force (SDF) T V: A VC paramilitary structure responsible for
the defense of hamlet and village areas controlled by the VC. These forces do not leave
their home area, and they perform their duties on a part-time basis. Duties consist of
conducting propaganda, constructing fortifications and defending home areas.
- Secret Self-Defense Force (SSDF) T V B Mt: A clandestine VC
organization which performs the same general functions in GVN controlled villages and
hamlets as do the self-defense forces in VC controlled areas. Their operations involve
intelligence collection as well as sabotage and propaganda activities.
For Phc Tuy Province, the US CICV reported the three following estimates for
strengths of the VC Irregular Forces as at 2 December 1966:
US Sector S2 Advisor : Guerrillas - 467; SDF 245; SSDF 207. Total 919.
ARVN
: Guerrillas 420; SDF - 1,445; SSDF 410. Total 2,275.
MACV Order-of-Battle: Guerrillas 405; SDF 575; SSDF 410. Total 1,390.
31

In May 1973, the US Defense Attache Office (DAO) estimated the strength of 445 Bn Ba Ria Long
Khanh Province Unit as 180 and also in Phc Tuy Province: D.500 Battalion MR1 with a strength of
55 NVA and 634 Battalion Ba Ria-Long Khanh Provincial Unit with a strength of 50 VC. USDAO,
PLAF/PAVN Troop Strength by Unit - May 1973 , Saigon, 31 May 1973 USDAO Report No. 6 918 5093
73. These USDAO figures were also cited on a Vietnamese military history website: Rongxanh, Phn b qun s cc n v Qun Gii phng min Nam trn lnh th min Nam Vit Nam n 31/5/1973
(Deployment and Strengths of South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces with the Territory of South
Vietnam 31 May 1973), Qun S Vit Nam.
32
In southern Phc Tuy Province: D445 250 personnel; and in Long Khnh-Bnh Tuy Provinces: 274
Regiment (1,300) and 33 Regiment (900) VCAT Item No.13370146001.
33
US CICV Estimate of Viet Cong Irregular Forces Strength in SVN (Draft Study), Saigon, 24 March
1967 VCAT Item No.0240612102.

C-7

However, in May 1967, these figures for December 1966 were amended to:
MACV Order-of-Battle: Guerrillas 400; SDF 250; SSDF 200. Total 850.34
84.2% of the Province was assessed as under Government control.35
However, The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and USMACV disagreed
significantly on irregular forces strength estimates until late 1967. In mid-September 1967
following a MACV/DIA/CIA conference in Saigon, USMACV removed secret self
defense forces essentially low level fifth columnists, used for information collection
from their order-of-battle reporting in late 1967.36 An agreed assessment was formalised
in November 1967.37 However, on 31 January 1968, a senior analyst in the office of the
CIAs Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs complained of acquiesence to MACV
half-truths, distortions, and sometimes outright falsehoods on VC manpower figures.38
The CIA v MACV disagreement was reported in the US media ie: CIA reported
enemy strength 150,000 NVN and VC troops in the South, Pentagon claimed 100,000
White House said about 70,000.39 CIA criticisms of USMACV and its methodology for
assessing NVA/VC strengths continued.40

34

USMACV-JGS RVNAF, Estimate of the Strength of VC Irregular Forces in SVN, 6-18-22, Saigon, 18
May 1967 VCAT Item No.0240618022. Following a review, MACV-JGS accepted lower figures based
on the Sector S-2 RITZ reporting. Discussion continued on strength figures later in Strength of VC
Irregular Forces, Saigon, 21 May 1967 1967 - see VCAT Item No.0241804003. MACV later made a public
statement: MACV Briefing on the Enemy Order of Battle, Saigon, 24 November 1967 see VCAT Items
No.2131001078 and 2120907019. This explained the change from irregulars to guerrillas full-time; and
the dropping of SD and SSD (previously two-thirds of the Irregulars strength of 100-120,000) due to SD
and SSD being considered part-time, a home guard, a fifth-column, of all ages with a large number of
females, and many not armed at all therefore not a valid part of the enemy force and not appropriate
on the MACV military order of battle and removed. Vit Cng political cadre were also removed from
the military order of battle and categorised as Vit Cng Infrastructure (VCI).
35
From January 1967, the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) was introduced as a method of statistical
assessment of security and pacification status in the countryside. MACV District Senior Advisors assessed
military, security, administrative, political and economic indicators which were then computer-processed.
The HES was an imperfect indicator and was given little credence after about 1972 when assessment was
done by Vietnamese officers. The HES categories were A to E and V - with A, B and C as secure; D and
E as contested; and V as VC-controlled - see Pike, D., South Vietnam Background Data, July 1971
VCAT Item No.2390805002. As at 1 January 1968, of South Vietnams population of 17.234 million,
those considered in secure areas were assessed as numbering 11,582,000 (67%); in contested areas:
2,818,000 (16.3%); and in VC-controlled areas: 2,834,000 (16.4%).
36
USMACV Briefing, 1 November 1967 VCAT Item No.2120907019.
37
Director of Central Intelligence, Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South
Vietnam (Special National Intelligence Estimate 14.3-67), Langley, 13 November 1967, pp.15-16. VCAT
Item No.F029200050309.
38
VCAT Item No.F029200050637.
39
Know Your Enemy: The Numbers Game, Newsweek, 4 March 1968, p.13 VCAT Item
No.F029200050770.
40
For a summary of the dispute between the CIA and MACV on NVA/VC strengths. between CIA and
MACV, see Adams, S., (CIA), Chronology of VC/NVA Problem, 22 Oct 1969,VCAT Item No.
F029200060698.

C-8

Post-Paris Agreement Figures

In April 1973 after the Paris Agreement, USMACV and CIA figures for
NVA/VC forces were respectively - Regular Combat: USMACV 128,000/ CIA 154,000;
Administrative Support: 63,000/71,000; and Guerrilla: 26,000/50,000; Total:
217,000/275,000 - and Dry Season ((armoured vehicles)) deployed into the South:
314/450 tanks; 27/50 APCs.41

D445 Personnel - ? 42
41
Memorandum: Comments on Differences Between MACV and CIA/OER Data on Communist Strength
in South Vietnam, 9 April 1973. VCAT Item No.F029200060825.
42
This is a commonly used/referred to photograph purportedly of D445 soldiers Australian War
Memorial (AWM) photograph P01934.033. The photograph was among several photographs in a portfolio/
album of photographs (see AWM P01934.001 to .042) recovered by 7RAR (Major E.J. ODonnell) during
Operation Santa Fe at YS 561825 about 10 kilometres north-east of Bnh Gi village on 8 November 1967.
The photographs have been labelled by the AWM as used by propaganda purposes, probably by a political
officer from D445, and two of the photographs are noted by the AWM as D445 ie P01934.033 and
P01934.041. However, the portfolio included several photographs of meetings and rallies in Bnh Dng
Province (eg: P01934.038). Accordingly, it is probable that photograph P01934.033 - shown above, is not
of D445 personnel. A set of photographs was also recovered on 23 November 1969 by 12/D/5RAR during
Operation Kings Cross in the north-western Hc Dch area at YS 359811 which are sometimes referred to
as D445 photographs and are displayed on the 5RAR Association website and on the Surplus Sammy
website on the Internet. These Kings Cross photographs appear to be of personnel from the VCs 10 th
Rng Sc Regiment or reconnaissance soldiers of the 5th VC Division. A 1 ATF INTSUM noted that regarding the large number of photographs recovered by D Company/5RAR at YS 359811 on 23 November
1969: Ident of Doan 10. Le Dinh Long - rallied from the Ba Long HQ, recognised a member of the 5th Div
Recce Coy. 1 ATF, INTSUM No.337/69, Ni t, 3 December 1969, para 6.b. The AWM website also
has a series of photographs - including Vit Cng soldiers (P01003.001 P01003.026) that are noted as
having been recovered in Phc Tuy Province in November 1971. However, there are commonalities
with the Kings Cross photographs, so it is highly probable that most of that series of photographs were
seized at the same time. Some of the photographs in that AWM series also show large quantities of Vit
Cng weapons captured in May 1970 near the Cambodian border and Vit Cng bunkers ie photographs
taken by ARVN or US military photographers, not by the Vit Cng.

Annex D
THE PROBABLE ORGANISATION OF D445 BATTALION MID-19661
Commander/CO
Political Officer
Deputy CO/XO/2ic4
Adjutant (Qun L)
1

Bi Quang Chnh (Su Chnh)2

Vn Lin (Ba Lin)3
T Chnh5 (V Quc Chnh)
Nguyn Tun Gii (Mi Gii)6

For brief biographies of nine Key Cadre of 445 Battalion, see Annex A; for Senior Cadre, see Annex
B. Several of these appointments in this Annex D for mid-1966 are based on a large number of proposed
and confirmed appointments (company commander to section 2ic) that were listed in an undated document
probably promulgated in the first quarter of 1966 - CDEC Log 12-2393-66. An outline organisation
diagram of 445 Battalion prepared by the Australian military in September 1966 is at p.94 in Burstall, T.,
Vietnam The Australian Dilemma, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1993. For 275th VC
Regiment senior cadre in mid-1966, see Annex O p.11.
2
See Chamberlain, E., Research Note 23/2010, 23 September 2010. Note that the Australian official history
(McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., p. 365) incorrectly shows Nguyn Vn Kim as the commander of 445
Battalion at the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966. This error has been repeated in several media. PostWar, Nguyn Vn Kim appeared in a lengthy Australian video documentary as the Long Tn
commander and described the battle - Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan The True Story,
Australian Broadcasting Commission/Film Australia, Lindfield, 1993. The 2004 D445 History states that
V Quc Chanh (T Chnh) commanded D445 at the Battle of Long Tn but this is assessed as very
unlikely, see the related discussion in Annex A Key Cadre.
3
Ba Lin was also noted as the head of the B Ra Province Political Section in July-September 1965 when
issuing a directive on Vit Cng desertions including from D445 Battalion - CDEC Log 09-2601-66.
Soon after, he was appointed the political officer of D445 Battalion. In a March 1989 interview, Ba Lin
gave his real name to the author Terry Burstall as ng [sic] Vn Chng but Vietnamese histories
and recovered Vietnamese records show his name as Vn Chng. For Vn Lin/Ba Lins
biography, see Annex A. The 2004 D445 History states that Nguyn Minh Ninh (Nm Ninh) replaced
Vn Lin (Ba Lin) as the D445 political officer in mid-1966 ie prior to the Battle of Long Tn but this
is assessed as very unlikely, see the following footnote and discussion in Annex A Key Cadre.
4
In an interview with a former 1 ATF Civil Affairs officer Barry Smith in 1990, Nguyn Minh Ninh
declared that he had been the deputy commander of D445 battalion at the battle of Long Tan. - Smith, B.,
The Role and Impact of Civil Affairs in South Vietnam 1965-1971, The Australian Army and the Vietnam
War 1962-1972, Army History Unit, Canberra, 2002.
5
In late 1963, T Chnh (V Quc Chnh) was appointed as the C445 Company Commander. At the
beginning of 1964, C440 was formed under Nm nh and C445 remained under T Chnh. T Chnh
(ie V Quc Chnh) was appointed the 2ic of the B Ra Province Concentrated Unit on 23 February 1965
ie before the Battalions formal foundation in May 1965 - see CDEC Log 09-1983-66. However, in the
1991 D445 History, T Chnh is not mentioned as a senior cadre at the formal formation of 445 Battalion
in May 1965. The 1991 D445 History (p.62) states that at Long Tn: the 1st and 3rd Companies of 445
Battalion were directly commanded by Comrade Su Thu (the Battalion 2ic) ie Nguyn c Thu. The
2004 D445 History states that V Quc Chanh was appointed commanding officer of D445 in mid-1966
and mentions him as the commander during the Battle of Long Tn but this is considered as very unlikely.
Later, T Chnh is reported in the 1991 445 Battalion History at p.65 as the Battalion 2ic and
commanding the Battalions forces in the successful attack on the n Sp camp at Phc Hi on 20
November 1966. Soon after - at p.68, Ba Kin is noted as the Battalion 2ic. A rallier in February 1967
reported 445 Battalions commanding officer as Su Chnh and the Executive Officer as T Chnh CMIC 02-031-67. Also in February 1967, the rallier Trn Vn Ba (Party Secretary, Tha Tch village)
stated an assistant battalion commander (but unit not known) named Chanh was killed in the Long Tn
battle see VCAT File No.F034600791676. T Chnh is also reported to have replaced Su Chnh (ie Bi
Quang Chnh) and become 445 Battalions second commander until T Chnh was killed in an
Australian ambush in 1967 Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, p.124. See also the biographies
in Annex A.
6
Nguyn Tun (Vn) Gii (Mi Gii - b. Qung Ngi, North Vietnam) was a platoon commander in the
5th Company of 445 Battalion in January 1966. As the Battalion adjutant, he attended a COSVN/SVNLA
training course at the H21 Rear Services School in the period February-early August 1966, and was
formally appointed adjutant (qun l) of 445 Battalion in September 1966. The Battalion adjutant was
responsible for managing rear service support including finances. Nguyn Tun Giis diary indicates that

D-2

1st Company OC
Deputy/XO/2ic
Political Officer
Asst Political Offr
Asst Political Offr
Adjutant

Trn Vn Chin7 - ie Trn Vn Hu (Su Chin)

o Vn Tng (Tm Tng)8
T Vn Dng9
ng Cng Quang10
Nguyn Thnh Long11
Trn Vn Anh

2nd Company OC
Political Officer
XO/Deputy
Asst Political Offr

o Thanh Xun12
Nguyn Minh Khanh (Hai Khanh)13
L Minh Kiu (?)
Nguyn Vn Binh14

3rd Company15 OC

Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu)16

he was enroute from H21 back to Phc Tuy Province at the time of the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August
1966.
7
Trn Vn Chin (Su Chin) was appointed from Executive Officer (XO/2ic) to the position on 20
October 1965 (CDEC Log 09-1876-66). He was awarded a Certificate of Commendation by the B Ra
Province Unit in mid-February 1966 (CDEC Log 04-1394-66), was as an outstanding emulator of 1965
(CDEC Log 05-1294-66) a very unusual award for such a high-ranking cadre, and had been formally
promoted to Commander of the 1st Company on 15 February 1966 (CDEC Log 05-1294-66). He was killed
in action at the Battle of Long Tn. He was honoured as the martyr Trn Vn Chin (Trn Vn Hu) the
445 Battalion deputy commander killed in 1966 - Dinh L, B Ra-Vng Tu Internet, 13 Jul 2009.
8
Appointed on 20 October 1965 - promoted from platoon commander. He was still with the Company in
October 1966. Commander of the 1st Company in December 1967. Appointed 445 Battalion Commander in
1973.
9
T Dng was noted early in the 1991 and 2004 D445 Histories as the deputy political officer of 440
Company in December 1964. He was formally promoted from platoon leader to assistant political officer
by Military Region 1/B Ra Province Unit on 20 October 1965 CDEC Log 09-1876-66. However in the
earlier D445 History, T Dng is shown in May 1965 as the 1st Company political officer. He was also
recorded in a captured document conducting a motivational campaign as the 1 st Company political officer in
December 1965 that included a quite detailed history of the then 117-strong 1st Company - CDEC Log 051293-66. In mid-1966, a T Vn Dng was recommended for promotion to political officer of the
Battalions 1st Company CDEC Log 12-2393-66. T Dng was killed in action against Australian forces
in mid-July 1966 A number of comrades were wounded. Comrade T Dng the political officer of the
1st Company, died on the withdrawal route back to our base. See also 1 ATF INTSUM No.55, Ni t, 26
July1966. His replacement was not apparent.
10
Noted as the commanding officer of the Chu Thnh District Militia Unit on 12 March 1965 CDEC
Log 04-1385-66. Appointed company assistant political officer on 20 October 1965 - promoted from
platoon commander. Noted as an Assistant Political Officer in February 1966 CDEC Log 9-2049-66. Still
with the Company in October 1966.
11
Appointed 20 October 1965 promoted from platoon commander. Killed in an ambush by Australian
forces at C Thi near Xuyn Mc on 31 December 1970 when commanding D445 Battalions 2nd Company.
12
Appointed 20 January 1966 promoted from XO. According to a rallier (3rd Section 2ic/2/2/D445) in
February 1967, the 2nd Company commander was then Danh Su Chin. He noted that the previous CO
died in the Long Tn battle on 18 August 1966 CMIC 02-031-67. However, that may be a confused
reference to Trn Vn Chin (Su Chin see footnote 7) the commander of the 1st Company who was
killed at the Battle of Long Tn.
13
Promoted from assistant political officer to political officer on 20 October 1965. Still with the Company
in October 1966. According to a rallier in February 1967, Nguyn Minh Khanh (Hai Khanh) was
transferred to the Battalion headquarters staff in December 1966 - CMIC 02-031-67.
14
Promoted from platoon commander to Executive Officer (XO ie 2ic) on 20 October 1965.
15
Command Committee: Trn Hng c, o Vn Tun, Nguyn Vn Thnh, Trn Minh Khi CDEC
Log 12-2419-66. No date, but probably post-September 1966 see the following footnote 21.
16
Promoted from platoon leader to XO on 20 October 1965. Probably still formally an XO but filling the
company commander position. See also McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.365 which has Nguyn

D-3
Political Officer
XOs/Deputies18

Nguyn Vn Thnh17
L Minh Kin (?), o Vn Tun19, Trn Vn Khi/Khi.20

4th Company OC
Asst Political Offr
Asst Political Offr

Trn H g c (Trn Thanh Sn)21

H Vit Hoa/Ha22
Nguyn c Thng/Thng (Su Thng)23

5th Company OC24

--------------------------------------------------------Platoon commanders:
Nguyn Vn Triu/Thiu, Trn Vn Thc (Ngc Chu), Lm Phng, Nguyn
Hang V, Nguyn Vn Thin (Ha), Nguyn Vn i25 wef 5 June 1966 (plus six
c Thu commanding C2 ie the 2nd Company. The 1991 D445 History (p.62) states that at the 18 August
1966 Battle of Long Tn: the 1st and 3rd Companies of 445 Battalion were directly commanded by
Comrade Su Thu (the Battalion 2ic) ie Nguyn c Thu. The 2004 D445 History similarly notes: The
1st and 3rd Companies were directly commanded by a company commander Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu).
Thu was noted commanding the 2nd Company in October 1966; and as a Battalion 2ic in early 1967.
17
Promoted from assistant political officer to political officer on 20 October 1965. Still with the Company
in October 1966.
18
All former platoon commanders probably being posted to XO positions.
19
Still with the Company in October 1966.
20
Still with the Company in October 1966 also as Trn Minh Khi (see footnote 15 above) and Nguyn
Vn Khi.
21
XO and acting company commander ie he replaced Phan Vn Nh (aka T Nh - who had been
appointed OC of the 4th Company on 9 December 1965) - CDEC Log 12-2438-66. See cs Personal
History Statement, 15 July 1966 CDEC Log 12-1265-66. On 9 December 1965, Trn Hng c was
posted from XO to the Civil Affairs Committee of the B Ra Province Unit. Post-Long Tn, on 28
September 1966, Trn Hng c was appointed to command the 3rd Company CDEC Log 12-2438-66
ie probably to replace Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu) who was seriously wounded at the Long Tn battle.
Trn Hng c was noted commanding the 3rd Company in October 1966 and Phan Vn Nh was noted
to have returned to command the 4th Company. See Trn Hng cs Personal History Statement at
footnote 37.
22
Still with the Company in October 1966.
23
Party Chapter Secretary of the 4th Company. Still with the Company in October 1966. Member of its
Command Committee in February 1967 the 4th Company (C4) was then 73-strong - CDEC Log 05-176967.
24
Cadre not identified in mid-1966. The Battalions 5th Company was noted as active in 1965 (CDEC Log
04-1431-66 commendation for L Vn Li; CDEC Log 12-2451-66 - promotion of H Vn Phong) and in
1966 (see footnotes 69, 83, 172, 178 and 197 in the 1991 D445 History). The Military Affairs Committee
Roster document (CDEC Log 12-2393-66) of mid-1966 lists promotions for nine junior personnel of the 5 th
Company and Nguyn Vn Gii (see footnote 6 above) was noted as a platoon commander in the 5th
Company in the first half of 1966 CDEC Log 05-1752-67. Long was reportedly the Company
Commander in October 1966 possibly Nguyn Thnh Long (see footnote 11). In December 1966,
according to a finance report, the 5th Companys strength was 91 CDEC Log 05-1724-67. For the Battle
of Long Tn (18 August 1966), the 5th Division History (2005) notes a L Hu Ngha commanding the
reconnaissance company of the 275th Regiment the 275th Regiments B-21 Reconnaissance Company
was reportedly 60-strong (early 1967). L Hu Ngha was also the aka of L Trung Dung, a staff officer
(senior captain) of the military branch of T1/MR1 in early 1966 CDEC Log 03-1341-66.
25
Real name: Nguyn Vn c see his Personal History Statement (PHS) dated August 1965, together
with 20 junior cadre CDEC Log 12-2394-66. He was an acting platoon leader from 27 August 1965;
promoted to platoon commander of B2/C4 on 5 June 1966, promoted to XO of the 4th Company on 28
September 1966 - CDEC Log 12-2451-66, and was still with the 4th Company in October 1966. A member
of the Command Committee of the 73-strong 4th Company in March 1967 CDEC Log 05-1769-67.

D-4
newly-promoted deputy platoon leaders) see CDEC Log 09-1830-66, Bulletin 1057.26
Trnh Vn Lim (later killed on 31 December 1970 at C Thi when the 2nd Company
political officer). Nguyn Su platoon commander in 3rd Company CDEC Log 122419-66, 12-2394-66 (Personal History Statement).
Probable platoon commanders include: Hong Thanh Dn, Nguyn Vn Bo and
Phm Thanh Phn (Phm Vn Vn), B2 of 3rd Company - CDEC Log 09-2049-66, 122394-66); and Nguyn Vn Su platoon leader, sapper unit.
Possible platoon commanders (vide CDEC Bulletin 1761, Log 12-2393-66)
include: Trn Trung Hng probably 3rd Company; Trn Vn n/n (Nguyn Vn
On/n/n) B3, 4th Company27; Trn Vn Li B1, Quch Vn Mi (Mi Dm,
Quch Vn Tm)28; Trn Trung B (Trn Vn B)29 B2, 1st Company; Nguyn Vn V
(Nguyn Vn Nm, Nm V)30 B3, 1st Company; Trn Minh B1, 2nd Company;
Nguyn Vn Bi (Phc)31 Reconnaissance Platoon.
Nguyn Vn Nhng (alias Lc) a D445 defector/rallier (29 July 1969),
declared that during the Battle of Long Tn, he served as the 2ic of the 3rd platoon, 1st
Company D445.32
Medical Officer: Nguyn Vn Hiu also as Nguyn Thanh Hiu.33
----------------------------------------------------------Strength and Personnel Profile of 445 Battalion 1966 34
Based on a comprehensive report by 445 Battalions political officer Vn Lin
dated 23 July 1966 ie about four weeks before the Battle of Long Tn, it is probable that
the Battalions strength in mid-August 1966 was 380-400 and: 70 percent of its strength
were aged 25 years and younger; 93 percent had joined the Army in the period 19611966; 70 percent were single; 73 percent had already been awarded Letters of
26

A number of platoon and section/squad commanders appointed in early 1966 can be deduced from CDEC
Log 12-2393-66, but their status in August 1966 is unconfirmed. As noted, the Personal History Statements
of 20 platoon commanders, 2ics, squad/section leaders in August 1965 (ie a year before the Long Tn
battle) can be found in CDEC Bulletin 1761 and Log 12-2394-66.
27
Personal History Statement at CDEC Log 12-2394-66. Still with the 4th Company in October 1966.
28
Personal History Statement at CDEC Log 12-2394-66. Commanding B1, 1st Company (in August 1965).
29
Personal History Statement at CDEC Log 12-2394-66.
30
Nguyn Vn Nm (Nm V , Nguyn Vn V), b. 1941, Phc Hi a platoon commander in the 1st
Company of 445 Battalion in May 1965 and the Group Chapter Secretary see his Personal History
Statement (25 August 1965) CDEC Log 12-2394-66. Nm V ie as 2ic of 445 Battalion, was killed
by Australian forces at t on 17 September 1970 see his outline biography at Annex A.
31
Personal History Statement at CDEC Log 12-2394-66.
32
Pannell, B.W., Postscript to Long Tan, Australian Infantry, 16, No.2, May 1970, p.180. Nguyn Vn
Kim Commander D445 (1968-1969) stated that Nhng had served as a squad leader at Long Tn, and
that he (Kim) had later promoted him to the level of company commander. - McNeill, I., To Long Tan,
op.cit., 1993, p.367. For biodata on Nhng, see Annex B, footnote 18.
33
In the text of this 2004 D445 History, he is referred to as both Nguyn Thanh Hiu and Nguyn Vn Hiu
(aka Nm Hiu). Hiu was detached from 445 Company in August 1961 to attend an y t (medic/nurse)
course. In early 1964, as an y t, he headed the 445 Company medical element. In 1965, following
training, he graduated as an y s (assistant doctor) and returned to command the 445 Battalion medical
element. In January 1973, he was reportedly appointed as the head of the K76C Hospital. See: L Thanh
Dng (et al), Lch S Ngnh Y T B Ra-Long Khnh (1945-2006) - The History of the B Ra-Long
Khnh Medical Services (1945-2006), Vng Tu, 2008. For detail on 445 Battalions medical equipment
and stores as at 5 July 1966, see the signed report by the Battalions doctor Nguyn Vn Hiu, that
includes several thousand chloroquine tablets for malarial prophylaxis. CDEC Log 12-2427-66.
34
For a review of 445 Battalion strength figures with references, see Annex C.

D-5
Appreciation or Certificates of Commendation; 66 percent came from lower class
families and 33 percent from middle class families; 29 percent were Party members and
35 percent were Labour Youth Group members; and 12 percent had completed four years
of schooling and above. For further data see Annex G The Party in D445 Battalion.
Within the unit - additional to the Party Chapter system, solidarity, cohesion and
control were assisted by the communist system of three-man cells within sections and
self-criticism (kim tho). The cells were intended as harmonious three-man cooperatives
that fought, ate and quartered together. For 445 Battalions cell and morale in April 1967,
see the debrief of Nguyn Vn Hch (G.4544 Ordnance Company) that notes the 3-man
team ((cell)) system, whereby one checks on the other two prevents them from taking
the chance to rally.35 Political officers also exhorted their troops on the basis of several
codes including the: Code of Discipline (12 points), Oath of Honour (12), Three
Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points of Attention, Rule of Secrecy (15).36

Personal History Statement Military Member, B Ra Province.

Trn H g c Company Commander D445 Battalion37

35

CDEC Log 9-0038-67, VCAT Item No.F034600701360.

See appendices in Lanning M.L. & Cragg, D., Inside the VC and the NVA, Ballantine Books, New York,
1992.
37
See also footnote 21. Personal History Statement, dated 15 July 1966 Trn Hng c (aka Trn Thanh
Sn). The booklet details his family, military, and Party history - eg he joined the Party on 6 January 1960.
CDEC Log 12-1265-66.
36

D-6
Awards for D445 Personnel 38
A number of 445 Battalion personnel received Letters of Appreciation (Giy
Khen) for their performance at the Battle of Long Tn. Documents captured by Australian
forces included: Giy Khen for : o Vn Trung section 2ic/2nd Company/D445, 18
Aug 66 - Long Tn (CDEC Log 12-2368-66) see below; and: Trn Vn Tranh 2nd
Company/D445, and Phm Vn ng of the 2nd Company/D445 CDEC Log 01-167369.

Letter of Appreciation awarded to o Vn Trung

for his achievements in the battle with the Australians on 18 August 1966,
signed by the 445 Battalion Political Officer Vn Lin on 12 November 196639

38

A captured 445 Battalion document showed that of the Battalions strength of 403 in mid-1966, 294 (73
percent) had received awards - ie Letters of Appreciation or Certificates of Commendation. See Annex G,
for further data on age, social and marital status, Party membership, and length of service of 445 Battalion
personnel including awards at p.5 and footnote 13. According to 1985 ng Nai Province publication,
D455 personnel were awarded a total of 1,777 Letters of Appreciation (Giy Khen). - H Sn i & Trn
Quang Toi, ng Nai (The Heroic Units of ng Nai), op.cit., 1985, p.11. The listings did not
separately include Bng Khen (Certificates of Commendation) ie a higher award than Giy Khen, many of
which were awarded to D445 personnel. For a listing of D445 awards cited in the 1985 ng Nai Province
publication, see footnote 613 in the main text.
39
Australian troops contacted 12 VC local force troops on 5 December 1966 at YS 435638. o Vn Trung
was probably one of the five VC killed in the clash. 1ATF, INTSUM No.187, Ni t, 5 December 1966.

Annex E
THE BATTLE OF LONG TN:
A SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT) SUMMARY
SIGINT1
The Australian Army Official History notes: The overall assessment by Major
Furner ((MBE, DSM - GSO2 Intelligence HQ 1 ATF, 1967-1968)) was that Sigint could
be an extremely useful tool to the intelligence officer provided it was taken in
conjunction with all the other sources available. In that way it achieved its true value, and,
said Furner, I would rank it as a very important and a primary source of intelligence
value in any type of military operation. During the course of the war, whenever task
force intelligence summaries were able to provide reliable information on the location or
movement of the NVA and Viet Cong main force regiments, the source of the
information was most often the work of 547 Signal Troop. The role and the behind-thescenes operations of this mystery unit deserve some examination.2
The 275th VC Main-Force Regiment
The 275th VC Main-Force Regiment as the 5th VC Divisions 5th Regiment,
was formally founded in September 1965. See Annex O for detail on the Regiment that
includes reference to its History published in mid-20153, particularly the Regiments role
as the principal VC element at the Battle of Long Tn in mid-August 1966.
In August 1966, the Regiment commanded by NVA Senior Captain Nguyn
Thi Bng (t Thi - biography at Appendix 2 to Annex O), comprised three infantry
battalions4 and support companies, and had a strength of about 1,500.5 Captured
1

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is intelligence-gathering by the interception of signals - whether

communications between people (communications intelligence - abbreviated to COMINT), or from
electronic signals not directly used in communication (electronic intelligence - abbreviated to ELINT).
2
McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.59 and endnote 125 (p.505). The intelligence
sources and agencies available to 1 ATF included: Higher and flanking headquarters eg MACV (Si Gn)
and its agencies including CDEC, the US II FFV (Long Bnh), 10th/18th ARVN Division (Xun Lc); 1
ATF units principally infantry including SAS; Technical assets Signals Intelligence, Aerial Recon/Photo
Recon, Sideways Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR), Red Haze (airborne infra-red), E-63 airborne People
Sniffer, Artillery locating and ground sensors, ground surveillance radar (PPS-10); Human intelligence
POWs, ralliers, agents and informants (assisted by an ARVN detachment 10 MID); Captured Documents
and Equipment including directives, personal notebooks, staff tables and personnel lists, financial
accounts, and letters; Liaison with ARVN Sector HQ (B Ra) and Sub-Sectors/Districts, the Pheonix
Program, the Provincial Recon Unit (PRU), the Census Grievance Program, the Chiu Hi Centre
(NVA/VC defectors), and the local US MACORDS Advisory Team 89. See: Chamberlain, E.P., The
Enemy and Intelligence, in Phuoc Tuy: Successes and Failures, NVVM, Phillip Island, 12 April 2014.
3
H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), Lch S Trung on B Binh 5 (1965-2015) - The History of the 5th
((275th)) Infantry Regiment, Nh Xut Bn Quan i Nha Da (The Peoples Armed Forces Publishing
House), H Ni, 2015.
4
The 1st and the 2nd Battalions had their origins in the Mekong Delta region. Following heavy casualties, in
May 1966, the NVA D605 Battalion, was incorporated as the Regiments new 3rd Battalion.
5
In May 1966, 1 ATF assessed the strength of the 275th Regiment as 1,850 and the 5th VC Division as
3,850+ 1 ATF, INTSUM No.1/66, Vng Tu, 21 May 1966. For the agreed US and RVNAF

E-2

documents indicate that in August 1966, the 275th Regiments Signal Company had a
strength of 105 with a further 39 in each of the signal platoons of its three organic
infantry battalions.6 Radios used by the 275th Regiment in mid-1966 comprised the US
AN/GRC-9 (HF: 2-12 MHz, 15w)7; the Chinese Communist (Chicom) 102E (AM HF: 212 MHz, 15w ranges: voice 80 kilometres, CW/morse 200 kilometres - a copy of the
US AN/GRC-9); the Chicom 71B (AM HF: 1.9-7.2 MHz morse, up 40 kilometres); the
US AN/PRC-10 (VHF)8; and the VTS9 HF receiver. The numbers held of each of those
radios are unclear10, but at the battalion level, based on the known data on the 271st VC
Regiment11 and the 274th VC Regiment12, the 275th Regiment almost certainly also had
assessment of the 5th Division and its regiments including organisation and senior personnel, as at midAugust 1966, see: Confirmation of Enemy Units, 20 August 1966 - CDEC Log 8-0805-66, VCAT Item
No.F034600421687. The 275th Regiments strength was estimated at 1,800: Several cadre and soldiers of
the 5th ((ie the 275th Regiment)) have contracted malaria, and after the defeat of 21 March, it will be a long
time before the unit can resume its combat activities. - ie after the second battle of V Su/V Xu in March
1966 (see Annex O, p.11).
6
One document a notebook, detailed the expenditures of the 275th Regiments Signal Company for the
period June 1965 July 1966, see: CDEC Log 10-1720-66, VCAT Item No.F034600110443. This
document was captured by the US 1st Air Cavalry Division on 29 September 1966 at ZT 233217.
Expenditures were denominated in Cambodian riels suggesting probable purchases from Cambodian
military and civilian sources.
7
The 275th Regiments 2nd Battalion had captured an AN/GRC-9 radio in an attack on the Sui Cat strategic
hamlet (YS 595065) on Route 1 in early November 1965 debrief of NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting, CMIC
No.2550, VCAT Item No.2310305007.
8
This listing is based principally on the battery purchases- ie pin, in the notebook cited in footnote 6.
9
The VTS ie the VTS-2 named after the VC heroine V Th Sau (b. 1933 in t ), was a receiver
manufactured in North Vietnam used principally for intercepting enemy communications. See the VTS-2
operating manual at CDEC #3-0736-66, VCAT Item No.F034600171499; and US MACV, VC/NVA Signal
Order of Battle - Update, Study 67-021, Saigon, 16 September 1967. - VCAT Item No.F015900250094. In
mid-June 1970, the t District History (2006) related: According to the enemys messages that we
intercepted, they lost 80 killed, and two aircraft were shot down. see footnote 460 in the main text.
10
According to a 1967 MACV Study, the following numbers of radios were held by NVA/VC forces in III
Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ): AN/GRC-9 18 radios; Chicom 102E - 23 ; Chicom 71B 60; AN/PRC-10
- 133; AN/PRC-25 - 11; ex-USAID radios 20. See: VC/NVA Electronic Warfare (EW) Capability
MACV ST 67-061, 1 July 1967 - VCAT Item No.2250110001. The NVA/VC termed their signals
intelligence activities as: Trinh sat K thut - ie Technical Reconnaissance. For a report on the 12-man
A-3 Intercept Unit captured by the US 1st Infantry Division in Bnh Dng Province on 20 December
1969 see VCAT Item No.11271007001. See also Military Region 7s Technical Reconnaissance Unit
(1970-71) at VCAT Item No.2131611049 and Item No. 2311214015. For 1 ATF awareness, see footnote
99. The probable NVA/VC interception of 1 ATF communications in April 1969 during an attack on VC
Military Region 7, is cited in Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2013, pp.108-109,
897-898 see also 1 ATF INTSUM No.146-69, 26 May 1969 (AWM95, 1/4/52); and footnote 193.
11
In the first half of 1966 to 8 June 1966, the 271st Regiment was noted to hold the following
communications equipment: radios a 15w radio, 71B, PRC-10, PRC-25; telephones TA43, TA312.
CDEC Log 03-2881-67.
12
The HQ 274th Regiments radio equipment in mid-1966 comprised: two 15w HF radios (Chicom 102E
and/or US AN/GRC-9); VHF manpack: one PRC-25, and three PRC-10 sets. There were also a total of 10
PRC-10 sets with its battalions, and two HF Chicom 71B radios with the Regiments reconnaissance
element. - see: CDEC Log 11-1253-66, VCAT Item No.F034600560291.

E-3

captured US AN/PRC-1013 and/or AN/PRC-2514 VHF manpack radios at the battalion

level; and the Regiments reconnaissance element probably operated Chinese 71B HF
radios. Specifically, a captured document detailed that in 1966 the Regiments 3rd
Battalion (the D605 NVA Battalion) was equipped with one 15w HF radio, three PRC-10
VHF radios, two signal pistols, six telephones, and six kilometres of telephone cable.15
Other civilian non-ruggedize radios seized by Vit Cng forces from villages and
districts, were also utilized including the US-made Hallicrafters HT-1 handie-talkie.16
For security, Vit Cng and North Vietnamese forces made extensive use of messagecarrying by communications-liaison (commo-liaison) couriers, telephone line-laying,
switchboards, and field telephones; whistles; bugle calls17; and flag signals.18 Their
communications security (COMSEC) was also enhanced by limiting the power output of
radio transmitters, encryption, remoting transmitters from the locations of headquarters
elements, cover designators and letter-box numbers for units, codewords, nicknames,
veiled speech, and other security-enhancing methods and techniques.
In 1966, the 275th Regiments communications to higher headquarters were
principally to the Headquarters 5th VC Division and also to the headquarters of Military
Region 119, and with the Long - B - Bin Province Headquarters.20

13

The AN/PRC-10 VHF FM manpack radio (.9 watt output) had a planning range of eight kilometres with
its short antenna. With the RC-292 antennae at each end of a link, the range was 19 kilometres. Due to the
PRC-10s unsatisfactory performance, in mid-1965 General W.C. Westmoreland COMUSMACV,
ordered the replacement of the PRC-10s held by US forces in Vietnam with the more effective AN/PRC-25
radio.
14
The VHF FM AN/PRC-25 manpack radio had a range of up to eight kilometres (using the short steel-tape
aerial) and up to about 17 kilometres (using the long whip aerial). In 1967, General Creighton C. Abrams
COMUSMACV, stated that the PRC-25 was the single most important tactical item in Vietnam."
15
The notebook of the signal platoon commander showed the platoons strength as 31. CDEC Log 042199-67.
16
The following radios were provided by the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM) and the U.S. Agency for
Intenational Development (USAID): the HT-1 Handie-Talkie (.5 watt): voice 5km; TR-5 (5 watt), voice
16km AM; TR-20 (20 watt): 32 km CW, voice; and the FM-1 (1 watt) voice: 5km.
17
There are several references to the use of bugle calls in the D445 Histories and of a Battalion bugle
section. On 28 May 1966, a D445 Battalion bugler Nguyn Vn Lm, was killed in an attack at Cy
Trng, Hi M village see Annex F p.15 for his death certificate (Giy Bo T) and letter of condolence.
1 ATF records show 6RAR engaged a VC company group at YS 509682 on 25 July 1966 during which
the VC elements employed bugle calls, returned fire, and withdrew. 1 ATF, INTSUMs No.54 and No.55,
Ni t, 25 and 26 July 1966. The 1 ATF Commanders Conference 3 August 1966, noted that D445
used bugles to give signals. For VC bugle signals at the Battle of Long Tn, see footnote 123.
18
For technical detail on NVA/VC communications: organisation, techniques, tactics, training and
equipment (and including an organogram and data on the 105-strong Signal Company of the 275th
Regiment) see: Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) US MACV, VC/NVA Signal Order of
Battle - Update, Study 67-021, Saigon, 16 September 1967 - VCAT Item No.F015900250094. That Study
lists 275th Regiments radios as only: one 102E, one GRC-9, and one 71B switchboard [sic]. For other
USMACV reference publications see: VCAT Item No.F031100050340; F01590029051- 7/6/66;
F015900290670 18/7/66 for training aspects; F015900290694 - 1/9/66; F015900290264 - 1/9/66;
F015800190145 1/5/69 ; F015900300282 29/11/70.
19
Military Region 1 (ie T.1) later became Military Region 7 (T.7).

E-4

VC HF Radio Operators
D445 Local Force Battalion
Prior to D445s initial founding as a company-sized element (C40) in August
1958, radio communications for communist forces in Phc Tuy Province had already
been established ie: At the beginning of 1958, the Military Committee of the Eastern
Region appointed Comrade L Minh Thnh (Sau Thnh) to take a section and a radio to
B Ra and organise an armed force.21 In May 1960, the 40th Company ie a D445
predecessor element, seized a radio from a commando unit at Xuyn Mc. In July
1964, its successor 445 Company seized a US AN/PRC-10 VHF radio following an
engagement with ARVN Sub-Sector elements at c M hamlet (Bnh Ba). In December
1964, 440 Company reportedly seized a US PRC-25 [sic] VHF radio following an
ambush on Route 44 at Ging.22 About a year later, as a battalion, D445 seized two
PRC-25 radios in an ambush at Ging on 24 December 1965 [sic]23, and a further two
in an engagement at B K Slope (t ) in April 1966. The extent to which D445
Battalion used HF radios in 1966 is unclear.24
20

The 1991 D445 History relates a reconnaissance of the Long Tn and Long Phc area in early August
1966 by cadre of the 5th VC Division Headquarters, the Province Unit, and an element from D445 Battalion
see: Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit., 2011, pp.39-40; and also footnote 260 in the preceding main
text.
21
2004 D445 History, p.21. C.40 Company ie an early D445 predecessor, was founded in June 1958
under L Minh Thnh.
22
This seizure of an AN/PRC-25 radio on 24 or 25 December 1964 is recounted in both the 2004 D445
History and the 2006 t District History but not in the 1991 D445 History. AN/PRC-25 radios were
not introduced into Vietnam until late 1965 see footnote 13. Accordingly, it is more likely that a
AN/PRC-10 radio was probably seized.
23
This was reportedly D445s first battalion-level mobile ambush. While the 2004 D445 History cites
the Ging ambush as occuring on 24 December 1965, the more detailed account in the 1991 D445
History and US reports, indicate the engagement occurred on 7-8 January 1966. The 1991 D445 History
does not record any seizure of PRC-25s in this ambush ie on 7 January 1966, nor on 24 December 1965.
However, the seizure of an AN/PRC-25 is also related in the t District History (2006). It is possible
that AN/PRC-25 radios then only recently available, were being carried by US advisors three were
reportedly killed in the engagement.
24
A 1967 US MACV study listed D445s signal equipment as comprising only five PRC-10 radios, two
PRC-6 radios, and ten field telephones. - US MACV, VC/NVA Signal Order of Battle - Update, Study 67-

E-5

547 Signal Detachment/Troop25

The role of 1 ATFs signals intelligence unit - 547 Signal Detachment (a 16strong Detachment until later formally titled as a Troop in early March 1967), was
to receive end product from US SIGINT sources, and to conduct communications
intercept, processing and reporting activities as agreed by the US ASA ((Army Security
Agency)) to meet the requirements of the Commander 1 Aust Task Force. The
Detachment was under the operational control of the US ASA organisation for
operational tasking instructions and technical support.26 The Detachment moved from
Vng Tu to the Task Force base at Ni t on 14 June 1966 - with the Detachment sited
adjacent to the 1 ATF Headquarters. Intercept operations commenced on 24 June against
VC HF communications from two-three operator27 positions each with two radio
receivers.28
The units history recounts:

021, Saigon, 16 September 1967 - VCAT Item No.F015900250094. A later 1 ATF study in early 1969
reported that D445 possibly had a US-manufactured SCR-694 HF radio (AM, 17w, CW and voice, 22.5
kg). De Cure, P.F. Major, D445 Local Force Battalion, HQ 1ATF Ni t, 18 January 1969. In midSeptember 1970, a D445 Battalion rallier stated the Battalions radios comprised: a 15w set using only
morse ((ie: HF - highly likely to have been a Chicom 102E or a US AN/GRC-9)), three PRC-25 sets, one
PRC-10 set, and three field telephones with 2,000 metres of cable. - 1 ATF, INTSUM No.263/70, Ni t,
20 September 1970. The encrypted HF morse communications of D445 Battalion were in a four figure
(one-time letter) code, with five figure and five letter ((code)) mainly used in traffic to higher formations
that was in a higher encryption. email to author (Chamberlain) from Major R.W. Hartley AM (Retd)
29 April 2012.
25
547 Signal Detachment/Troops alpha-numeric SIGINT Activity Designator (SIGAD) was AUM 352.
The SIGAD of its parent unit 7th Signal Regiment at Cabarlah (Queensland) was AUM 350.
26
The Detachment was established and its operational role detailed in AHQ (DMI) Instruction No. 1/66,
Comint Support for 1 ATF Vietnam, Canberra, 17 June 1966. For cover purposes, the Detachment was
referred to as the AMF ((ie Australian Military Forces)) Direct Support Unit (AMF DSU) for cover, see
also footnote 99. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) at 1 ATF included the monitoring, collection, and
decryption and analysis of enemy radio communications almost solely morse; and the fixing of enemy
transmitter locations. At its founding, the Detachments primary aim was to provide a means by which
Comd 1ATF could receive results of the U.S. Signal Intelligence effort. In addition, a small intercept and
processing capability was inbuilt in order that the DSU ((ie 547)) could provide a direct service to Comd
1ATF on VC units and formations within the 1ATF TAOR. DMI (to DCGS), AMF Signal Intelligence
Support of 1ATF, Canberra, 15 November 1966.
27
547 Signal Detachments intercept operators ie by trade: Operator Signals (Op Sigs), were very
experienced - with almost all having previously served on SIGINT duties overseas in Malaya/Malaysia,
Singapore, Borneo, and Hong Kong as well as at the Detachments parent regiment, the 7th Signal
Regiment (Cabarlah, Queensland). Some had previously covered Vietnamese communist transmissions
from Australian stations located in Singapore and other sites.
28
The technical data for the Detachments initial search operations was provided by the US 303rd ASA
Battalion at Bin Ha with their cooperation and help noted as superb Signal F46/3455, Captain
T.J. Richards to MI8/DMI Canberra, 29 June 1966. Subsequently, intercept positions at 547 Signal
Detachment were manned over three eight-hour shifts each day, with at least three positions manned in the
period 0700-2200hrs.

E-6

The VC operators were well trained and disciplined.29 Our Op Sigs ((Operator
Signals ie intercept operators)) rapidly proved their worth and within a fortnight we had
completely recovered 5 Div and were providing more accurate info than that received
through the Comcen ((ie from US sources30)) the recovery of 5 Div wasnt as easy
as may have been expected. There were literally hundreds of VC transmissions between
4 and 7 Megs and the material we were given to work with was hopeless. after we had
recovered 5 Div, we still had problems distinguishing between the outstations of 274
Regiment and 275 Regiment and fortunately for us we were able to confirm who was who
well prior to Long Tan.31
The NVA/VC messages (ie morse traffic) intercepted by 547 Signal
Detachment32 were usually in a four figure (one time letter) code, with five figure and
29

All our Intel ((intelligence)) was based on traffic analysis as their comms security was impeccable
one time pads and no operator chatter. Brigadier T.J. Richards (Retd), email to author (Chamberlain), 1
May 2012. The VC operators were well trained. They ceased operating, as a rule, when aircraft were
overhead. Most of their traffic was sent of an evening when the aircraft stopped flying. From an operators
point of view it was an interesting but sometimes boring job. WO2 E.C.K. Grace, p.58 in: Hampstead,
B.V, 547 Signals Troop in Vietnam: The Soldiers Perspectives , op.cit., July 2008. For VC awareness
and communications security (COMSEC) including the remoting of transmitters away from VC
headquarters, see also footnote 45. The Australian Official History notes: American signallers were
impressed by the communist radio operators rigorous standards of communications security and discipline
of their brief radio transmissions and to minimise the risk of intercepts, they altered their nets and
frequencies of transmissions daily in accordance with complicated patterns. - McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On
the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.59 and endnote 118.
30
The 547 Signal Troop History adds: We were amazed at the amount of bumf coming through the
Comcen. In Dougs ((WO2 D.M. Rogers Australian Intelligence Corps, analyst)) words: It was absolute
rubbish. You couldnt sort the wheat from the chaff. Within a fortnight we had completely recovered 5
VC Div and were providing more accurate info than that received through the Comcen (from the Yanks).
The US agencies tended to issue all intercepted traffic as reports and did not filter out non-intelligence
material. Hartley, R.W. AM & Hampstead, B.V., The Story of 547 Signal Troop in South Vietnam 19661972, Googong, 2014, p.46. I suppose I was always surprised at the amount of traffic that came in from the
Yanks - particularly the reems of ARDF summaries. I was told our blokes had to check everything because
the summaries contained the results not just from fixes taken on suspected VC activity in Phuoc Tuy
province but in the neighbouring provinces as well. Every callsign had to be checked because the Yanks
often misread them and every fix in, or near our TAOR ((Tactical Area of Responsibility)) really got the
treatment. Lance Corporal K. Lever, see: Hampstead, B.V., 547 Signals Troop in Vietnam: The Soldiers
Perspectives , op.cit., July 2008, p.13. For a recent summary history written by US SIGINT veterans
noting 547 Signal Troop operations, see: Long, L. & Blackburn, G.B., Unlikely Warriors: The Army
Security Agencys Secret War in Vietnam 1961-1973, iUniverse LLC, Bloomington, 2013 Chapter 12:
The Diggers of Nui Dat.
31
recovery of the (VC) 5th Infantry Division was done by Frank Young, Ray Pratt, Slim Bartlett and
Bomber Brown. - Hampstead, B.V, 547 Signals Troop in Vietnam: The Soldiers Perspectives , op.cit.,
July 2008, p.17 and p.56 citing the Detachment/Troop Sergeant Major (TSM) WO2 E.C.K. Grace.
32
In mid-1966, the Detachment was structured for 24/7 operations with a Set Room Section of six
operators (including the TSM), a Processing Section of four personnel, a Communications Centre with four
personnel, and a Senior NCO as a Direction Finding (DF) controller. Two personnel on loan from the
Task Forces 103 Signal Squadron supplemented the Detachment. Technically a Detachment, but when
subsequently reinforced in February 1967 with additional personnel, 547 Signal Detachment formally
became a Troop on 2 March 1967 (with Captain W.E. Hughes as OC from April 1967).

E-7

five letter ((code)) mainly used in traffic to higher formations that was in a higher
encryption.33 Although little of the traffic could be deciphered/decrypted34, information
could be derived ie exploited, from the externals of the enemy transmissions through
the process of traffic analysis and other techniques applied by the Detachments small
four-man processing section that included two Vietnamese linguists.35
The speed of morse transmissions by VC operators varied. A senior defector NVA Lieutenant Colonel L Xun Chuyn (a senior staff officer on HQ 5th VC Division),
stated during his debriefing in mid-1966: The primary difficulty is not the lack of signals
33

Major R.W. Hartley AM (Retd) email to author, 29 April 2012. Described in Hampstead, B.V., 547
Soldiers Perspectives , 2008, p.17: Stations sending 4 & 5 short figure groups of traffic are worth a
listen - the four or five figure groups are sent using the Short Figure Check (SFC) No 9 cut where A = 1, U
= 2, D = 8, N = 9 and T = 0 with other numerals sent in full. For further information on VC transmission
characteristics in Phc Tuy eg: high level codes were normally five figure or five letter groups
generated from one time pad, see: Hartley, R.W., AM & Hampstead, B.V., The Story of 547 Signal Troop,
op.cit., 2014, p.58. When combat was imminent, a Regiments cypher clerks were reportedly sometimes
withdrawn and simpler, less-secure codes used but these were still quite complex. In combat, units would
often use lower-powered VHF FM radios - including captured equipment, for voice communications with
subordinate elements which were less liable to interception. For equipment, procedures and techniques,
see the 9th VC Division 1966 annual communications report at CDEC Log 03-2865-67, VCAT Item No.
F034601031499; a report on the 36th Regiment at VCAT Item No.11271007002; and VC/NVA Electronic
Warfare EW Capability MACV ST 67-061, 1 July 1967 - VCAT Item No.2250110001.
34
By 1964, Vietnamese communist communications ciphers had moved from the earlier K Thut A (KTA
A Technique) system to the more advanced KTB4 dictionary code (code book and random key). See:
Gaddy, D.W. (Trans/Ed) - NSA, Essential Matters: A History of the Cryptography Branch of the Peoples
Army of Vietnam 1945-1975, National Security Agency Fort Meade, Maryland, 1994, (Vietnamese
1990), pp.145-147, endnote 1, p.163. In the South, encryption and decryption was reportedly done manually
ie by pen and paper without machine assistance authors email exchanges with D. (David) W. Gaddy
April-May 2014. The Australian Official History, states that Captain Richards was always at pains to
explain that he was only tracking the movement of a radio, not intercepting transmissions. McNeill, A.,
To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950-1966, Allen & Unwin in association with
the Australian War Memorial, St Leonards, 1993, p.309. However, this is not wholly correct, as VC radio
transmissions were being intercepted by the Detachment but the encrypted text could not be
broken/deciphered. In a highly-classified Top Secret Trine report to Canberra in mid-September 1966,
Captain Richards noted that: end-product put out are actual translations of messages. These come off the
low grade intelligence nets, and, up until just recently, there was very very little of it. There were only two
notations in the whole of the Phuoc Tuy Province area which were readable, and the amount of information
off this was generally stereotyped in that they were all convoy reports etc. He added that the two systems
readable included the military intelligence link connected with the 274th Regiment. we can now read
this system. The VC are still using it and we are finding now that the 274th Regiment is passing operational
orders over this network. When I say operational orders, I mean passing messages of an operational nature,
and it's from commander to battalion commanders - Richards, T.J. Captain, Transcript of an Audio
Tape to DMI (MI8), Ni t, 13 September 1966 (in response to a DMI signal to OC 547 Signal
Detachment of 30 August 1966). For Readability of NVA/VC communications, see also page 45.
35
For example, the externals of an unreadable message could potentially provide the probable who
to/who from; and traffic levels/volumes, types of traffic, urgency etc and could indicate the operational
status of a unit or formation. An intercept operator could sometimes identify the sound of a particular
transmitter and/or the individual operator transmitting the message by the senders hand (ie morse
keying-style). In 1966, 547 Signal Detachment did not have a radio fingerprinting capability to assist with
the identification of NVA/VC transmitters.

E-8

equipment, but the lack of trained signals personnel. Voice operators are not efficient
and generally have much difficulty in transmitting and receiving. CW ((ie morse))
operators have a general capability of 12 words per minute.36 547 Signal Troop veterans
have advised that: the normal speed for our VC/NVA targets ie the speed for four short
figure traffic was around 20-22 words-per-minute (our speed). The speed for the higher
echelon nets using alphabet would be around 18-20 words-per-minute.37
In August and September 1966, 547 Signal Detachment attempted to intercept VC
VHF voice communications from a site atop Ni t Hill - but there was absolutely
nothing on the air; and the OC the Detachment opined that: virtually the only time the
VC use VHF is when they actually carry out an operation.38 The intercept of VC HF

36

CDEC Log 04-0074-66. A 1967 USMACV report noted that the COSVN Signal School conducted an 8
to 10-month basic course for CW ((morse)) operators, who must develop the ability to send and receive at
least 12 words per minute. - US MACV, VC/NVA Signal Order of Battle - Update, Study 67-021, Saigon,
16 September 1967 - VCAT Item No.F015900250094.
37
Major R.W. Hartley AM (Retd), email 13 January 2014 and also discussions with 547 Signal Troop
veterans: Lieutenant Colonel S. (Steve) W. Hart (Retd); Major J. (Jack) E. Fenton (Retd), and Mr B.V.
Hampstead. A 1967 MACV Study noted that NVA/VC morse operating standards after six months
training were: receiving at 90 letters per minute (ltm ie about 18 words per minute, wpm) short figures
at 100 ltm, long figures at 75 ltm; and transmitting at 85 ltm (ie about 17 wpm) short figures at 100 ltm,
long figures at 75 ltm. VC/NVA Electronic Warfare EW Capability MACV ST 67-061, 1 July 1967 VCAT Item No.2250110001. For Vietnamese communist accounts of communications techniques, training,
organisation including morse speeds, see: the debriefs of Sergeant Vn n, 36th Regiment (Qung
Nam Province) December 1969: VCAT Item No.11271007002; Lieutenant Nguyn Vn Minh, 22nd
Regiment (MR5), September 1969: VCAT Item No.2311202006; and trainees achieving 75 characters per
minute VCAT Item No.11271007001.
38
Captain Richards also assessed that: it is just not going to pay to put out a VHF intercept operator with a
Battalion actually on the ground; and in mid-September 1966 began to plan for possible airborne VHF
intercept using 1 ATF Cessna aircraft as a platform. - Richards, T.J. Captain, Transcript of an Audio Tape
to DMI (MI8), Ni t, 13 September 1966. Subsequently, 547 Signal Troops equipment included R216
VHF receivers in 1968, and its operators reportedly first successfully intercepted NVA/VC VHF
communications in May 1968 (see footnote 192). email advice from Major R.W. Hartley AM (Retd), 10
December 2015. As noted, VC forces had US VHF radios in 1966 including the US AN/PRC-10 (see
footnote 13) and subsequently the more capable the AN/PRC-25 (footnote 14). However, these were lowpower, short-range equipments; and any VC VHF transmissions were swamped in the large number of
US and ARVN transmissions. In later years, when 547 Signal Troop was equipped with the OA 1451/PRR
(R744) VHF receiver and the AN/PRC-77, the intercept of NVA/VC low-level voice (LLV) VHF
communications was attempted including from Ni t, The Horseshoe base, and forward Fire Support
and Patrol Bases (FSPBs), but with only limited success . email to author (Chamberlain) from Lieutenant
Colonel S.W. Hart (Retd), 1 November 2014. The Vietnamese linguists in 547 Signal Troop graduates of
the RAAF School of Languages, monitored Vietnamese voice communications in real time and recorded
transmissions on tape recorders for read-back and analysis - see footnote 192. The US forces also
addressed this difficult Low Level Voice (LLV) task - including utilizing Vietnamese nationals as
transcribers, but had only very limited success see the Dancer and Bee programs related in:
National Security Agency (NSA), Cryptolog, Vol II No.10, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, October
1975; and Hanyok R.J., Spartans in the Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War (1945-1975),
Center for Cryptologic History National Security Agency, Maryland, 2002, p.110, 242, 381-382, 385-386,
402, 461, and 464 (note: that the publication has been heavily redacted).

E-9

communications continued as the principal task of the Detachment/Troop throughout its

service in Vietnam.
The Troops HF intercept equipment the Australian-manufactured TRA R5223
radio receiver, had performed poorly in earlier trials in Australia, and was similarly
unreliable at Ni t. In early July 1966, HQ AFV advised Army Headquarters in
Canberra that the unserviceability of the Detachments R5223 receivers was seriously
affecting the operational capability of the Detachment.39 Replacement equipment was
soon acquired, including the more effective Collins R-390 receiver and four HF
intercept positions were maintained throughout July and August 1966.40

547 Signal Detachment, 1 ATF Set Room in mid-1966 (with R5223 receivers) 41
WO2 E.C. Grace, LCPL K. Lever (armed with an Owen Gun), LCPL F.Young
US SIGINT Support
547 Signal Detachment/Troop was supported by the US SIGINT organisation
through the Special Security Officer (SSO)42 located at the II FFV Headquarters at Long

39

HQ AFV, OPS 8076, 8 July 1966: 547 Sig Tp now almost incapable of carrying out its role after only 3
weeks of operations.
40
547 Signal Detachment acquired four Collins R-390 receivers from US sources in-country to supplement
the R5223 receivers. The 3rd SAS Squadron was also having difficulties with its R5223 receiver
including frequency drift, so one Collins R-390 receiver was passed to the 3rd SAS Squadron. Hampstead,
B.V., 547 Soldiers Perspectives , 2008, p.11. Subsequently, Collins model R-391 receivers were also
acquired.
41
Hampstead, B.V, 547 Signals Troop in Vietnam: The Soldiers Perspectives , op.cit., July 2008, p.13.

E-10

Bnh (Bin Ha Province), the US 303rd Radio Research Battalion (Long Bnh) for
technical control, and the US 509th Radio Research Group (located at Davis Station in
Tn Sn Nht airbase in Si Gn). SIGINT information was routinely passed over a
special communications link from II FFV to the Detachment at Ni t as Special Agent
Reports (SPARs).43 547 Detachments reports were sent to the 303rd Battalion, the 509th
Group and the Directorate of Military Intelligence (MI-8) in Canberra and the Defence
Signals Division (DSD) in Melbourne were kept informed of the Detachments operations
and status. In the period 1-18 August 1966, the 1 ATF Operations Logs show 120 SPARs
received from USMACV and II FFV - ie an average of 6.6 SPARs per day. As noted
above, much of the content in these reports did not relate specifically to 1 ATFs tactical
area of intelligence interest.

HQ 1 ATF Log evening of 17 August 1966, showing incoming SPAR messages

42

Copies of the Detachments operational logs were also forwarded to the US Department of Defense
Special Representative (DODSPECREP) in Si Gn ie the US National Security Agency (NSA)
representative.
43
HQ 1 ATF Operations Logs indicate that the HQ first received SPARs from MACV on 29 May 1966
(four on that day) ie when HQ 1 ATF was located at Vng Tu. The brief entries in the Operations Logs
only recorded the receipt of the SPARs not their content ie there was no mention of the VC units
identities or locations.

E-11

However, as 1 ATF had no organic SIGINT direction-finding capability when

deployed in mid-196644, of particular interest in the incoming SPARs were the fixes of
the transmitter locations of HQ 5th VC Division, its subordinate regiments, and other VC
elements provided by the US airborne direction finding (ARDF) aircraft.45 In mid-1966,
these US ARDF close tactical support missions were flown from the Tn Sn Nht
airbase in Si Gn by EC-47 aircraft of the US Air Forces 6994th Security Squadron
(code-named PHYLLIS ANN missions) and light aircraft were flown by the 146th
Army Security Agency (ASA) Aviation Company (U-6, U-8, and CV-2B aircraft). The
Officer Commanding 547 Signal Detachment (Captain T.J. Richards) recounted: the
ARDF results that we got were Top Secret Codeword Flash ((precedence)) - went to the
Brig directly with the USA ARDF messages as they were 'Flash' priority.46 With tasking
input from 547 Signal Detachment47, 6994th Squadron aircraft flew SIGINT missions in
support of 1 ATFs Operation Holsworthy48 in late July and August 1966, and in support

44

The Australian Official History states that 547 Signal Troop had fixed ((ie located)) the radio sets
Richards tracked the radio set associated with 275 Regiment . McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993,
p.308, p.309. As noted, on deployment to Vietnam, 547 Signal Detachment had no integral radio direction
finding (DF) capability - land-based or airborne, and was reliant on US support and reporting and,
subsequently, two ground-base PRD-1s loaned by a US SIGINT unit see footnote 59.
45
Since 1965, COSVN had warned VC formations and units to ensure radio transmitters were remoted or
displaced several kilometres away from the location of their headquarters to limit damage from artillery
and airstrikes. - Bergen, J.D., The Electronic Battlefield, Military Communications: A Test for
Technology, Military History Publication 91-12, US Army Center for Military History, Washington D.C.,
1986. The History of the USAF 6994th Security Squadron that flew ARDF missions in support of 1 ATF
noted: It became increasingly evident that the Viet Cong were aware of the fact that airborne
communications intelligence (COMINT) activities were being used against them. Army ARDF aircraft
noted with increasing frequency that transmitters abruptly ceased operations when the aircraft was in their
vicinity. Too, interrogation reports, captured SOIs, and translated message texts confirmed this awareness.
tell-tale maneuvering [sic] of the aircraft in the vicinity of the target being fixed. Odom, T.Z. &
Hoskins, R.E., History of the 6994th Security Squadron: 1 July 31 December 1966, Tn Sn Nht Air
Base, 1 July 1967, p.20 (Secret Savin declassified 1 April 2014). The 9th VC Division reported that in
1966 one of its transmitter sites had been struck five times by B-52 raids - CDEC Log 03-2865-67, VCAT
Item No.F034601031499. On 22 August 1966, a communique by the 274th Regiments commanding
officer ng Vn K (Ba K), reported that the entire base area had been hit by a B-52 strike that
morning CDEC Log 09-1732-66. The strike was probably in the area of YS 550730, about 13 kilometres
north-east of 1 ATFs Ni t base. B-52 sorties comprised either four or six aircraft, with the usual bomb
load of 51 750lb bombs per aircraft. For a ground eye-witness description of the effect of a B-52 strike (late
March 1970), see Trng Nh Tng, Journal of a Viet Cong, Jonathan Cape, London, 1986, p.160.
46
Email Brigadier T.J. Richards (Retd) to author (Chamberlain), 16 July 2013.
47
In mid-September 1966, Captain T.J. Richards explained: Every Monday I put in a request for ARDF
the name of an operation, what area it is in, and then request that the following units be covered within
that area. Those requests are coordinated from the 1st Division, 25th Division, 173rd Brigade, by II Field
Force (Vietnam) and consolidated and passed onto MACV. MACV then allocate the aircraft for the week
commencing the following Saturday. - Richards, T.J. Captain, Transcript of an Audio Tape to DMI (MI8),
Ni t, 13 September 1966.
48
5RARs Operation Holsworthy (a reconnaissance phase followed by deployment: 5-18 August 1966) was
a cordon and search operation reclaiming the village of Bnh Ba and opening Route 2.

E-12

of the US Operation Toledo49 in August and September against 5th VC Division

elements.50

USAF EC-47 ARDF Aircraft

49

Operation Toledo (10 August - 7 September 1966) directed by II FFV, began in south-eastern Long
Khanh and western Bnh Tuy Provinces. Ground operations did not move south into the 274 th Regiment and
5th VC Division base areas in northern Phc Tuy until 22 August ie following a change in the concept
of the operation after the Battle of Long Tn, see Annex N footnote 27. However, US armed helicopter
attacks were conducted earlier against 5th VC Division targets in north-eastern Phc Tuy from mid-August
1966.
50
Odom, T.Z. & Hoskins, R.E, History of the 6994 th Security Squadron, op.cit., 1 July 1967. Martin, J.,
History of the 6994th Security Squadron (Draft), 2014. The EC-47s arrived in Vietnam in May 1966 and
were equipped with the AN/ARD-18 ARDF equipment and later the AN/ALR-34, 35, and 38. By the end
of 1966, 26 EC-47s were operating in Vietnam. Emails: 6994th Security Squadron historians - including
from Joe Martin of 29 April 2014 and from Rick Yeh. See also: HQ PACAF, Project CHECO Report
No.94, The EC-47 in Southeast Asia, 20 September 1968 VCAT Item No.F031100181132. Support was
also provided by US Armys 146th Army Security Agency (ASA) Aviation Company (flying RU-1 Otter,
RU-6A Beaver, RU-8D Beechcraft Seminole, and RCV-2B/RC-7B Caribou aircraft). The 146th ASA
Squadron of the 224th Aviation Battalion was operational at Ta Sn Nht airbase from 1 June 1966. Some
146thASA Squadron veterans recall flying ARDF missions to support 1 ATF in August 1966, including
during the Battle of Long Tan, When flying out of Nui Dat we usually took a Beaver (RU6A) because
of the length of the runway - email from Richard McCarthy (via Barry Hampstead), 5 August 2012.

E-13

USAF EC-47 ARDF Interior Rear showing SIGINT operator positions

U6A (Beaver) 146th ASA Aviation Company (US Army)

E-14

Focused in the West : Seeking Dodo an early target (July-October 1966)

In mid-1966, the Vit Cng Military Region 1 (later MR 7) had established a
small reconnaissance and observation group on the Ni Dinh/Ni Th Vi /Ni ng Trnh
Mountains in western Phc Tuy Province to overwatch and report on military vehicle
movements on Route 15. During the build-up of US forces in Vietnam, Route 15 was a
critical route that linked the port city of Vng Tu to Long Bnh, Bin Ha and Si Gn.51
In July 1966, 1 ATFs 547 Signal Detachment monitored the VC observation groups HF
transmissions ie slow-speed morse at about five words-per-minute (wpm), and reported
on its presence which was nicknamed Dodo.52 COMUSMACV General W.C.
Westmoreland, personally urged that the VC observation and reporting posts monitoring
the vulnerable Route 15 be eliminated ASAP a Priority One Alfa task.53
As noted, on deployment to Vietnam, 547 Signal Detachment had no integral
radio direction finding (DF) capability either land-based or airborne (ARDF) although
some personnel had experience with ground-based tactical DF equipment. Initially,
fixes on the location of Dodo were acquired by EC-47 aircraft of the USAF 6994th
Security Squadron. Locations of the Dodo radio were provided to the 547 Detachment at
1 ATF in SPAR messages through a SIGINT-dedicated communications link.
From mid-July, patrols from 1 ATFs 3rd SAS Squadron54 were tasked to
eliminate Dodo - ie tasked against the special target (a comms station), the OPs and
comms station, the special target area on Ni ng Trnh Mountain (YS 680688)
closely overlooking Route 15, and in and to the east of, the Ni Dinh Hills (YS 3365).55
Fred a US vernacular term for an unidentified enemy radio transmitter56, was also
51

USMACV, CICV Area Analysis Study 66-36: National Route 15, 1 March 1966. VCAT Item No.
F015900190068. On 1 August 1966, the 274th VC Regiment ambushed an ARVN convoy at YS236784 (on
the Province border between Ph M and Thai Thin) resulting in 32 ARVN KIA, 14 WIA, plus missing.
1ATF, Ops Log Sheet 612, Serial 105.
52
Dodos SIGINT station identifier was RAD1963 and its notation was VNGB ((Vietnamese Guerilla
Morse)) M7178. Another station called Leech (RAD255A, VNGB M7191) probably associated with
Dodo, also operated in the Ni Th Vi Hills. - 547 Signal Troop, message OPS001, 190400Z August 1966
((note a typo, the date/time group should have been 290400Z)). These stations were usually secure
in caves with observers of Route 15 providing information to them by courier.
53
In late [sic] July, 547 Signal Troop [sic] began picking up powerful Viet Cong radio transmissions from
the Ni Dinh hills. General Westmoreland seemed to attach particular importance to it. McNeill,
I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.395. Dodo may have been an element of Military Region 1s Ni Dinh
OP noted subsequently in Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.146-69, Ni t, 26 May 1969. Dodo was
not associated with the B-46 Intelligence Group established in the Minh m /Long Hi Mountains (at YS
469534) from July 1964 to November 1966. see VCAT Items No. F034601662053, F034601632278.
ATF ordered by General Westmoreland to capture VC radio station in our area (substation on Priority
One Alfa). - Captain T.J. Richards, signal to DMI (MI8), of 2 August 1966.
54
Major J.R. Murphy OC of the 3rd SAS Squadron, had previously had access to SIGINT information
when serving in Borneo, and had been SIGINT-indoctrinated.
55
On the return of SAS Patrol 22 on 23 July, the 1 ATF Commander and the Operations Officer requested
to speak with the patrol commander (Sergeant E. Tonna) on the deployment of further patrols to the
special target area. 3rd SAS Squadron, Commanders Diary Narrative, July 1966. AWM95, 7/12/2.
56
MACV, Target Presentation Branch - VCAT Item No.F031100320668; and also 3690214051,
4900117001. All unidentified ((SIGINT)) fixes are given a code name of Fred, these are passed over the

E-15

used in SAS reporting as a nickname for Dodo. On 27 July, SAS Patrol 31 - led SGT
A.G. Urquhart, killed five VC including two women, in the Ni Dinh Hills (at YS
351668). Captured documents indicated that the two women were couriers/food suppliers
for the VCs Dodo observation posts and radio team.57
However, Dodo was not silenced. The US ARDF fixes were often unreliable
at times out by several kilometres - ARDF has been found wanting so far as its
accuracy is concerned.58 In late July 1966, in order to more accurately locate Dodo, two
AN/PRD-1 ground-based DF equipments 59 were allocated on loan to 547 Signal
Detachment by the US 17th Radio Research (RR) Group (at Long Bnh, later redesignated
the 303rd RR Battalion in September 1966) specifically to fix Dodo which would be
attacked and eliminated by 1 ATF SAS patrols. The PRD-1s were initially sited on Ni
t Hill within the 1 ATF base and at the ARVN National Training Centre at Vn Kip
on the eastern outskirts of B Ra Town and the fixes were more accurate than the
locations reported by ARDF. A PRD-1 DF base-line was established with equipments
deployed one at Baria, one at the Task Force area, and one about 6 Kms [sic] north of
Baria at Binh Ba approximately 7 kilometers between each equipment .60
normal intelligence channels to the normal intelligence staff . - Richards, T.J. Captain, Transcript of an
Audio Tape to DMI (MI8), 13 September 1966. Within 547 Signal Troop: Firstly, when I arrived at 547
((May 1967)), all unidentified fixes were plotted on our maps and referred to as 'Fred/s'. Barry
Hampstead, email, 22 August 2014. See also footnotes 73 and 89.
57
See the AWM files AWM95, 7/12/2 and 7/12/3 for SAS reporting. See also: Horner, D., Phantoms of the
Jungle: A History of the Special Air Service, Allen & Unwin, 1989, pp.188-190; Chamberlain, E.P., The
Enemy and Intelligence, in Phuoc Tuy: Successes and Failures (presentation and paper); Conference:
Phantoms Australias Secret War in Vietnam, National Vietnam Veterans Museum, Phillip Island, 12
April 2014.
58
Richards, T.J. Captain, Transcript of an Audio Tape to DMI (MI8), 13 September 1966. Earlier - in a
signal to DMI (MI8) on 2 August 1966, Captain Richards had noted: ARDF A lot of problems causing
poor service feel final answer is ARDF once system ironed out. On the radius of accuracy of ARDF
fixes, in 1968 a MACV report noted that: Fix accuracy at present averages 1,500 metres due to all errorcausing mechanisms. The RU6 is limited to daylight, good-weather operations. USMACV, MACV Significant Problem Areas May 1968, 6 June 1968, p.16, VCAT Item No. F015800220378. See also
footnote 89. For technical detail on the standardization of ARDF radii reporting, see also: 460th Tactical
Reconnaissance Wing, EC-47 Combat Tactics Bulletin, No.7, 28 February 1968.
59
A number of 547 Signal Detachment personnel had experience in operating PRD-1s (with 121 Signal
Squadron in Malaya in 1962, and also in Hong Kong) CPL C. Day and LCPL K. Lever underwent a short
period of re-familiarization training at the Vn Kip base in B Ra on the PRD-1s. For SIGINT detail on
the Dodo operation, see: Hartley, R.W. AM & Hampstead, B.V., The Story of 547 Signal Troop in South
Vietnam 1966-1972, Googong, 2014; and Hampstead, B.V, 547 Signals Troop in Vietnam: The Soldiers
Perspectives , op.cit., July 2008. The OC of 547 Signal Detachment Captain T.J. Richards, was initially
reticent about eliminating Dodo believing that continuing to monitor its transmissions would produce
useful actionable intelligence, but his objections were overruled. Captain T.J. Richards, signal to DMI
(MI8) of 2 August 1966.
60
Captain Richards continued: Now anything within that area, you can get quite good fixes on. But to get
fixes on anything else in the Province, they have to be redeployed to form a new base line. The number of
sites which are technically suitable on to which to put the PRD-1 are extremely limited. Secondly. you have
to put out a protective force to protect them, and the Brigadier says that the minimum force he would put
out, or allow me to put out, with a PRD-1 would be a company - and he is not prepared to let a company go
just to protect one PRD-1 site. From mid-August, 14 US Army SIGINT personnel (including an officer

E-16

An AN/PRD-1 DF equipment manned by a US soldier

However, there were few suitable secure forward sites for an optimum base-line to
deploy the two ground-based PRD-1s. At the end of August 1966, Captain Trevor
Richards proposed to DMI (Canberra) that the Troop borrow man-wearable Telefunken
DF kits then on trial with a US SIGINT unit, for a two-week period, and have SAS
troopers operate the kits to focus-in on Dodo (ie guided by more general ARDF and PRD1 fixes). The proposal was approved by Canberra, but in the interim two US Special
Forces sergeants were attached to 547 Signal Troop to operate the man-wearable
Telefunken DF equipment on SAS patrols albeit unsuccessfully as the enemy had gone
well outside our TAOR.61
The PRD-1 equipments were not used for tasks to the east of Ni t ie the
approach of the 275th VC Regiment in the first half of August 1966. The PRD-1s were
and a sergeant) a fly-away short-range DF team, were allocated to operate the PRD-1s. These US
personnel returned in mid-September simply because all VC targets have moved outside the range of the
PRD-1, there is nothing left here for them to do. - Richards, T.J. Captain, Transcript of an Audio Tape to
DMI (MI8), Ni t, 13 September 1966.
61
547 Signal Troop, message OPS001, 190400Z August 1966 ((as noted earlier a typo, should have
been 290400Z)). Captain Richards advised that the Telefunken DF kits were accurate up to one mile
when mounted on a man. Following consultation with the Defence Signal Division (DSD), DMI MI-8
approved the proposal with qualifications and precautions Army Canberra, 302355Z August 1966. The
US Special Forces sergeants accompanied only one SAS patrol and returned to their unit on 14 September
1966. - Richards, T.J. Captain, Transcript of an Audio Tape to DMI (MI8), 13 September 1966. 547 Signal
Troop did not trial the Telefunken man-wearable DF equipment until four years later when worn by the
Troops Signalman Lloyd Giles (30 August 6 September 1970), see footnote 195.

E-17

not used against 275 Regt. They were ((for)) a specific task-oriented one-time event
against Dodo.62 In September 1966, two M113-mounted PRD-1 direction-finding
equipments and their operators, were attached to 547 Signal Detachment from Long
Bnh to assist in fixing Dodo. Experienced operators from 547 Signal Troop
Detachment worked with the US personnel from a range of sites. However, SAS patrols
were still unable to locate the principal Dodo radio. At the conclusion of their attachment,
in late October the M113/PRD-1 vehicles that had been detached from Long Bnh rejoined the 409th Radio Research Detachment as the Direct Support Unit (DSU) of the US
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11 ACR) preparatory to the occupation of their
Blackhorse base at Sui Rm north of Ni t at the end of October 1966.63
Dodo was eventually eliminated on 24 October 1966, when a female VC radio
operator (T Th Nu - aka Ba Hong, alias Minh Hong Military Proselytising Section,
Ha Long village) was captured by B/6RAR on Ni Dinh Mountain (at YS 332657)
together with a Type RT-77 AN/GRC-9 radio.64
Dissemination of SIGINT at 1 ATF : mid-1966
The Vietnam War was the first time that a tactical Australian Army SIGINT
element had directly supported a formation in the field65 and there were security
constraints requiring that SIGINT-derived intelligence could only be passed to cleared
personnel ie: the 1 ATF commander and three staff officers on his headquarters.66 The
62

Email to author (Chamberlain) from Brigadier T.J. Richards (Retd) OC 547 Signal Detachment/Troop,
1966-1967, 2 July 2015.
63
The OC of the M113-mounted PRD-1 detachment, Lieutenant J. L. Cochrane was killed by a VC sniper
in a vehicle ambush south of Xun Lc Town in Long Khanh Province on 24 October 1966 while
travelling from the 11 ACRs Long Bnh staging area to their developing Blackhorse base to reconnoitre
PRD-1 sites.
64
1ATF Intelligence Review, Ni t, 29 October 1966. Ms Nu was subsequently interrogated at 1 ATF
and was the object of the infamous water torture incident see McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., pp.395398; McNeill I. & Ekins A., On the Offensive, 2003 (including endnotes); and AWM file AWM98,
R670/1/7.
In the period 1964-1966, the Australian Armys 693 Signal Troop operating from Labuan (Borneo) was a
Corps-level asset email to author from Brigadier T.J. Richards (Retd), 29 November 2014, see also:
Hartley, R.W. AM & Hampstead, B.V., The Story of 693 Troop During Indonesian Confrontation 1964 to
1966, Googong, 2014.
66
Australia was a member of a Western SIGINT intelligence community together with the US, the UK,
Canada, and New Zealand. To guard against any enemy gaining knowledge of the effectiveness of SIGINT
operations, the number of personnel indoctrinated/cleared and briefed on SIGINT was very limited.
Regulations required that no one who knew about these intelligence gathering methods: "shall be
committed to a hazardous undertaking which might subject him to capture by the enemy or third party."
Referring to the Battle of Long Tn, and the failure to apprise the commanding officer of 6RAR (Lieutenant
Colonel C. Townsend) of pre-battle SIGINT, the Australian author Paul Ham has cited: a confounding
regime surrounding Sigint The secrecy of the intelligence source overrrode all other concerns,
including the loss of life. The risk of an officer being captured with knowledge of the Sigint capabilities
was too great. Ham, P., Betrayal at Long Tan Signal Failure, The Bulletin, Vol. 124 - Issue 6533,
Sydney, 15 August 2006, p.32. On a number of occasions, officers commanding 547 Signal Troop were
65

E-18

Australian Official History relates: This source could be revealed only to ((Major R.H.))
Hannigan (the operations officer), the two intelligence officers of the task force
headquarters67 ((Major J.S. Rowe68 - Aust Int Corps; Captain R.M. Keep69 RA Inf)),
and ((Brigadier O.D.)) Jackson himself. But the habitual secrecy also meant that
officers other than those of the Intelligence Corps had no experience in interpreting,
informally counselled by the Australian Armys Directorate of Military Intelligence (MI8 DMI Canberra)
for initiating activities that potentially risked capture of 547 Signal Troop personnel. Restrictions on the
employment of indoctrinated personnel were relaxed in later years eg from late 1968 Australian battalion
commanders and their intelligence officers received limited SIGINT- indoctrination. For related US
restrictions during the Vietnam War, see footnotes 70 and 166. The Republic of Vietnam became a third
party to the SIGINT community for detail see: Hanyok, R.J., Spartans in the Darkness: American
SIGINT and the Indochina War , op.cit., 2002, p.386, p.464; and: National Security Agency (NSA),
Cryptolog, Vol II No.10, op.cit., October 1975. Subsequently - when battalion commanders were SIGINTbriefed, they considered the DF fixes as extremely useful but accurate only to approx 1,500 metres.
ONeill, K.J. Lieutenant Colonel, 8RAR Combat After Action Report - Operation Cung Chung I and
Operation Petrie, Ni t, 10 August 1970, paras 16, 26.
67
In early 1966, the only intelligence officer authorised on the establishment of an Australian task force
headquarters was a GSO3 (Int) ie a captain. For 1 ATF in Vietnam, a major ie a GSO2 (Int), was added
by informally transferring the position of a HQ AFV Liaison Officer (Major) from Si Gn to Ni t. In
September 1966, HQ 1 ATF sought to have the GSO2 (Int) position at HQ 1 ATF formalised. The 1 ATF
submission to HQ AFV also compared the HQ 1 ATF staffing with that of the 173 rd Airborne Brigade (US)
- noting that the 173rd Brigades establishment provides one Colonel, two Lt Colonels, four Majors and six
Captains to produce the work which 1 ATF is expected to produce with one Major and three Captains. In
addition, HQ 1 ATF has to produce work for HQ AFV. HQ 1 ATF Proposed Amendment to
Establishment Headquarters, Task Force 11/2/1 (TW), Ni t, 12 September 1966. AWM95, 1/4/12 Part
2 folio 94.
68
An experienced career intelligence officer, Major J. (John) S. Rowe had served in Borneo and in the
Directorate of Military Intelligence in Canberra. As a captain/temporary major, from November 1965 to
April 1966, he was an integrated officer serving as the Assistant S2 (Intelligence/Civil Affairs) with the
US 173rd Airborne Brigade based near Bin Ha before moving to the GSO2 (Int) position at HQ 1 ATF.
Reportedly, the US attachment had made him wary of SIGINT DF fixes ie regarding them as not always
reliable. In 1965, he had worked with a US airborne brigade where, on many operations, radio fixes had
misleadingly indicated regimental-sized forces. Ham, P., Betrayal at Long Tan Signal Failure, The
Bulletin, op.cit., 15 August 2006, p.32. Brigadier T.J. Richards (Retd) - a captain in 1966 commanding 547
Signal Detachment, has related that: John Rowe in particular wanted nothing to do with it ((SIGINT)) and
banished me from the HQ and I was to hide in 103 Sig Sqn out of sight. I was not allowed to attend his
intelligence meetings either. So, I sidestepped him and went to the Brig directly with the US ARDF
messages as they were Flash priority. Brigadier T.J. Richards (Retd), email to author, 16 July 2013.
See also Brigadier Richards similar comments in Hartley, R.W. AM & Hampstead, B.V., The Story of 693
Troop, op.cit., 2014, p.130. For Major J.S. Rowes sharply divergent views on the relative importance of
signals intelligence, see: Ham, P., Vietnam The Australian War, Harper Collins Publishers, Pymble,
2007, pp.212-217; and also footnote 84. Major Rowe was medevaced from 1 ATF to the Australian
military hospital in Vng Tu late on 16 August due to hepatitis, and was eventually replaced as GSO2
(Int) at HQ 1 ATF by Major W.A. (Alex) Piper, RA Inf. Major Piper had been serving at Headquarters II
FFV (at Long Bnh). Post-War, Major Rowe wrote on the Vietnam War eg see footnote 82.
69
Captain R. (Bob) M. Keep was replaced as GSO3 (Int) at HQ 1 ATF by Captain D. (Don) A. Willcox
(intelligence officer, 5RAR) on about 6 August 1966. Very soon after on 9 August, Captain Keep was
medevaced to Vng Tu, then to RAAF Base Butterworth (Malaysia) on 15 August - and returned to
Australia. See: Ham, P., Vietnam The Australian War, op.cit., 2007, pp.215-216.

E-19

evaluating or even understanding the strengths and limitations of this form of

information. Jackson, for one, had not been exposed to signals intelligence before. As a
result, his ability to use it, as far as the signals intelligence officer ((Captain T.J. Richards
OC 547 Signal Detachment)) was concerned was very limited.70
Captain Richards and Captain Keep regularly briefed SIGINT information to
Brigadier Jackson reportedly often bypassing Major Rowe and Major Hannigan.71
Within 547 Signal Detachment, the locations of enemy transmitters were marked on a
small simple map in the Detachments Processing Section.72 Some information from
the US SPAR reports and 547 Signal Detachment information was also marked on a
briefing map at one end of the 1 ATF Command Post marquee tent.73 However,
according to Captain Richards, up to the night after Long Tan, Brig Jackson, Hannigan
and John Rowe did not take 547 nor the ARDF fixes seriously.74
SIGINT-derived intelligence could not be identified as such in reports and
briefings, lest it compromise that highly-classified source. However, such intelligence
was usable if it could be credibly attributed that it was from another source. Based on
SIGINT information, SAS patrols were despatched to the DF-ed locations of a VC
transmitter eg Dodo, and thus provided collateral cover to the highly-classified
SIGINT intelligence.75
70

McNeill, A., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.307. As noted, before the Battle of Long Tn, Captain T.J.
Richards became aware that Major J.R. Murphy OC of the 3rd SAS Squadron, had previously had access
to SIGINT information when serving in Borneo, and Richards began to informally brief Major Murphy on
relevant SIGINT aspects see footnotes 75, 131 and 166 also. Similar constraints on SIGINT access
existed in US Army units and seemingly for some time longer, see: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG
Jonathon R. Burton, 3d Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Period 10 April 1971 to 13
December 1971, 3 May 1972, p.3. Brigadier General Burton also commented on the restrictions on
disseminating signals intelligence to subordinate combat commanders.
71
Ham, P., Vietnam The Australian War, op.cit., 2007, p.214.
72
Email from Brigadier T.J. Richards (Retd) to author (Chamberlain), 5 August 2012.
73
These enemy locations were labelled Fred (or a similar name) with the date/time of the location
by Second Lieutenant D. (David) J. Harris (aide to the 1 ATF Commander) that is how very secret info
showing the advance and retreat of Fred ended up on the mapboard in the conference area. Email from
David Harris to author (Chamberlain), 25 June 2012. For Fred, see also footnotes 56, 88 and 89. For
Captain T.J. Richards explanation of Fred, see footnote 56. Captain Richards also noted that classified
material was not taken out of the 547 Signal Detachment area except for a map trace which I go up and
put on the Brigadiers map board. - Richards, T.J. Captain, Transcript of an Audio Tape to DMI (MI8),
Ni t, 13 September 1966.
74
Brigadier T.J. Richards (Retd), email to author (Chamberlain), 5 August 2012. A dismissive attitude
towards SIGINT-derived information appears to be indicated in the 1 ATF INTSUM, No.60 of 31 July
1966 that began: The discrediting of agent reports (all types) relating to the presence of the 275 th VC
Regiment in the general area of 1 ATF has led to a re-assessment of the likely enemy forces affecting 1
ATF TAOR. However, ground reports from own reconnaissance elements in the west of the 1 ATF TAOR
tend to confirm VC activity in that area 48 hours ago, at which time Chinooks received considerable ground
fire.
75
Captain T.J. Richards explained to Canberra: the SAS have proven invaluable in producing open
collateral for our material so far as action-on Sigint is concerned, in that having Major Murphy
indoctrinated we get a series of ARDF fixes or SRDF fix, ((an)) SAS patrol is put out to confirm this on the
ground, and they will bring back all necessary collateral. When I say collateral, it need not necessarily be
the actual contact with forces but can be use of [sic] trails, water points, bunkers that have been used in the

E-20

Intelligence Assessments end of July and early/mid-August 1966

At the end of July 1966, 1 ATFs intelligence staff had assessed in their
Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) No.60 that: Within or immediately adjacent to 1 ATF
TAOR ((Tactical Area of Responsibility)), the following VC forces are operating:
approximately 100 guerrillas, 2 district companies, 1 provincial battalion, 1 (possible)
main force battalion (possibly from 274 Regt) 1 ATF patrols operating east and west
of the Nui Dat base camp could contact up to a battalion size force in each case.76 A few
days later, that 1 ATF assessment was repeated verbatim in a 6RAR report: Enemy 1
ATF Area.77 However, the assessment by 1 ATFs superior headquarters at Long Bnh
ie Headquarters II Field Force Vietnam (II FFV), overviewing the situation in III Corps
Tactical Zone at the end of July had indicated a more serious possible threat to 1 ATF:
... it appears that the 5th VC Division has shifted its attention to the 1st ATF north of
Phuoc Le ((ie B Ra Town)) in Phuoc Tuy Province. ... The probable location of the
274th and 275th Regiments in Phuoc Tuy Province indicates a possible threat to the 1st
ATF. Documents found on a VC body identified the 860th ((ie D445)) Local Force
Battalion. It is likely that small VC reconnaissance and intelligence groups are
maintaining surveillance of the 1st ATF while the main force regiments are awaiting a
suitable opportunity to attack. The 274th Regiment, the 860th ((D445)) LF Battalion
and possibly the 275 Regiment may attack the 1st ATF in Phuoc Tuy Province.78
On 9 August 1966, when ARDF fixes on the 275th Regiment within Phc Tuy
Province to the east of Ni t were already known to the Headquarters 1 ATF
intelligence and operations staff, the Headquarters 1 ATF INTSUM No.69 79 reported:
last 24 hours and things of this nature. This information has then become open, and the Brigadier uses it as
positive intelligence for the planning of operations. - Richards, T.J. Captain, Transcript of an Audio Tape
to DMI (MI8), Ni t, 13 September 1966, p.9.
76
1 ATF, INTSUM No.60, Ni t, 31 July 1966.
77
6RAR, Enemy 1 ATF area, Ni t, 3 August 1966 (AWM file: AWM95, 7/6/5).
78
Headquarters II FFV, Lessons Learned up to 31 July 1966, Long Bnh, 15 August 1966, p.6-7 and p.69. - DTIC AD388151.
79
1 ATF INTSUMs - issued daily (as at 2400hrs) were a primary intelligence reference for units, but
were classified Confidential and did not include specific SIGINT information. The handful of SIGINTcleared officers at HQ 1 ATF would however also have had higher grade information on which to base
their judgements and influence assessments in INTSUMs and in operational planning. Occasionally,
SIGINT-related information would appear in Task Force documents eg: 5RARs Operation Darlinghurst
OPORD 14-66 (25 August 1966), stated on the 274 th Regiment that: The urgency of their movement was
revealed in radio transmissions to their battalions today. It appears that 274 Regiment is attempting to come
to the rescue of 275 Regiment. In later years - before unit commanders were SIGINT codeword-cleared
to receive explicit signals intelligence, such intelligence was routinely sanitized by the senior 1 ATF
intelligence staff and advised as Special Agent Reports (SPARs) or disguised as emanating from other
sources such as POWs, ralliers, captured documents etc. The foregoing practice was confirmed in emails to
the author (Chamberlain) from Lieutenant Colonel G.C. Cameron (Retd) - GSO2 (Int) HQ 1 ATF, 19681969, emails of 17 and 20 February 2014. Describing intelligence dissemination in later years, the
Australian official history (2003) relates that: The acceptable time from interception of a transmission,
through deciphering, translation and recording, to the delivery to the task force intelligence officer was one
hour. Intelligence collected by 547 Signal Troop that was of concern to 1ATF was disseminated as part of

E-21

Within or immediately adjacent to the 1 ATF TAOR, the following VC forces are
operating: Approximately 100 guerillas, 2 district companies, 1 provincial battalion.80
That 1 ATF INTSUM No.69 of 9 August 1966 lessened the threat assessment from that
promulgated earlier in 1 ATFs INTSUM No.60 of 31 July 1966 by significantly
understating the enemy in, and adjoining, Phc Tuy Province ie as that INTSUM
No.69 omitted the earlier references in INTSUM No.60 to: 1 (possible) main force
battalion (possibly from 274 Regt) and also omitted the final sentence from INTSUM
No.60 ie: 1 ATF patrols operating east and west of the Nui Dat base camp could
contact up to a battalion size force in each case. Following the VC shelling of the 1 ATF
base in the very early hours of 17 August 1966, that evenings INTSUM reported that
following the mortar attack probably by D860 ((D445)) An attack on the Task
Force base area is unlikely. It is considered that the increased enemy activity reported in
INTSUM 71 has been designed to allow the VC to take advantage of any isolated patrols
in the TAOR.81 However, in a review some 25 years later, the senior 1 ATF
intelligence officer in August 1966 has asserted that, pre-Long Tn: Intelligence reports
had indicated at least two main-force enemy regiments, the 274th and the 275th, together
with the local D445 battalion, were operating in the vicinity of the Task Force base.82
The VC Reconnaissance and Advance to Long Tn
547 Signal Detachments Direction-Finding SNCO Sergeant J. (Jim) W. Rayner
routinely tasked the US SIGINT organisation at Long Bnh with the Detachments
requirements for the locations of the transmitters of the 5th VC Division, its subordinates,
and other VC elements within the 1 ATF area of intelligence interest. The 547 Signal
Troops Early History relates that Sergeant Rayner: was responsible for tasking the
American ARDF aircraft who sent Spotreps (Spot Reports) - ie fixes on targets fixed
in basically the same position on a day-to-day basis, and Tacreps (Tactical Reports) for
any major change. The fixes they provided on the radio station serving the HQ of the 275
Regiment, particularly from the 29th July, certainly grabbed our attention. 83 The location
intelligence briefings before operations, and in routine intelligence summaries of Phuoc Tuy province
delivered to all units. Occasionally, Sigint material resulted in direct action. When the analysis of radio
traffic and ARDF fixes indicated the presence of 274 or 275 Main Force Regiments in the Hat Dich or May
Tao areas, for example, this was often sufficient to order B-52 strikes. - McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the
Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.60.
80
1 ATF, INTSUM No.69, Ni t, 9 August 1966 signed by Captain D.A. Willcox (the new GSO3 Int
replacing Captain R.M. Keep) for John S. Rowe, Major, S2. AWM95, 1/4/7 Part 2.
81
1 ATF, INTSUM No.77, Ni t, 17 August 1966 (170001H to 172400H) released by Flight
Lieutenant J.V. McConville, RAAF (Special Duties Intelligence) for the GSO 2 (Int). AWM95, 1/4/7 Part
2. D860 was believed to be a cover-name for D445 VC Local Force Battalion.
82
Rowe, J., Vietnam The Australian Experience, Time-Life Books Australia, North Sydney, 1993, p.70.
83
Unfortunately, the information barely caused a ripple at HQ 1ATF. Jim Rayner was working in
processing as the ARDF controller and the Yanks were giving him good results particularly on the
whereabouts of elements of 275 Regt. In the lead up to the Battle of Long Tan, the radio station serving the
HQ of 275 Regiment was fixed on numerous occasions as it moved in steady steps from the area to the east
of the Task Force and north of Xuyen Moc. Apparently the information hardly raised an eyebrow up at

E-22

fixed for the 275th Regiment on 29 July 1966 was about four kilometres northnorthwest of Xuyn Mc District Town (see the following Map 14.1 at page E-23).
The Australian Official History relates that: Then around 29 July, 275 Regiment
stepped up its radio activity It was apparent to Richards that something important was
happening. Jackson appeared to take little notice of him, and Rowe84 had shown
himself sceptical of the reliability of direction-finding . Richards knew he had hard
evidence.85
The USAFs 6994th Squadron flew ARDF support missions in support of 1ATFs
Operation Holsworthy and for II FFVs Operation Toledo as shown below:

Extract from: History of the 6994th Security Squadron86

In a post-Long Tn report to the Armys Directorate of Military Intelligence
(DMI) in Canberra, Captain Richards wrote: so far, we have been extremely fortunate in
Task Force HQ. No wonder the analysts were a bit touchy. Hampstead, B.V., 547 Soldiers
Perspectives , 2008, p.24 citing a interview by B.V. Hampstead with J.W. Rayner at Bribie Island
(Queensland), September 2006.
84
Major John Rowes scepticism reportedly influenced by his prior service in 1965-1966 on the staff of
the US 173rd Airborne Brigade, is also referenced in: Ham, P., Vietnam: The Australian War, op.cit., 2007,
pp.213-215. For scepticism see also footnote 68, and also 1 ATF, INTSUM No.60, Ni t, 31 July 1966
for discrediting agent reports (all types) suggesting that the 275 th Regiment was to the east of 1 ATF.
85
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.308 and endnote 16 at p.545.
86
Odom, T.Z. & Hoskins, R.E., History of the 6994 th Security Squadron, op.cit., 1 July 1967, p.31. As
noted, 5RARs Operation Holsworthy (5-18 August 1966) was a cordon and search operation
reclaiming the village of Bnh Ba and opening Route 2. The ARDF Controller at 547 Signal
Detachment passed a support request to II FFV prior to Operation Holsworthy - while 5RAR was engaged
in Operation Sydney II, a cordon and search of the southern hamlet of Bnh Ba village - ie c M, in the
period 19-20 July 1966. The extract above shows two ARDF fixes on 29 July 1966 in support of tasking
for Operation Holsworthy, one of which was passed to the Direct Support Unit (DSU) of 1 ATF ie 547
Signal Detachment. A further 11 ARDF fixes are shown as having been passed to 547 Signal Detachment in
August 1966. SIGINT product as Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), was classified with
discrete codewords in 1966: Top Secret Trine, Secret Savin, and Secret Larum. Following the capture of
the USS Pueblo on 23 January 1968, the compromised codewords were changed respectively to Top Secret
Umbra, Secret Spoke, and Secret Moray.

E-23

that every day we have had an aircraft over our area, and particularly when we had this
big contact with the 275th Regiment We had anything up to two or three aircraft over
our area on one particular day. So, from the point of view of getting a good continuous
series of ARDF fixes, we have been extremely fortunate.87
As noted earlier, the 13 reported locations of the VC transmitter were marked on a
small map in 547 Signal Detachments Processing Section, and also marked on a
Conference map in the 1 ATF Command Post.88 Thus, a 275th Regiment radio
transmitter its rear link to the 5th VC Division (see the following footnote 126) was
fixed by ARDF as it seemingly moved westward towards 1 ATF at Ni t in steady,
deliberate stages taking 16 days to cover the 17 kilometres to the Long Tn area. These
13 transmitter locations for the 275th Regiment were illustrated on a map in the 1993
Australian Army Official History as beads with the numbers representing the dates in
August, as shown below:

McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.310.89

87

Richards, T.J. Captain, Transcript of an Audio Tape to DMI (MI8), Ni t, 13 September 1966. Five
EC-47 ARDF aircraft were reportedly available for missions including two DRILL PRESS COMINT EC47s deployed from Military Region 1 on 10 August 1966 staged against targets in Phuoc Tuy Province. Odom, T.Z. & Hoskins, R.E, History of the 6994 th Security Squadron, op.cit., 1 July 1967, p.27
88
On a briefing map at one end of the 1 ATF Command Post marquee tent see footnote 73.
89
The ARDF locations indicated on this map were not provided to Dr (Lieutenant Colonel Retd) Ian
McNeill by former 547 Signal Troop personnel authors (Chamberlains) discussions with 547 Signal
Troop senior veterans including Brigadier T.J. Richards (Retd). On this aspect, the author Paul Ham has
written: McNeill, To Long Tan, p.309 - The beaded line on the map in McNeills book was in fact handdrawn by the author ((ie Dr Ian McNeill)) and not generated by 547 Signal Troop, as the image suggests.
When Rowe informed McNeill that I had not seen this beaded diagram or anything like it before, McNeill
stated that he had drawn it himself. There was never a copy at the [Task Force] said Rowe. (note to
author). Ham, P., Vietnam The Australian War, op.cit., 2007, endnote 33, p.700. Former Second
Lieutenant David Harris the aide to the 1 ATF Commander (see footnote 73), has advised that - during the
writing of the Australian Army Official History (1993), he spoke with Dr Ian McNeill and told him about
the ((conference briefing)) map and the info I had recorded on it prior to the battle. I told him about the
movement of the VC radio being recorded on the map. The fact that there was a map in 1966 in the
TFHQ showing the advance of Fred could therefore not be left out of the OH ((Official History)), and so a

E-24

Before 10 August ie prior to Operation Toledo90, the US 173rd Airborne Brigade

Headquarters had received signals intelligence from its 404th Radio Research (RR)
Detachment91 (that included information from airborne direction-finding missions flown
by USAF 6994th Security Squadrons EC-47 aircraft) that indicated the transmitter of the
5th VC Division Headquarters was located at YS 6779 (about 11 kilometres north of
Xuyn Mc District Town), with the 274th Regiments transmitter at YS 5586 (about nine
kilometres north-east of Bnh Gi village), and that of the 275th Regiment at YS 5473
(about 15 kilometres to the south-west of that 5th Division Headquarters position ie the
275th Regiment was about 12 kilometres north-east of the 1 ATF base).92 That location for
the 275th Regiments transmitter corresponds with the 7th August location/bead
indicated on the Ian McNeill-drafted Map 14.1 shown earlier. On 14 August, attacks by
US helicopters including with CS gas, were made on the suspected 5th VC Division
Headquarters at YS 686736 about 7 kilometres north-east of Xuyn Mc District Town
(in eastern Phc Tuy Province ie about 14 kilometres east-south-east of the My To
Mountains).93 As noted, during Operation Toledo, US ground troops did not operate into
north-eastern Phc Tuy until 22 August.
map was drafted with approximate locations and that is how the map appeared in the OH. I supplied Ian
with some 13 pages of notes. email from David Harris (including to Chamberlain), 25 June 2012.
Brigadier T.J. Richards (Retd) has commented that the radius of error of an ARDF fix was, at best, 250
metres. He remembers the line of fixes ((of the advance of the 275th Regiment)) being less uniformly
spaced than indicated on Map 14.1: the approach of 275 was like a tipsy soldier after a good night out!! A
staggered line! email to author (Chamberlain), 12 August 2013. For the accuracy of ARDF fixes ie
1,500 metres, see footnote 58. Dr Ian McNeill may also have accessed the archives of the then Defence
Signals Directorate (DSD) for detail on the fixes as in the Preface to the 1993 History he credits Mr
Tim James (DSD) and the Director of Military Intelligence (Colonel E.P. Chamberlain) for their
assistance. See: McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.xix. Lieutenant Colonel H.A. Smith SG, MC
(Retd) has claimed that on the day of the battle 547 Signal Detachment fixed the location of 275s
transmitter near Ni t 2, just north of the Long Tan rubber plantation. - Grandin, R., The Battle of Long
Tan , op.cit., 2004, pp.277-278. However, such a DF fix is not noted on Map 14.1.
90
Operation Toledo directed by II FFV, began in south-eastern Long Khanh Province - ie south of Gia
Ray (YT 6312), and in western Bnh Tuy Province. On 18 August, ie in Phase 2 of Operation Toledo,
173rd Airborne Brigade elements were operating south of Gia Ray and north of the My To Mountains.
Their Phase 3 ground operations did not move south into the 274 th Regiment and 5th VC Division base areas
in north-eastern Phc Tuy until 22 August 1966 following the change in the concept of the operation
after the Battle of Long Tn. North of Bnh Gi village, 173rd Airborne Brigade elements destroyed several
base camps of the 274th Regiment and recovered a very large quantity of documents.
91
The 173rd Airborne Brigade credited its SIGINT Direct Support Unit (the 404th RR Detachment) with
providing 90 enemy locations during the twentynine days of Operation TOLEDO. Fortysix of these
locations - more than half, came by way of PHYLLIS ANN EC47 missions flown by the 6994th Security
Squadron. Martin, J., History of the 6994th Security Squadron (Draft), 2014. As noted at footnote 87,
from 10 August 1966, USAF DRILL PRESS SIGINT aircraft deployed from Military Region 1, also
flew COMINT missions (ie communications intercept as distinct from direction-finding missions) in
support of Operation Toledo.
92
173d Airborne Brigade, Combat Operations After Action Report Lessons Learned: Operation Toledo,
15 December 1966. : http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/510789.pdf - ie DTIC AD510789.
93
The subsequent air attack on the Headquarters of the 5 th VC Division on 19-20 August ie at YS 647823,
took place on the northern edge of Tha Tch village astride Route 328 ie south-west of the My To

E-25

According to the 5th VC Division History (2005): In August 1966, the leadership
cadres studied the Australian target at Ni t - B Ra. Comrade Trn Minh Tm - the
Deputy Divisional Commander, personally led a group to Long Tn to study the battle
zone and the Australian activities and to discuss a combat plan with the B Ra local
armed forces.94 According to the 1991 D445 History, the three day reconnaissance
also involved the second-in-command of the reconnaissance company of the 5th
Division, and the 445 Battalions reconnaissance element to go and examine the
battlefield in the Long Tan and Long Phc region of B Ra.95
Prelude to the Battle
In July and August 1966, the focus of the 1 ATFs operations and patrols had been
in the west and the central area of Phc Tuy Province principally to secure the
strategically important Route 15 running north-west from B Ra to Bin Ha and Si
Gn; and to reclaim Route 2.96 On 10 August, the 274th Regiments 265th Battalion had
attacked a group of 15 ARVN trucks on Route 15 (YS 270660) - about 14 kilometres
south of the Phc Tuy/Bin Ha border; and on 11 August an estimated VC battalion
attacked the ARVN compound at Ph M on Route 15 (YS 237766).97 Remaining close
to the Ni t base, in late July and August 5RAR had conducted cordon and search
operations of Bnh Ba village, a few kilometres north of the base ie Operation Sydney II
and Operation Holsworthy.
At about midday on 13 August, an Australian Sioux (Bell 47G-3B1) Possum
helicopter of 161 Reconnaissance Flight reported hearing an unknown radio transmission
on its radar homing/direction-finding device (ie its VHF FM Homing Receiver)
emanating from the base of the Ni t 2 Hill (ie Ni Thm - YS 486678) about five
kilometres to the east of the 1 ATF base.98 The Task Force Commander was informed, the
Mountains. These attacks on 14 and 19-20 August were about 12-14 kilometres south-west and west-southwest of the My To Secret Zone.
94
Subsequently: On 10 August, the Combined Battle Headquarters comprising Trn Minh Tm and
Comrade ng Hu Thun (Commander of the B Ra Unit) met to determine the fighting tactics to destroy
an Australian battalion in the Long Ta region. 5th VC Division History (2005) - see Annex K for extracts
from that History related to the Battle of Long Tn. That 5th VC Division account was recently summarised
in: Nguyn Vn Bch, The Ambush Battle at Long Tn, 18 December 2014 see the full translation at
Annex Q. For the account in the 275th Regiment History (2015), see Annex O Appendix 3.
95
For the account of the Battle of Long Tn in the 1991 D445 History, see Annex M.
96
As noted earlier at footnote 53, during the buildup of US forces 1966, the security of Route 15 was a high
priority for USMACV. 5RARs early operations in the Route 15 area were: Operation Canberra: 6-10
October; Operation Robin: 11-16 October; and Operation Queanbeyan 17-26 October 1966. To secure Bnh
Ba and the Route 2 area north to Bnh Gi, 5RAR conducted Operation Holsworthy see ONeill, R.J.,
Vietnam Task, op.cit., 1968, pp.66-158. 6RARs operations to secure the Route 15 area included:
Operation Brisbane: 16-18 July; Operation Vaucluse: 8-24 September; and Operation Bathurst: 2-27
October 1966.
97
For detail of the operations of the 274th VC Regiment in 1966, see Annex N.
98
1 ATF, Operations Log, Sheet 681 Serial 896 (131225hrs). The Vietnamese-language transmission is
likely to have emanated from an AN/PRC-10 radio (or less likely, an AN/PRC-25 radio) operated by a VC

E-26

RRU (ie Radio Research Unit)99 was advised, and an artillery fire mission was called
on the whole area. Subsequently, a further artillery battery fire mission was called on
YS 493688. 6RAR reported clouds of white smoke in the area for several hours, and
that the movement of people in and out of Long Tan was observed throughout the
afternoon on the road running north-south.100 Late on the evening of 13 August, the daily
1 ATF INTSUM reported the unknown radio transmissions received by the Sioux
helicopter, noting that in its reception Vietnamese voices were heard.101 On enemy
movements, that INTSUM included reports from Phc Tuy Sector of three hard core
VC companies in the far north-west of the Province - ie following the two major
ambushes in the Route 15 area on 10 and 11 August by elements of the 274th Regiment.
On 13 August, 1 ATF advised HQ AFV that: visual sightings and enemy radio
interception again indicate the presence of possibly company-sized forces in the vicinity
of Nui Dat YS4868. ie Ni t 2. 102
On 14 August, USAF ARDF aircraft had fixed the radio transmitter of the 275th
Regiment on the eastern slopes of the Ni t 2 (Ni Thm) feature (YS 486678) see
the preceding Map 14.1. On 15 August, D Company 6RAR patrolled out to Nui Dat 2
and back through the Long Tan rubber plantation.103
forward or reconnaissance element. The AN/PRC-10 VHF FM manpack radio (.9 watt output) had a
planning range of eight kilometres with its short antenna. With RC-292 antennae at each end of a link, the
range was 19 kilometres. The VHF FM AN/PRC-25 manpack radio had a range of up to eight kilometres
(using the short steel-tape aerial) and up to about 17 kilometres (using the long whip aerial).
99
Radio Research Unit (RRU) was a cover designator for 547 Signal Detachment/Troop. US intercept units
were cover-titled Radio Research Units, and 1 ATF at times referred to 547 Signal Detachment as such,
implying that it was involved in the communications security (COMSEC) overwatch of 1 ATFs own
communications. - see: 1 ATF, Signal G223, Ni t, 28 February 1967. For 1 ATFs awareness of the
threat from NVA/VC communications intercept, see: 1 ATF, Communications Security, Ni t, 3 January
1967 that stated there was sufficient evidence to show that at least down to battalion level the enemy has
the ability to intercept our VHF and HF transmissions; and reaffirmed the need for Operations, Numerical,
and Points of Origin Codes; Q hour; and Nicknames and advised that a Communications Security
Monitoring Team would be in-country from 1 January 1967. See also footnote 10, and the subsequent
Troops Information Sheet, No.79, Ni t, 14-20 January 1968; 1 ATF, INTSUM No.150/69, Ni t, 30
May 1969; and 1 ATF, Vietnam Digest, Issue No.26-69, Ni t, 28 June 5 July 1969. 1 ATFs Troops
Information Sheet No.79 (AWM95, 1/4/80) enjoined units to swiftly forward any captured NVA/VC
communications-related documents to Headquarters 1 ATF as quickly as possible to ensure timely
exploitation, and provided a list of key words and key abbreviations that indicated a captured document
contained material that might unlock the secret of his ((NVA/VC)) communications - ie cryptological and
signal information , enemy frequencies, call signs, codes and even SOIs. Such implied that 1 ATF had
an integral SIGINT capability to exploit NVA/VC communications. Many 1 ATF officers had soon
surmised that the euphemistically-termed Special Agent Reports (SPARs) were based on SIGINT.
Occasionally, these reports were referred to as from a URS ie a usually reliable source; for example
see the secret-level SIGINT reports (Yellow Jacket program) on the locations of D445 Battalion and the
274th Regiment in mid-late July 1971 on file AWM95, 1/4/228, folios 81-84 inclusive. For the Yellow
Jacket program, see also footnotes 176 and 177.
100
HQ 1 ATF, Operations Log, Sheet 684, Serial 926 132030H Aug from 6RAR. AWM95, 1/4/6 Part 1.
101
1 ATF, INTSUM No.73, Ni t, 13 August 1966, 3.h. (2). AWM95, 1/4/7 Part 2.
102
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.309.
103
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.311.

E-27

The Australian Official History notes that Brigadier Jackson did send company
patrols out specifically into the area where 275 Regiment was reported by 547 Signal
Troop.104 Understandably however, 1 ATF had not dispatched patrols from its infantry
battalions (5RAR, 6RAR) eastward beyond the range of 1 ATF artillery support to
confirm or deny the SIGINT indicators of a major VC force that had seemingly
approached the Ni t 2 feature from the east. Importantly, in mid-August 1966, the
defences of the 1 ATF base had yet to be fully developed and there was a shortage of
defence stores and equipment, including machineguns. On the employment of 3rd SAS
Squadron patrols including beyond the range of 1 ATF artillery, Professor Dr David
Horner has noted: the SAS had provided little solid evidence that the enemy was
massing for an attack on the Task Force. The only intelligence from the SAS was that
there was some enemy activity north of Binh Gia.105
A 547 Signal Detachment intercept operator Lance Corporal K. Lever, who was
alone on the night-shift of 15/16 August, has related that: The radio station serving the
HQ of 275 Regt began sending a heap of traffic, and it continued through and past the
time I was supposed to knock off. There was no relief, and no one to call to. I dont know
where Eric ((WO2 E.C.K. Grace Intercept Supervisor and TSM)) and Doug ((WO2
D.M. Rogers Intelligence Analyst)) were - so I was stuck. I just continued to copy the
traffic and even though there were occasional periods of silence, I couldnt take the risk
of leaving the sets to call someone. I stayed all night and surprised Eric when he fronted
up next morning at 6 am. It wasnt too hard to work out that something big was in the
wind the amount of night traffic alerted our blokes, but didnt seem to cause too much
excitement up at the Task Force HQ.106
According to the acting Officer Commanding 6RARs A Company Captain C.S.
Mollison, on the afternoon of 15 August, he arranged for a briefing to the whole of the
Company by the Battalions intelligence officer, Captain Bryan Wickens. In his 2006
book, Mollison records that: Wickens told us that, although not included in the official
HQ 1 ATF Intelligence Summary, a secretive organisation, generally referred to as Sig Int
(Signals Intelligence) had tracked what they believed to be the radio of the enemy 275
104

On 15 August, D Company 6RAR patrolled out to Nui Dat 2 and back through the Long Tan rubber
plantation. The following day, A Company from 6RAR was dispatched on a three-day patrol following a
route that led around the Nui Dat 2 feature. They were to scour the Nui Dat feature and the ridge to the
north-west. McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.311.
105
Horner, D. Professor/Dr, Phantoms of the Jungle, 1989, pp.118-120. For detail on 1 ATFs intelligence
focus to the west of Route 2, see: Chamberlain, E.P., The Enemy and Intelligence, in Phc Tuy:
Successes and Failures (presentation and paper), Conference: Phantoms Australias Secret War in
Vietnam, National Vietnam Veterans Museum, Phillip Island, 12 April 2014: To the east of the Task
Force, Lieutenant Peter Schumans SAS patrol moved north towards Bnh Gi village beginning on the 31st
of July and returned on 8 August. With a Corps-level operation - Operation Toledo, in south-eastern Long
Khanh Province seeking the 5th Division Headquarters, the 274th and 275th Regiments, other SAS patrols
were preparing for a mid-August insertion north of Bnh Gi to support that operation. However, the
SAS Squadron did not decide where it would patrol such was directed by the operations staff of the Task
Force Headquarters, as advised by the intelligence staffs collection plan.
106
Hampstead, B.V., 547 Soldiers Perspectives , 2008, p.24, p.25.

E-28

Regiment into an area just to the east of Nui Dat 2.107 In his 2006 book, author Paul Ham
notes that: Mollison cannot have known as he implies in his book of the Sigint reports at
the time a case of being wise after the event.108 Bryan Wickens has recently (2015)
confirmed that he gave no such briefing.109
The 2ic/Operations Officer of the 103rd Signal Squadron at Ni t has written
that: While we in 103 Sig Sqn did not have access to what the 547 fellows were doing,
apart from our OC Major Peter Mudd, it was clear something was up. Peter called me into
a meeting with Trevor Richards (OC 547 Sig Tp), and I was advised that the SIGINT
boys were monitoring a large VC force that included the VC Regiment, 275. It appears
that this force was moving from north to south a few kilometres to our East. This data was
being continually passed onto the Task Force HQ via their [sic] S03 Int Capt Bob Keep.
Unfortunately, Bob's boss, the S02 Int, decided he knew better than Bob, and having
spoken to US Intelligence who told him this was not happening, he advised the Task
Force Commander to ignore it.110
On 16 August, 6RARs A Company began its first patrol111 to the east of the 1
ATF base. It was dispatched on a three-day patrol following a route that led around the
Nui Dat 2 feature. They were to scour the Nui Dat and the ridge to the north-west and
subsequently other infantry companies of 6RAR mounted patrols to the east as far as Nui
Dat 2 (Nui Thom) ie five kilometres east of the Task Force base but all stayed within
the Task Force artillery cover.112
Following the Vit Cng shelling113 of the Ni t base in the very early hours of
17 August, the 1 ATF intelligence staff as related earlier, disseminated the following
assessment on the enemy:
Capabilities and Vulnerabilities: The enemy is capable of attacking up to
company sized patrols within the Task Force TAOR and of launching mortar attack [sic]
107

Mollison, C.S., Long Tan and Beyond Alpha Company 6RAR in Vietnam 1966-67, op.cit., 2006,
p.127.
108
Ham, P., Vietnam The Australian War, op.cit., 2006, p.216 and endnote 45.
109
Bryan Wickens has stated: I gave no such briefing. I only wish that I had known ! - Wickens B. H.,
email to author (Chamberlain), 23 January 2015.
110
Spencer, D., Taking 103 Signal Squadron to War in South Vietnam, Signalman, November 2012, p.9.
111
Abigail, P. Major General (Retd) - Chairman, Review of Recognition for the Battle of Long Tan,
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra, 31 March 2008.
112
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.311. The Company patrol pattern towards Long Tan, 16-18
August is illustrated on Map 14.2 in McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit.,1993 p.326.
113
The 1 ATF Commanders Diary for August 1966 described the impact on 17 August of 63 VC 82mm
mortar bombs and five 70mm howitzer rounds based on crater analysis - Headquarters 1 ATF Commanders Diary, August 1966. The detail of the shelling was later included in a Summary of Enemy
Artillery Action as Figure 1 to the 1 ATF Combat Operations After Action Report Operation Smithfield,
R723-1-5, December 1966 (that related the recovery of a 70mm Japanese howitzer shell at YS 432664; and
the discovery of 23 expended VC 75mm RCL cartridges at YS 469688) see footnote 269 in the main text,
and 1 Field Regiment, Report on Enemy Artillery Action Night 16/17 Aug 66, Annex B to Operational
Report No 3, Ni t, 14 September 1966 (AWM95, 3/5/15). For the recovered Japanese 70mm shell (
the fuse had not been screwed completely in.) see Brigadier J.H.Townley AM (Retd) 1 ATF CounterBombardment Officer - August 1966, Early Days in 131 Div Loc Bty, 131 Locators Association.

E-29

similar to that of 170240H. The mortar attack against the 1 ATF base was probably
mounted by D860 ((ie D445)) battalion under orders from the VC Provincial HQ. An
attack on the Task Force base area is unlikely. It is considered that the increased enemy
activity reported in INTSUM 71 has been designed to allow the VC to take advantage of
any isolated patrols in the TAOR.114
The Battle 18 August 1966: VC Communications Aspects
There is no mention of the use of radios by VC forces during the Battle of Long
Tn in Vietnamese accounts - ie in the 5th VC Division History (2005) see Annex K,
nor in the accounts in the 275th Regiment History (2015) see Appendix 3 to Annex O,
nor in the 1991 (Annex M) and 2004 D445 Histories,. Rather, the 1991 D445 History
notes the use of line115, field telephones, and a switchboard ie: After having confirmed
the situation with the observation group, t ng116 flicked the switchboard117, to another
line and loudly and clearly ordered: Attention, forward blocking group: the enemy is
advancing in three columns to the west-northwest straight into our battle zone. Comrades
must strive to maintain complete secrecy. Wait until the enemy is truly close, and only
open fire when the order is given by the headquarters. Nm Tam118 picked up his
communications device and added: Attention Tail, the enemy force is very long. If there
are any difficulties with the commands communications system, then automatically open
fire on the enemy when they are 30 metres from the battle zones forward blocking
position.
According to its unit history, the C.12-65 Bnh Gi Victory Assault Youth
Company also assisted at the Long Tn battle: ie As the enemy artillery was very heavy
114

1 ATF, INTSUM No.77, Ni t, 17 August 1966, paras 11, 12. signed by Flight Lieutenant Julian
McConville (RAAF, SD Intelligence). Both Major J.S. Rowe GSO2 (Int), and Captain R.M. Keep
GSO3 (Int), had been earlier medevaced to Vng Tu see footnotes 68 and 69. As noted at footnote 79,
INTSUMs were only classified Confidential. However, the code word-cleared/indoctrinated officers at
HQ 1 ATF had access to higher grade/classified information, including from SIGINT.
115
The 1991 D445 History records that the Battalions attack on the town of Long in on 23 December
1965, was the first time that a battle had been commanded using a telephone system. Our communications
soldiers had surmounted every obstacle to ensure constant liaison including the techniques for using the
equipment and laying the telephone lines in enemy-controlled areas. Several metres of telephone line
D-10 cable and large wooden spools were recovered from the Long Tn battlefield on 19 August 1966.
116
ng Hu Thun - the commander of the B Ra Province Unit. According to the 1991 D445 History, t
ng (ng Hu Thun the Commander of the B Ra Province Unit) and Nm Tm (Trn Minh Tm
Chief of Staff /Deputy Commander of the 5th VC Division), directly commanded the battle from a position
two kilometres north of Long Tn ie Ni t 2.
117
Literally: t hp in thoi - probably a field telephone switchboard, most likely the Chicom Type 10.
118
Trn Minh Tm (Nm Ta ) Chief of Staff/Deputy Commander of the 5th VC Division. As noted
above, Trn Minh Tm was reportedly collocated with t ng (ng Hu Thun) - the commander of the
B Ra Province Unit, most likely on the southern slopes of Ni t 2 Hill. However, Nguyn Thanh Hng
(aka Hai Hng, born 1932 in Hi M) - an operations staff officer on the Headquarters 5th VC Division, has
claimed that it was left to him to plan the attack at Long Ta , and that he was the on-site commander
throughout from Phc Hng hamlet - ie about two kilometres east of the Long Tn battlefield at GR YS
495670.

E-30

and destroyed the field telephone lines, they were employed in commo-liaison duties
taking messages from the headquarters to the battlefront, repairing broken field telephone
lines, and evacuating casualties to Hospital 1500 in the area of the My To
mountains.119 According to a similar C.12-65 Company account120: The unit operated
with the 4th Regiment121 of the 5th Division and coordinated with the 445 Force to attack
the base of the Australian Brigade at Ni t, Long Phc Village. At this time, the
Assault Youth Group was divided into two elements: a male element with the task of
mobile communications; and a female group that carried the wounded. In this battle, we
fought against the invading expeditionary forces, and it was very fierce. At the time, the
C.12-65 Assault Youth Group had the responsibility for mobile communications and
laying communications wire122 from the headquarters to the battlefront. In this battle, we
coordinated with three types of forces to destroy an Australian battalion at Ni t
between Long Phc and Long Tn. When the battle began, the enemys artillery fell
ceaselessly, and the telephone wires were broken and contact was lost with the
headquarters. Our people had to leave their below-ground defensive positions to rejoin
the wires and enable command of the battle.
The Vit Cng force also used bugle calls as signals and commands during the
Battle: The constant blaring of bugles was heard from the trees as the VC units
manoeuvred for their assaults. There seemed to be no tune or melody, just blasts to
signal Wait!, Ready!, and Go! 123
119

L Thin Minh Khoa, i Thanh Nin Xung Phong The Assault Youth Unit, Lch s, Truyn
thng a phng B Ra-Vng Tu, Phn II, Trang Vn Hoa-X Hi Lch s B Ra-Vng Tu, 11
December 2009.
120
L Thin Minh Khoa "Qu trnh hnh thnh Thanh Nin Xung Phong" - "The Process of Founding the
Assault Youth", T ho s xanh B Ra-Vng Tu Ln 2 Pride in the History of B Ra- Vng Tu
Part 2, 25 October 2010. That article also claims a whole Australian battalion was destroyed at Long
Tn.
121
This is an error as in the 1991 D445 Battalion History. The 5th Regiment (ie the 275th Regiment) was
the 5th Division formation at the Battle of Long Tn not its 4th Regiment (ie the 274th Regiment).
122
Line and field telephones were used extensively within the 5 th VC Division including during ambush
operations. In September 1966, the 274th Regiment Headquarters held six field telephones and 8.5
kilometres of line; and each of its three battalions held four or five field telephones and 4.8 kilometres of
line. The Regiment had requested a further 22 field telephones and 30 kilometres of line see VCAT Item
No.F034600560223. In 1968-69, the 275th Regiment held 15-17 kilometres of communications wire and
12 Type 054 field telephones, together with two Chicom 102E radios and four Chicom K-63 HF radios (ie
that replaced the Chicom 71B models) debrief of NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting, CMIC No.2550, VCAT
Item No.2310305007. As noted, a D445 Battalion rallier in mid-September 1970 stated the Battalions
communications equipment comprised: a 15w set using only morse ((ie: a Chicom 102E or a US
AN/GRC-9 HF radio)), three PRC-25 sets, one PRC-10 set, and three field telephones with 2,000 metres of
cable. - 1 ATF, INTSUM No.263/70, Ni t, 20 September 1970.
123
McAulay, L., The Battle of Long Tan, Arrow Books, London, 1987, p.88. See also McNeill, I., To Long
Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.328: 6.35 p.m. To the blowing of bugles, the enemy line started advancing.. See
footnote 17 for the earlier use of bugles by D445 Battalion in July 1966. The Australian Official History
notes that during the Battle: Communications were by whistles and bugles which were found in the area,
as well as signal cable on reels to connect telephones. McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.353.
Although not noted at the Battle, other signalling equipment in the 275 th Regiment included signal pistols.

E-31

Several years later, a captured NVA officer who served in the 275th Regiment,
provided a brief account of the Battle: On approx 10 August 1966, the ((275th))
Regiment went to the area of t Mountain in t District (vicinity YS 4867) in
Phc Tuy Province. On approx 17 August, the Regiment - along with the 1st B Ra
Battalion aka 45 [sic] Battalion (Local Force), ambushed elements of the Australian
Army as they were coming from their camp on t Mountain. The battle lasted for
approx four hours in which the Regiment sustained over 200 casualties including both
KIA and WIA.124
Post-Battle Developments
Captain Trevor Richards commanding 547 Signal Detachment, has recounted
that: On the night of Long Tan ((18 August 1966)), I was called to see the Brig. He
demonstrated to me that I had proved the accuracy of the ARDF material. He asked me if
there were any other VC besides 275 Regt - which he now knew he was up against.
Where was 274 Regt ? I said that the ARDF fixes showed that their HQ Radio had not
moved and that they were highly unlikely to be involved.125 Some weeks after the Battle,
in a report to Canberra, Captain Richards summarised:
on this attack by the 275th Regiment, we did produce some useful intelligence
through the ARDF fixes in that the Brigadier was warned that the 275th was moving
towards our direction, and although we didnt know exactly where he was because the
only transmitter we could fix on the whole Regiment was the rear link working back to
the ((5th)) Division we then had no idea where the actual headquarters was or the
battalions. Hence when the actual contact came, the Brigadier called me up and said:
"Well, who is it?" - and quite obviously it was the 275th Regiment. So although we
couldn't - and it has been impossible up to now to pin down to battalion level where each
of the battalions and various regiment are at - at least we have been able to give him
indicators as to the fact that a Regiment is coming towards us or going away from us. As
such the Commander has found this valuable, or so he has stated. These fixes are
produced in the time frame to make it valuable.126
In a mid-September 1966 summary report to Canberra, Captain Richards noted
one bad security breach when as directed by the 1 ATF Commander, he very, very
hastily gave an on-the-spot SIGINT briefing to Lieutenant Colonel J.A. Warr - CO
5RAR, who was not SIGINT-indoctrinated. Lieutenant Colonel Warr had been tasked to
start chasing up 275 Regiment.127
124

NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting aged 36, the Assistant Political Officer of the 3rd Battalion of the 275th
Regiment, was captured by ARVN forces on 26 February 1969 (see footnotes 7 and 122).
125
Brigadier T.J. Richards (Retd), email to author (Chamberlain) 16 July 2013. See also footnote 152.
126
Richards, T.J. Captain, Transcript of an Audio Tape to DMI (MI8), Ni t, 13 September 1966. In his
report, Captain Richards also noted that during the visit of the Chief of the General Staff (CGS
Lieutenant General T.J. Daly) to 1 ATF, the 1 ATF Commander (Brigadier O.D. Jackson) had told the CGS
that we were producing the only intelligence at all that was of any use to him up here in this area.
Lieutenant General T.J. Daly visited Vietnam in the period 6-9 September 1966. See also footnote 172.
127
Ibid.

E-32

During his questioning in February 1969, the NVA POW Captain Trn Vn Ting
related that: After the battle, the ((275th)) Regiment moved back to the L Jungle Base
Camp ((Rng L vicinity YT 7610)). The Regiment remained in camp for a week, after
which the entire Regiment minus the 1st Battalion, moved to Bnh Thun Province to an
area approx. five kilometres west of the T Bao Bridge. The Regiment made this move in
search of rice. After this attack, the Regiment returned to its old base in the Sng Ray
area. The Regiment remained in this area until March 1967, refitting and resupplying.128
On 21 August, US SIGINT ARDF aircraft fixed the 275th Regiments main
transmitter at YS 530720 (10 kilometres north-east of 1 ATFs Ni t base).129
On 22 August 1966, the second phase of II FFVs Operation Toledo commenced
with ground operations launched southward into northern Phc Tuy against the
Headquarters 5th VC Division and the 274th Regiment and the Operation also hoped to
engage elements of the 275th Regiment that had withdrawn to the north and north-east
following the Battle of Long Tn.130
Soon after the Battle, Captain Richards wrote:
The main thing about ARDF which I will emphasise is that at the moment until
the system is perfected, ARDF is not, and I repeat, not a tactical aid, in that the claimed
radius of error has been found to be wanting in many occasions, although in two or three
occasions it has been proved quite accurate. Now, for example, after the contact with the
275th Regiment ((Long Tn - 18 August)), they were located by ARDF from about 22nd
August to about four days later. An SAS patrol was put in to confirm it on the ground
and they found a group of ten people approximately 100 paces from the centre of the
fix.131 They couldnt actually work out whether this group of eight to ten people had a
radio station with them, but this is the normal size of a radio detachment whether it is a
command transmitter or is an intelligence transmitter. As such, it was a rather large
coincidence if they werent the particular people in question. So I still feel that ARDF is
quite accurate in some circumstances, but in others, it can be quite wrong .132
At the beginning of 1 ATFs phase of Operation Toledo, the Duc Thanh
Company plus elements of 860 Bn ((ie D445)) and the 275th Regiment were thought to
be along Route 2 between the 79 and 87 Northings.133 1 ATFs 5RAR conducted the
128

CMIC No. 2550, VCAT Item No.2310305007.

CTG 79.5 (US Marine Corps Battalion Landing Team 1-26), Combat After Action Report Operation
Deckhouse III (Phase I and II), 2 September 1966, Part II, sub-para 4.d.
130
For detail of Operation Toledo activities in northern Phc Tuy, see Annex N: The 274th Regiment - Not
at the Battle of Long Tn.
131
A four-man SAS patrol Patrol 13, had deployed to an area about seven kilometres east of Ni t at
YS 513688 on 23 August. At 1320hrs on 25 August, Patrol 13 was advised by the SAS HQ to: recce vic
YS 515709. Radio Direction Finding eqpt located comd radio of 275 Regt (VC). Investigate. The patrol
was sighted by 6 VC plus at YS 515709 and was extracted later that afternoon. The Patrol Report noted
that: A report from 1 ATF to 3 SAS Sqn informing that the HQ of 275 Regt (NVA) was possibly located at
YS 515709 was probably verified by Ptl 13s sighting. 3 SAS Sqn, Commanders Diary/Duty Officers
Log/Patrol 13 Report (Sergeant T.D. Hogg). - AWM file: AWM95, 7/12/3.
132
Richards, T.J. Captain, Transcript of an Audio Tape to DMI (MI8), Ni t, 13 September 1966.
133
5RAR, Operation Toledo - Combat Operations After Action Report, An Ph hamlet, 29 September 1966.
(AWM 95, 7/5/8). The Report noted that at the beginning of the Battalions participation in Operation
Toledo (23 August), the enemy dispositions were thought to be: HQ 5 Div and supporting element - YS
129

E-33

Australian element of Operation Toledo134 ie: to search and destroy, establishing

blocking positions in concert with the 173rd Brigade/II FFV operation of the same title,
to the west of Route 2 in the period 23 August to 8 September 1966. A 5RAR company
commander wrote that: As a blocking force for the activities of 173 Abn Bde and as part
of Operation Toledo, we did not achieve any results, however the contact with local
guerillas made the long walk worthwhile.135
A month after the Battle of Long Tn, 1 ATF assessed the 275th Regiments
strength as 1,500.136
Writing to Canberra in mid-September, the OC of 547 Signal Detachment
Captain Trevor Richards, reported: Now we have found over the last couple of weeks
due to a captured document by the 173rd Brigade, that we can now read this system ((a
274th Regiment link, see footnotes 34, 140, 183-185)). The VC are still using it, and we
are finding now that the 274th Regiment is passing operational orders over this network.
When I say operational orders, I mean passing messages of an operational nature, and it's
from commander to battalion commanders, and although there is not very much in it at
the moment, at least it is possible after receiving a series of these messages to start
pinning down roughly where the various battalions are. This has proved invaluable, and is
really the first really positive piece of intelligence we have to indicate where the actual
VC forces are, for that is about the only one.137
On 25 August, a 173rd Airborne Brigade ambush patrol at YS 563848 sighted 75100 VC moving north carrying large rucksacks138. In an apparent breach of signals
intelligence security, 5RARs Operation Darlinghurst Operations Order of 25 August
1966 see the extract below, stated on the 274th Regiment that: The urgency of their
movement was revealed in radio transmissions to their battalions today. It appears that
274 Regiment is attempting to come to the rescue of 275 Regiment.139
6780; 274 Regt (HQ and one or two bn) - YS 5388; a Bn of 274 Regt - YS 4277; 45 Regt ((ie 275th
Regiment)) and 860 Bn ((ie D445 Battalion)) within the area between the 70 and 82 Northings and 57 and
75 Eastings; Duc Than [sic] Coy plus elements of 860 Bn ((ie D445 Battalion)) and 275 Regt along TL
((Provincial Route)) 2 between 79 and 87 Northings. Note that there was still some confusion with unit
nomenclatures eg: 45 Regt and 860 Bn.
134
See Operation Darlinghurst (26-31 Aug 66 nee Toledo), OPORD 14-66, Ni t, 25 August 1966; 1
ATF, OPS21, Operation Toledo - FRAGO 2-8-66, 31 August 1966, Annex A (Intelligence); 5RAR,
Operation Toledo FRAGO 2-13-66, An Ph hamlet, 1 September 1966 (ie 5RAR is to destroy any enemy
forces moving through area of operation 19); ONeill, R.J., Vietnam Task, op.cit., 1968, p.93, pp.95-96;
and 5RAR, Operation Toledo - Combat Operations After Action Report, An Ph hamlet, 29 September
1966. (AWM 95, 7/5/8). http://static.awm.gov.au/images/collection/bundled/RCDIG1030130.pdf .
135
D Coy/5RAR, Sub Unit Operational Analysis Report, An Ph hamlet, 11 September 1966. (AWM 95,
7/5/8).
136
1 ATF Intelligence Review No.1, Ni t, 13 September 1966. Subsequently - in early June 1967, 1
ATF estimated that the 275th Regiment had 900 men McNeill I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit.,
2003, p.543 - endnote 5.
137
Richards, T.J. Captain, Transcript of an Audio Tape to DMI (MI8), 13 September 1966.
138
173rd Airborne Brigade, Combat Operations After Action Report Lessons Learned: Operation Toledo,
15 December 1966, p.25.
139
5RAR, Operation Darlinghurst (26-31 Aug 66 ie nee Toledo), OPORD 14-66 Annex A (Enemy),
An Ph hamlet, 25 August 1966 (252350H Aug 66), para 3. (AWM95, 7/5/8) see the following insert.

E-34

Signals Intelligence mentioned: 5RAR Operation Order 25 August 1966 140

Headquarters 1 ATF Intelligence Reviews included reference to Special Agent

Reports (SPARs) eg:

SPAR mentioned: 1 ATF Intelligence Review 13 September 1966 141

SPAR mentioned: 1 ATF Intelligence Review No. 2 29 October 1966 142

140

5RAR, Operation Order 14-66 (OP Darlinghurst) Annex A (Enemy), An Ph hamlet, 252350H Aug
66, para 3. (AWM95, 7/5/8). A 6RAR report noted: SPAR has indicated a primary area of interest
bounded by YS 5875 . Intelligence Review No.1, Annex A to 6RAR Op Ord Casula, 1 October 1966.
141
1 ATF, Intelligence Review No.1, Ni t, 13 September 1966 - covering 31 Aug-11 Sep 1966, p.2 AWM95, 1/4/12 Part 2. Red Haze were infra-red ie heat detecting, missions flown by US Army
Mohawk fixed-wing aircraft. As noted earlier at footnote 100: Many 1 ATF officers had soon surmised
that the euphemistically-termed Special Agent Reports (SPARs) were based on SIGINT. For SPARs,
see also footnote 79.
142
1 ATF, Intelligence Review, No.2, Ni t, 29 October 1966 covering 11-28 October 1966, p.2.
(AWM95, 1/4/14 Part 2).

E-35

547 Signal Detachment continued to monitor the radio communications of the 5th
VC Division including those of the 274th Regiment143 and the 275th Regiment144 and
also D445 Battalion.145 Later, the Troop also monitored Military Region 7, B Long
Province, Sub-Region 4, D440 Battalion146, the 33rd NVA Regiment147 and the Vit Cng
District Units148 - but little detail is yet publicly available. US ARDF missions also
continued involving the USAF 6994th Security Squadron and the US Army Security
Agencys 146th ASA Aviation Company of the 224th Battalion, both operating out of the
Tn Sn Nht airbase.

143
For the later mid-1969 interception of the 274th Regiments communications by 547 Signal Troop that
alerted the Thai Army defenders of a battalion (minus) position before the 274th Regiments unsuccessful
attack at Lc An on 16 June 1969, see: Hart, S.W. with Chamberlain, E.P., A Tactical SIGINT Success
Story, The Bridges Review (Issue No. 2) Journal of the Australian Intelligence Corps, Defence
Publishing Service, 2013 on-line (Internet) at: http://pronto.au104.org/547Sigs/547story3.html.
144
In early 1969, the 275th Regiment had two Chicom R-102E (15w) and four Chicom K-63 radios
(sometimes termed 251-A, that replaced the 71Bs), and one AN/PRC-10 for monitoring enemy nets
used by an element of the ((Military Region 7)) B-21 Reconnaissance Company to monitor ARVN
forces. The Regiment had no personnel who spoke English and did not monitor other than ARVN
forces debrief of NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting - CMIC No.2550, VCAT Item No.2310305007. During
the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966, 6RAR reported interference on their VHF communications
including oriental music. However, such was unlikely to have been VC jamming but rather other
Vietnamese transmissions in the crowded VHF band that included local ARVN, Territorial Forces, and
the communications of other Vietnamese security and civil agencies (see also footnote 38).
145
As noted earlier, the radio messages (HF morse code) from D445 Battalion to the Province Unit were
probably encrypted and transmitted on one of the following radio types: 102E (15w HF), AN/GRC-9, K-63
(2w, AM with CW capability or the earlier 71B that it replaced), PRC-25 (VHF), or less likely, PRC-10
(VHF). As noted, a 1 ATF study in early 1969 reported that D445 possibly had a US-manufactured SCR694 HF radio (AM, 17w). De Cure, P.F. Major, D445 Local Force Battalion, HQ 1 ATF Ni t, 18
January 1969. In February 1970, a rallier related that each company of D445 Battalion had one PRC-25
and section headquarters have PRC-10s. 1 ATF, INTSUM No.56/70, Ni t, 25 February 1970. A
D445 Battalion rallier in mid-September 1970 - Ng Vn Phach, stated the Battalions radios comprised: a
15w set using only morse ((ie: a Chicom 102E or a US AN/GRC-9)), three PRC-25 sets, one PRC-10
set, and three field telephones with 2,000 metres of cable. 1 ATF, INTSUM No.263/70, Ni t, 20
September 1970. The encrypted HF morse communications of D445 Battalion were in a four figure (onetime letter) code, with five figure and five letter ((code)) mainly used in traffic to higher formations that
was in a higher encryption. email to author from Major R.W. Hartley AM (Retd) 29 April 2012. For
the operation of the 102B and 102E radios including from the Minh m Zone, see the report by the
rallier (April 1967) from the B-46 Intelligence Group - VCAT Item No.F034601662053.
146
See: Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story (and the Battle of Bnh Ba), Point
Lonsdale, 2013.
147
See: Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment - North Vietnamese Army: Their Story (and the Battle of
Bnh Ba), Point Lonsdale, 2014. Appendix 17 of that work relates 547 Signal Troops intercept of the 33rd
NVA Regiments communications prior to, during and after the Battle of Bnh Ba in early June 1969.
148
For the intercept by 547 Signal Troop of Chau c Districts HF transmitter in the Rng Sc north of
Long Sn Island (vicinity YS 268600) on 9 November 1970 and the related subsequent downing of the
helicopter carrying the commanding officer of 2RAR/NZ see footnote 171. See also: Stock, P.X.., My
Chau Duc Experience Annex P (with maps) in Hartley, R.W. AM & Hampstead, B.V., The Story of 547
Signal Troop , op.cit., 2014 (and pp.254-255 of that works main text).

E-36

The 1 ATF Long Tn After Action Report Confidential

The 1 ATF Report149 - produced in December 1966 and classified at
Confidential level, understandably made no mention of SIGINT. However, the Reports
Intelligence paragraph noted: Prior to the operation, there had been numerous low
grade reports and indications of enemy activity in the area of Xa ((village)) Long Tan YS
4865 and Nui Dat YS 4860, and listed nine main items of intelligence interest. These
included: 13 August: Radio interference was received by a H13 aircraft flying over Xa
Long Tan. The glide path indicator in the aircraft indicated that the transmissions were
emanating from the southern base of the Nui Dat feature. This is the incident involving
the 1 ATF Sioux (Bell 47G-3B1) Possum helicopter see the preceding footnote 98.
The 1 ATF After Action Report also noted that: At the time D/6RAR
commenced its patrol, it was thought possible that a heavy weapons company plus at least
one rifle company could be in the area of Nui Dat YS 4868 Xa Long Tan YS4865.
However with the exception of the enemy mortar and artillery attack on 17 August, there
was little in these reports during August which differed from previous indications of
enemy activity in this area or many others in other parts of the Task Force area of
operations. 6RAR patrol activity in the area North, South, and East of the Nui Dat feature
YS4868 disclosed no unusual activity. There were however other indications of
increasing enemy interest to the East of the Task Force base area which resulted in our
attention being directed towards this area in order to locate any sizable enemy force.150
Some Comments and Questions
From early in the War, both the North Vietnamese and Vit Cng forces were
aware of US, RVNAF and Allied SIGINT operations and consequently maintained strict
communications security (COMSEC) measures. As noted, since 1965 COSVN had
warned formations and units to ensure that their radio transmitters were remoted or
displaced several kilometres from the location of their headquarters principally to
minimise the impact of bombing and shelling.151 Aware of SIGINT operations against
1st Australian Task Force Vietnam, Combat Operations After Action Report Operation Smithfield,
R723-1-5, December 1966 (with nine maps and the D Coy/6RAR After Action Report).
150
In the last sentence, other indications appears to allude to signals intelligence reporting. However, as
noted, prior to 15 August, 1 ATF did not deploy any ground patrols SAS or infantry, far enough to the
east of Long Tn to confirm or deny the possible approach of elements of the 275th Regiment. See also
footnote 153 for comment in the Australian Official History on post-operational rationalization - McNeill,
I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.359 .
151
As noted earlier, the 9th VC Division reported that in 1966 one of its transmitter sites had been struck
five times by B-52 raids; and the 274th Regiment reported that on 22 August 1966 their entire base area
probably then about 12 kilometres north-east of the 1 ATF base, had been hit by a B-52 strike see the
preceding footnote 45; and also Annex N, footnote 39. VC and NVA units commonly operated radios
well-removed from served units, frequently moved radio sites, and practiced [sic] deception. Johnson,
J.R. (et al) - General Research Corporation, Analysis of Tactical Intelligence Experience in Southeast Asia,
Maclean, February 1976. (ADC0055059).
149

E-37

them, for security whenever possible, NVA/VC units relied principally on couriers or
field telephone lines - ie rather than radio communications that were susceptible to
intercept. As noted, the COMSEC discipline of their cypher personnel and radio operators
was high. Why then did the 275th Regiment violate COMSEC principles that allowed its
rear-link radio transmitter152 to be fixed 13 times by SIGINT in the period 29 July-14
August 1966 ie resulting in a string of beads leading from the Xuyn Mc area
westwards to Ni t 2 - ie to positions five kilometres to the east of 1 ATFs Ni t
base ? Why would the VC telegraph its advance to Ni t ? Was this incompetence
or intended ? Why did the VC shell the 1 ATF base from the east153, a day-and-a-half
before the Battle alerting the Task Force and allowing the 1 ATF commander to
withdraw almost all of 5RAR back to the base (ie less C Coy)154 on 17 August from

152

It is not yet known whether the Regiments fixed transmitter was accompanying a headquarters/
reconnaissance group or that group, together with the Regiments three battalions and support elements.
153
The shelling of the 1 ATF base in the early hours of 17 August 1966 including by weapons not held by
a VC local force unit eg 75mm RCL and a Japanese 70mm mountain howitzer (see footnote 113), alerted
Headquarters 1 ATF to a developing threat from the east. Patrols including company-sized, were
deployed eastward to the area of Ni t 2 seeking the mortar base plate positions. The Australian Official
History notes that on 18 August: D Company, like B Company, the day before, was responding solely to
the mortar attack. ((Major H.A.)) Smith was looking for the group that mortared the task force base. He had
no other brief. Neither Townsend ((CO 6RAR)) nor Smith ((OC D/6RAR)) was warned of 275
Regiment being in the vicinity. Any suggestion that D Company was looking for a regiment of the 5 th VC
Division is misleading, and a post-operational rationalization. - McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit.,
1993, p.359. Earlier - in the early hours of 17 August, Major H.A. Smith OC D/6RAR, had reported
hearing a gun fire three rounds towards the end of the mortar firing. 6RAR Operations Log, 17 August,
Sheet 1 Serial 3, 0410hrs.
154
In August 1966, 1 ATF was a two-battalion Task Force (5RAR, 6RAR) with a total strength of
2,830 (30 June 1966), and the base defences had yet to be completed see the layout of the 1 ATF Base
Area 1:5,000 scale map, in file AWM95, 1/4/12 Part 2, folio 41. Defence stores were in short supply as
were field telephones and switchboards; and the 1 ATF Commander - Brigadier O.D. Jackson wrote: I am
concerned about the lack of MGs ((machineguns)) for the defence of the base camp when a battalion goes
out on an operation taking their GPMGs ((General Purpose Machine Guns ie M60s)) with them. A
variation to entitlement to overcome this problem was submitted last month, but as yet has not resulted in
action. Commanders Diary (AF C 2118), July 1969. In September 1966, a 1 ATF review noted:
Additional automatic weapons and communications are essential for use by rear elements in base camp
defences while major units are away on operations. HQ 1 ATF, 1 ATF Vietnam: Lessons Learnt, Ni
t, 10 September 1966. - AWM95, 1/4/12 Part 2. The Commanding Officer of 5RAR Lieutenant Colonel
J.A. Warr, noted in his recommendations in an After Action Report: 24 additional GPMG M60 to be
allocated to 5RAR to assist with the defence of the ((1 ATF)) base area while the battalion is away on
operations. At the present time, NO M60 are available to assist with the defence of the base area. 5RAR,
Operation Toledo Combat Operations After Action Report, An Ph hamlet, 29 September 1966.
AWM95, 7/5/8. See also the following footnote 161 on denuding the base. The Australian Official
History notes however that Brigadier Jackson did not recall 5 RAR back from clearing/search and destroy
operations following the cordon and search of Bnh Ba but that Lieutenant Colonel J.A. Warr, CO
5RAR, suggested that 5RAR return to the base because Operation Holsworthy had become less fruitful.
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.359, p.560 (endnote 6). As noted above, for a 1:5,000-scale map
of the 1 ATF Base Area (Edition 3) showing defensive positions in August-September 1966, see AWM95,
1/4/12 Part 2, folio 41.

E-38

Operation Holsworthy at Bnh Ba an operation of which the Vit Cng 155 were aware ?
Why shell 1 ATF from east and risk compromising their assembly area ?
While some Australian writers have contended that the aim of the 5th VC Division
-directed force was to attack the 1 ATF base, communist Vietnamese writers and several
senior Vietnamese communist veterans have claimed that the aim was to lure156 an
Australian force from the base and to annihilate the Australians in a mobile ambush.
These two views a planned attack on the 1 ATF base or a planned mobile
ambush, were examined in the Australian Official History published in 1993, and the late
Dr Ian McNeill then concluded that: Too much information is missing to make a
conclusive assessment of the enemy intentions and motives. The battle had all the
appearances of a surprise encounter between the two forces. Nevertheless it does seem
that 5 Viet Cong Division intended to stage an ambush.157
The senior Vit Cng cadre planning the engagement would be mindful that 5th
VC Division elements had failed in major set attacks earlier in 1966 against prepared
positions defended by ARVN troops and had suffered heavy casualties eg: the attack by
the 274th Regiment at V Su (Bnh Tuy Province) on 28 February 1966 and the
subsequent attack on V Su by the 275th Regiment on 15 March. However, several VC
ambushes in Phc Tuy Province had been successful - eg: against ARVN armour
(M113s) just south of Bnh Ba by the 272nd Regiment on 9 December 1964; against the
ARVN 4th Marine Battalion east of Bnh Gi on 31 December 1964 (112 Marines KIA);
several ambushes on Route 15 against ARVN columns; and a mobile ambush against a
company of the 16th Regiment of the 1st US Infantry Division at Tm B/Cm M on 8
April 1966 (US casualty figures: 48 US KIA and 58 US WIA - Operation Abilene). In
Long Khnh Province, the 275th Regiment had successfully ambushed an ARVN column
at ng n on 30 June 1966.
155

On the afternoon of 16 August 1966, 6RARs A Company killed two VC about four kilometres northeast of the 1 ATF base (at YS 479693 and YS 483693) - 1 ATF, INTSUM No.76, Ni t, 16 August 1966
(AWM95, 1/4/7 Part 2). Captured documents indicated that the VC were elements of the 33-strong B Ra
Town Unit (C.982) and possibly a Province intelligence element (C.187) ie of Long - B - Bin Province.
CDEC Log 09-2055-66, VCAT Item No.F034600124501; CDEC Log 12-1843-66.
156
The tactic is described in several Chinese and Vietnamese military documents ie luring the tiger from
the mountain a Chinese and Vietnamese saying (Vietnamese: Dn h/cp khi ni; Sino-Vietnamese:
iu h ly sn; Chinese: ). Post-War, several senior Vietnamese veterans including Nguyn
Vn Kim and Nguyn Thanh Hng, have explained this as the tactic for the Long Tn Battle rather than
any attack against 1 ATFs Ni t base itself - McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit.,1993, pp.366-367, p.370.
See also The Ambush Battle account at Annex Q. For published contemporary Australian Army military
doctrine on enemy ambush tactics, see: Army Headquarters, The Enemy 1964, Canberra, 1 July 1964,
pp.37-38. See also: The Viet Cong Ambush Appendix 4 in McAulay, L., Arrow Books Ltd, London,
1987, pp.174-178.
157
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.364 and pp.370-371. In 2014, on the base attack or
lure/ambush views, Dr Peter Edwards has similarly summarised that: The debate continues to this day.
Edwards, P., Australia and the Vietnam War, Australian War Memorial/New South Publishing, Sydney,
2014, p.151. See also Fairhead, F. Lieutenant Colonel (Retd), A Duty Done: A Summary of Operations by
the Royal Australian Regiment in the Vietnam War 1965-1972, Royal Australian Regiment Australia
Association SA Inc, Linden Park, 2014, p.175 Note 6.

E-39

Several Vietnamese communist accounts have indicated that initial clash with
D/6RAR on the afternoon of 18 August 1966 in the Long Tn rubber (the Long Hip/B
ic plantation) was premature and unexpected158 and have implied that the ensuing
prolonged engagement with the Australians within the range of 1 ATFs artillery was a
deadly error.159
If the aim of the 5th VC Division planners was to attack ie ground assault, the
1 ATF base in mid-August 1966, then to increase the chance of their success, the
Division would most likely have also employed its 274th Regiment in a direct or
supporting role. The 274th Regiment was within an easy days march of the 1 ATF base.
However, the 274th Regiment was not involved it had other tasks, as detailed in Annex
N. The seemingly slow pace of the direct advance of the 275th Regiment elements
towards Ni t also begs questions. For security and safety, the Vit Cng force could
for example, have stayed in the area north of Xuyn Mc Town, and made a forced
march to the Ni t area in radio silence in the last few days. Indeed, 30 km per day
was quite manageable.160 This with other factors including the shelling on 17 August,

158

The 5th Division History (2005) implies that NVA Lieutenant Colonel Trn Minh Tm (Nm Ta ) - the
Chief of Staff of the 5th VC Division who was the battlefield commander at Long Tn, misappreciated 1
ATF capabilities ie: Trn Minh Tm concluded that the enemy did not have the capability to launch a
sweeping operation on 18 August - so he directed the observation element to temporarily withdraw to the
2nd Battalion position. see the extract from the 5th VC Division History (2005) at Annex K, footnote.42.
The 275th Regiment History (2015) states that the observation posts were withdrawn back to the 3rd
Battalion Headquarters site. - see Annex O Appendix 3.
159
The VC main killing zone for the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment (ie formerly the NVA D605
Battalion) was reportedly to be in the area of the Tht Pagoda. see the translated extracts of the 5th VC
Division History (2005) at Annex K, footnote 38. The 275th Regiment History (2015) however, relates:
The force for the killing zone comprised the 1 st Battalion, the 2nd Battalion, and a company of 445
Battalion stationed opposite. Following the Battle, several large camps, trenches and weapon pit
complexes were found within 105mm howitzer range of Ni t at YS 489666 and 490667 (5.5km), YS
508678 (7km), and YS 517662 (8km) 6RAR, Commanders Diary - Annex A to 6RAR, After Action
Report Operation Smithfield: 18-21 Aug 66, Ni t, 7 September 1966. Artillery units in the 1 ATF base
at Ni t comprised: 1st Field Regiment RAA (105mm M2A1 howitzers maximum range 10,575
metres), 161st Battery RNZA (105mm), A Battery of the US 2/35 th Regiment (155mm M109 medium selfpropelled guns maximum range 14,600 metres). A total of 3,198 105mm and 242 155mm rounds were
reportedly fired in support of the Long Tn battle McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351. In
response to a query on 10 November 1987 by Australian author T. Burstall to a 5th VC Division staff officer
present at the Battle of Long Tn - Nguyn Thanh Hng, on why the VC forces engaged D/6RAR within
the range of 1 ATFs artillery, Hng responded: We thought that we could grab their belts and it would
be over in a couple of hours. He said that at that time their policy was not to let a confrontation develop
any longer than two hours. Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, p.100. For detail on the grab
their belts tactic, see footnotes 222 and 287 in the main text. For the impact of the heavy monsoonal rain
on the Battle, see Annex K footnote 46.
160
Vit Cng troops ie as light infantry, had a capability to move swiftly across-country. According
to a senior NVA officer who rallied in 1970 LTCOL Nguyn Vn Nang: during the Dry Season, VC
units could move approx 20 to 25 kilometers in one night. Normally, they travelled four kilometers per
hour, and marched for five to five and one-half hours per night; during the Rainy Season, it took the units
approx 33 percent more marching time to cover the same distance. VCAT Item No.11271006005.

E-40

suggests that the VC intention was probably not to attack the 1 ATF base at Ni t, but
rather to annihilate an Australian force lured into an ambush to the east of the base.
Following the Battle, the 1 ATF Commander elected not to pursue the defeated
VC force on 19 August wary of an ambush and concerned for the defence of the 1 ATF
base161 : Jackson ((Commander 1 ATF)) permitted Townsend ((Lieutenant Colonel C.M.
Townsend, CO 6RAR)) to venture another 1,000 metres, not further than artillery range.
Nor was Jackson prepared to move forward any of the guns to increase their cover. 162
The CO 6RAR concurred that any pursuit would have been unwise.163
The 1 ATF Commander and his senior staff would have been aware of the latest
report164 from the US Headquarters II FFV at Long Bnh that assessed: it appears that
the 5th VC Division has shifted its attention to the 1st ATF north of Phuoc Le ((ie B Ra
Town)) The probable location of the 274th and 275th Regiments in Phuoc Tuy Province
indicates a possible threat to the 1st ATF. Documents found on a VC body identified the
860th ((ie D445)) Local Force Battalion. It is likely that small VC reconnaissance and
intelligence groups are maintaining surveillance165 of the 1st ATF while the main force
regiments are awaiting a suitable opportunity to attack. The 274th Regiment, the 860th
(LF) Battalion and possibly the 275th Regiment may attack the 1st ATF in Phuoc Tuy
Province.
SIGINT Access and Awareness
According to the Australian Official History: A major result of the Battle of
Long Tan was the decision to include commanding officers in the small group who were
briefed directly on the findings of signals intelligence.166 Regrettably however, that does
not appear to be accurate.167 Expanded access to specific SIGINT did not occur until
161

Jackson believed that denuding the base might also have exposed it or Binh Ba to attack by a battalion
or more of 274 Regiment, notwithstanding advice from 547 Signal Troop that the whole regiment was out
of the area. McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.557 (endnote 93). See also footnotes 12 and 126 for
SIGINT advice, and footnote 154 for the 1 ATF base defences.
162
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, pp.346-347.
163
Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Townsend 6RAR, After Action Report Operation Smithfield: 18-21 Aug
66, Ni t, 7 September 1966, para 16.
164
HQ II FFV, Lessons Learned - Operational Report for the Quarterly Period ending 31 July 1966, Long
Bnh, 15 August 1966 - which would have been received at Ni t very soon before the Battle.
165
Subsequently as noted earlier at footnote 155, on the afternoon of 16 August 1966, 6RARs A
Company killed two VC about four kilometres north-east of the 1 ATF base (at YS 479693 and YS 483693)
- 1 ATF, INTSUM No.76, Ni t, 16 August 1966 (AWM95, 1/4/7 Part 2). See also footnotes 20, 95, 96,
and 98 and the 5th VC Division History (2005) at Annex K pp.6-7, for the pre-Battle reconnaissance by
VC elements of the Ni t/Long Tn area.
166
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.360.
167
As related at footnote 70, Captain T.J. Richards (OC 547 Signal Detachment 1966-67) had apprised
Major J.R. Murphy OC of the 3rd SAS Squadron, of detailed SIGINT information prior to mid-August
1966. However, before the Battle, Major J. Rowe GSO2 Int, became aware of this breach of SIGINT
security and Captain Richards was ordered not to speak directly to him ((Major Murphy)) However
Keep ((Captain GSO3 Int)), Murphy and I ((Captain T.J. Richards)) worked our way round it - but this is
the problem with exclusive clubs in a combat environment. Brigadier T.J. Richards (Retd) email to

E-41

about late 1969 when battalion commanders were SIGINT-indoctrinated/listed by the

list manager, ie the GSO2 Int (the Task Force security officer). Before that time,
while unit commanders were not SIGINT codeword-cleared to receive explicit signals
intelligence, such intelligence was routinely sanitized by the 1 ATF senior intelligence
staff and advised as Special Agent Reports (SPARs) - or as emanating from other
sources such as POW, ralliers, captured documents etc.168 As indicated earlier, SPARs
were sometimes specifically mentioned in 1ATF intelligence reviews and operations logs.
A subsequent failure to disseminate SIGINT detail to field commanders is cited as
occuring 21 months after Long Tn ie preceding the Battle of Coral in mid-May 1968.
Prior to that battle, although sanitized and accurate SIGINT on NVA regiments in the
Surfers AO in Bin Ha and Bnh Dng provinces was included in briefings and reports
to unit commanders and their senior staffs including in a written intelligence annex to
the Task Force operation order, it does not appear to have influenced their plans or
subsequent unit deployments.169 A further example is cited in early June 1969, when
battalion commanders and their senior staffs were not apprised of the detail of available
SIGINT on the 33rd NVA Regiment prior to the Battle of Bnh Ba.170 In November 1970 when battalion commanders were SIGINT-cleared, the CO 2RAR/NZ when advised of
the location of the transmitter of the Chu c District Unit in the Rng Sc, was
wounded in a helicopter reconnaissance of that site.171
author (Chamberlain), 16 July 2013. For the 547-SAS relationship, see also footnote 131. For constraints on
SIGINT dissemination in a US formation in 1971, see the report by BG Jonathon R. Burton, 3rd Brigade
(Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) noted earlier at footnote 70. As note earlier at footnote 127, in
August 1966, Captain Trevor Richards briefed an unindoctrinated Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Warr CO
5RAR, on SIGINT-related aspects of the 275th VC Regiment. On 11 September 1966, Captain Richards
SIGINT-indoctrinated Major L.G. Doyle (RAA) the OC of 161 Recce Flt, to facilitate discussions on the
development of a 1 ATF airborne direction-finding capability utilizing Australian aircraft.
168
The Australian Official History notes: Intelligence collected by 547 Signal Troop that was of concern to
1ATF was disseminated as part of the intelligence briefings before operations, and in routine intelligence
summaries of Phuoc Tuy Province delivered to all units. All Sigint information was highly classified,
however, and was never mentioned as the source for an operation. McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the
Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.60.
Chamberlain, E.P., Research Note 07/2014: Vietnam War: The Battle of Coral - 13 May 1968,
Intelligence Aspects and Enemy Strengths, Point Lonsdale, 31 July 2014; and Chamberlain, E.P., The
Enemy and Intelligence, in Phc Tuy: Successes and Failures (presentation and paper) - Conference:
Phantoms Australias Secret War in Vietnam, National Vietnam Veterans Museum, Phillip Island, 12
April 2014. Authors (Chamberlains) email exchanges in mid-February 2014 with Major P.T. Murray (OC
547 Signal Troop May 1968) and with Major G.C. Cameron (GSO2 Int, HQ 1 ATF May 1968) on 17
and 20 February 2014.
170
Chamberlain, E. P., The Battle of Bnh Ba: a baffling mystery and SIGINT failure No!, The Bridges
Review, Issue 1, Canungra, January 2013, pp.91-92. Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment North
Vietnamese Army: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2014.
171
On 9 November 1970, reacting in response to this report - and preparatory to the deployment of an
infantry company to the area, a Sioux reconnaissance helicopter carrying the CO 2RAR/NZ Lieutenant
Colonel J.M. Church, to the location was shot down, and he was lightly wounded presumably by Chu
c, over the Rng Sc mangroves, about two kilometres north of the western end of Long Sn Island.
1 ATF, SUPINTREP No.45/70 (9-15 November 1970 inclusive), Ni t, 17 November 1970. See also
footnote 148. The GSO2 (Int) HQ 1 ATF Major C.C.M. Peters, had advised the CO 2RAR/NZ of the
169

E-42

547 from Detachment to Troop

In late October 1966, a senior officer from the Directorate of Military Intelligence
(MI8), two senior officials from the Defence Signals Division (DSD), and scientists from
the Australian Weapons Research Establishment (WRE) visited 1 ATF to review its
SIGINT capabilities and to trial a WRE-developed ARDF equipment. Subsequent to that
review, in early 1967 with the important contribution of SIGINT in support of 1 ATF
operations having been acknowledged, the strength of 547 Signal Detachment was
increased172 and the Detachment was formally re-titled as a Troop in May 1967. At
30 June 1967, the Troops strength of 29 personnel was double the Detachments orginal
number; and the Troops establishment was further increased in October 1969 to 40
personnel. Following the early trials of the Australian WRE-developed ARDF system in
Phc Tuy in October November 1966, in early September 1967, the Troop acquired its
own Australian-developed ARDF capability in a Cessna 180B aircraft flown by 1 ATFs
161 (Independent) Reconnaissance Flight.173 On 10 June 1968 - based on an ARDF fix,
a SAS patrol attacked a VC camp in the Ni Dinh Hills (YS 335668) killing eight VC and
seizing a home-made radio complete and documents.174

SIGINT ARDF fix but was not aware that Lieutenant Colonel Church had intended a reconnaissance
flight to the site. Email to author (Chamberlain) from Colonel C.C.M. Peters (Retd), 29 October 2013.
172
In November 1966, DMI advised the DCGS that: This small independent capability has been so
successful that both the Commanders AFV and 1ATF have stressed that this unit is providing the most, and
in many cases the only reliable intelligence, and that any means that can be found to increase this capability
would be greatly appreciated and fully supported. - DMI (to DCGS), AMF Signal Intelligence Support of
1ATF, Canberra, 15 November 1966. In 1966, the Australian Armys SIGINT capability was also heavily
engaged in monitoring Indonesian military communications during Konfrontasi including from a
squadron in Singapore and a troop in Labuan/Kuching (Borneo). see footnote 65.
173
For detail on 547 Signal Troop ARDF flying hours and data on fixes in the period October 1967 to
November 1971 see Annex F in Hartley, R.W. AM & Hampstead, B.V, The Story of 547 Signal Troop ...,
op.cit, 2014. A total of 4,616 ARDF fixes by 547 Signal Troop are recorded over that 33-month period.
From mid-January 1970, ARDF missions ie usually a minimum of two daylight sorties each day (of at
least 2 hours duration), were undertaken by the newly-deployed Pilatus Porter (PC-6) aircraft ie
together with the Cessna aircraft. Additionally, 547 Signal Troop obtained DF fixes from its ground-base
facility at Ni t see footnote 180.
174
1 ATF, INTSUM No.161-68, Ni t, 10 June 1968. Simpson, G.L. Lieutenant, Patrol Report Patrol
14, Ni t, 11 June 1968 (AWM93, 7/11/4).

E-43

547 Signal Troop Set Room 1969

(seven intercept positions each with two Collins radio receivers and Nagra tape
recorders)
Sig M. (Mick) F. Guillot, Sig K.D. (Lofty) Hayward, Cpl H.G. (Gordon) Greaves,
Cpl Ken Perry, Sig Earl J. Rush.175
The Yellow Jacket Program
In late 1969, a deliberate policy of attacking enemy headquarters was adopted in
order to degrade their ((NVA/VC)) command and control systems by Headquarters II
Field Force Vietnam (II FFV) at Long Bnh.176 With the formation of Headquarters Third
Regional Assistance Command (TRAC) on 30 April 1971 replacing II FFV,
subordinate formations including 1 ATF, were required to report their operations
cued by SIGINT to Headquarters TRAC with spot reports and weekly summaries. 1
ATF reported operations against D445 Battalion, the 274th VC Regiment, and the 33rd
NVA Regiment citing a usually reliable source, ie a euphemism for SIGINT.177

175

Hartley, R.W. AM & Hampstead, B.V., The Story of 547 Signal Troop in South Vietnam: 1966-1972,
Googong, 2014, p.83, fig 98.
176
Senior Officer Debriefing Report: LTG Julian J. Ewell, CG, II Field Force Vietnam, Period 2 April 1969
through 15 April 1970, 15 June 1970 see: DTIC AD0509550. The Report also noted that the policy was
also initiated for other reasons beyond the security classification ((confidential)) of this paper.
177
Indicatively - following the location of D445 on 14 July 1971 in the area of YS 5966, 3RAR was
deployed. On 18 July, 4RAR was deployed against the 274 th VC Regiment at YS 4095. On 9 August, D445
was located in the vicinity of YS 679712, and 3RAR deployed the following day. On 18 September 1971, a
usually reliable source (see footnote 99) located elements of the 33rd NVA Regiment in the area of YS
5082 3RAR and 4RAR elements were deployed, ie precipitating Operation Ivanhoe on 19 and 20
September 1971.

E-44

Subsequent SIGINT Coverage

Recently available material178 indicates that 547 Signal Detachment/Troop
provided regular SIGINT coverage of: Military Region 7, the B Long Province Unit
(station identifier M0094), the 5th VC Division Headquarters (RAD 136A, 4800A etc),
the 274th VC Regiment (4191A) and its battalions, the 275th VC Regiment, the 95th VC
Regiment, the 174th VC Regiment, the 74th Artillery Group (M4000), D445 (7345A,
M1523), D440, Sub-Region 4, the Chu c District Unit (E0809), the Long t District
Unit (B4024), HQ 84th Rear Service Group (4157A) and its subordinates, the Vng Tu
City Unit, the Vng Tu Guerilla Unit (M5908) as well as smaller elements (entities)
such as military intelligence detachments.179 In October 1968, an Australian-developed
ground-based DF system a Single Station Location (SSL) DF system (codenamed
Short Cell), was provided to 547 Signal Troop. The SSL system could only fix a
NVA/VC radio transmitter to within a circular area of probablility (CEP) of 10
kilometres but provided an area within which the ARDF aircraft could be tasked for
more accuracy. The SSL system including its two shelters, was sited to the north-east
of Ni t Hill, near the rubbish dump.180
Coverage of the 5th VC Division Headquarters and the 275th Regiment ceased in
March-April 1970 when those two elements withdrew westwards into Cambodia from the
1 ATF Area of Intelligence Interest following the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk and the
US/ARVN cross-border ground incursions. Subsequently, these VC elements operated
in Cambodia, western Military Region 3, and northern Military Region 4 see Annex O.
In the period from late May 1970 to October 1971, the 1 ATF PDP-8/L
(Intelligence Log) records indicate that about 1,400 SPAR DF location fixes were
provided over a period of some 400 days ie about 3.5 fixes per day (including 99
locations of the D445 Battalion transmitter). Often however, some VC elements
(entities) would not be located by SIGINT DF for some time occasionally not for
several weeks. For example, in the period June-July-August 1970, the 1 ATF Intelligence
Log indicates that D445 was not fixed until 7 August and then next in August on 8,
178

In 1971, a Battle Intelligence Computer Trial was conducted at HQ 1 ATF with entries from the
Intelligence Log and SPAR locations of NVA/VC units typed into a PDP-8/L computer. Earlier, as an aid to
the analysis of enemy data eg pattern analyis of locations, teletypewriters and printers had been used to
manage information. In 2014, Australian War Memorial staff were able to recover data from the computer
tapes see: Bennington, S. (Curator - Official History), Vietnam Battle Intelligence Computer data tapes
Part 2, Australian War Memorial Canberra, 19 November 2014. The station identifier designators noted
above were provided to the author by Major R.W. Hartley AM (Rtd) in late August 2015.
179
In that 1970-1971 period, locations of other NVA/VC elements were occasionally noted in SPARs eg U1
(Bin Ha Province Unit), Bnh Tuy Province Unit, 10th Sapper Battalion etc. The listing of NVA/VC
elements above is incomplete. It has not yet been possible to recover all the information from the computer
data tapes eg DF locations prior to May 1970 and SPAR material for the Battle of Long Tn (August
1966), the 1968 Tt Offensive (February 1968), the Battles of Coral/Balmoral (May-June 1968), and the
Battle of Bnh Ba (June 1969).
180
For detail on the Single Station Location (SSL) direction-finding system, see: Annex I to Hartley, R.W.
AM & Hampstead, B.V., The Story of 547 Signal Troop, op.cit., 2014.

E-45

11, 12, 18, 27, 29, 30 and 31st August.181 During those three months, D440, the 274th
Regiment, and the B Long Province Unit were regularly located. Subsequently on one
day in mid-1971 (on 30 June 1971), DF fixes were noted for the transmitters of: Military
Region 7 (Rear Services), Long t District Unit, D445, HQ 33rd NVA Regiment, 2nd
Battalion/33rd Regiment, and the 3rd Battalion/33rd Regiment. D445 Battalion was fixed in
June 1971 on 17 days; in July 1971 on six days; and on 1, 9 and 13 August 1971.182
Readability of NVA/VC Communications
As noted earlier, in September 1966, Captain Richards OC 547 Signal
Detachment, reported: we can now read this system 274th Regiment is passing
operational orders over this network .183 The communications of the 274th Regiment
continued to be regularly readable. In early June 1969, following 547 Signal Troops
intercept and reading of 274th Regiments communications, the Thai Forces battalion base
at Lc An (Bin Ha Province) was forewarned of the impending attack by the 274th
Regiment. 212 VC were reported KIA (BC) in the failed attack by the 274th Regiment
early on 18 June 1969.184 On 20 November 1969 intercepting messages of the
Regiments 2nd Battalion, 547 Signal Troop reported: Elements of 2 Bn have received
foodstuffs and have been ordered to continue their mission of ammunition resupply. A
message intercepted on 18 November instructed the Bn to give priority to the
transportation of AK and B40 ammunition urgently needed by Regt HQ. The same
message reported that HQ VC 274 Regt had opposed an Allied sweep and had been
engaged in two large battles.185 Messages of that Regiment were the most regularly
exploited by 547 Signal Detachment/Troop.
The communications of the B Long (ie B Ra-Long Khanh) Province
Headquarters and D440 Battalion were also sometimes readable. On 19 February 1970, a
547 Signal Troop report included : Plans for forthcoming attacks on Allied positions at
Duc My (YS 432724) were discussed in intercepted messages between the suspected HQ
181

Headquarters 1 ATF commented in mid-June 1970 that D445 are trying to keep out of trouble with its
headquarters and two companies in the Minh m Zone/Long Hi Hills area. 1 ATF, SUPINTREP 23/70,
Ni t, 16 June 1970. The Intelligence Log records D445 was subsequently fixed in September 1970 on
1, 4, 5, 10, 12 September; in October 1970 on 5 and 9 October; and in December 1970 on 12, 14, 17 and 23.
182
The Australian Official History relates that following Operation Paddington in mid-July 1967: the
task force lost track of the enemy formation ((274 th VC Regiment)). 274 Regiment then turned up one
month later, without warning, and a company of 7RAR was caught in a savage battle with one of its units
during Operation Ballarat, in what became known as the battle of Suoi Chau Pha. McNeill, I. & Ekins,
A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.58, p.215, and p.505 - citing Major J.O. Furner SO2 (Int) 1 ATF
1967-1968.
183
See footnote 137 - Richards, T.J. Captain, Transcript of an Audio Tape to DMI (MI8), 13 September
1966. See also footnote 140 for reference to 274th Regiment communications by 5RAR in August 1966.
184
See footnote 143 and Hart, S.W. with Chamberlain, E.P., A Tactical SIGINT Success Story, op.cit,
2013.
185
547 Signal Troop, Report 37/69 - Summary of VC and NVA Military Activities in BIEN HOA, LONG
KHANH and PHUOC TUY Provinces 14-20 November 1969, 20 November 1969 advised by Major R.W.
Hartley, AM (Retd), 28 February 2016.

E-46

Ba Bien Province186 and the suspected D440 Local Force Battalion (currently located
some 7km north of Duc My). In a message passed on 18 February which may be
associated with these plans, D440 Local Force Battalion was instructed that Highpoint
X was to commence on 26 February and continue until 7 March and that D-Day during
this Highpoint was to be the night of 26/27 February.187
On 26 April 1970, 547 Signal Troop reported that: 33rd NVA Regt was fixed by
ARDF in the vicinity of YT 9420. The 33 NVA Regt was still engaged in moving stores
and equipment and carrying out reconnaissance missions. The 3rd and 4th Coys of this
Regt suffered heavy casualties from B-52 strikes necessitating the move of approximately
250 men from the Regt HQ.188 presumably from the Regiments support elements.

547 Signal Troop Report 11/70: Period 4-9 April 1970: Map 189
186

B Bin Province existed from late 1966 to late 1967. In February 1970 and until May 1971, the entity
was called B Ra-Long Khnh Province. See Annex J.
547 Signal Troop, Report 426, 19 February 1970 advised by Major R.W. Hartley, AM (Retd), 28
February 2016.
188
547 Signal Troop, Report 14/70, 26 April 1970 advised by Major R.W. Hartley, AM (Retd), 28
February 2016. 547 Signal Troop reports of 18 March, 29 March, 9 April, and 15 April also indicated that
some 33rd NVA Regiment messages were, at times, being read by 547 Signal Troop.
189
547 Signal Troop, Summary of VC and NVA Military Activity in the Bien Hoa, Long Khan [sic] and
Phuoc Tuy Provinces During the Period 4 Apr 70 9 Apr 70. For clarity, typed labels and several place187

E-47

Limitations
The Australian Official History notes that: Sigint made a vital contribution to
information-gathering throughout the Vietnam War.190 However - while an important
input to operational planning, DF fixes often intermittent, were no intelligence
panacea for HQ 1 ATF. As noted, some VC transmitters would not be located by
SIGINT DF for some time (see footnote 181) occasionally not for several weeks. The
1st Battalion of the 274th Regiment was not located by SIGINT in the period 18 February
3 July 1969; and its 2nd Battalion was unlocated for three months (June-August
1971).191 Further even if fixed, as light infantry, NVA/VC troops were highly
mobile and could move rapidly across-country reportedly 20 to 25 kilometers in one
night. Phc Tuy Province was only about 55 kilometres from east-to-west and about 35
kilometres from north-to-south (an area of 1,958 sq km about 3% of the size of the
Tasmania). As noted earlier, 547 Signal Troop attempted to intercept NVA/VC low-level
VHF voice (LLV) communications including from Ni t Hill, The Horseshoe base,
and forward Fire Support and Patrol Bases (FSPBs), but with only limited success.192
Further, SIGINT was potentially vulnerable to NVA/VC communications deception
measures eg false traffic and/or false locations. Such measures were used successfully
by the NVA/VC in their Central Highlands campaign in March 1975.193 1 ATF was alert
to NVA/VC imitative deception ruses ie when NVA/VC operators would attempt to
join radio nets as US or Australian forces.194
names have been added to this April 1970 map. Both D445 and D440 battalions had been located on 8
April. The HQ 274th Regiment was located in the Hc Dch area. However, on the 3rd Battalion of the 274th
Regiment: nothing heard since 15 Dec 69. The HQ 33rd NVA Regiment was located on 7 April 1970
deployed in the northern Binh Tuy Province area. As noted, the HQ 5 th VC Division and its 275th
Regiment had moved into Cambodian territory in late March 1970.
190
McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.58 and endnote 115.
191
SIGINT Weekly Summary 15/69 and 547 Signal Troop Report 547-326, 4 July 1969. The 1st Battalion
was probably proximate to the Regiments Headquarters, and communications were direct or by courier etc.
192
See also footnote 38. Documents captured during the Battle of Coral included enemy Signal Operating
Instructions. Flown-in to the area on 18 May 1968, a three-man detachment from 547 Signal Troop
intercepted two VC voice networks from 28 May which were recorded on tapes for analysis. This was
believed to be the first ever VC voice intercept in III CTZ, and there was widespread US interest. - 547
Signal Troop, Troop Progress Reports 1-31 May 68 and 1-30 June 68. For ten nights in the period of Tt
(February) 1970, the Troops operators at Ni t searched the VHF band, but there was not one hint of
VC voice. 547 Signal Troop, Operational Report 1-28 February 1970 advice from Major R.W. Hartley
AM (Retd), 4 December 2015. See footnote 144 noting the crowded VHF communications band.
193
The massing of the 10th and 320th NVA Divisions against Ban M Thut in March 1975 was not
detected, and the appearance of the 316th NVA Division from North Vietnam in the battle was a near
complete tactical surprise. Rather, NVA/VC deception measures had suggested that Pleiku was the priority
objective. Hanyok, R.J., Spartans in the Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War , op.cit.,
2002, pp.432-434.
194
1 ATF, Jamming/ICD (Imitative Communications Deception) Directed Against Free World Forces, G223, Ni t, 28 February 1967; 1 ATF, Troops Information Sheet No.78, Ni t, 7-13 January 1968. For
NVA/VC SIGINT activities including the probable intercept of 1 ATF communications in April 1969, see
the earlier footnote 10.

E-48

In late August early September 1970, a 547 Signal Troop operator equipped
with a man-portable DF system deployed with a SAS patrol to the area of the Long
Khnh/Phc Tuy Province border in an attempt to fix more accurately the location of
the VC B Long Province Headquarters but without success, and the equipment was not
employed again.195
Recognition for 547 Signal Troop
In June 1967, Captain T.J. Richards was recommended for the award of
Mentioned in Dispatches (MID). The recommendation submission (AF - W 3121) noted
that: His team became recognised as one of the leaders in its field, producing results out
of all proportion to its size, and contributing time after time to the disruption of planned
enemy operations. However, the award was not progressed for approval.
Corporal Ray Pratt (13 June 1966 8 June 1967) and Warrant Officer (Class 1)
John (Jack) Hooker (23 September 1968 10 September 1969) were awarded MIDs for
their service with 547 Signal Troop.
Beginning in May 2012, the award of a Meritorious Unit Citation (MUC) or
another form of medallic recognition, for 547 Signal Troops service in Vietnam was
considered by the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT). The
Tribunal noted that: Until more recent times, the role of the unit and its work in Vietnam
was secret. While the Tribunals report acknowledged that 547 Signal Troop had
operated successfully against a highly capable enemy and achieved its mission and
highly commended the Troop, the Tribunal decided not to recommend any award for
the Troop. In June 2015, the Government advised that it had accepted the Tribunals
recommendation that no action be taken.196

Conclusion
Up until the Battle of Long Tn, the Task Force Commander and its senior
operations and intelligence officers (ie GSO2 Ops, GSO2 Int) were not convinced of the
accuracy or usefulness of SIGINT. During the pre-Long Tn period, the Task Force was
focused perhaps understandably, on the security of Route 15 in western Phc Tuy197
195

The Telefunken PE-484 body-wearable DF system was worn by Signalman Lloyd Giles. The SAS patrol
was inserted at 1635hrs on 31 August 1970 by helicopter and similarly extracted at 1150hrs on 6 September
1970. The patrol operated just inside north-eastern Phc Tuy, 5 kilometres to the north-west of the My
To Mountains see 1 SAS Squadron Report OPS 238/70 dated 7 September 1970. For detail, see: Hartley,
R.W. AM & Hampstead, B.V., The Story of 547 Signal Troop, op.cit., 2014 that cites Giles description
of the patrol (based on his email dated 5 October 2014) and includes photographs. See also footnote 61.
196
DHAAT, Inquiry into Recognition for Service with 547 Signal Troop in Vietnam from 1966 to 1971,
Canberra, 7 May 2015.
197
The 275th Regiment had attacked Route 15 outside B Ra Town in November 1965 at Kim Hi/Phc
Ha see Annex O; and the 274th Regiment had ambushed convoys and attacked posts on Route 15 three
times in August 1966 see Annex N.

E-49

a priority directed by General Westmoreland, and the three officers mentioned above may
have been influenced by SIGINTs inability to accurately fix VC radio stations in the
Ni Th Vi and Ni Dinh areas (Dodo, Leech). The SIGINT-located approach of the
275th Regiment from the east was apparently not viewed as credible by the Commander
and his senior intelligence and operations officers. Indicatively, in July and August 1966,
SAS patrols were almost solely tasked with operating to the west of Route 2.198 Reporting
on a 275th Regiment radio to the east of 1 ATF and moving westward towards Ni t,
did not alert the Commander or his senior staff to the developing threat.
Immediately following the Battle of Long Tn, SIGINT was recognised and
included by the Task Force Commander - and the few SIGINT-cleared headquarters staff
officers, as an essential input to operational planning. As noted, in early September 1966,
Brigadier Jackson reportedly told the visiting CGS Lieutenant General T.J. Daly, that
547 Signal Detachment was producing the only intelligence at all that was of any use to
him up here in this area and the DCGS was advised that: This small independent
capability has been so successful that both the Commanders AFV and 1ATF have
stressed that this unit is providing the most, and in many cases the only reliable
intelligence.199 In mid-1967, the strength of 547 Signal Troop was almost doubled, and
the development and operation of an Australian ARDF capability from Ni t added
significantly to the Troops effectiveness.
While the number of SIGINT-indoctrinated Task Force personnel only grew
slowly over the following years, sanitised SIGINT-derived material became a routine
element of operational planning and intelligence reporting often noted as SPARs.

198

Professor Dr David Horner has noted: the SAS had provided little solid evidence that the enemy was
massing for an attack on the Task Force. - Horner, D. Professor/Dr, Phantoms of the Jungle, 1989,
pp.118-120. For an analysis of 1 ATFs intelligence focus to the west of Route 2, see: Chamberlain, E.P.,
The Enemy and Intelligence, in Phc Tuy: Successes and Failures (presentation and paper), NVVM,
Phillip Island, 12 April 2014 see footnote 105.
199
See footnotes 126 and 172. The statements are however somewhat excessive and should be leavened
with an understanding of SIGINTs limitations and the contribution of other sources of information and
intelligence (outlined at footnote 2). As related at p.47 SIGINT was no panacea to the enemy question.

E-50

Readers Comments and Notes

Annex F

THE BATTLE OF LONG TN: CASUALTIES AND LOSSES

Accuracy of Claims
During the War, both sides measured battlefield success by the numbers of
casualties inflicted on the enemy. Body counts reported by South Vietnamese, US and
other Free World Forces are known to often have been exaggerated particularly
during the attrition strategy phase of the War directed by COMUSMACV General
W.C. Westmoreland.1 Communist accounts of casualties inflicted on their enemies were
invariably excessive and routinely hyperbolic.2
In recent years, discussion has re-emerged on the accuracy of casualty figures for
the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966.3 In particular, some believe that the Vit
1

For the dissatisfaction of COMUSMACV (General W. C. Westmoreland) with 1 ATFs pacification

focus in January 1967 which was not producing the body count by which the war of attrition was
measured, see McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.428. General Westmorelands successor (wef 11
June 1968) General C.W. Abrams, eschewed Westmorelands discredited attrition strategy and search
and destroy operations. Under Abrams command, the strategic emphasis shifted to pacification
operations.- Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.4, pp.41-43 (body count),
and p.395. For General Westmorelands views on indicators to measure progress in the War ie enemy
dead, captured weapons, villages pacified, population under government control, roads opened etc see:
Westmoreland, W.C. General, Report on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 June 1968), Section II, p.106.
VCAT Item No.168300010017, eg: The damage inflicted on the enemy was one indicator. The body
counts of NVA/VC KIA may have been at times unintentionally inflated due to the state of KIA remains
due to heavy firepower ie body parts additional to torsos being counted see footnotes 9 to 19 for KIA
body-counting at Long Tn in August 1966, and footnote 84 for a US Army interpretation of body count.
2
On communist claims of Australian casualties, their Military Region 7 Headquarters declared that during
calendar year 1969: approximately 2,509 Australian troops were killed, resulting in six companies and
five platoons destroyed. Five other companies and six platoons were depleted. They admitted that the 5 th
Australian Battalion has lost its combat effectiveness. see: CDEC Log 07-1632-70/CDEC Report No. 6
028 0700 70. Subsequently, in early 1970, Military Region 7 claimed that 2,701 Australians had been killed
in 1969, including a lieutenant colonel. - CDEC Log 05-1067-70. The ng Nai History (1986) related that
the Australians withdrew in December 1971: after seven years as mercenaries (1965-1971) - with three
generals directly commanding the Task Force, and causing misery and loss to the people. However, they
had to pay a price of over 10,000 wounded and killed. - Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit.,
1986, p.167. In mid-2006, a media article claimed that D445 Battalion had killed 10,000 enemy, including
1,700 Americans and their vassals. - Nguyn c, Mt Ngy Tiu on 445, 21 June 2006.
3
For detail on the 275th Vit Cng Main Force Regiments casualties at the Battle of Long Tn, see also
Annex O pp.18-25. With the exception of the t District History (2006), none of the available
Vietnamese district/village-level histories mention the Long Tn battle - including the Long t District
History (1986) - although the battle took place on the far northern border of Long t District; the Chu
c History (2004); the Xuyn Mc Resistance (Khang Chin) History (1989); The Minh m History
(2006); or the Ha Long Village Party Chapter History (2009). The t District History (2006) merely
states: On 18 August 1966, Regional troops (of the 5 th Division) coordinated with Province forces and
Long Tn village guerrillas to conduct an ambush on the Australian military at Long Tn, wiping out an
Australian platoon and wounding hundreds of the enemy. This battle was a very great victory that created a
stir in the Australian Parliament and among the Australian people. - ng Tn Hng (ed), The History of
the Struggle of t District (1930-2005), op.cit., 2006

F-2

Cng casualties at Long Tn cited by Australian sources have been overstated4 - eg T.

Burstall, Nguyn Thanh Hng and Nguyn Vn Kim; while some senior Vietnamese
cadre have queried the Australian casualty figures as being too low eg Hng and Kim.5
In 2008 and 2011, Vietnamese contributors to an official Vietnamese military blogsite6
also challenged the Australian figure for Vit Cng casualties as being excessive. The
Wikipedia entry for the Battle of Long Tn notes that there is still Controversy on
Strengths and Casualties in the Battle.
NVA/VC Casualties and references7
Prior to the Battle of Long Tn, casualties inflicted on the Viet Cong by the
Australians since their arrival in Phuoc Tuy were reportedly about 141 VC killed in
action (KIA).8 On the day following the Battle of Long Tn - at 1105hrs on 19 August
1966, 6RAR reported to Headquarters 1 ATF: Enemy: 113 bodies and two WIA
((wounded in action)) collected at this time. Collection continues. Possibility that they are
North Vietnamese.9 An initial report to Australia related that the Australian forces had
clashed with two VC companies at 1615-1910hrs, enemy probably a main force battalion
possibly local force. 138 enemy KIA.10 Subsequently, on 20 August 1966, 1 ATF
4

Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, pp.77-79 and p.106; and Vietnamese veterans: Nguyn
Thanh Hng (5th VC Division staff officer 1966) and Nguyn Vn Kim (CO D445 Battalion 1968-1969).
5
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, pp.365-371. See the following footnotes 21, 77 and 78.
6
Altus, Trn Long Tn, Qun S Vit Nam website, 8 May 2008 and postings in August 2008 by sudoan
and several others in February and March 2011.
7
The Vietnamese term lit si is translated as martyr, and their deaths - hy sinh, is translated in
dictionaries as to be sacrificed. Following the First Indochina War, regulations defined martyrs as only
those killed in direct combat with the enemy. Subsequently, qualifications were broadened considerably to
include those who were killed in indirect actions eg by enemy artillery and air power, and those who died
from wounds, injury, illness, or in prison. Regulations were recently re-promulgated by the Vietnamese
Government in its Decision No.31/2013/N-CP Defining Details for Guidance on Implementing a
Number of Articles Regarding the Law on Privileges for Those Who Served the Revolution, H Ni, 9
April 2013 (see particularly Article 17). In some Martyrs Lists, the deceased is noted as having died in
hospital or, for example, died as a result of malignant/pernicious malaria (b st rt c tnh).
8
Casualties inflicted on the Viet Cong by the Australians since their arrival in Phuoc Tuy now total 138
killed, including 59 killed confirmed by body count, 11 probably killed, 49 badly wounded, and 19
captured. A further 188 suspects have been detained. Australian Success in Viet Nam, Directorate of
Public Relations For Press: No.4557, Army Headquarters, Canberra, 14 August 1966, p.2.
9
HQ 1 ATF, Ops Log, Serial 395, Sheet 728, Ni t, 191105H August 1966 (Narrative Duty Officers
Log) AWM95, 1/4/6 Part 1; and 1st Australian Task Force - Vietnam, Combat Operations After Action
Report Operation Smithfield, R723-1-5, Ni t, December 1966, sub-sub-para 12.b.(88-92) AWM95,
1/4/26, folio 112, Internet-accessible - see Bibliography. Subsequently at 1215hrs, 6RAR reported: En:
Body count difficult to assess at this stage. Bodies have been sighted as far east as YS 487667. HQ 1
ATF, Ops Log, Serial 399, Sheet 728; at 1430hrs: Current body count 168 Ops Log, Serial 414, Sheet
730; at 1615hrs: Body count now 180 Ops Log Serial 424, Sheet 731; at 1925hrs: Body count 188 VC
KIA Ops Log Serial 435, Sheet 732.
10
Report to the Minister for Foreign Affairs - 19 August 1966, National Archives of Australia - A1838,
696/8/6/5, p.100.

F-3

reported the number of enemy KIA (killed in action) at Long Tn as now 231 (BC
Body Count).11 On the afternoon of 21 August, 14 VC bodies were found by 6RAR in
shallow graves (YS 508687) about two kilometres north-east of the abandoned hamlet of
Phc Hng ie about three kilometres north-east of the main battle area - that brought
the body count to 245 VC KIA.12 That evening, a cumulative total of 245 VC KIA
(BC) since 18 August was reported by 1 ATF.13 In mid-September 1966, 1 ATF reported
that at Long Tn: D445 had probably lost between 30-40 KIA. This leaves them with a
fighting strength of about 300 .14 The 1 ATF and 6RAR After Action Reports on
the Battle, reported 245 enemy killed in action (by body count), three captured and
estimated that the enemy evacuated at least 350 casualties.15 On 5 September 1966, 1
ATF similarly reported enemy casualties as 245 KIA (BC), 3 VCC (Vit Cng
Captured) to Headquarters II Field ForceVietnam (II FFV) in 1 ATFs routine Monthly
Evaluation (MONEVAL) report.16 In his After Action Report, Major H. A. Smith the
11

1 ATF, INTSUM No.80, Ni t, 20 August 1966. This report appears to have been based on an update
from 5RAR at 1845hrs on 20 August 1966 see 5RAR Operations Log, 20 August 1966, AWM95, 7/5/7
Part 1. In a 2004 publication, former Sergeant R.S. Buick MM (acting platoon commander 11/D/6RAR
during the Battle) related that on 19 August 1966 on the Long Tn battlefield: I counted and placed a
branch on each ((NVA/VC)) body counted. This was to eliminate a double count. after counting about
130, and an hour of walking through and on the mangled bodies, we had to give it away I counted whole
torsos, the main part of the body. - Grandin, R., The Battle of Long Tan: As Told by the Commanders to
Bob Grandin, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2004, p.228.
12
HQ 1 ATF Ops Log, Sheet 745 Serial 588, Ni t, 211415H 21 August 1966 (from 6RAR). On 23
September 1966, SAS Patrol 34 found a grave at YS 508676 about two and a half kilometres east of the
battlefield, with seven bodies (age: four-six weeks old) probably from OP SMITHFIELD. 3 SAS,
Commanders Diary, 23 September 1966. AWM95, 7/12/4.
13
1 ATF, INTSUM No.81, Ni t, 21 August 1966 the 1 ATF INTSUM reported the location of the 14
VC bodies as GR YS 508678 - ie not 508687 (ie transposing the final two digits).
14
1 ATF, Intelligence Review No.1, Ni t, 13 September 1966, para 4.c. Much later, in a 12-page
history of D445, 1 ATF assessed D445 had: suffered very heavy casualties in the order of 70 KIA and 100
WIA at the Battle. - 1 ATF, D445 Local Force Battalion, Ni t, 18 January 1969. In May 1971, the 1
ATF Intelligence Staff reported that 445 Battalion returnees later stated that their casualties were
approximately 70 KIA and 100 WIA - Peters, C.C.M. Major, D445 - Order of Battle, 1 ATF Battle
Intelligence Section, Ni t, 6 May 1971 as similarly reported in an earlier 29 May 1970 edition.
15 st
1 Australian Task Force - Vietnam, Combat Operations After Action Report Operation Smithfield,
R723-1-5, Ni t, December 1966, sub-para 13.a. AWM95, 1/4/26, folio 112. Internet-accessible, see
Bibliography. Townsend, C.M. Lieutenant Colonel, 6 RAR After Action Report Operation
SMITHFIELD: 18-21 August 1966, Ni t, 7 September 1966 - see in: Mollison, C.S. Lieutenant
Colonel (Retd), Long Tan and Beyond Alpha Company 6 RAR in Vietnam 1966-67, Cobbs Crossing,
Woombye, 2006, pp.387-396.
16 st
1 Australian Task Force, Monthly Evaluation (MONEVAL), Ni t, 5 September 1966 AWM95,
1/4/7. The MONEVAL report also related that D/6RAR were involved in a three hour fire-fight with an
estimated two battalions of 275 Regt and elements of D445 Bn, and that statements by two POWs
indicated that one battalion of 275 Regt was NVA and the remainder of the Regiment had been heavily
infiltrated [sic] with NVA replacements. The two NVA POWs captured on 19 August 1966 on the Long
Tn battlefield were: Nguyn Vn Thanh (b.1947) of the 3rd Battalion/275th Regiment (gunshot wounds to
the leg and the hip) who was moved from the III CTZ Bin Ha POW facility to the major POW camp on
Ph Quc Island on 20 May 1970; and Nguyn Vn Huy (b. 1948, unit not recorded). The D445 POW was
L Vn Trung (b.1946 57mm RCL crew). Both Huy and Trung were moved to Ph Quc Island on 6

F-4

commander of B Company of 6RAR, reported enemy casualties as 245 killed (by body
count), 150 possibly killed, and 500 possibly wounded.17 According to the Australian
Official History: The confirmed result of the battle of Long Tn was 245 enemy left
dead on the battlefield and three enemy captured. Two of the captured were from North
Vietnam and another from D445 Battalion.18 That official history also relates that: A
diary of the enemy commander at Long Tn which was subsequently captured listed his
losses as 500.19 During an interview with Dr Ian McNeill, when told of the Australian
claim of 245 communist troops killed, Nguyn Thanh Hng - a former Headquarters 5th
Division operations officer, responded that such a figure (for killed on the battlefield) was
October 1967 and later released under the provisions of the Paris Peace Agreement on 12 February 1973. In
his mid-2015 autobiography, Lieutenant Colonel H.A. Smith SG, MC states that: Charlie Company 6RAR
found another wounded VC. four wounded. Smith, H.A. (with McRae T.), Long Tan the start of a
lifelong battle, Big Sky Publishing Pty Ltd, Newport, 2015, p.163. However, 1 ATF SITREPs, INTSUMs,
After Action Reports, and Logs do not appear to record such a fourth POW nor does the HQ AFV
summary POW listing: Record of Australian Forces Captured Prisoners of War, July 1966 to July 1971.
17
Smith, H. A. Major & Townsend, C. M. Lieutenant Colonel, D Coy After Action Report: Operation
SMITHFIELD, Ni t, undated AWM95, 1/4/26, folio 112 ie an attachment to the 1 ATF Report at
footnote 15 above. In a battle sketch drawn in September 1966, Major Smith indicated that after the Battle
240 VC KIA (BC) were found in the Main Area (ie bounded approximately by the Eastings 477 to 487
and the Northings 668 to 676), with five further VC KIA (BC) found about 150 metres south-east of the
Main Area see Skitch, R., War in Vietnam A Surveyors Story (The Royal Australian Survey Corps at
Nui Dat in its first year: 1966-67), 2010, Part 2, pp.54-55. However note that three days after the battle on
21 August, Australian forces found 14 bodies buried about three kilometres north-east of the Battle site (at
YS 508678) see the preceding footnotes 12 and 13, which reportedly made the cumulative total of 245.
On casualty numbers, see also Lieutenant Colonel H. A. Smiths (Retd) later assessments in a 2004
publication and a 2006 article at footnotes 40 and 41 respectively. The statement by Malcolm Fraser, the
Minister for the Army on 21 December 1966 - advising Gallantry Awards Vietnam, cited 254 enemy
killed at Long Tn this was probably a typo.
18
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351 & p.558 (endnotes 107-109). Dr Ian McNeill also noted
that the Task Force believed higher enemy casualties were probable. The Officer Commanding D
Company/6RAR Major H.A. Smith calculated that possible results for the enemy included a further 150
killed and 500 wounded. and that the Vit Cng probably evacuated 350 casualties p.351, 558
(endnote 109), see footnote 17 above. Dr McNeill stated that The Australian count of the bodies may not
have been completely accurate but it would have been close. - p.562 (endnote 46). In 1967, the USMACV
History related: 18 August 1st Australian Task Force launches four-day search-and-destroy Operation
Smithfield in Phuoc Tuy Province during which a VC battalion is annihilated after attempting an ambush in
[sic] most significant Australian victory of the war to date (245 VC KIA, 37 individual and 16 crew-served
weapons captured 17 Australians killed in action and 22 wounded) - Military History Branch USMACV, Events during 1966, op.cit., 27 April 1967. VCAT Item No.13370149004. See also USMACV,
Summary of Major Developments, 3d Quarter 1966, Saigon, October 1966. two reinforced Viet Cong
battalions attempted to overrun an Australian company. VCAT Item No.168300010718.
19
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351, & p.558 (endnote 110). Dr McNeill stated that The
enemys own estimate was 500 killed - p.562 (endnote 46). However, the 500 killed appears to be a
reference to the purportedly captured diary of the commander of the 275th Regiment - ie Nguyn Thi Bng
(t Thi), that cited his losses as 500 McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351, see also the
following footnote 35. A subsequent Task Force commander Brigadier S.C. Graham (January-October
1967), related seeing this captured document at the Headquarters of the 18 th ARVN Division in Xun Lc
(see footnote 35) but no copy or extract from such a diary, ie corroboration, has available to date.

F-5

exaggerated ten times.20 The Australian body-count of 245 killed in action, was also
disputed in a 1987 interview by Nguyn Thanh Hng (as related earlier, a former
Headquarters 5th Division operations officer).21 As noted, the 2004 D445 History quotes
passages from work of the late British historian J. Pimlott on the Battle. However, the
2004 D445 History does not include Pimlotts statement that: Altogether the ATF lost 17
dead at Long Tan, VC casualties were heavy: 245 bodies were found and buried22, with
evidence of many more having been dragged away. The battle of Long Tan gave the
initiative to the Australians in Phuoc Tuy.23
A former commander of 445 Battalion (1968-1969) Nguyn Vn Kim, but who
was not present at the Long Tn battle24, claimed that 445 Battalions casualties both
dead and wounded, were approximately 30, mainly from artillery fire.25 Nguyn Vn
Nhng (alias Lc) a platoon 2ic in 445 Battalion at Long Tn - who subsequently
defected under the Chiu Hi program and was employed as a Bushman Scout in
20

McNeill, To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.368, p.562. Nguyn Thanh Hng (Hai Hng) an operations
staff officer at Headquarters 5th Division in 1966, has stated that he was the battlefield commander for the
Vit Cng forces at the Battle of Long Tn. However, he is not mentioned in the accounts of the Battle in
either the 1991 and 2004 D445 Battalion Histories - nor in the 5th Division History (2005), see Annex K.
21
Interviewed by Terry Burstall Bin Ha, 10 November 1987, see Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns,
op.cit., 1990, p.106. See also the following footnote 78.
22
The 6RAR chaplain Captain L. Thompson, suggested that the VC bodies be recovered to B Ra for
burial, but this was rejected. A back-hoe and a dozer were requested from 1 Field Squadron to dig burial
pits at the battle site for 308 VC dead - but this was cancelled, and the burials were done by Infantry
with shovels. 1 Field Squadron, Commanders Diary (Major W.W. Lennon), August 1966 (AWM95,
4/2/15). Note however, Major H. Smiths account at page 8. In the G Cat (B Ra) Cemetery, there are 10
individual headstones (bia m) for 275th Regiment soldiers killed on 18/8/66 see Annex O, p.43 and
Appendix 1. For a summary of 1 ATFs subsequent policy on the burial of enemy dead, see: The History of
the Ha Long Village Party Chapter (1930-2005) at Annex N, footnote 11 in Chamberlain, E.P., D445
, op.cit., 2011 that includes a review of 1 ATF, SOPs, Revised Jan 1971, Nui Dat, Section 12, para 10.
23
Pimlott, J., Vietnam: The Decisive Battles, op.cit., 1990, p.71.
24
In the Australian Official History, Nguyn Vn Kim is cited as the most important witness during
interviews in Vietnam in mid-1988 McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.365. At p.563 (endnote 29),
Dr Ian McNeill noted that Kim was recognised as the commanding officer of D445 Battalion at the time
of the battle in August 1966, but witnesses were reticent to confirm whether he actually led troops in that
battle. However, throughout August 1966, Kim was the Commander of the Chu c District Unit and
did not join 445 Battalion until very late 1967/early 1968 see Chamberlain, E. P., Research Note 23,
Vietnam War: Commander of D445 Battalion at Long Tan Not Nguyen Van Kiem but Bui Quang
Chanh , 23 September 2010 (to the Australian War Memorial and the Australian Army History Unit). See
also the outline biographies of Nguyn Vn Kim (Nm Kim) and Bi Quang Chnh (Su Chnh) at
Annex A.
25
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.368. A December 2014 Vietnamese on-line article noted that
despite the heavy Australian artillery fire which included naval gunfire support the casualties were
limited because we had prepared carefully, and when deploying to the battlefield every soldier had carried a
shovel and on their shoulders they each were bearing a bundle of about 10 branches (each as thick as a
wrist and about a metre long) to make anti-shrapnel covers for their individual pits and shelters to protect
against enemy artillery fire. Nguyn Vn Bch, Trn Phc Kch Long Tn (The Ambush Battle at Long
Tn), Cu Chin Binh (War Veterans) Thnh Ph H Ch Minh On-line, Thnh Ph H Ch Minh (H
Ch Minh City), 18 December 2014 see also footnote 81 and the full article with comments at Annex Q.

F-6

6RAR/NZ in 1969, claimed the VC received only light casualties, and 445 Battalion
casualties were 10 killed in action and 16 wounded in action. Nhng also claimed that
5 Div had about 200 killed in action, three 75mm RCLs lost in action, seven wheelmounted HMGs and about 200 small arms (LMG, SMG, AK47), also lost in action.
but he believed the figure of 200 to be a gross under-estimate.26 According to the 1991
D445 History: it was also a battle in which we suffered heavy casualties. In 445
Battalions 2nd Company alone, there were 23 casualties of whom three died. The 5th
Division lost 30 comrades killed and over 60 wounded. Our casualties were mainly
inflicted by the enemys artillery.27 The 2004 D445 History similarly claims: Our total
number of dead and wounded in the battle was more than 100 comrades (445 Battalion
and the 5th Regiment). In particular, the 2nd Company of 445 Battalion suffered 23
wounded and three killed. Comrade Trn Vn Chin (Su Chin) the 1st Company
commander, was wounded in the battle. However, when he was taken by his comrades to
a forward aid post, it was shelled and he suffered a further wound and died.28 A Vit
Cng medical history of B Ra-Long Khnh Province cites the same casualties for the
2nd Company of 445 Battalion as related in the 1991 D445 History and also notes that:
5th Division main forces suffered over 200 casualties.29
In 2006, retired Major General Nguyn Minh Ninh in some accounts cited as the
D445 political officer at the Battle, stated: I do not remember the casualties on our side,
we never sat down and took stock of the final figure.30
26

Pannell, B. W., Postscript to Long Tan, Australian Infantry, 16, No.2, May 1970, p.180 and included
in Burstall, T., The Soldiers Story, op.cit., 1986, pp.163-165. Nhng claimed that he was wounded in the
attack and did not play a very big part. Nhngs list of VC weapons lost in combat at Long Tn is far
greater than the number recovered by Australian forces. Nhng also maintained very strongly that when
the units reached the Nui May Taus [sic], there were over one thousand missing from the units. Burstall,
T., The Soldiers Story, op.cit., 1986, p.162. For an outline biography of Nhng, see Annex B footnote 18.
27
Chamberlain, E. P., D445 , op.cit., 2011, p.47. Paul Ham also cites that 1991 D445 History as
conceding 60 wounded and 30 deaths as the 5th Division casualties Ham, P., Vietnam The Australian
War, HarperCollinsPublishers, Pymble, 2007, p.36. The recently-published 5th (ie 275th) Regiment History
(2015) also cites these figures see: Appendix 3 to Annex O.
28
In the Addendum to the 2004 D445 history ie the List of 445 Battalion Martyrs, only Trn Vn Chin
Company Commander, b.1936 at Phc Bu (Xuyn Mc), is listed as having been killed at the Battle of
Long Tn on 18 August 1966 see footnote 644 in the main text. For Martyrs, see footnote 7; and for
POWs, see footnote 16.
29
L Thanh Dng (et al/tg), Lch S Ngnh Y T B Ra-Long Khnh (1945-2006), Vng Tu, 2008. That
History relates: 5th Division main forces suffered over 200 casualties. 30 seriously wounded were
evacuated to the Bu Sen base ((in the vicinity of YS 5288)), and the majority of the lightly wounded were
taken to the Province military medical unit. K76A Hospital received over 200 wounded. The K76A
Hospital a subordinate of the 84th Rear Services Group (on 84), treated 5th VC Division casualties and
was located in the My To Mountains region in far north-eastern Phc Tuy Province on the Bnh Tuy
Province border (centre of mass: YS 7491). For the report by Committee Secretary L Tm of K76A
Hospital for the period January-November 1966, including sub-locations, see CDEC Log 02-2054-67. For
the organisation of 84th Rear Services Group, see Annex B to 1 ATF, Intelligence Review No.2, Ni t, 29
October 1966 and CDEC Log 02-1520-67.
30
Greenland, H., The Battle Through the Eyes of the Viet Cong The Other Side, The Bulletin, Vol. 124
- Issue 6533, Sydney, 15 August 2006.

F-7

The 5th Division History (2005) cites lower figures ie: The 1st Battalion and the
3 Battalion ((of the 275th Regiment)) suffered high casualties. Our forces suffered a
large number of casualties 32 were killed and 60 comrades were wounded.31 The 5th
Division History also notes that the planned main killing zone for the 3rd Battalion of
the 275th Regiment at Long Tn was the Tht Pagoda.32 The Long t District History
(1986) and the t District History (2006) relate that: In 1967, the women of Long
M and Hi M villages demonstrated against the enemy - demanding to bury the
remains of 36 soldiers of the 5th Division who had been killed at Cha ((Pagoda)) Tht.
While it was thought that these were possibly the remains of 275th Regiment and D445
soldiers killed at the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966, it is now almost certain that
they were the remains of 5th VC Division soldiers killed at L Gm on 20/21 March
1967.33
Two and a half years after the Battle, a 5th VC Division POW an assistant
political officer in 3/275th Regiment at the Long Tn battle, stated that the 275th Regiment
sustained over 200 casualties, including both KIA and WIA at the Long Tn battle on
approximately 17 August 1966.34 As noted earlier, according to a 1 ATF Commander
Brigadier S.C. Graham, the captured diary of the 275th Regiment Commander at Long
Tn (see Annex O footnotes 5, 84, and 106) listed his losses at 500 his figures, I
would say in that case, would have been true. If anything, they would have been
underestimated.35 However as noted earlier, no copy or verifiable extract from such a
diary - ie corroboration, is currently available.
Soon after the Battle, a Liberation Armed Forces journalist visited medical
facilities in the My To region and wrote: We suffered a quite large number of
casualties in that battle more than 600 people the 1500th Military Hospital no
longer had any spaces to treat the wounded.36
According to an Australian press article in August 1996, in an interview, [The]
senior [North] Vietnamese officers made the startling claim that only 700 of their men
rd

5th Division History (2005), see Annex K.

5th Division History (2005), see Annex K, footnote 38.
33
Long t District History (1986), p.142 see Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit., 1991, Annex L,
p.13 and footnote 30. Trn Quang Toi & ng Tn Hng (eds), The History of the Struggle t
District, op.cit., 2006. There are several Tht pagodas in the Province including one near Hi M
village (now Phc Hi village) see Annex O, footnotes 82 and 105; and Annex K, footnote 38.
34
Captain (NVA) Trn Vn Ting - captured on 26 February 1969 - VCAT Item No.2310305007. In a
probable reference to the Battle of Long Tn, in May 1967 a 275th Regiment POW (L Tn t, B-23
Medical Company) stated that his platoon had supported the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment that had
fought against the Australians during the rainy season, dates unknown he saw three dead and 50
wounded evacuated. VCAT Item No.F034601290663.
35
Brigadier S.C. Graham - Interview by Morison, R.F. Lieutenant Colonel, Canberra, 29 March 1972. Also
cited in the Australian Official History, see previous footnote 19.
36
Hu Thanh (as told by H.B.), Min ng Nam B khi la (Fire and Sword in the Eastern
Region), 28 August 2008. see also footnote 57.
31
32

F-8

had taken part in the battle half the most conservative Australian estimate and that
only 30 had been killed.37
In an article in a 2004 publication, the Officer Commanding the Australian
infantry company at the Battle of Long Tn related that: The engineers had a small
bulldozer working digging shallow grave trenches . There has been some criticism that
the body count was over-stated. All I can say is that we called for a bulldozer to dig a
mass grave for about a hundred VC dead in one small area alone, near where 11 Platoon
fought. There were independent reports of bodies found by other units around the battle
area, from the final company position to the APC contact area. All these were collated by
Battalion HQ and added up to 245. These did include bodies found some five hundred
metres behind where 11 Platoon had fought, and it could be assumed they were from
artillery or air strikes in depth, or were seriously wounded who died when they were
withdrawing east. There were several bodies of VC found later in a large trench area well
to the east who could have been killed in that area or dragged there by the retreating VC.
. I was told by HQ 6RAR that the diary of the VC Commander at Long Tan, captured
by the US [sic] Army forces some time later38, showed his admitted losses to be in the
order of five hundred dead and near a thousand wounded. Later, I heard the body
count from graves and other information in VC documents discovered after Long Tan,
particularly by 6RAR on Operation Marsden in the huge Nui May Tao hospital complex
during their second tour in 1969, eventually amounted to 850 KIA and 1800 WIA.39 All
were attributed to Long Tn. Dozens of recent graves were found, several being large
enough to hold up to ten bodies. Although the graves were shallow, they were not dug up
as that task would have been not only distasteful but also unnecessary These graves
were not added to the Long Tn body count statistics.40
Subsequently, in 2006, an article by the Officer Commanding D Company/6RAR
at Long Tn related: While we had buried 245 and found other graves along bloodied
withdrawal routes, documents indicated their losses were some 800 killed or died from
wounds, with around another 1,000 wounded.41
37

Baker, M., "Stilling the ghosts of battle", Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, 16 August 1996, p.28.
This is probably a reference to the diary of Nguyn Thi Bng (t Thi) - purportedly captured by 18th
ARVN Division troops and related by Brigadier S.C. Graham the 1 ATF Commander, see footnotes 19
and 40.
39
See footnotes 38 and 40.
40
Grandin, R., The Battle of Long Tan , op.cit., 2004, pp.236-237, 239. In this passage, Lieutenant
Colonel H. A. Smith SG, MC (Retd) cites the diary of the VC commander at Long Tan admitting
losses of five hundred dead and near a thousand wounded this is a reference to the diary of Nguyn
Thi Bng cited by Brigadier S.C. Graham see the preceding footnotes 19, 35, and 38. Above, Smith also
assesses enemy casualties as 850 KIA and 1,800 WIA ie similar to the figure that he cites in his 2006
article (see the following footnote) ie some 800 killed or died from wounds, with around another 1,000
wounded. The source for these figures appears to be the reported My To /Operation Marsden captured
documents see footnote 43 below. Similar figures of: up to 800 men killed in action and perhaps 1000
wounded were cited without references, in Caulfield, M., The Vietnam Years: From the Jungle to the
Australian Suburbs, Hachette, Sydney, 2009, p.332.
41
Smith, H. A., No Time for Fear, Wartime Issue 35, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 2006.
Lieutenant Colonel H. A. Smith SG, MC (Retd) also wrote: Headquarters tallied the reports of 245 VC
38

F-9

In mid-2015 autobiography, Lieutenant Colonel H.A. Smith SG MC (Retd) asserts

that enemy casualties at the Battle of Long Tan totalled 293 - ie by body count on the
battlefield, with four wounded, and some 90 weapons left behind.42 This is higher than
the figure of 245 KIA and three PoW in the Australian Official History (1993) and in
contemporary After Action Reports, intelligence reports, and Logs.
In 2007, a published work related that during Operation MARSDEN in late 1969,
the Australians captured a Vit Cng dispensary that had a list of dead and wounded
attributed to Long Tan: 878 KIA/Missing/died of wounds and approximately 1,500
WIA.43 However, as noted, such a list has never been available for examination.
The United States Presidential Citation awarded to D Company/6RAR states that
the Company was: surrounded and attacked on all sides by an estimated reinforced
enemy battalion using automatic weapons, small arms, and mortars. the enemy

bodies. We found three wounded, one VC and two from the North Vietnamese battalion reinforcing two
battalions of 275 VC Main Force Regiment. These plus D445 and D400 [sic] made around 3,000 enemy
troops. Lieutenant Colonel Smith also earlier contended D440, D445, and 860 Battalion were
elements of the enemy force at the Battle. - Grandin, R., The Battle of Long Tan , op.cit., 2004, p.85.
42
Smith, H.A. (with McRae T.), Long Tan the start of a lifelong battle, op.cit, 2015, p.163 - see also
p.172 and p.177. Lieutenant Colonel Smith states that: shallow mass graves were located further east on
the 20th, with another 48 bodies and weapons never added to the 245 body count published on the 19 th,
making 293. However, according to the 1 ATF SITREPs, the body count on 20 August was 231 (see also 1
ATF INTSUM No.80) to which is added 14 bodies killed by artillery found in shallow graves on 21
August (211415H) at YS 508687/508678 by C/6RAR ie to make a total of 245 (1 ATF SITREP dated 22
August 1966; 1 ATF INTSUM No.81, 21 August 1966).
43
Ham, P., Vietnam The Australian War, op.cit., 2007, p.245 and p.704 (endnote 15) citing information
from the late photo-journalist Denis Gibbons provided to David Sabben (former Second Lieutenant - 1966,
12/D/6RAR ie a Battle of Long Tn veteran). This appears to be a reference to documents reportedly
recovered by 6RAR/NZ during the capture of several installations of the K76A Hospital (84th Rear Services
Group) in the My To Mountains in vicinity of YS 744896 and YS 739895 in the period 15-19 December
1969. However, no such documents are mentioned in the very detailed 6RAR/NZ After Action Report ie:
After Action Report Operation Marsden, 23 February 1970 (AWM95, 7/6/30 including individual
Incident/Contact After Action Reports; and the daily Sequence of Events on AWM95, 7/6/28). There is
no reference to such a document or such figures, in 1 ATF intelligence reports - including in those of the
Detachment of the 1st Divisional Intelligence Unit that deployed an element from Ni t to the My To
Mountains and recovered enemy documents and interrogated POWs during Operation Marsden. In midOctober 2013, the author (Chamberlain) discussed the purported document with Lieutenant Colonel W. F.
(Fred) Fairhead (Retd) - Intelligence Officer 6RAR/NZ and Officer Commanding D Company, 6RAR/NZ,
December 1969; but Lieutenant Colonel Fairhead (Retd) had not heard of any recovery of such a document
noting VC casualty figures at Long Tn - and he did not include the claim in his book ie: A Duty Done: A
Summary of Operations done by the Royal Australian Regiment in the Vietnam War 1965-1972, op.cit,
2014. Rather, in that work, he has summarised the enemy as suffering well over a thousand casualties at
Long Tn p.33. In summary, no records have been found to corroborate the claim of an enemy document
detailing their casualties at Long Tn having been recovered in the My To Mountains by 6RAR/NZ
during Operation Marsden in December 1969. The author (Chamberlain) considers it quite unlikely that
Vit Cng casualties at the Battle of Long Tn were as high as the cited 878 KIA/Missing/died of wounds
and approximately 1,500 WIA.

F-10

withdrew from the battlefield carrying many dead and wounded, and leaving 245 Viet
Cong dead forward of the defensive position of D Company.44
In 2008, the report of a Recognition Review ordered by the Australian
Government noted that D Company was pitted against at least two battalions of
Vietnamese regular and provincial soldiers but that Review did not address the aspect
of NVA/VC casualties in the Battle.45
The Purported Chinese Accountof the Battle
In August 2006 in an email sent to several senior Australian veterans of the
Battle, an Australian civilian - claiming to have been an Australian Army officer, related
having met a Chinese General in Shanghai in March 2006 who purportedly gave him an
account of the Long Tn battle including NVA/VC casualty numbers. According to this
alleged account, the NVA/VC force reportedly suffered 1,632 KIA with approximately
70% of these casualties being caused by artillery. In his 2015 autobiography,
Lieutenant Colonel H. A. Smith SG, MC (Retd) noted that: Chinese Army records,
shown by a Chinese General to former Australian Army officer Geoff [sic] Jones working
in Beijing on Army Landing Craft electronics in 2006, gave the eventual final figure to be
1500 who eventually died or were disabled from wounds.46 The Australian civilian
cited above, also falsely claimed to have been a Vietnam veteran. In the view of this
author (Chamberlain), his Chinese account was patently false and fabricated.47
On the website of the ANZAC Day Commemoration Committee (Queensland)
and the website of the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps Association, a Powerpoint
presentation includes: In 2006, a Chinese General speaking informally with an
Australian ex-Brigadier suggested that the actual number of ((NVA/VC)) troops lost

44

Johnson, L.B. President, The Presidential Unit Citation (Army) for Extraordinary Heroism, The White
House - Washington, 28 May 1968.
45
Abigail, P. Major General (Retd) - Chairman, Review of Recognition for the Battle of Long Tan,
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra, 31 March 2008, p.1.
46
Smith, H.A. (with McRae T.), Long Tan the start of a lifelong battle, op.cit, 2015, p.178. A few years
earlier, in an address to a Conference in June 2012, Lieutenant Colonel H. A. Smith SG, MC (Retd) had
stated: In 2006, Chinese Army records ((in Beijing)) increased the final figure to 1500 killed or died of
wounds We encountered a reinforced 275 Regt of six battalions and support troops, some 3500 men.
Smith, H. A. Lieutenant Colonel SG, MC (Retd), The Long Tan Battle & an Australian Soldiers
Perspective of the Vietnam War, 9 June 2012, pp.22-43 in Vietnamese Community in Australia,
Reflections on the Past Looking to the Future, Bonnyrigg, 8-10 June 2012.
http://vietnamese.org.au/vca/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/VCA-Book-May-2012-National-Conference.pdf .
47
Copies of the Australian civilians correspondence claiming his meeting with a Chinese General in
Shanghai and the civilians alleged record of service in the Australian Army, were passed to the author
(Chamberlain). In mid-late June 2012, the author advised the senior Australian Army Long Tn veterans
noted above that the Chinese account was patently fraudulent and fabricated and should be disregarded.
In a presentation at the Perspectives Conference at the Australian War Memorial in August 2013, the
author (Chamberlain) advised the participants that the purported Chinese-provided figure of 1,632 KIA
was a fraudulent claim see Annex L: The Battle of Long Tn 18/8/66 NVA/VC Revisited.

F-11

(dead and severe amputees) was in excess of 2500.48 A Vietnam Veterans Association
website similarly claims: The enemy forces are assumed to number approx 3500 with
something like 2500 killed or amputees as advised by a Chinese General in 2006.49
The 275th VC Regiment List 179, 172, or 139 killed at Long Tn
In late November 2011, a Hanoi-based Vietnamese Missing-in-Action NGO
announced: Our work is very special and humanitarian ((paragraph heading))
Recently, by joining together information from a variety of sources, we have found the
burial places, the full names and origins of the 179 martyrs of the 2nd Battalion and 3rd
Battalion of the 5th Regiment ((ie the 275th Regiment)) of the 5th Division; and 440 [sic]
and 445 Local Force Battalions who died on 18 August 1966 in B Ra - Vng Tu
Province.50 The figure of 179 was soon corrected to 172; and mention of D440 and
D445 was withdrawn.51 The List of the 172 included names, dates of birth, units, dates
of death (all 18/08/1966), places of birth, site of sacrifice (B ic Plantation, Ni
t, Long Tn, B Ra), and the names of next-of-kin. Adjusted for double entries, the
List numbers 139. All the listed deceased were members of the 275th Regiment with no
mention of either D445 or D440 battalions. 50% were members of the Regiments 3rd
Battalion (ie previously the NVA D605 Battalion).52

48
The ANZAC Day Commemoration Committee of Queensland.
www.anzacday.org.au/history/vietnam/longtan.pps . See also the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps
Assocation website: www.raamc.org.au/web/downloads/longtan.pps .
49
Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia http://www.vvaa.org.au/Major%20Maurice%20StanleyMBE.pdf
50
MARIN NGO announcement by Ms Ng Th Thy Hng (Deputy Director), H Ni, 20 November
2011 also reported by Kim Dung, Tm gng bnh d m cao qu, Qun i Nhn Dn (Peoples
Armed Forces), H Ni, 19 November 2011.
51
Email from Ms Ng Th Thy Hng (MARIN NGO) to author (Chamberlain), 21 December 2011. Ms
Hng had been misinformed by an Australian Vietnam veteran that D440 had been involved in the Battle of
Long Tn and that 397 VC had died in the Battle. These figures were included in several articles in the
Vietnamese media including in: Phng Nguyn: Cu binh c v 38 k ha b i Vit Nam (Australian
veterans and the 38 sketches done by Vietnamese troops), Tin Phong On-line, 25 September 2012. See a
sketch of a 275th Regiment soldier in Annex O at page 28, footnote 95. The figure of 397 above was
apparently based on the figure of 245 KIA plus a possible further 150 killed ((ie 395)) suggested in
the Australian Official History McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351 (assessed as reasonably
accurate - emails to author/translator - 7 May, 26 September 2012).
52
The List was advised by the author (Chamberlain) to the official historians at the Australian Department
of Veterans Affairs, the Australian War Memorial, and the Australian Army History Unit in letters dated
13 December 2011, and also to the Museum of Australian Military Intelligence 14 December 2011. The
list included several duplications ie 33 double entries, making a revised total of 139. The detail of that
275th Regiment casualty list was also presented at a conference at the Australian War Memorial on 16
August 2013 - ie Chamberlain, E.P., The NVA and VC Soldier: Tougher Than Us presentation and
paper to the conference: International Perspectives on a Long War. The List is at Annex O, Appendix 1.

F-12

The 2016 Martyrs List of 96

In February 2016, a List of Martyrs at Long Tn based on records in the G
Cat Martyrs Cemetery in B Ra Town, listed 98 martyrs killed on 18.8.66 (with two
entries duplicated ie = 96). Almost all were personnel from the 275th Regiment. Of those
listed, 30% were Northerners (presumably former NVA D605 Battalion personnel). Of
the Southerners, almost all were born in Mekong Delta provinces and Si Gn. The List
of 96 included the names of 36 martyrs not on the List of the 139 martyrs provided by
the H Ni-based NGO in November 2011 see the preceding paragraph. The List see
Appendix 4 to Annex O, included only one martyr born in Phc Tuy Province.
Evacuation of NVA/VC Casualties
As noted earlier, a Vit Cng medical history (see footnote 29) related that the:
5th Division main forces suffered over 200 casualties. 30 seriously wounded were
evacuated to the Bu Sen base ((vicinity YS 5288 about 22 kilometres north-northeast
of the 1 ATF Ni t base)), and the majority of the lightly wounded were taken to the
Province military medical unit. K76A Hospital received over 200 wounded. The K76A
Hospital treated 5th Division casualties and was located in the My To Mountains region
in far north-eastern Phc Tuy Province astride the Phc Tuy Province/Bnh Tuy
Province border. According to policy disseminated in August 1965 by the Vit Cng B
Ra Province Headquarters, Province and District units were only authorised to evacuate
their sick and wounded to Hospitals 1500A and 45C (formerly K10) when they operated
in the vicinity of those hospitals or when the cases were beyond the capabilities of the
Province Dispensary.53
According to its unit history, the C.12-65 Bnh Gi Victory Assault Youth
Company assisted at the Long Tn battle: ie as the enemy artillery was very heavy and
destroyed the NVA/VC field telephone lines, they were employed in commo-liaison
duties taking messages from the headquarters to the battlefront, and the female members
also assisted with casualty evacuation. According to one C.12-65 Company account54:
The unit operated with the 4th Regiment ((ie 274 Regiment))55 of the 5th Division and
coordinated with the 445 Force to attack the base of the Australian Brigade at Ni t,
Long Phc Village. At this time, the Assault Youth Group was divided into two
53

CDEC Log 09-2603-66. See also footnote 30 for the Province military medical unit. The Bu Sen base
was in the vicinity of YS 5288 (about 22 kilometres north-northeast of the 1 ATF Ni t base; ie east of
Route 2 and a few kilometres south of the Phc Tuy-Long Khnh border). Nguyn Vn Hch captured
18 February 1967, claimed that following the Battle of Long Tn in Aug 66, his unit (G.4544 Province
Ordnance Company) evacuated about 40 wounded from Long Tn to the Tm B stream. Preliminary
Interrogation Report, Det 1 Div Int Unit, Ni t, 20 February 1967 - VCAT Item No.F034600701784.
54
L Thin Minh Khoa, i Thanh Nin Xung Phong The Assault Youth Unit, Lch s, Truyn
thng a phng B Ra-Vng Tu, Phn II, Trang Vn Hoa-X Hi-Lch s B Ra-Vng Tu, 11
December 2009. The article claims an Australian battalion was destroyed at Long Tn.
55
This is an error as in the 1991 D445 History. The 5th Regiment (275th Regiment) was the 5th Division
formation at the Battle of Long Tn not the 4th Regiment (274th Regiment). Both the 2004 D445 History
and the 5th VC Division History (2005) correctly cite the 5th Regiment ie the 275th Regiment.

F-13

elements: a male element with the task of mobile communications and a female group
that carried the wounded. In this battle, we fought against the invading expeditionary
forces, and it was very fierce. At the time, the C.12-65 Assault Youth Group had the
responsibility for mobile communications and laying communications wire from the
headquarters to the battlefront. In this battle, we coordinated with three types of forces to
destroy an Australian battalion at Ni t between Long Phc and Long Tn. When the
battle began, the enemys artillery fell ceaselessly, and the telephone wires were broken
and contact was lost with the headquarters. Our people had to leave their below-ground
defensive positions to rejoin the wires and enable command of the battle. The tasks of
female comrades were as strenuous as those of our male comrades. They worked
tirelessly, suffered thirst, were unafraid of the hardships and death, and carried the
wounded from battlefield throughout the day and night in order to get them back safely to
the rear area. After the attack on the Ni t base, the unit moved with the 5th Division
elements to the My Tu [sic] to consolidate and train. While stationed there, the unit had
not yet completed building its camp or its trenches when our C.12-65 unit was attacked
by enemy aircraft. Seven of our comrades were killed including four males (Kit a
platoon 2ic, Lp a section commander, and Nhn and Tnh unit members; and three
female comrades: Xun Mai, Nga and Phng) these were the largest casualties that the
unit had suffered. From the base of the 1500th Hospital also called Base Area 33 at the
u River56 (Bu Lm village) , the unit moved to the B Mn fields where we
were attacked by enemy helicopters and lost two comrades killed.
As noted earlier, reference to casualties being treated at on 150057 was also
related by a former journalist of a Liberation Armed Forces publication (Bo Qun Gii
phng) who served with the 5th Division in 1966: The 4th [sic error, should be 5th]
Regiment and the local forces decided to strike a warning blow and teach them ((the
Australians)) a lesson. But they didnt expect that the Ni t terrain was so exposed.
Moreover, the Americans provided maximum artillery fire support, including two 203mm
[sic] guns (each round weighed 90 kilograms and was loaded mechanically) from
warships in the South China Sea. Especially telling was the fire of the New Zealand
artillery battalion [sic] with 24 155mm [sic] guns that fired without respite. In this
battle, our forces suffered quite heavy casualties more than 600 people, to the extent
that the 1500th Hospital (part of Military Region D555 Rear Services later retitled
Group 1500) the largest in the Eastern Region, had no more room to treat the wounded.
In a very similar account, the base of the 1500th Hospital is noted as being called Base Area 33 Sui
D. - L Thin Minh Khoa "Qu trnh hnh thnh Thanh Nin Xung Phong" - "The Process of Founding
the Assault Youth", T Ho s xanh B Ra-Vng Tu Ln 2 Pride in the History of B Ra-Vng
Tu Part 2, 25 October 2010. That article also claims a whole Australian battalion was destroyed at
Long Tn.
57
on 1500 (Group 1500) was a logistic unit of the 84th Rear Services Group (on 84) based principally
in the My To Mountains region. Following the attack on V Su by the 274th VC Regiment (4th Regiment
aka on 94, on 49, and Q764) on 10 March 1966, their casualties were evacuated to medical
installation 1500 located about four kilometres to the south-east of Gia Hunh village near the Long
Khnh Province/Bnh Tuy Province border CDEC Log 12-027-67.
56

F-14

I went to the 1500th Hospital and saw that this was true that there were no more places
for the wounded.58
Recovered Vit Cng documents also revealed that in November 1966, the 5th
Division had 470 men at the Convalescent Centre, excluding personnel at C.210 in Bnh
Thun Province.59
Vit Cng Death Notices and Letters of Condolence
No notices or letters for casualties at the Battle of Long Tn have been noted
in captured documents. Earlier however, the 445 Battalion Political Officer Vn
Lin (Ba Lin), wrote a letter of condolence on 10 January 1966 to the parents of section
commander Nguyn Quc Thng killed in a battle on Route 44 on 8 January 1966.60 In
late July 1966, the B Ra Province Unit issued a post Post-Mortuary Report for
Nguyn Vn Thun61 the Chief of the B Ra Province Unit Workshop, who died on
28 July 1966 as a result of wounds suffered in an air strike.62 On 22 December 1966,
Nguyn t (ie Nguyn c Hot) the Executive Officer/2ic of the B Ra Province
Unit signed a typed proforma letter of condolence to the mother of Nguyn Vn Lm, a
soldier (bugler) of 445 Battalion.63 An associated typed proforma death certificate/notice
Giy Bo T, completed by the Province Unit, noted that Lm had been killed on 8
December 1966 during a clash with an ARVN patrol at the hamlet of Cy Trng, Hi
M village.

58

Hu Thanh (as told by H.B.), Min ng Nam B khi la - Fire and Sword in the Eastern
Region, 28 August 2008. D555 Rear Services Group was retitled Group 1500 in mid-late 1963 - Lin on
Lao ng , Lch s , op.cit., 2011, p.116.
59
CDEC Log 02-1520-67; VCAT Item No.F034600742556 the 5th VC Divisions strength in November
1966 was 4,445, and the 470 personnel at the Convalescent Centre would have included men from several
engagements - and also from illness. On 19 November 1966, C.210s strength was 131 including 42
women CDEC Log 05-3254-67.
60
CDEC Log 01-1032-67.
61
A field grade political officer in the Province political section - see footnote 5 in Annex J, Higher
Headquarters
62
CDEC Bulletin No.1085, Log 09-2061-66. Workshop should probably be translated more accurately as
Worksite ie a headquarters element.
63
CDEC Log 04-3218-67, covering both the letter of condolence and the death certificate/notice.

F-15

The Death Notification for Phm Vn Hong,

and the Death Certificate of Nguyn Vn Lm.
Australian Casualties at the Battle of Long Tn
The Australian official history states: The Australians suffered seventeen killed
in action, one died of wounds, and 24 wounded. Of these, D Company had seventeen
killed and nineteen wounded - one third of its strength; one member from the 3rd APC
Troop died of wounds; A Company and B Company each received one wounded. Three
cases of severe battle stress were also evacuated.64
According to the 1991 D445 History: In this large battle with the Australian
forces, we wiped out an entire company and inflicted heavy casualties on one of their
battalions.65 The 2004 D445 History only states: 445 Battalion had inflicted heavy
casualties on the Royal Australian 6th Battalion. The 5th Division History relates that the
Long Tn battle: had a very important significance: it was the first time that we had
destroyed an Australian company.66 The Military Region 7 History states: The 5th
Division deployed to the Route 2 area in B Ra-Long Khnh and Route 15 and fought
64

McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351. See also: 1st Australian Task Force - Vietnam, Combat
Operations After Action Report Operation Smithfield, R723-1-5, December 1966, sub-para 13.a.

AWM95, 1/4/26, folio 112. When the Australians withdrew to a position outside the immediate Long Tn
battlefield area late on 18 August 1966, most of their dead and two wounded (Pte J.P. Richmond, Pte B.C.
Meller), were left behind overnight. During the night, a number of informal attempts were made to recover
these casualties (including by A/6RAR personnel: WO2 J.W. Roughley, Cpl R.E. Smith, Pte P.E. Bennett,
and Pte E.W. Dare) McAulay, L., The Battle of Long Tan, op.cit., 1987, pp.119-120.
65
Chamberlain, E. P., D445 , op.cit., 2011, p.47.
66
See Annex K. page 12 and footnote 49.

F-16

many battles with the Americans, and - in particular, together with the B Ra 445
Battalion, for the first time struck the Australian forces in the rubber plantation at Long
Tn (18 August 1966) and inflicted heavy casualties on an Australian company.67 The
1986 history of ng Nai Province claimed the communist forces had eliminated 500
Australians and destroyed 21 tanks.68 A later Internet history of ng Nai Province
(ng Nai Monograph) claimed: (19-8) The B Ra-Vng Tu 445 Battalion attacked
69
the Australian troops at Vn Xoi and killed 500 and destroyed 10 tanks. According
to the intelligence officer of the Australian 5RAR Battalion, the Vit Cng in Phc Tuy
Province circulated handbills which claimed: 700 Australians killed, one battalion and
two companies of infantry destroyed, two squadrons of APCs destroyed.70
According to the B Ra-Vng Tu Party Chapter History, D445 Battalion
ambushed Australian forces in the Long Hip rubber plantation at Long Tn on 18 August
wiping out the 6th Battalion and only about a company remained the 8th [sic]
Battalion had to be brought from Australia to replace it.71
A 1985 ng Nai Province publication claimed that D445 together with the
main-force 5th Division killed more than 300 Australians and Americans at Long Tn in
1966.72
On Australian casualties, in his 53-page diary (to 7 October 1966) Nguyn Nam
Hng (the 2ic of the 274th Regiment) related that the 5th Regiment attacked at Ni t
and 500 Australians were killed and 1 Australian Battalion was exterminated.73

67

The Armed Forces of Military Region 7 50 Years, op.cit., p.35.

The 3rd [sic] Battalion advanced from Ni t with tank support and fell into our ambush. 275 Regiment
and 445 Battalion manoeuvred to strike the enemy decisively. Our troops eliminated 500 Australians and
destroyed 21 tanks. - Phan Ngc Danh & Trn Quang Toi, Lch S , op.cit., 1986, p.132. The ng
Nai History is also cited in McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.366. The later ng Nai Monograph 2001 similarly relates: The B Ra-Vng Tu 445 Battalion attacked the Australian troops at Vn Xoi
on 19 August 1966 and killed 500 and destroyed 21 tanks. - a Ch ng Nai, Nh Xut Bn Tng Hp
ng Nai, Bin Ha, 2001. A recent article on the 5th Division Veterans Website relates that: The 3rd [sic]
Royal Australian Battalion came out to break our blockade just as we had intended. The 5 th Regiment
and 445 Battalion inflicted heavy losses on the Australian battalion. Major General Nguyn Hng Phc,
Truyn thng chin u ca S on BB5 Anh hng, 12 May 2013.
69
1955-1975 http://nguyenlinh.homeip.net/vn.dongnai.sdt.diachidongnai/html/tap1/biennien19551975.html
70
ONeill, R.J., Vietnam Task the 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, Cassell Australia Ltd,
Melbourne, 1968, p.86. Dr ONeill also related: It was interesting to discover that the official report of the
outcome of the battle which was sent to the Viet Cong headquarters by the Fifth Viet Cong Division
which commanded 275 Regiment, was very close to the propaganda leaflet which the Viet Cong had
handed out. p.86.
71
Lch s ng b tnh B Ra-Vng Tu (1930 - 1975) (The History of the B Ra-Vng Tu Party
Chapter), Chng VII: anh Thng Chin Tranh Cc B Ca M, Ngy v Ch Hu (1965-1968),
(Chapter 7: Defeating the Limited War of the US, Their Puppets and Vassals (1965-68), 2011.
72
H Sn i & Trn Quang Toi, ng Nai n V Anh Hng (The Heroic Units of ng Nai), Nh
Xut Bn ng Nai (ng Nai Publishing Company), ng Nai, 1985, p.7.
73
CDEC Log 11-1259-66. The diary/notebook was captured by Australian forces (5RAR) on 20 October
1966. Subsequently, another notebook see footnote 101 and the following extract inserted at page F-24,
that was captured by 5RAR on 29 March 1967, related that C13 Company of the 3rd Battalion (formerly the
68

F-17

According to a major H Ni-published history of the War, On 18 August, the

troops of the 5th Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division led by Deputy Divisional
Commander Trn Minh Tm set an ambush and attacked the Royal Australian Battalion
[sic] which was sweeping the Ni t-t area. After 30 minutes of fighting, the 6th
[sic] Battalion (of the 5th Regiment) supported by a company of the 445th Battalion (B
Ra Provincial Unit) destroyed a company of Australian soldiers. As a result, this
Australian mercenary force - renowned for its experience in counter-guerrilla warfare,
became panic-stricken and fled to t .74
On 23 August 1966, a North Vietnamese news article claimed that on the night
of 16 August, Liberation Armed Forces killed over 100 Australians defending the
((Ni t)) post and wounded many others.75 Soon after, in a 27 August 1966 broadcast,
Radio H Ni claimed over 400 Australian mercenaries were wiped out and
summarized that two whole companies were annihilated and another heavily
decimated; the day before, 17 August, the Liberation Armed Forces, in the same
province wiped out 100 Australian mercenaries. The victorious units were awarded the
Liberation Military Exploits [sic more probably Military Feats] Order (Third
Class).76
A Directive by the Vit Cngs Military Region MR1/Eastern Nam B in midSeptember 1966 on future activity for 1966-67 noted that in first eight months of 1966,
Military Region 1 forces had knocked out of action 9,498 US personnel and 568
Australian personnel.77

D605 NVA Battalion) of the 275th Regiment was awarded a letter and certificate of commendation from
the Military Region for killing 35 Australian servicemen at Long Tn CDEC Log 04-2690-67.
74
Lch s Khng chin chng M cu nc, Tp 4 - The History of the Resistance War of National
Salvation Against the Americans, Vol 4, Nh Xut Bn Chnh Tr Quc Gi, H Ni, 1999.
75
100 Australian Mercenaries Killed 60km South East of Saigon on August 16 [sic], The Vietnam
Courier, Issue No. 23 (1966), 23 August 1966, Hanoi. VCAT Item No.2130708004. This predated the oftcited announcements by Radio Hanoi (27 August) and Radio Peking (28 August) see the following
footnote.
76
Reports by Radio Hanoi (27 August) and Radio Peking (28 August) were promulgated to the Australian 1
ATF forces at Ni t in the 1 ATF Troops Information Sheet, No.7, 29 August-4 September 1966. Very
similar to the Radio Hanoi item, Radio Peking reported: More than 500 Australian satellite troops
including two whole companies were wiped out In an attack on an Australian base at Nui Thu [sic] on
17th August, the Liberation Army in Ba Ria Province wiped out more than 100 Australian troops. In the
afternoon of the following day, the Liberation Army knocked out a number of Australian troops which fell
into an ambush in Long Tan hamlet. Then, the Liberation Forces concentrated their fire on the rest of the
enemy and wiped out more than four hundred Australian satellite troops, two companies were completely
wiped out and another company was heavily battered. Three M-113 armoured cars were destroyed. These
two reports are also cited in McAulay, L., The Battle of Long Tan The Legend of Anzac Upheld, op.cit.,
1987, pp.145-146. McAulay notes that: The next day, Radio Peking repeated the gist of the Hanoi report.
77
Eastern Nam B, Directive No. 90/C.T.B., 16 September 1966 - CDEC Log 01-2270-67. While the
presence of the Royal Australian Regiment at Ni t was noted, no specific engagements with
Australian troops were cited.

F-18

As outlined earlier, in post-War interviews, senior Vit Cng cadre including the
late Nguyn Vn Kim78 and Nguyn Thanh Hng, have queried the relatively small
number of Australian casualties as recorded in the Australian official accounts.79
In 1975, a Vietnamese historical novel 80 on Phc Tuy Province and D445
described several battles against US and Australian forces, including Long Tn: the
Australians were over-run. Almost 700 were wiped out. Those remaining fled back to Ni
t.
In December 2014, an on-line media article - similar to the text of the 1991 D445
History, related that: the fleeing Australian soldiers fled to the edge of the rubber
plantation and stumbled into the minefield that we had laid, and tens were killed and
many were wounded. we inflicted heavy losses on an Australian battalion - including
wiping out an Australian company and setting fire to two armoured vehicles, killing and
wounding hundreds of Australian soldiers. Comrade L Tn Tao used his AK rifle and a
B40 to shoot and kill 36 enemy on-the-spot, and seized many weapons.81
In late 2014, a Vietnamese Documentary Film (ie Phim Ti Lieu) on the
history of D445 Battalion featured the engagement at Long Tn on 18 August 1966. In
the fighting against an Australian battalion with a supporting squadron of armoured
vehicles, the Australians reportedly suffered heavy casualties and many tanks and
armoured vehicles were set on fire and destroyed.82

78

As noted at footnote 5, in an interview with Dr I. McNeill in June 1988, Kim requested that the
Australian casualty figures be examined more closely. McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, pp.368369 & pp.562-563 (endnotes 52 and 53).
79
Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, p.109. Burstall wrote that Nguyn Thanh Hng when told
of the official figure for Australian casualties, did not dispute the figures but obviously disbelieved them.
On claims of Australian casualties in 1969 by the Vit Cng, their Military Region 7 Headquarters declared
that during calendar year 1969: approximately 2,509 Australian troops were killed, resulting in six
companies and five platoons destroyed. Five other companies and six platoons were depleted. They
admitted that the 5th Australian Battalion has lost its combat effectiveness. see: CDEC Log 07-163270/CDEC Report No. 6 028 0700 70. Subsequently, in early 1970, Military Region 7 claimed that 2,701
Australians had been killed in 1969, including a lieutenant colonel - CDEC Log 05-1067-70. For Australian
official casualty figures, see footnote 515 in the main text ie: 414 killed in action and 2,348 wounded see
McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, Appendix F, "Statistics.
80
Bi c i, a con ca t, Vn Hc Gii Phng, H Ch Minh City, 1975, Chapter 36.
81
Nguyn Vn Bch, Trn Phc Kch Long Tn (The Ambush Battle ), op.cit., 18 December 2014
see a translation of the article, with comments, at Annex Q. This article on the H Ch Minh City War
Veterans website appeared to have been catalysed by the visit of the Australian Wandering Souls group
(Dr R.A. Hall, Mr D. De Heer) to the Headquarters of the 5 th Division in H Ch Minh City.
82
V Vn Cm - Director, Trng thnh t trong chin u (Coming-of-age during combat), B Ra Vng Tu Television, 4 November 2014. Vietnamese commentators included Colonel (Associate Professor,
Dr) H Sn i (an author and historian Head, Science Office, Headquarters Military Region 7);
Associate Professor Dr H Minh Hng (former Head, History Department National University, H Ch
Minh City); and Major (Retd) Nguyn c Thu (a D445 company commander at the Battle, and later
Commanding Officer of D445 Battalion in 1969).

F-19

445 Battalion Strength Figures83

At the time of the Long Tn Battle on 18 August 1966, 445 Battalions strength
was 380-400 ie less than the 1 ATF estimate of about 550 (see detail at Annex C).
Subsequently, captured documents detailed the Battalions strength in November 1966 as
409 in five companies - and in December 1966 as 394 personnel.
NVA/VC Casualties During the War: US Calculations and Body Count
The US Military Assistance CommandVietnam (MACV) promulgated detailed
definitions, statistical data and approved computations for enemy infiltration, and enemy
killed and wounded ratios etc. For every one NVA/VC killed in action (KIA) by body
count, 1.5 enemy were considered to have been wounded in action (WIA); and a figure of
35 percent of the figure for KIA were considered to have died of wounds or been
permanently disabled.84 In March 1967, the US II FFV Headquarters at Long Bnh
clarified its interpretation of BC Body Count to its subordinate formations
including to 1 ATF as follows: Body Count is not synonymous with Body Recovery
but is a realistic appraisal of circumstances that leave no doubt that a specific number
were killed eg, kills by patrols, outside defensive positions, and only include combatants.
FAC/Army aircraft reports are acceptable in artillery and airstrike assessments made in
areas where ground follow-up is impracticable or in areas where targets of opportunity
are engaged and no ground troops are available to exploit. Map coordinates and times
must be reported accurately.85
For 5th VC Division battle-clearance norms ie battle casualty expectations and
calculations and weapons recovery, see the debrief of the 5th VC Division defector
NVA Lieutenant Colonel L Xun Chuyn.86 For a Vietnam-wide analysis, see also:
Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam, Medical Causes of Non-Effectiveness among
83

See also Annex C for assessments on 445 Battalion strength figures over several years.
See: USMACV Order of Battle Reference Manual Strengths (Annex F) 1967. USMACV
J2/D00600/67, 12 February 1967 - CDEC 0240605012, VCAT Item No.F029200040210. These ratios were
determined following an Intelligence Conference in Pacific Command (Hawaii) on 6-11 February 1967
see VCAT Item No.0240604014, No.F029200040138. Applying that US criteria to the 245 NVA/VC KIA
(BC) at Long Tn, the NVA/VC force would have suffered 367 WIA and 86 Died of Wounds. However,
such estimates would not include consideration of KIA who had been evacuated from the battlefield ie not
included in the Australian-cited figure of 245 KIA (BC) counted at the battle site. For a US Defence
Intelligence Agency (DIA) critique of these ratios 10 April 1967, see VCAT Item No.0240614017. In his
debrief, NVA rallier Lieutenant Colonel L Xun Chuyn also provided detailed information on the
calculation of combat casualties ratios within the 5th VC Division ie up to mid-1966 - CMIC Special
Report US 618-66/1211, 26 December 1966 Item No.F034600601776.
85
HQ 1 ATF, Enemy Casualties: II FForce V Interpretation, Signal G 187, Ni t, 220530Z February
1967. This HQ 1 ATF direction to its subordinate elements concluded: This interpretation is to be adopted
in 1 ATF.
86
L Xun Chuyn stated that in a "stand off" engagement - ie in which neither side had clearly won, they
would expect to recover 70-80% of their dead from the battlefield. If defeated, they would expect to recover
40-50% of their dead. CMIC US 618-66/1211.
84

F-20

VC/NVA Troops (Third Update), ST 69 II, MACJ231-7, Saigon, 31 August 1969. That
study indicates that for combat casualties, 5% of wounded NVA/VC died during
evacuation, 3-5% died once hospitalized, and 25-30% of those hospitalized were
permanently disabled.87
NVA/VC Battlefield Clearance - Weapons
The NVA/VC focused strongly on recovering their casualties and especially
weapons, from the battlefield.88 As indicated in the table below, there was often a large
disparity between the large number of dead enemy reported by Free World Forces and the
low number of NVA/VC weapons that they recovered after an engagement.
Battle of Long Tn (18 August 1966): 245 NVA/VC KIA (Body Count
BC); 54 individual and 4 crew-served weapons (CSW) recovered.89
US Fire Support Base (FSB) Crook (Ty Ninh 5-7 June 1969):
402 NVA/VC KIA (BC); 59 individual weapons recovered.
Thai Battalion position at Lc An (16 June 1969): 212 NVA/VC KIA
(BC); 36 individual and CSW recovered (Thai forces tipped-off by
SIGINT ie by 1 ATFs 547 Signal Troop, through US liaison officers).90
Battle of Bnh Ba (5RAR 6-8 June 1969): 50-99 NVA/VC KIA (BC): 17
small arms and 3 CSW recovered (33rd NVA Regiment; D440 Battalion).
Sui Ct (US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment 2 December 1966, 275th
VC Regiment attacked a small US convoy): 94 NVA/VC KIA (BC) + 150
possible; 1 individual weapon and 3 CSW recovered. 1 US KIA, 22
WIA.91

87

VCAT Item No.2250112029.

As noted above, for 5th VC Division battle-clearance norms ie battle casualty expectations and
calculations and the recovery of weapons, see the debrief of the 5th VC Division defector NVA Lieutenant
Colonel L Xun Chuyn - CMIC US 618-66/1211. COMUSMACV General W.C. Westmoreland wrote:
The number of enemy weapons captured was an indication not only of the armament lost by the enemy but
also of the state of enemy morale and battlefield competence. Westmoreland, W.C. General, Report on the
War in Vietnam (as of 30 June 1968), Section II, p.106. VCAT Item No. 168300010017.
89
CSW comprised two 57mm RCL Type 30, one .30 Browning machinegun, and a 7.62mm Goryunov SG43/SGM heavy machinegun wheeled, with shield.The OC of D Company/6RAR at the Battle has advised:
We had some 80 weapons (although not all handed in) left behind, and no doubt they took all they could
carry from the dead. Lieutenant Colonel H. A. Smith SG, MC (Retd) email to author, 14 June 2012. In
1966, Major Smith noted that members of crew-served weapons ((at the Battle)) did not always have
personal weapons but carried a large amount of weapon ammunition. Smith H.A. Major, D Coy After
Action Report: Operation Smithfield, Ni t, undated, para 18 (AWM95, 7/6/5).
90
Hart, S.W. with Chamberlain, E.P., A Tactical SIGINT Success Story, The Bridges Review (Issue No.
2) Journal of the Australian Intelligence Corps, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, 2013.
91
USMACV - Military History Branch, Chronology of Significant Events during 1966, 27 April 1967.
VCAT Item No.13370149004.
88

F-21

Operation Atlanta (US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment: 20 October - 8

December 1966) 136 NVA/VC KIA (BC), 51 captured; weapons captured:
five machineguns, six sub-machineguns, eight small arms.92

Such seeming disparities between numbers of NVA/VC reported as killed and the
smaller number of weapons recovered could arise from, for example, souveniring or
looting of enemy weapons by Free World troops and ARVN. There was an active
market for recovered communist weapons among US support, logistic and rear area
personnel particularly for K-54 pistols (about $250 USD) and for non-automatic
weapons that could be taken back to the US eg the Mosin Nagant K-44 rifle.93 Also,
some of the body count is highly likely to have included unarmed communist personnel
including: labourers; support personnel - such as Assault Youth members (eg C.12-65 at
Long Tn); members of crew-served weapon teams without individual weapons (see
footnote 89); and sappers and grenadiers whose weapons were principally grenades,
satchel charges and other explosives.94
Regardless, it is evident that battlefield discipline and clearance by the communist
forces was very good indeed - particularly in the 33rd NVA Regiment. Few documents
were ever recovered from the soldiers packs or bunkers of the 33rd NVA Regiment. In
summary, the relatively low numbers of recovered NVA/VC weapons suggests that the
NVA/VCs battlefield clearance was of a high standard often undertaken in the dark and
under direct and indirect fire from Free World Forces and the RVNAF.
Non-Battle Casualties
Vietnamese military histories make little reference to non-battle casualties ie
from disease, illness, or injury.95 Malaria, in particular, had a very debilitating impact on
92

Combat Operations After Action Report Operation Atlanta, 19 June 1967, p.18. See:
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/386099.pdf.
93
A CIA cable noted souvenir shrinkage and a souvenir scramble - citing the US III Marine
Amphibious Forces first engagement in the Chu Lai area where 134 weapons were captured but only 32
turned in. Saigon, 29 July 1967. VCAT Item No.F029200040865. For an earlier CIA cable (23 June
1967) on apparent anomalies between reported enemy KIA compared with number of captured NVA/VC
weapons citing Operation Fairfax and Operation Billings, see VCAT Item No.F029200040826.
94
In 1970, NVA/VC forces reportedly suffered 104,480 killed. Weapons reported recovered were: Small
Arms (SA): 28,689; Machineguns: 648; RPGs: 1,584; Rocket launchers: 31; Recoilless rifles (RCL): 28;
Mortars: 302; Other Crew Served Weapons (CSW): 1,367, Artillery pieces: 114. 1970 Summary Report
Office of Information, Record of MACV, VCAT Item No.F015800070328. Authors Comment:
Statistically, this suggests one SA weapon recovered from every 3.6 NVA/VC killed. The foregoing very
crude calculation does not consider a range of factors including weapons recovered from POWs or
ralliers; weapons recovered from caches etc eg during the 1970 Cambodian incursion. According to 1 ATF
records, in 1969 Australian forces killed 874 NVA/VC, captured 46, received 12 ralliers, and seized 913
individual weapons and 67 crew-served weapons Enemy Casualties as a Result of 1 ATF Ops, Annex F
to 1 ATF INTSUM No.90/71, Ni t, 31 March 1971.
95
For a Vietnam-wide analysis see Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam, Medical Causes of NonEffectiveness among VC/NVA Troops (Third Update), ST 69 II, MACJ231-7, Saigon, 31 August 1969

F-22

the effective strength of units.96 While all NVA/VC units suffered severely from malaria,
there is no specific mention of malaria in either the 1991 or 2004 D445 Histories.97 An
analysis of 274th VC Regiment documents - captured from their Convalescent Company,
shows that of personnel hospitalised in late 1968 and early 1969, 70 percent were for
malaria and only 13 percent were patients who had been wounded in action.98
Some Vit Cng Awards99
A number of 445 Battalion personnel received Letters of Appreciation (Giy
Khen) for their performance at the Battle of Long Tn. Documents subsequently captured
by Australian forces included: Giy Khen for : o Vn Trung section 2ic/2nd
Company/D445, 18 Aug 66 - Long Tn (CDEC Log 12-2368-66) see below; Trn Vn
VCAT Item No.2250112029. That study indicates 44% of NVA/VC troops had malaria at any one time
and 20% would be hospitalized for an average of 12.7 days. On combat casualties, the study indicates 5%
of wounded NVA/VC died during evacuation, 3-5% died once hospitalized, and 25-30% of those
hospitalized were permanently disabled. A comprehensive annual report for 1966 for K76A Hospital
(principally in the My To Mountains and eastern Xuyn Mc District) dated 20 November 1966 by Le
Tam refers to the treatment of a total of 811 TBB comprising 389 battle casualties (TBB 60 serious)
and 455 for illness (BB) of whom 253 were for malaria. - CDEC Log 02-2054-67, VCAT Item
No.F034600490110. For 1 ATF malaria casualties including the high incidence in late 1969-early 1969,
see: Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.47-52
96
See Annex O for data on malaria in the 275th VC Regiment and other indicative combat effectiveness
calculations. Due to change of loc and the rainy season, the number of sick has sharply increased
Almost 100% of 275 Regiment (E5) personnel contracted malaria. 5 VC Division, Medical Situation
Report, 1 April 1966 - CDEC Log 06-1014-66 VCAT Item No.F034600060098. A high-ranking defector
L Xun Chuyn (NVA Lieutenant Colonel - the Chief of Operations of the 5th VC Division) related high
figures for the impact of malaria on unit effectiveness: 274 Regiment had 25% of its strength immobilized
because of malaria (Nov 65); 275 Regiment: 25-30% immobilised (June 1966) - L Xun Chuyn, US 61866/1211, 26 December 1966 - VCAT Item No.F034600601776. In the 275th Regiment 20% bed-ridden
with malaria, about 30% too ill for combat (February 1969) - NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting WIA/POW,
Assistant Political Officer, 3/275th Regiment - VCAT Item No.2310305007.
97
For detail on 445 Battalions medical equipment and stores as at 5 July 1966, see the signed report by the
Battalions doctor Nguyn Vn Hiu (also as Nguyn Thanh Hiu), that includes several thousand
chloroquine tablets for malaria prophylaxis and treatment. CDEC Log 12-2427-66.
98
1 ATF, INTSUM No.199-69, Ni t, 18 July 1969. For COSVN criteria for malarial prophylaxis as
promulgated by Group 94 (ie the 274th VC Regiment) in mid-September 1965 ie paludrine, nivaquine, and
chloroquine (varying ie: January-May and June-December) see CDEC Log 09-1409-66, VCAT Item
No.F034600441905.
99
A captured 445 Battalion document showed that of the Battalions strength of 403 in mid-1966, 294 (73
percent) had received awards - ie Letters of Appreciation or Certificates of Commendation. See Annex G,
for further data on age, social and marital status, Party membership, and length of service of 445 Battalion
personnel including awards at p.5 and footnote 13. According to a 1985 ng Nai Province publication,
D455 personnel were awarded a total of 1,777 Letters of Appreciation (Giy Khen). - H Sn i & Trn
Quang Toi, ng Nai (The Heroic Units of ng Nai), op.cit., 1985, p.11. The listings did not
separately include Bng Khen (Certificates of Commendation) ie a higher award than Giy Khen, many of
which were awarded to D445 personnel. For a listing of D445 awards cited in the 1985 ng Nai Province
publication, see footnote 613 in the main text.

F-23

Tranh 2nd Company/D445, and Phm Vn ng of the 2nd Company/D445 CDEC

Log 01-1673-69.

Letter of Appreciation awarded to o Vn Trung

for his achievements in the battle with the Australians on 18 August 1966
signed by the 445 Battalion Political Officer Vn Lin on 12 November 1966100

Soldiers of the 275th VC Regiment also received medals, commendation

certificates, and letters of appreciation for their actions in the battle at Long Tn see
Annex O. In particular, soldiers of C13 Company of the 3rd Battalion of 275 Regiment
received letters and certificates of commendation for killing 35 Australians at Long Tn
on 18 August 1966 see the following extract.101
In January 1967, a 275th Regiment report on political guidance also commended
members of C6 and C8 Companies who had killed dozens of Australians in 1966.102

100

Australian troops contacted 12 VC local force troops on 5 December 1966 at YS 435638. o Vn

Trung was probably one of the five VC killed in the clash. 1ATF, INTSUM No.187, Ni t, 5 December
1966.
101
Trng Vn Tinhs notebook was captured by 5RAR following a clash (2 VC KIA) on 29 March 1967
at YS 381678, six kilometres west of the 1 ATF base. 1 ATF, INTSUM 88-67, Ni t, 29 March 1967.
Tinh an assistant platoon commander, related that C13 Company of the 3 rd Battalion (formerly the D605
NVA Battalion), of the 275th Regiment was proposed for a medal and awarded a letter and certificate of
commendation from the Military Region for killing 35 Australian servicemen at Long Tn CDEC Log
04-2690-67.
102
CDEC Bulletin 3969, Log 04-2584-67 on 54 Activities for 1967, 15 January 1967.

F-24

An extract from the notebook of Trng Vn Tinh 275th Regiment, noting his company
had killed 35 Australian troops at the Battle of Long Tn (footnote 100).
Captured Documents and Operation Wandering Souls
Operation Wandering Souls a research project of the University of New South
Wales (UNSW) at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA)103 in Canberra has
provided information to Vietnamese authorities including from official Australian
records, on NVA/VC personnel who died in action against Australian and New Zealand
forces during the Vietnam War.104 Such included information on the location of every
recorded engagement by 1 ATF with enemy forces and available detail on burial sites.
In 2013, during a visit to Vietnam, the Wandering Souls group returned a large
number of captured documents to Vietnamese authorities including a portfolio-style
booklet: The Phuoc Tuy Documents, comprising letters, certificates, documents, and

103

The research team comprises: Dr R.A. (Bob) Hall, Dr Andrew Ross, Dr Amy Griffin, and Mr Derrill De
Heer. See also: Hall, R., Operation Wandering Souls, Wartime, Issue 55, Australian War Memorial,
Canberra, July 2011, pp.25-29.
104
During several visits to Vietnam, project team members have also directly returned letters, diaries and
artefacts to the next-of-kin and other relatives of fallen NVA/VC.

F-25

sketches.105 In November 2014, the group returned further documents including Letters of
Appreciation recovered from the battlefield after the Battle of Long Tn for Phm Vn
Ha and M Tan [sic] Tan both soldiers in the 1st Battalion of the 275th Regiment (on
45).
Casualties Study (NVA/VC) 1 ATF Records and Recent Analysis
In recent years, a small group of Australian military historians in Canberra has completed
an analytical study of about 3,900 engagements by 1 ATF during the War against NVA
and VC forces (see footnotes 515 and 643 in the main text) and produced a
Vietnamese Missing In Action Database.106 The Database identifies the approximate
burial site of more than 3,790 NVA and VC soldiers killed in action by elements of 1
ATF. The Database includes cadre and soldiers of units other than 445 Battalion eg
other provincial elements, district forces, village guerrillas, personnel from the 274th,
275th and 33rd Regiments, rear services personnel, and those killed in engagements
outside Phc Tuy Province by 1 ATF forces. This data was formally passed to
Vietnamese authorities in March 2010. The Canberra-based military historians further
refined their studies, and in late May 2015 launched a website enabling on-line access to
information on nearly all ground combat actions Australians fought in during the
Vietnam War, numbering over 4,500.107 On Long Tn, the website cites 598 enemy
casualties: 245 KIA, 353 WIA (see also footnote 51); and the enemy strength at the
Battle as 2,500.
Total NVA/VC Casualties during the War
In 2012, the Vietnamese Governments Department of Labour, Wounded
Veterans and Society (B Lao ng Thng binh v X hi) announced that 1,146,250
martyrs had fallen during the War and there were 780,000 grave sites in 3,077 Martyrs
Cemeteries. 80% of the martyrs remains had been recovered with data confirmed for
590,000. The remains of 303,000 martyrs were still being sought.108

105

Hall, R. Dr (et al), Operation Wandering Souls (Nhng linh hn phiu bt) The Journey Home (Tr
lai qu hng) The Phc Tuy Documents (Ti liu Phc Tuy), UNSW at ADFA, Canberra, 2013.
106
Hall, R., 1st Australian Task Force A new operational analysis 1966-1971, Vietnam Center &
Archives Seventh Triennial Symposium, Session 5A, Lubbock Texas, 11 March 2011. VCAT Item No.
999VI3155. See also: Hall, R., Operation Wandering Souls, Wartime, Issue 55, Australian War
Memorial, Canberra, July 2011, pp.25-29.
107
Hall, R.A. Dr (Lieutenant Colonel Retd); Ross, A. Dr; Kimberley, P.; Griffin, A. Dr; De Heer, D.V.;
Turner, T. Dr; Smith B.L. Australias Vietnam War: Exploring the combat actions of the 1st Australian
Task Force, University of NSW/Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 2015.
https://vietnam.unsw.adfa.edu.au/
108
Thu Hng, an xa nh danh tnh hi ct lit s cn thiu thng tin: Khng a phng pha tm
linh, ngoi cm vo a , Veterans Association of Vietnam Online, 24 February 2012.

F-26

Martyrs Cemetery at G Cat, Phc Trung Ward, B Ra Town.

Readers Notes and Comments

Annex G

THE PARTY IN D445 BATTALION

The Party leads absolutely, directly, and completely.1
Very few of the published English-language works on the Vietnam War discuss
the Communist Party2 organisation and activities in NVA/VC units. All NVA and VC
formations and units and the political and principal front organisations, contained cadre
of the Vietnam Workers Party (for NVA) or Peoples Revolutionary Party (for VC) who
directed and controlled political, social and military activities.3 Within political, military
and front organisations, these cadre manned the Party Committees and Chapters ie:
The Party Committee or Party Chapter is responsible for leading its unit and making
important decisions for the unit military and political commanders to carry out
accordingly. A commander can make an emergency decision but must be responsible for
that decision to the Party Chapter or Party Committee.4 All organisations also had Party
Youth Groups (on) at all levels whose members aspired to Party membership.5
Within military formations and units, the Partys specifically-trained political officers and
assistant political officers were established at battalion, company and platoon level6 for
445 Battalion, see Annexes A, B, and D.
1

L Chnh & Lu Thnh Lun (eds), Lch S Tiu an 445: on V Anh Hng Lc Lng V Trang
Nhn Dn 1965-2004 (The History of 445 Battalion: An Heroic Unit of the Peoples Armed Forces 19652004), Nh Xut bn Qun i Nhn dn (Armed Forces Publishing House), H Ni, 2004, p.284.
2
See Combined Intelligence Centre Vietnam (CICV) US MACV, VC/NVA Political and Ideological
Training, Study ST 67-054, 18 May 1967. VCAT Item No.F015900240721. The Communist Party of
Vietnam was disbanded in 1945 and re-emerged as the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) in 1951. In January
1962, it created its ostensibly separate southern arm the Peoples Revolutionary Party (PRP). The
Peoples Revolutionary Party organisation in the South was directed locally by H Nis COSVN (The
Central Office for South Vietnam). Vit Cng military units and the National Liberation Front were
directed and controlled by the People's Revolutionary Party through its organs at all levels. In 1976, the
VWP of North Vietnam was merged with the People's Revolutionary Party in South Vietnam to
reconstitute the Communist Party of Vietnam. For the progression of the Peoples Army of Vietnam (ie
North Vietnamese Army, NVA) personnel within the Vietnam Workers Party, see US Embassy, The
Prototypical NVA Soldier: 1970, Si Gn VCAT Item No.0440206002.
3
United States Mission in Vietnam, The Party In Command: Political Organization and the Viet Cong
Armed Forces, Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes, Document No. 34, Saigon, May 1968 VCAT
Item No.2311009027. 1 ATF had earlier broadly disseminated an article on The Authority of NVA
Military and Political Officers in 1 ATF, Troops Information Sheet No.36, Ni t, 10-16 April 1967. For
detail of the roles of commissars (see footnote 6) and political officers, see also PAVN/PLAF Political
Commissary [sic] System, November 1968 VCAT Item No.2310814007.
4
For implemenation at Military Region, Province, District and unit levels, see also COSVN Resolution
No.04/A8: Regulations for the Party Committee System in the SVN Liberation Army (VC Army) CDEC
Item No.23130001036. In mid-1966, the Liberation Armed Forces promulgated a system of Revolutionary
Military Councils (Hi ng Qun Nhn Cach Mng) to be managed by Party Chapters at company-level
in order to democratise decision-making. CDEC Log 09-1749-66 (Vietnamese text only). For aspects of
the Peoples Revolutionary Party regulations, admissions, exclusions, and probationary periods (probably
issued by Military Region 5) see VCAT Item No.2311603006.
5
Some documents indicate that the minimum age for entry into the Party was 27 years.
6
During the War, at Division and Regiment levels, the senior political cadre were titled chnh y ie
political commissar. Like other Vit Cng personnel, the political officers (ie cadre) did not normally

G-2

The extensive role of the Party political officers in 445 Battalion is well-illustrated
in the Political Report for July 1966 prepared by 445 Battalions political officer
Vn Lin (Ba Lin) see Annex H, that covered both the unit and its relationship with the
populace. A critical role of the Party functionaries7 was ensuring the commitment and
morale of the troops under extremely difficult conditions eg: they faced far heavier
enemy firepower and regularly suffered heavy casualties; many were far from home8; for
Southerners, visits to/by families were restricted and discouraged9; living conditions
were poor; food was often inadequate10; medical support was quite rudimentary malaria
was endemic; and the Struggle appeared to have no finite end. Party political cadre also
had to contend with the Si Gn Governments aggressive and successful rallier/returnee/
defector program the Chiu Hi program.11 Desertions from units were a serious
have formal military rank - ie lieutenant, captain etc. Rather, their status was recorded in military-type
functional grades ie Battalion commander level cadre, platoon deputy commander cadre. During
infiltration into the South, NVA personnel routinely physically abandoned their rank and other insignia and
adopted functional titles. However, in many formations and units this was nominal, and their military
ranks were used see Advanced Research Projects Agency, Basic Profile: NVA PW MR3, Summary
Report No.15, Washington, 14 January 1971, VCAT Item No.2321314001.
7
In several captured documents, the political staff are described as non-combatants eg statements by
Trn Vn Ting (3/275th Regiment) and Vn Lin (445 Battalion).
8
To enhance morale, the NVA/VC operated a complex postal system that included personal mail. Their
field elements were allocated discrete Letter Box Numbers (LBNs) that were regularly changed eg 445
Battalions LBNs included 61142 VT in 1966 and 61,202/VT D12 in 1970. The system included mail to
North Vietnam for detailed regulations on the postal system, see CDEC Log 01-1367-69. On 15 July
1966, Military Region 1 promulgated a Directive on letters between North and South Vietnam, see CDEC
Log 08-1555-66. All letters were subject to censorship, and no more than one letter a month to close
relatives and friends in North Vietnam was allowed. The letters should provide good advice and
encouragement for the addressees. Under no circumstances can classified information (location,
assignment, designation of units or agencies, etc) be mentioned in letters. The B Ra Province Units
Command Committee reproduced the Military Region 1 Directive ie on the exchange of personal letters
between North and South Vietnam and within South Vietnam, and added cover designators of agencies and
units within the Province (signed by the Assistant Political Officer, Nguyn Thanh Cn). - CDEC Log 091974-66. On LBNs and mail to the North, see also the Nhn Trch District Directive dated 9 September
1966 CDEC Log 11-1394-66. For military mail in North Vietnam, see NIC Report 282/67, VCAT Item
No.F034600930007. For detailed regulations on the postal system, see also CDEC Log 01-1367-69.
9
For example, see the comprehensive Group 84 (Rear Services) Directive of 1 June 1966 CDEC Log 091390-66. Command cadre feared that personnel visiting their families would be proselytised and
encouraged to participate in the Chiu Hi programme (see footnote 11).
10
In July 1966, Group 84 (Rear Services) advised U2 (B Ra) and the 5th VC Division that a revised food
staples ration was to consist of two-thirds rice substitutes (corn and manioc) and one-third rice. - CDEC
Log 12-1914-66.
11
Phc Tuy Province statistics for the Chiu Hi programme were reported as : 1965 77 ralliers/
returnees; 1966 278; 1967 317; 1968 45; 1969 121; 1970 196; 1971 37 : seven years 1,071
(nationally 176,756) - CORDS VCAT Item No.2234403020. For warnings by B Bin Province regarding
the Chiu Hi programme, see CDEC Log 11-1631-67. For the author (then Lieutenant E.P. Chamberlain)
interviewing 445 Battalion rallier Nguyn Vn Nhng company commander, at the Phc Tuy Province
Chiu Hi Centre in July 1969, see AWM photo P04667.589. A lesser subversive threat was the Si Gn
Governments Bit i Thin Nga (White Swan Special Unit). This comprised female Republic of Vietnam
police personnel tasked to covertly infiltrate the Vit Cng infrastructure organisation and base areas.

G-3

concern before Australian forces arrived in Phc Tuy Province in mid-1966.12 To

positively influence morale of the troops, the political cadre managed the awarding of
Letters of Appreciation (Giy Khen), Certificates of Commendation (Bng Khen)
almost solely for junior personnel, and Liberation Military Exploit Medals (Hun Chng
Qun Cng) and Liberation Military Feats Medals (Hun Chng Chin Cng) each in
three grades.13 Political cadre also managed cultural activities to enhance unit and
individual morale as related in the 1991 and 2004 D445 Histories following the
chemical shelling incident in late1966/early 1967. Party Committees and Chapters also
dealt with loyalty and discipline issues with their cadre status reports14 listing
offences in several categories.15
In 1966, the 445 Battalion adjutant Nguyn Tun Gii, recorded in his diary that
it was very difficult to agitate anti-American movements among the people and
relations between the Party and the people were in a bad situation especially in the
Worker and Peasant Associations.16
Several captured documents give an insight into 445 Battalion personnel and
Party numbers, structures and activities eg:

Formed in August 1968, in 1972 the units title was changed to Special Mission Group G4231g. See
Nguyn Thanh Thy (a former unit commander), Nh n Bit i Thin Nga Remembering the
White Swan Special Unit, 17 June 2008.
12
In mid-September 1965, morale problems were discussed at a four-day political conference held by the
B Ra Province Unit, and it was reported that 44 personnel in the Province had deserted in the preceding

two-month period (July, August) including eight from 445 Battalion, 10 from the Long t District Unit,
eight from the Chu c District Unit and four from the Bnh Chu (Xuyn Mc) guerrilla unit. The main
reasons cited for desertion were reported as: fear of death, shelling and particularly enemy aircraft attacks,
hardship - and a preference for the easy life at home CDEC Log 09-2601-66 (signed by B [sic] Lin
Head of the Political Section of the B Ra Province Unit the signature is identical to that of Vn Lin
(aka Ba Lin, the 445 Battalion political officer from December 1965 to about January 1968). For 445
Battalions morale in April 1967, see the debrief of Nguyn Vn Hach (G.4544 Ordnance Company) that
noted the 3-man team ((cell)) system, whereby one checks on the other two prevents them from taking
the chance to rally. CDEC Log 9-0038-67, VCAT Item No.F034600701360.
13
Data on awards was detailed in Strength Status Reports eg: for the first six months of 1966, 97
Citations (ie Certificates of Commendation) and 238 Letters of Appreciation were awarded to personnel
in the 403-strong 445 Battalion CDEC Log 09-2136-66. See also the 445 Battalion Bi-Annual/Monthly
Report at Annex H. Submissions were also made for the awarding of medals to the Battalion and subelements, see Political Officer Vn Lins letter to the B Ra Provincial Unit Headquarters requesting
medals for three companies (1st, 2nd, 4th) CDEC Log 09-2123-66 at Annex I.
14
Reference to Cadre Status Reports is sometimes a CDEC mis-translation ie when the report
covers both cadre (cn b) and soldiers (chin s).
15
Incidents recorded included: involvement in political problems, suspicion, violation of
regulations, violation of policy, violation of discipline of the masses, rape, obscenity,
corruption, theft, desertion and surrender. CDEC Log 09-2136-66. Directives from Provincelevel alerted 445 Battalion to issues of concern. In mid-March 1967, Party officials in Chu c District
warned against misbehaviour and bad practices - including smoking expensive cigarettes, listening to
Radio Si Gn, intoxication, and baulking at political indoctrination - CDEC Log 04-3181-67.
16
Diary of 445 Battalion Adjutant, Nguyn Tun Gii - CDEC Log 06-1673-67.

G-4

In early July 1966, Bi Quang Chnh (Commander, 445 Battalion) completed a

Bi-Annual Political Report for the period January-June 1966 see translated extracts at
Annex H. Of 445 Battalions personnel strength of 395 in July 1966, he noted that Party
members numbered 115 ie 84 official and 31 probationary members: totaling 29.11% of
the Battalions strength; while Party Youth Group (on) members numbered 140:
totaling 35.44% of the Battalions strength. The Battalion had five Party Chapters (Chi
B) and five Labour Youth Chapters (Chi on). The largest Party Chapter had 81
members, and the smallest 12. The largest Labour Youth Chapter was 41-strong, and the
smallest had 13 members. The Battalion Party Committee comprised five comrades.
There were 26 Chapter Committee members in the Battalions companies. The Executive
Committees of the Company Labour Youth Chapters had 20 members.
On 9 August 1966, the Political Report for July 1966 by Vn Lin (Political
officer, 445 Battalion) see translated extracts at Annex H, noted that 445 Battalions
personnel strength as at August 1966 was 392. The Party had 115 members: 85 official
members, 30 probationary - 29.34% of the Battalions strength; the Youth Group (on)
had 145 members - 36.99% of the Battalions strength. The Battalion had five official
Party Chapters and five Youth Group Chapters. The largest Party Chapter numbered 33,
and the smallest had 12 members. The largest Youth Group Chapter had 37 members, and
the smallest had 14.
The foregoing two reports - ie by Bi Quang Chnh and Vn Lin, probably
drew on data in two tabular reports prepared in mid-1966 in 445 Battalion and also
recovered on 26 August 196617 (ie together with the Bi Quang Chnh and Vn
Lin reports):
- A Bi-Annual Report on Cadre Status18 comprising four tables that detailed
35 cadre holding appointments from Battalion Commander to Platoon
Commander inclusive but without the names of the individual cadre. The
document provided detailed information on their social class, age, date of
joining the Army, date of joining the Party, Party position and date assigned, a
summary of any previous combat experience, training courses attended,
nationality, health, awards, punishments, marital status, and education. Their
ranks/functions were recorded as: one Battalion Commander19, three Battalion
Executive Officers, three Company Commanders, 13 Company Executive
Officers and 15 Platoon Commanders ie totaling 35.20 The Battalion Party
Committee had five members including the Commanding Officer, and each
17

At 1200hrs on 26 August 1966, A/2/503rd Infantry Brigade contacted 8-12 VC at YS 575735 who fled
after the engagement; a bunker was discovered there were no casualties in A Company see Combat
After Action Report, HQ 173 Airborne Brigade (Separate), 15 December 1966, p.26.
18
Recovered by the US 173rd Airborne Brigade on 26 August 1966 at YS 575735, see CDEC Log 09-212166.
19
In mid-1966, the Battalion Commander was Bi Quang Chnh see Annexes A, B and H. While the
Battalion Commander was not named in the Report, the data showed that the Battalion Commander was
single, had four years of schooling, was of the lower social class, aged above 41 years, his health was
graded as B, he had joined the Party in the period 1945-1950, and joined the Army in the period 19451947.
20
These were functional ranks - some may have been filling higher appointments within the Battalion.

G-5

company and platoon had a Party Chapter. Of the 15 Platoon Commanders, 11

were noted as infantry officers, one was an assistant company political officer,
one a signals officer and one a rear services officer.
A set of tables seemingly complementary to the above, titled Strength
Status Reports21 and signed by Vn Lin the 445 Battalion political
officer, on 23 July 1966. These tables provided data for the categories of
Platoon Commander and higher rank, Assistant Platoon Commander,
Squad/Section Leader, Privates, and the 3rd Company. These tables showed
the Battalions strength was 403 with 116 (29%) Party members and 142
(35%) Group members ie 145 (36%) were neither members of the Party nor
the Groups. 268 (66%) came from lower class families, 132 (33%) from
middle class, and three from higher class families. 93 (23%) were under 20
years of age, 186 (46%) were in the 21-25 years age bracket, 94 (23%) in the
26-30 years group, 19 (5%) were in the 31-35 years group, six (1.5%) were
36-39 years, and five (1.2%) 40 years and over. 376 of the 403 (93.3%) had
joined the Army in the period 1961-1966. 294 personnel (73%) had received
awards (Letters of Appreciation or Certificates of Commendation), nine had
been captured and detained by the enemy, 27 (6.7%) had previously been
drafted by the RVNAF, 283 (70%) were single, two had wives living in North
Vietnam, 118 (29%) had wives living in South Vietnam, 180 had A-grade
health 183 were B-grade and 40 were C-grade, 36 (9%) had four years
of schooling, 11 (3%) had completed Junior High School, and two had
completed Senior High School.

Party members and the performance of the Party in committees and units was
assessed and formally rated.22 Solidarity within the NVA/VC units and cohesion and
control, was assisted by the communist system of three-man cells within the military
sections and the dynamic of self-criticism. These cells were intended to function as
harmonious three-man cooperatives that fought, ate and quartered together. A D445
soldier who rallied noted that the 3-man team ((cell)) system, whereby one checks on the
other two and each individual is, in turn, checked by two others. Many of the men want to
become Chieu Hois, but this 3-man trap prevents them from taking the chance to rally.23
Political officers also exhorted their troops on the basis of several codes including the
Code of Discipline (12 precepts), an Oath of Honour (12), the Rules of Secrecy
21

Recovered by the US 173rd Airborne Brigade on 26 August 1966 at YS 575735 - see CDEC Log 092136-66.
22
Military Region 1 - Directive on the Rating of Party Cadre (assessing: Behaviour, Capability, Personal
Achievements) and also for Committees and Units see: MR1 Directive No.013/CT, 19 July 1966
CDEC Log 08-1553-66 , VCAT Item No.F034600021550. See also: 1 ATF, Viet Cong Leadership
Prerequistes, Troops Information Sheet, No.42, Nui Dat 1-7 May 1967 that reportedly included a
minimum height requirement of 5 feet 5 inches.
23
See the debrief of Nguyn Vn Ha h (G.4544 Ordnance Company) CDEC Log 9-0038-67, VCAT Item
No.F034600701360.

G-6

(15), and the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points of Attention. Party
Chapters were exhorted to achieve the Four Good Qualities.24
Aspiring Party members had to complete an Application for Party Membership in
accord with Party-established criteria.25 When posted to new positions, Party and Group
members were provided with a proforma letter of introduction signed by a senior
political cadre of their unit, that cited the members Party/Group credentials and
requested that he be permitted to participate in Party/Group activities in his new unit.26
Almost all military cadre had a Personal History Statement booklet27that included a
political section detailing their Party/Group status and activities, and Party cadre had a
similar document.28
A Letter of Introduction to Participate in Party Activities is shown opposite ie
of the Peoples Revolutionary Party, to the Political Office of Military Region 1 for
Nguyn Vn Kim. The Letter (a poor original copy) was signed on 7 October 1965 and
shows Kims alias as Nguyn B Thanh. The text relates that Kim joined the Party as a
probationary member on 6 January 1950 ie of the then disbanded Vietnam
Communist Party and the Vietnam Workers Party from early 1951, and that Kim
became an official member on 24 April 1950. His status is shown as a company
commander in the political office. Kim later served as the Commander of the Chu
c District Unit before being appointed Commander of 445 Battalion in December
1967/January 1968 his outline biography is at Annex A, pp.3-8.

24

The Four Good Qualities for Party Chapters (Chi B 4 Tt) required Party Chapters to be: Good in
ideological guidance; Good in leadership of the unit; Good in promoting solidarity between the people and
the Army; and Good in the recruitment and training of Party members and the improvement of Party
Chapters.
25
For Party regulations on application for membership criteria see CDEC Item No.F034600530260.
26
See CDEC Log 05-1752-67 Letter of Introduction (Giy Gii Thiu) signed by the 445 Battalion
political officer Vn Lin for a platoon leader (Nguyn Tun Gii aka Mi Gii later the Battalions
adjutant) moving from 445 Battalion to the H21 Rear Services School. In mid-May 1972, a North
Vietnamese soldier Corporal ng Li ch a reinforcement from the 325th NVA Division to 445
Battalion and a probationary member of the Vietnam Workers Party, presented letters of introduction - ie
to enable him to participate in Party activities, to the B Ra Sub-Region and 445 Battalion CDEC Log
06-1049-72.
27
Personal History Statement (PHS) ie L Lch Qun Nhn (Military Member Personal Particulars).
See CDEC Log 12-1265-66 for the PHS of Trn Hng c (Commander of the 4th Company at the Battle
of Long Tn) dated 15 July 1966 see a photocopy of his PHS booklet cover at Annex D, p.5. 20 PHS for
junior cadre of 445 Battalion are at CDEC Log 12-2394-66 see also Annex D.
28
The Personal History Statement Party Chapter (L Lch Chi B) of Nguyn Vn Kim Commander
of the Chu c District Unit, dated 5 August 1966, is at CDEC Log 09-1860-66. His Peoples
Revolutionary Party proforma on the opposite page, ie his Letter of Introduction for Party Activity
(Giy Gii Thiu Sinh Hot ng) is at CDEC Log 12-2423-66. Kim subsequently commanded 445
Battalion in the period from December 1967/January 1968 to May 1969.

G-7

Letter of Introduction to Participate in Party Activities

Nguyn Vn Kim (alias Nguyn B Thanh), 7 October 1965.

G-8

Readers Notes and Comments

Annex H

D445 COMMAND AND POLITICAL REPORTS MID-1966

On 26 August 1966, several documents were captured by the US 173rd Airborne
Brigade1 that give an insight into the status and activities of 445 Battalion before the
Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966. In outline, these documents2 were:
-

8 July 1966 by Bi Quang Chnh (Commander, 445 Battalion): Bi-Annual Political

Report January-June 1966. This reported D445s personnel strength as 395 at July
1966. Party members were noted as 115 (ie 84 official members, 31 probationary): ie
29.11% of the Battalions personnel; on (Youth Group) members 140: 35.44%
of the Battalions personnel. Casualties in the previous six months: 39 killed, six
deserted, one captured.
10 July 1966 by Vn Lin (Political Officer, 445 Battalion): A letter to the B Ra
Province Unit Headquarters requesting medals for three companies (1st, 2nd, 4th) see
Annex I.
9 August 1966 by Vn Lin (Political Officer, 445 Battalion): Political Report
for July 1966: This reported D445s personnel strength as 392 at August 1966. Party
members were noted as 115 (ie 85 official members, 30 probationary) ie 29.34% of
the Battalions personnel; on (Youth Group) 145: 36.99% of the Battalions
personnel. In the month of July 1966, casualties were 14 soldiers killed, one posted,
one deserted.

Note: According to the Australian official history, in August 1966 the Australian Task
Force assessed the strength of 445 Battalion as 550 McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit.,
1993, p.351, p.559 (endnote 114). The two 445 Battalion Command and Political
Reports above suggest that 445 Battalions strength at the Battle of Long Tn was
probably no more than about 380 ie when absences are considered.
Further extracts from the two Reports and the letter follow:
Bi Quang Chnh (Commander, 445 Battalion):
Bi-annual Political Report, January-June 1966 (Bo Co Chnh Tr 6 Thng t thng 1
n thng 6 1966) 8 July 1966. Original - handwritten: 23 pages, 8 inches x 10 inches.
Chnhs first paragraph is a summary of actions by D445 in the period January to
June 1966 including: two ambushes on Route 44 ( Dng [sic]) and at B K Slope (t
At 1200hrs on 26 August 1966, A/2/503rd Infantry Regiment contacted 8-12 VC at YS 575735 about 12
kilometres east of Bnh Ba village, who fled after the engagement without casualties. A bunker was
discovered and there were no A Company casualties see Combat After Action Report ((Operation
Toledo)), 15 December 1966, p.26.
2
CDEC Bulletin 1092 of 24 September 1966, CDEC Log 09-2123-66. There is only a short English
summary of the three documents ie there is no full translation of the Vietnamese text; the documents are
in manuscript, and some passages are not fully legible VCAT Item No.F034600130787. As noted above,
the documents were recovered by the US 173rd Airborne Brigade on 26 August 1966 at YS 575735
together with two associated documents that give insights into the backgrounds (service and societal) of 445
Battalion personnel : A Bi-Annual Report on Cadre Status comprising four tables that detailed 35 senior
cadre holding appointments (see Annex G, footnote 18); and a set of seemingly complementary tables
titled Strength Status Reports signed by Vn Lin the 445 Battalion political officer, on 23 July
1966 (see Annex G, footnote 21).
1

H-2

), and countering five waves of enemy sweep operations from 25 February 1966
including a series of US sweeps on 1 April 1966 and on 17 May 1966. The Battalion
engaged in transporting strategic material to support fraternal units including mortar
ammunition, for periods of 5-7 days and with the longest period of one month.
Morale was good, however there were some negatives. Among Party members, a
fear of sacrifice had arisen and some were reluctant to operate deep into enemy
territory, were afraid of the enemys artillery and air support, wished to visit their
families, and when operations were in prospect - feigned illness. Youth Group members
feared combat and hardship and also feigned illness. They disregarded and argued with
cadre. The Battalion dug 45 metres of tunnels in the Long Tn village area. In the period
February-March 1966, the Battalion conducted the emulation program: Quyt Chin
Quyt Thng Gic M Xm Lc (Resolve to Fight and Defeat the American
Invaders). A second phase from 25 June to 25 July 1966 was titled: Hate the
Americans and their Puppets. The Party Committees (Chi y) of the five companies
were democratically elected.
D445 Battalions strength was 395 at July 1966. Party members numbered 115
(ie 84 official, 31 probationary members) representing 29.11% of the Battalions
personnel strength; on (Labour Youth Group) members numbered 140 - 35.44% of the
Battalions strength. In the period, the Party gained 21 members (18 pht trin ie
internally developed, and three b sung arrived as reinforcements); 11 Party
members were killed. The on (Labour Youth Group) gained 40 (28 pht trin, 12 b
sung); Youth Group numbers declined by 33 - including 16 killed, 10 became Party
members, 3 deserted, 2 were in convalescence, one was captured, and one was trn rt
(timid). In the six months period, a total of 46 comrades were lost including 39 killed,
six deserted, one captured ((Translators Note: These figures are repeated in a later
section see below)). Those killed included one company 2ic, two platoon commanders,
one platoon 2ic, five section commanders and three section 2ics.
The Battalion had five Party Chapters (Chi B) and five Labour Youth Chapters
(Chi on). The largest Party Chapter had 81 members, and the smallest 12. The largest
Labour Youth Chapter was 41-strong, and the smallest had 13 members. The Party
Committee comprised five comrades. There were 26 Chapter Committee members in the
companies. The Executive Committees of the Company Labour Youth Chapters had 20
members. Two members of the Party Committee had attended a 40-day course at the
Province level.
In the six months period, Province awarded to Battalion personnel a total of 106
Letters of Appreciation (Giy Khen) and 57 Certificates of Commendation (Bng Khen) comprising five Letters and 10 Certificates for sections, six Certificates for teams/cells,
and three Letters and nine Certificates for platoons.
In the six months, 39 comrades were killed including one company executive
officer/2ic, two platoon commanders, one platoon 2ic, five section commanders, and
three section 2ics. Among those lost, two ((?)) were killed by air attack and artillery fire.
For battalion-level operations, 20-50 civilian labourers were recruited none were killed
or injured, except for one being wounded by an M-79 fragment fired from a helicopter.

H-3

The Battalion issued five Letters of Appreciation to civilian labourers for their support
during the battle at B K Slope (t ).
Shortcomings: In the Dng [sic] battle (t ) two seriously wounded
enemy were killed because we were unable to evacuate them.
Status ((functional levels/grades)) of Battalion cadre in the past six months were:
one battalion commander, three battalion-level deputies, three company commanders, 12
deputy company commanders, 16 platoon commanders, 20 deputy platoon commanders,
43 section commanders, 63 deputy section commanders. Losses killed (hy sinh): 1 deputy
company commander, two platoon commanders, one deputy platoon commander, five
section commanders, three deputy section commanders. Promotions in the past six
months: seven platoon commanders, eight deputy platoon commanders, 27 section
commanders, 44 deputy section commanders.
8/7/1966 Headquarters D445 - Bi Quang Chnh (signed)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Vn Lin (Political Officer, D/445):
Letter to the B Ra Province Unit Headquarters (Knh gi: Ban Ch Huy Tnh i) - 10
July 1966. Original (handwritten): one page, 5 inches x 8 inches.
Considering the achievements of the companies in building our forces, fighting,
studying, and implementing the policies since our establishment on 19 May 1965 until
now it is proposed that the Province Committee support a submission to the Military
Region to commend and reward the 1st Company, the 2nd Company and the 4th Company
as follows: for the 1st Company the Liberation Military Feats Medal (Hun Chng
Chin Cng) Second Class; for the 2nd Company the Liberation Military Feats Medal
Second Class; and for the 4th Company - the Liberation Military Feats Medal Third
Class.
For a full translation, see Annex I.
------------------------------------------------------------------------- Vn Lin (Political Officer, 445 Battalion):
Political Report July 1976 (Bo Co Chnh Tr Thng 7 Nm 1966) - 9 August 1966.
Original (handwritten): 19 pages, 8 inches x 10 inches.
The Battalion conducted a mobile ambush on the Australians sweeping operation
on 25 July 1966.3 The 1st Company moved quickly to attack the enemy. the enemy fled
3

For the Australian account, see McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., pp.280-281 (Sui Bang; the
Australian forces - ie B/6RAR , suffered two killed; the enemy reportedly suffered six killed including
probably the commander of the 1st Company of D445). The accounts in the 1991 and 2004 D445 History
state: 1991 pp.60-61 A number of comrades were wounded. Comrade T Dng the Political Officer of
the 1st Company, died on the withdrawal route back to our base.; 2004 p.70, f.253: T Dng the
Political Officer of the 1st Company, who died on the way back to our base.

H-4

in panic. The enemy had heavy fire support and was of greater strength than our
forces. In general, morale during July improved, and resolve for combat was high. Work,
study and emulation activities were conducted enthusiastically and diligently. During
July, no political study meetings were conducted as our base was always on the move, the
weather was unusually wet, and the enemy was very active. In the month, the whole
Battalion was only able to review Resolution 1965, the report on the first five months of
1966, and the resolution of the Province Committee. Additionally the Party Chapters held
study sessions on Party regulations, and the Youth Group held studies on Group
regulations. During the month, we received copies of the following publications: one
copy of the special edition of Combat Victory (Chin Thng), 50 copies of the B
Ra News of 25 June 1966, 50 copies of the B Ra News of 26 June 1966, five copies
of Current Affairs dated 30 June 1966, 20 copies of the Liberation (Gii Phng)
magazine dated 11 June 1966 (No. 82), and five copies of the Eastern Region Liberation
Forces magazine dated 15 July 1966. Additionally, the companies twice disseminated
news of victories heard on the radio. Cultural activities were continued. However, while
the 1st Company was located in Long Tn, they were unable to conduct regular cultural
activities due to enemy commando (bit kch) operations. There were no desertions in
July.
The units resolve was first evidenced in our attack on the Australians sweeping
operation of 25 July. Whenever the sound of gunfire was heard, our troops would rush to
that location. In a meeting, the 2nd Company was commended, and nine comrades
received written acknowledgements. In the 1st Company, there were three comrades
(Tho, Du and Sn) who had not responded.
In July, the Company Party Chapters democratically elected their Party Chapter
Committees - the Party Committee no longer chose half. The Battalions strength was 392
at August 1966. Party members totalled 115: 85 official, 30 probationary members
(29.34% of the Battalions strength); there were 145 members in the Youth Group (on)
(36.99% of the Battalions strength). Battalion numbers were reduced by 16 in July: 14
soldiers were killed; one was posted to a district; and one deserted. Composition: four
Party organisations; five Groups (on); and seven Masses Organisations. Five new
Party members were accepted; there were 10 new Youth Group members (seven newly
appointed and three incoming reinforcements); four Party members were lost (three
killed, one posted to a district); six Youth Group members were lost (five killed, one
accepted into the Party). The Battalion had five official Party Chapters and five Youth
Group Chapters. The largest Party Chapter numbered 33, and the smallest had 12
members. The largest Youth Group Chapter had 37 members, and the smallest had 14.
The Party Committee had five members; and the Chapter Committee had 26 members. In
the month, when commanding the mobile battles, the Party Chapter was located at the
farthest 2km (from the front) and as close as 1.5km when commanding the mobile battles.
Consequently, the soldiers were unafraid of being isolated or abandoned by the unit and
so whenever they heard the sound of gunfire, they rushed towards it in order to strike the
enemy. No matter how fierce the battles were, all thoughts such as: fear of isolation,

H-5

exposed flanks, fear of abandonment by the unit, fear of error, fear of aircraft and artillery
were all resolved.
Deficiencies: The Party Chapters do not yet have good methods to resolve
problems. In relation to the engagement with the Australians on 25 July, the Party
Committee convened meetings to assess the results and to examine experiences. In
July, the Battalion awarded 12 Letters of Appreciation to sub-units and individuals
(including a letter for Sub-group 3 of the 4th Company). The National Liberation Front
Military Forces awarded the Battalion the Liberation Combat Feats Medal 2nd Class for
the battles at Ging and t .4
Policy on Dead and Wounded ((Translators Note: half-page missing)) of those
killed in action, four bodies were recovered, ((Translators Note: presumed 10 see
below)) were left on the battlefield. No prisoners were taken during July. However, we
continued training on the Partys policies towards prisoners. Deficiencies: Our policy
regarding our battlefield dead had not been fully disseminated. Consequently, the bodies
of 10 comrades were abandoned on the battlefield.
Our cadre numbers are: Company Commanders three; Company 2ics 12;
Platoon Commanders 14; Platoon 2ics 19; Section Commanders 44; Section 2ics
60 ((or 65)). Cadre losses were: one Company 2ic killed; one Platoon Commander killed;
one Platoon 2ic killed; 1 Section Commander killed; one Section Commander responsible
for administration deserted; two Section 2ics killed one was the commander of a heavy
machinegun group. The number of cadre currently undergoing study in the month
comprised: three Company 2ics at COSVN; four Platoon Commanders studying at
COSVN; one studying administration5; three studying as medics at Province; one
studying medicine at COSVN. The cadre who undertook study during July comprised:
two Platoon Commanders at COSVN; four Platoon 2ics at COSVN; one Platoon 2ic at
Province; one Section Commander at Province; four section 2ics at Province.
9/8/1966, Headquarters D445, Political Officer Vn Lin (signed).

Translators Note: On 15 May 1966 vide Decision #49/QD-KT, the Headquarters of the South
Vietnamese Liberation Army awarded the Liberation Military Exploits [sic probably Feats] Medal 2nd
Class to the Concentrated Battalion of B Ra Province for its destruction of the Long Hi NCO School
students on 8 January 1966 ie the battle at Ging and its superior performance of duties in the
Phc Thnh Battle on 26 April 1966. ie the battle at t . Military Region 1 produced a copy of
the award on 9 July 1966 see CDEC Log 09-1972-66 and footnote 86 in the 1991 D445 History. CDEC
translators in Saigon were not always consistent in translating terminology for NVA/VC medals. The author
has translated Hun chng qun cng as the Military Exploits Medal, and the lower grade Hun chng
chin cng as the Military Feats Medal.
5
Probably the Battalion adjutant - Nguyn Tun Gii (Mi Gii), see footnote 6 in Annex D.

H-6

Reports
Final pages of the reports with signatures, by:
Bi Quang Chnh 445 Battalion Commander, 8 July 1966.
Vn Lin 445 Battalion Political Officer, 9 August 1966.

Annex I

D445 BATTALION: MEDALS SUBMISSION 10 JULY 1966 1

D/445
Respectfully to the Headquarters of the Province Unit,
-

Considering our achievement in our founding year, combat, work activities,

training and the execution of the policies by our companies since the
establishment of the Battlion on 19 May 1965 up until now:
In order to mark its coming of age with the Battalion now aged one, the Party
Committee met and unanimously proposed ((illegible)) study to propose
that the Military Region commend and reward the 1st Company, the 2nd Company,
and the 4th Company as follows:
+ 1st Company: The Liberation Military Feats Medal2 2nd Class;
+ 2nd Company: The Liberation Military Feats Medal 2nd Class;
+ 4th Company: The Liberation Military Feats Medal 3rd Class;
We will forward the accomplishment reports of the Companies to the Province
Unit Headquarters. If the ((illegible)) are typed before sending on, we request
that additional copies be made for us ie two copies of each accomplishment
report (one to be given to the Company and one to be retained in the Battalion
records).
10 July 1966
On behalf of
D/445 Headquarters
((signed))
Vn Lin 3

Translators Note: See the Vietnamese text on the following page. This letter was recovered during
Operation Toledo by the troops of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade on 26 August 1966 at YS 575735 - about
12 kilometres east of Bnh Ba village. At 1200hrs, Company A of the 2nd Battalion of the 503rd Infantry
Regiment made contact with 8-12 VC at YS 575735 who threw six grenades, detonated two Claymore
mines, and then fled north with no casualties. Company A reported no casualties and also found a bunker
with 1,000 s/a rounds, six 60mm mortar rounds, one 81mm mortar shell, 25 grenades, one M-2 carbine, one
chicom claymore mine, four protective masks (US) and assorted documents. 173d Airborne Brigade
(separate), Combat After Action Report ((Operation Toledo)), 15 December 1966, p.26.
2
Translators Note: Military Feats Medal 2nd Class: Hun Chng chin cng hng hai.
3
Translators Note: Vn Lin (Ba Lin Vn Chng), Political Officer of D445 Battalion see
his biography at Annex A.

Annex I

Annex J
HIGHER HEADQUARTERS
445 Battalions immediately higher headquarters1 was the B Ra Province Unit.2
In 1966, the B Ra Province Unit had approximately 16 subordinate elements and
entities.3 The principal elements of the Province Units headquarters and its subordinate
entities included: a Staff (73 members)4, Political personnel (27)5, military staff (46),
445 Battalion (about 380 strong), a B Ra Town Unit (C610/982 - 33 members), the
Long t District Unit (159), the Chu c District Unit (about 110)6 , the Xuyn Mc
Unit (29), a small Province Reconnaissance Unit, a rear services element, a medical
element (46), a POW camp (14), and a Military Training School (18). Additionally, the
1

445 Battalion is incorrectly described as a subordinate of the 5 th VC Division as well as thousands of

local guerrillas, in Ham, P., Vietnam The Australian War, op.cit., 2007, p.182. A similar error occurs in
the end-credits of a 2006 DVD - Lay, D., (Director/Producer), The Battle of Long Tan, Animax Films Pty
Ltd/Red Dune Films, Sydney, 2006.
2
Its principal cover designator was U2 ie one of the nine provinces of Military Region 1 (T.1 Eastern

Nam B, later Military Region 7). Note however that B Ra had been incorporated with Ch Ln Province
from May 1951 to 1955 to form B Ch Province; in April 1963, B Ra was combined with Long Khnh
to create B Ra-Long Khnh Province; also in April 1963, Bin Ha was incorporated - and the three
provinces became B Bin Province (with Nguyn Sn H - aka Nm Tr, as the Secretary) ie until
December 1963 (or September 1965) when Bin Ha was detached and B Ra-Long Khnh Province reestablished; in December 1966, the three-province Long B Bin Province was briefly re-formed; and in
October 1967, B Ra-Long Khnh was re-established; in May 1971, the B Ra Sub-Region (Phn Khu)
was formed; in October 1972, the province of B Ra-Long Khnh and Bin Ha was re-formed; in
January 1976, the three provinces were incorporated into ng Nai Province see Phm Vn Hy & Hunh
Ngc Bu, ng Nai 30 Nm Chin Tranh Gii Phng (1945-1975) S Tho (The 30-year Liberation
Struggle in ng Nai) Draft, Nh Xut Bn ng Nai, ng Nai, 1986, footnote 1; and Tr Quang Toi
(et al), Lch s ng b ng Cng sn Vit Nam ti h ng Nai 1930 1995, T 1, Nh Xut Bn ng
Nai, Bin Ha, 1997, footnote 1.
3
CDEC Item No.F034601072302/CDEC Log 09-2062-66; CDEC Log 07-1050-71.
4
Staff included the Finance and Economy Section that managed the budget including tax collection.
For the operation of the Vit Cng budget see CDEC Report 6 028 0460 72. For example, in Chu c
District, 10 percent of farm produce was to be collected as tax in 1970 CDEC Report 6 028 0356 71. A
comprehensive listing of Vit Cng tax rates in B Ra-Long Khnh Province in late 1970 including
industrial taxes (shops, vehicles, brick kilns, timber, sand, alcohol etc) is detailed in CDEC Report 6 028
1502 70. A B Ra Sub-Region Finance and Economy Section document captured in 1972 described the
three-level COSVN budget and the management of village budgets including incomes and authorized
local expenditures CDEC Report 6 028 0462 70. For a comprehensive listing of income and commercial
tax rates for 1972 for Nhn Trch District and for B Ra Sub-Region with effect from 1 April 1972, see
CDEC Report 06 028 0416 72, Log 08-1234-72. For the provision of funds by the Province Unit to 445
Battalion, see footnotes 227 and 240 in the 1991 D445 History ie Chamberlain, E.P., ... D445 , op.cit.,
2011.
5
A listing of the Personnel Roster of the Political Section August 1966 was captured on 26 August
1966 by troops of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade CDEC Log 09-2064-66. The personal particulars of the
27 members of the political section as at August 1966, are detailed with the list headed by Nguyn
Thanh Cn b.1925, of battalion commander rank; L Minh Vit b.1929, of company commander rank;
and Nguyn Vn Thun b.1922, a field-grade political officer. According to a captured Post-Mortuary
Report, Nguyn Vn Thun as the Chief of the B Ra Province Unit Workshop died on 28 July 1966
as a result of wounds suffered in an air strike CDEC Bulletin No. 1085, Log 09-2061-66.
6
This figure of 110 appears to also include village guerrillas.

J-2

B Ra Province Unit commanded through the three District Units, several village
guerrilla units/militia and the Vit Cng Infrastructure7 (VCI - including Party and Front
entities). The Province had encrypted HF morse communications with the Military
Region 1 (ie later Military Region 7), and with its subordinate military units and districts
(employing principally Chicom 102E and US AN/GRC-106 radios). However, a primary
means of contact was by courier (commo-liaison) and employing a postal system
utilizing cover designators and Letter Box Numbers (LBNs).8
In early 1966, the standard of the Provinces Party cadre was assessed as low.9
In 1966, the senior cadre of the B Ra Province Unit were:
Commander (Chairman of the Command Committee): Mi Th (Nguyn Vit
Hoa/ Nguyn Vn Mi)10 then from mid-1966, ng Hu Thun.11
Deputy Secretary - Phm Vn Hy (from end of 1966 - ie the B Bin period).12
7

The primary agency that directed communist efforts in the South was the Peoples Revolutionary Party
the southern arm of the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP). The VWP managed the war in the southern half of
South Vietnam through its Central Office for South Vietnam - ie COSVN, reinstituted in January 1961 to
replace the X y Nam B (Nam B Regional Committee). Party structures controlled all geographic
entities, military units and front organisations. In the South, the umbrella front organisation was the
National Liberation Front of South Vietnam formed in December 1960. Subsequently, a Provisional
Revolutionary Government (PRG) was formed on 8 June 1969 - see United States Mission in Vietnam, The
Viet Cong Infrastructure, Saigon, June 1970 and The Party in 445 Battalion at Annex G.
8
For the postal/courier system including cover designators and LBNs, see footnotes 25 and 27.
9
A B Ra Province Report dated 13 March 1966 related political re-orientation training conducted in the
Province based on two COSVN resolutions including for 166 cadre, 226 Party Chapter Committee
members and 272 Party members at district level (Long t, Chu c, Xuyn Mc, Cn Gi, Cao Su and
B Ra). Chu c and Long t Districts were specifically cited: The fighting spirit of the District
Committee (Chu c) especially the comrades in charge of military affairs, was low. At Long t
District, the District Party Committee and cadre concentrated operations in all the easy areas. They only
operated in the difficult areas and distant areas once for two or three months. Criticism focused on lack of
discipline, poor performance, vainglory and other failings. In ideology, the most common weakness is
rightism and pacificism [sic]. CDEC Log 09-2048-66.
10
According to the 1991 and 2004 D445 Histories, Mi Th (Nguyn Vit Hoa ) was the commander of
the B Ra Province Unit in May 1963. Mi Th moved in mid-1966 to the Rng St/on 10 as its Chief
of Staff and later Commander.
11
ng Hu Thun was also known as t ng, V ng, and Thim. He had infiltrated into the South in
1961, and in 1965-1966 he served at Military Region 1/T.1 as the Chief of Operations and Training with the
grade of regimental XO CDEC Bulletin 257, Log 03-1253-66. He was transferred from T.1 to B Ra
on 30 June 1966 - CDEC 12-2459-66. The 5th VC Division History (2005) relates that on: 10 August 1966,
the Combined Battle Headquarters comprising Trn Minh Tm and Comrade ng Hu Thun
(Commander of the B Ra Unit) met to determine the fighting tactics to destroy an Australian battalion in
the Long Tn region. ng Hu Thun was commander of the B Ra Province Unit in January 1968 see
the 1991 D445 History, p.75. t ng became the Chief of Staff of Military Region 7 in January 1969
VCAT Item No.2310510003.
12
Phm Vn Hy (aka Phm Tin: b. 1931 d. 2010) was the Deputy Secretary/Political Officer of the B
Ra-Long Khnh Province Unit in the period 1967-1969, and Secretary in the period September 1969 to
June 1971 - see Phm Vn Hy, Tinh y B Ra-Long Khnh Vi Chin Trng Xun Lc - Long Khnh
(The B Ra-Long Khnh Province Committee and the Xun Lc-Long Khnh Battlefield) pp.161-164 in
Military Region 7 (Qun Khu 7), Chin Thng Xun Lc-Long Khnh (The Xun Lc-Long Khnh
Victory), Nh Xut Bn Tng Hp ng Nai, Bin Ha.

J-3

Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff: Nguyn t (Nguyn c Hot, Ba t).

H Vn Thun13: Chief of Staff.
Nguyn Kim Tro - Deputy Chief of Staff.
L Chnh/Chnh L (L nh Nhn)14 Political Officer (June 1966).
Nguyn Thanh Cn Assistant Political Officer.15
Nguyn Tng Assistant Political Officer.
A captured document provided tabular detail on all Vit Cng military personnel
under the command of the B Ra Provincial Unit (aka U2) for the first half of 1966
totalling 686 personnel.16 This figure possibly included the personnel of 445 Battalion
(see Annex C - D445 Battalion Strength Figures) and possibly the three District
companies. In mid-1966, a draft B Ra Province Unit document summarised its Party
membership status as 447 Party members in 32 Chapters and 406 Group members in 25
Group Chapters.17
In the following years, several re-organisations occurred that expanded the
geographic extent of B Ra.18 In late 1966, the Vit Cng Military Region 1 (T.1

13

In January 1967, H Vn Thun was noted as the COFS of the B Bin Province Unit (confirmed as at
December 1967) see CDEC Log 12-2532-66.
14
In February 1966 Chnh L (L nh Nhn) was transferred from U1/T.1 to B Ra Province as
Secretary of the Party Committee and political officer of the B Ra Province Unit. By August 1966, he
appears to have been replaced by Nguyn Thanh Cn see the following footnote. For Chn L (L nh
Nhn) as the secretary of the B Ra Province Party Committee in January 1968 - see the 1991 D445
History, p.75. Chnh L/L Chnh was the Secretary of the T.7 Region in 1970 and the Secretary of B Ra
Sub-Region Party Committee in August 1971, see: Annex Roster of a Number of High-Ranking Cadre of
T1 and T4 Military Regions Recorded from 1967 to Date VCAT Item No.2310510003. See also
following footnotes 20, 21 and 23.
15
Nguyn Thanh Cn b.1925, may have replaced Chnh L (L nh Nhn) see footnote above, as the
political officer by August 1966. Cn was noted as the senior member of the Political Section in August
1966 and had been an official member of the Party from August 1948. His status was ranked as a Battalion
Commander CDEC Log 09-2064-66. Cn was the commander of the Provinces Chin Thng
(Victory) Military Training School in October 1966 CDEC Log 12-2425-66.
16
Bi-Annual Report on Political Status of Cadre CDEC Log 09-1963-66 (Bulletin 1075, VCAT Item No.
F034601062693). The tables covered personnel from platoon leaders and above - 61; assistant platoon
leaders 33; section/squad leaders 65; assistant section/squad leaders 100; privates - 390 and
troops without rank - 39 totalling 686. Of this total, 224 were Party members 32.6 percent ; and 247
were Group (on ie Party Youth Group) members 36 percent.
17
Dated 20 June 1966, but the full text is not available - CDEC Log 09-2065-66. These figures (447 and
406) total 853 personnel as Party and Group members indicating a broader scope than 686 military
personnel listed in the Bi-Annual Report see footnote 15 above.
18
These changes are also outlined in Phm Vn Hy, Tinh y B Ra-Long Khnh Vi Chin Trng Xun
Lc-Long Khnh - The B Ra-Long Khnh Province Committee and the Xun Lc-Long Khnh
Battlefield in the document: Military Region 7 (Qun Khu 7), Chin Thng Xun Lc-Long Khnh (The
Xun Lc-Long Khnh Victory), Nh Xut Bn Tng Hp ng Nai, Bin Ha, 2004, pp.168-174. Phm
Vn Hy served as the Secretary of the B Ra-Long Khnh Province Party Committee d. 2010.

J-4

Eastern Nam B)19 was re-organised to comprise three provinces: Ty Ninh, Th Du

Mt and B Bin. B Bin then comprised the former B Ra Province together with
three districts of Bin Ha Province (Long Thnh, Trng Bom, and Bnh Sn) and
districts of Long Khnh Province (including nh Qun).20 In October 1967 preparatory
to the Tt 1968 Offensive, Military Region 1 was dissolved, and COSVN established nine
Sub-Regions most as sectors radiating from Si Gn the principal objective of the
1968 Offensive and General Uprising. B Ra and Long Khnh Provinces21 reportedly
became Sub-Region 9 and part of Sub-Region 4. In March 1968, Sub-Region 9 was reorganised ie it lost several districts22, and reverted to B Ra Long Khnh Province
(ie B Long) comprising three cities and six districts.23 Military Region 7 which
had reportedly existed earlier as a task organisation over Sub-Regions 4, 8 and 9, was
formally established in May-June 1968 and encompassed B Ra Long Khnh Province,
19

Military Region 1 was redesignated Military Region 7 (ng Nam B/Eastern Nam B) in mid-1968.
These military regions were subordinate to the B2 Front (Theatre) that encompassed about half the territory
and two thirds of the people in South Vietnam - ie from Qung c/Gia Ngha (inclusive) southward.
20
According to the ng Nai History (1986), L nh Nhn (see footnote 14) was appointed secretary of
B Bin Province and t ng (ng Hu Thun) was the Province Unit Commander with control over
445 Battalion and 240 (a Long Khnh-based company) - Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm ,
op.cit., 1986, p.135. A captured document listed the Partys Current Affairs Committee of B Bin Province
in late July 1967 as: Hai Nht, Hy, inh, Ngha and Lc. CDEC Log 06-2913-67
21
According to a political/labour history, in October 1967 B Ra-Long Khnh Province was reestablished (ie compare with footnotes 22 and 23) with its leadership as: Comrade L nh Nhn (Chn
L) as Secretary; Comrades Phm Vn Hy and V Vn Thit (Hai Nht/Nht) as Deputy Secretaries; and
Standing Committee members L Minh H, Nguyn Hoan/Hon, L Minh Nguyn, Phm Lc, and ng
Hu Thun (t ng). Comrade ng Hu Thun was the Province Unit Commander with Phm Lc,
Vn Chng (Ba Lin) and Nguyn Vn Hot (Ba t) as his Deputies. - Lin on Lao ng , Lch s
, op.cit., 2011, p.134 (footnote 156). V Vn Thit (Hai Nht) was reportedly killed in late January 1968
see Chamberlain, E.P., D445 op.cit., 1991, Annex L, p.14.
22
When established in October 1967, Sub-Region 9 comprised the districts of Bin Ha, Long Khnh and
B Ra Provinces - but in March 1968, Long Thnh District was separated from Sub-Region 9 and
integrated into Sub-Region 4; and Vnh Cu and Trng Bom Districts were separated from Sub-Region 9
and integrated in U1 (Sub-Region 9) to form the Bin Ha Province Unit.- Pike, D., Communist Territorial
Organization in the Eastern Nam Bo and Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh from 1966 to Date (78 pages), June 1973
VCAT Item No.2310510003.
23
B Ra City, Long Khnh City, Vng Tu City, Long t District, Chu c District, Xuyn Mc
District, Xun Lc District, Cao Su District, nh Qun District. Phm Lc was reportedly the Province
Unit commander, Phm Vn Hy was the Province Political Officer, and L Chnh/Chnh L/Chn L (L
nh Nhn) was the Province Party Committee Secretary. H Vn Thun was the Deputy Province
Commander and Chief of Staff. According to the ng Nai Monograph (2001): On 26-27 January 1968
preparatory to the Tt 1968 Offensive, a Command Committee was established for the B Ra-Long Khnh
Front. For B Ra Town and the districts of B Ra: L nh Nhn the Secretary of the Province
Committee was appointed Political Commissar (chnh y) and ng Vn Thun (t ng) the
Commander of the B RaLong Khnh Provincial Unit was made Commander (t lnh). For Long Khnh
Town: Phm Lc the Deputy Commander of the B RaLong Khnh Province Unit was made
Commander (t lnh) with L Sc Nghi of the B RaLong Khnh Standing Committee as Political
Commissar (chnh y). The towns and districts all established command committees led by their secretaries.
- a Ch ng Nai (ng Nai Monograph), Tp 3 (Vol 3) Chng 6 (Chapter 6), Nh Xut Bn Tng
Hp ng Nai, Bin Ha, 2001, footnote 21.

J-5

Bin Ha Province and Sub-Region 4.24 In 1969, as the B Ra-Long Khnh Province
Unit ie B Long, the Units subordinates also included Xun Lc District, nh Qun
District and Xun Lc City of Long Khnh Province; the border District of Cao Su
(covering the rubber plantations north of Ni t); and Vng Tu City (Cp).25
In early 1970, a rallier detailed the organisation and cadre of the Headquarters of
the B Ra-Long Khnh Province Unit.26 The span of the Province Units command in
mid-1970 was also illustrated in a captured document detailing new Letter Box Numbers
(LBNs) totalling 65.27 In late 1970, an Australian study included detail on the
organisation and activities of B Ra-Long Khnh (ie B-Long) Province.28 Following the
US and RVNAF cross-border operations into the Khmer Republic, in March 1971 the B
Ra-Long Khnh Province was merged into Sub-Region 4 and formed a new B Ra
Sub-Region.29 According to the 1991 D445 History: in May 1971, to implement the
24

On 3 April 1969, the Australian 5RAR battalion attacked and seized the hurriedly-evacuated Military
Region 7 Headquarters at YS 312984 and seized large quantities of documents Summary of Intelligence
Aspects , Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.146-69, Ni t, 26 May 1969. According to a Military
Region 7 Political Staff Communique (as on 12-B), in 1969 the Region fought 2,538 battles, killed
32,134 RVNAF including 2,701 Australians including one lieutenant colonel, 1 captain, six 1 st/2nd
lieutenants; and six Australian companies and 14 platoons were destroyed CDEC Log 05-1067-70. The
organisation of Military Region 7 was related in the Australian Army Training Information Letter (TIL)
No.14/70, Canberra, November 1970, Notice/Item 4, Part 3.
25
In 1966, the B Ra Province Letter Box Number (LBN) was 3642A CDEC Log 04-1347-66. A
comprehensive listing of LBNs as at December 1969 indicated that the subordinates of the B Ra-Long
Khnh Province (LBN 3245A and 61,202/ VT) included 445 Battalion (1st Battalion), 440 Battalion (2nd
Battalion), Sapper/Recce Unit (for the formation of C36 Company, see the 1991 D445 History footnote
254), Engineer Unit, Military School, PW Camp, Convalescence Camp, Group (on) 30 and several staff
sections see PLAF Administrative Units , VCAT Item No.2310907010, CDEC Log 05-2772-70.
LBNs changed from a five-digit system to a six digit system on 1 July 1970 for a June 1972 RVNAF
JGS analysis, see: VCAT Item No.2311005037.
26
Debrief of Hunh Vn Lin (rallier, former section commander 445 Battalion) - Appendix 1 to Annex
A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.56-70, Ni t, 26 February 1970.
27
The 65 LBNs comprised five for staff sections integral to the headquarters of the B Ra-Long Khnh
Province Unit (LBN 61,203 VT) and the remainder for external units and agencies eg: schools, camps,
445 Battalion (61.450/VT as 1st Local Force Battalion) and 440 Battalion (61.451/VT as 2nd Local
Force Battalion), on 30 with the bulk of LBNs for its District Units (most with seven sections:
administration, political, military intelligence, medical, ordnance, military postal section, and local unit) CDEC Log 08-1120-70; 08-1121-70 (VCAT Item No.2311005043). Another captured document listed 36
LBNs for B Ra-Long Khnh units, agencies, localities and staff sections (20) not including 445 or 440
Battalions - CDEC Log 07-1050-71.
28
Australian Army Training Information Letter (TIL) No.14/70, Canberra, November 1970, Notice/Item 4,
Part 3, pp.4-24 to 4-30.
29
B Ra Sub-Region comprised: B Ra City, Long Khnh City - and the districts of: Long t, Chu c,
Xuyn Mc, Xun Lc, Cao Su, nh Qun, Nhn Trch, Long Thnh, Duyn Hi and Th c. Nm Tin
was the chief of the political staff, and Vn Lin (a former D445 political officer) was an assistant field
grade political officer - Douglas Pike, Communist Territorial Organization in the Eastern Nam Bo SaigonCholon-Gia-Dinh from 1966 to Date (78 pages), June 1973 - VCAT Item No.2310510003. Through a
document captured on 16 June 1971, 1 ATF became aware of the formation of the B Ra Sub-Region 1
ATF INTSUM No.169/71, Ni t, 18 June 1971; and the Reorganisation of MR7, Annex C to 1 ATF
INTSUM No.176/71, Ni t, 25 June 1971. However, subsequently according to 1 ATF, the B Ra

J-6

COSVN policy for the new circumstances, COSVN Headquarters decided to disband
Military Region 5 and U130 and establish two Sub-Regions directly subordinate to
COSVN - ie the B Ra Sub-Region31 and the Th Bin Sub-Region. The ng Nai
History (1986) noted that: Chn L [sic] (L nh Nhn) was the Secretary of the SubRegion Committee, Trn Sn Tiu (Nam L) was Deputy Secretary and Commander,
and Phm Vn Hy as Deputy.32 In September 1972, Military Region 1 (T.1) was reestablished and B Ra Long Khnh Province restructured to comprise the provincial
towns of B Ra and Long Khnh and six districts.33
On 26 March 1974, the Route 2 Campaign began. The Campaign Headquarters
was established in an area of over-grown rubber to the east of Cm M village (Xun
Lc) and comprised Colonel L Vn Ngc of the Military Region Headquarters as
commander. Comrade Phm Vn Hy, the Secretary of B RaLong Khnh Province was
the political commissar (chnh y) and Comrade Phm Lc the Province Unit
Commander, was the deputy commander.34 On 16 May 1974, the B Ra Long Khnh
Province Unit reportedly held its sixth festive congress to greet the achievements of the
PLAF, with the participation of more than 70 representatives of outstanding units and
emulation combatants from all the units and battlefields in the Province.35
Sub-Region was not operational until August 1971; and comprised the districts of Xun Lc- nh Qun,
Chu c, Long t, Cao Su, Nhn Trch, Long Thnh, Th c, Cp B, Long Khnh City, and Duyn
Hi (Rng St) - Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM No.302/71, Ni t, 29 October 1971; and the 70-page
booklet: Headquarters 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF), Ba Ria Sub-Region, Vng Tu, 10 December
1971, p.6. That 1 ATF document detailed the formation and organisation of the Ba Ria Sub-Region (with
maps and organograms) including subordinate main-force military elements: the 33rd NVA Regiment, the
274th VC Regiment, 74A NVA Rocket Artillery Battalion, and the on 10 Water Sapper Battalion. The
33rd Regiment had joined the 5th Division in July 1968, - and was transferred to Military Region 7 in June
1970 see the 5th Division History (2005) and Chamberlain, E.P., The 33 rd Regiment op.cit., 2014.
30
U1 was a principal cover designator for the Bin Ha Province Unit. The B Ra Province Units
designator was U2, Bnh Dng Province was U4, Ty Ninh was U5, Long Khnh was U8, and Phc
Thnh was U9.
31
The 1991 D445 History included in a footnote at p.107: The B Ra Sub-Region comprised nine districts
(in the provinces of B RaLong Khnh, and Long Thnh, Duyn Hi, Th c) and the three towns of
Long Khnh, B Ra and Vng Tu). For the activation of the two Sub-Regions, see also CDEC Report 6
028 0970 71 covering JGS No.1217/TTM/2/TT204 dated 30 October 1971.
32
Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.164. The History also noted that in May 1971,
the 274th NVA Artillery Regiment allocated an artillery battalion to each of the Sub-Regions (Phn Khu).
The B Ra Sub-Region then controlled the 274th VC Regiment, the 33rd NVA Regiment and the 6th Sapper
Battalion. The B Ra Sub-Region was supported in the 1970s by its rear service organisation, Group 500
CDEC Item No.2311006049.
33
Long t (13 villages), Chu c (10 villages), Xuyn Mc (five villages), Xun Lc (five villages), Cao
Su (four villages and eight rubber plantations including Bnh Ba and Cm M) and nh Qun (seven
villages).
34
a Ch ng Nai (ng Nai Monograph - 2001), Tp 3 Chng 6, Nh Xut Bn Tng Hp ng
Nai, Bin Ha, 2001.
35
During more than a year of punishing the enemy for violating the agreement and nibbling at the
liberated areas, B RaLong Khnh Liberation Armed Forces put out of action 7,400 men, sank or set
ablaze 10 warships, destroyed 80 military vehicles, downed or damaged 10 planes, and recovered and
defended many liberated areas. - Liberation Radio, 27 May 1974.

J-7

In early April 1975, 445 Battalion together with K8 (Xun Lc), the 34th
Company, the 41st Company (both of Chu c), and the 207th Company (Cao Su
District), formed a force equivalent to a regiment and - led personally by Comrade Phm
Vn Cn (the deputy chief-of-staff of the Province Unit), joined the attack to liberate
Xun Lc from the south.36 On 9 April, 445 Battalion reportedly joined with 7th Division
elements to attack ARVN units at Sui Ct, and on 21 April attacked ARVN elements
withdrawing from Xun Lc down Route 2 through Phc Tuy Province. While the 3rd
NVA Division seized B Ra Town in late April 1975, 445 Battalion attacked Long in
and t . 445 Battalion then joined with the 3rd NVA Division for the drive on Vng
Tu following which a company from the Battalion participated in the liberation of the
island of Cn o in the South China Sea.
Post-War, in January 1976, Phc Tuy (B Ra) Province was incorporated into
ng Nai Province with the Province capital at Bin Ha. Under the ng Nai
Province Unit, 445 Battalion operated against enemy military remnants,
reactionaries, and counter-revolutionaries. In 1978, ng Nai Province established
the 746th Regiment (the inland regiment) based at B T (Xuyn Mc) comprising the
9th La Ng Regiment, 440 Battalion, and 445 Battalion. In June 1978, to counter Khmer
Rouge incursions on the South-West Border, a 300-strong 1st ng Nai Battalion was
formed and deployed to Sng B with 445 Battalion contributing a company as the
nucleus of the Battalion.37 From the end of 1978, ng Nai Province had
((successively)) established four battalions (with the titles: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th ng Nai
Battalions) As each battalion was set up, 445 Battalion contributed a company as its
nucleus.
In 1979, a ng Nai Forward Headquarters was formed in Kompong Thom
Province (Cambodia) commanding the 3rd, 5th, and 6th ng Nai Battalions. In 1982, the
ng Nai Forward Headquarters returned to Vietnam but its battalions were transferred
to Group 7701. In 1984, ng Nai Province deployed the 350-strong 445 Battalion
which was then operating as the Province independent mobile unit, to Kratie
(Cambodia) to assist our friends.
In November 1989, the ng Nai Province Military Headquarters disbanded the
7th, 8th, and 9th Battalions (of the 16th Regiment) and focused its forces on creating a
battalion titled 445 Battalion. Accordingly, the ng Nai Regiment had two battalions:
the 445th (stationed at H.20 in B Ra Town) and the 141st. In 1991, the ng Nai
Province Military Headquarters deployed 445 Battalion to be stationed in the Ni Th Vi
Mountains area (Chu Thnh). From August 1991 with the creation of B Ra Vng
36
1991 D445 History. Phm Vn Cn is also referred to as the Chief of Staff of the B Ra-Long Khnh
Province Unit commanding the Southern Front Headquarters at Cm M - see Mai Thanh Xun, Bt i
T , op.cit., 2004. He is possibly Phm Vn Cn b. Long Phc 1941, probationary Party member
1963, platoon 2ic/1st Company/445 Battalion in May 1965 CDEC Log 12-2394-66.
37
Translators Note: This - and the subsequent quoted information in this Annex J, are from the 2004 D445
History ie: L Chnh & Lu Thnh Lun (eds), Lch S Tiu an 445: on V Anh Hng Lc Lng
V Trang Nhn Dn 1965-2004 (The History of 445 Battalion: An Heroic Unit of the Peoples Armed
Forces 1965-2004), Nh Xut bn Qun i Nhn dn (Armed Forces Publishing House), H Ni, 2004.

J-8

Tu Province, 445 Battalion became subordinate to the B Ra Vng Tu Province

Military Headquarters.

Military Region 3 (Republic of Vietnam)

Annex K

THE HISTORY OF THE 5th INFANTRY DIVISION (1965-2005)

H Sn i Colonel (ed), Lch S S an B Binh 5 (1965-2005) The History of the
5th Infantry Division (1965-2005), The Peoples Army Publishing House, H Ni, 2005.1
Translators Note: The following translated extract comprises principally passages
in which Australian military forces are mentioned. For clarity, some Vietnamese terms
are included in double brackets ie (( )). The Australian Task Force (1 ATF) published
comprehensive analyses of their knowledge of the 5th VC Division in April and
November 1967.2 A map of Military Region 3 (MR3/III CTZ) is included at page 20.
The US imperialists regarded the Eastern Nam B battlefield as a critical front in
which to concentrate and crush the main force and the higher headquarters of the
Southern Liberation Forces. From the beginning of May 1965, top-notch units such as the
1st US Infantry Division, 11th Brigade3, heavy artillery units and the Royal Australian
Regiment4 had rushed out to hold their critical strategic bases in Bin Ha, Bnh Dng,
Ty Ninh and B Ra-Long Khnh. As the bridgehead joining the Central Region (Trung
B) with Eastern Nam B and Si Gn, the province of B Ra-Long Khnh was regarded
by the US and their puppets as an outer defensive line of critical importance to Si Gn.
Accordingly, they deployed a large number of their forces into the area. The 2nd US Field
Headquarters and the 173rd Airborne Brigade were stationed at Bin Ha and along Route

1
Translators Note: This is a revised 2005 edition - the first edition was published in 1995 ie: H Sn i Lieutenant Colonel (ed), Lch S S an 5 (History of the 5th Division), Nh Xut Bn Qua i Nha
Da (The Peoples Armed Forces Publishing House), H Ni, 1995. In November 2012, a history of the 5th
VC Division was related in a five-video series based on their 2005 History, see footnote 52. The 5th
Division veterans also have an association website: http://www.cuuchienbinhf5.vn/gioi-thieu . That site
includes K c ngi lnh S on 5 2010 (Memories of the 5th Division Soldiers - 2010). In December
2014, Military Region 7 and 5th Division veterans in H Ch Minh City published an article on the Battle of
Long Tn see the translation at Annex Q: Nguyn Vn Bch, Trn Phc Kch Long Tn (The Ambush
Battle at Long Tn), Cu Chin Binh (War Veterans) Thnh Ph H Ch Minh On-line, Thnh Ph H
Ch Minh (H Ch Minh City), 18 December 2014. A separate 5th NVA Division (Nng Trng 5) operated
in the northern coastal provinces of South Vietnam (under Military Region 5 in Ph Yn Province and north
of the c Lc Plateau). see VCAT Item No.21309140602, CDEC Log 07-3509-67. The presence of the
5th NVA Division in South Vietnam was formally included on the US MACV Order-of-Battle on 20
October 1966. However that Division was declared defunct in 1969, and US MACV retitled the 5th VC
Division as the 5th NVA Division in mid-late 1970.
2
Translators Note: Furner, J.O. Major (GSO2 Int, HQ 1 ATF), 5th VC Division, R569-1-16, HQ 1 ATF Ni t, 22 April 1967 and 15 November 1967.
3
Translators Note: This is probably a reference to the US 11 th Armored Cavalry Regiment. However that
formation did not arrive in Vietnam until September 1966 see detail on its movement from the US in
Annex N, pp.10-11.
4
Translators Note: The 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment (1RAR) and an APC troop arrived
in the Republic of Vietnam on 10 June 1965 and, based at Bin Ha, operated under the command of the
US 173rd Airborne Brigade until 1RARs withdrawal to Australia in mid-1966.

K-2

1; the 3rd Royal Australian Brigade [sic] was deployed at Ni t, B Ra5; the NZ
artillery battalion [sic] was at Gia Quy6; the headquarters of the Australian force was in
Vng Tu7; the 11th US Armored ((Cavalry)) Regiment at Sui Rm-Long Khnh; and
the puppet 18th Division in Xun Lc Town. Apart from the US main forces, the puppets
also reinforced their Civil Defence Force ((Bo An ie Regional Forces)) battalions, their
Peoples Self-Defence Corps ((Dn V - ie Popular Forces)) and created a system of
control points from southern Bnh Thun to Long Khnh-B Ra as a security belt for the
eastern gateways to Si Gn.
In the face of these acts by the US imperialists to up-scale the war, on 25 March
1965, the Executive Committee of the Central Party Committee met and advocated the
concentration of all the forces of the whole nation to prepare to oppose - and resolve to
defeat, the limited war strategy of the US imperialists.
From the beginning of November ((1965)), the forces of the 18th Division
coordinated with the Australian battalion at Ni t8, and the 52nd Ranger Battalion at B
Ra to conduct continuous sweeps along Route 51.9 The Division Headquarters gave the
5th Regiment10 the responsibility to organise forces to destroy the 52nd Ranger Battalion
which was conducting sweeping operations in the Long Thnh-B Ra area. After many
days of examining the enemy operations, the 5th ((275)) Regiment prepared its operation
using its 3rd Battalion reinforced with regimental firepower, to set an ambush on a
section of the road at Kim Hi hamlet, Phc Ha village (B Ra). From the
beginning of November, Comrade Nguyn Thi Bng ((Commander of the 5th /275th
Regiment)) together with the Battalion Commander Hai Phng, engaged directly in the
preparations for the battle on Route 51. On 4 November, the 3rd Battalion deployed from
its base at Sng Ray to Long Thnh for the engagement. After three days of difficult and
tiring movement and avoiding discovery by enemy elements patrolling from their posts,
on 7 November the 3rd Battalion reached its fighting positions at the base of the Ni Th
Vi mountains. The fighting strength of the Battalion at this time was still low a
company only had 40 weapons. The 1st Company (of the 1st Battalion) with a strength
of only 45, was attached to the 3rd Battalion as a reinforcement. As a consequence, the
problem required that the ambush had to be truly secret and a surprise if the intention to
Translators Note: Australian forces (1st Australian Task Force 1 ATF) were not based at Ni t until
early June 1966. The first two Australian infantry battalions based at Ni t were 5RAR and 6RAR.
3RAR did not arrive in Vietnam until December 1967.
6
Translators Note: A four-gun New Zealand 105mm artillery battery served with the 173rd Airborne
Brigade at Bin Ha from June 1965, and joined 1 ATF at Ni t in mid-1966. Gia Quy an extinct
volcano on the northern edge of t Town was developed as a base by 1 ATF and became known as
The Horseshoe see footnote 238 in the main text.
7
Translators Note: The Headquarters of the Australian Forces Vietnam (HQ AFV) was located in Si
Gn. The Australian Logistic Support Group/Logistic Support Force was located in Vng Tu.
8
Translators Note: As noted, there were no Australian forces based at Ni t until June 1966.
9
Translators Note: Route 15 from Vng Tu to Si Gn, was retitled Route 51 after 1975.
10
Translators Note: Also known as the 275th VC Main Force Regiment, its cover names included on 45,
on 54 (briefly), Q765, Q5, and A55). In June 1970, during its service in Cambodia, the 5 th Regiment
was significantly re-organised and became the 1st Regiment of the 5th Division.
5

K-3

completely destroy two enemy companies and their vehicles was to be achieved. After
a day of fierce fighting, the 3rd Battalion and the 1st Company of the 5th Regiment had
killed a large number of the enemy, inflicting heavy casualties on the 52nd Ranger
Battalion and a Phc Tuy Sector provincial company, destroyed two helicopters, 16
mechanized vehicles, a jeep, captured 6 enemy and seized 12 weapons and two radios.
We lost 16 comrades and a further 32 were wounded. 11
In January 1966, the US imperialists began their plan for the First Dry Season
Strategic Counter-Offensive. the Counter-Offensive was focused on Eastern Nam B
and Southern Trung B, with the first phase from January to March. In the B RaLong Khnh area, the enemy further developed the bases of the 18th Division, the 11th US
Armored ((Cavalry)) Regiment and the 1st Royal Australian Brigade [sic].
((In March 1966)) A combined headquarters of the 5th Division and the B Ra
Province forces met to discuss preparations to attack the base at i Xim and to shell the
Vng Tu airbase in order to destroy the US forces building their base and to attack the
Rangers training at i Xim.
With the enthusiastic assistance of the local guerrillas of the villages of Phc
Tnh and Long M, on the afternoon of 12 March the Divisions sapper company and its
RCL company together with the B Ra local company, deployed from the Minh m
base across Route 44, and - using motorized boats crossed the Lp River, and
concentrated east of the ng Dinh. At 8.30pm (2030hrs), we shelled the Vng Tu
airfield, and the sapper company led by Comrade Tng Vit Dng12 attacked the i
Xim training centre.
In only 45 minutes of combat, 138 rounds of 82mm mortar and 75mm RCL were
fired together with 70 other rounds, and 25 B40s. The artillery and sappers of the 4th
Regiment ((274th Regiment)) killed and wounded a large number of the enemy
including a senior officer ((of major to full colonel rank)), and destroyed nine enemy
aircraft. Our troops returned to their base without any casualties.13
11

Translators Note: The ambush was sited at Kim Hi hamlet, Phc Ha village (on Route 15, 10km
north-west of B Ra Town). That ambush failed however - as a disaffected VC (Comrade S) forewarned
ARVN officers, and the convoy stopped short of the ambush site. For detail, including a photograph, see
pp.3-4 in Annex O The 275th VC Main Force Regiment.
12
Translators Note: The biography of Tng Vit Dng the commander of the 70-strong sapper
company, claimed almost 300 Americans were killed at the airfield while watching an outdoor movie
including a colonel, and 37 aircraft were destroyed.
http://www.phahe.vn/Images/File/Tong%20Viet%20Duong.pdf .
13
Translators Note: For further detail of the attack on Vng Tu in mid-March 1966 reportedly including
preparatory training assistance by 445 Battalion, see footnote 87 in the 1991 D445 History. According to
the Minh m Base History (2006): On 22 March 1966, a force comprising Vit Cng sappers (240C
Company) and an artillery element from the 5th VC Division moved from the Minh m base and attacked
and shelled the Vng Tu airfield and the Ch Linh Rural Development Cadre Training Centre in Vng Tu
see Phm Ch Thn, Cn C Minh m, op.cit., 2006, pp.47-48. The Eastern Nm B Region citation for
the attack on Vng Tu shows the date of the attack as 12 March CDEC Log 09-1880-66; as does the
COSVN award of the Liberation Military Exploits Medal 3 rd Class CDEC Log 09-2189-66. According to
a rallier (hi chnh) from 240C Sapper Company, the unit incorporated a platoon from 445 Battalion and
had undergone training directed by Su Chnh - the commander of 445 Battalion, prior to the attack on

K-4

From May 1966, in the B Ra-Long Khnh area, the US and their puppets
mobilized large forces comprising the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division, the 3rd
Battalion14 of the Royal Australian forces, two armoured platoons of the 11th Regiment
and two artillery batteries of New Zealand artillery, to conduct a sweeping operation Operation Atdihoc ((ie Operation Hardihood)), to destroy the Long Phc War Zone
and to destroy the organs of the B Ra Province Committee and its local armed units.
In July 1966, the US military transferred responsibility for security control and
pacification in B Ra to Australian forces. Immediately after taking over from the
Americans, the Australian troops urgently developed two bases at Da Quy15 and Bu
Lng16, reinforced their numbers, and established a tactical combat headquarters of the
Royal Australian Regiment [sic] at Ni t with Brigadier Henderson as its
commander.17
To commence its program of building a base and undertaking pacification, from
the beginning of July 1966 with the support of three flights of aircraft and a force of
nearly 100 tropical counter-guerrilla warfare specialists, the Australian force in B Ra
mounted a sweeping operation around its base, and conducted ambushes in order to block
our communication routes and food movements.
With a tactic of secrecy to hide their ambushes, using stay-behind parties and
rapid movement - and applying maximum fire power from aircraft and artillery, the
Australian forces committed a very large number of serious crimes and created many
difficulties for the revolutionary movement in B Ra. On 15 July, the Australian 3rd [sic]
Battalion secretly attacked the base of the 445th Battalion18 at the L stream.19 In this
Vng Tu. The organisation of 240C Company and preparations for the attack on 13 March 1966 are
detailed in a USMACV report - VCAT Item No.F034600931151.
14
Translators Note: Operation Hardihood - to 18 June 1966, involved the recently-arrived Australian
5RAR infantry battalion. Only one battery of New Zealand artillery was in Vietnam at this time.
15
Translators Note: Sometimes also spelt as Gia Quy (see footnote 6) - an ancient volcano about 8
kilometres south-east of the 1 ATF base at Ni t, and termed The Horseshoe by the Australian forces.
16
Translators Note: This passage refering to Da Quy and Bu Lng also appears in the 1991 and 2004
D445 Histories. Bu Lng is highly likely a reference to an area where the Sng Cu stream crosses
Route 2 near An Ph hamlet just north of the 1 ATF Ni t base see footnote 239 in the main text. Far
less likely, it might refer to Bu Lun where a US Special Forces element established a camp (B-36) in
January 1967 to train Vietnamese Mobile Strike Force (MSF - Mike Force) elements. That camp was
located on Route 44 west of the Long Hi Mountains about a kilometre north of Long Hi village.
17
Translators Note: Following Operation Hardihood to secure the area, the Australian 5RAR occupied the
Ni t area on 2 June. Headquarters 1 ATF - commanded by Brigadier O.D. Jackson, arrived at Ni t
on 5 June 1966 (Brigadier W.G. Henderson took command in June 1970) the same error ie
Henderson/Herderson as the first 1 ATF commander, appears in both the 1991 and 2004 D445 Histories.
18
Translators Note: 445 Battalion is incorrectly described as a subordinate of the 5 th VC Division as
well as thousands of local guerrillas, in Ham, P., Vietnam The Australian War, op.cit., 2007, p.182. For
the subordination of 445 Battalion ie under the Province Unit until early 1975, see Annex J Higher
Headquarters.
19
Translators Note: For the Australian account, see McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., pp.280-281 - at Sui
Bang; Australian forces (B/6RAR) suffered two KIA; the Vit Cng reportedly suffered 6 KIA
including possibly the commander of the 1st Company of D445. A contemporary report by Vn Lin
the D445 Battalion political officer, shows the date of the engagement as 25 July 1966 see Annex H.

K-5

first engagement, we lacked tactical experience against the Australians and although the
cadre and soldiers of the 445th Battalion fought very bravely, they were unable to destroy
many of the enemy. Rather, the unit suffered heavy casualties from the firepower of the
enemys artillery.
At this time in Long Khnh, the US 11th Armored ((Cavalry)) Regiment20
mounted continuous operations to clear the areas of Cm M, Ngi Giao, Tc Trng, and
nh Qun, and US aircraft concentrated heavy fire into the rear service installations of
Group 8421 and our bases in the east and west of Route 2.
At the beginning of March 1966, a cadre responsible for field operations on the
Divisions headquarters staff surrendered to the enemy.22 All 20 troop sites and rear
service areas of the Division were pin-pointed and destroyed. A number of plans and
tactical projects of both the 4th ((ie 274th)) Regiment23 and the 5th ((ie 275th)) Regiment
were revealed and could not be progressed. In response, the Division Headquarters
ordered the units to urgently move their bases and warehouses and actively defend the
storage areas and food supplies of the 84th Rear Services Group in the areas east and west
of Route 2. At the same time, they were to continue to achieve their Wet Season tasks,
and to coordinate with the B Ra local armed forces and attack the Australian military
forces that were extending their control and replacing the US forces in advancing their
pacification plans in B Ra.

Translators Note, the armoured vehicles of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment did not arrive at Vng
Tu until 7-10 September 1966, and the Regiment was not established at its Blackhorse base at Long Giao
south of Xun Lc Town in Long Khanh Province until September/ October 1966. For detail of the
Regiments movement from its US base to Vietnam, see Annex N, pp.10-11.
21
Translators Note: Group 84 (on 84 - ie the 84th Rear Services Group aka Sub-Region E)
commanded by L Minh Thnh, had a strength in mid-1966 of about 1,100 see CDEC Log 12-1786-66.
For the organisation of 84 Rear Services Group, see VCAT Item No.F034600742556, CDEC Log 02-152067; and CDEC Logs 04-2096-67, 09-1390-66,12-1837-66, 02-2033-67 and 12-1854-66. See also: Annex B
to 1 ATF Intelligence Review No.2, Ni t, 29 October 1966; and Furner, J.O. Major, 5th VC Division,
R569-1-16, HQ 1 ATF - Ni t, 15 November 1967 that includes data on the 84th Rear Services Group
base areas 300 -303 inclusive principally located in the My To Mountains region in the far north-east of
Phc Tuy Province and astride the Long Khnh Province and Bnh Tuy Province borders.
22
Translators Note: This is a reference to North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Lieutenant Colonel (or Major)
L Xun Chuyn the Assistant Chief of Staff and Chief of Operations of the 5th Division (b.1929
reportedly a former Commander of the 66th Regiment/304th NVA Division). Chuyn left Headquarters 5th
Division in March 1966 to convalesce at Sui Ket (Hai c District, Bnh Thun Province) but was in
contact with senior cadre of the 5th VC Division until late July, ie before surrendering on 2 August 1966 in
Bnh Thun. He provided considerable information on the organisation, personalities and activities of the 5th
VC Division in particular, see: CMIC Report 110, CDEC Log 08-029-66, VCAT Item No.23130033016.
An organisational chart of the 5th VC Division and the 274th and 275th Regiments in 1966 is included at
pp.83-85 in Burstall, T., Vietnam The Australian Dilemma, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia,
1993 and appears to be based on the debriefing of L Xun Chuyn.
23
Translators Note: Also known as the 274th VC Main Force Regiment (cover designators included: Q764,
on (Group) 94, on 49, and Q4).
20

K-6

In June 1966, the 4th ((274th)) Regiment24 received orders to move to the Chu
Pha-Hc Dch area with the task of attacking the enemy and defending the supply areas of
Group 84.25 The 5th ((275th)) Regiment moved from Long Khnh to east of Route 2 to
protect the offices of the Divisional Headquarters and to prepare its forces to attack the
Australian forces developing their base at Ni t-B Ra . Although the units of the
Division had suffered losses, faced difficulties - and had to change their missions and
combat zones, they all moved urgently to achieve their tasks.26 In August 1966, the 4th
((274th)) Regiment organised an ambush of mechanized vehicles on Route 51 ((Route
15)), destroying seven military vehicles, 50 enemy, shooting down an aircraft27 and
seizing two weapons.
The 5th ((275th)) Regiment immediately studied the situation and prepared forces
to attack the Australian military at Ni t.28 In August 196629, the leadership cadres
Translators Note: In June 1966, the total strength of the 274th Regiments three infantry battalions was
1,128 (ie: D1/800 Battalion/H12 411 personnel; D2/265 Battalion/H14 401; D3/308 Battalion/H16
316) CDEC Log 09-1854-66.
25
Translators Note: McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.249 relates that in October 1966, the diary
of Colonel Nguyn Nam Hng, the deputy commander of the 274th Regiment was captured that indicated
the 274th Regiment had planned to ambush Australian troops near the Ni Ngh feature (YS 395725) in
early June 1966. For further detail on Nguyn Nam Hngs diary, see the following footnote 34.
26
Translators Note: For the agreed US and RVNAF assessment of the 5th VC Division and its regiments
including its organisation and senior personnel as at mid-August 1966, see CDEC Log 8-0805-66, VCAT
Item No.F034600421687. For the 275th Regiments engagements at ng n in mid-June 1966, see
following footnotes 34 and 52.
27
Translators Note: Possibly the US observation aircraft shot down on 8 June 1966 see ONeill, R.J.,
Vietnam Task, op.cit., pp.48-49. For detail on the 274th Regiments activities against Route 15 in the first
half of 1966, see Annex N.
28
Translators Note: As noted, in its Operational Report for the period ending 31 July 1966, the US II
FFV HQ at Long Bnh had assessed: it appears that the 5th VC Division has shifted its attention to the 1st
ATF north of Phuoc Le ((ie Ba Ria Town)) The probable location of the 274th and 275th Regiments in
Phuoc Tuy Province indicates a possible threat to the 1 st ATF. It is likely that small VC reconnaissance
and intelligence groups are maintaining surveillance of the 1st ATF while the main force regiments are
awaiting a suitable opportunity to attack. The 274 th Regiment, the 860th (LF) Battalion ((ie D445
Battalion)), and possibly the 275th Regiment may attack the 1st ATF in Phuoc Tuy Province. - HQ II FFV,
Operational Report for the Quarterly Period ending 31 July 1966, Long Bnh, 15 August 1966.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/388151.pdf . Subsequently however, the 1 ATF INTSUM of 9 August
significantly understated the enemy in, and adjoining, the Province ie: Within or immediately adjacent to
1ATF TAOR, the following VC forces are operating: approx 100 guerrillas, 2 district companies, 1
provincial battalion. 1 ATF, INTSUM No.69, Ni t, 9 August 1966.
29
Translators Note: In August 1966, the Headquarters of the 5 th VC Division reportedly moved from its
base at Sui u (in the vicinity of YS 780820) to a location three kilometres to the south in the vicinity
of YS 790784 see the debrief of rallier Senior Lieutenant Nguyn Vn Phng at CMIC 1521, CDEC Log
14-010-67. Prior to the commencement of II FFVs Operation Toledo on 10 August in south-eastern Long
Khnh Province, the US 173rd Airborne Brigades signals intelligence (SIGINT) Direct Support Unit - the
404th Radio Research Detachment, reported the principal radio transmitter of the 5th VC Division
Headquarters at YS 6779. Subsequently, based on SIGINT, US armed helicopters attacked reported
locations of the 5th VC Division Headquarters in north-eastern Phc Tuy on 13 August at YS 686736. On
18 August ie in Phase II of Operation Toledo, 173rd Brigade ground elements were operating south of Gia
Ray (YT 6312) and north of the My To Mountains. See: 173rd Airborne Brigade, Combat Operations
24

K-7

studied the Australian target at Ni t - B Ra. Comrade Trn Minh Tm30 - the Deputy
Divisional Commander, personally led a group to Long Tn to study the battle zone and
the Australian activities and to discuss a combat plan with the B Ra local armed
forces. After several days of observing Australian attacks and sweeping operations around
Long t and t 31, on 10 August 1966, the Combined Battle Headquarters
comprising Trn Minh Tm and Comrade ng Hu Thun (Commander of the B Ra
Unit)32 met to determine the fighting tactics to destroy an Australian battalion in the Long
Tn region.33
To achieve the battle plan, we used the 5th ((275th)) Regiment34 and the 445th B
Ra Battalion to conduct an ambush on a stretch of Route 52 in the rubber area of Long
After Action Report Lessons Learned: Operation Toledo, 15 December 1966. :
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/510789.pdf.
30
Translators Note: Trn Minh Tm (aka Nm Tam) was the founding commanding officer of the 4th
Regiment (274th VC Regiment) see also footnote 125 in the 1991 D445 History. The defectors Lieutenant
Colonel L Xun Chuyn (see the preceding footnote 22) and Senior Lieutenant Nguyn Vn Phng
(rallied March 1967 see footnote 29) noted Lieutenant Colonel Nm Tam as the Chief of Staff of the
5th Division and Chuyn described Tm as: young and resolute, drinks and argues, has no capability as
far as tactics and staff work. According to this 5th Division History (2005), Tm was the NVA/VC
battlefield commander at Long Tn in August 1966 and, as a Colonel (Thng T), Tm was later
appointed acting (ie quyn) commander of the 5th Division in October 1968. Tm is also noted in a major
Vietnamese account of the War as leading the 5th Division elements at Long Tn see: Nguyn Vn Minh
Colonel (ed), Lch s Khng chin chng M cu nc -Tp 4 (Vol 4), Nh Xut Bn Chnh Tr Quc Gia,
H Ni, 1999.
31
Translators Note: 1 ATFs principal operation at this time was 5RARs Operation Holsworthy (5-18
August 1966) - acordon and search operation reclaiming the village of Bnh Ba and opening Route 2.
See: ONeill, R.J., Vietnam Task, op.cit., pp.66-83, and: Statement of Events Annex B to 1 ATF Combat
After Action Report OP Holsworthy (File R723-15), 9 September 1966, p.3 AWM95, 1/4/12 Part 2.
32
Translators Note: Referred to both by his nickname t ng and ng Hu Thun in both the 1991
(footnote 127) and 2004 (footnote 301) D445 Histories.
33
Translators Note: The planning and conduct of the battle at Long Tn is also described in the 1991 D445
History at pp.62-65 - ie see Chamberlain, E.P., D445 2011, pp.39-47 and see also the extract at
Annex M. The account of the Battle of Long Tn in the 2004 D445 History is less detailed and cites the
writings of the late English author and academic Dr John L. Pimlott (1948-1997). Note that this 5th Division
History (2005) does not suggest that an attack was planned against the 1 ATF base at Ni t.
34
Translators Note: As noted earlier, the 5th Regiment was also known as the 275th Regiment (see Annex O
for a listing of the Regiments designators). The 1991 edition of the D445 Battalion History incorrectly
reports the 4th Regiment - ie the 274th Regiment, as being involved in the Battle at Long Tn (ie instead of
the 5th/275th Regiment). Regarding the 274th Regiment, the 2ic of the 274th Regiment Nguyn Nam Hng,
noted in his diary on 28 September 1966: the 5th Regiment attacked Ni t, 600 Australians were
killed and 1 Australian battalion exterminated CDEC Log 11-1259-66. Hng also related that for most
of August and September, the ((274th)) Regiment was transporting rice. For a three-page commentary on
Nguyn Nam Hngs diary, see also 1 ATF, Troop Information Sheet No.31, Ni t, 13-19 February
1967. Hngs statement and the 5th VC Division History conflict with the claims including by Nguyn
Vn Kim (Commander D445, 1968-1969), that the 274th Regiment was tasked in mid-August 1966 to
interdict any US forces that might move south on Route 2 from Long Khnh Province to relieve Australian
forces during the Long Tn battle see Kims statement in Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan
The True Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993. For a discussion of the 274th Regiments non-involvement in the
Battle of Long Tn, see Annex N. According to a 275th Regiment POW, the 275th Regiment had suffered

K-8

Tn over a length of two kilometres.35 The 2nd Battalion of the 5th Regiment and a
company of the 445th Battalion - reinforced with B40s and a 57mm RCL, were positioned
in the south and the north-west of the T-junction of the B Road36 and Route 52 with the
task of blocking the forward elements of the enemys formation. The 3rd Battalion37 was
deployed about 800 metres to the north-west of Route 52 with the task of attacking into
the main killing zone at the Tht Pagoda.38 The 1st Battalion was reinforced with two
70 casualties during its ambush on the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) column at the ng n
Junction ((ie the junction of Route 1/Route 333, about 15 kilometres west of Xun Lc Town at YT
630085)) on 30 [sic] June 1966 - after which it withdrew to its base camp in the Rng L area (in the
vicinity of YT 7610 Xun Lc District, Long Khnh Province) to resupply and on approx. 10 August
1966, the Regiment went to the area of t Mountain in t District (vicinity YS 4867) before the
Regiment ambushed elements of the Australian Army on approx 17 August. For a discrete summary
history of the 275th VC Main Force Regiment, see Annex O.
35
Translators Note: When interviewed by Dr I. McNeill on 7 September 1990, NguynThanh Hng (the
operations officer of the 5th VC Division see footnotes 37 and 48) and Nguyn Vn Kim (the 445
Battalion commander in 1967-69, interviewed in June 1988) asserted that only one battalion of the 275th
Regiment was involved at Long Tn and, together with D445 Battalion, the combined force only totalled
700-800 men McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, pp.367-368.
36
Translators Note: Literally ng B, which could also perhaps mean the ox track.
37
Translators Note: The 275th Regiments 3rd Battalion was allocated the killing ground at Long Ta
see also Annex O. The 3rd Battalion was previously the NVAs 605th Battalion and had initially been raised
as the 4th Battalion of the 32nd Regiment in Thanh Ha (North Vietnam) on 15 April 1965 of its 500
members, two-thirds were Southerner regroupees (soon joined by 200 Northern recruits). On 10
September 1965, the Battalion was redesignated D605 and began its 2,000km/112-day infiltration on 13
September see MACV CDEC Bulletin 3975, 19 April 1966. A major Vietnamese history of the War
incorrectly cites the 6th Battalion of 275 Regiment ie rather than the 3rd Battalion, and a company of
445 Battalion destroying a company of Australian soldiers - Nguyn Vn Minh Colonel (ed), Lch s
Khng chin, Tp 4, op.cit., 1999. The Australian Official History notes that 1 ATF estimated that the 275th
Regiment of three battalions ((had been)) reinforced by at least one battalion from the North Vietnamese
Army together with D445 Battalion. - McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351. According to the
defector NVA Lieutenant Colonel L Xun Chuyn (see footnote 22), the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Regiment
was fairly good because it consisted entirely of North Vietnamese who had been recalled to active duty
and infiltrated into the South. At the Battle of Long Tn, the 3rd Battalion may have been commanded by
NVA Captain Nguyn Vn c (its inaugural commander - Nguyn Vn Thiu, had been killed in action in
June 1966). V Ngc Khuyn - the Battalions political officer at Long Tn, may also have commanded the
Battalion at the Battle. Note however, that according to NguynThanh Hng (footnotes 41 and 48): he
((Hng)) established his headquarters ((a forward element of Headquarters 5th Division)) in the small
deserted hamlet of Phc Hng (about two kilometres east of the Long Tn battle area YS 495670) and
had with him there the third battalion of the 275 th Regiment as a reserve element, while the other two
battalions were forming a screen to the east and north of the plantation. - Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns,
Book 2, op.cit., 1990, p.99. See also Annex O The 275th Regiment.
38
Translators Note: No temple or pagoda appears on any Australian survey maps or battle sketches of the
Long Tn area. However, the Long t District History (1986) and the t District History (2006)
noted that: In 1967, the women of Long M and Hi M villages demonstrated against the enemy demanding to bury the remains of 36 soldiers of the 5 th Division who had been killed at Cha ((Pagoda))
Tht. for the Long t District History (1986), see: Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit., 2011, Annex
L, p.13 and footnote 36. While it is possible that these were the recovered remains of 275th Regiment and
D445 soldiers killed at the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966, it is almost certain that these were the
remains of VC soldiers killed at L Gm on 20/21 March 1967 in the area of the Tht Pagoda near Hi

K-9

companies from the 445th Battalion and deployed about 800 metres to the north of Route
52 with a rear blocking task and the role of coordinating with the 3rd Battalion to destroy
the enemy in the decisive area of the battle. To guarantee support for the battle, we
deployed a transport element comprising 80 comrades from the V Th Su Company39
and a forward surgical team from the Division led by Comrade Hai Phong and Comrade
Nguyn nh Knh in order to directly support the 5th ((275th)) Regiment. On 15 August,
all preparatory tasks to conduct the battle had been completed.
Continuously through 16 and 17 August, the local forces and the Divisions
reconnaissance teams fired mortars40 into Ni t and placed mines to block Route 52, in
order to force the Australians to mount a sweeping operation to clear the area of Long
Tn so that we could destroy them. At 2 ((am)) on 17 August, the elements of the 5th
((275th)) Regiment had deployed into their forward positions ready to launch the attack
and strike the enemy.
On 18 August, from 6am to 3pm, our undetected observation element noted signs
that the enemy was organizing a sweeping operation. The battlefield commander41, Trn
M village (now Phc Hi village). Possible sites for the Tht Pagoda associated with the Battle of Long
Tn are YS 477659 or 480673. See also Annex O - The 275th Regiment, footnotes 65 and 88.
39
Translators Note: V Th Su of t , was a female Vit Minh fighter imprisoned by the French and
executed on Cn o island in 1952 see the Long t History (1986), translated extracts at Annex L to
Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit., 2011. This support unit may have been a regular rear service
element of the Province Unit - or composed of youth from the Thanh Nien Xung Phong (Assault Youth) - ie
the C.12-65 Bnh Gi Victory Assault Youth Unit.
40
Translators Note: See also the 1991 D445 History, footnote 146. The 1 ATF Commanders Diary for
August 1966 described the impact on 17 August of 63 VC 82mm mortar bombs and five 70mm howitzer
rounds based on crater analysis Headquarters 1 ATF Commanders Diary, August 1966 see also
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.305 that relates the 22-minute shelling that began at 0243hrs on
17 August. The shelling comprised 63-67 82mm mortar rounds, 23 75mm RCL rounds, and five 70mm
howitzer rounds (probably from an obsolescent Japanese Model 92 howitzer). 1 ATF suffered 24 wounded
two seriously. On 17 August, patrols from B Company of 6RAR found the firing site of the Vit Cng
75mm RCLs (at YS 468655) with 23 abandoned 75mm shell cases, bits of bodies and blood-stained
clothing, and an ox cart destroyed by 1 ATFs artillery counter-battery fire. - Mollison, C.S., Long Tan and
Beyond Alpha Company 6 RAR in Vietnam 1966-67, Cobbs Crossing, Woombye, 2006, pp.124-125.
Mortar base-plate positions were also found in the vicinity of YS 459671. Post-War, a Vit Cng medic Chung, related that three of the Vit Cng RCL party from the 275th Regiment were killed in the Australian
artillerys counter-fire and were buried nearby. - Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan The True
Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993. The detail of the shelling was later included in a Summary of Enemy Artillery
Action as Figure 1 to the 1 ATF Combat Operations After Action Report Operation Smithfield, R723-15, December 1966 (that included the discovery of 23 expended VC 75mm RCL cartridges at YS 469688). 1
ATFs Artillery Intelligence Section would presumably have assessed that such indirect fire weapons were
not held by any VC local force unit.
41
Translators Note: Nguyn Thanh Hng (born 1932, Hi M, Phc Tuy - aka Hai Hng) an operations
staff officer of the Headquarters 5th Division, has claimed that it was left to him to plan the attack at Long
Tn and that he was the on-site commander throughout. Hng related that he chose a tactic that he
described as the luring of the tiger from the mountain, and he also claimed to have established the 5th
Division Forward Headquarters near the Long Tn battlefield in Phc Hng hamlet. see T. Burstalls
interview with Nguyn Thanh Hng in Bin Ha City on 10 November 1987 pp.99-112 in Burstall, T., A
Soldier Returns , op.cit., 1990 and the preceding footnotes 35 and 37. See also Dr I. McNeills

K-10

Minh Tm, concluded that the enemy did not have the capability to launch a sweeping
operation on 18 August - so he directed the observation element to temporarily withdraw
to the 2nd Battalion position42, and ordered the forward attack elements to continue to
maintain their formation. However, at 3.30pm, the 2nd Battalions reconnaissance cell
reported that an enemy company had secretly advanced to within 650 metres of the
Battalions battlefield. About 1.5 kilometres to the rear, there was a force of about two
((Australian)) companies with four tanks/armoured vehicles43 that were advancing along
Route 52 towards the battlefield.
We waited until the enemy was close and only opened fire when they were 10
metres from our fighting trenches.44 Eight of the enemy were killed on the spot. The
battle became fierce with the Australians exploiting the firepower of two armoured
vehicles to shoot thick-and-fast into the assault formation of the 2nd Battalion. At that
moment, at the reconnaissance companys position, its commander L Hu Ngha,
bravely advanced into the hail of enemy fire and used a B40 to destroy the leading
armoured vehicle. This created the opportunity for the Regiments recoilless rifle to
destroy completely the second armoured vehicle. The leading assault elements of the 2nd
Battalion engaged in close combat with the Australian troops. We used light machine
guns and B40 anti-armour weapons and the Australians withdrew in panic into the edge
of the rubber, stepping on the mines45 that we had planted and abandoning the bodies of

September 1990 interview of Hng in McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, pp.365-371; and Sketch 16.1
opposite p.327. Hngs claims were repeated in the Legislative Council of Western Australia: The Viet
Cong battle plan was straightforward enough. It was master-minded by a senior officer of the 5th Viet Cong
Division, Colonel [sic] Nguyen Than [sic] Hong, who directed that the VC attacking force was to approach
the Australians at Nui Dat undetected and then fire mortars and recoilless rifle shells into their base. It was
calculated that this action would lure the Australians out of their strong defensive positions to look.
Apology to Vietnam Veterans, moved by the Hon Frank Hough, 6 December 2001. Nguyn Thanh Hng
was subsequently appointed Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of the 5 th Division in 1968, and served
as the Divisional Commander in 1979-1980 in Cambodia, before retiring in 1984. See also Annex O The
275th Regiment, footnotes 48, 49 and 51 including his visit to Australia (Kuranda) in September 1990.
42
Translators Note: This implied criticism of Trn Minh Tm does not appear in either 1991 or the 2004
D445 Battalion Histories. See also the following at p.12 ie: We had committed an error in our observation
of the enemy and in arranging our formations to start to attack from a far distance.
43
Translators Note: Literally: xe tng-thit gip. The Australian tanks (xe tng) ie 52-tonne
Centurions, did not arrive in Vietnam until 1968. The initial Australian force at Long Tn the 105-strong
D Company of 6RAR (infantry) with a three-man artillery observer team, did not have any integral or
accompanying/supporting armoured vehicles. Australian armoured personnel carriers (APCs - M113A1,
11-tonne) - carrying infantry reinforcements, only arrived at Long Tn towards the end of the Battle at
approximately 1850hrs (ie 6.50pm) on 18 August 1966.
44
Translators Note: A contemporary Australian account of the battle is in 1st Australian Task Force
Vietnam, Combat Operations After Action Report Operation Smithfield, R723-1-5, December 1966; and
the post-War Australian Official History account is in McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, pp.305-375.
Those records indicate that the Battle commenced at 4.08pm on 18 August 1966.
45
Translators Note: In December 2014, a Vietnamese on-line media article - similar to the text of the 1991
D445 History, related that: the fleeing Australian soldiers fled to the edge of the rubber plantation and
stumbled into the minefield that we had laid, and tens were killed and many were wounded. - Nguyn Vn

K-11

almost ten Australians. After 30 minutes of combat, the 2nd Battalion had inflicted heavy
casualties on an enemy platoon.
Meanwhile at the 3rd Battalion and the 1st Battalion ((positions)), our assault
troops moved towards the sounds of the battle but at that time there was very heavy rain
and the forward elements encountered difficulties.46 The enemy began to fire artillery,
and their rear elements split into two wings along the axis of Route 52 to concentrate on
striking and rolling up the 2nd Battalion. At 4pm, the 3rd Battalion and an element of the
1st Battalion attacked the enemy in the decisive area of the battlefield. The Australian
troops regrouped and resisted while calling intense artillery fire onto our vanguard
elements and the blocking elements of the 1st Battalion and the 445th Battalion. At the
same time, the firepower of the enemys armoured vehicles was decisively targeted
against the 3rd Battalion elements.
At 4.30pm, the situation of our leading elements was difficult due to the enemys
artillery and firepower that had blocked us, and we were unable to achieve an
encirclement of the enemy battalion. The 1st Battalion and the 3rd Battalion suffered high
Bch, Trn Phc Kch Long Tn (The Ambush Battle ), op.cit., 18 December 2014 see Annex Q
for a full translation of the article. No Australian account of the Battle refers to NVA/VC mines.
46
The Australian Official History notes the monsoon broke at 4.08 p.m, reducing visibility to 50 metres
and turning the ground into red mud. McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.318. The effect of the
heavy monsoonal rain is mentioned in the 1991 D445 History see Annex M p.9 ie: it was difficult for our
infantry and artillery to support one another. Rain began to come down in buckets; and also in the 2004
D445 History: due to heavy rain see footnote 276. A late 2014 Vietnamese article noted: our
troops had moved forward in a coordinated manner towards the sounds of the gunfire, but at that time the
heavens opened up with very heavy rain, and our attacking columns had difficulties in deploying. see
Annex Q, footnote 15. The 1 ATF After Action Report related: Weather: The battle was fought in a heavy
monsoonal rain storm which reduced visibility to thirty metres or less during the late afternoon and early
evening. - 1st Australian Task Force Vietnam, Combat Operations After Action Report Operation
Smithfield, R723-1-5, December 1966, sub-par 9.e. The 6RAR After Action Report noted that: All
communications by voice and radio were very difficult because of the noise ((from APCs and artillery fire))
and the very heavy rain. Townsend, C. Lieutenant Colonel, 6 RAR After Action Report Operation
SMITHFIELD: 18-21 August 1966, Nui Dat, 7 September 1966. Major H.A. Smith - the D
Company/6RAR commander on the battlefield, wrote: Visibility was about 150 metres but fell to 100
metres when the heavy rain started about 1730hrs. Major H.A. Smith, D Coy After Action Report:
Operation Smithfield - as an enclosure to the preceding 1 ATF After Action Report, and also as Annex E to
the 6RAR After Action Report. Describing the intensity of the rain, Lieutenant Geoff Kendall
commanding 10 Platoon/D Company, later stated: When I say rain it rained like it rains in Vietnam in
the afternoon. It absolutely started to pour monsoonal rain. - McAulay, L., The Battle of Long Tan,
op.cit., 1987, p.55. Second Lieutenant David Sabben commanding 12 Platoon D/6RAR at the Battle, later
described the mud mist and the splash effect of the heavy monsoonal rain on the red laterite soil as
creating a red mist up to 50 cm high and thick enough lower down to hide a person laying on the ground
. The soldiers uniforms were also stained red ((from the mud)) adding to the camouflage effect. The
Battle of Long Tan (Powerpoint presentation), The ANZAC Day Commemoration Committee of
Queensland. www.anzacday.org.au/history/vietnam/longtan.pps . The meteorological forcecast for August
1966 was: Southwest monsoon in full force; 22 days of precipation in August including six with
thunderstroms; mean daily maximum temperature 87 Fahrenheit, mean daily minimum 74 Fahrenheit;
relative humidity 86-88 percent; light data sunset on 18 August at 1911hrs, EENT at 1958hrs. 5RAR,
August Climatic Summary of III Corps, An Phu, 2 August 1966 (AWM95, 7/5/7 Part 1).

K-12

casualties. At 5pm, the battlefield headquarters ordered our units to withdraw to the
regrouping position.47
This first battle was organised as a mobile ambush to destroy the Australian force
a new combat objective on the battlefield. We had committed an error in our
observation of the enemy and in arranging our formations to start to attack from a far
distance because of this, we were unable to surround and destroy the enemy battalion.
Our forces suffered a large number of casualties 32 were killed and 60 comrades were
wounded.48 However, the battle against the Australians at Long Tn had a very important
significance: it was the first time that we had destroyed an Australian company49 on the
47

Translators Note: After the battle, the 275th Regiment elements reportedly moved back to the L Jungle
base camp ie Rng L area (vicinity of YT 7610 Xun Lc District, Long Khnh Province). The
Regiment remained in camp for a week after which the entire Regiment minus the 1st Battalion, moved to
Bnh Thun Province in search of rice and returned to the L Jungle base camp in early November
1966. as related by NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting (Assistant Political Officer, 3rd Battalion (J-3), 275th
Regiment), captured on 26 February 1969.
48
Translators Note: The term Our forces might not encompass 445 Battalion ie rather only the 5th
Division elements. A 275th Regiment POW (Captain Ting see the footnote above) declared the
Regiment ((ie 275th)) sustained over 200 casualties including both KIA and WIA. The 1991 D445 History
p.65 relates: The 5th Division lost 30 comrades killed and 60 wounded. This statement is also cited in
Ham, P., Vietnam, op.cit., 2007, pp.246-247. McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351 - states that a
diary of the enemy commander at Long Tan ((Nguyn Thi Bng - also known as t Thi, Commander of
the 275th Regiment)) which was subsequently captured listed his losses as 500. McNeill, I., To Long Tan,
op.cit., 1993, p.363 (the Official History) also states that for the battle at Long Ta : The official 5 Division
casualty figure was 200 killed. In mid-1988, a former D445 Battalion commander (from late 1967/early
1968 to 1969) Lieutenant Colonel Nguyn Vn Kim (interviewed by Dr I. McNeill), stated that D445
casualties both dead and wounded, were approximately 30, mainly from artillery fire McNeill, To
Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.368. Dr McNeill accepted Kims declaration that he was the D445 Battalion
commander at Long Tn but noted: There were some ambiguities about the precise nature of Kiems
command of D445 Battalion, though, and his actual role in the battle at Long Tan. Ekins, A.,
Unravelling the riddles of Long Tan, op.cit., July 2011, p.43. Analysis of captured documents and the
1991 D445 History have indicated that the 445 Battalion commander at the Long Tn battle was Bi
Quang Chnh (Su Chnh). Kim was not appointed 445 Battalion commander until December
1967/January 1968. The 2004 D445 History claims that V Quc Chanh (T Chnh) commanded D445 at
the Battle but this is assessed as unlikely, see the biographies at Annex A. Regarding NVA/VC losses,
there is a considerable disparity between the Vietnamese and Australian claims - eg the official Australian
records claim 245 enemy killed (by body count), 3 captured and 57 enemy weapons recovered, see
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit, 1993, p.351, p.558 (endnotes 108, 109) - and an estimated 150 enemy
wounded. During an interview with Dr Ian McNeill - when told of the Australian claim of 245 communist
troops killed, NguynThanh Hng (footnote 41) responded that such a figure (for killed on the battlefield)
was exaggerated ten times McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.368, p.562. As noted above,
according to Dr Ian McNeill, the official 5 Division casualty figure ((for their forces)) was 200 killed.
However, the 5th Division Histories (1995, 2005) were not available to Dr McNeill in the early 1990s, and
those histories are not included in the bibliography in Ham, P., Vietnam The Australian War,
HarperCollinsPublishers, Pymble, 2007. For a detailed examination of casualty claims for the Battle of
Long Tn, see Annex F.
49
Translators Note: The Military Region 7 History relates: The 5th Division deployed to the Route 2 area
in B Ra-Long Khnh and Route 15 and fought many battles with the Americans, and - in particular,
together with the B Ra 445 Battalion, for the first time struck the Australian forces in the rubber

K-13

battlefield a force that had been regarded as the most highly effective of all the
specialists in counter-guerrilla warfare and which the enemy often lauded. The battle had
been conducted very close to the combat headquarters of the Royal Australian Regiment
[sic] and greatly surprised the enemy forces.50 The battle contributed towards the crushing
of the enemys intentions to sweep and pacify the region - and strengthened the
revolutionary movement in B Ra-Long Khnh to continue its development.51 The
ambush battle against the Australian force at Long Tn concluded the wet season phase of
activities for 1966 by the Division.52
plantation at Long Tn (18 August 1966) and inflicted heavy casualties on an Australian company. - The
Armed Forces of Military Region 7 50 Years, p.35. In a 27 August 1966 broadcast, Radio Hanoi claimed
over 500 Australian mercenaries were wiped out and summarized two whole companies were
annihilated and another heavily decimated . A history of ng Nai Province claimed the communist
forces had eliminated 500 Australians and destroyed 21 tanks - Phan Ngc Danh, ng Nai , op.cit.,
1986, p.14. Soldiers of the 275th Regiment received commendation certificates for their actions in the battle
at Long Tn see Annex O, eg soldiers of C13 Company of the 3rd Battalion of the Regiment were awarded
letters of appreciation and certificates of commendation for killing 35 Australians at Long Tn on 18
August 1966 - MACV CDEC 04-2960-67, 19 April 1967. A 5th Division veterans website relates: In
August 1966, at Long Tn (B Ra), the 5th Regiment and 445 Battalion conducted an ambush battle
luring Australian forces out to destroy them. The 3 rd [sic] Battalion of the Royal Australian Task Force
sortied out just as we had intended. The Regiment opened fire, and in almost a day of fighting, the 5 th
Regiment and 445 Battalion inflicted casualties on two Australian battalions. To assuage their pain, the 18 th
of August each year has become one of the Australians veterans days. Nguyn Hng Phc Major
General, Truyn thng chin u ca s on BB5 Anh hng (The Fighting History of the Heroic 5 th
Infantry Division), K c ngi lnh S on 5 2010 (Memories of the 5th Division Soldiers 2010), H
Ch Minh City, November 2005.
50
Translators Note: On Vit Cng strengths at Long Tn - according to the Australian Official History: In
the final evaluation, including forces held in depth, the task force assessed the enemy as 275 Main Force
Regiment of three battalions reinforced by at least one battalion from the North Vietnamese Army together
with 445 Battalion. The total strength of 275 Regiment was 1600 The strength of the NVA battalion
was 500 and the strength of D445 Battalion was 550. McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351 and
p.559 (endnotes 113 and114).
51
Translators Note: On 20 August during the second phase of US II FFVs Operation Toledo (see footnote
29), based on signals intelligence, US armed helicopters were employed in an air attack that included the
use of CS gas, against the reported location of the 5th VC Division Headquarters in north-eastern Phc Tuy
at YS 647823. See: 173rd Airborne Brigade, Combat Operations After Action Report Lessons Learned:
Operation Toledo, 15 December 1966. : http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/510789.pdf .
52
Translators Note: Released in mid-November 2012 by Military Region 7, the history of the 5th Infantry
Division was related in a series of five videos based on their 2005 history. The first video featured Major
General Nguyn Nam Hng (as the former Chief of Staff of 274 th VC Regiment see footnotes 25, 34, 54,
57 and 60) who discusses the Battle of V Xu (late February 1966) and the Battle of Tm B (against
elements of the 1st US Infantry Division on 11 April 1966); and Lieutenant General Nguyn Thi Bng (as
the former Commander of the 275th VC Regiment) who discusses the Battle of ng n Junction in June
1966 (against the 52nd ARVN Regiment) and the Battle of Long Phc (against US and ARVN forces) in
June 1966. The second video begins with the 5th Divisions operations in July 1967 ie omitting any
reference to the Battle of Long Tn against Australian forces on 18 August 1966. For Part 1, see: S on
B Binh 5 Ho Kh Min ng Phn 1: Trng thnh trong la n (The 5th Infantry Division
Powerful and Magnanimous in the Eastern Region: Coming-of-age in War), Military Region 7/HCM TV
Film Company, HCM City, released on 15 November 2012 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kfjzstwEZg .

K-14

((In November 1966)) The 2nd Battalion ((of the 4th ie: the 274th Regiment))
deployed back to the Hc Dch, B Ra. After many days of studying the Vn Kip
objective53 and the activities of the enemy within, the Deputy Regimental Commander
Nguyn Nam Hng54, put forward a tactical plan: to employ the 2nd Battalion and the
Chau c local company to secretly cross the Sng Dinh and, skirting the waters edge,
traverse more than two kilometres of exposed ground avoiding the enemys guarding
elements and observation posts at the same time being reinforced by concealed
elements from the end of the firing range to the north-west, they would await until the
enemy returned from range practice and then they would attack them.
At 5pm on 18 November ((1966)), the 2nd Battalion and two companies of Chu
c District deployed for the operation. Having carefully studied the terrain, we moved
along the waters edge so that the enemys patrols and guard posts around the firing range
were completely unaware. After the vanguard of the 2nd Battalion and the Chau c
Company had reached their designated positions, the enemy withdrew to debrief their
firing practice. We immediately opened fire and attacked using firepower such as the
12.8mm ((heavy machinegun)) and rapid-fire from 82mm mortars into the enemys ranks.
Having been surprised and attacked from three directions simultaneously, all the
defenders - and the battalion of recruits who had participated in the firing exercise, were
unable to resist. Some were killed, some lived and surrendered. In 30 minutes of fighting,
the 2nd Battalion and the Chau c District Company had completely destroyed the two
companies of troops that had participated in the firing practice and the Vn Kip firing
range defence platoon. Many of the enemy died on the spot 187 were captured and 71
weapons of various types were seized.55
After the resounding victory at Vn Kip, the 4th ((274th)) Regiment organised an
education program for the prisoners and chose 80 of the ((enemy)) soldiers who had
volunteered to join the revolutionary forces. 40 were incorporated into the B Ra local
forces and 40 into the units of the 4th Regiment.
53

Translators Note: The ARVN Vn Kip National Training Centre was located on B Ra Towns eastern
outskirts its firing range was to the north-west of the Town, see the following footnote.
54
Translators Note: The attack on 18 November 1966 at the Vn Kip firing range (YS 363621) ie at
Phc Ta beside the Dinh River at the base of the mountains, is described in detail in Nguyn Nam
Hngs 2006 memoir. Hng notes that the 2nd Battalions approach along the line of the Dinh River to their
objective the firing range, could not be observed from Ni t. He relates that 187 ARVN personnel
were captured and 71 weapons seized. The next day, 100 prisoners were released, and 80 volunteered to
join our troops. - Nguyn Nam Hng Major General, Mt i Chinh Chin (A Life at War), Nh Xut
bn Chnh tr Quc gia, H Ni, 2006. 1 ATF records the incident at the firing range as occuring on 9
December 1966 see: 1 ATF, INTSUM No.192, Ni t, 10 December 1966 (ie: ARVN casualties: 11
KIA, 26 WIA, 184 MIA; VC: 2 KIA. VC possibly 265 Bn/274 Regiment or D445 Provincial Battalion);
and 1 ATF, Intelligence Review No.4, Ni t, 11 January 1967 see also the following footnote.
55
Translators Note: According to ARVN reporting, on 9 December 1966, 180 ARVN recruits were
captured at the Vn Kip National Training Centre, and the VC subsequently released 62 elderly and sick
ARVN POWs on 9 January 1967 see the report by Phc Tuy Sector S-2 (Intelligence) on 5 February
1967 CDEC Report 6 075 3301 67; the Phc Tuy Sector S-2 debrief of POWs at CDEC Report 6 075
3302 67; and footnote 181 in the 1991 D445 History ie Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit., 2011.

K-15

The victorious battle of Vn Kip was a new coming-of-age for the 4th Regiment
in tactical leadership and the use of its forces. We had produce a good battle plan, ensured
secrecy and surprise for the battle, and achieved tight tactical coordination between main
force elements and the local forces. The battle only took a short period of time had
destroyed the enemy, and prisoners were taken and weapons seized. The 4th Regiments
military proselytizing was good educating and recruiting 80 prisoners to serve our
fighting forces, and a large number were won over to become good fighters.
Moving into 196756, the US and their puppets continued to mount very large
operations on the Eastern Nam B battlefield. The most representative were Operation
Cedar Falls and the Junction City Campaign waged by the US and their puppets in the
region north-west of Si Gn.
On the B Ra-Long Khnh front, the Australian military units, the 11th Armored
((Cavalry)) Regiment, and an element of the US 199th Brigade began a campaign to
destroy the forces of the 5th Division and achieve their pacification plans in the area
south-east of Si Gn. On 15 January ((1967)), the puppet 18th Division together with
US and Australian forces, launched a sweeping operation titled Dm Tm in the southeast of Long Khnh. In five years, the Division had fought in more than 1,000
engagements both large and small, with all types of military opponents: Americans,
puppets, Australians, and Thais.57
From January to July 196758, the Divisions infantry regiments, artillery battalion,
sappers and reconnaissance elements closely followed the enemys activities and
continuously organised attacks and ambushes on their outposts in B Ra-Long Khnh.
The Divisions units destroyed communications along Route 20 and combined with the
local armed forces of Long Khnh to defeat the US-puppet Operation Dn Tm.

56

Translators Note: The strength of the 5th Division was indicated in captured 84th Rear Services Group
documents dated 30 December 1966 ie: October 1966: 4,789; November 1966: 4,445 see VCAT Item
No.F034600742556 CDEC Log 02-1520-67. The recovered documents also revealed that in November
1966, the 5th Division had 470 men at the Convalescent Centre, excluding personnel at C.210 in Bnh
Thun Province. On 19 November 1966, C.210s strength was 131 including 42 women CDEC Log 053254-67. For the organisation and senior cadre appointments of the 5th Division as at March 1967, see the
debrief of rallier Senior Lieutenant Nguyn Vn Phng at CMIC 1521, CDEC Log 14-010-67.
57
Translators Note: The Royal Thai Armed Forces Queens Cobra Regiment was previously mentioned
in the 5th Division History in mid-1965 as based at Long Thnh in Bin Ha Province. The 274th VC
Regiment suffered heavy casualties in attacks on Thai positions at Lc An (YS 167916) on 16 March 1969
(168 KIA) - VCAT Item No.2143302025; and on 16 June 1969 at Lc An (212 KIA) - Hart, S. with
Chamberlain, E.P., A Tactical SIGINT Success Story, The Bridges Review (Issue No. 2) Journal of the
Australian Intelligence Corps, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, 2013. Neither attack is mentioned in
the 2006 memoir of the 274th Regiments then Commander Major General (Retd) Nguyn Nam Hng,
see the preceding footnote 54. The 16 June 1969 attack on the Thai position by the 274 th Regiment is also
not noted in other Vietnamese communist writings.
58
Translators Note: A listing of the 275th Regiments engagements in the period January-late June 1967
compiled from US intelligence reports can be found in Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns , op.cit., 1990,
pp.56-57. However, none of those actions appears to have been related in the 5th Division History (2005).

K-16

On 30 January 1967, a battalion of the 199th US Brigade59 and two armoured

companies ((chi on)) combined with the 52nd Black Panther Battalion to launch a
sweeping operation in the Cm M, Ngi Giao area to destroy the autumn supply points
and rear bases of the 4th ((274th)) Regiment and the 84th Group. Having closely monitored
the enemys activities, on 30 January, the 4th Regiment attacked the US position at Kim
Long. In this engagement, we were unable to kill all the enemy elements but, with great
fighting spirit and bravery, the battalions of the 4th Regiment destroyed an enemy
company, caused heavy casualties to an armoured platoon (setting fire to seven armoured
vehicles), and shot down three helicopters.60
At the beginning of April 196761, the US 11th Armored ((Cavalry)) Regiment
participated in Operation Junction City in the area north of Ty Ninh and suffered heavy
casualties - forcing the unit to withdraw to its base at Sui Rm to regroup. With
information from local reconnaissance, the headquarters of the 4th Regiment quickly
organised a reconnaissance force to follow the enemy and prepared a tactical plan to
strike a really strong blow against the US armoured regiment.
In the six months of the Dry Season, the operations of the 5th ((275th)) Regiment
had encountering many difficulties in terms of food and equipment however, the
fighting momentum of the Regiment remained high. For months, these fine soldiers lived
in situations lacking rice, vegetables and medicines to cure their ailments. However, the
cadre and troops of the Regiment strived to the utmost to overcome these difficulties and
to fight. The whole Regiment vigorously initiated a competitive program with the 4th
((274th)) Regiment entitled: Valiant soldiers kill Americans62 and Valiant soldiers
destroy mechanized vehicles with everyone hoping to go into battle and achieve
success. One soldier in the Regiment wrote in his diary: I would greatly regret it if I
were to die of malaria before I fought the Americans.

59

Translators Note: The US 199th Light Infantry Brigade (Redcatchers Brigade) was complete at Long
Bnh on 24 December 1966 and did not operate in Phc Tuy Province in January 1967. 199th Infantry
Brigade, Combat After Action Report Lessons Learned: 1 November 1966 31 January 1967, 15
February 1967 DTIC AD 388889. 1 ATF Operations Logs and INTSUMs do not report any NVA/VC
attacks in the area of northern Route 2 in late January 1967 by VC main-force elements. No such attacks are
related in the Chu c District History (2004).
60
Translators Note: The account of the engagement in the 2006 memoir (see footnote 54) of the then 274th
Regiment Chief of Staff - Nguyn Nam Hng, is almost identical to that in the 5th Division History shown
in the text above. Nguyn Nam Hng was appointed 274th Regiment Commander in August 1967 - Nguyn
Nam Hng Major General, Mt i (A Life at War), op.cit., 2006.
61
Earlier - on 20/21 March 1967, the 2nd Battalion of the 275th Regiment (the 5th Regiment) unsuccessfully
attacked the small Popular Force outpost at L Gm a few kilometres north of Phc Hi - the bodies of 37
Vit Cng were recovered at the outpost following attack for detail see Annex O, pp.25-26
62
For the criteria for the award of the title: Valiant Killer of Americans, see the Group 84 Circular dated
5 July 1966 with the attached COSVN memorandum dated 5 February 1966 CDEC Log 12-1913-66. In
September 1966, the Military Political Department of the National Liberation Front promulgated a
clarifying instruction on awards by grade, of the Valiant Killers program that noted Americas vassals
(ie chu hu comprising troops from Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Korea) were included
in the program VCAT Item No.23119093001.

K-17

At the beginning of May 1967, the 5th ((275th)) Regiment was ordered to deploy to
north-east Long Khnh and coordinate with the armed forces of Tnh Linh to destroy the
enemys Operation Angtin 1 ((Akron)) in the Tnh Linh-c Linh area of southern
Bnh Tuy Province. On 4 May, the 5th Regiment ambushed and attacked the 3rd Battalion
of the 52nd Task Force engaged in a sweeping operation in the region of ng n
Junction ((ie the junction of Route 1/Route 333, about 15 kilometres east of Xun Lc
Town at YT 630085)). After an hour of combat, the 5th ((275th)) Regiment had destroyed
two enemy companies, captured 13 enemy, and seized a large quantity of weapons and
equipment.63
Exploiting this success, throughout May and the first half of June, the Regiment
conducted many engagements in coordination with the local troops and guerrillas of Tnh
Linh-Hai c to defeat the sweeping operations of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the
18th puppet Division in the region of southern Bnh Tuy. After completing its mission in
the region north-east of Long Khnh, the 5th ((275th)) Regiment received orders to
withdraw to an area west of the ng Nai River to regroup its forces to engage in the
autumn campaign. The 1st and 2nd Battalions were located west of the River together
with the regimental headquarters. The 3rd Battalion deployed to the east of the River at
Bn Nm ((Long Khnh Province)). On 29 May, the battalion commanders and company
commanders of the 3rd Battalion were ordered to concentrate at the Regiment to study
objectives. A number of fit comrades remained behind under the leadership of Comrade
V Ngc Khuyn the Battalions political officer, and moved across Route 20 to the
area west of Bo Bnh to collect rice in preparation for the campaign.
By 10am on 31 [sic] June ((1967)), the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 5th Regiment
((275 Regiment)) had completely destroyed the puppet 52nd Black Panther Ranger
Battalion.
The news of the victory at Bn Nm inspired enthusiasm in all units. The
Regimental Headquarters assessed that the enemy would reinforce and launch an
operation to recover its dead. The Regimental Commander Tm Phi, ordered the 2nd
Battalion to continue to work with the 3rd Battalion to strike any enemy that returned to
retrieve their comrades bodies.
On the afternoon of 31 July, with aircraft support, two companies of Rangers
began a sweeping operation to clear the Bn Nm area. In a hail of fire including from
the aircraft, the 3rd Battalion and the 6th Company of the 2nd Battalion fought continuously
for three hours inflicting casualties on an enemy company. At 5pm, the 5th ((275th))
Regiment Headquarters and the direct support company of the 1st Battalion crossed back
to the east of the River and prepared an operation to destroy an approaching group of
In May 2014, at a 5th Division memorial in Phc Hi village (formerly Hi M village), a service was
conducted for 35 soldiers of the 5th VC Division who were killed in a surprise ambush on 5 May 1967
near the Tht Pagoda (Cha Tht) when returning to their base area after an operation. Huyn t t
chc l ving cc chin s S on 05 , t District On-line, 7 May 2014. Such an action in early
May 1967 is not recorded in the t District History (2006), the 5th Division History (2005) or in 1 ATF
records. It is almost certainly a reference to the VC attack on nearby L Gm (YS 515550) on 20/21 March
1967 see the following footnote 66 and also: Annex F, page 6; and Annex O, footnotes 88 and 89.

63

K-18

Rangers. At this time, all types of enemy aircraft were attacking the battlefield around
Bn Nm. At 10pm, the bunker of the 5th Regiment Headquarters was hit by a bomb.
Comrade Tm Phi the Regimental Commander, and Hunh Thn the Regimental
Political Commissar, were both killed; and Comrade Su Thanh the Chief of Staff, was
wounded. On the night of 1 [sic] July, the Regiment crossed back to the west of the ng
Nai River and ended the battle.64
The victory at Bn Nm signified a step in the development of the standards of the
tactical organisation of the 5th ((275th)) Regiment, and confirmed that one of our
battalions could destroy an enemy battalion that had both air and artillery support.
In August 1967, in response to the needs of the battlefront, the 5th Regiment and
the direct support units of the Division returned to Kho Xanh-Phc Long to receive their
new missions.65 The 4th ((274th)) Regiment remained on the B Ra-Long Khnh
battlefield and joined with the local armed forces to strike the enemy.66
Moving into the second phase of the Tt Mu Thn General Offensive and
Uprising, from April 1968 - due to operational requirements, there were changes in the
force structure of the Division. The 4th ((274th)) Regiment continued to operate
independently on the B Ra-Long Khnh-Bin Ha battlefield strengthening the fighting
formations of the Eastern Military Region. The 5th ((275th)) Regiment and units directly
64

Translators Note: Captain Trn Vn Ting an NVA POW, recounted that the 275th Regiments 3rd
Battalion and the 6th Company of its 2nd Battalion suffered 80 casualties including both killed and
wounded. CMIC No.2550, VCAT Item No.2310305007.
65
Translators Note: In late August 1967, the 5th Division moved eastward and reportedly camped along
the Cambodian/South Vietnam border with its Headquarters about 10 kilometres north of YU 3344.
Captain Trn Vn Ting - CMIC No.2550, VCAT Item No.2310305007.
66
Translators Note: Several engagements involving 5th Division elements in Phc Tuy Province are not
mentioned in its 2005 History. As noted in an earlier footnote, on 20/21 March 1967, the 2nd Battalion of
the 275th Regiment (the 5th Regiment) unsuccessfully attacked the small Popular Force outpost at L Gm a
few kilometres north of Phc Hi - the bodies of 37 Vit Cng were recovered at the outpost following the
attack see Annex O footnote 88. The 4th Regiment - ie the 274th Regiment, fought heavy engagements
against US and ARVN forces in the Kim Long area north of c Thnh in June 1967 (ie additional to the
engagements at Kim Long on 30 January 1967). The 5th Division History (2005) also does not mention any
action against Australian forces in August 1967 eg at Sui Chu Pha. 7RAR (Operation Ballarat)
engaged elements of the 274th Regiment at Sui Chu Pha beginning on 5 August 1967, and captured
material that indicated an Australian infantry company had engaged the reconnaissance platoon and at least
one company of the 274th Regiment. OBrien, M., Conscripts and Regulars , op.cit., 1995, pp.55-64.
Translators Note continues: A captured document dated 25 September 1968, listed the personnel strength
(probably of the 5th Division) as 6,436 which included 1,279 in A55 (probably the 275th VC Regiment);
1,133 in A56 (probably the 88th NVA Regiment); and 1,468 in A57 (the 33rd NVA Regiment) 845
additional personnel were to be recruited in the subsequent month. CDEC Log 10-1719- 69. While the
33rd NVA Regiment was incorporated into the 5th Division in July 1968, the 5th Divisions 2005 History
makes no mention of the major engagement between the Australian forces and elements of the 33rd
Regiment at the Battle of Bnh Ba in early June 1969 see Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment Their
Story , op.cit, 2014. In June 1970, the 33rd Regiment became a subordinate formation of Military Region
7. A 12-page report 33rd NVA Regiment, was produced by 1 ATF see Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM
No.264/71, Ni t, 21 September 1971. Post-War, a memorial and museum to the 33rd NVA Regiment
was established in Bnh Ba village and, post-War, many of its soldiers settled in the South.

K-19

commanded by the Division were ordered to operate as mobile elements on the front
north-west of Si Gn and strike the enemy in the areas of Trng Bng, Du Ting, and
Dng Minh Chu. 67
In April 1976, the Division moved back to B Ra, the place where the
Division was created and had come of age in the days and months of decisive fighting
against the Americans and their puppets. The Divisions organisation comprised the 1st
Regiment, the 2nd Regiment and the 28th Artillery Regiment; and the Division was
stationed across a broad area of B Ra-Long Khnh Province from Ni t to Ni Th
Vi, Cm M, Gia Kim, and Long Khnh Town. In June 1976, the 4th (274th)) Regiment
rejoined the Division.68 The 3rd Regiment after more than five years of fighting as part
of the Division, returned to be under the direct command of the Ty Ninh Provincial Unit.

While prepared for combat and ready to drive away the enemy and
continuing to train, the units of the Division actively increased production. Despite having
to change locations many times over a short period and handing over our cultivated areas
in Ty Ninh - which had already been planted when we moved to B Ra-Long Khnh,
the troops still took advantage of the time to grow trees and plants and to raise animals in
order to contribute to the improvement of the soldiers lives.
At midnight on 24/25 September 1977, the reactionary Pol Pot-Ieng Sary
clique ((Khmer Rouge)) launched a mass attack invading the border areas of the
provinces of Military Region 7. From 10 to 20 October 1977, the Military Region rearranged its forces. The Divisions remaining elements all deployed to the Ty Ninh
border.
Implementing the Military Region orders, on the night of 21-22 December 1977,
the Divisions units attacked and seized the Phum a area ((ie in the Khmer Republic)).

*
*

67

Translators Note: In September 1968, noting the increasing number of NVA in the South, the US CIA
reported: In the Viet Cong 5th Division, two of its four regiments are listed as totally North Vietnamese
and its other two regiments --the Viet Cong 274th and 275th Regiments -- are 40% and 65% North
Vietnamese respectively. Thus, countrywide, 46 of the 58 known enemy regiments are completely North
Vietnamese, and nine of the 12 Viet Cong regiments are believed to be 50% North Vietnamese. CIA,
Research Memorandum: Increasing Role of North Vietnamese in Viet Cong Units, 17 September 1968.
VCAT Item No.F029200060548.
68
Translators Note: The 274th Regiment (the 4th Regiment aka Q764, Q4, on 94, and on 49) had
operated independently on the B Ra -Long Khnh-Bin Ha battlefield from about April 1968 as a
subordinate of Military Region 7 and was later placed under the B Ra Sub-Region. 1 ATF elements
captured Trn Vn ng (aka Trn Kim Thinh) - Executive Officer/2ic of the 274th Regiment, on 28 April
1969 near Cm M see CMIC Report 6 029 0870 69 dated 25 August 1969 for a debrief of Trn Vn
ng and data on the 274th Regiment.

K-20

Military Region 3 (Republic of Vietnam)

Annex L

The Battle of Long Tn 18/8/66 NVA/VC Revisited

NVA/VC Casualties: Figures for NVA/VC casualties at the Battle of Long Tn are
disputed ranging from a low of 30 killed in some Vietnamese communist sources to over
1,600 claimed by one Western source.
NVA/VC Histories state: 30 KIA, 32 KIA, or 47 KIA.
versus
Official Australian figures: 245 KIA and:
Unofficial:
397 killed (Vietnamese NGO from advice by an Australian veteran)
losses at 500 (BRIG S.C. Graham, COMD 1ATF).
800 KIA, 850 KIA.
878 KIA (the purported My To /OP MARSDEN document)
1,632 KIA (a fraudulent claim).
nearly 2,000 dead and wounded
--------------------------------------------------------------NVA/VC Participants: These vary in Australian accounts my assessment is:
INVOLVED
Battle of Long Tn 18 August 1966:
(Reconnaissance parties: participants noted, but the exact dates are unclear1)
HQ 5th VC Division a small command and staff element led by Lieutenant Colonel
Trn Minh Tm (Nm Tm) and including Nguyn Thanh Hng (Hai Hng).
HQ B Ra-Long Khnh-Bin Ha (Long B Bin) Province Unit a small
command and staff element led by ng Hu Thun (t ng).
275th VC Regiment - led by Nguyn Thi Bng (t Thi): three battalions including
the former NVA D605 Battalion as its 3rd Battalion (wef May 1966).
D445 VC Battalion led by Bi Quang Chnh (or far less likely: V Quc Chnh
akaT Chnh). Strength 392 (see Bi Quang Chnhs biannual report of 8 July 1966 ie not 550 as in 1 ATF reporting).
V Th Su Civil Labour Company led by Ms Chn Phng.
C.12-65 Bnh Gi Assault Youth Unit for commo-liaison (runner) support and
casualty evacuation.
Surgery element including Dr Hai Phong and Dr Nguyn nh Knh.
Reconnaissance elements: 5th VC Division; Province C.982 (elm B Ra Town ?).
70mm gun/howitzer (probably an element of Z-39 Artillery Battalion) .
NOT INVOLVED
274th VC Regiment see the entry for 18 August 1966 in the Regiment 2ics (Nguyn
Nam Hng) notebook and 28 September 1966 description of the Battle of Long Tn.2
D440 Battalion not yet formed, still in North Vietnam moved south as 211 Group
in early-mid 1967.3
D400 Battalion (did not exist error on a plaque); D806 or D860C Battalion (in
1966-67 were believed by RVNAF and Allied Forces to be cover-names for D445).
Nguyn Vn Kim was not the D445 commander at the Battle4, but was then
commander of the Chu c District Unit (see below).
1
See Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2011, p.40.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/62621973/The-Viet-Cong-D445-Battalion-Their-Story .
2
Recovered by 5RAR on 19 October 1966 (Captain R.J. ONeill, intelligence officer).
3
See Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2012.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/137658877/The-Viet-Cong-D440-Battalion-Their-Story.

Annex L

275th VC Main Force Regiment: In late 2011, a H Ni-based Vietnamese NGO in

collaboration with the next-of-kin of the deceased 275th Regiment soldiers, produced5 a
detailed listing of those reportedly killed at Long Tn with names, year and place of birth,
unit, and next-of-kin detail totalling 171. From the data of those 275th Regiment soldiers
reportedly killed at the Battle of Long Tn the following can probably be deduced:
About 54% were Northerners from the 3rd/D605 Battalion; the average age of those
killed was 25, and the oldest was 45 (ie L Thin Thai6, b.1921 - a platoon commander in the
Regiments 3rd/D605 Battalion).The youngest was 17 (b.1949) from the Mekong Delta, and
there were 21 soldiers aged 18.
The career of the the 275th Regiments commander Nguyn Thi Bng, did not
falter after the heavy casualties suffered by the Regiment at Long Tn he went on to
become a Division Commander, a Front Commander in Cambodia, a Region Commander,
and - as a Lieutenant General, was the Vice Minister of Defence (in the late 1990s).
274th VC Main Force Regiment was not at the Battle of Long Tn. Several published
books and articles claim that the 274th Regiment was at the Battle, in the area, or tasked to
ambush any US reinforcements moving to Long Tn or the Ni t base. An article on the
Internet includes a map showing the 274th Regiment located west of Ni t 2 - one
kilometre north of the Battle site. However, the recovered notebook of the 274th Regiments
2ic (Nguyn Nam Hng see footnote 2), indicates that at the time of the Battle, the 274th
Regiment was many kilometres away in base camps in the Hc Dch area (vicinity YS 4682)
and in north-eastern Phc Tuy (north of Bnh Gi village in the Sui L area, vicinity YS
512878) and planning an attack on strategic hamlets on Route 1 in the Hng Ngha-Hng Lc
area of central-western Long Khnh Province and rice-portering tasks east of the Sng Ray
and in the Route 23 area of south-eastern Phc Tuy. Captain T.J. Richards the OC of the
Australian SIGINT unit (547 Signal Detachment) advised the 1 ATF commander on the
evening of 18 August of the 274th Regiments location, and commented that they did not
appear to be preparing for combat - seemed to be on R & R.
Nguyn Vn Kim. In the years after the War, Nguyn Vn Kim (Nam Kim) was
regularly presented by Vietnamese authorities as the commander of D445 at the Battle of
Long Tn - to visiting Australian historians, journalists and veterans including a former
Chief of the Army, and to the Australian Deputy Prime Minister. Apart from briefings, Kim
also conducted on-site battlefield tours. However, Kim was not at the Battle. Rather, at the
time, he was the commander of the Chu c District Unit and signed an administrative
order in that capacity on 19 August 1966. However, about 16-17 months after the Battle, he
did command D445 (from January 1968). A long time Party member - a Southerner who had
regrouped to the North in the mid-1950s, Kim died in August 2009 and is buried in Baria.
Australian War Memorial Conference: Vietnam: International Perspectives on a Long War
- Ernie Chamberlain, 16 August 2013 (chamber@pipeline.com.au)

As noted, the D445 commander at the Battle of Long Tn was Bi Quang Chnh (Su Chnh) or less likely:
V Quc Chanh (T Chanh). For biographies of Bi Quang Chnh, V Quc Chanh, and Nguyn Vn Kim see
Annex B to Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit., 2011 and Annex A to this 2004 D445 History.
5
First reported in: Kim Dung, Tm gng bnh d m cao qu: Hng MARIN c b thin s , Qun i
Nhn Dn, H Ni, 19 November 2011. The initial report cited 179 killed, had units listed incorrectly, and at
least 33 names were duplicated.
6
See also his Certificate of Commendation (Bng Khn) for the Battle of ng n on 30 June 1966.

Annex M

The Battle of Long Tan: D445 History 1991.1

Following the coordinated sweeping operations by the Americans, Australians,
and the puppet forces, tens of thousands of enemy troops struck into our base areas at
Sng Cu, Sui L , Long Phc and Minh m with the aim of achieving victory in
the first phase of their Counter-offensive Strategy on the B Ra battlefield but they
were all defeated. From the 1966 Wet Season, the Americans transferred the
responsiblility for pacification in all of Phc Tuy Province (B Ra) to the Australian
forces.2 The New Zealand artillery was placed wholly in support of the Australians. In
August 1966, the Australians set up two further major positions at Ni t and Bu
Lng3.
At the end of the 1965-66 Dry Season, COSVN reinforced the B Ra battlefield
with a regiment from the 5th Division to join with the local forces against the enemys
sweeping operations.4
1

Translators Note: This translated extract and commentary/exegesis is from: Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet
Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2011 (free-to-read on the Internet since mid-2011).
The following cited footnote numbers are those in the 2011 publication ie not this translation and
commentary of the D445 History published in 2004. However, the references to see Annex refer to the
annexes in this 2015 translation/commentary on the 2004 publication. In December 2014, a Vietnamese
veterans website included an article on the Battle that was very similar to the text in the 1991 D445 History
and the 5th Division History (2005): Nguyn Vn Bch, Trn Phc Kch Long Tn (The Ambush Battle
at Long Tn), Cu Chin Binh (War Veterans) Thnh Ph H Ch Minh On-line, Thnh Ph H Ch
Minh (H Ch Minh City), 18 December 2014 see Annex Q. In late 2014, a 23-minute documentary
film featured the history of D445 Battalion and the Battle of Long Tn - V Vn Cm - Director, Trng
thnh t trong chin u - Coming-of-age during combat, B Ra - Vng Tu Television, 4 November
2014.
2
Translators Note: On pacification, see footnotes 29 and 225 in the 1991 D445 History and in the 2004
D445 History: f.70, 148, 199, 375, 385, 400, 437, 483.
3
Translators Note: Bu Lng also appears in the 2004 D445 History and is probably a reference to an
area where the Sng Cu stream crosses Route 2 near An Ph hamlet just north of the 1 ATF Ni t base
see f.239 in the main text. Less likely, it refers to Bu Lun where a US Special Forces element
established a camp (B-36) in January 1967 to train Vietnamese Mobile Strike Force (MSF - Mike Force)
elements. That camp was located on Route 44 west of the Long Hi Mountains about a kilometre north of
Long Hi village. The Long t District History (1986) relates that, in 1970, the Australians set up a
battalion-level training centre at Bu Lun for the Lon Nol troops and used them for patrolling on Routes 23
- 44. Australian personnel trained Khmer Republic soldiers at the Long Hi camp from January 1972. The
ng Nai History 1986 refers to a base at Bu Ln with more than one thousand troops. - Phan
Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.132.
4
Translators Note: The 5 Division History (2005) relates: In June 1966, the 4th ((274th)) Regiment
received orders to move to the Chu Pha-Hc Dch with the task of attacking the enemy and defending the
supply areas of Group 84. The 5th Regiment moved from Long Khnh to east of Route 2 to protect the
offices of the Divisional Headquarters and to prepare its forces to attack the Australian forces developing
their base at Ni t B Ra. In June 1966, the total strength of the 274th Regiments battalions was
1,128 (D1/800 Bn/H12 411 personnel; D2/265 Bn/H14 401; D3/308 Bn/H16 316) CDEC Log 091854-66. On 20 October 1966, Australian 5RAR troops in an operation in the Ni Th Vi mountains
recovered the notebook/diary (completed to 7 October 1966) of Nguyn Nam Hng the second-incommand of the 274th Regiment - see CDEC Bulletins 1413 and 1418; CDEC Log 11-1253-66 and 111259-66 (translated text); and 1 ATF Troops Information Sheet No.31, Ni t, 13-19 February 1967 (for a

M-2

In the 1966 Wet Season, the headquarters of the 5th Division5 coordinated with the
military headquarters of B Ra - Long Khnh Province to direct a major destructive
strike against the Australian forces on the B Ra battleground. Comrades Nm Truyn6,
Nm Tm7 (S Nm), Ba t8, t ng9 (B Ra - Long Khnh Province Unit) together
three-page commentary). The capture of the diary and an outline of its contents is related in ONeill, R.J.,
Vietnam Task, op.cit., pp.48-49 and pp.155-156. According to Australian sources, the diary reportedly
related that, in the period 9-11 June 1966, the 274th Regiment lay in wait to ambush an Australian sub-unit
expected to recover a US observation aircraft shot down in the Ni Ngh area. Similarly - according to the
Australian official history, the diary indicated that the 274th Regiment had planned to ambush Australian
troops near the Ni Ngh feature in early June 1966. see McNeill, I., To Long Tan , op.cit.,1993, p.249.
The Australian author Paul Ham interviewed Nguyn Nam Hng in Vng Tu in mid-November 2005, but
Hng could not recall the loss of his diary. Ham, P., Vietnam The Australian War,
HarperCollinsPublishers, Pymble, 2007, p.710.
5
Translators Note: The 5th Division History (2005) also relates the Battle of Long Tn in some detail see
the translation at Annex K, pp.6-12. In August 1966, the Headquarters of the 5 th Division moved three
kilometres south from its base at Sui u (YS 780820 in Base Area 301) to the vicinity of YS 790785.
6
Translators Note: Colonel (Thng T) Nguyn Th Truyn (aka Nm Truyn and Nm Si Gn) had
commanded the 1st Regiment (271/Q761 Regiment) during the successful battle of Bnh Gi in early 1965.
He commanded the 5th Division until late November 1967. Nm Truyn was killed in combat in early
February 1968 during the NVA/VC Tt Mu Thn offensive while serving as Commander of Sub-Region 1.
7
Translators Note: Trn Minh Tm (Nm Tm) was the founding commander of the 4 th Regiment (274th
Regiment) of the 5th VC Division. In August 1966, he was the Chief of Staff of the 5 th Division confirmed
by the NVA defector Lieutenant Colonel L Xun Chuyn. His participation in the planning and conduct of
the battle at Long Tn as the Deputy Divisional Commander is also related in the 5th Division History
(2005), see Annex K, pp.9-10. That History relates Nm Tm meeting with Comrade ng Hu Thun
(Commander of the B Ra Unit) on 10 August 1966 to plan the engagement, and Trn Minh Tm is
described as the battlefield commander. Tms presence is also related later in the 1991 D445 Battalion
History see footnotes 142, 149 and 162. Tm is also noted in a major Vietnamese account of the War as
leading the 5th Division elements at Long Tn ie Lch s Khng chin chng M cu nc The History
of the Anti-American Resistance War for National Salvation, Tp 4 (Vol 4), Nh Xut Bn Chnh Tr Quc
Gi, H Ni, 1999. However, Trn Minh Tm is not mentioned as the senior 5th Division Headquarters
representative during the Battle by Nguyn Thanh Hng (Hai) a 5th Division operations officer, who
strongly implied that he - ie Hng, played the principal 5th Division role - see Burstall, T., A Soldier
Returns, op.cit., 1990, pp.99-104. According to Nguyn Thanh Hng, during the Battle, the headquarters of
the 275th Regiment was on Ni t 2 Hill (see footnote 142), and he commanded the forward element of the
5th Division Headquarters in p Phc Hng (GR YS 495670) see footnotes 137, 142, and 144. PostWar, Nguyn Thanh Hng appeared in an Australian DVD/video documentary and described aspects of the
Long Tn battle - Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan The True Story, Australian Broadcasting
Commission/Film Australia, Lindfield, 1993.
8
Translators Note: Ba t ie Nguyn c Hot, Deputy Commander of the B Ra Provincial Unit was
also reportedly known as Nguyn Vn t. He was transferred to the staff of Military Region (MR) 7 in
June 1969 VCAT Item No.2310510003. Nguyn c Hot (Ba t) as Deputy Chief of Staff of MR7,
was killed by Australian forces on 21 November 1969 in north-west Phc Tuy Province 1 ATF,
INTSUMs No.39/70, Ni t, 8 February 1970; and No.326/69, Ni t, 22 November 1969.
9
Translators Note: ng Hu Thun was also known as t ng, ng, and Thim. He had infiltrated into
the South in 1961, and in 1965-1966 he served at Military Region 1/T.1 as the Chief of Operations and
Training with the grade of regimental executive officer CDEC Bulletin 257, Log 03-1253-66. Thun
was transferred from T.1 to B Ra on 30 June 1966 CDEC Log 12-2459-66. ng Hu Thun (t ng)
is noted in the 5th Division History (2005) as the commander of the B Ra Province Unit. According to that
History: on 10 August 1966, the Combined Battle Headquarters comprising Trn Minh Tm and

M-3

with the staff elements of the two units, held many meetings to carefully consider and
assess the situation - while delegating Comrade Nguyn Hu Ngha10 - the second-incommand of the reconnaissance company of the 5th Division, and the 445 Battalions
reconnaissance element to go and examine the battlefield in the Long Tn and Long
Phc region of B Ra. After three days, the reconnaissance elements of the two units
had completed their study of the battlefield.11 In the L Stream base, the Provinces
military command section and the headquarters of the Division convened a conference of
cadres comprising the platoon commanders and above of the two units - ie 445 Battalion12
and the 4th [sic] Regiment13 of the 5th Division, to thoroughly study the tactical outline of
the ambush battle to destroy the Australians at Long Tn.14
Comrade ng Hu Thun (Commander of the B Ra Unit) met to determine the fighting tactics to destroy
an Australian battalion in the Long Tn region. t ng is also later described in the 1991 D445 Battalion
History at p.67, pp.75-76 as the commander of the B Ra Province Unit apparently replacing Nguyn
Vn Mi/Nguyn Vit Hoa (Mi Th) in mid-1966. Nguyn Vit Hoa (Mi Th) was transferred to
command the Vit Cng on 10/Group 10 unit in the Rng Sc/St - CDEC Log 06-2022-67. on 10
was reportedly 64-strong Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.132. However, see
the detailed Rung Sat Special Zone Intelligence Study (circa mid-1968) of the Rng Sc and on 10 (997strong, including 211 guerrillas) VCAT Item No. 4000105007.
10
Translators Note: Nguyn Hu Ngha or probably more correctly L Hu Ngha, was either the
commander or 2ic of the reconnaissance company of the 275th Regiment see following footnote 153. A
Nguyn Hu Ngha a member of the 9th VC Division, had been attached to B Ra but, as directed by
the B Ra Province Unit on 19 July 1966, was returned via MR6 CDEC Log 09-1979-66.
11
Translators Note: The 445 Battalion political officer Vn Lin (Ba Lin), stated that he and Su
Chnh (Bi Quang Chnh 445 Battalion Commander) coordinated with the 275 Regiment and the
element of 5 Division headquarters Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, p.117.
12
Translators Note: According to the Australian official history, the Australian Task Force assessed the
strength of 445 Battalion as 550 McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351, p.559 (endnote 114). Dr
McNeill has apparently reported the 1 ATF estimate as at late May 1966 see footnote 116. However, 445
Battalions strength was probably no more than about 380 see social data on the Battalions personnel
at Annex G and translated extracts of the recovered 445 Battalion Command and Political Reports of July
and August 1966 at Annex H. In the 1991 D445 Battalion Historys account of the Battle of Long Tn, the
name of the 445 Battalion commander is not mentioned. The Australian official histories cite Nguyn Vn
Kim (see footnote 195) as the 445 Battalion commander at the Battle ie rather than Bi Quang Chnh
(Su Chnh) see Chamberlain, E. P., Research Note 23, Vietnam War: Commander of D445 Battalion at
Long Tan Not Nguyen Van Kiem but Bui Quang Chanh , 23 September 2010 (to the Australian War
Memorial and the Australian Army History Unit - Canberra) - and discussion in outline biographies at
Annex A Key Cadre. Note however that an Australian intelligence document (an organisational chart)
in September 1966 included Sau Chanh as the commander of 445 Battalion reproduced in Burstall, T.,
Vietnam The Australian Dilemma, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1993, p.94.
13
Translators Note: An apparent error (corrected in the 2004 D445 History) as the 5th Regiment (275th
Regiment) was the principal Vit Cng formation involved in the Battle of Long Tn ie not the 4th
Regiment (274th Regiment). The 274th Regiment is also incorrectly cited (in lieu of the 275th Regiment) in
the history of the C.12-65 Bnh Gi Victory Assault Youth Group see Annex F: Long Tn Casualties.
The official histories of the 5th Division (2005) and the ng Nai History (1986) as well as the major
Vietnamese history of the War ie: Lch s Khng chin , Tp 4 (Vol 4), op.cit., 1999 all cite the 275th
Regiment (ie the 5th Regiment) as the principal Vit Cng formation at the Battle of Long Tn. At Long
Tn, the 275th Regiment was commanded by Nguyn Thi Bng (also known as t Thi see footnotes 56,
142 and Annex O) and Nguyn Vn Cc was the Regiments political officer. The 2ic of 274 Regiment
Nguyn Nam Hng, noted in his diary on 28 September 1966: the 5 th Regiment ((ie 275th Regiment))

M-4

The forces to participate in the fighting comprised15:

-

the 2nd Company of 445 Battalion with the responsibility of being the forward
blocking force at Hamlet 1 of Long Tn village reinforced with one B4016, a
reconnaissance element from the 5th Division and a 57mm recoilless rifle from
the Battalion.

attacked Ni t, 600 Australians were killed and 1 Australian battalion exterminated CDEC Log
11-1259-66. On 274 Regiments activity, Hng related that for most of August and September, the
((274th)) Regiment was transporting rice. Hngs statement conflicts with claims including by Nguyn
Vn Kim (Commander D445, early 1968-1969), that the 274th Regiment was tasked in mid-August 1966
to interdict any US forces moving south on Route 2 to relieve Australian forces during the Long Tn battle
see Kims statement in Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan The True Story, op.cit., DVD,
1993. On the 274th Regiments activities, see also extracts of the 5th Division History (2005) at Annex K,
footnote 29; and the detailed account at Annex N. According to the 275th Regiment commander Nguyn
Thi Bng, during the Battle of Long Tn, his 275th Regiment headquarters was located on the small
feature of Ni t 2 see the map at the end of this Annex M, and he was accompanied by his executive
officer Major Ba Du (ie Ba c) - see the interview in Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, Book 2, op.cit.,
1990, p.100 and p.206. According to the Australian official history: In the final evaluation, including
forces held in depth, the task force assessed the enemy as 275 Main Force Regiment of three battalions
reinforced by at least one battalion from the North Vietnamese Army together with 445 Battalion. The
total strength of 275 Regiment was 1600 The strength of the NVA battalion was 500 and the strength of
D445 Battalion was 550. McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351 and p.559 (endnotes 113
and114). A contemporary account reported that: At least one North Vietnamese battalion was attached to
275 Regiment for the operation. - Townsend, C. Lieutenant Colonel, 6 RAR After Action Report
Operation SMITHFIELD: 18-21 August 1966, Ni t, 7 September 1966.
14
Translators Note: The Australian official account of the Battle of Long Tn including discussion of
casualties, is in McNeill, I., To Long Tan , op.cit., 1993, pp.305-375. Other relevant Australian works on
Long Tn include: Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns (Book 2), op.cit.,1990, pp.92-124; McAulay, L., The
Battle of Long Tan, op.cit., 1987; Grandin, R., The Battle of Long Tan: As Told by the Commanders to Bob
Grandin, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2004; and Ekins, A., Unravelling , op.cit., July 2011. The
account of the Long Tn battle as related in the 5th Division History (2005) is included in Annex K, pp.6-12.
15
Translators Note: Further listings are examined in Chamberlain, E.P., The Battle of Long Tan 18/8/66
NVA/VC Revisited, Point Lonsdale, 2013 and 2014 see Annex L; and the 274th Regiment - Not at the
Battle of Long Tn see Annex N. Additional to the listed elements, according to Mr Quang: the Long
Tan Village Guerrilla Group also participated see the interview in Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer),
Long Tan The True Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993. In 2006, the officer commanding the Australian forces at
Long Tn (Major H. A. Smith) related Vit Cng forces involved as: 275 VC Main Force Regiment. These
plus D445 and D400 [sic] made around 3,000 enemy troops. - Smith, H. No Time for Fear, Wartime
Issue 35, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 2006. Lieutenant Colonel Smith also earlier contended that
D440, D445, and 860 Battalion were elements of the enemy force at the Battle. - Grandin, R., The
Battle of Long Tan , op.cit., 2004, p.85. However, neither 440 Local Force Battalion (see Annex P) - nor
a D400 were involved. D440 Battalion infiltrated from North Vietnam and did not operate in Phc Tuy
Province until mid-late 1967. 860 was an aka for D445 Battalion. A map of the battle site is at page
100 of the main text of the 2011 edition and also at the end of this Annex M.
16
Translators Note: B40 a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-2), effective range 150 metres; B41 a larger
rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7), effective range 500 metres.

M-5

the 1st and 3rd Companies of 445 Battalion directly commanded by Comrade
Su Thu (the Battalion second-in-command)17 together with the 1st Battalion
(4th [sic] Regiment18 of the 5th Division) as the rear blocking group.

the 3rd Battalion19 (4th [sic] Regiment of the 5th Division) with the
responsibility for the flanking thrust (the decisive point20). We reinforced the
area of the killing ground with a minefield comprising 12 DH5 and DH1021
mines, and 42 American Mk1 mines.

Translators Note: Su Thu (Nguyn c Thu) was previously noted as commander of the 2nd
Company at the founding of 445 Battalion. Post-War, Nguyn cThu appeared in an Australian
television documentary and described aspects of the battle - Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan
The True Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993. For further detail, see Major Nguyn c Thus biography at Annex
A.
18
Translators Note: see footnote 13 (131) above should be 5th (ie 275th) Regiment throughout not 4th
(274th) Regiment.
19
Translators Note: This indicates that the 275th Regiments 3rd Battalion was allocated the killing
ground at Long Tn as confirmed by the 5th Division History (2005), see the following footnote 138.
However, Nguyn Thanh Hng (footnote 125) stated that - at the 5th Division forward headquarters element
in the small deserted hamlet of Phc Hng near Long Tn, he had with him there the third battalion of
the 275 as a reserve element. - Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, Part 2, op.cit., 1990, p.99. According to the
NVA defector L Xun Chuyn (Lieutenant Colonel/Chief of Staff of 5th VC Division see VCAT Item
No.4080124002), the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment was fairly good because it consisted entirely of
North Vietnamese who had been recalled to active duty and infiltrated into the South. The 3 rd Battalion was
previously the North Vietnamese Armys 605th Battalion and had initially been raised as the 4th Battalion of
the 32nd Regiment in Thanh Ha on 15 April 1965 of its 500 members, two-thirds were Southerner
regroupees ie cn b hi kt (soon joined by 200 Northern recruits). On 10 September 1965, the
Battalion was redesignated D605 and began its 2,000km/112-day infiltration on 13 September CDEC
Bulletin 3975. D605 Battalion (commanded by Nguyn Vn/nh Thiu; and with V Ngc Khuyn as
political officer) was incorporated into the 275th Regiment in May 1966 following the Regiments heavy
casualties at the second battle of V Su (Bnh Tuy Province) in mid-March 1966 which had forced the
incorporation of the Regiments 2nd and 3rd Battalions as a restructured 2nd Battalion. The Australian official
history notes that the Australian Task Force estimated that the 275th Regiment of three battalions ((had
been)) reinforced by at least one battalion from the North Vietnamese Army together with D445 Battalion.
- McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351. Nguyn Vn/nh Thiu did not command 275s 3rd
Battalion at Long Tn as he had been killed in the ng n engagement in March 1966 in Long Khnh
Province as related in the 5th Division History (2005). A major Vietnamese history of the War incorrectly
cites the 6th Battalion of 275 Regiment ie rather than the 3rd Battalion, and a company of 445 Battalion
destroying a company of Australian soldiers at Long Tn - Lch s Khng chin , Tp 4 (Vol 4), op.cit,
1999. For detail on the 275th Regiment, see Annex O.
20
Translators note: Literally Quyt chin im which equates to killing ground. The 5th Division
History (2005) - see Annex K, footnotes 37 and 38, similarly states that The 3rd Battalion was deployed
about 800 metres to the north-west of Route 52 with the task of attacking into the main killing zone at the
Tht Pagoda.
21
Translators note: The DH10 (DH: nh Hng - directional mine), was equivalent to the US
Claymore mine. In December 2014, an on-line media article - similar to the text of the 1991 D445 History,
related that: the fleeing Australian soldiers ran to the edge of the rubber plantation and stumbled into
the minefield that we had laid in preparation, and tens were killed and many were wounded. we inflicted
heavy losses on an Australian battalion - including wiping out an Australian company and setting fire to
two armoured vehicles, killing and wounding hundreds of Australian soldiers. Comrade L Tn Tao used
his AK rifle and a B40 to shoot and kill 36 enemy on-the-spot, and seized many weapons. - Nguyn Vn
17

M-6

the 80-strong V Th Su22 civil labour company comprised mainly of

females from the Province and led by Chn Phng as company commander,
to support the battle.
a surgery element led by Dr Phong and Dr Knh.23
a forward command element was established two kilometres to the north of
Long Tn24 by Comrades t ng and Nm Tm25 to directly command the
battle.26

Bch, Trn Phc Kch Long Tn (The Ambush Battle ), op.cit., 18 December 2014 see Annex Q.
In Australian accounts of the Battle, there is no mention of VC mines.
22
Translators Note: In May 1950, V Th Su, a member of the t Cng An Xung Phong was
captured. She was born in 1933 in Phc Li (joined Vit Minh at age of 14), captured and sent to Cn o
(a prison island in the South China Sea), and executed in January 1952. V Th Su was made a member of
the ng Lao ng Vit Nam (Vietnam Labour ie Communist, Party) one day before being shot. A statue
of the female martyr V Th Su was erected in t in 1985 see the Long t District History (1986)
at Annex L in Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit., 1991, pp.64-65, p.99 for detail. According to its unit
history, the C.12-65 Bnh Gi Victory Company also assisted at the Long Tn battle: ie as the enemy
artillery was very heavy and destroyed the NVA/VC field telephone lines, they were employed in commoliaison duties taking messages from the headquarters to the battlefront, repairing broken field telephone
lines, and evacuating casualties to "Hospital 1500" in the area of the My To Mountains. Reference to
casualties being treated at on 1500 (ie on 555 until mid-late 1963) is also included in Hu Thanh,
Min ng Nam B khi la, Thursday - 28 August 2008. For translated extracts and discussion related to
NVA/VC casualty evacuation, see Annex F The Battle of Long Tn: Casualties.
23
Translators Note: Comrade Hai Phong and Comrade Nguyn nh Knh.
24
Translators Note: The headquarters would appear to have been on the southern slopes of Ni t 2 (GR
YS 485676) a small wooded hill about 126 metres in height, also called Ni Thm (see footnote 291).
During the Battle, a Vit Cng heavy machinegun and a medium/light machinegun fired on Australian
troops from that location, and the enemy command element was thought to be on the forward slopes of
Nui Dat 2 McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.328 and p.323. As noted earlier however (see
footnotes 125 and 137), Nguyn Thanh Hng related that the headquarters of the attacking force of the 275
Regiment under the command of Senior Captain Ut Thoi ((ie: Nguyn Thi Bng)) was located on the
small feature of Nui Dat 2, just to the north of the ((Long Tn)) plantations edge, and that he ((Hng))
commanded the forward headquarters element of the 5 th Division in a small deserted hamlet just on the
eastern side of the Long Tan plantation called Ap Phuoc Hung - ie about two kilometres east of the Long
Tn battlefield at GR YS 495670. Hng made no mention of the presence of Trn Minh Tm the Chief of
Staff of the 5th VC Division at the Battle see T. Burstalls interview with Nguyn Thanh Hng in Bin
Ha City on 10 November 1987 pp.99-112 in Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns , op.cit., 1990.
25
Translators Note: Trn Minh Tm Chief of Staff of the 5th Division, See footnotes 125 and 127.
26
Translators Note: This passage notes t ng (ng Hu Thun the Commander of the B Ra
Province Unit) and Nm Tm (Trn Minh Tm Chief of Staff /Deputy Commander of the 5 th Division, see
footnotes 125 and 127) directly commanded the battle from a position two kilometres north of Long Tn
ie Ni t 2. However, as noted above, Nguyn Thanh Hng (aka Hai Hng, born 1932 in Hi M) an
operations staff officer on the Headquarters 5th Division, has claimed that it was left to him to plan the
attack at Long Tn and that he was the on-site commander throughout from Phc Hng hamlet. Nguyn
Thanh Hng also stated that he chose a tactic for the Battle that he described as: the luring of the tiger
from the mountain see T. Burstalls interview with Nguyn Thanh Hng in Bin Ha City on 10
November 1987 pp.99-112 in Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns , op.cit., 1990. Subsequently Hng also
outlined his role including the luring the tiger tactic in Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan
The True Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993. See also Annex O The 275th Regiment, footnotes 48 and 51 for
information on Nguyn Thanh Hng.

M-7

The ambush27 configuration for the battle was almost three kilometres long.28
At 10.15am on 18 August 196629, two Australian battalions and an armoured
vehicle squadron30 advanced in three columns (a main column and two subsidiary
27

Translators Note: Vietnamese accounts describe the engagement as a planned ambush (see footnotes
138 and 144). The 5th Division History (2005) - (see Annex K p.12) describes the tactic as a mobile
ambush to destroy the Australian force a new combat objective on the battlefield. Several Australian
works contend that an encounter battle is a more appropriate description see McNeill, I., To Long Tan,
op.cit., 1993, pp.362-371; Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, Book 1 - p.160, Book 2 p.99,
pp.109-110, pp.122-123; Ekins, A., Unravelling , op.cit., 2011. See also footnote 79. In his report
citing intelligence indications, the commander of 6RAR wrote that D Company contacted 275 Regiment
plus elements of D445 Bn which was moving to attack 1 ATF base on the night 18/19 Aug 66. Townsend, C. Lieutenant Colonel, 6 RAR After Action Report Operation SMITHFIELD: 18-21 August
1966, Ni t, 7 September 1966. The 1 ATF Report similarly implied that the Vit Cng force intended to
attack the Ni t base - 1st Australian Task Force - Vietnam, Combat Operations After Action Report
Operation Smithfield, R723-1-5, December 1966. In recent publications, Lieutenant Colonel (Retd) H.A.
Smith SG, MC (the officer commanding D/6RAR at the Battle of Long Tn) and David Sabben (a platoon
commander at the Battle) have argued strongly that the Vit Cng force had planned a ground attack against
the 1 ATF base at Ni t - ie rather than an ambush at Long Tn eg see Grandin, R., The Battle of
Long Tan , op.cit., 2004, pp.275-293; and Sabben, D., Was the Battle of Long Tan a VC ambush? : A
presentation, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1996.
28
Translators Note: See a map of the Battle area at the end of this Annex M.
29
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 Battalion History does not mention the shelling of the 1 ATF Ni t
base on 17th August. However, according to Vn Lin the 445 Battalion political officer, the Battalion
provided guides for the units that mortared the Task Force Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990,
p.117. The 5th Division History (2005) see Annex K, p.9, relates: Continuously through 16 and 17 August,
the local forces and the Divisions reconnaissance cells fired mortars into Ni t. The 1 ATF
Commanders Diary for August 1966 described the impact on 17 August of 63 VC 82mm mortar bombs
and five 70mm howitzer rounds based on crater analysis Headquarters 1 ATF - Commanders Diary,
August 1968 see also 1 ATF INTSUM No.77, Ni t, 17 August 1966 that reported the shelling as
probably by D860 Battalion; and McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.305 that related the 22-minute
shelling that began at 0243hrs on 17 August. The shelling comprised 82mm mortar, 75mm RCL and 70mm
howitzer rounds (probably from an obsolescent Japanese Model 92 howitzer). 1 ATF suffered 24 wounded
two seriously. On 17 August, patrols from B Company of 6RAR found the firing site of the Vit Cng
75mm RCLs (at GR YS 468655) with 23 discarded 75 mm shell cases, bits of bodies and blood-stained
clothing, and an ox cart destroyed by the 1 ATF artillery counter-battery fire. - Mollison, C.S., Long Tan
and Beyond Alpha Company 6 RAR in Vietnam 1966-67, Cobbs Crossing, Woombye, 2006, pp.124125. Mortar base-plate positions were also found in the vicinity of GR YS 459671. Post-War, a Vit Cng
medic - Chung, related that three of Vit Cng RCL party from the 275th Regiment were killed by the 1
ATF counter-battery fire and were buried nearby. - Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan The
True Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993. According to the official Australian account of the Battle in McNeill, I.,
To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993 pp.305-375, the ground battle commenced at 4.08pm on 18 August 1966.
According to the 5th Division History - 2005, the Australian force was sighted: at 3.30pm by the 2 nd
Battalions reconnaissance cell (of the 275th Regiment) and engaged soon after. A comprehensive
contemporary Australian report of the Battle is at: 1 st Australian Task Force - Vietnam, Combat Operations
After Action Report Operation Smithfield, R723-1-5, December 1966 (Internet-accessible, see
Bibliography). According to the Report, the first contact between the two forces was at 1540hrs (3.40pm).
Maps and sketches attached to the Report illustrate the phases of the Battle and also note the Vit Cng
shelling positions and the 1 ATF counter-battery targets.

M-8

columns) that moved in parallel into our battle zone. The main column advanced along
the dirt road to Long Tn with four tanks31 in the vanguard, followed by two infantry
companies supported by two armoured vehicles. The two subsidiary columns advanced as
pincers parallel with the main column and at a distance of 300 metres from it. Each of
the pincers comprised a battalion with two tanks in support. All three enemy columns fell
into our encircling ambush.32
Nguyn Vn Bng the commander of the observation post element reported
the following to the headquarters:
Report ! The enemy has appeared 650 metres from the rear blocking position of
our battle zone.
After having confirmed the situation with the observation group, t ng flicked
the switchboard33 to another line and loudly and clearly ordered: Attention, forward
blocking group: the enemy is advancing in three columns to the west-northwest straight
into our battle zone. Comrades must strive to maintain complete secrecy. Wait until the
enemy is truly close, and only open fire when the order is given by the headquarters.
Nm Tm34 picked up his communications device and added: Attention Tail,
the enemy force is very long. If there are any difficulties with the commands
communications system, then automatically open fire on the enemy when they are 30
metres from the battle zones forward blocking position.
Everything went without a hitch until the last minute. When an enemy tank was
50 metres from the forward blocking position, the trigger was pulled on a recoilless rifle
(RCL) - but the round missfired ! The enemy then discovered our battle position. They
fired thick-and-fast while withdrawing and redeploying their formations. Comrade L
Thanh Trng a 5th Division reinforcement to D44535 and armed with a B40, had just got
30

Translators Note: Literally as: chi on xe bc thp. The initial Australian force at Long Tn ie the
108-strong D Company of 6RAR (infantry, three artillery personnel) was not mounted in armoured
personnel carriers and was not accompanied by armoured vehicles. Australian armoured personnel carriers
(APCs - M113A1, 11-tonne) - carrying infantry reinforcements, only arrived at Long Tn towards the end
of the Battle at approximately 1850hrs (ie 6.50pm) on 18 August 1966.
31
Translators Note: Literally as: xe tng. The Australian tanks (ie xe tng) the 51-tonne Centurions,
did not arrive in Vietnam until February 1968 (by August 1968, the squadron was at full strength with 28
tanks). Subsequently, in this 445 Battalion History, the Vietnamese term, xe thit gip has been translated
as armoured vehicle this is almost always a reference to the M113A1 APC, and its variants.
32
Translators Note: The 5th Division History (2005) - see Annex K, p.10, p.11, f.42; indicates that the 275th
Regiment elements were caught off-guard by the Australian advance because Trn Minh Tm (Nm Tm)
who was directly commanding the battle, had directed the observation element to temporarily withdraw
We had committed an error in our observation of the enemy and in arranging our formations to start to
attack from a far distance because of this, we were unable to surround and destroy the enemy battalion.
33
Translators Note: Literally as: t hp in thoi - probably a field telephone switchboard, most likely
the Chicom Type 10.
34
Translators Note: Trn Minh Tm (Nm Tm) Chief of Staff of the 5th VC Division, see footnote 125.
As noted at footnote 144, Trn Minh Tm was reportedly collocated with t ng (ng Hu Thun) - the
commander of the B Ra Province Unit, most likely on the southern slopes of Ni t 2 Hill (see footnote
142).
35
Translators Note: This is the only reference in the 1991 D445 Battalion History to the Battalion as
D445. The NVA/VC used letter designators for their formations, units and sub-units - ie A for

M-9

up to fire on a tank when he was shot through the chest by a round from an enemy heavy
machinegun. The hero L Thanh Trng had fallen ! Nguyn Hu Ngha the
commander of the reconnaissance element (from the 5th Division)36 came forward and
grabbed the B40 and hit the leading armoured vehicle, setting it on fire. Comrade Vnh
the number two37 of a 57mm RCL crew, followed up by loading a second round for
Comrade Tn to hit and set fire to the second armoured vehicle. The third armoured
vehicle was destroyed by two B41 rounds fired by the reconnaissance element from the
5th Division. The engagement at the forward blocking position became increasingly
fierce. The situation was like a Battle Royal as the enemy massed quite close to our
positions. The battle became close combat, fought in groups and by areas it was
difficult for our infantry and artillery to support one another. Rain began to come down in
buckets. Our 57mm RCL38 was nullified at a tactical distance of a few tens of metres,
and many of the comrades in the weapon crew were killed and the crew commander was
captured.39 After the first few minutes of confusion, our forward position was still able to
section/squad, B for platoon, C for company, D for battalion, E and sometimes Q for regiment,
F for division, and T for military region. 445 Battalion was referred to as D445 in the reports by the
Battalion commander and the political officer see Annex H.
36
Translators Note: Earlier see footnote 128, Nguyn Hu Ngha was described as the 2ic of the
reconnaissance company of the 5th Division. The 5th Division History (2005) however relates a L Hu
Ngha as the officer commanding the 275th Regiments reconnaissance company and who used a B40 to
destroy the leading armoured vehicle at the Long Tn battle.
37
Translators Note: Literally: x th ph ie not the firer of the DKZ 57 (57mm recoilless rifle), but
the support soldier who loaded the weapon.
38
Translators Note: The Vietnamese text implies a single weapon only. However, two 57mm recoilless
(RCL) rifles were among the weapons captured by the Australian forces at Long Tn. Individual weapons
recovered were 33 AK-47 rifles, five SKS rifles, two M1 carbines, one M1 Garand rifle, one Browning
automatic rifle, seven RPD light machineguns, one PPSh M1941 sub-machinegun, one Thompson submachinegun, and four RPG-2 rocket launchers. Crew-served weapons captured were one 7.62mm SGM
heavy machinegun (with shield/wheels) and two 57mm RCLs see McAulay, L., The Battle of Long Tan,
op.cit., 1987, p.141 and McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.558, endnote 108. Several side-arms
including K-54/Tokarev automatic pistols, were also recovered but retained by Australian personnel. For
the souveniring of weapons from the battlefield and disparities between the numbers of weapons
recovered and the numbers of reported enemy KIA, see Annex F: The Battle of Long Tn Casualties,
pp.18-20.
39
Translators Note: On the evening of 18 August 1966 ie at the conclusion of the Battle, 1 ATF reported
that the VC unit was probably the 274 Regiment of the 5 Division 1 ATF INTSUM No.78, Ni t, 18
August 1966. On the afternoon of the day following the Battle, a 6RAR situation report noted recovering
ID cards issued in North Vietnam. Enemy units involved in battle identified as C14 Company, D3
Battalion, Q5 Regiment; D605 and 45 NVA Regiment. - Mollison, C.S., Long Tan and Beyond , op,cit,
2006, p.201. Only one member of 445 Battalion was captured at Long Tn (reportedly a 57mm RCL
gunner); and two members of the 275th Regiment were captured who declared themselves as members of
on 45 (ie then a cover designator for the 275th Regiment). Later on 19 August, 1 ATF reported that the
two Northern POW were members of NVA 45 Regiment whilst the other was a member of D445
Battalion Local Provincial Mobile. The North Vietnamese prisoners revealed that 45 Regiment formally
[sic] 23 Regiment (possibly means 33 Regiment) moved into Phuoc Tuy Province in May this year and is
allied to 66 Regiment. Captured documents revealed that D3 Battalion, D605 Battalion, and C14/D3/Q5
Regiment were in contact with elements of 6RAR on 18 August 1 ATF INTSUM No.79, Ni t, 19
August 1966. Translators Note (continues): Some published Australian accounts have misinterpreted the

M-10

force the enemy into the killing zone. They fell into our minefield and were killed in large
numbers. Our rear element also began to storm into the enemy in the killing zone while,
at the same time, our flank attacking group advanced. The enemy was in a miserable
situation and surrounded, but the tanks and infantry in their subsidiary columns continued
to press into our areas that lacked anti-tank firepower and counter-attacked us. Following
this, the enemy regrouped and used coloured smoke to mark their positions and called in
directed artillery fire. We were unable to move even a half-metre to finish off a number of
the enemy because of their rain of artillery from the New Zealand orchestra (a term
used by the enemy for their New Zealand artillery battalion in B Ra40). Almost all our
attacking elements suffered casualties to the enemy artillery.41 Comrade Su Thu the
commander of 445 Battalions rear blocking group, was seriously wounded by an AR15
round that passed through one ear lobe to the other.42 Comrade Su Chin43 the
commander of the 1st Company was killed.
foregoing to indicate that a North Vietnamese unit/formation titled 45 ie separate to the 275th Regiment,
was involved at Long Tn (see footnotes 131 and 137). The foregoing three unit/sub-unit designators in the
captured documents (INTSUM No.79) all relate to the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment of the 5th VC
Division for an outline history of 3/275 Regiment see footnote 137, and also Annex O for the 275th
Regiment (including a very brief account of the Long Tn battle by NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting). On 21
August, the 1 ATF intelligence staff were still unsure of the enemy elements engaged at Long Tn
assessing that: The 275 VC Regt, 605 Bn 250 Regt and C860 Bn withdrew East and NE following the 18
Aug operations against 6 RAR Annex A to Op Toledo Frag Order 1-8-66, OPS204, 211600H Aug 60.
As noted earlier at footnote 137, D605 was the earlier title of the 3 rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment that
had joined the Regiment in May 1966, and C860 was believed by 1 ATF and US sources, to be a covername for 445 Battalion.
40
Translators Note: The New Zealand artillery element ie 161 Battery - Royal New Zealand Artillery
(RNZA) had earlier been attached to the US 173rd Airborne Brigade since June 1965. In mid-1966, it joined
the Australian Task Force and was located in the Task Force base at Ni t not in B Ra. Two New
Zealand infantry companies were later integrated into Australian battalions the first arriving in April
1967. For New Zealand forces in Vietnam, see Rock, J.R., Kiwis Under Fire: The New Zealand Armed
Forces in South Vietnam c.1965-1972, University of Auckland, November 1995.
41
Translators Note: Artillery units in the 1 ATF base at Ni t comprised: 1 Field Regiment (105mm
M2A1 howitzers maximum range 10,575 metres), 161 Battery RNZA (105mm), A Battery of the US 2/35
Regiment (155mm M109 medium self-propelled guns maximum range 14,600 metres). A total of 3,198
105mm and 242 155mm rounds were reportedly fired in support of the Long Tn battle McNeill, I., To
Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351. A December 2014 Vietnamese on-line article noted that despite the heavy
Australian artillery fire that included naval gunfire support : the casualties were limited because we
had prepared carefully, and when deploying to the battlefield every soldier had carried a shovel and on
their shoulders they each were bearing a bundle of about 10 branches (each as thick as a wrist and about a
metre long) to make anti-shrapnel covers for their individual pits and shelters to protect against enemy
artillery fire. Nguyn Vn Bch, Trn Phc Kch Long Tn (The Ambush Battle ), op.cit., 18
December 2014 see Annex Q.
42
Translators Note: Some of the Australian troops at the Battle of Long Tn were armed with the 5.56mm
M16 rifle and also the earlier, very similar, AR15 model. Post-War, in an Australian television
documentary, Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu) spoke on the Long Tn battle and displayed his head wound. Horsefield, B. (Director/ Producer), Long Tan The True Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993 see also the
biographical notes on Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu) at Annex A.
43
Translators Note: Trn Vn Chin (Su Chin) was appointed - from Executive Officer, to command the
1st Company on 20 October 1965 - CDEC Log 09-1876-66. He was awarded a Certificate of

M-11

After about an hour of fighting, the headquarters ordered our elements to

withdraw.44 Miss Chn Phng and her comrades in the V Th Su civil labour company
unafraid of death, ran fearlessly through the enemys falling artillery and - together with
the troops, carried the wounded to safety.
In this large battle with the Australian forces, we wiped out an entire company and
inflicted heavy casualties on one of their battalions.45 COSVN Headquarters awarded the
Liberation Military Feats Medal Third Class for the battle.46 However, it was also a battle
in which we suffered heavy casualties. In 445 Battalions 2nd Company alone, there were
Commendation by the B Ra Province Unit in mid-February 1966 - CDEC Log 04-1394-66, was as an
outstanding emulator of 1965- CDEC Log 05-1294-66 (very unusual for such a high-ranking military
cadre), and had been formally promoted to Commander of the 1 st Company on 15 February 1966 - CDEC
Log 05-1294-66.
44
Translators Note: In an interview on 18 March 1989 in Bin Ha, Vn Lin (Ba Lin) the 445
Battalion political officer, related to Terry Burstall that after the battle: Ba Liens part of the D445 went to
the area of the Song Rai [sic] forest and moved around the area telling the people all about the big battle in
the rubber plantations. They did not go anywhere near the Nui May Taos [sic] Burstall, T., A Soldier
Returns, op.cit., 1990, p.117. After the battle, the 275th Regiment elements moved back to L Jungle base
camp (ie the Rng L vicinity YT 7610 in Xun Lc District of Long Khnh Province) see Annex O,
The 275th Regiment.
45
Translators Note: For an all-sources summary of casualty claims for the Battle, see Annex F The
Battle of Long Tn: Casualties. On Australian casualties, in his 53-page diary (to 7 October 1966, recovered
by Australian forces on 20 October 1966), Nguyn Nam Hng (2ic of 274 Regiment) related that the 5th
Regiment attacked at Ni t and 600 Australians were killed and 1 Australian Battalion was
exterminated CDEC Log 11-1259-66. The 5th Division History (2005) relates that the Long Tn battle:
had a very important significance: it was the first time that we had destroyed an Australian company. The
Military Region 7 History account notes: The 5th Division fought many battles and - in particular,
together with the B Ra 445 Battalion, for the first time struck the Australian forces in the rubber
plantation at Long Tn (18 August 1966) and inflicted heavy casualties on an Australian company. - The
Armed Forces of Military Region 7 50 Years, 1995, p.35. The ng Nai History (1986) relates: As
planned, on 19 [sic] August 445 Battalion ambushed (phc kch) the Australian group at Vn Xoi.
Their 3rd [sic] Battalion advanced with tank support from Ni t and fell into our ambush. 275 and 445
manoeuvred to decisively fight the enemy. Our troops killed 500 Australians and destroyed 21 tanks. Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.132. The ng Nai Monograph (2001) similarly
records: The B Ra-Vng Tu 445 Battalion attacked the Australian troops at Vn Xoi on 19 August
1966 and killed 500 and destroyed 21 tanks. - a Ch ng Nai, op.cit., 2001. A major Vietnamese
account of the War relates: On 18 August, the troops of the 5th Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division led by
Deputy Divisional Commander Trn Minh Tm set an ambush and attacked the Royal Australian Battalion
[sic] that was sweeping the Ni t-t area. After 30 minutes of fighting, the 6th [sic] Battalion (of the
5th Regiment) supported by a company of the 445th Battalion (B Ra Province Unit) destroyed a company
of Australian soldiers. As a result, this Australian mercenary force - renowned for its experience in counterguerrilla warfare, became panic-stricken and fled to t . - Lch s Khng chin , Tp 4 (Vol 4),
op.cit., 1999.
46
Translators Note: The Liberation Military Feats Medal Third Class ie: Hun chng chin cng gii
phng hng ba. Several 445 Battalion soldiers were awarded Letters of Appreciation (Giy Khen) for their
exploits fighting the Australians on 18 Aug 66 at Long Tn including o Vn Trung section 2ic/2nd
Company - CDEC Log 12-2368-66; Trn Vn Tranh section 2ic/2nd Company; Phm Vn ng - 2nd
Company CDEC Log 01-1673-69. For soldiers of the 275th Regiment who received medals, letters of
appreciation, and certificates of commendation for their action in the battle at Long Tn see Annex O.

M-12

23 casualties of whom three died.47 The 5th Division lost 30 comrades killed and over
60 wounded.48 Our casualties were mainly inflicted by the enemys artillery. Once more,
445 Battalions cadre and soldiers again discovered a dangerous trick: the use by the
Australian forces of directed and counter-assault artillery fire.

47

Translators Note: The same casualty figures for the 2nd Company are cited in a medical history - L
Thanh Dng (et al), Lch S , op.cit., 2008. A former commander of 445 Battalion (early 1968-1969)
Nguyn Vn Kim, but who was not present at the Long Tn battle, claimed that 445 Battalions casualties
both dead and wounded, were approximately 30, mainly from artillery fire McNeill, I., To Long Tan,
op.cit., 1993, p.368. According to Nguyn Vn Nhng (alias Lc) a 445 Battalion platoon 2ic at Long
Tn who subsequently defected under the Chiu Hi programme (see footnote 233), 445 Battalion
casualties were 10 killed in action and 16 wounded in action. Pannell, B.W., Postscript to Long Tan,
Australian Infantry, 16, No.2, May 1970, p.180. In mid- September 1966, 1 ATF reported: D445 had
probably lost between 30-40 KIA. - 1 ATF Intelligence Review No.1, Ni t, 13 September 1966, para
4.c. Much later, in May 1971, the 1 ATF Intelligence Staff noted that returnees had stated 445
Battalions casualties were 70 KIA and 100 WIA. - Peters, C.C.M. Major, D445 - Order of Battle, 1 ATF
Battle Intelligence Section, Ni t, 6 May 1971. At the time of the Battle, 445 Battalions strength was
probably 380-400 (see Annexes D and H). Captured 445 Battalion documents detailed the Battalions
strength as 392 in early August 1966, 409 in November 1966 and about 415 in December 1966 see Annex
C D445 Battalion: Strengths.
48
Translators Note: For a summary of Long Tn battle casualty claims and assessments, see Annex F. On
the 5th VC Divisions casualties in the Long Tn battle (ie almost all suffered by its 275th Regiment), the 5th
Division History (2005) relates: The 1st Battalion and the 3rd Battalion ((of the 275th Regiment)) suffered
high casualties. Our forces suffered a large number of casualties 32 were killed and 60 comrades were
wounded. - Phm Quang inh, Colonel (ed) Lch S , op.cit., 2005. A more recent medical history has
related that the 5th Divisions main forces suffered over 200 casualties - L Thanh Dng (et al), Lch S
, op.cit., 2008. The rallier Nguyn Vn Nhng (see the preceding footnote) stated that the official
casualty figure for the 5th Division was about 200 killed in action, but he believed the figure of 200 to be
a gross under-estimate. - Pannell, B.W., Postscript , 1970, op.cit., p.180. Subsequently, a 5 th Division
POW NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting an assistant political officer in the 275th Regiment at the Long Tn
battle (captured on 26 February 1969), stated that the 275th Regiment sustained over 200 casualties,
including both KIA and WIA at the Long Tn battle on approximately 17 August 1966 VCAT Item
No.2310305007. The Australian official history relates that A diary of the enemy commander at Long
Tan which was subsequently captured listed his losses as 500 - McNeill, I., To Long Tan, 1993, op.cit.,
p.351 and p.558 (endnote 110) - note however, that no copy or translation of that reported document is
available. In 2008, Vietnamese contributors to an official Vietnamese military blogsite challenged the
Australian figures for Vit Cng casualties as excessive see Altus, Trn Long Tn, Qun S Vit Nam
website, 8 May 2008 and postings in August 2008 by sudoan, and also in February and March 2011.
Only one of the available Vietnamese district-level histories make any mention of the Long Tn battle ng Tn Hng (ed), The History of the Struggle and Development of the Party Committee, the Forces
and the People of t District (1930-2005), ng Nai Collective Publishing House, Bin Ha, 2006.
That History briefly states: On 18 August 1966, Regional troops (of the 5 th Division) coordinated with
Province forces and Long Tn village guerrillas to conduct an ambush on the Australian military at Long
Tn, wiping out an Australian platoon and wounding hundreds of the enemy. The Battle is not mentioned
in the Long t District History (1986) - although the battle took place on the far northern border of Long
t District - Phan Ngc Danh & Trn Quang Toi,, Lch S , op.cit., 1986; nor in the History of the Ha
Long Village Party Chapter (1930 2005), op.cit., 2009; nor The Minh m Base History, op.cit, 2006. As
noted, for further discussion on aspects of the Battle, including Vietnamese and Australian casualty claims
and assessments see Annex F, The Battle of Long Tn: Casualties.

M-13

Throughout the 1966 Wet Season, the Australian forces coordinated with the
puppet military to continuously launch clearing operations deep into our rear service
bases located east and west of Route 2, in Long Phc, and the Minh m they had
met our forces on the B Ra battlefield particularly 445 Battalion which they regarded
as a Force to be afraid of. They coordinated with intelligence networks and the military
intelligence of the puppet forces to find out 445 Battalions operating methods and the
location our bases in order to attack us with artillery and airpower and launched large
clearing operations using infantry with the aim of eradication. However, not only
were they unable to achieve such, but there were many occasions on which they suffered
heavy casualties. 445 Battalion continued to operate right beside them. In places where
the enemys bombs, shells and tanks had flattened the earth, it looked like not even a
mouse could exist. However from July [sic]49 1966 onwards, 445 Battalion did not
conduct any large operations (at battalion-level) as we were continually on the defensive
countering the enemys sweeping operations. Nevertheless, unplanned engagements
occurred regularly and these were very tense. After almost a year of contending with the
enemys counter-offensive strategy in the critical areas, many of our core soldiers and
battle-experienced cadres had become casualties. The morale and the fighting will of the
Battalion were still good but our combat strength was uneven.

49

Translators Note: As the battle at Long Tn occurred on 18 August 1966, the reference to July 1966,
may imply that 445 Battalion did not regard the battle at Long Tn as an engagement in which they had
operated at battalion-level or, more likely July 1966 should perhaps have been September 1966.

M-14

Translators Endnote: Long Tn Map

Scale: each grid square is 1km x 1km.

The site of the engagement on 18 August 1966 is indicated by the dotted lines
based on Major H. A. Smiths sketches (see Annex F footnote 17; and footnotes 132
and 146 in the 1991 D445 History50). There were no maps or sketches of the Long Tn
area in either the 1991 D445 History or the 5th Division History (2005). The 2004 D445
History however included a sketch map depicting the engagement see page 76 and
footnote 275 in the main text.
The 1ATF base at Ni t was about five kilometres to the west of the battle site.

50

Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2011 (free-to-read on
the Internet since mid-2011).

Annex N

The 274th Regiment - Not at the Battle of Long Tn

(nor planned to ambush any US reaction force)
References:
A. Chamberlain, E.P., The Battle of Long Tn 18/8/66 The NVA/VC Revisited,
Australian War Memorial Conference International Perspectives on a Long
War, Canberra, 14 August 2013 (paper and presentation)
B. Chamberlain, E.P., The Enemy and Intelligence, in Phc Tuy: Intelligence
Successes and Failures, National Vietnam Veterans Museum, 12 April 2014.
(paper and presentation)
Recently, in an article on the Internet - that included the map below, the 274th Vit
Cng Main Force Regiment ie the 4th Regiment, was reportedly present on the Long
Tn battlefield on 18 August 1966 to the west of Ni t East (Ni t 2).1 Was the
274th Regiment at - or involved in, the Battle of Long Tn ie together with the 275th
Regiment ?

B-Ra Phc-Tuy Trong Khi La - Trn Long Tn (Fire and Sword in B-Ra Phc-Tuy the Battle
of Long Tn), B-Ra Phc-Tuy Community website:
http://www.bariaPhctuy.org/tailieu/tranlongtan.html (Westminister, California, US).

N-2
The Australian Official History
In its section on the Battle of Long Tn in mid-August 1966, the 1993 Australian
Official History2 relates that:
In conjuction with the ambush in the rubber plantation, 274 Regiment was sited
in a second ambush position astride Route 2, north of Binh Ba. Their role was to
ambush a squadron of the 11th Armoured [sic] Cavalry Regiment if it moved down
inter-provincial Route 2 to support the Australians. [According to Second
Lieutenant David Harris, Captain Keeps3] pet hypothesis was an attack from the
east by a VC regiment with a regimental ambush set on Route 2 north of the base
camp above Binh Ba, to catch the newly-arrived 11 ACR as they streamed down
to help us. pp.369-370. The associated Endnote 58 at p.563 adds sources and
elaborates as follows: Shelby L. Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle, Galahad
Books, New York, 1987, pp.129-130. Intelligence after the battle confirmed that
on or about 18 August, 274 Regiment had indeed been astride Route 2 between
Ngai Giao and the province northern boundary. When it became obvious that the
275 Regimental attack had failed, the regiment moved westward deep into the Hac
Dich area. 6RAR Operation Vaucluse: Combat After Action Report, 3
November [sic] 1966, Annex A, Enemy, 6RAR Commanders Diary, September
1966, AWM 95 [sic].4 3 Squadron 11 Armoured [sic] Cavalry Regiment (ACR)
had arrived in Long Khanh province on 12 August and was being followed by the
rest of the regiment in September In this instance, 3 Squadron 11 ACR did not
react as the enemy anticipated.
Similar Accounts
More recently, in 2011 similar to the account above, an article in the Australian
War Memorials Wartime magazine related:
Yet Australian intelligence had confirmed that the enemy forces encountered by
D Company 6RAR also included elements of 274 and 275 Vit Cng Regiments
((p.45)) 274 Regiment was sited in a second ambush astride Route 2 , north of
the task force base, in order to ambush any American relief forces that might be
sent south to assist the Australians. (p.47)5
2

McNeill, I., To Long Tn: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950-1966, Allen &
Unwin/Australian War Memorial, St Leonards, 1993, pp.369-370 this is cited in the article on the Battle
on Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Long_Tan . Regarding the 274th Regiment, Ian
McNeill appears to be relating accounts told to him in interviews by Nguyn Vn Kim in Vietnam in June
1988 and by Nguyn Thanh Hng in Australia in September 1990. Sketch 16.1 (between pp. 326-327) the
Enemy plan as described by Colonel Nguyen Thanh Hong, includes an annotation: Force from 274
Regiment in position on Route 2 to ambush reinforcements from 11 (US) Armoured [sic] Cavalry
Regiment. As noted above, McNeill also cited information in his Endnote 58 (p.563) to support the claim
of an ambush planned by 274 Regiment against 11th ACR elements see also Sketch 16.1 opposite p.327.
Note also p.370 where junior staff officers at HQ 1ATF are related as having hypothesised that the VC plan
might have included a regimental ambush set on Route 2 north of the base camp to catch the newly arrived
11 ACR as they streamed down to help us.
3
Captain R.M. Keep the GSO3 Intelligence departed 1 ATF on about 6 August. 11 ACRs armoured
vehicles did not arrive in Vietnam until 7 September 1966 and only occupied their Sui Rm base in
October 1966.
4
The 6RAR Operation Vaucluse Operation Order 1-9-66 dated 6 September 1966 is at AWM95, 7/6/6.
5
Ekins, A., Unravelling the riddles of Long Tan, Wartime, Issue 55, Australian War Memorial, Canberra,
July 2011, pp.42-47.

N-3

In late July 2012, a posting on the Canberra Times newspaper website (managed
by journalist David Ellery) by Mr Martin Walsh asserted:
It is also important to note that 274 Regiment comprising some 2,500 men was to
the West of Nui Dat in a position (by all reports) to ambush any allied
reinforcements from Saigon which would come down when 275 Regiment
attacked Nui Dat.6
A number of elements in the Australian Official History - and the similar accounts
related above, are incorrect. The Australian Official History (1993) in particular has
influenced several subsequent writers7 with its claimed involvement of the 274th VC Main
Force Regiment8 and the prospect of possible relief operations by the US 11th Armored
Cavalry Regiment. The record on these aspects could usefully be corrected before the
upcoming 50th anniversary of the Battle of Long Tn in 1966.
274 VC Main Force Regiment in August 1966 Where was it ?
In the early days of August 1966, the 274th Regiment9 was located principally in
Long Thnh District of south-eastern Bin Ha Province close to the Phc Tuy Province
border. Its main local bases were in the Hc Dch area covering the tri-border area of Bin
Ha/ Long Khanh/Phc Tuy provinces (within Base Area 30310). Some significant base

Walsh, M. Red Dune Films, Communists Wrong on Long Tan History, Canberra Times, Canberra, 27
July 2012.
Others have also been influenced by the statements of Nguyn Vn Kim (Commander D445, early 19681969 see his biography at Annex A), that the 274th Regiment was tasked in mid-August 1966 to interdict
any US forces moving south on Route 2 to relieve Australian forces during the Long Tn battle see
Kims statement in Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tn The True Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993.
And also Walsh, M. in The Canberra Times, 27 July 2012.
8
On the late evening of 18 August 1966 ie at the conclusion of the Battle of Battle of Long Tn, 1 ATF
reported that the VC unit was probably the 274 Regiment of the 5 Division 1 ATF, INTSUM No.78,
Ni t, 18 August 1966 (corrected in the following days INTSUM to NVA 45 Regiment ie the cover
designator for the 275th Regiment). According to the AATTV advisor at the Phc Tuy Sector
Headquarters in B Ra, ARVN sources at the Sector HQ and at the 10 th ARVN Division HQ (Xun Lc)
claimed that at the Battle of Long Tn, a battalion from 274 Regt namely D800, was involved which
had been sent across west-to-east and north of the Long Tan battle area. Wells, M. Captain - AATTV, B
Ra Sector, 1966-1967, email to author (Chamberlain), 11 June 2012. Interestingly, the D445 Battalion
History (1991) also includes a somewhat similar error in naming the 4th Regiment (ie the 274th Regiment)
as the VC formation at the Battle of Long Tn ie instead of the 5th Regiment (275th Regiment). Similarly,
the 274th Regiment is also incorrectly cited (in lieu of the 275th Regiment) in the history of the C.12-65
Bnh Gi Victory Assault Youth Group. See: Chamberlain, E.P., The Vit Cng D445 Battalion, 2011,
f.131 and Annex E. However, the later 2004 revised edition of the D445 Battalion History correctly
identifies the 5th (ie 275th) Regiment as the major VC force at the Battle of Long Tn.
9
The 274th Regiment was founded on 3 February 1965. In June 1966, the total strength of the 274th
Regiments three battalions was assessed as: 1,128 - comprising D1/800 Bn/H12 of 411 personnel; D2/265
Bn/H14 401; D3/308 Bn/H16 316 CDEC Log 09-1854-66. Additionally, the Regiments support
companies C16 to C-30, totalled 677 personnel including 238 in its C-30 (Convalescent Company).
CDEC Log 09-1832-66. For detailed unit strengths in October 1965 totalling 1,977 (including the
regimental headquarters of 100) see CDEC Log 09-1586. In August 1966, 1 ATF assessed the
Regiments total strength as 1,700.
10
Base Area 303 (bounded by YS 250890 YS 340915 425855 395805 270785 265845) also
contained elements of Rear Services Group 84 responsible for support of 5 th VC Division forces in the
western area of VC B Bin Province. Resupply including rice from the Mekong Delta provinces, was
moved north across the Rng Sc and up into Base Area 303 in the Hc Dch.
7

N-4
camps were also located to east of Route 2 in the north of Phc Tuy Province - north of
Bnh Gi village.11
On 1 August 1966, on Route 15 - near the Phc Tuy/Bin Ha Province border,
the 274th Regiment had ambushed an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) convoy
and inflicted very heavy casualties12; on 10 August, the 274th Regiments 265th Battalion
attacked a group of 15 ARVN trucks on Route 15 about 14 kilometres south of the border
(YS 270660); and on 11 August an estimated VC battalion attacked the ARVN compound
at Ph M on Route 15 (YS 237766)13. Following the 10 and 11 August attacks,
significant elements of the 274th Regiment deployed eastward across northern Phc
Tuy Province, and joined rear service elements in base camps east of Route 2 (north of
Bnh Gi village) ie having moved a distance of about 30 kilometres.
The recovered notebook/diary14 of the 274th Regiments 2ic/Chief of Staff Nguyn Nam Hng, explicitly records the Regiments activities in mid-August 196615.
As noted above, the Regiment had conducted ambush and harassing activity on Route 15.
The notebook entry for 16 August following a regimental committee meeting, related
that some soldiers were depressed are afraid of the war and hardships the number
of ((sick and wounded)) soldiers under treatment was over 200 (232). Hngs location in
mid-August is unclear but he was probably in a base camp in north-eastern Phc Tuy.
On 18 August see the Vietnamese text and the translated extract from his
notebook/diary illustrated opposite, Hng wrote detailed notes ie a military operational
appreciation, planning for a future attack on the strategic hamlets on Route 1 (The Road
1 Area) in the Hng Ngha-Hng Lc region of central-western Long Khanh Province
(and made no mention of Australian forces - nor of central Phc Tuy Province).
11

Large camps were in the Tm B area (YS 520810) and a few kilometres to the east of Ni Sao (YS
518847).
HQ 1 ATF Ops Log Sheet 612, Serial 105, the ARVN convoy (2/48th Regiment) was ambushed at YS
236784 (on the border between Ph M and Thai Thin) - 10 trucks were damaged, 32 ARVN KIA, 14
WIA, plus missing. Weapons lost included a .30 MG, 60mm mortar, and 21 small arms. The 5th VC
Division History (2005) relates: In August, the 4th ((ie 274th)) Regiment organised an ambush of
mechanized vehicles on Route 51 ((ie previously Route 15)), destroying seven military vehicles, 50 enemy,
shooting down an aircraft and seizing two weapons. In the 5th VC Division History (2005), the description
of the planning, the reconnaissance, and the conduct of the Battle of Long Tn makes no mention of the
4th (ie 274th) Regiment. Two senior staff officers from the 5th VC Division Headquarters were at the
Battle site ie: Lieutenant Colonel Trn Minh Tm (Nm Tm) the deputy divisional commander the
battlefield commander, and Nguyn Thanh Hng (Hai Hng) an operations staff officer on the
Headquarters see Annex K and the earlier: Chamberlain, E.P., The Vit Cng D445 Battalion: Their
Story, Point Lonsdale, 2011, Annex I.
13
1ATF, INTSUMs No.70 and No.72, Ni t, 10 and 12 August 1966; and Troops Information Sheet
No.4, 8-14 August 1966. See also the citation signed by the 274th Regiment (on 94) commanding officer
ng Vn K, dated 19 August 1966 commending Trng Vn Chin CDEC Log 10-2268-66.
14
On 20 October 1966, Australian 5RAR troops in an operation in the Ni Th Vi mountains recovered the
notebook/diary (completed to 7 October 1966) of Nguyn Nam Hng the second-in-command/Chief of
Staff of the 274th Regiment - see CDEC Bulletins 1413 and 1418; CDEC Log 11-1259-66 (translated text);
and 1 ATF Troops Information Sheet No.31, Ni t, 13-19 February 1967 (for a three-page commentary).
The capture of the diary/notebook and an outline of its contents is related in ONeill, R.J. (Intelligence
Officer 5RAR October 1966), Vietnam Task, Cassell Australia, Melbourne, 1968, pp.48-49, pp.155-156,
and p.191. The Australian author Paul Ham interviewed Nguyn Nam Hng in Vng Tu in mid-November
2005, but Hng could not recall the loss of his diary. Ham, P., Vietnam The Australian War,
HarperCollinsPublishers, Pymble, 2007, p.710.
15
Nguyn Nam Hngs notebook indicated that a three-phase Summer-Autumn Campaign had been
planned for the period from 15 May 1966 to 15 August 1966. However, according to the notebook, the only
significant offensive activity conducted by the 274th Regiment during this period of time was the attack on
15 trucks moving on Route 15 on 10 August 1966. CDEC Log 11-1232-66, Bulletin No.1413.
12

N-5

The Notebook of Nguyn Nam Hng Entry for 18 August 1966

(English and Vietnamese: CDEC 11-1253-66, VCAT Item No.F03460056029)
The mid-2015 274th Regiment History
The only passage in this 2015 History covering August 1966 states: In August
1966, the Regiment engaged in two battles against US outposts at Kim Long and Cm M
(Route 2) while at the same time attacking Route 15 lines-of-communication killing 50
enemy, destroying seven military vehicles, shooting down one aircraft, and seizing two
weapons.16
Post-Long Tn Activities
According to detailed entries in his notebook17, from 20 August, the Regiment was
as planned, heavily involved in moving rice from eastern Phc Tuy Province including

16
H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), Lch S Trung an B Binh 4 (1965-2015) The History of the 4th
((274th)) Infantry Regiment (1965-2015), Nh Xut Bn Qun i Nhn Dn (The Peoples Army
Publishing House), H Ni, 2015.
17
1 ATF, Troops Information Sheet No.31, Ni t, 13-19 February 1967 that includes Commentary on
Nam Hungs Notebook at pp.5-7, but surprisingly, omits mention of his entries on 18 August. See also

N-6
from east of the Sng Ray River (that flows north-south about 10 kilometres east of Route
2) and from the Route 2318 area in south-eastern Phc Tuy. This rice-gathering
operation occupied Hngs attention during the rest of August and part of September
1966.19 About six weeks after the Battle of Long Tn, Nguyn Nam Hng made only a
very brief reference in his notebook to that Battle. On 28 September 1966, at the time of a
meeting reviewing recent 5th VC Division activities, he wrote: the 5th Regiment ((ie the
275th Regiment)) attacked Ni t, 600 Australians were killed and 1 Australian
battalion exterminated.20 There is no mention in Hngs notebook of any involvement
by the 274th Regiment in or any association with, that Long Tn operation on 18 August
directed by the 5th VC Division Headquarters. In his 2006 post-War memoir21, Hng
omits any reference to the Regiments participation in offensive combat operations in
Phc Tuy Province in the period May-September 1966 - apart from activity against road
traffic and positions on Route 15.
A 2013 on-line summary history of the 274th Regiment does not mention any
involvement in or any association with, the Battle of Long Tn by the Regiment.22
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
For the 1 ATF commander and his few cleared senior staff23, signals
intelligence - including interception, analysis, and direction-finding fixes, were
provided by 1 ATFs 547 Signals Detachment.24 Signals intelligence on the 5th VC

CDEC 11-1253-66, VCAT Item No. F03460056029. Nguyn Nam Hng notes that elements of the 274th
Regiment had transported 26,860 litres of rice from the Route 23 area before 20 August 1966.
18
Route 23 now Route 55, ran from B Ra eastward through t township to Xuyn Mc and then
along the coast to Hm Tn in Bnh Tuy Province.
19
The movement of the 274th Regiment elements into eastern Phc Tuy was reflected in the 1 ATF order
for Operation Toledo dated 31 August 1966 that stated: It is considered that only 274 Regt has the capacity
to carry out such a plan ((attacking Bnh Ba)), and that the HQ plus one battalion is located in the Hat [sic]
Dich area while the other two battalions are probably down in the mountain mass in the south of the
Province.
20
CDEC Log 11-1259-66. Discussed in: Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit., 2011, footnote 131.
21
Nguyn Nam Hng Major General, Mt i Chinh Chin (A Life at War), Nh Xut bn Chnh tr
Quc gia, H Ni, 2006. In mid-2015, Major General Nguyn Nam Hng was still active in veterans
affairs.
22
Trung on 4 Anh Hng Nhng Chng ng Lch S: 1965-1989 (The Heroic 4th Regiment Stages
in an Historic Journey: 1965-1989), 30 April 2013. See also other historical articles on the 4th (274th)
Regiment website at: http://linhsinhvien.vnweblogs.com/category/33592/59660.
23
The GSO2 Intelligence at HQ 1 ATF - Major J.S. Rowe (Aust Int Corps), appears to have been highly
skeptical of signals intelligence reporting. He had previously served for several months on the
intelligence/civil affairs staff of the 173rd Airborne Brigade earlier in 1966. See 1 ATF, INTSUM No.60, 31
July 1966 discrediting reports of the 275th Regiment to the east of 1 ATF.
24
For the Long Tn period, see Annex E, and footnote 31 in this Annex. From April 1967, 547 was
reinforced and retitled 547 Signal Troop. For further detail on 547 Signal Detachments/Troops SIGINT
operations against NVA/VC units and formations, see: Hartley, R.W. AM & Hampstead, B. V., The Story
of 547 Signal Troop in South Vietnam 1966-1972, Googong, 2014. High grade NVA/VC encryption could
not be broken, but radio transmitters could be identified to their unit; and useful intelligence gleaned
through traffic analysis. NVA/VC communications security was impeccable one-time pads and no
operator chatter. Email to author from Brigadier T.J. Richards (Retd) OC 547 Signal Troop 1966-67, 1
May 2012. The HQ 274th Regiments radio equipment in mid-1966 comprised: two 15w HF radios (Chicom
102E and/or US AN/GRC-9); and VHF manpack radios: one PRC-25, three PRC-10. There were also a
total of 10 PRC-10 sets with its battalions and two HF 71B radios with the Regiments reconnaissance
element. For technical detail on NVA/VC communications ie: organisation, techniques, training and
equipment (and including an organogram and data on the 75-strong C.21 Signal Company of the 274th

N-7
Division, the 275th and the 274th VC Regiments was provided before, during and
subsequent to the Battle of Long Tn.25 The Australian Army Official History notes that,
before Long Tn: 547 Signal Troop had fixed the radio sets of 274 Regiment in the
north-west of the province, 275 Regiment east of the Song Rai immediately north of
Xuyen Moc and 22 kilometres east of Ni t, and both reporting to 5 VC Division in the
Mao [sic] Tao mountains.26 Before 10 August ie prior to Operation Toledo27, the US
173rd Airborne Brigade had received signals intelligence28 locating a 274th Regiment HF
radio transmitter at YS 5586 - about eight kilometres north-east of Bnh Gi village in
northern Phc Tuy about five kilometres south of the Phc Tuy/Long Khanh border
ie in the area of known 274th Regiment base camps.
Specifically,on the status and activities of the 274th Regiment in mid-August 1966,
Brigadier T.J. Richards (Retd) (Captain, OC 547 Signal Troop 1966-67) has related:
- Gradually 547 Sig Tp asserted its skills and analytical capability commencing
with a significant input into the Battle of Long Tan. They showed that ONLY 275
Regt was involved (with D445 Bn) and that 274 Regt was resting in another part
of the province. This analysis enabled Brig Jackson to throw extra troops into the
battle if he desired without fear of the Nui Dat base being left unprotected."29
- The 274 Regt radio was just on daily schedules to say they were still there - ie no
traffic. They appeared to be on R&R! The fixes indicated they were across Route
15 . They were well north of Ni t, but I cannot recall the grid reference.

Regiment) see: Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) US MACV, VC/NVA Signal Order of
Battle - Update, Study 67-021, Saigon, 16 September 1967 - VCAT Item No.F015900250094. However
that 1967 confidential-level Study lists the 274th Regiments radios as only comprising: one GRC-9 radio,
one 15w radio, and an unknown number of PRC-10 and PRC-6 (walkie-talkie) radios.
25
In August 1966, 1 ATF received an average of six Special Agent Reports (SPARs) ie SIGINT
reports/summaries each day (Top Secret, Flash precedence) from HQ II Field Force Vietnam (IIFFV) at
Long Bnh. These reports included SIGINT airborne direction-finding fixes flown by EC-47 aircraft of
the USAF 6994th Security Squadron - and also from the 146th ASA Army Aviation Company for detail, see
Annex E.
26
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, 1993, op.cit., p.308.
27
Operation Toledo a combined operation directed by II FFV, included: the 173rd Airbrone Brigade, two
ARVN Ranger battalions, a battalion of the 1st US Division, and a US marine battalion (ie a BLT), and
began in south-eastern Long Khanh and western Bnh Tuy Provinces from 10 August. The initial purpose
of the operation was to locate and to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations in the May Tao Secret Zone,
an area believed to be the primary base for the 5 th VC Division. However, on 18 August, an event
occurred which caused a change in the concept of the operation, and which resulted in heavy losses to the
enemy. Elements of the 1st ATF, participating in a pacification operation north-east of their base camp,
encountered what was estimated to be one of [sic should be or] two reinforced VC battalions. These
forces were determined to be elements of the 275th VC Regiment and 860th Local Force Battalion. With
indications that the remnants of the 275th and possibly the 274th VC Regiments could be trapped following
this encounter, Operation Toledo shifted to the south and east. - II FFV Operational Report Quarterly
Period Ending 31 October 1966, Long Binh, 15 November 1966, pp.3-4. Ground operations did not move
south into the 274th Regiment and 5th VC Division base areas in northern Phc Tuy until 22 August 1966.
28
Analysis by US signals intelligence (by the 404th Radio Research Detachment that included information
from airborne direction finding missions flown by USAF 6994 th Security Squadrons EC-47 aircraft)
indicated that a regimental-level HF radio associated with the 274th Regiment was located in that area, in
the vicinity of YS 5586. At the same time, a radio of the 5th VC Division Headquarters was located at YS
6779 and that of the 275th Regiment at YS 5473. 173rd Airborne Brigade, Combat Operations After Action
Report Lessons Learned: Operation Toledo, 15 December 1966. :
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/510789.pdf.
29
Email Brigadier T.J. Richards (Retd) to author (Chamberlain), 30 April 2012.

N-8

They were closer to the next province than to Ni t. A typical deployment if

one just wanted early warning if the Aussies/Americans headed north.30
The night of Long Tn, I was called to see the Brig. He demonstrated to me that I
had proved the accuracy of the ARDF material. He asked me if there were any
other VC besides 275 Regt which he now knew he was up against. Where was 274
Regt ? I said that the ARDF fixes showed that their HQ radio had not moved and
that they were highly unlikely to be involved.31

A 274th Regiment Ambush on Route 2 ?

As noted, the Australian Official History (1993) has related that: In conjuction
with the ambush in the rubber plantation ((ie Long Tn)), 274 Regiment was sited in a
second ambush position astride Route 2, north of Bnh Ba. Intelligence after the battle
confirmed that on or about 18 August, 274 Regiment had indeed been astride Route 2
between Ngai Giao and the province northern boundary. That extract cites the 6RAR
Operation Vaucluse: Combat After Action Report. As noted, the operation order for
Operation Vaucluse - dated 6 September 1966 (predating the After Action Report)
included: 274 Regiment about the time of the Long Tan battle moved from the West and
sat astride interprovincial highway No 2 from the 80 northing, North to the vicinity of
((the)) Phuoc Tuy province boundary. When it became obvious that the 275 Regimental
attack had failed, 274 Regiment returned Westwards in the general area 3778, 3782.32
However, the source (before the 6RAR Operation Order of 6 September) of this
intelligence on the 274th Regiments location astride Route 2 is unclear. Such
intelligence of 274th Regiment being astride Route 2 in an ambush position is not
included in the contemporary 1ATF INTSUMs, Intelligence Reviews, Troops
Information Sheets (5-7 inclusive ie covering 15 August 4 September)33, nor in the 1
ATF Monthly Evaluation Report (MONEVAL), August 1966 to HQ II Field Force
Vietnam dated 5 September 1966.34 The account of the 274th Regiment sitting astride
Route 2 is highly likely to have been influenced by reports from the 173rd Airborne
Brigade in the later phases of Operation Toledo (10 August 7 September).35

30

Email Brigadier T.J. Richards (Retd) to author (Chamberlain), 1 May 2012.

Email Brigadier T.J. Richards (Retd) to author (Chamberlain), 16 July 2013. In a report to Canberra in
mid-September 1966, Captain Richards noted that: there are only two systems readable. One of them is the
military intelligence link connected with the 274th Regiment we can now read this system. The VC are
still using it and we are finding now that the 274th Regiment is passing operational orders over this network.
When I say operational orders, I mean passing messages of an operational nature, and it's from commander
to battalion commanders - Richards, T.J. Captain, Transcript of an Audio Tape to DMI (MI8), 13
September 1966.
32
6RAR, Operation Order 1-9-66: Operation Vaucluse, Annex A Enemy Situation, 6 September 1966.
This passage was subsequently repeated verbatim in 6RAR, Combat Operations After Action Report
(Operation Vaucluse), Annex A (Enemy Intelligence), October 1966.
33
1 ATF, Troops Information Sheet, No.5, 15-21 August 1966 and the 1 ATF August 1966 MONEVAL
(R723-1-3) dated 5 September 1966 summarised the Battle of Long Tn.
34
The INTSUMs of the 10th ARVN Division based at Xun Lc (ie - later retitled the 18th ARVN Division)
of that period although passed to 1 ATF, are not available for examination.
35
173rd Airborne Brigade, Combat Operations After Action Report Lessons Learned: Operation Toledo,
15 December 1966: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/510789.pdf. On 17 August, an agent had
reported that Route 2 had been cut in six places between YS 432940 and YS 441960 (a two-kilometre
section about five kilometres north of the Phc Tuy/Long Khanh border which was confirmed by visual
reconnaissance on 20 August. 1 ATF, Operation Toledo, FRAGO 1-8-66, 21 August 1966, Annex A
(Intelligence) sub-para 2.a.
31

N-9
Allied Operations in Northern Phc Tuy
As noted above, by mid-August, significant elements of the 274th Regiment had
moved eastward from the Hc Dch area36 across northern Phc Tuy Province, and
were located in regimental base camps east of Route 2 (north of Bnh Gi village).37 On
20 August, signals intelligence had fixed the headquarters of the 274th Regiment at YS
530880 - three kilometres south of the Phc Tuy/Long Khanh border, eight kilometres
east of Route 2.38 On 22 August, US forces the 173rd Airborne Brigade (Operation
Toledo), deployed into the area of the VC base camps in northern Phc Tuy. On 22
August, a communique by the 274th Regiments commanding officer ng Vn K
(Ba K), reported that the entire base area had been hit by a B-52 strike that morning.39
During Phase III of Operation Toledo beginning on 22 August, US 173rd
Brigade elements sought the 274th Regiment and other 5th VC Division forces in that
area.40 . Several large camps were destroyed and a large number of documents41
recovered. However, no VC elements larger than a platoon were engaged by the US

36

Vit Cng troops ie as light infantry, had a capability to move swiftly across country. From Base
Area 303 in the Hc Dch, the movement corridor eastwards crossed Route 2 in the Slope 30 area (YS
4681 YS 4781 YS 4784 YS 4584), and led to bases north of Bnh Gi village - a distance of about 24
kilometres, and to the My To base complex to the north-east. According to a senior NVA officer who
rallied in 1970: during the Dry Season, VC units could move approx 20 to 25 kilometers in one night.
Normally, they travelled four kilometers per hour, and marched for five to five and one-half hours per
night; during the Rainy Season, it took the units approx 33 percent more marching time to cover the same
distance. VCAT Item No.11271006005.
37
According to the detailed debrief of the defector L Vn Sang (1st Battalion, 274th Regiment) - who
rallied at Bnh Gi on 28 September 1966, the Regiment moved from the Hc Dch area in mid-August to
camps at the Le Stream (Sui L - YS 512878), 10 kilometres north of Bnh Gi village/three kilometres
south of the Long Khanh/Phc Tuy border CMIC No. 1325, 8 April 1967, CDEC Log 12-027-66. See
also ONeill, R.J., Vietnam Task, 1968, op.cit., pp.99-102. For L Vn Sang, see also footnotes 45 and 53.
38
Signals intelligence SPARs also fixed the headquarters of the 275th Regiment at YS 530720 (10
kilometres north-east of 1 ATFs Ni t base). CTG 79.5 (USMC Battalion Landing Team 1-26), Combat
After Action Report Operation Deckhouse III (Phase I and II), 2 September 1966, Part II, sub-para 4.d.
39
A copy of the communique was recovered by 173rd Airborne Brigade forces on 26-27 August 1966 about
10 kilometres north-east of Bnh Gi village (vicinity YS 5583) - CDEC Log 09-1732-66. This strike is
likely to have been the B-52 strike (No. 80483) advised in the 1 ATF Ops Log (Serial 573/Sheet 743) at
211010H August 1966. The area of a B-52 strike at YS 550730 12 kilometres north-east of the 1 ATF
base, was subsequently searched on 24 August by 2/503rd Battalion of the 173rd Airborne Brigade during
Operation Toledo.
40
Earlier - based on signals intelligence, US armed helicopters had attacked reported locations of the 5 th VC
Division in north-eastern Phc Tuy on 13 August at YS 686736. On 18 August ie in Phase II of
Operation Toledo, 173rd Brigade ground elements were operating south of Gia Ray (YT 6312) and north of
the My To Mountains. On 20 August, based on signals intelligence, armed helicopters and CS gas were
employed in an air attack against the reported location of the 5 th VC Division Headquarters in north-eastern
Phc Tuy at YS 647823. During Phase III of Operation Toledo beginning on 22 August, 173rd Brigade
units moved south into north-eastern Phc Tuy Province north and north-west of Bnh Gi village, and
destroyed several base camps of the 274th Regiment including at YS 544872, YS 542855, YS 543851, and
YS 540860. However, not all these camps were identified as associated with the 274 th Regiment. The 5th
Division History (2005) relates that in August 1966, the Headquarters of the 5 th Division moved three
kilometres south from its base at Sui u (YS 780820 in Base Area 301) to the vicinity of YS 790785
Chamberlain, E.P., The Vit Cng D445 Battalion, 2011, Annex I, pp.5-10; see also f.29 of Annex K to
this 2015 work.
41
According to the 173rd Airborne Brigades After Action Report, op.cit., 15 December 1966: 1,593
documents were recovered. For captured documents associated with the 274 th Regiment in this period, see
CDEC Bulletins 1016, 1037, 1038, 1039, 1041, 1042, 1045, 1046, 1048, 1049, 1050, 1051, 1054, 1058,
1061, and 1062.

N-10
forces in the area, and a total of only eight VC were killed. From 23 August, 1 ATFs
5RAR conducted Operation Toledo activities in the Bnh Ba area. The operations by the
173rd Airborne Brigade in the 274th Regiment base areas east of Route 2 are probably the
source of the statement in the Operation Vaucluse Operation Order of 6 September that
the 274th Regiment elements were astride interprovincial highway No 2 from the 89
northing North to the vicinity of ((the)) Phuoc Tuy province boundary.42 However, no
US reports specifically stated that the 274th Regiment was astride the road or
mentioned any ambush preparations by the 274th Regiment.
It is important to note that in the Operation Vaucluse Operation Order of 6
September 1966, the 6RAR intelligence officer is reporting on 274th Regiments locations
as at 18 August. However, such was not speculated upon earlier in the 1 ATF order for
Operation Toledo of 31 August that had stated: It is considered that only 274 Regt has
the capacity to carry out such a plan ((attacking Bnh Ba43)), and that the HQ plus one
battalion is located in the Hat Dich area while the other two battalions are probably down
in the mountain mass in the south of the Province.44 This reported activity by the 274th
Regiment in the south of the Province appears to coincide with entries in Nguyn Nam
Hngs notebook referring to rice-portering operations by the 274th Regiments elements
in the Route 23 areas (ie t and Xuyn Mc Districts).
There is no mention of ambush preparations by the 274th Regiment in the Route 2
area in mid-August 1966 in the comprehensive debrief of the 274th Regiment rallier, L
Vn Sang.45
Accordingly, while major elements of the 274th Regiment had moved eastward
from the Hc Dch area in mid-August to base camps east of Route 2 (north of Bnh Gi
village), there appears to be no evidence that the 274th Regiment was astride Route 2 in
any ambush configuration preceding or at the time of, the Battle of Long Tn on 18
August 1966. In mid-late August 1966, a significant number of the 274th Regiments
troops were also probably in the far eastern and south-eastern areas of Phc Tuy on riceportering tasks.46
42

6RAR, Operation Order 1-9-66: Operation Vaucluse, Annex A Enemy Situation, 6 September 1966.
The 5RAR Fragmentary Order (FRAGO 2-13-66) for Operation Toledo stated: Information received
indicates that this regiment ((274th Regiment)) has been considering an attack on the 5RAR company at
Binh Ba. This attack was timed for late August or early September as a face-saving operation after the
serious reversal suffered in mid-August.
44
1 ATFs 5RAR conducted 1 ATFs of Operation Toledo in concert with the 173rd Brigade/II FFV
operation of the same title, to the west of Route 2 in the period 23 August to 8 September 1966. See
Operation Darlinghurst (nee Toledo), OPORD 14-66, Nui Dat, 25 August 1966; 1 ATF, OPS21,
Operation Toledo - FRAGO 2-8-66, 31 August 1966, Annex A (Intelligence); 5RAR, Operation Toledo
FRAGO 2-13-66, An Phu hamlet, 1 September 1966 (ie 5RAR is to destroy any enemy forces moving
through area of operation 19 ie west of Route 2 in the Bnh Ba area); ONeill, R.J., Vietnam Task, 1968,
op.cit., p.93, pp.95-96; and 5RAR, Operation Toledo - Combat Operations After Action Report, An Phu
hamlet, 29 September 1966 (AWM95, 7/5/8) - citing: HQ 274 Regiment HQ and one or two battalions YS
5388, one battalion YS 4277. http://static.awm.gov.au/images/collection/bundled/RCDIG1030130.pdf .
For the 1 ATF, Operation Toledo: Combat Operations After Action Report, Nui Dat, 30 October 1966
with an annex delineating AOs, see AWM95, 1/4/14 Part 2.
http://static.awm.gov.au/images/collection/bundled/RCDIG1030130.pdf .
45
See footnotes 37 and 53 Sang rallied on 28 September 1966.
46
On 25 August, a 173rd Airborne Brigade ambush patrol at YS 563848 sighted 75-100 VC moving north
carrying large rucksacks After Action Report, op.cit., p.25. In an apparent violation of signals
intelligence security, 5RARs Operation Darlinghurst OPORD 14-66 (25 August 1966), stated on the
activities of the 274th Regiment that: The urgency of their movement was revealed in radio transmissions
to their battalions today. It appears that 274 Regiment is attempting to come to the rescue of 275
Regiment.
43

N-11
3rd Squadron of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11 ACR) in August 1966
As noted, the Australian Official History relates that in mid-August 1966, the
274th Regiments role was to ambush a squadron of the 11th Armoured [sic] Cavalry
Regiment if it moved down inter-provincial Route 2 to support the Australians. 3
Squadron 11 Armoured [sic] Cavalry Regiment (ACR) had arrived in Long Khanh
province on 12 August and was being followed by the rest of the regiment in September
In this instance, 3 Squadron 11 ACR did not react as the enemy anticipated. The cited
source for this information is: Shelby L Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle, Galahad
Books, New York, 1987, pp.129-130. That work and its later 2003 version, only state
that the 3rd Squadron arrived in Vietnam on 12 August 1966. That date however, is
apparently a typographical error.
The detailed raising and dispatch to Vietnam of 11 ACR is related in that
Regiments 142-page report: Lessons Learned to 31 October 1966, dated 21 April
1967.47 In outline, the 11 ACR advanced party arrived in Saigon by air in the period 9-16
August, and on 18 August began oversight of the off-loading of their trucks (ie motorised
vehicles) at the Saigon Port. The 3rd Squadron - the third increment, departed Oakland
(California) aboard the USNS Barrett on 23 August, arrived at Vng Tu on 11
September, and finished unloading on 12 September 1966.48 11 ACR elements
subsequently occupied a camp at Long Bnh north-east of Bin Ha at YT 062122. The
1st Squadrons advanced party moved to ng Qu (YS 3999) on 20 October 1966 to
secure the Blackhorse base camp at Long Giao south of Xun Lc Town (Operation
Atlanta) and their Blackhorse camp was occupied by the end of October 1966. The
Regiments 3rd Squadron was earlier the first element in action on 7 October 1966 during
Operation Hickory.49
Accordingly, as the 11 ACRs 3rd Squadron was not in-country in August 1966, it
was not available to provide any support to 1 ATF nor were any other elements of 11
ACR operationally available on 18 August 1966.
No Mention of 274 Regiments Involvement
In summary, there is no mention of the 274th Regiments involvement in or
association with, the Battle of Long Tn, in any of the following:
1 ATF, INTSUMs (with the exception of INTSUM No.78, 18 August 1966
corrected the following day, see footnote 8);
1 ATF, Intelligence Reviews;
1 ATF, Troops Information Sheets (5-7 covering 15 August 4 September);

47
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Lessons Learned to 31 October 1966, 21 April 1967. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/386101.pdf . See also Army Build-Up Progress Report, Deputy
Secretary of the General Staff, 17 August 1966 that highlighted: The 11th Armd Cav Regt is en route to
the West Coast, ETA ((Vietnam)) Sep 66, Establishment strength: 4,005 VCAT Item
No.F031700040795.
48
As confirmed in an email to the author by D. Snedeker (11 ACR Historian) on 21 May 2014 ie: 11
ACRs Third Squadron ((arrived)) on 11 September ((1966)) -- a troublesome boiler and a typhoon en
route delayed their arrival.
49
Operation Hickory: 7- 13 October 1966. See US Army Film LR 9843 at:
http://player.mashpedia.com/player.php?q=Fyk-5nIdi4M .

N-12
1 ATF, Monthly Evaluation Report (MONEVAL to II FFV), R723-13, Ni t,
5 September 1966;
1 ATF, 5th VC Division paper R569-1-16 (Furner, J.O., Major GSO2 INT),
Ni t, 22 April 1967, 15 November 1967;
1 ATF, 274 VC Main Force Regiment, Annex F to 1 ATF, INTSUM
No.144/71, Ni t, 24 May 1971;
The recovered notebook/diary of Nguyn Nam Hng (2ic 274th Regiment see
footnote 14);
The 2006 memoir of Nguyn Nam Hng see footnote 21;
The mid-2015 4th ((274th)) Infantry Regiment History.
A 274th Regiment summary history on-line, see footnote 22;
The D445 Battalion Histories 1991, 2004;
The 5th VC Division Histories 1995, 2005;
The Chu c District History 200450, the Long t District History - 198651,
nor the t District History - 200652;
The debrief of the 274th Regiment rallier L Vn Sang;53
Other higher regional Vietnamese histories.54
Conclusion
Regrettably, based principally on errors in the Australian Official History55 ie:
To Long Tan (1993), several writers have published accounts (see Appendix I) claiming
that the 274th VC Main-Force Regiment was sited on Route 2 in north-central Phc Tuy
Province in mid-August 1966 planning to ambush elements of the US 11th Armored

50

Nguyn Cng Danh & L Minh Ngha (et al), Lch s u Tranh Cch Mng Ca ng B V Nhn
Dn Huyn Chu c - 1930-2000 (The History of the Revolutionary Struggle of the Party Chapter and
the People of Chu c District - 1930-2000) ), Nh Xut Bn Chnh Tr Quc Gi, H Ni, 2004. That
History however, states: On 30 April 1966, the District military intelligence team reported: more than
100 American tanks (of their 11th Regiment) deployed from Sui Rm down Route 2 to Cm M. ie six
months before the 11th ACR occupied its base at Sui Rm. As noted, the 11 th ACR armoured vehicles
began to arrive in Vietnam on 7 September 1966.
51
Phan Ngc Danh, Lch S u Tranh Cch Mng Ca Huyn Long t (The History of the
Revolutionary Struggle in Long t District), Nh Xut Bn ng Nai (ng Nai Publishing House), ng
Nai, 1986.
52
ng Tn Hng (ed), Lch S u Tranh V Xy Dng Ca ng B, Qun V Dn Huyn t 1930-2005 (The History of the Struggle and the Building of the Party Chapter, the Forces and the Militia of
t District), Bin Ha, 2006. That History however, states: On 15 May 1966 the enemy deployed
almost 200 tanks of their 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to sweep into Long Phc and Long Tn. ie
five months before the 11 ACR occupied its Blackhorse base at Long Giao/Sui Rm.
53
See footnotes 37 and 45, Sang rallied on 28 September 1966 - VCAT Item No.F034600782483 CDEC
Log 12-027-66 8 April 1967.
54
Including: The Armed Forces of Military Region 7; The ng Nai Province Party History; The History
of the Resistance War in B Ra-Vng Tu; The 30-year Liberation Struggle in ng Nai; The ng Nai
Monograph; The History of the Armed Forces of ng Nai Province 1945-1995; The History of the
Communist Party of Vietnam in ng Nai Province 1930-1995; Chu Thnh District The Struggle and
Development 1945-1985; and The History of the B Ra-Long Khnh Medical Services.
55
As noted, the errors in the Australian Official History appear to have resulted, in part, from reliance on
information in a US publication Stanton, S.L. Captain (US Army, Retd), Vietnam Order of Battle, op.cit.,
1987, that incorrectly related that 11 ACRs 3rd Squadron had arrived in Vietnam on 12 August 1966.
For Stantons false claims of his service in Vietnam, see also:
http://www.o4sr.org/publications/pf_v5n1/StolenValor.htm .

N-13
Cavalry Regiment. The foregoing discussion indicates that such a scenario was not
possible.
Several writers contend that in August 1966, the 5th VC Division-directed
operation that culminated in the Battle of Long Tn had been intended to attack the 1
ATF base at Ni t ie not to lure the tiger from the mountain into a mobile ambush
in the Long Tn area (ie as is asserted in several Vietnamese communist histories and by
senior NVA/VC veterans). If the VC aim had been to attack the 1 ATF base in midAugust 1966, then to increase the chance of success, the 5th VC Division would most
likely have also employed the 274th Regiment in a direct or supporting role. It did not
the 274th Regiment had other tasks. This with other factors56, suggests that the VC
intention was probably not to attack the 1 ATF base at Ni t, but to annihilate an
Australian force in an ambush outside the base.
****

Appendix 1
Publications and Reports Referencing Involvement/Association by the 274th
Regiment and/or the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in the Battle of Long Tn
McNeill, I., To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950-1966, Allen
& Unwin/Australian War Memorial, St Leonards, 1993, pp.369-370, p.563, endnote 58;
and Sketch 16.1 opposite p.327.
Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA). Until late 2012, the DVA website on the Battle
of Long Tn had included The Vit Cng Main Force 274 Regiment was present but not
directly involved in the fighting.57
Ekins, A., Unravelling the riddles of Long Tn, Wartime, Issue 55, Canberra, July
2011, pp.42-47: Yet Australian intelligence had confirmed that the enemy force
encountered by D Company also included elements of the 274 and 275 Vit Cng
Regiment ; p.47: 274 was sited in a second ambush position astride Route 2
ambush any American relief forces.

56

The shelling of the 1 ATF base in the early hours of 17 August 1966 including by weapons not held by
a VC local force unit ie 75mm RCL, 70mm Japanese howitzer, alerted Headquarters 1 ATF to a
developing threat from the east. 5RAR conducting a cordon and search of Bnh Ba village (Operation
Holsworhy), returned forces to the Ni t base (less C Company). In August 1966, 1 ATF was a twobattalion Task Force with a total strength of 2,830 (30 June 1966), and the base defences had yet to be
completed. Defence stores were in short supply and Brigadier Jackson noted: I am concerned about the
lack of MGs for the defence of the base camp when a battalion goes out on an operation taking their
GPMGs with them. A variation to entitlement to overcome this problem was submitted last month, but as
yet has not resulted in action. Commanders Diary (AF C 2118), July 1969.
57
The website was corrected following correspondence from Chamberlain, E.P., DVA Website Vietnam
War: The Battle of Long Tn Uncorrected Errors, 27 August 2012.

N-14
Mollison, C., Long Tan and Beyond Alpha Company 6 RAR in Vietnam 1966-67,
Cobbs Crossing, Woombye, 2006, p.209. : It seems to me the basic enemy intention
was to attack the Australian Task Force base I think that the whole of the enemy 5th
Division was employed with 274 Regiment positioned on Route 2 north of the Australian
base at Nui Dat to intercept and ambush any reinforcement of the Australians by the US
11 Armoured [sic] Cavalry Regiment . Protected by 274 Regiment from any
reinforcement of the Base by US units to the North, the enemy could have then attacked
elements of the Task Force from within [sic] our Base.
Baria Community website (with map showing the 274th Regiment at the Battle see
footnote 1) http://www.bariaPhctuy.org/tailieu/tranlongtan.html (ie a pro-Saigon
diaspora site)
Walsh, M. (Red Dune Films), Communists wrong on Long Tan History, The Canberra
Times website (managed by journalist David Ellery), 27 July 2012,
http://www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/blogs/in-your-defence/communists-wrongon-long-tan-history-20120727-22zi5.html
It is also important to note that 274 Regiment comprising some 2,500 men was to the
West of Nui Dat in a position (by all reports) to ambush any allied reinforcements from
Saigon which would come down when 275 Regiment attacked Nui Dat.
The item also incorrectly has the NVA/VC order-of-battle at the Battle to include both
275 Regiment and 45 Regiment (but these are the same formation as on (Group) 45
was a cover-name for the 275th Regiment in 1966).
Walsh, M. Red Dune Films, Fact Sheet Battle of Long Tan and Vietnam Facts, Ver
2.3, 2008. http://battleoflongtan.reddunefilms.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Docoand-Long-Tan-and-Vietnam-Facts-Sheet-Final1.pdf
274 Regiment of the VC 5th Division comprising about 2,000 soldiers was in a position
North West of the 1ATF base at Nui Dat on 18th August 1966 to ambush any US
reinforcements from Saigon. 274 Regiment would then ambush any US
reinforcements from Saigon.
The Fact Sheet also incorrectly has NVA/VC order-of-battle to include both the 275th
Regiment and a 45th Regiment (ie the same formation as noted on (Group) 45 was a
cover-name for the 275th Regiment in 1966).
Willcox, D. Captain (SO3 Intelligence, HQ 1 ATF), 1 ATF, INTSUM No.78, Ni t, 18
August 1966. That 1 ATF INTSUM reported that the VC unit was probably the 274
Regiment of the 5 Division ie written only hours after the conclusion of the Battle of
Long Tn (but corrected the following day see footnote 8).
Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan The True Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993.
Including a statement by Nguyn Vn Kim (Commander D445, early 1968-1969) that
the 274th Regiment was tasked in mid-August 1966 to interdict any US forces moving
south on Route 2 to relieve Australian forces during the Long Tn battle.

N-15
Grandin, T., The Battle of Long Tn as told by the commanders to Bob Grandin, Crows
Nest, Allen & Unwin, 2004. Chapter Eight The Other Battles of Long Tan58 (by
Lieutenant Colonel H.A. Smith SG, MC - Retd): p.284: The forces most likely to come
to the aid of the base if under threat or attack were the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the US
11 Cavalry Regiment. The 11th Cavalry could move from their base twenty kilometres
to the north, but there was only one route south to the Australian base and that was along
Route 2. This was ideal for VC ambush activities p.285: This comprised 274
Regiment, about 2,000 strong - based in the north-west of the province, 275 Regiment of
1,850 based in the north-east and three regional (provincial) battalions: 860 Battalion of
about 550, D445 of 600 and D440 of 800.59 In all, there were some 6,000 combat
troops under the direct command of the NVA commander in the province. In addtion, an
NVA battalion was attached for use as a reserve element. One of the 274 Regiment
battalions would provide a diversion attack and the remainder of 274 Regiment would
place an ambush on Route 2 at the north of the province in anticipation of an 11th Cavalry
rescue mission. H-hour would be midnight, 18/19 August.
Lieutenant Colonel H.A. Smith SG, MC (Retd), No Time for Fear, Wartime Issue 35,
Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 2006. These ((275th VC Main Force Regiment))
plus D445 and D40060 made around 3,000 enemy troops. These wounded said they were
going to attack the ATF base, with 274 Regiment to the northwest to support the attack on
Nui Dat and cut off any relief column coming down from the north. Luckily for us, all
their heavy weapons were with the other regiment to support the attack on Nui Dat.
Wikipedia - Wikipedia article on the Battle of Long Tan - as at September 2015:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Long_Tan
Meanwhile the 274 Regiment was probably located 14 to 20 kilometres north-west
occupying a position on Route 2 to ambush a squadron of the US 11th Armored Cavalry
Regiment which they anticipated would move down the inter-provincial highway from
Long Khanh to support the Australians.

58

This chapter was written by Lieutenant Colonel H.A. Smith SG, MC (Retd), the officer commanding
D/6RAR at the Battle of Long Tn. At pp.282-293, Lieutenant Colonel Smith provided a scenario and
possible enemy plan for an attack on the 1 ATF base. He provided this scenario and plan in a three-hour
presentation made to the Australian War Memorial on 1 November 1996 p.281. The scenario and plan
include several errors on the NVA/VC elements at the Long Tn battle eg: 860 Battalion was a title for
D445 Battalion ie it was not a separate battalion to D445; D445 Battalions strength was about 390, not
600 see Chamberlain, E.P., The Vit Cng D445 Battalion, op.cit., 2011. D440 Battalion did not
arrive in South Vietnam until early/mid-1967 see Chamberlain, E.P., The Vit Cng D440 Battalion,
op.cit., 2013 and Annex P. The errors noted above also appear in the Harry Smith (Australian Soldier)
item in Wikipedia ie with an 806 Battalion cited.
59
860 Battalion was believed to be an aka D445 Battalion ie it was not a separate battalion; D440
Battalion did not enter Phc Tuy until early/mid-1967 see the preceding footnote. These errors are
repeated at pp.289-291 of that publication.
60
There was no D400 Battalion this is probably meant to be D440 that - as noted above, did not enter
Phc Tuy Province until early/mid-1967. See footnote 58 above and the D440 history at Annex P, page 1.

N-16

274th Regiment troops

manning a 12.7mm heavy machinegun in an anti-aircraft role, late 1973.

Post-War: The 274th Regiment Martyrs Memorial - X Bang village

Annex O

THE 275th VC MAIN FORCE REGIMENT

This annex has been included in the D445 history exegesis as the 275th Regiment
was the principal Vit Cng (VC) element at the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966.
A Vietnamese-language history of the 275th Regiment was published in mid-2015.1
In early 1965, the 1st Regiment of the Western Nam B Military Region operating in the Bc Liu Sc Trng area of the Mekong Delta comprised two battalions
and supporting companies with a strength of 800.2 In the middle of April 1965, the
Regiment deployed northwards into the VC Eastern Region and re-equipped with new
weapons including AK-47s and B40s supplied from North Vietnam.
According to the 5th Division History (2005): After 25 days of continuous
movement over 600 kilometres, the Regiment safely reached its new base in the B Ho
((jungle)) - Dng Minh Chu ((District, Ty Ninh Province)).3 At the beginning of
May 19654, COSVN appointed Nguyn Thi Bng5 as the commander of the
1

The 275th Regiments 220-page History was published in May 2015 ie: H Sn i Senior Colonel
(ed), Lch S Trung on B Binh 5 (1965-2015) - The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment, Nh
Xut Bn Qua i Nhan Dan (The Peoples Armed Forces Publishing House), H Ni, 2015 a
Vietnamese-language copy was provided to the author (Chamberlain) by Blair Tidey in late September
2015. Other principal sources on the 275th Regiment are the 5th Division History (1995 and 2005) and the
debrief of NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting aged 36, the Assistant Political Officer of the 3rd Battalion of
the 275th Regiment who was captured on 26 February 1969 by ARVN forces in Bin Ha Province
CMIC No.2550, VCAT Item No.2310305007 see footnotes 122 and 126; and the outline organisation of
the Regiment at Appendix 3 p,8. The debrief of the defector Lieutenant Colonel L Xun Chuyn a
senior staff officer on Headquarters 5th Division, is also quite useful - CMIC Log 08-029-66 and VCAT
Item No.23130003016, see footnotes 34 and 36. The 275th Regiment is also mentioned in both the 1991
and the 2004 D445 Battalion Histories. Note however that, as related earlier, the 1991 D445 History
incorrectly cites the main-force VC regiment at the Battle of Long Tn as the 4th Regiment ie the 274th
VC Regiment. This error also appears in a history of the C.12-65 Bnh Gi Victory Assault Youth
Company that provided support at the Battle of Long Tn ie L Thin Minh Khoa, i Thanh Nin
(The Assault Youth Unit ), op.cit., 11 December 2009; and in an article by a Liberation Armed Forces
journalist Hu Thanh (as told by H.B.), Min ng Nam B khi la (Fire and Sword in the Eastern
Region), 28 August 2008.
2
V Hnh was the military commander and Ba Dng was the senior political officer. The 1st (the 70th)
Battalion was led by Sau Khng with T Phng as the political officer; and the 2nd (the 80th) Battalion
was led by Nguyn Quc Bao with Hunh Vn Xuyn as its political officer.
3
Restated at 50th anniversary commemoration events in 2015. Other sources specifically note that the
Regiment was formed in the Tha La River area (XT 3467). The Regiments founding date is 31 May
1965. The 275th Regiment History (2015) claims the 600km move from the Delta area took 55 days.
4
According to the 275th Regiment History (2015), the Regiments founding date was 31 May 1965, and the
ceremony was attended by senior COSVN cadre Comrade Trn Vn Tr and Comrade Nguyn Th nh.
- H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, p.18.
5
Nguyn Thi Bng - known as t Thi (code-name Hng Tm), was born in 1925 in Ty Ninh Province.
He fought at the Battle of Bnh Gi in December 1964/January 1965; and reportedly commanded the 275th
VC Regiment at the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966. Nguyn Thi Bng was briefly interviewed by
T. Burstall in H Ch Minh City on 14 March 1989; and by the official Australian military historian - Dr I.
McNeill, in June 1988 - see their post-meeting photograph (Australian War Memorial photo AWM
P01509.008) annotated: General Bung was the commander of the Viet Cong (VC) 275 Regiment during

O-2

Regiment with Nguyn Vn Cc6 as its political commissar. Ba Dng was the assistant
political commissar, V Hnh became the regimental deputy commander, and Sau Thanh
was appointed as the chief-of-staff. At the same time, the Regiment was announced as
COSVNs 5th Main-Force Regiment ie its predecessor being the 1st Regiment7 of
Western Nam B. In late July 1965, the 5th Regiment was reinforced with a battalion
((e its third)), from the Delta (Western Nam B) led by Comrade Hai Phng with
Comrade Hai T as its political officer.8 At the beginning of September 1965, the
Regiment deployed to the B Ra battlefield.9
On 2 September 1965, COSVN formally established the 5th VC Division with the
th
274 and 275th 10 Regiments as its principal formations.11 The 275th Regiment moved
into Long Khnh Province in September 1965 - and was stationed and operated in the B
Ra-Long Khnh area from late October 1965, but did not deploy into the B Ra
battlefield until mid-1966. On 11 September 1965, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the
the Battle of Long Tan. Nguyn Thi Bng passed away on 22 January 2014 see his biography at
Appendix 2 to this Annex.
6
Nguyn Vn Cc (also known as Ba Cc) his title and function was Chnh y - ie Political
Commissar. Nguyn Vn Cc subsequently reach the rank of Major General.
7
The 275th Regiments casualty list for the Battle of Long Tn (see pages 22-24 and Appendices 1 and 4),
indicates the Regiments 1st Battalion was raised in the Provinces of C Mau (ie the Republic of Vietnams
An Xuyn Province), Rch Gia (Kin Giang), M Tho (nhTng) and Gia nh; while the 2nd Battalion
was raised in Bn Tre (Kin Ha), Cn Th (Phong Dinh), Sc Trng (Bc Liu) and Tr Vinh (Vnh
Bnh). Two 2nd Battalion/275th Regiment POWs (see footnote 105) - captured on 21 March 1967 near L
Gm, related the founding of the Regiments 1st and 2nd Battalions - see VCAT Item No.F034600701813.
8
According to the 275th History (2015) pp.18-22, in July 1965, other appointment changes included: T Tu
( Quang Tu) was appointed to command the 1st Battalion with Xut (Phm Vn Xut) as the political
officer and Sau Thanh as the Battalion 2ic; Phm Xun Hiu (Hai Hiu) was appointed to command the 2nd
Battalion, with T Tnh (Ta) as the political officer and Nguyn Quc Bao as the Battalion 2ic. However, at
p.401, the History states that on the 3rd Battalions incorporation into the Regiment in July 1965, the 3 rd
Battalion was commanded by t Hui with Trung as its political officer. - H Sn i Senior Colonel
(ed), The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015. At p.46, the 5th Division History
(2005) states that the 3rd Battalion led by Phng with T as its political officer, came from the North.
9
H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, p.22.
10
The 5th VC Division referred to the 275th Regiment as the 5th Regiment. The 275th Regiment also had
several cover designations principally Q765, Q5, on (Group) 45 - from late 1966 to early 1967. Phm
Vn Xut as the Commander 1/45 signed a Letter of Appreciation on 12 December 1965 for Ma Tan
[sic] Tan (see footnote 92). on 45 was also used as a cover designator by Headquarters 5th Division who appear to have swapped their on 54 designator with the 275th Regiment in late November 1966
see CDEC Item No.250011103 (1968). Other 275th Regiment designators included: V-26 from April 1967,
on 83B from April 1968, A-55 Regiment, and F-21 from February 1969 see also footnote 16. In June
1970 - when operating in north-western Cambodia, the 5th Regiment (ie 275th Regiment) detached its 1st
and 2nd Battalions to form the nucleus of the 205th Regiment (an independent COSVN regiment) and the 5th
Regiment was retitled the 1st Regiment of the 5th Division with Tm N as the regimental commander
see footnotes 137 and 138.
11
The establishment of the 5th VC Division initially comprised the 4th Infantry Regiment ((274th
Regiment)), the 5th Infantry Regiment ((275th Regiment)) and the following combat support units: 22
Mountain Artillery Battalion, 12 Anti-Aircraft Company, 95 Reconnaissance Company, 23 Mortar
Company, 25 Engineer Company, 605 Communications Company, and 96 Medical Company. 5th
Division History (2005), p.49.

O-3

Regiment attacked the Tc Trng New Life Hamlet (YT 4226) in Xun Lc District.12 In
early November 1965, the Regiments 2nd Battalion attacked the Sui Ct Strategic
Hamlet on National Highway 1 (YT 595065)13.
On 11 November 1965, 3/275th VC Regiment attempted to ambush an ARVN
convoy (the 52nd Ranger Battalion and Regional Forces elements) at Kim Hi hamlet,
Phc Ha village (on Route 15, 10 kilometres north-west of B Ra Town).14 The 5th
Division History (2005) relates: From the beginning of November, Comrade Nguyn
Thi Bng together with Battalion Commander Hai Phng, engaged directly in the
preparations for the battle on Route 51 ((Route 15)). On 4 November, the 3rd Battalion
deployed from its base at Sng Ray to Long Thnh for the engagement. After three days
of difficult and tiring movement and avoiding discovery by enemy elements patrolling
from their posts, on 7 November the 3rd Battalion reached its fighting positions at the base
of the Ni Th Vi Mountain. The fighting strength of the Battalion at this time was still
low a company only had 40 weapons. The 1st Company (of the 1st Battalion) with a
strength of only 45, was attached to the 3rd Battalion as a reinforcement. As a
consequence, the problem required that the ambush had to be truly secret and a surprise if
the intention to completely destroy two enemy companies and their vehicles was to be
achieved. After a day of fierce fighting, the 3rd Battalion and the 1st Company of the 5th
Regiment had killed a large number of the enemy, inflicting heavy casualties on the 52nd
Ranger Battalion and a Phc Tuy Sector provincial company, destroyed two helicopters,
16 mechanized vehicles, a jeep, captured 6 enemy and seized 12 weapons and two radios.
We lost 16 comrades and a further 32 were wounded. 15. According to a contemporary
Vit Cng pamphlet titled: Victories in November 1965, two Ranger companies were
wiped out and 16 vehicles destroyed on 11 November 1965.
12

Enroute to B Ra, the Regiment attacked and wiped out the Regional Force post at Tc Trng on 11
September 1965 capturing 21 and seizing 35 weapons. - 5th Division History (2005) pp.47-48.
Following that engagement, the Regiment moved to its new base area at Bo Bnh (YT 480035 - on the
Sng Ray River). In this liberated zone, the local people of Xuyn Mc and Bu Lm - noting that the
Regiments soldiers carried water in red plastic containers on their backs, referred to them as the young red
plastic flask carriers from the West. - H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th ((275th))
Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, pp.24-25.
13
A 15-watt GRC-9 radio and three carbines were reportedly seized in the attack see the debrief of NVA
Captain Trn Vn Ting (footnote 1).
14
The ambush is mentioned briefly in 1 ATF, INTSUM No.1/66, Vng Tu, 21 May 1966 (as is the later
11-12 April 1966 battle against US forces during Operation Abilene at Tm B north of Ni t involving
elements of the 274th VC Regiment). The Kim Hi/Phc Ha ambush is related in the Australian Armys
official history, but incorrectly cited as occurring at Binh Gia ie: The Viet Cong demonstrated their
capacity to mount regimental-sized ambushes on 11 November 1965, when 275 Regiment ambushed and
virtually destroyed the elite ARVN 52nd Ranger Battalion near Binh Gia. McNeill, I., To Long Tan,
op.cit., 1993, p.222. A US JUSPAO Report noted 300 VC killed in the action at Kim Hi, JUSPAO Field
Report, 30 November 1965, VCAT Item No.23970103001.
15
The ambush is similarly related in the 275th Regiment History (2015) - H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed),
The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, pp.30-34. That account lists the 275th
Regiments casualties in the engagement as 16 killed and 32 wounded.

O-4

ARVN personnel including Rangers, with captured 275th Regiment weapons at

B Ra Sector Headquarters, 12 November 1965 VCAT Item No. VA054855.
In mid-November the Regiments 1st Battalion launched an unsuccessful attack on
the Bo Chnh Strategic Hamlet (YT 545113 near the railway line, about 10km east of
Xun Lc Town); the 2nd Battalion attacked the strategic hamlet at Sui Ct twice in
December-January; and in January 1966 the 2nd Battalion participated in an attack on the
ng Qu Strategic Hamlet (YS 370980) west of Route 2 in Xun Lc District.
According to NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting, in the 275th Regiment: There were
no regulations concerning the wearing of uniform within the unit. No rank or unit insignia
was worn by any member of the organization. Clothing worn by the unit included the
regular NVA fatigue uniform mixed with civilian clothing. Some members wore black
VC pajamas [sic] others wore civilian clothes.16
According to the defector NVA Lieutenant Colonel L Xun Chuyn: in
Nov/Dec 65, 80% of the 5th Regiment ((275th Regiment)) of the VC 5th Division was
sufficiently ill with malaria to be immobilised. 5% of these were acutely ill with malaria.
Because of this high malaria rate, several operations that had been planned for the
Regiment had to be cancelled.17 The Regiments 2015 History similarly notes: In our
16

NVA Captain Trn Vn Tings (see footnote 1) infiltration group entered South Vietnam in March 1965
- and in June 1965 he was allocated to the signals company of 275 Group. According to Trn Vn Ting,
275 Group was formally redesignated the 5th Regiment in early November 1965. According to Ting,
cover designators for the Regiment included: Q-5, V-26, 83B Group, A-55 Regiment, and F-21 Regiment
(from February 1969).
17
L Xun Chuyn see his biodata at footnotes 34 and 36, added that in June 1966, 25-30% of the 275th
Regiments strength were immobilised because of malaria many personnel stricken with malaria were

O-5

first days, we were not yet familiar with the hard living and the mountains and jungles of
the Eastern Region. 100 % of the unit suffered from malaria.18
In February 1966, according to Lieutenant Colonel Chuyn, the Regiment was
forced to break contact from a conflict at V t [sic] ((Bnh Tuy Province))19 This
command decision was not based on the sickness rate alone, but it was influenced by fact
that the malaria rate in the Regiment rose 10% during the first three days of the
conflict.20

not excused from duty if they were not immobilised by the disease. the rates for June 1966 were
considered to be the yearly average malarial rate for the Regiment. CMIC Special Report US 618-66/1211,
26 December 1966 VCAT Item No.F034600601776. The 5th Division History (2005) also noted high
malaria rates in February 1966: the Division had to face bombs, commandos and spies - and the cadre and
soldiers of the Division regularly suffered from hunger and malaria. One hundred percent of the units troop
strength suffered from malaria and many comrades were seriously swollen with oedema and unable to
move. The 84th Rear Services Group could only supply enough for the comrades who were ill p.63.
For a Vietnam-wide analysis see Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV), Medical Causes of NonEffectiveness among VC/NVA Troops (Third Update), St 69 II, MACJ231-7, Saigon, 31 August 1969. That
study related that 44% of NVA/VC troops have malaria at any one time and 20% will be hospitalized for
an average of 12.7 days. On combat casualties, the study indicated 5% of wounded NVA/VC died during
evacuation, 3-5% died once hospitalized, and 25-30% of those hospitalized were permanently disabled.
VCAT Item No.2250112029. For a directive on the COSVN regime for malarial prophylaxis (re-issued by
on 94 - ie the 274th ng Nai Regiment on 13 September 1965) - ie on the use of paludrine, nivaquine
and chloroquine, see CDEC Log 09-1409-66.
18
H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, p.25.
19
Chuyns account is confused. On 27-28 February 1966, the 274th Regiments attack on V Su failed
as acknowledged in the 5th Division History (2005). That engagement was reported by MACV History
Staff as: 28 February 1966 at Vo Su (Binh Tuy Province) VC attack resulted in 48 VC killed, three
captured, 32 ARVN killed, 60 wounded and 17 missing. - Military History Branch - USMACV,
Chronology of Significant Events during 1966, Saigon, 27 April 1967. VCAT Item No.13370149004. The
275th Regiment attacked V Su on 15 March 1966 and its failure was also criticised in the 5th Division
History (2005) see footnote 22 below. For a listing of some the 275th Regiments malarial casualties at K10 Hospital from late 1965 to early 1967, see CDEC Log 06-3851-67. The head of the 5th VC Division
medical services reported: Due to the sudden troop movement, change of location and activities, and the
rainy season, the number of sick has sharply increased Almost 100% of E5 ((275th Regiment)) personnel
contracted malaria. Causes were also listed together with the names of the Regiments medical officer
and the 10 technicians, and a critique of shortcomings. 5th VC Division, Medical Situation Report, 1 April
1966 - CDEC Log 06-1014-66, VCAT Item No.F034600060098. As noted, for COSVN criteria for
malarial prophylaxis as promulgated by Group 94 (ie the 274th VC Regiment) on 15 September 1965 ie
paludrine, nivaquine, and chloroquine (varying: Jan-May, Jun-Dec) see CDEC Log 09-1409-66; VCAT
Item No.F034600441905.
20
In his debrief, L Xun Chuyn (see footnotes 34 and 36) also provided detailed information on the
calculation of combat casualties ratios within the 5th VC Division. CMIC Special Report US 618-66/1211,
26 December 1966 VCAT Item No.F034600601776. As noted, the 5th VC Division History (2005)
relates that the troops suffered from jungle malaria 100% of the troops in the units suffered from
malaria, many had severe oedema and were unable to walk. p.63.

O-6

The 275th Regiments first major engagement was the failed second21 attack on the
ARVN base at V Xu/Su on Route 334 in Bnh Tuy Province on 15 March 1966.22
Withdrawing, the Regiment consolidated in the M area (vicinity YT 7610)..
On 23 March 1966, elements of the 605th Battalion of the Bc Sn Regiment in
coordination with the D840 Battalion (Military Region 6), ambushed an ARVN truck
on Route 14, and members of the Company were awarded Certificates of Commendation
and Letters of Appreciation.23 In late April 1966, the 3rd Battalion of the Bc Sn
Regiment was located in central-western Phc Long Province.
On 1 May, the 605th Battalion24 of the Bc Sn Regiment25 of Military Region 6 operating in the B ng and B p area ((districts in Phc Long Province)), was
ordered to deploy to Long Khnh26 and was integrated into the 275th Regiment with the

21

As noted above, the first attack on V Su in the early hours of 28 February 1966 was launched by the
274th Regiment led by ng Ngc S/S. For detail see: H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), Lch s Trung
on B Binh 4 (1965-2015) - The History of the 4th ((274th)) Infantry Regiment, Nh Xut Bn Quan i
Nhan Da (The Peoples Armed Forces Publishing House), H Ni, 2015, pp.65-70 a Vietnameselanguage copy was provided to the author (Chamberlain) by Blair Tidey in late September 2015. The 274th
Regiments heavy casualties were recorded as: 43 killed and 84 wounded p.70. That battle is also
related in the 5th VC Division History (2005) at pp.65-71 including a coloured map of the engagement.
22
The account of the 275th Regiments attack on V Xu/Su on 15 March 1966 related in the 5th VC
Division History (2005 pp.70-72) includes criticisms of 275 Regiments suitability for, and performance
in, the V Xu/Su battle eg: not sufficiently satisfactory, weak tactics were employed, and the
Regiment was not yet experienced for such a concentrated attack etc. The attack is related in the 275th
Regiment History (2015) at pp.37-39: the Regiment was unable to achieve its objective and suffered heavy
casualties 78 cadre and soldiers were casualties. According to Captain Trn Vn Ting see footnote 1,
the Regiment suffered over 150 casualties in that battle. The MACV History relates casualties in the attack
on 21 March as 107 VC killed, 8 captured, 12 ARVN killed and 28 ARVN wounded. - Military History
Branch - USMACV, Events during 1966, op.cit., 27 April 1967. VCAT Item No.13370149004.
23
CDEC Log 04-2690-67. The captured notebook cites D840 but it is more likely to have been D480
ie the Bnh Thun District battalion. The captured documents included detail on the personnel and weapons
of the 275th Regiments 13th Company ie previously an element of the Bc Sn Regiment.
24
The 605th Battalion was initially raised as the 4th Battalion of the 32nd Regiment in Thanh Ha (North
Vietnam) on 15 April 1965 of the 500 members, two-thirds were Southerner regroupees (soon joined by
200 Northern recruits). On 10 September 1965, the Battalion was redesignated D605 of the Bc Sn
Regiment (aka 250A Regiment see the following footnote) and began its 2,000km/112-day infiltration
into the South on 13 September see History of NVA 3rd Battalion, CDEC Bulletin 3975 and Log 042594-67, 19 April 1966. The commanding officer of the 400-strong D605 Battalion was noted as Senior
Captain Nguyn Vn Thiu and its political officer as Senior Captain Khuyn (ie V Ngc Khuyn)
CDEC Log 07-0812-66, 09-0806-66.
25
For detail on the raising of the Bc Sn (250A) Regiment (named after the insurrection of 27 September
1940) and its infiltration to VC Military Region 6/Bc K (Phc Long and Qung c Provinces) see
CDEC Log 07-0812-66, 09-0806-66. For the infiltration of the Bc Sn Regiment (ie commencing 1 July
1965 and arriving Phc Long Province on 21 October 1965), see also the notebook of Nguyn Vn c at
CDEC Log 02-1686-67.
26
On 18 April 1966, the D605 Battalion of the Bc Sn Regiment moved south from its base camp at YU
300355 near Phc Hoa in central-western Phc Long Province to a new base in the Bunard II Plantation
(YT 285885) in central-southern Phc Long Province near the border with Long Khnh Province. This
move by D605 Battalion commanded by Nguyn Vn Thiu, was apparently to join the 275th Regiment

O-7

title of the 3rd Battalion.27 The commander of the 3rd Battalion was Comrade Nguyn
Vn/nh Thiu28 and the Battalion political officer was V Ngc Khuyn. The great
majority of the cadre and troops of the 3rd Battalion were southern cadre who had
regrouped to the North and served at the Sng m Agricultural Worksite ((ie Nng
Trng a euphemism for a divisional-sized entity)) in Thanh Ha and had
enthusiastically volunteered to return to their home areas to fight. Although only recently
formed, it was on the battlefield in its first days. The 3rd Battalion participated
continuously in the fighting, completing its tasks in an exemplary manner - becoming the
principal battalion of the Bc Sn Regiment.29
The background to the incorporation of the 605th Battalion into the 275th Regiment
in May 1966 ie as its new 3rd Battalion, is related in the VC 5th Division History (2005)
as follows: the 5th ((275th)) Regiment had regrouped and interdicted communications to
defeat the enemys pacification program in the nh Qun and La Ng regions along
Route 20. After a year of activity, the strength of the 5th Regiment was still only 500.
The 5th Divisional Headquarters decided to incorporate the troops of the ((former)) 3rd
Battalion of the 275th Regiment into its 1st and 2nd Battalions. According to Captain Trn
Vn Ting, in late April 1966, the 3rd Battalion was dissolved and its members
approximately 150 personnel, were reassigned to the 1st and 2nd Battalions.
On 17-18 June 1966, the 275th Regiment under Regimental Commander Nguyn
Thi Bng (t Thi), attacked elements of the ARVN 18th Divisions 52nd Regiment at
the ng n T-Junction in the Long Khnh-Hai c area (ie the junction of Route 1/
Route 333, about 15km west of Xun Lc Town at YT 630085). According to the 5th
Division History (2005), the 275th Regiment destroyed a battalion of the ARVN 52nd
farther south see: Preliminary Interrogation Report Item No. 66-5-930 (DTIC AD0394026). That report
also includes detail on the organisation of the Bc Sn Regiment (aka 250A).
27
During infiltration into the South, Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN - ie North Vietnamese Army NVA)
military personnel routinely physically abandoned their rank and other insignia and adopted functional
titles. However, in many formations and units this was nominal, and their military ranks and titles were
used see Advanced Research Projects Agency, Basic Profile: NVA POW MR3, Summary Report
No.15, Washington, 14 January 1971, VCAT Item No.2321314001.
28
In late-April 1966, the commanding officer of D605 was declared as Nguyn Vn Thiu by the
Assistant Combat Training Office of the Bc Sn Regiment see DTIC AD039026 (see the preceding
footnotes 24 and 26). According to the 5th Division History (2005), the commander of the 275th Regiments
3rd Battalion was killed during the withdrawal from the attack at ng n (Long Khnh) on 18 June 1966.
The 275th Regiment History (2015) similarly states that the commander of the 3rd Battalion - Nguyn Vn
Thiu, and four of the Battalions soldiers, were casualties during the withdrawal from the engagement at
ng n. p.44.
29 th
5 Division History (2005) p.82; 275th Regiment History (2015) p.40. See also the similar comment
by the rallier NVA Lieutenant Colonel L Xun Chuyn on the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment at
footnote 36 ie being entirely of North Vietnamese. However, as former southern regroupees, the
great majority of the 3rd Battalion cadre could probably more correctly be described as having deployed
from North Vietnam. Most of the soldiers in the 275th Regiment were reportedly from Western Nam B
(Ty Nam B), and the Regiment was also reportedly colloquially referred to as the C G Regiment (Trung
on C G) see Hu Thanh, Min ng Nam B khi la, Si Gn , 28 August 2008 (footnotes 1
and 85) .

O-8

Regiment at the ng n Junction an inspiration for the troops of the 5th Regiment.
This was the first battle at regimental level by the 5th Regiment. For their
accomplishments, the 5th Regiment and the 3rd Battalion were awarded the Liberation
Military Exploits Medal, Second Class.30 The Party History of Long Khnh Town relates
that at the ng n Junction ambush, the ARVN force was supported by the American
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment31; 16 vehicles were hit and set alight, including six
M113s; and a battalion political officer Hong T, died heroically.32 According to
NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting (POW see footnote 1), the Regiment suffered 70
casualties in the attack, both killed and wounded.
The Organisation and Strength of the 275th Regiment mid 1966 33
According to NVA Lieutenant Colonel L Xun Chuyn34 (the former Assistant
Chief of Staff/Head of Operations Section, Headquarters 5th Division to March 1966

30 th
5 Division History (2005) pp.85-86. However, the 275th Regiment History (2015 pp.42-45.) records
its 2nd Battalion under Nguyn Vn Hiu attacking the Regional Force post at ng n earlier ie on 2627 May 1966 p.41; followed by the regimental-level ambush by the Regiment on elements of the 52nd
ARVN Regiment at the ng n T-Junction on 17-18 June 1966. Commendation certificates for 275th
Regiment personnel (as on 45) cite the ng n Junction battle (Long Khnh) as occurring on 30 June
1966 including a certificate for Phan [sic] Vn Chi, commander of 12th Company/3rd Battalion (ie
previously D-605)/on 45. see CDEC Log 04-2208-67. Until late 1966, the 275th Regiment also
routinely used the cover designator on 45. According to the Communist Party History, Chapter III :
On 30 June 1966, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 5th ((275th)) Regiment of the 5th Division together with
the armed forces of Xun Lc and the Gia Ray guerrillas ambushed a puppet task force of the 10 th ((18th))
Division at the ng n junction and Sui Ct. Our forces completely wiped out an enemy battalion, an
armoured squadron of 16 armoured vehicles, and seized a large quantity of weapons.
http://123.30.190.43:8080/tiengviet/tulieuvankien/tulieuvedang/details.asp?topic=168&subtopic=5&leader_
topic=79&id=BT1381139309 . The MACV History related that: On 30 June 1966 in Long Khanh
Province, the VC ambushed 4/520th [sic] ARVN resulting in 19 ARVN killed, 31 wounded, and 35 missing.
- Military History Branch - USMACV, Events during 1966, op.cit., 27 April 1967. VCAT Item
No.13370149004. According to the POW Captain Trn Vn Ting (see footnote 1), the 275th Regiment had
suffered 70 casualties during the ambush on an ARVN column at the ng n Intersection on 30 [sic] June
1966, after which it withdrew to its base camp in the Rng L area to resupply and on approx. 10 August
1966, the Regiment went to the area of t Mountain in t District (vicinity YS4867) before the
Regiment ambushed elements of the Australian Army on approx. 17 August.
31
However, the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11 ACR) did not arrive in Vietnam until some months
later ie in early September 1966, see Annex N.
32
Trn Quang Toi & Phan nh Dng, Lch s (The History of the Party in Long Khnh Town 19302007), op.cit., 2009, p.108. The US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment did not arrive in Long Khnh Province
until October 1966 see detail on the 11 ACRs deployment schedule in Annex N
33
1RARs draft Operation Order (29 March 1966) for Operation Abilene noted the strength of the 5 th /Q765
/275th Regiment as 1,850 (AWM95, 7/1/69). In May 1966, HQ 1 ATF assessed the strength of the 275th
Regiment as 1,850 and the 5th VC Division as 3,850+ 1 ATF, INTSUM No.1/66, Vng Tu, 21 May
1966. For the agreed US and RVNAF assessment of the 5th VC Division and its regiments including
organisation and senior personnel, as at mid-August 1966, see CDEC Log 8-0805-66, VCAT Item
No.F034600421687.

O-9

and who rallied on 2 August 1966): The commander of the 275th Regiment was NVA
Senior Captain t Thi ((ie Nguyn Thi Bng)), the executive officer was Major Ba
c (Hanh)35, the political commissar (Chnh y) was Major Bac Cu ((ie Ba Cc Nguyn Vn Cc)), and the head of the political staff and the deputy commissar (Ph/F
Chnh y) was Senior Captain Ba Dng ((ie Nguyn Dng)). The Regiments
battalions were 1st Battalion (aka D.800) commanded by Tm Bao; the 2nd Battalion (aka
D.265) commanded by Nguyn Vn Hiu (Hai Hiu)/Hai Phng and its original 3rd
Battalion had been disbanded and elements incorporated into the 1st and 2nd Battalions,
but had been replaced by a battalion entirely of North Vietnamese.36 In late July/early
August 1966, the political officer of the 3rd Battalion of the Regiment - V Ngc Khuyn,
may have been appointed to command the 3rd Battalion following the death of Nguyn
Vn Thiu. Additional to its three infantry battalions, the 275th Regiment reportedly had
up to nine support companies ie: mortar (81/82mm), recoilless rifle, anti-aircraft
machinegun (12.7mm) engineer, signals, sapper/reconnaissance, transport, medical and
convalescence.37
According to the NVA defector L Xun Chuyn, with a strength of
approximately 1,500, in July 1966, the Regiment was located approximately two
kilometres south-east of Phu Mountain near the boundary of Tnh Linh District (Bnh
Tuy Province) and Long Khnh Province. The Regiment was presently under
strength with each company having about only 70 persons. The Regiments primary
base was located about two kilometres south-east of Thu Mountain in Xun Lc District
of Long Khnh Province with secondary bases in the area north of Gia Huynh (Tnh
Linh District, Bnh Tuy Province) and south of the Xun Lc District capital (Long
Khnh Province). In August 1966, the RVNAF Joint General Staff J2 Staff (Intelligence
Staff) estimated the strength of the 275th Regiment at 1,800.38

34

When rallying, L Xun Chuyn declared himself to have been an NVA Lieutenant Colonel - although
some communist sources cite him as a major. His debrief is at CMIC Log 08-029-66 and VCAT Item No.
23130003016. As a Lieutenant Colonel, he is often cited as the most senior of the NVA/VC defectors ie
among other lieutenant colonels and senior political cadre. Chuyn provided considerable information on
the higher NVA/VC organisation, personalities and operational activities. He was appointed to a Director
position in the Si Gn Governments Chiu Hi Ministry. Chuyn reportedly committed suicide in Si
Gn on 1 May 1975.
35
Subsequently, in September 1966, the Chief of Staff of on 45 (275th Regiment) was noted as
Nguyn Thanh CDEC Log 12-1751-66 ie Su Thanh, see the following footnotes 46 and 113.
36
See footnote 34. Although L Xun Chuyn had been posted from Headquarters 5th Division to COSVN
in March 1966, he had contact with the operations officer of the 5 th VC Division on 27 July 1966. For 1
ATFs subsequent post-Long Tn assessment of the structure of the 275th Regiment including D605
Battalion, see 1 ATF, Intelligence Review No.1, Ni t, 13 September 1966, related at footnote 99.
37
Furner, J.P. Major, 5th VC Division R569-1-16, HQ 1ATF Ni t, 15 November 1967 see the
organogram of the 275th Regiment at Appendix 2 to Annex A of that report.
38
RVNAF J2, 20 August 1966 CDEC 8-0805-66. Their assessment included information from the NVA
defector Lieutenant Colonel L Xun Chuyn. See also 1 ATFs May 1966 estimate of 1,850 (footnote 33).

O-10

The Battle of Long Tn

According to the 5th Division History (2005)39: In June 196640, the 275th Regiment
moved from Long Khanh to east of Route 2 to protect the offices of the Divisional
Headquarters and to prepare its forces to attack the Australian forces developing their
base at Ni t B Ra. Although the units of the Division had suffered losses, faced
difficulties - and had to change their missions and combat zone, they all moved urgently
to achieve their tasks. The 5th ((275th)) Regiment immediately studied the situation and
prepared forces to attack the Australian military at Ni t. In August 1966, the
leadership cadres studied the Australian target at Ni t - B Ra. Comrade Trn Minh
Tm41, the Deputy Divisional Commander, personally led a group to Long Tn to study
the battle zone and the Australian activities and to discuss a combat plan with the B
Ra local armed forces to wipe out an Australian battalion in the Long Tn area.
While some Australian writers have contended that the aim of the 5th VC
Division-directed force was to attack the 1 ATF base, communist Vietnamese writers and
several senior Vietnamese veterans have always claimed that the aim was to lure an
Australian force from the base and to annihilate the Australians in a mobile
ambush.42 The 275th Division History (2015) summarised: After many days of
examining the operating methods of the Australian forces, the Battle Headquarters
agreed on a plan to shell the enemy combined with cutting communication routes to
5th Division History (2005), p.88. See translated extracts at Annex K.
See footnotes 17-20 ie at this time, 25-30% of the strength the 275th Regiment were reportedly
immobilised because of malaria.
41
Trn Minh Tm (aka Nm Ta ) was the founding commanding officer of the 4 th (274th) Regiment. In
August 1966, he was the Chief of Staff of the 5 th VC Division. The defectors L Xun Chuyn (see
footnotes 34 and 36) and Nguyn Vn Phng (footnote 51) noted Lieutenant Colonel Nm Ta as the
Chief of Staff of the 5th VC Division and Chuyn described Tm as: young and resolute, has no
capability as far as tactics and staff work. According to the 5 th Division History (2005 see extracts at
Annex K), Nm Tam was the NVA/VC battlefield commander at Long Tn in August 1966 see however
the claims by Nguyn Thanh Hng (Hai Hng) at footnotes 50, 54, 63, 67 (biographic notes), 68 and 104.
Trn Minh Tm is also noted in a major Vietnamese account of the War as leading the 5th Division elements
at Long Tn, see - Nguyn Vn Minh Colonel (ed), Lch s Khng chin chng M cu nc - Tp 4 (Vol
4), Nh Xut Bn Chnh Tr Quc Gi, H Ni, 1999. The 5th VC Division History (2005) - see Annex K,
included implied criticism of Tms pre-battle security arrangements at Long Tn - ie the premature
withdrawal of an observation element. Subsequently as a Colonel (Thng T), Tm was appointed as
Commander of the 5th VC Division in October 1968.
42
These two views a planned attack on the 1 ATF base or a planned mobile ambush, were examined in
the Australian Official History published in 1993, and the late Dr Ian McNeill then concluded that: Too
much information is missing to make a conclusive assessment of the enemy intentions and motives. The
battle had all the appearances of a surprise encounter between the two forces. Nevertheless it does seem
that 5 Viet Cong Division intended to stage an ambush. - McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.364 and
pp.370-371. In 2014, on the base attack or lure/ambush views, Dr Peter Edwards similarly summarised
that: The debate continues to this day. Edwards, P., Australia and the Vietnam War, Australian War
Memorial/New South Publishing, Sydney, 2014, p.151. See also Fairhead, F. Lieutenant Colonel (Retd), A
Duty Done: A Summary of Operations by the Royal Australian Regiment in the Vietnam War 1965-1972,
Royal Australian Regiment Association SA Inc, Linden Park, 2014, p.175 Note 6.
39
40

O-11

force the enemy to send out troops to break the blockade, which we would then destroy.
On 18 August 1966, the Regiment implemented its operational method of attacking a
base and destroying relief forces by drawing Australian forces out from their base to
destroy them.43
The VC planners would be mindful that the 5th VC Division had failed in major
set attacks earlier in 1966 against prepared positions defended by ARVN troops - and
had suffered heavy casualties eg: the attack by the 274th Regiment at V Su (Bnh Tuy
Province) on 28 February 1966 and the subsequent attack on V Su by the 275th
Regiment on 15 March (see footnote 22). However, several VC ambushes in Phc Tuy
Province had been successful - eg: against ARVN armour (M113s) just south of Bnh Ba
by the 272nd Regiment on 9 December 1964; against the ARVN 4th Marine Battalion west
of Bnh Gi on 31 December 1964 (112 Marines KIA); several ambushes on Route 15
against ARVN columns; and a mobile ambush by the 274th Regiment against a company
of the 16th Regiment of the 1st US Infantry Division at Tm B/Cm M on 11 April 1966
(48 US KIA and 58 US WIA - Operation Abilene). In Long Khnh Province, the 275th
Regiment had ambushed an ARVN column at ng n in mid-June 1966.
Both the 1991 and the 2004 D445 Histories relate the activities of the 275th
Regiment at the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966.44 For subsequent passages from
the 5th Division History (2005) relating the 275th Regiments involvement in the Battle of
Long Tn in August 1966 see Annex K (pp.5-9) and the December 2014 article at Annex
Q.45 - and also later battles, including at Bn Nm in Long Khnh Province in early July

43

H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, p.46, p.402.
As noted at footnote 1, the 1991 D445 History incorrectly states that the 4th ((274th)) Regiment ie not
the 5th ((275th)) Regiment, was the 5th VC Divisions formation involved in the battle at Long Tn see
Annex M. However, this 2004 D445 History correctly cites the 5 th ((275th)) Regiment. In his 53-page
notebook/diary captured by Australian forces on 20 October 1966, the 274th ((ie 4th)) Regiment deputy
commander - Nguyn Nam Hng, wrote: the 5th Regiment attacked at Ni t and 500 Australians
were killed and 1 Australian Battalion was exterminated - CDEC Log 11-1259-66. Nguyn Nam
Hngs notes also indicated that - in August 1966, the 274th Regiment was interdicting Route 15 and for
most of August and September, the ((274th)) Regiment was transporting rice. Hngs statement conflicts
with claims including by Nguyn Vn Kim (Commander D445, early 1968-1969), that the 274th
Regiment was tasked in mid-August 1966 to interdict any US forces moving south on Route 2 to relieve
Australian forces during the Long Tn battle see Kims statement in Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer),
Long Tan The True Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993. A review and analysis of Nguyn Nam Hngs notebook
is in 1ATF, Troop Information Sheet 31, Ni t, 13-19 February 1967. For an examination of the 274th
Regiments activities in August 1966, see Annex N.
45
The Military Region 7 History relates that The 5th Division deployed to the Route 2 area in B Ra-Long
Khnh and Route 15 and fought many battles with the Americans, and - in particular, together with the B
Ra 445 Battalion, for the first time struck the Australian forces in the rubber plantation at Long Tn (18
August 1966) and inflicted heavy casualties on an Australian company. - The Armed Forces of Military
Region 7 50 Years. A major Vietnamese history of the War incorrectly cites the 6 th Battalion of the
275th Regiment ie rather than the 3rd Battalion, and a company of 445 Battalion destroying a company
of Australian soldiers at Long Tn - Nguyn Vn Minh Colonel (ed), Lch s Khng chin , Tp 4 (Vol
4), op.cit., 1999.
44

O-12

196746 and on Route 20 on 21 July 1967.47 In mid-2015, the history of the 275th Regiment
was published and a translation of its passages on the Battle of Long Tn is at Appendix
3.48 That History relates that: At 2300hrs [sic] on 17 August, as our units had completed
occupying the battlefield, the Regiments recoilless rifles and mortars attacked the
enemys base at Ni t.49
The 275th Regiments commander at the Battle of Long Tn appears to have been:
Nguyn Thi Bng (t Thi) according to statements made in interviews.50 However,
the 275th Regiments 2015 History states that: After commanding the unit to win a large
victory at the ng n T-Junction ((mid-June 1966)), the Regiments commander Nguyn Thi Bng, was appointed to a new task51; and Comrade Nguyn Vn Hiu52 was
46

On 31 July 1967, Tm Phi the 275th Regiment Commander, and Hunh Thn the Regiments
Political Commissar, were both reportedly killed in the battle at Bn Nm; and Su Thanh the Chief of
Staff, was wounded. 5th Division History (2005) see footnotes 112 and 114, and Annex K p.17. The 275th
Regiment History (2015) however, cites these deaths as occuring in an airstrike on 30 May 1967 following
an engagement with the 52nd ARVN Ranger Battalion. H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of
the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, p.57.
47
In the ambush of US forces on Route 20 north of Tc Trung strategic hamlet, the 275th Regiment
reportedly sustained over 100 casualties including killed and wounded. - Debrief of NVA POW Captain
Trn Vn Ting - CMIC No.2550, VCAT Item No. 2310305007. USMACV noted on 21 July the 2nd and
3rd Battalions of the VC 275 Regiment and the Dong Nai Battalion ambushed US and ARVN forces
conducting a road-clearing operation on Route 20 between Xuan Loc and the IIICTZ/IICTZ border. The
results were 95 enemy killed and two detainees. - USMACV, PERINTREP, July 1967. VCAT Item No.
2130906001.
48
H Sn i - Senior Colonel (ed),The History of the 5th Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, pp.45-50.
49
Ibid, p.47. However, the 2004 D445 History states that: The 4 th Company ((D445)) was ordered by the
Battalion to set up two 82mm mortars and a 75mm recoilless rifle (RCL) and shell the Australian military
base. See footnote 269 in the main text of this D445 History (2016) for detail on the shelling that began at
at 0243hrs ie pre-dawn, on 17 August (for 22 minutes). Despite the failure of 1 ATFs AN/KPQ-1 mortar
locating radars, effective counter-battery fire hit the VC firing base positions in seven minutes.
50
In June 1988, the official Australian historian, Ian McNeill met with then Lieutenant General Nguyn
Thi Bng Commander Military Region 7, at the Military Region 7 Headquarters. A photograph in the
Australian War Memorial following their brief meeting notes: General Bung was the commander of the
Viet Cong (VC) 275 Regiment during the Battle of Long Tan. - AWM P01509.008. Subsequently, the
Australian Official History noted that at the Battle of Long Ta : The enemy commander was Lieutenant
Colonel Ut Thoi, Commander 275 Regiment. - McNeill, I., To Long Tn, 1993, op.cit., p.558 (endnote
110). Following his discussions with Nguyn Thi Bng (t Thi) in March 1989, the Australian Vietnam
veteran and author - Terry Burstall, wrote: He commanded the 275 Regiment at the Battle of Long Tan.
t Thi was directly in charge of the forces during the battle, and there were two battalions and one in
reserve plus some of the forces of the D445. - Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, Part II, op.cit., 1990 pp.122123. See also the interviews of Nguyn Thanh Hng (10 November 1987), Nguyn Thi Bng (14 March
1989), and Ba c (22 March 1989) in Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, Part II, opcit., 1990, p.100, p.102,
pp.122-123, and p.206. See also the following footnote 66. The List of Regimental Commanders from
Inception to 2015 in the 275th Regiment History (2015) at p.432 includes Nguyn Thi Bng as the
Regiments commander in the period 1965-1967.
51
Several US reports note that in August/September/October 1966, Nguyn Thi Bng was appointed
Deputy Chief of Staff of the 5th VC Division. His official obituaries in late January 2014 record that: In
August 1966, our Comrade ((Nguyn Thi Bng)) was made Deputy Chief of Staff of Staff of the 5 th
Division. A 275th Regiment POW related that t Thi moved to Headquarters 5th Division in September

O-13

appointed as the Regiments second-in-command and concurrently the acting commander

of the Regiment. The 275th Regiment Commander at the Battle of Long Tn is not
specifically named in published histories of the D445 VC Battalion (1991 and 2004) nor
in the 5th VC Division History (2005) or the December 2014 article at Annex Q. This
aspect of command at the Battle is also discussed in Appendices 2 and 3.
Other senior 275th Regiment cadre at the at the Battle of Long Tn were: Political
Commissar - Nguyn Vn Cc (Ba Cc)53; Executive Officer - Ba c (Hanh); Assistant
Political Officer Nguyn Dng (Ba Dng); and Chief of the Political Section
Nguyn Vn M. The Regiments 2ic/Executive Officer was Phan Vn Khu; and the
battalion commanders were probably: Tm Bao (1st Battalion), Nguyn Vn Hiu (Hai
Hiu) or Hai Phng (2nd Battalion), and V Ngc Khuyn (3rd Battalion). According to
Nguyn Thanh Hng (see a biographical note at footnote 67), during the Battle of Long
Tn on 18 August 1966: Senior Captain t Thi located his 275th Regiment
headquarters on the small feature of Ni t 2, and t Thi was accompanied by his
executive officer Major Ba Du (ie Ba c aka V c, b.1925, Thi Bnh).54 At the
Battle, the 275th Regiments 3rd Battalion was probably commanded by either NVA
Captain V Ngc Khuyn55 - or NVA Captain Nguyn Vn c (as noted, its inaugural
1966 and was replaced by Hai Hiu, a Northerner, aged 35 VCAT Item No.F034600701813.
According to the defector NVA Senior Lieutenant Nguyn Vn Phng (assistant operations officer HQ
5th VC Division, September 1965 February 1967) Lieutenant Colonel t Thi ((ie Nguyn Thi Bng))
commanded the 275th Regiment in Oct 66 and then became the Deputy Chief of Staff of the 5th VC
Division - until he was replaced in January 1967 and moved to COSVN VCAT Item No:
F034600782214; F034600850749; F034600900691; F034601500569. Nguyn Thi Bngs biography is at
Appendix 2 to this Annex O.
52
Nguyn Vn Hiu (Hai Hiu) is noted as the commander of the 2nd Battalion/275th Regiment in July
1965. He led the 2nd Battalion at the Battle of V Xu in mid-March 1966; at ng Qu (26-27 May 1966)
and was wounded by napalm at the Battle of ng n in mid-June 1966. H Sn i Senior Colonel
(ed), The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, p.21, p.38, p.41, p.44. A 1ATF study
noted that Regt Commander Lt Colonel Hai Hieu (A recent report indicates that he may have been
killed on 21 Jul 67.) Furner, J.P. Major, 5th VC Division R569-1-16, HQ 1ATF Ni t, 15
November 1967.
53
At the end of 1966, Political Commissar Nguyn Vn Cc (Ba Cc) was given a new appointment, and
Comrade Hunh Thn became the Regiments political commissar and Tm Phi was appointed as
commander of the Regiment. H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry
Regiment, op.cit., 2015, p.50.
54
See the interviews of Nguyn Thanh Hng and Nguyn Thi Bng in Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns,
Part II, opcit., 1990, p.100, p.102, pp.122-123, and p.206.
55
V Ngc Khuyn had been the political officer of the NVA D605 Battalion (see footnote 24) ie which
became the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment. He often signed documents for (ie T M) the commander
of the 3rd Battalion including on 25 July 1966. However, on 6 August 1966, Khuyn signed a document as
Th Trng D3 ie Commander 3rd Battalion, for the promotion of 14 personnel. Subsequently, he
also signed documents as the battalion commander on 1 December 1966 see CDEC Log 04-2218-67. See
also footnote 101 for V Ngc Khuyn as the battalion commander in November 1966. However, note also
in the 5th VC Division History (2005), Khuyn is mentioned as the political officer of the 3rd Battalion in
May 1969 see Annex K, p.17. He was also the Battalion Party Secretary, and later operated in the
Mekong Delta in 1972 as a senior cadre in the 3 rd Regiment of Group 13 (5th VC Division). CDEC Log
08-1122-72.

O-14

commander - Nguyn Vn Thiu, had been killed in action in June 1966). As noted
above, V Ngc Khuyn may have also acted as the 3rd Battalions political officer at the
Battle, and NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting (footnote 1) was its assistant political officer.
Both the 1991 and 2004 D445 Battalion Histories and the 5th Division History (Annex K footnotes 37 and 38) relate that the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment was allocated the
main killing ground at the Battle of Long Tn ambush. The 275th Regiment History
(2015) however relates that the force for the killing zone comprised the 1st Battalion, the
2nd Battalion, and a company of 445 Battalion stationed opposite. see the 275th
Regiment description of the Battle at Appendix 3.
A December 2014 article by a Vietnamese veterans association in H Ch Minh
City related that during the Battle: Thousands of rounds fell on our battlefield. However,
we had prepared carefully. When deploying to prepare the battlefield, every soldier had
carried a shovel and on their shoulders, each was bearing a bundle of about 10 branches
with every branch as thick as a wrist and about one metre long, to use as anti-shrapnel
covers for their individual pits and for our defensive works, and so this limited our
casualties. Comrade L Tn Tao56 used his AK rifle and a B40 to kill 36 enemy onthe-spot and seized many weapons.57
In February 1969, a very brief account of the Long Tn battle was provided by the
assistant political officer of the 275th Regiments 3rd Battalion - ie NVA POW Captain
Trn Vn Ting58 as follows: On approx 10 August 1966, the Regiment went to the area
of t Mountain in t District (vicinity YS 4867) in Phc Tuy Province. On
approx 17 August, the Regiment - along with the 1st B Ra Battalion aka 45 [sic]
Battalion (Local Force), ambushed elements of the Australian Army as they were coming
from their camp on t Mountain. The battle lasted for approx four hours in which the
Regiment sustained over 200 casualties including both KIA and WIA. After the battle, the
Regiment moved back to the L Jungle Base Camp ((Rng L vicinity YT 7610)). The
Regiment remained in camp for a week, after which the entire Regiment minus the 1st
Battalion, moved to Bnh Thun Province to an area approx. five kilometres west of the
T Bao Bridge. The Regiment made this move in search of rice.59
56

Other individual soldiers are cited for their exploits during the Battle of Long Tn in the 1991 and D445
Histories. L Tn Tao/To was a soldier in the 275th VC Main Force Regiment either in its 1st or the 2nd
Battalion (LBN 12372E-A6). Two Tt 1967 letters to his family (Khanh Bnh village, Mi V District,
C Mau Province) were recovered undelivered, by elements of the 7th ARVN Division on 20 June 1967 at
XS 315535 during Operation Cu Long 60/58 CDEC 07-2667-67. Letters written by by a total of 70
personnel of the 275th Regiment seemingly all members of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, were recovered as
well as several Tt 1967 cards signed by the Regiments Political Officer, Nguyn Vn Cc. The members
families were principally in C Mau Province (ie the Republic of Vietnams An Xuyn Province), Tr Vinh
(Vnh Bnh), M Tho Province (nh Tng), and Cn Th Province (Phong Dinh). See also footnote 146.
57
Nguyn Vn Bch, Trn Phc Kch Long Tn (The Ambush Battle at Long Tn), Cu Chin Binh
(War Veterans) Thnh Ph H Ch Minh On-line, Thnh Ph H Ch Minh (H Ch Minh City), 18
December 2014. See a translation and commentary at Annex Q, including footnote 18.
58
NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting aged 36, the Assistant Political Officer of the 3rd Battalion of the 275th
Regiment, was captured by ARVN forces on 26 February 1969 (see footnote 1).
59
NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting - No. 2550, VCAT Item No.2310305007.

O-15

The 1 ATF After Action Report of the Long Tn battle noted that two NVA
POWs60 from the 45th Regiment (ie the 275th Regiment) declared that only two
battalions of the Regiment the 2nd Battalion and the 3rd Battalion, were in the area.61
Also, post-War, several former senior VC cadre declared quite low strengths for the 275th
Regiment at the Battle of Long Tn. Following interviews in Vietnam in June 1988, the
Australian official historian Dr I. McNeill wrote: The Vietnamese did not concede
((their troops at Long Tn)) as more than two battalions, a total of some 700-800 men.
Kim62 was adamant that the prime force was D445 Battalion with a strength of 600,
reinforced by one company of North Vietnamese from Headquarters Military Region 7
with a strength of 120 men. The total was 720 troops. ((Nguyn Thanh)) Hng 63
agreed that 275 Regiment was involved, but only one of its battalions. This, he said, with
D445 Battalion, came to 700-800 men. When told that the Australian assessment of his
total strength was at least 1500, he replied simply: No, its not right. Because I am one of
the organisers for this battle so I know very well.64
60

The two NVA soldiers captured on 19 August 1966 on the Long Tn battlefield were: Nguyn Vn
Thanh (b. 1947) of the 3rd Battalion, 275th Regiment (gunshot wounds to the leg and the hip) who was
moved from the III CTZ Bin Ha POW facility to the major POW camp on Ph Quc island on 20 May
1970; and Nguyn Vn Huy (b.1948). The D445 POW was L Vn Trung (b. 1946). Both Huy and Trung
were moved to Ph Quc Island on 6 October 1967 and released under the provisions of the Paris Peace
Agreement on 12 February 1973.
61 st
1 Australian Task Force - Vietnam, Combat Operations After Action Report Operation Smithfield,
R723-1-5, December 1966, sub-sub-para 12.b. AWM95, 1/4/26, folio 112 ( Internet-accessible, see
Bibliography). Note however that in his After Action Report, Major H.A. Smith reported that: It is now
understood that the enemy was 275 Regiment plus one NVA battalion and D445 Mobile Force Bn with an
artillery battalion (6 Bn), advancing 3 up and one in reserve. - Smith, H. Major & Townsend, C.M.
Lieutenant Colonel, D Coy After Action Report: Operation SMITHFIELD, undated, para 18. AWM95,
1/4/26, folio 112. Subsequently, Lieutenant Colonel H.A. Smith SG, MC (Retd) wrote: Headquarters
tallied the reports of 245 VC bodies. We found three wounded, one VC and two from the North Vietnamese
battalion reinforcing two battalions of 275 VC Main Force Regiment. These plus D445 and D400 [sic]
made around 3,000 enemy troops. - Smith, H., No Time for Fear, Wartime Issue 35, Australian War
Memorial, Canberra, 2006. Lieutenant Colonel Smith (Retd) also earlier contended that D440, D445,
and 860 Battalion were elements of the enemy force at the Battle. - Grandin, R., The Battle of Long Tan
, op.cit., 2004, p.85. The D440 error - and an NVA 806 [sic] Battalion, appear in the Harry Smith
(Australian Soldier) item in Wikipedia. The MACV History related: 18 August 1st Australian Task
Force launches four-day search-and-destroy Operation Smithfield in Phc Tuy Province during which a
VC battalion is annihilated after attempting ambush in most significant Australian victory of the war to date
(245 VC KIA, 37 individual and 16 crew-served weapons captured 17 Australians killed in action and 22
wounded). - Military History Branch - USMACV, Events during 1966, op.cit., 27 April 1967. VCAT Item
No.13370149004.
62
Nguyn Vn Kim commanded the Chu c District Unit in August 1966, and was only appointed to
command 445 Battalion from very late 1967/early 1968 see his biography at Annex A.
63
Nguyn Thanh Hng (Hai Hng ie Hng) was a Headquarters 5th Division operations officer, see also
footnotes 41, 50, 54, 67 (bio), 68 and 104. Hngs statement that only one of its battalions was involved
is contradicted by his statements to the Australian author Terry Burstall in November 1987 when Hng
stated that all three battalions of the 275th Regiment were at the Battle Long Tn see footnote 68.
64
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, pp.365-368 In June 1988, Dr I. McNeill interviewed Nguyn
Vn Kim on the Battle of Long Tn as the most important witness (as noted, Kim had claimed,

O-16

Sketch Map: The Battle of Long Tan - the D445 (2004) account65
falsely, to have commanded 445 Battalion at the Battle), and Nguyn c Thu (commander of the 2nd
Company of 445 Battalion at Long Tn). However, in his record-of-interview, Dr McNeill stated: There
were some ambiguities about the precise nature of Kiems command of D445 Battalion, though, and his
actual role in the battle at Long Tan. Ekins, A., Unravelling the riddles of Long Tan, op.cit., July 2011,
p.43. Subsequently, Dr Ian McNeill interviewed Nguyn Thanh Hng (a 5th Division operations officer) and
L Thnh Ba (a former political officer of 445 Battalion September-December 1965) at Kuranda
(Queensland) on 7 September 1990 - McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, pp.562-563 and Sketch 16.1
of the enemy battle plan by Nguyn Thanh Hng opposite p.327; and Walker, J., Long Tan doubts left in
peace, The Australian, September 1990. In critiquing information provided during interviews in June
1988, Dr Ian McNeill noted that his Vietnamese interlocutors appeared on some issues to be captives of
their recent past. The full transcripts of the late Dr Ian McNeills interviews are not accessible as they are
less than 30 years old and are still within the closed period advice to the author (Chamberlain) by the
Australian War Memorial Research Centre, RCIS26101, 9 April 2010.
65
For detail, see footnote 275 in the main text. Ta is Us, and ch is Enemy. The number 5
within a rectangular flag represents the 5th VC Regiment ie the 275th VC Main Force Regiment - with its

O-17

Terry Burstall (author and 6RAR Vietnam veteran) interviewed Nguyn Thanh
Hng in November 1987, and Nguyn Thi Bng (t Thi 275th Regiment
commander) and Ba c (275th Regiment 2ic/executive officer) in March 1989 and
others. Following his discussions with Nguyn Thi Bng (t Thi), Burstall wrote: He
commanded the 275 Regiment at the Battle of Long Tan. t Thi was directly in
charge of the forces during the battle, and there were two battalions and one in reserve
plus some of the forces of the D445.66 Nguyn Thanh Hng67 claimed to Burstall that
it was left to him to plan the attack ((at Long Tn)) and on 18 August 1966, he
established his headquarters in the small deserted hamlet of Phc Hng - about two
kilometres to the east of the battlefield (YS 495690) and had with him there the third
battalion of the 275th as a reserve element, while the other two battalions were forming a
screen to the east and north of the plantation. One unit of the D445 had been placed on
the south-western edge of the plantation with several rocket launchers.68 Importantly,
battalions (1, 2, and 3) is shown as triangular flags. The symbols of an arrow with two cross-bars
represent a company assault. The diamond symbol represents an Australian medium tank. Long Kin
the western-most hamlet of the unihabited ie resettled, village of Long Phc is shown.
66
Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, Book 2, op.cit., 1990 pp.122-123. In June 1988, the Australian official
military historian - Ian McNeill, met with then Lieutenant General Nguyn Thi Bng Commander
Military Region 7, at the Military Region 7 Headquarters. A photograph in the Australian War Memorial
of their meeting notes: General Bung was the commander of the Viet Cong (VC) 275 Regiment during
the Battle of Long Tan. - AWM P01509.008.
67
Nguyn Thanh Hng (Hai Hng) was born in Hi M village (Phc Tuy Province) in 1932. He joined
the revolutionary forces in 1947 at the age of 15 and fought in the Vit Minh during the whole of the French
war. In 1965-1968, Hng was an operations staff officer at the headquarters of 5th VC Infantry Division.
In 1968, he reportedly was promoted to lieutenant colonel as Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff of the 5th
Division. see Burstall, A Soldier Returns op.cit., 1990, pp.94-99 (ie interview with Nguyn Thanh
Hng, Bin Ha City, 10 November 1987). In the period 1979-1980, Senior Colonel (i Ta) Nguyn
Thanh Hng was the commander of the 5th VC Division 5th Division History (2005). As related above,
Hng has claimed that he planned the attack at Long Tn and, from his headquarters at the abandoned
Phc Hng hamlet, he ordered deployments eg: the commital of 445 Battalion and the eventual
withdrawal of Vit Cng forces from the battlefield. see Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990,
pp.99-104. However, neither the 1991 nor the 2004 D445 Histories mention Nguyn Thanh Hng in
either the pre-battle planning group or in the conduct of the battle. The 1991 D445 History relates that t
ng (ng Hu Thun the Commander of the B Ra Provincial Unit) and Nm Tm (Trn Minh Tm
Chief of Staff /Deputy Commander of the 5th VC Division see footnote 34) were principals in the
reconnaissance and planning and established a forward command element to directly command the
battle. However, the 2004 D445 History does not mention either Nm Tm (Trn Minh Tm) or t ng
(ng Hu Thun) as associated with the Battle of Long Tn. The 5th Division History (2005) relates that
Trn Minh Tm the Deputy Divisional Commander led a group to Long Tn to study the battle zone and it is possible that Hng may have been part of that group. That 5th Division History (2005) cites Trn
Minh Tm as the battlefield commander at Long Ta on 18 August 1966 - and does not mention Nguyn
Thanh Hng. Post-War, Nguyn Thanh Hng appeared in an Australian video/DVD documentary in which
he described aspects of the Long Tn battle - Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan The True
Story, Australian Broadcasting Commission/Film Australia, Lindfield, 1993.
68
Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, Book 2, op.cit., 1990, p.99. According to Nguyn Thanh Hng, the small
deserted Phc Hng hamlet was just on the eastern side of the Long Tan plantation. Note however that
Hngs description of the employment of the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment differs from accounts in
both the 1991 D445 History see Annex M; and the 5th Division History (2005) - see Annex K.

O-18

several Vietnamese military histories including the 1991 and the 2004 D445 Histories,
the 5th Division History (2005), the ng Nai History (1986), and the 275th Regiment
History (2015), have related that all three battalions of the 275th Regiment was present at
the Battle of Long Tn.69 The foregoing indicates that when speaking with the official
Australian historian - Dr Ian McNeill, some of his post-War Vietnamese interlocutors
attempted to downplay the strength of the 275th Regiment in the Battle of Long Tn and
to emphasise the role of 445 Battalion. Such statements were probably intended to justify
the withdrawal of the Vit Cng forces from the battlefield, imply a more equitable
balance of forces, and explain-away the relatively small number of Australian
casualties. This emphasis on the role of 445 Battalion at the Battle - and minimizing or
omitting reference to the 275th Regiment, is also evidenced on the Vietnamese Ministry
of Culture plaque on the 6RAR Long Tn memorial ie: D445 of Ba Ria Long Khanh
province contacted 6th Battalion of the Royal Australian Army near Long Tan village
see the following page 41. Formal acknowledgement by Vietnamese authorities of the
275th Regiments principal role appeared in the 1991 D445 History and the 1995 and
2005 editions of the 5th VC Division History. A recently-acquired (November 2011)
275th Regiment casualty list of the Regiments cadre and soldiers killed at the Battle of
Long Tn included personnel from all three battalions about 57% of those killed were
3rd Battalion personnel, and about 52% of those listed as killed were Northerners - for
detail, see Appendix 1, and also: The Battle of Long Tn: Casualties - Annex F.70
In late February 1969, the NVA POW Captain Trn Vn Ting Assistant
Political Officer, 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment who was at the Long Tn battle,
stated that the total strength of the 275th Regiment in early 1969 was about 1,600. Of this
number about 55 were political indoctrination personnel, 150 were cadre, and 1,450
were soldiers. Ting also stated that 650 of the Regiments strength (about 41%) had a
combat role, about 800 (about 50%) had a combat support role and about 90 (about
6%) were personnel in Rear Services. The foregoing and a consideration of personnel
ill from malaria, indicates that far less than the Regiments total strength of about 1,600
were available for front-line combat tasks, including at the Battle of Long Tn.

69

According to the official Australian military history: In the final evaluation, including forces held in
depth, the task force assessed the enemy as 275 Main Force Regiment of three battalions reinforced by at
least one battalion from the North Vietnamese Army together with 445 Battalion. The total strength of
275 Regiment was 1600 The strength of the NVA battalion was 500 and the strength of D445 Battalion
was 550. McNeill, I., To Long Tn, op.cit., 1993, p.351 and p.559 (endnotes 112 and 113). A US
estimate as at 31 August 1966 reported the strength of the 275th Regiment as 1,800 - USMACV/CDEC,
Summary of VC Order of Battle South of the 17th Parallel, 31 August 1966, CDEC Log #9-0793-66, VCAT
Item No.034600301272 (based principally on RVNAF Joint General Staff figures).
70
The detail of that 275th Regiments casualty list was included in a presentation at the Australian War
Memorial on 16 August 2013 - ie Chamberlain, E.P., The NVA and VC Soldier: Tougher Than Us
presentation/paper to the international conference: International Perspectives on a Long War.

O-19

The 275th Regiments Advance to Long Tn

1 ATFs signals intelligence (SIGINT) unit at Ni t 547 Signal Detachment,
was operational from July 1966 and had soon recovered ie intercepted and identified,
communications of the 5th VC Division.71 On 29 July, US airborne direction-finding
(ARDF) missions flown by EC-47 aircraft of the USAF 6994th Security Squadron fixed
the 275th Regiments rear-link radio to the east of the 1 ATF base at Ni t north of
Xuyn Mc Town. Subsequently, in the period 2 August to 14 August, the 275th
Regiments radio transmitter72 was fixed 12 times as it moved in stages from north-east
of Xuyn Mc Town westward towards Ni t.73 Prior to the commencement of II
FFVs Operation Toledo on 10 August, the US 173rd Airborne Brigade noted the
transmitter of the 275th Regiment located at YS 5473 about 12 kilometres north-east of
the 1 ATF base.74 Subsequently, as noted above, the radio was fixed several times and
71

The 5th VC Divisions high frequency radio communications principally using low-power (15-watt)
Chinese 102E and US AN/GRC-9 HF radios (2-12 MHz range), were intercepted by 547 Signal
Detachment; and also geographically fixed by airborne direction-finding (ARDF) flown by the USAF
6994th Security Squadrons EC-47 aircraft and also by the US Armys 146th Army Security Agency
Aviation Company (RU-6A Beaver aircraft). 547 Signal Detachment did not acquire a ground-based DF
capability (two borrowed US AN/PRD-1s) until some weeks after the Battle of Long Tn. At first, it was
difficult for the 547 Signal Detachment operators to distinguish between the HF morse communications of
the 274th and the 275th Regiments. VC operators were skilled, and their communications security discipline
was impeccable. The communications traffic was in four or five figure code groups using short
figures. Only low-grade codes were decipherable. See: Hampstead, B., 547 Signals Troop in Vietnam:
The Soldiers Perspectives Deployment, Early Days and the Lead-up to Long Tan, Toowoomba, July
2008. The encrypted HF morse communications of the 274 th and 275th VC Regiments were in a four figure
(one-time letter) code, with five figure and five letter ((code)) mainly used in traffic to higher formations
that was in a higher encryption. email to author from Major R.W. Hartley, AM (Retd) 29 April 2012.
For detail, see also Annex E: The Battle of Long Tn: A Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Summary.
72
In 1965-1966, the 275th Regiments radios included: the US AN/GRC-9 (HF: 2-12 MHz), the Chinese
Communist (Chicom) 102E (HF: 2-12 MHz, a copy of the US AN/GRC-9), the Chicom 71B (HF: 1.9-7.2
MHz), and the US PRC-10 (VHF). In early 1969, the Regiment had two Chicom R-102E 15w and four
Chicom K-63 radios (replacing the 71Bs), and one AN/PRC-10 for monitoring enemy nets. debrief of
NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting - CMIC No.2550, VCAT Item No.2310305007. For technical detail on
NVA/VC communications: organisation, tactics, techniques, training and equipment (and including an
organogram and data on the 105-strong Signal Company of the 275th Regiment) see: Combined
Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) US MACV, VC/NVA Signal Order of Battle - Update, Study 67021, Saigon, 16 September 1967 - VCAT Item No.F015900250094. That Study lists 275 th Regiments
radios as only: one 102E, one GRC-9, and one 71B [sic] switchboard.
73
Intelligence on the move of the 275th Regiment is related in McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993,
pp.307-312 with Map 14.1 at p.310 showing the DF-ed locations of the 275th Regiment radio
transmitter on 29 July and from 2-14 August (see Annex E to this D445 history - including a copy of Map
14.1). The locations marked are indicative only as the fixes from the US airborne DF equipment would be
unlikely to have produced such a definitive and seemingly-linked direct path.
74
The 173rd Airborne Brigades SIGINT Direct Support Unit - the 404th Radio Research Detachment
reported a regimental-level radio associated with the 275th Regiment in the vicinity of grid reference YS
5473. At the same time, a radio of the 5th VC Division Headquarters was located at YS 6779 and that of the
the 274th Regiment at YS 5586. 173rd Airborne Brigade, Combat Operations After Action Report Lessons
Learned: Operation Toledo, 15 December 1966. : http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/510789.pdf.

O-20

on 14 August, was reportedly fixed about five kilometres east of the Ni t base.
Increased communications traffic was noted on 15 August suggesting heightened activity
and probable operational preparations. This signals intelligence on the location of the
275th Regiment east of 1 ATF (from 29 July 1966) was passed to the 1 ATF commander
and to the few security-cleared operations and intelligence officers on the Headquarters.
However, this signals intelligence was seemingly discounted by the 1 ATF commander,
his intelligence major (GSO2 Int), and the senior operations officer (GSO2 Ops). No
Special Air Service (SAS) patrols were deployed specifically to confirm or deny the
approach of the 275th Regiment from the east towards 1 ATF. Rather, SAS patrols
continued to focus principally on areas to the west of Route 2.75 On 31 July 1966, the 1
ATF intelligence summary began: The discrediting of agent reports (all types) relating to
the presence of the 275th VC Regiment in the general area of 1 ATF has led to a reassessment of the likely enemy forces affecting 1 ATF TAOR. However, ground reports
from own reconnaissance elements in the west of the 1 ATF TAOR tend to confirm VC
activity in that area 48 hours ago, at which time Chinooks received considerable ground
fire76
On 15 August, 1 ATF monitored the Phc Tuy National Police radio network
and noted an agent report that on 12 August the 265 and 605 Battalions were
located near the Ni Th Vi Mountain about 15 kilometres north-west of the Ni t
base.77 On the afternoon of 16 August, the Operations Officer of 5RAR visited SubSector at Duc Than [sic] and was told that 274 [sic] Regt was approx 2000 metres east of
the 1 ATF location.78
275th Regiment Casualties at the Battle of Long Tn.
The 1991 D445 History related that at the Battle: The 5th Division lost 30
comrades killed and over 60 wounded however, the 2004 D445 History does not
mention 5th VC Division casualties at the Battle. According to the 5th Division History
(2005): The 1st Battalion and the 3rd Battalion ((ie of the 275th Regiment)) suffered high
75

See: Chamberlain, E.P., The Enemy and Intelligence, in Phc Tuy: Successes and Failures, National
Vietnam Veterans Museum, Phillip Island, 14 April 2014 (presentation and paper).
76
1 ATF, INTSUM No.60, Ni t, 31 July 1966. As a security measure, signals intelligence reports were
termed Special Agent Reports SPARs. It appears that SPARs were probably included within that
INTSUMs reference to agent reports (all types).
77
This was probably the first report of 605 Battalion (D605) ie the NVA-manned 3rd Battalion of the
275th VC Regiment, received by 1 ATF. 6RAR, Operations Log, Sheet 1/Serial 19, Ni t, 15 August
1966, (AWM95, 7/6/5). However, the 275th Regiment was then east of 1 ATF not north-west, and such
reports contributed to 1 ATFs focus to the west of Route 2 (ie following the attacks by the 274th VC
Regiment in the Route 15/Ph M area on 10 and 11 August see 1ATF, Troops Information Sheet, No.4,
Ni t, 8-14 August 1966).
78
Statement of Events Annex B to 1ATF Combat After Action Report OP Holsworthy (File R723-15),
9 September 1966, p.3 AWM95, 1/4/12 Part 2. A 5RAR Ops Log entry at 2010 hrs on 16 August 1966
noted that the Operations Officer had visited the 1st Commando Company (ARVN) and Duc Than [sic] and
been told that enemy reports could tie in with 6RAR contact today. - AWM95, 7/5/7 Part 1.

O-21

casualties. Our forces suffered a large number of casualties 32 were killed and 60
comrades were wounded. The 275th Regiment History (2015) similarly states: 445
Battalion and the 3rd Battalion suffered a large number of casualties. On our side, we
suffered 32 cadre and soldiers killed, and 60 comrades wounded.79 A D445 Battalion
defector in late July 1969 - Nguyn Vn Nhng (aka Lc) stated that the official
casualty figure for the 5th Division at the Battle was about 200 killed in action, but he
believed the figure of 200 to be a gross under-estimate.80 As noted above, according to
a 275th Regiment political cadre captured in 1969 (Captain Trn Vn Ting), the 275th
Regiment sustained over 200 casualties including both KIA and WIA at Long Tn.81
The 5th Division History (2005) noted that the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment
was deployed about 800 metres to the north-west of Route 52 with the task of attacking
into the main killing zone at the Tht Pagoda.82 Both the Long t District History
(1986) and the t District History (2006) relate that: In 1967, the women of Long
M and Hi M villages demonstrated against the enemy - demanding to bury the
remains of 36 soldiers of the 5th Division who had been killed at Cha ((Pagoda)) Tht.
While it had been thought that these were possibly the remains of 275th Regiment and
D445 soldiers killed at the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966, it is now almost
certain that these were the remains of 5th VC Division soldiers killed at L Gm on 20/21
March 1967 in the area of the Tht Pagoda near Hi M village (now Phc Hi
village).83
The Australian official history relates that: A diary of the enemy commander at
Long Tn ((ie Nguyn Thi Bng - also known as t Thi - Commander 275th Regiment,
biography at Appendix 2)) which was subsequently captured, listed his losses as 500. The
79

H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, p.48.
Pannell, B.W., Postscript , 1970, op.cit., p.180.
81
NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting, the Assistant Political Officer of the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment.
In a probable reference to the Battle of Long Tn, in May 1967 a 275th Regiment POW (L Tn t, B-23
Medical Company) stated that his platoon had supported the 3rd Battalion of the Regiment that had fought
against the Australians during the rainy season, dates unknown he saw three dead and 50 wounded
evacuated. VCAT Item No.F034601290663.
82 th
5 Division History (2005), see Annex K, p.8/footnote 38. Post-Long Tn, the strength of the 3rd
Battalion of the 275th Regiment was only about 250 ie only half of its estimated strength at Long Tn - for
detail see CDEC 04-2242-67. A Cha (Pagoda) Tht was reported by 1 ATFs Det 1 Div Int Unit at YS
493555 see VCAT Item No.F034600701861. However, that is the pagoda about one kilometre east of Hi
M village.There are several Tht pagodas in the Province including in Phc Hi village (see footnote
110 in the main text) and in Phc Hi village (formerly Hi M) that contains a small memorial to the 5th
VC Division (i tng nim S on 05). The author has written to the Buddhist Association in B Ra
seeking clarification on the site of the Tht Pagoda associated with the Battle of Long Tn. Possible
locations are YS 477659 or 480673. For the engagement at L Gm on 20/21 March 1967 and the nearby
Tht Pagoda at Hi M, see the following footnotes 104 and 105.
83
Long t District History (1986), p.142 see Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit., 1991, Annex L,
p.13 and footnote 30. Also related in: Trn Quang Toi & ng Tn Hng (eds), The History of the
Struggle t District, op.cit., 2006. The 35 soldiers killed on 5/5/67 [sic] in the area of the Tht
80

Pagoda near Hi M village were commemorated in an article: Huyn t t chc l ving cc chin
s S on 05, 7 May 2014. See also footnotes 105 and 109.

O-22

main force losses in both men and equipment were such that the task force assessed that
275 Regiment would not be capable of launching a regimental operation for some
months. The enemy commander was Lieutenant Colonel Ut Thoi, Commander 275
Regiment - ((ie Nguyn Thi Bng)).84 Soon after the Battle, a Liberation Armed Forces
journalist visited Vit Cng medical facilities in the My To Mountains region and
wrote: We suffered a quite large number of casualties in that battle ((ie Long Tn))
more than 600 people, to such an extent that the 1500th Military Hospital (of the rear
services group of Military Zone D555 whose designation was later changed to Group
1500, and was the largest in the Eastern Region) no longer had any spaces to treat
wounded. I visited the 1500th Military Hospital and saw that it was true that there werent
any more places for the wounded.85
In calculating total casualties in an engagement, the senior NVA defector L Xun
Chuyn provided indicative data for the 5th VC Division, and a MACV study on
NVA/VC combat casualties indicated that 5% of NVA/VC wounded in an engagement
died during evacuation, 3-5% died once hospitalized, and 25-30% of those hospitalized
were permanently disabled (see footnote 17). Further references and data on calculations
for NVA/VC casualties are in Annex F The Battle of Long Tn: Casualties.
The 2011 275th Regiment Long Tn Martyrs (KIA) List
In late November 2011, a H Ni-based Vietnamese Missing-in-Action NGO
announced: Our work is very special and humanitarian ((paragraph heading))
Recently, by joining together information from a variety of sources, we have found the
burial places, the full names and origins of the 179 martyrs of the 2nd Battalion and 3rd
Battalion of the 5th Regiment ((ie 275th Regiment)) of the 5th Division; and 440 and 445
Local Force Battalions who died on 18 August 1966 in B Ra-Vng Tu Province.86
The figure of 179 martyrs was soon corrected to 172 martyrs.87 The List of the 172
(totaling 139 when adjusted for 33 duplications) included the names, dates and places of
birth, units, dates of death (18/08/1966), and names of next-of-kin.

84

McNeill, I., To Long Tn, 1993, op.cit., p.351 and p.558 (endnote 110). Note however that no copy nor a translation, of that reported document ie diary/notebook, is currently available.
85
Hu Thanh, Min ng Nam B khi la (Fire and Sword in the Eastern Region), 28 August 2008
ie as related by H.B.
86
MARIN NGO announcement by Ms Ng Th Thy Hng, H Ni, 20 November 2011 also reported
by Kim Dung, Tm gng bnh d m cao qu, Qun i Nhn Dn (Peoples Armed Forces), H Ni,
19 November 2011. Subsequently, the figure of 179 was reported in the Vietnamese media together with
a statement that 397 VC had been killed in the Battle and that D440 Battalion had also been involved.
Phng Nguyn: Cu binh c v 38 k ha b i Vit Nam, Tin Phong On-line, 25 September 2012.
The information on 397 (an informal and questionable estimate) and D440 (incorrect see footnote 88
below) had been provided to MARIN staff by a visiting Australian Vietnam War veteran.
87
Email from Ms Ng Th Thy Hng to author (Chamberlain), 21 December 2011.

O-23

List Provided by a Vietnamese NGO (page 1 of 10)

The List appeared to have been compiled from official death certificates (giy bo
t). All the deceased listed were members of the 275th Regiment with no mention of
either D445 or D440 Battalions.88 93 were members of the Regiments 3rd Battalion (ie
previously the NVA D605 Battalion).89 Of the personnel of the 275th Regiment listed as
killed at Long Tn, 50% were Northerners90 from the 3rd/D605 Battalion; the average

88

See the List at Appendix 1. D440 Battalion infiltrated from North Vietnam as Group 211 and did not
arrive in Phc Tuy Province until mid-late 1967. See: Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion:
Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2013.
89
The List was advised by the author/translator to the official historians at the Australian Department of
Veterans Affairs, the Australian War Memorial, and the Australian Army History Unit letters dated 13
December 2011, and also to the Museum of Australian Military Intelligence, Canungra 14 December
2011. As noted, the detail of the 275th Regiment casualty list was included in a presentation at the
Australian War Memorial on 16 August 2013 - ie Chamberlain, E.P., The NVA and VC Soldier: Tougher
Than Us presentation/paper to the international conference: International Perspectives on a Long War.
Until mid-2015, a discrete history of the 275th VC Regiment had not been published; and the Regiment does
not have a formal families association advice to author from Ms NgTh Thu Hng (MARIN, H
Ni), 24 March 2015.
90
In August 1966, US MACV assessed NVA strength in South Vietnam as 42,460 combat troops and VC
combat troops numbering 64,294 with 112,760 militia; 17,803 combat support troops; and 39.175
political. 1 ATF, Troops Information Sheet No.4, Ni t, 8-14 August 1966. Two years later, noting
the increasing number of NVA in the South, the US CIA assessed: 46 of the 58 known enemy regiments
are completely North Vietnamese, and nine of the 12 Viet Cong regiments are believed to be 50% North
Vietnamese. The Viet Cong 274th and 275th Regiments are 40% and 65% North Vietnamese
respectively. CIA, Research Memorandum: Increasing Role of North Vietnamese in Viet Cong Units, 17
September 1968. VCAT Item No.F029200060548. The 275 th VC Main Force Regiment is incorrectly
described as a North Vietnamese Main Force Unit in Abigail, P. Major General (Retd) - Chairman,

O-24

age of those killed was 25. The oldest was 45 L Thin Thai (b.1921), a platoon
commander in the Regiments 3rd Battalion (ie previously the NVA D605 Battalion),
who had been awarded a Certificate of Commendation (Bng Khen) for his bravery and
skill in the battle at ng n on 30 June 1966. The youngest was 17 years (b.1949) of the
1st Battalion from the Delta (Sc Trng), and there were 12 soldiers aged 18. The list
indicates the units of those killed as: 1st Battalion 11%; 2nd Battalion 17%; 3rd
Battalion 51%; unit not indicated 21%.
The February 2016 Martyrs List
In February 2016, a List of Martyrs at Long Tn based on records in the G
Cat Martyrs Cemetery in B Ra Town, listed 98 martyrs (with two duplicated ie =
96) killed on 18.8.66 almost all were personnel from the 275th Regiment. Of those
listed, 30% were Northerners (presumably former NVA D605 Battalion personnel). Of
the Southerners, almost all were born in Mekong Delta provinces. The List of 96
included the names of 36 martyrs see Appendix 4 to Annex O, not on the List of the
139 martyrs provided by the H Ni-based NGO in November 2011. The Lists included
only one martyr born in Phc Tuy Province.
275th Regiment - Captured Documents (relating to the Battle of Long Tn)
On the afternoon of 19 August - the day following the Battle, a 6RAR report noted
recovering ID cards issued in North Vietnam. Enemy units involved in battle identified
as C14 Company, D3 Battalion, Q5 Regiment; D605 and 45 NVA Regiment.91

Review of Recognition for the Battle of Long Tan, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra,
31 March 2008, p.8.
91
Mollison, C.S., Long Tan and Beyond Alpha Company 6 RAR in Vietnam 1966-67, Cobbs Crossing,
Woombye, 2006, p.201. See also 1 ATF, Ops Log, Sheet 730 Serial 414, Ni t, 19 August 1966. Two
members of the 275th Regiment were captured at the Battle of Long Tn who declared themselves as
members of on 45 (ie then a cover designator for the 275th Regiment). On 19 August, 1 ATF reported
that the two Northern POWs were members of NVA 45 Regiment whilst the other was a member of
D445 Battalion Local Provincial Mobile ((see footnote 60 for names and disposal)). The North
Vietnamese prisoners revealed that 45 Regiment formally [sic] 23 Regiment (possibly means 33 Regiment)
moved into Phuoc Tuy Province in May this year and is allied to 66 Regiment. Captured documents
revealed that D3 Battalion, D605 Battalion, and C14/D3/Q5 Regiment were in contact with elements of
6RAR on 18 August 1 ATF INTSUM No.79, Ni t, 19 August 1966. The 1 ATF Intelligence Annex
to the Operation Order for Operation Toledo (FRAGO 1-8-66) noted that: The 275 VC Regt, 605 Bn of
250 Regt and C860 Bn withdrew east and north-east following the 18 Aug operations against 6RAR. 1
ATF, OPS204, Ni t, 21 August 1966. Some published Australian accounts have misinterpreted the
foregoing to indicate that a North Vietnamese unit/formation titled 45 or 45 Regiment ie separate and
additional to the 275th Regiment, was involved at Long Tn, and that D605 Battalion was additional to the
three battalions of the 275th Regiment.

O-25

However, no documents recovered by the 6RAR Intelligence Section after the Battle
nor the interrogation reports of the three POWs, are currently available.92
Documents captured or recovered in following months mainly Letters of
Appreciation (Giy Khen), referred to the battle at Long Tn - or at Ni t on 18
August 1966.93 These included:
A Letter of Appreciation (Giy Khen) for Nguyn Quang o a deputy
company commander of the 13th Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment, for
his bravery in an attack at Ni t and Long Tn. The letter was signed by the assistant
political commissar (F Chnh y) of the Regiment - Nguyn Dng, on 30 September
1966 CDEC Log 04-2208-67. It was very unusual for Letters of Appreciation to be
awarded to cadre above platoon commander level.
A Letter of Appreciation (Giy Khen) for L nh Thm of the 3rd Battalion of
th
the 275 Regiment for his performance in a combat mission at Ni t CDEC Log
04-2220-67.
A Certificate of Commendation (Bng Khen) for Trnh Vn M - see below, for
his combat exploits in the battle at Long Tn, Ni t signed by the assistant political
commissar (F Chnh y) of the Regiment - Nguyn Dng, on 30 September 1966 CDEC Log 04-2234-67.

92

Following the Battle, under the direction of the 6RAR intelligence officer Captain B. (Bryan) H.
Wickens, the 6RAR Intelligence Section recovered a large quantity of enemy documents which were
bagged and despatched immediately to HQ 1ATF by helicopter for analysis. Email: Wickens, B.H. to
author (Chamberlain), 18 December 2014. However, those documents cannot now be traced and do not
appear in records of the USMACV Combined Document Exploitation Centre (CDEC - Saigon) that are
accessible in the Texas Tech University (ie VCAT) Archives (ie no related documents appear in CDEC
Bulletins #195 to the end of 1966). However, a sketch-book - comprising 38 charcoal-based drawings, was
informally recovered from the battlefield by an officer of 6RAR, and retained. In July 2013, the drawings
(see page 27) were returned to Vietnamese authorities under the Wandering Souls Program conducted by
the University of New South Wales/Australian Defence Force Academy. See: Hall R. A. Dr, De Heer D.V.,
Ross A.T. Dr, & Griffin A.L. Dr, Operation Wandering Souls (Nhng linh hn phiu bt) The Journey
Home (Tr lai qu hng) The Phc Tuy Documents (Ti liu Phc Tuy), UNSW at ADFA, Canberra,
2013. The drawings principally depicted military scenes, and the sketch-book is highly likely to have
belonged to a cadre or soldier of the 275th Regiment. See also: Hall, R. Dr, Operation Wandering Souls,
Wartime, Issue 55, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, July 2011, pp.25-29. Two Certificates of
Commendation were also recovered from the Long Tn battlefield informally and retained by a member of
6RAR ie for Phm Vn Ha and Ma Tan Tan, both born in the Mekong Delta province of Rch Gia and
members of the 1st Battalion of the 275th Regiment. Those two Certificates of Commendation were returned
under the Operation Wandering Souls Program to Vietnamese authorities in H Ni in November 2014.
93
On the day before the Battle on 17 August 1966, a Letter of Appreciation (Giy Khen) for Bi Quang
Hnh 3rd Battalion/275 Regiment, was signed by Phan Vn Khu for the Q5 Commander. - CDEC Log
04-2204-67, see page 43. Phan Vn Khu was noted as a Battalion Executive Officer/2ic in late 1966 see
page 29/footnote 101. Such awards may have been intended to boost morale in units before a major battle.

O-26

The Certificate of Commendation (Bng Khen) above, for Trnh Vn M

- a section 2ic, for his combat exploits in the battle at Long Tan, Ni t signed
by the assistant political commissar (F Chnh y) of the 275th Regiment Nguyn Dng, on 30 September 1966. Trnh Vn M was born in Xun Tin
village of Th Xun District, Thanh Ha Province (North Vietnam).
A Certificate of Commendation (Bng Khen) for L Vn Long for his exploits
at the battle at Ni t - signed by the assistant political commissar (F Chnh y) of
the Regiment - Nguyn Dng, on 30 September 1966 - CDEC Log 04-2234-67.
A Certificate of Commendation (Bng Khen) for Phm Vn Ngh assistant
squad leader, for his combat achievements during the Ni t battle signed by the
assistant political commissar (F Chnh y) of the Regiment - Nguyn Dng, on 30
September 1966 CDEC Log 05-1120-67.
Certificates of Commendation (Bng Khen) for Trn Ngc and Nguyn Vn
Chiu for their combat exploits in the battle at Long Tan, Ni t - signed by the
assistant political commissar (F Chnh y) of the Regiment - Nguyn Dng, on 30
September 1966 CDEC Log 04-2230-67.
A notebook (belonging to Trng Vn Tinh) see below, recovered by 5RAR on
29 March 1967, relating that C13 Company of the 3rd Battalion, 275th Regiment was
awarded a letter and certificate of commendation from the Military Region for killing
35 Australian servicemen at Long Tn CDEC Log 04-2690-67.

O-27

The Personal History Statement of NVA Sergeant Nguyn Xun Th of the 3rd
Battalion, 275th Regiment who participated in the battle at Long Tn, Ni t on 18
August 1966 and was awarded a Military Exploits Medal Third Class for his exploits
at Long Tan, Ni t. - CDEC Log 04-2569-67 (the Vietnamese text is illegible).
The notebook of V/V Vn Mu platoon commander (B1/D11/C3/275) who
participated in the battles at ng n Junction (Long Khnh), Ni t and Long Tn CDEC Log 05-1111-67. Mu a regroupee, was born in Long An Province.
Group 54 94 Activities for 1967 - 15 January 1967: The political guidance section
commended Nguyn Vn Thng and Nguyn Vn Nhiu - members of C6 and C8
Companies (2nd Battalion, 275th Regiment) who, in 1966, succeeded in killing dozens of
Australians although themselves seriously wounded - CDEC Log 04-2584-67.
Liberation Military Exploit Medals - Third Class (Hun Chng qun cng gii
phng - hng ba) were awarded by the 5th VC Division (as on 45) to three members of
the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment (as on 54) on 7 December 1966 for their
achievements in the Long Tn battle (1966) - ie: V (Vn) Mu - platoon 2ic [sic] of
C13/3/275 (mentioned above); Ng Thnh Long platoon commander of C13/3/275; and
ng Vit im a soldier of C12/3/275 CDEC Log 05-1097-67. That medal was also
awarded to Nguyn Vn Th (a section commander unit not indicated, of on 54)
CDEC Log 04-2588-67.

94
In the period from mid-1966 to mid-1967, 275 Regiment used the cover designators Q.765, Q.5, on
(Group) 45 and also on 54 (from Dec 1966 CDEC Bulletin No. 3554) see footnotes 10 and 91.

O-28

Tin Ln (Advance), 275th Regiment (unknown artist) 95

Post-Long Tn
In a review following the Battle, Headquarters 1 ATF assessed:
Enemy : Local Force VC : Our experience continues to be that as a rule these will only
stand and fight if they think they have the friendly force outnumbered, or if they consider
they are sure of victory.
Main Force VC : Our sole experience with Main Force ((275th Regiment)), gained in the
contact near Long Tanh [sic] on 18 Aug 66, was that they are the complete opposite ((ie
to Local Force VC)) and will attack very aggressively when they make contact. On this
occasion, they made a series of mass attacks, reminiscent of the Chicom Forces in Korea,
in spite of the heavy artillery and automatic fire being directed at them. This contributed
to their failure and to the large number of casualties they suffered. The aggressive and
somewhat fool-hardy tactics are attributed, at least in part, to the indoctrination they
receive about their superiority over the enemy and the certainty of victory.96
On 22 August 1966, the second phase of II FFVs Operation Toledo launched
ground operations southward into northern Phc Tuy against Headquarters 5th VC
Division and the 274th Regiment and also hoped to engage elements of the 275th
Regiment that had withdrawn to the north and north-east following the Battle of Long
95

Sketch, a soldier with a PPS/Type 43 recovered on the battlefield by a member of 6RAR after the Battle
of Long Tn (see footnote 92). - Cha Nh Qunh, Tm thy 38 bc phc tho xc ng v b i c H
(38 moving sketches found of Uncle Hs soldiers), Tin Mi (On-Line), H Ni, 28 September 2012.
96
HQ 1 ATF, 1 ATF Vietnam: Lessons Learnt, Ni t, 10 September 1966. AWM95, 1/4/12 Part 2.

O-29

Tn.97 On 21 August, US signals intelligence (SIGINT) direction-finding aircraft fixed

the 275th Regiments principal transmitter at YS 530720 (10 kilometres north-east of 1
ATFs Ni t base).98 Post-Long Tan, 1 ATF assessed 275 Regiments strength as
1,500.99 As noted earlier, according to NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting: After the battle,
the Regiment moved back to the L Jungle Base Camp ((ie the Rng L vicinity YT
7610 in Xun Lc District of Long Khnh Province)). The Regiment remained in the
camp for a week after which the entire Regiment minus the 1st Battalion moved to Bnh
Thun Province to an area approximately five kilometres west of the T Bao Bridge. The
Regiment made this move in search of rice. . After this attack, the Regiment returned
to its old base in the Sng Ray area. The Regiment remained in this area until March
1967, refitting and resupplying.100
A Health Control Record prepared by the Regiments dispensary in November
1966 listed the names and positions of 25 senior cadre of the Regiments 3rd Battalion
including V Ngc Khuyn (aged 39) as the battalion commander; and L Hui and Phan
Vn Khu as battalion executive officers.101
On 2 December 1966102, the 275th Regiment mounted an unsuccessful ambush on
th
US 11 ACR elements east of Sui Cat on National Route 1 (vicinity YT 6106). The US
With indications that the remnants of the 275th and possibly the 274th VC Regiments could be trapped
following this encounter ((ie the Battle of Long Tn)), Operation Toledo shifted to the south and east. - II
FFV Operational Report - Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966, Long Binh, 15 November 1966, p.4.
For detail on Operation Toledo activities in northern Phc Tuy, see Annex N The 274th Regiment - Not
at the Battle of Long Tn.
98
CTG 79.5 (USMC Battalion Landing Team 1-26), Combat After Action Report Operation Deckhouse
III (Phase I and II), 2 September 1966, Part II, sub-para 4.d.
99
1 ATF, Intelligence Review No.1, Ni t, 13 September 1966. 1 ATF Intelligence Review No.1 also
noted: 605 Battalion 250 Regt (NVA) is no longer held by this HQ as being under the operational control
of 274 Regt, or even in Phuoc Tuy Province This battalion-size group arrived in Phuoc Tuy in May
1966, when it joined up with two other battalion groups which had arrived in March. These three battalion
groups were possibly from the 23rd Regt NVA. According to a rallier ((authors note: the ralliers name has
been redacted, but it was NVA Lieutenant Colonel L Xun Chuyn)) who had been the Deputy Chief of
Staff 5th Div, a NVA Battalion joined the Division in ((date redacted)). In May 66, the 1 st, 3rd and 4th
battalions (NVA) were combined along with the 2nd Bn 5th Regiment to form Q45 Regt, formerly know as
the 275 Regt 5th VC Division. - para 2.b. Subsequently - in early June 1967, 1 ATF estimated the 275th
Regiment had 900 men McNeill I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.543 (endnote 5).
100
Debrief of NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting see footnote 1. A listing of 275 Regiments engagements in
the period January-late June 1967 - as compiled from US intelligence reports, can be found in Burstall, T.,
A Soldier Returns , op.cit., 1990, pp.56-57.
101
V Ngc Khuyn had previously served as the political officer of D605 NVA Battalion which became
the 3rd Battalion. Senior NVA Lieutenant Phm Vn Chi (aged 37 see footnotes 107 and 147) and
Nguyn Vn L were noted as company commanders. All 25 cadre appear to be from the 3rd Battalion ie
with ranks/functions as follows: battalion commander one ((ie V Ngc Khuyn)), battalion executive
officers two, company commanders three, company executive officers 11, platoon commanders
seven, assistant platoon commander one. CDEC Log 04-2604-67. Subsequently, in 1972, V Ngc
Khuyn was noted as the Secretary of the Party Committee of the 3rd Regiment (Group 13) of the 5th VC
Division operating in the Mekong Delta region CDEC Log 08-1122-72.
102
Documents captured in March 1967 included detailed personnel data for the last six months of 1966
for the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment which had reportedly suffered heavy casualties at the Battle of
97

O-30

after-action report stated 275th Regiments casualties as: 99 killed (body count), 100-150
possibly killed, and three captured. However, only about 13 individual VC weapons were
reportedly recovered.103 According to NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting, in that engagement,
the 275th Regiment suffered 150 to 200 casualties both killed and wounded.
On 20/21 March 1967104, the 2nd Battalion of the 275th Regiment (commanded by
Ba Liu) attacked the small Regional Force/Popular Force outpost at L Gm (YS
515550) reportedly manned by 38 soldiers, about two kilometres north of Phc Hi
village.105 The 2nd Battalion may have been reinforced by other elements for the attack
Long Tn on 18 August 1966. Four months after the Battle of Long Ta , the 3rd Battalions strength in
December 1966 was 251 (in four companies) comprising: 114 private soldiers, 52 section 2ics, 41 section
commanders, 12 platoon 2ics, and 32 cadre of platoon commander-level and above. 110 personnel were
single (44%) and 141 (56%) were married (134 had married in North Vietnam and seven in South
Vietnam). 90 personnel were Party members, and 93 were Youth Group (on) members VCAT Item
No.F034600882735, CDEC Log 04-2242-67. Citing this engagement, the author Terry Burstall queries the
assessment in September 1980 by the Australian historian Ian McNeill that it was a long time before 275
Regiment reappeared at any scene of action. Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, p.56.
103
11 ACR Operational Report Lessons Learned, Quarter 1 Nov 66 31 Jan 67, 19 June 1967, pp.75-84
including a map and tactical sketches (DTIC AD386099). The small 11th ACR group (two M-48 tanks,
three ACAV, and two dump trucks) was quickly reinforced. See also film footage at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y26iz4H3Nec . As related above, the Australian author Terry Burstall
notes that the 275th Regiment had recovered sufficiently from their defeat at Long Tn to engage US forces
in December 1966 and, citing MACV sources, also notes the Regiments fighting fit engagements in the
period 9 January 1967 28 June 1967. - Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, pp.56-57.
104
As noted earlier, NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting the Assistant Political Officer of the 3rd Battalion/275th
Regiment, was captured by ARVN forces on 26 February 1969 and provided detailed information on the
275th Regiments organisation, senior personnel and activities. However his debrief did not mention any
post-Long Ta activity by the 275th Regiment in Phc Tuy Province before his capture in February
1969. According to Nguyn Thanh Hng a Headquarters 5th Division operations officer, an attack on a
RF post at Phc Hi to the south of L Gm on 17 February 1967 was undertaken by 445 Battalion. He
claimed that 5th VC Division elements had lured Australian troops into their prepared defensive positions
east of Hi M. Hng stated that from his recollections, the 275th Regiment was the 5th Division
formation involved Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, pp.110-111. However, it appears that
Nguyn Thanh Hng probably conflated the 17 February attack at Phc Hi with the attack by 2rd
Battalion of the 275th Regiment on the nearby ARVN post at L Gm on 20/21 March 1967.
105
See the interrogations of 2nd Battalion/275th Regiment POWs Hunh Vn Tho and Trn Vn Lm
captured near L Gm 1 ATF 16-1-2 (19), Ni t, 29 March 1967 VCAT Item No.F034600701813.
Their interrogations provided personality data on several cadre including the move of the 275th Regiment
commander Nguyn Thi Bng (t Thi) to the Headquarters 5th Division. In May 1967, a 275th Regiment
POW (L Tn t, B-23 Medical Company) stated that the 2nd Battalion suffered heavy casualties at L
Gm in March 1967: dead unknown, but 40 wounded. As a result, the Battalion was only able to raise two
understrength companies. This battalion was divided between the 1st and 3rd Battalions. VCAT Item No.
F034601290663. The 2/275th attack at L Gm is detailed in McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive,
op.cit. 2003, pp.146-149 - and in ONeill, R.J., Vietnam Task, op.cit., 1968, pp.236-239. However,
according to the Commander 1 ATF Brigadier S.G. Graham, the whole of 275 Regiment was sent down
to do this job. After the engagement, 275th Regiment elements panicked and broke up into very small
groups, virtually every man for himself and ran, and they really didnt stop running until they got way up
into the May Taos, about 25 miles away. So that was virtually the end of 275 Regiment as far as we were
concerned. It never again appeared as a full regiment, while I was there. Interview by Morison, R.F.
Lieutenant Colonel, Canberra, 29 March 1972 (Australian War Memorial - AWM107, 2). In May 2014, at a

O-31

possibly from 445 Battalion and the bodies of 37 Vit Cng were recovered at the
outpost following the failed attack.106 Documents and equipment captured in the area a
few days later on 24 March 1967 by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11 ACR)
indicated that the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment had planned to attack the Regional
Forces at Xuyn Mc while Allied and ARVN elements were engaged at L Gm.107
Subsequently, a US report estimated that: In the Lo Gom (YS 5155) action of 20 March,
the second battalion was reported to have been reduced to less than 100 men, and as a

5th Division memorial in Phc Hi village (formerly Hi M village), a service was conducted for 35
soldiers of the 5th VC Division who were killed in a surprise ambush near the Tht Pagoda (Cha Tht)
on 5 May 1967 when returning to their base area after an operation. Huyn t t chc l ving cc
chin s S on 05 , t District On-line, 7 May 2014. Such an action in early May 1967 is not
recorded in the t District History (2006), the 5th Division History (2005), the 275th Regiment History
(2015) or in 1 ATF records. It is almost certainly a reference to the VC attack on nearby L Gm (YS
515550) on 20/21 March 1967. See footnotes 82 and 109 and also Annex F, page 7; and Annex K
footnote 63.
106
ONeill, R.J., Vietnam Task, op.cit., 1968, pp.236-237. According to a report by the senior US military
advisor in Phc Tuy, the 275th Regiments 2nd Battalion attacked the outpost at L Gm occupied by the
2nd Platoon of the 615th RF Company on 21 March 1967. 36 VC were reportedly KIA and two captured. A
further 100 enemy were estimated as killed and 150 wounded. Captured weapons included one LPD-50
flamethrower, one B-40, three Chinese light machine guns, 17 AK-47s, eight Chicom carbines, one M-1
rifle, and 60 hand grenades. Lieutenant Colonel J.K. Gilham, Senior Advisor, 6 April 1967. In mid1967, Nguyn Thi Bng reportedly narrowly avoided capture by elements of the 18th ARVN Division in
Long Khnh Province and his personal diary was captured. The 1 ATF Commander Brigadier S. C.
Graham, reportedly saw translations of some bits of the diary which included extravagant claims of a
Vit Cng victory at L Gm on 20/21 March 1967 Interview by Morison, R.F. Lieutenant Colonel,
Canberra, 29 March 1972 (Australian War Memorial - AWM107, 2); and in McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the
Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.149. In a psychological operation to ridicule Nguyn Thi Bngs claims of
victory at L Gm, eight pages of his diary describing the L Gm action were reportedly reproduced and
distributed by 1 ATF to Popular Force units in the Province, and these became a best seller. Brigadier
S.C. Graham, Interview by Morison, R.F. Lieutenant Colonel, op.cit, 29 March 1972. Neither the L Gm
action nor its aftermath, are mentioned in the 2005 5th Division History (no engagements involving the
275th Regiment are mentioned in the period September 1966 to April 1967 inclusive), nor in the 5th ((275))
Regiment History (2015), nor in the comprehensive debrief of NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting (footnote 1).
107
ONeill, R.J., Vietnam Task, op.cit., 1968, p.238; McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit.
2003, pp.146-149; and 1 ATF Commanders Diary, AWM 95, 1/4 Mar 67 - PART 1. A very large number
of back-packs (81) and documents - principally of the 13th Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 275th
Regiment, were captured by the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at YS 602699 (about 5 kilometres
north-west of Xuyn Mc) in AO Silver during Operation Portsea on 24 March 1967 see 1 ATF, SITREP,
Ni t, 25 March 1967; and 1 ATF, INTSUM No.83-67, Ni t, 24 March 1967. Many of the documents
were associated with NVA Senior Lieutenant Phm Vn Chi (OC 13th Company, 3rd Battalion) - see
CDEC Log 04-2234-67. US forces claimed B-52 airstrikes killed at least 50 soldiers of the 3rd Battalion,
275th Regiment in suspected enemy locations but there is no mention of such in the debrief of NVA
Captain Trn Vn Ting. In April 1967, 1 ATF estimated the 275th Regiments strength as 1,000 with its
commander: Ut Thoi, executive officer/2ic: Ba Duc, and political officer: Bac Cu - Furner, J.O. Major,
5th VC Division, R569-1-16, HQ 1 ATF, Ni t, 22 April 1967.

O-32

result disbanded.108 The 275th Regiment History (2015) makes no mention of the
engagement at L Gm in March 1967.109
On 29 March 1967, during Operation Leeton, 5RAR killed two soldiers of the 3rd
Battalion of the 275th Regiment at YS 381678.110 This appears to have been 1 ATFs last
engagement with elements of the 275th Regiment.
In May 1967, the 275th Regiment fought engagements in north-eastern Long
Khnh Province and southern Bnh Tuy Province, before moving south-west to the ng
Nai River area.111
According to the 5th VC Division History (2015), on 30 May 1967 in the Bn
Nm area (Kim Tn District, Long Khnh Province), the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the
5th Regiment ((275th Regiment)) completely destroyed the puppet 52nd Black Panther
Ranger Battalion. The news of the victory at Bn Nm inspired enthusiasm in all units.
However, Comrade Tm Phi 112 the Regiments Commander, and Hunh Thn the
Regiments Political Commissar, were killed in an air strike and the Chief of Staff
Su Thanh, was wounded.113 The 275th Regiment History (2015) records the
engagements in the Bn Nm area as occuring in the period 28-30 May 1967 and notes
that following the death of Tm Phi, Xun Thanh the Regiments second-in-command,
took temporary command of the Regiment.114
According to a US 9th Infantry Division report, over two days from 28 June 1967,
th
the 275 Regiments 3rd Battalion and elements of its 2nd Battalion, were contacted by
units of the 18th ARVN Division in the vicinity of YT 3332 and forced to withdraw across
the ng Nai River into War Zone D. On 27 June, the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment
engaged the 52nd ARVN Ranger Battalion in the vicinity of YT 3332. The Rangers were
aided by elements of the 11th ACR and the 9th US Division and 49 VC KIA (BC)
were reported.115

108

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Combat After Action Report, Operation Akron 9-27 June 1967, 28
March 1968, p.7 (DTIC AD389132).
109
See also footnotes 82 and 105 ie: The 35 soldiers killed on 5/5/67 [sic] in the area of the Tht
Pagoda near Hi M village were commemorated in an article: Huyn t t chc l ving cc chin
s S on 05, 7 May 2014.
110
1 ATF, INTSUM No.88-67, Ni t, 29 March 1967. See also footnotes 148 and 151.
111
Between 28 April and 5 May 1967, the 275th Regiments 1st and 3rd Battalions were involved in
countersweep operations in the Rung La area (vicinity YT 7810) against elements of the 18 th ARVN
Division. On 5 May 1967, the Regiments reinforced 2 nd Battalion attacked Ham Tan compound (YS
9882) inflicting moderate casualties on the defenders. 9th US Infantry Division, Operational Report
Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967, 7 November 1967. VCAT Item
No.22830106001. See also: 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Combat After Action Report, Operation
Akron 9-27 June 1967, 28 March 1968 (DTIC AD389132).
112
NVA Captain Tm Phi had been noted earlier as the Chief-of-Staff of the 274th Regiment in early-mid
1966 see the debrief of NVA Lieutenant Colonel L Xun Chuyn, footnote 34 and Annex K p.17.
113 th
5 Division History (2005). Su Thanh ie Nguyn Thanh. See Annex K pp.17-18.
114
H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, pp.53-57.
115 th
9 US Infantry Division, Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July
1967, 7 November 1967. VCAT Item No.22830106001.

O-33

USMACV reported on 21 July the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the VC 275 Regiment
and the Dong Nai Battalion ambushed US and ARVN forces conducting a road-clearing
operation on Route 20 between Xuan Loc and the III CTZ/II CTZ border. The results
were 95 enemy killed and two detainees.116 The account in the 275th Regiment History
(2015) of the ambush on the Letter C section of Route 20 near Tc Trng village (YT
4226) on 21 July 1967 claimed to have destroyed 48 M-41 tanks and M113 armoured
vehicle, killed and wounded hundreds of American troops, and seized 30 weapons of
various types. while suffering 70 casualties. Following the battle, to resolve food
supply difficulties, the Regiment and its immediate subordinates and the Divisional
Headquarters were ordered to deploy to the Kho Xanh base in Phc Long Province.117
1 ATF noted that in August 1967 the 275th Regiment moved to Phc Long
Province to regroup and repair.118 From mid-September to mid-October, the 275th
Regiment was engaged in transporting 120 tonnes of rice that had been procured in
Cambodia to c Phong District in Phc Long Province. In mid-October/November, the
Regiment received 500 North Vietnamese replacements the Regiments commander
was Xun Thanh, and the political commissar was Ba Dng.119 USMACV reporting
noted that on 25 November 1967 in Central Phuoc Long Province, elements of the VC
275th Regiment attacked a company of the 3/9 ARVN at Song Be, resulting in 100 enemy
killed.120
On 5 November 1967, elements of the ARVN 5th Division and the 31st Ranger
Battalion reportedly engaged the 2nd Battalion of the 275th Regiment south of Ba Ra
Mountain (YU 175031) that resulted in an estimated 265 VC KIA.121
During the first phase of the 1968 Tt Offensive, the 275th Regiment attacked the
Bin Ha airbase, the US II Field Force Vietnam (II FFV) Headquarters at Long Bnh,
116

USMACV, PERINTREP, July 1967. VCAT Item No.2130906001. NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting
related that in the ambush of US forces on Route 20 north of Tc Trung strategic hamlet on 21 July, the
275th Regiment sustained over 100 casualties including killed and wounded. - Debrief of NVA POW
Captain Trn Vn Ting - CMIC No.2550, VCAT Item No.2310305007, see footnote 1.
117
H Sn i - Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, p.66.
118
As noted at footnote 107, for the 1 ATF assessment of the 275th Regiment its organisation and
activities to late 1967, see Furner, J.O. Major, 5 th VC Division, R569-1-16, HQ 1 ATF Ni t, 15
November 1967.
119
H Sn i - Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, pp.59-63.
These replacements probably assisted in rebuilding the Regiments 2nd Battalion following its losses at L
Gm in March 1967 see footnotes 82 and 104-106. In September 1967, a US intelligence report estimated
the 275th Regiments strength as 1,500 men. In November 1967, 1 ATF reported the 275th Regiments
strength as approx. 1200 with its commander as Hai Hieu (see also footnote 48 on his possible death
on 21 July 1967) and its battalion commanders as Tan [sic] Bao, Ba Lieu, and Ut Hui Furner, J.O. Major,
5th VC Division, R569-1-16, HQ 1 ATF, Ni t, 15 November 1967. However, the 275th Regiment
History (2015) notes the senior appointments in November 1967 as - Commander: Xuan Thanh; Political
Commissar: Ba Dng; Regiment 2ic: L Quang Tr; CO 1st Battalion: Nguyn Ba; CO 2nd Battalion: Ba
Lu; CO 3rd Battalion: t Hui. - H Sn i - Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry
Regiment, op.cit., 2015, p.66.
120
USMACV, PERINTREP MACV J2 11-67, November 1967. VCAT Item No.2131001124.
121
1 ATF, Troops Information Sheet No.69, Nui Dat, 5-11 November 1967 (AWM95, 1/4/69).

O-34

and other targets in the Bin Ha area in the period 31 January-2 February.122 In the
second phase of the Tt Offensive in early May, the Regiment (with the cover designator
A-55) fought at Trng Bng in Ty Ninh Province north-west of Si Gn.
In mid-May 1968, 275th Regiment moved to operate in Ty Ninh Province and
engaged US forces in that area with its H6 Battalion suffering heavy casualties on 21
May 1968 in the Bau Me area. In ten days of fighting t Hui the commander of the
3rd Battalion, and more than 30 cadre were killed before the Regiment withdrew on 24
May to the Dng Minh Chu base area.123
On 17 August 1968, the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment was engaged by US
forces as it moved towards Ty Ninh City the 275th Regiment History (2015) refers to
these as the Battles of G Da near Ch L village on Route 26.124 In an engagement
with elements of the 25th US Infantry Division on 19 August 1968 about eight kilometres
east of Ty Ninh City, the 275th Regiment reportedly suffered 34 killed. On 22 August, 25
troops of the 275th Regiments 3rd Battalion were killed in an attack on FSB Rawlins (XT
352445) including the Battalion commander, Nguyn Vn X. On 3 September, the
Regiment reportedly suffered 19 killed in an engagement with US forces in the Bn Ci
plantation (XT 450449) and further heavier casualties in that area on 11 September (99
VC reported as KIA), on 16 (44 KIA), 17 (38 and 18 KIA), 19 (42 KIA) and 20
September 1968 (37 KIA).125
A captured 5th VC Division document dated 25 September 1968 noted the
Divisions strength as 6,436 personnel with the 275th Regiments strength (as A-55)
122

In mid-January 1968, the Regiments three battalions were redesignated H4 to H6 - with respective
strengths of 350, 350 and 300. NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting (refer footnote 1 and Index) related that the
Regiments attacks at Tt 1968 in the Bin Ha/Long Bnh area were blocked: The battle raged throughout
the day and at 2000 hours on 1 Feb 68, the Regiment started to withdraw By the time the Regiment
arrived back at its base camp on 6 February, it had sustained over 300 casualties including both KIA and
WIA and had lost a good part of its weapons. In mid-February 1968, the Regiment received approximately
100 NVA replacements. For a US report noting the 275th Regiments activities at Tt 1968 see Annex I
(III Corps Advisory Group) to Weyand, F.C. Lieutenant General, Military Assistance Command Vietnam,
Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACJ3-32) (K-1) - Tet Offensive After Action Report (31
January 18 February 1968), Saigon, 1968 VCAT Item No.13680112021. According to that US post-Tt
1968 report (Appendix 1 to Annex A VC Order of Battle, p.A-1-1), the 275th Regiments pre-Tt strength
was estimated at 1,500; and post-Tt was estimated at 900 and the Regiment was assessed as Marginally
Combat Effective VCAT Item No.13680112004. The account in the 275th Regiment History (2015)
relates that early on 31 January 1968, the 1 st and 2nd Battalions suffered heavy casualties and were
withdrawn the 3rd Battalion withdrew after heavy casualties on the night of 31 January. hundreds of
our brave cadre and soldiers were killed in the battle. Following the battle, on Vn Khoan was
appointed the Regiments political comissar, and L Quang Tr became commander of the Regiment - H
Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, pp.70-72.
123
H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, p.81.
124
H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, pp.82-89.
125
25th US Infantry Division, Combat After Action Report The Battle of Tay Ninh: 17 August 25
September 1968. VCAT Item No.2930218006. The 275th Regiment History (2015) notes the Bn Ci
engagement occuring on 19 September with the 2ic of its 1st Battalion (Ba Quang) among its tens of
KIA. H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, p.90.

O-35

at 1,279. In September 1968, a US CIA report assessed the 275th Regiments strength as
65% North Vietnamese - see Annex K, footnotes 66 and 67.
In October-November 1968, the Regiment refitted and retrained in Phc Long
and Bnh Dng Provinces, before moving back to former base areas in Long Khanh
Province. In late February 1969 at Tt K Du, the 275th Regiment was scheduled to
attack the Bin Ha Province Headquarters and the Police Headquarters. However, aware
that their plan had been compromised, the Regiment attacked the area Bin Ha airfield
but without success, and the Regiments 2ic Tam Chu, was killed in the fighting and
the assistant political officer of the 3rd Battalion Su Ting126, was reportedly captured.
In mid-1969127, the 275th Regiment with the new cover designator of F21,
fought 18th ARVN Division elements in the nh Qun area in the Long Khnh
Campaign. On 8-10 May 1969, the 275th Regiment reportedly destroyed two battalions
of the 18th ARVN Divisions 43rd Regiment in the Sui Rt/Tm Bung area.128 On 17-18
May 1969 reinforced by elements of the 95th Regiment, the 275th Regiment attacked an
ARVN artillery base at Hong Diu on the outskirts of Xun Lc Town resulting in 36
VC killed.129 In mid-June, the 275th Regiment in cooperation with the 33rd NVA
Regiment, attacked elements of the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the ARVN
52nd Regiment in the Gia Ray/Sui Rt/Tm Bung area. In summary, the 5th ((275th))
Regiments model achievements included wiping out two enemy battalions, inflicting
heavy losses on four battalions including two of the 18th Divisions premier battalions and
two battalions of the US [sic] Air Cavalry.130
126

275th Regiment History (2015), p.94. Su Ting is almost certainly NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting who
was wounded and captured in the area on 26 February 1969 see footnote 1 and footnote 127 below.
127
The organisation, personnel, strengths and equipment of the 275th Regiment as at February 1969 are
detailed in the debrief of NVA POW Captain Trn Vn Ting Assistant Political Officer of its 3rd
Battalion, see footnote 1. Ting noted Major Mi Tr 40 years, as the Commander of the 275th Regiment
(Mi Tr ie L Quang Tr/Nguyn Vn Tr, was subsequently killed in Cambodia in December 1970
when Deputy Commander of the 5th VC Division). o Thanh Xun was noted as the Chief of Staff of the
275th Regiment in July 1969 CDEC Log 10-1721-69. Ting stated the Regiments strength in February
1969 was 1,600 with its principal units being J-1 Battalion (250 personnel), J-2 Battalion (250), J-3
Battalion (217) and its support companies numbered B-1 to B-21.
128
The Regiments commander was t Ba, the political commissar was on Vn Khoan, and battalion
commanders included Trn Vn Su (1st Battalion) and T B. The Regiment was reportedly struck by
nine waves of B-52 strikes and suffered heavy casualties in the fighting one company of the 1st
Battalion was reduced to 25 men. - 5th Division History (2005). The 275th Regiment History (2015)
however, notes that t Ba replaced L Quang Tr as the Regiments commander after the battle ended on 9
May 1969.
129
In September 2014, 36 sets of remains were recovered of whom 25 were identified. Hong Lc, Hnh
trnh 22 nm tm kim, Lao ng ng Nai On-Line, September 2014.
130 th
5 Division History (2005). The account in the 275th Regiment History (2015) relates attacking elements
of the 52nd ARVN Regiment in mid-June, but does not mention US forces. That History summarised: 218
cadre and soldiers were killed on the violent and difficult battlefield in north-western Long Khanh
Province. COSVN awarded the Regiment a victory banner with the eight golden words Surmount Every
Difficulty and Always be Victorious. Military Feats Medals (Hun chng Chin cng) were awarded to:
the Regiment; each of its three battalions; the Regiments commander Nguyn Ba; its political commissar
- on Vn Khoan; two battalion commanders; and several cadre and soldiers p.105. The USMACV

O-36

Following the 1969 campaign131 in Long Khnh, COSVN awarded the 275th
Regiment the Resolved to Win (Quyt Thng) banner embroidered with the eight
golden words: Surmount Every Difficulty and Always be Victorious. The commander of
the 1st Battalion - Trn Vn Su, was awarded the Military Feats Medal Second Class.132
The Regiment returned to operate in Phc Long Province and the Regiments History
(2015) notes difficulties with food supplies and high rates of malaria. In October 1969, 1
ATF assessed the 275th Regiments strength as 975.133
Following the overthrow of Sihanouk by Lon Nol in mid-March 1970, the 5th
Division134 began operations against Khmer Republic forces in Cambodia. In late April
1970, the 275th Regiment withdrew into Cambodian territory to defend NVA/VC base
areas.135 Following a cross-country march of more than 100 kilometres, on 5-6 May
1970 the 275th Regiment attacked and seized the Cambodian provincial town of Kratie on
the Mekong River capturing the province chief. Moving 98 kilometres to the north,
the Regiment seized the town of Stung Treng on 16 May 1970.136
The 205th Regiment
In June 1970, the Regiments 3rd Battalion remained at Kratie and according to
the 5th Division History (2005), the 275th Regiment detached its 1st and 2nd Battalions to
become the core element of the 205th Regiment (an independent COSVN regiment) and
Monthly Summary for June 1969 notes that on 12 June 1969, elements of the 275th Regiment attacked FSB
Joy (3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division) 18 miles north-east of Xun Lc on the Long Khanh/Bnh Tuy
Province border resulting in 35 NVA/VC KIA VCAT Item No.7390115001.
131
As noted above, for detail on the 275th Regiment as at February 1969, see the extensive debrief of POW
NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting (footnote 1) eg: total strength 1,600 (combat 650, support 800, rear
services 90) 80 percent NVA, 20 percent Southerners (including regroupees).
132 th
5 Division History (2005) see also footnote 129. The Military Feats Medal Class II ie: Hun
chng Chin cng - hng nhi. Of interest, in February 1969, the monthly wages for 275 th Regiment
personnel were: Private to Senior Sergeant 80 piastres per month; Aspirant to Senior Lieutenant 100
piastres; Captain to Lieutenant Colonel 120 piastres; Senior Colonel and above 150 piastres. Additional
to these sums, each member of the 275th Regiment received 15 piastres per day to buy rations. The official
exchange rate in 1969 was USD 1 = 118 piastres. See the debrief of NVA Captain Trn Vn Ting
(footnote 1) CMIC No.2550, VCAT Item No.2310305007.
133
Annex A to 1 ATF SUPINTREP 2/69, Ni t, 6 October 1969.
134
From October 1966 until 1969, the US MACV order-of-battle included a 5th NVA Division (Nng
Trng 5) operating in Ph Yn Province and north of the c Lc Plateau in central coastal Vietnam
including in VC Military Region 5s Base Area 101. However, it appears to have been an administrative
and support formation, and that Division was declared defunct in 1969 see The NVA B3 Front Rear
Services System, VCAT Item No.11272114004. From mid-late 1970, US MACV began to retitle the 5th VC
Division as the 5th NVA Division - ie as its troop strength was significantly NVA. see also Annex K,
footnote 1.
135
There are no readily available records to indicate that the 275th Regiment engaged Australian forces in
1970 before its move into Cambodia in April 1970.
136
The Regiment was awarded the Military Feats Medal Class I ie: Hun chng Chin cng - hng nht,
for its seizure of Kratie and Stung Treng. H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th ((275th))
Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, pp.112-115.

O-37

continued to assist our friends ((ie the Khmer Rouge)) in the Kompong Som-Siem Reap
area and along Route 5 as part of Group C40.137 The Regiment incorporated recruits to reestablish its 1st Battalion and formed a 3rd Battalion from newly-arrived troops from the
North.138 With the 205th Regiment subordinate to C40, a new Regiment with the title of
the 1st Regiment was incorporated into the 5th Division with Comrade Tm N as that
Regiments commander.139 The 275th Regiment History (2015) regards both the 205th
Regiment and the 1st Regiment as 5th ((275th)) Regiments successor formations.
In mid-April 1972, the 205th Regiment became directly subordinate to COSVN
and attacked Lon Nol forces at Kompong Trabek. In May 1972, the Regiment returned to
Vietnam and operated in the Hn Qun area of Bnh Long Province.and participated in
the Nguyn Hu/Easter Offensive attacks against An Lc. At the beginning of 1973, the
205th Regiment deployed north-east to the Qung c Front in the southern Central
Highlands; and in November 1973 Nguyn Vn Hiu was appointed commander of the
Regiment. At the beginning of 1974, the Regiment returned to Ty Ninh, and in 1975
fought as a formation of Front 232.
The 1st Regiment
As noted, the 1st Regiment was formed in the Kratie area in July 1970 based on
the 275 Regiments 3rd Battalion, with cadre from the 174th Regiments 5th Battalion and
a battalion of new troops from North Vietnam.140 As a 5th Division subordinate formation,
the 1st Regiment fought in the Snoul area in February-March 1971. In late May 1971, the
Regiment participated in the 5th Divisions attack on Snoul Town defended by ARVN
th

137

The 275th History (2015) relates that after the siezure of Skoun at the end of July, the Regiment
withdrew to Tng Cc and its title was changed to the 205th Regiment (under Military Region C40)
comprising two battalions, with Nguyn Ba as its commander. Group 2163 recruits from the North, then
became its 3rd Battalion pp.116-117. According to contemporary US SIGINT reports, the 275th Regiment
was temporarily deactivated. Elements of the Regiment were used to form the nuclei of new, combined
VC/Khmer communist units such as the 203rd and 205th Regiments and possibly the 201st and 207th
Regiments. Some of the new units eventually moved deep into Cambodian territory. The 203 rd Regiment,
for one, was observed through SIGINT, operating near Siem Reap in western Cambodia. - National
Security Agency, Focus on Cambodia Cryptologic History Series, Fort George G. Meade, January 1974
(released 2004 and 2008), pp. 63-64 and footnote 21.
138
In mid-1971, Doctor Hoang of the 205th Regiment was reportedly detained in the A35 Detention
Camp in Santuk District for the mercy killing of two 205 th Regiment soldiers. CIA Report, Phnom Penh,
3 March 1972. VCAT Item No.F02920010179.
139 th
5 Division History (2005). According to US reporting, the 275th (ie 5th) Regiment was reorganised in
August 1970 divided into the 275A Regiment (soon redesignated the 205th NVA Regiment, the nucleus of
the Bnh Long Group in Kompong Thom) and the 275B Regiment (redesignated the 203rd NVA Regiment).
- HQ II Field Force Vietnam, Operational Report Lessons Learned, period 1 November 1970 30 April
1971. For the 275A Regiments activities in Cambodia in mid-1970 probably as on commanded by
Nguyn Vn Tin, see CDEC Log 01-1859-71, VCAT Item No.2311203004.
140
H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, pp.121-122.

O-38

forces.141 On 7 April 1972, the 5th Division attacked Lc Ninh a district town in
Vietnams Bnh Long Province. In four days of fighting, the 5th Division reportedly
killed thousands of enemy, captured 1,876 prisoners including a colonel and 61 other
officers. Lc Ninh became the seat of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of
South Vietnam.142 During the subsequent battles for An Lc Town 32km to the south,
the 1st Regiment attacked the Ni Gi position with T-54 tank support, on 20 April
1972.
In June 1972, the 1st Regiment moved into the ng Thap Mi area (Plain of
Reeds) in the upper Mekong Delta region (VC Military Region 8) and fought in several
battles.143 In March 1973, the Regiment moved back to its base area in northern Ty Ninh
to regroup. In May 1973, the US Defense Attache Office (USDAO) in Si Gn noted the
5th Divisions 1st Regiment (Group 11 275 Regiment) had an assessed strength of
640.144 The 1st Regiment returned to fight in Kin Tng and Long An provinces in the
upper Delta in March 1974. In mid-April 1975, the Regiments attack on Tn An Town
the base of the ARVN 9th Infantry Division in Long An Province, failed and more than
200 cadre and soldiers were killed. During the H Ch Minh Campaign in late April
1975, the 5th Division interdicted Route 4 in the upper Delta with the 1st Regiment
seizing the C Chi Special Sector (yu khu) and occupying Tn Hip Town on 30 April
1975.
Post-War and International Duty in Cambodia
The 1st Regiment was initially based in Ty Ninh until moving to Xuyn Mc
District in April 1976 to pursue enemy remnants and support the local authorities. In
June 1976, the Regiment moved to Ni t where - after constructing its camp, it became
a recruit training formation as Group 55. In June 1978, as the 55th Regiment of the
303rd Division, the Regiment moved to the Cambodia border area to counter Khmer
Rouge incursions. From September 1978, it fought in the Snuol and Kratie areas. In
October 1979, retitled the 732nd Regiment, it became a formation of the 310th Division
and operated in the Kompong Cham area. At the end of 1980, the Regiment returned to
Vietnam, deploying back to Cambodia in April 1981 as an element of 7702nd Specialist
Group (Front 779) in Mimot District. In September 1989 after ten years of
International Duty in the Land of Temples, the Regiment was re-assigned to the 5th
141

For descriptions of the fighting at Snoul in late March 1971 and 25-30 May 1971, see: Senior Colonel
Vit Tuyn, Snoul i thng (A great victory at Snoul), 13 May 2013.
142
H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, pp.151-152.
143
Le Gro, W.E. Colonel, From Cease Fire to Capitulation, United States Army Center of Military History,
Washington D.C., 1981. VCAT Item No.8850505001. For the 275th Regiments activities in Cambodia and
the Mekong Delta area from April 1970 onwards, see: Phan Trung Th - Colonel, K c ngi lnh S
on 5 (Memories of the 5th Division Soldiers), Nhng trn a h ng bng Sng Cu Long (The
Battles in the Mekong River Delta), December 2009
http://www.cuuchienbinhf5.vn/ky-uc/bai-viet/nhungtrandanhodhongbangsongcuulong .
144
US Defense Attache Office (DAO) - Saigon, PLAF/PAVN Troop Strength by Unit - May 1973,
Saigon, 31 May 1973. VCAT Item No.2311006085.

O-39

Division and returned to Vietnam (Chu Thanh District, Ty Ninh Province its current
base). At the beginning of 1990, the Regiment was retitled the 5th Regiment.
The 275th Regiment Personal Mail and Documents
To enhance morale, the NVA/VC operated a complex postal system that included
personal mail. Their field elements were allocated discrete Letter Box Numbers (LBNs)
that were regularly changed. Policy for mail between North and South Vietnam for
communist troops was declared by VC Military Region 1 in a Directive in mid-July 1966.
Each man should not write more than one letter a month, should be sent to close
relatives and friends only, and should provide good advice and encouragement for the
addressees.145
60 letters from 275th Regiments 3rd Battalion personnel (dated in the period
December 1966 to January 1967) and yet to be delivered to North Vietnam, were
recovered by the US 4th Infantry Division during Operation Junction City II at XT 339724
on 24 March 1967.146 The letters had been censored (kim duyt) by the Regiments
cadre, and no tactical details were included. Most of the recovered letters included wishes
for the 1967 New Year (Tt inh Mi), and a number included printed pro-forma Tt
greeting cards (see opposite) produced by the political commissar of the Regiment (as
on 54) Nguyn Vn Cc. Responses from families in the North were to be forwarded
to Letter Box (Hm Th) 43.910 KP (on the outer envelope with a stamp), with Letter
Box 86,522 YK (on the inner envelope ie for 275th Regiment: aka 5th Regiment, aka
Q765).

145

Additionally: Under no circumstances can classified information (location, assignment, designation of

units or agencies, etc) be mentioned in letters. - Military Region 1 Political Staff, Directive No.09/CT, 15
July 1966. - CDEC Log 08-1555-66. The B Ra Province Units Command Committee reproduced the
Military Region 1 Directive ie on the exchange of personal letters between North and South Vietnam and
within South Vietnam, and added cover designators of agencies and units within the Province (signed by
the Assistant Political Officer, Nguyn Thanh Cn). - CDEC Log 09-1974-66. On LBNs and mail to the
North, see also the Nhn Trch District Directive dated 9 September 1966 CDEC Log 11-1394-66. For
military mail in North Vietnam, see NIC Report 282/67, VCAT Item No.F034600930007. For detailed
regulations on the military postal system, see CDEC Log 01-1367-69.
146
CDEC Log 04-1523-67, 04-1474-67, 04-1478-67 (CDEC Bulletins No.3566, 3548, 3550). In December
1966, the 275th Regiments LBNs were principally 43910 KP (for the outer envelope) and 86,522YK (for
the inner envelope). CDEC analysts noted that the letters did not disclose any significant military
information and that the letters were still sealed when recovered. A comprehensive instruction on passes
and mail management (circa mid-1969) - apparently recovered in Cambodia in May 1970, is at CDEC 052772-70 (VCAT Item No.2310907010). That instruction listed the 275th Regiment as E2 (2nd Regiment aka
D54) with an LBN of 86,522/yK. LBNs changed from a five-digit system to a six digit system on 1
July 1970 for a June 1972 RVNAF Joint General Staff (JGS) analysis, see: VCAT Item No.2311005037.

O-40

Tt New Year Greeting card 1967 (Tt inh Mi)

On 24 March 1967, a very large quantity of documents (in 81 packs) related to
the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment (orders, notebooks, lettters, certificates etc), were
recovered by the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at YS 602699 - (about 5 kilometres
north-west of Xuyn Mc) in AO Silver during Operation Portsea.147
As noted, on 29 March 1967 during 1 ATFs Operation Leeton, following a clash
with elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 275th Regiment at YS 381678, documents
recovered included Personal History Statements and notebooks. 148
On 20 June 1967, letters from about 70 personnel of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of
the 275th Regiment were recovered undelivered, by a reconnaissance element of the 7th
ARVN Division at XS 315535 during Operation Cu Long 60/58. Many of the letters
included printed pro-forma 1967 Vietnamese Lunar New Year (Tt inh Mi) greeting
cards signed by the Regiments Political Officer Nguyn Vn Cc, see above. The
members families were principally in the Mekong Delta region in C Mau Province (ie
the Republic of Vietnams An Xuyn Province), Tr Vinh Province (Vnh Bnh), M Tho
Province (nh Tng), and Cn Th Province (Phong Dinh).149
The personal letters only rarely related tactical detail of combat actions. However,
in two letters from Trn Huy Tin to loved ones and relatives in Nam H Province (North
147

As noted earlier, many of the documents were related to NVA Senior Lieutenant Phm Vn Chi
commander of C13 Company, 3rd Battalion, 275th Regiment (see footnotes 101 and 107). For the
documents, see CDEC Bulletin No.3820 to Bulletin No.3837 inclusive.
148
See CDEC Bulletin No.3967. See footnote 110 - 1 ATF, INTSUM 88-67, Ni t, 29 March 1967; and
CDEC Log 04-2690-67, 04-2584-67.
149
See: CDEC Log 07-2667-67 (letters dated 31 December 1966 early January 1967); CDEC Log 071508-67 (letters dated 6 January 5 March 1967); CDEC Log 07-2704-67 (letters dated 11-23 January
1967); CDEC Log 07-2593-67; CDEC Log 07-3256-67; CDEC Log 07-1426-67; CDEC Log 07-1522-67;
CDEC Log 07-1746-67; CDEC Log 07-2575-67; CDEC Log 07-1715-67; CDEC Log 07-1135-67; CDEC
Log 07-1053-67 (including a Bng Khen commendation); CDEC Log 07-1152-67.

O-41

Vietnam) and dated 2 December 1966, Tin referred to operations east of Si Gn

including the Long Tn Battle at Ni t on 18/9 [sic ie 18 September 1966] and at
other places, in which the Liberation Armed Forces and the regional troops fought
continuously making the Americans and their puppets completely perplexed, and in the
future there will be many new and larger victories see below.150

Letter written by Trn Huy Tin 275th Regiment, dated 21 December 1966.

150

CDEC Log 04-1523-67. Among attacks east of Si Gn, Trn Huy Tin includes the shelling of
Sui Rm ((ie the US 11th ACR Blackhorse base on Route 2 south of Xun Lc Town)) on 21 November
((1966)) in which he claimed 150 US troops were killed and 140 military vehicles destroyed, while our
troops suffered no casualties at all.

O-42

An extract from the notebook of Trng Vn Tinh 275th Regiment, relating that his
company had killed 35 Australian troops at the Battle of Long Tn.151
The Long Tn Memorial and Cross (Bia/Cy Thnh Gi Long Tn)
In mid-August 1969, a memorial including a cross, was erected on the Long Tn
battlefield by 6RAR/NZ personnel of 1 ATF. Post-War in 1984, the Cross was removed
by the Vietnamese authorities to the ng Nai Museum in Bin Ha City. In late 1988,
the memorial was declared a National-level Historic Heritage Site (Di Tch Lch S Cp
Quc Gia) by Decision No.1288-VH/QD of the Cultural and Information Department, H
Ni, 16 November 1988. In 1989, the memorial was refurbished, and a replica cross
erected. The inscribed plaque on the replica cross states:
Socialist Republic of Vietnam - The Ministry of Culture Recognizes:
Historic Place - Battlefield: D445 of Ba Ria Long Khanh province contacted 6th
Battalion of the Royal Australian Army near Long Tan village on 18-8-1966.
The 5th ((275th)) Regiment is not mentioned on the plaque.152 The Vietnamese
Ministry of Culture loaned the original cross for display at the Australian War Memorial
in Canberra from 17 August 2012 until April 2013.

151

Trng Vn Tinhs notebook was captured by 5RAR following a clash (2 VC KIA) on 29 March 1967
at YS 381678 six kilometres west of the 1 ATF base. 1 ATF, INTSUM 88-67, Ni t, 29 March 1967.
Tinh an assistant platoon commander, related that C13 Company of the 3rd Battalion (formerly the D605
NVA Battalion) of the 275th Regiment was proposed for a medal and awarded a letter and certificate of
commendation from the Military Region for killing 35 Australian servicemen at Long Tn CDEC Log
04-2690-67.

O-43

B Ra Cemetery Headstones 275th Regiment, 18/8/66

Among the 1,009 headstones in the G Cat Cemetery (B Ra), there are 10
headstones (bia m) of 275th Regiment personnel153 killed in action on 18/8/66 but
with no place of death cited see Appendix 1. It is unclear whether their remains were
exhumed from the Long Tn battlefield post-War or from sites nearby or in the My
To Mountains. A larger number of 18/8/66 headstones are reportedly in the G Cat
Cemetery.
*
*

The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment 2015

In mid-2015, the first history of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment was published
ie: H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), Lch s Trung on B Binh 5 (1965-2015) - The
History of the 5th ((275th )) Infantry Regiment, Nh Xut Bn Quan i Nhan Dan (The
Peoples Armed Forces Publishing House), H Ni, 2015.
A translated extract from that Historys account of the Battle of Long Tan in midAugust 1966 follows as Appendix 3.

5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment History Workshop

Ty Ninh, 3 December 2014

152

The local Party History also only mentions 445 Battalion as the VC force at the Battle of Long Tn ie
with no mention of the 275th Regiment. Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s ng b tnh B Ra-Vng Tu
1930 - 1975 (The History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu Province), op.cit., 2000, Chapter VII.
153
The headstones are for: Phm Ph Hi, Nguyn Vn Huy, Phm Vn Chiu, Phm Vn ng, V c
Tn, Hong Gia Tch, Nguyn Vn S, Phm Vn V, V Xun o, and o c Thin.

O-44

Letter of Appreciation (Giy Khen) for Bi Quang Hnh

3rd Battalion/275th Regiment, signed by Phan Vn Khu
for the Q5 Commander on 17 August 1966
ie the day before the battle of Long Tn see footnote 93.
Such awards may have been intended to boost morale in units
before a major battle.

Appendices
1.
2.
3.
4.

275th Regiment Personnel KIA - Battle of Long Tn (140 names).

Lieutenant General Nguyn Thi Bng A Biography.
The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment (2015) pp.45-49, p.402.
List of Martyrs Killed at Long Tn 18.8.66.
(G Cat Cemetery List of 36 February 2016).

Appendix 1 to
Annex O
275th Regiment Personnel KIA Battle of Long Tn (140 names)
(collated from the list of 172 see footnotes 86-89 in Annex O ie 139 + one))
Bi Cnh Hng

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

Kim Dual

2 Bn, b. Sc Trng.

Bi nh m

3 Bn, b. Hi Phng.

La Thai Huyn

2 Bn, b. Bn Tre.

Bi Vn D

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

Lm Vn B

2 Bn, b. Tr Vinh.

Bi Vn Dc

- , b. M Tho.

L Cng Chn

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

Bi Vn Tc

- , b. Sc Trng.

L Cng Tht

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

Chu Vn Chiu

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

L Hong Chn

3 Bn, b. Bn Tre.

Danh Chu

1 Bn, b. Rch Gia.

L Hng Sn

2 Bn, b. Rch Gia.

Danh

2 Bn, b. Sc Trng.

L Hu Chu

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

o c Thin1

3 Bn, b. Thai Bnh.

L Quang Trung

3 Bn, b. Qung Tr.

o Minh Li

2 Bn, b. Rch Gia.

L Thanh Xun

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

inh Xun Ti

3 Bn, b. Hi Dng.

L Thin Thai

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

inh Xun Tui

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

L Trng Mc

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

Vn Binh

- , b. Cn Th.

L Trng Nho

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

Xun Thnh

3 Bn, b. Hi Dng.

L Vn ng

2 Bn, b. Rch Gia.

on Quang Lnh

3 Bn, b. Hi Dng.

L Vn ng

- , b. Tr Vinh.

on Trng Lnh

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

L Vn Lng

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

Ha Vn T

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

L Vn Sng

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

H Xun Bin

3 Bn, b. Tha Thin

L Vn Tn

1 Bn, b. Sc Trng.

H Vn Hunh

2 Bn, b. Bn Tre.

L Vn Thanh

2 Bn, b. Tr Vinh.

Hong Gia Tch2

3 Bn, b. Hi Phng.

L Vn Tn

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

Hunh Vn Qun

1 Bn, b. Sc Trng.

L Vit Cao

3 Bn, b. Hi Dng.

Khu T

2 Bn, b. Tr Vinh.

L Vit To

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

Kim oan

2 Bn, b. Sc Trng.

Luyn Duy Th

3 Bn, b. Hi Dng.

L Ph

2 Bn, b. Sc Trng.

1
2

Headstone in G Cat Cemetery, B Ra see p.4.

Headstone in G Cat Cemetery, B Ra.

M Tn Bo

1 Bn, b. Rch Gia.

Nguyn Vn Hng

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

Mai Vn Hc

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

Nguyn Vn Huy3

3 Bn, b. Nam Vang.

Mai Vn Huynh [sic] 1 Bn, b. C Mau.

Nguyn Vn Kt

1 Bn, b. Sc Trng.

Ng Vn Li

1 Bn, b. C Mau.

Nguyn Vn Khoat

2 Bn, b. H Bc.

Nguyn B Tr

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

Nguyn Vn Lm

- , b. Tr Vinh.

Nguyn ng Soan

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

Nguyn Vn Nga

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

Nguyn ng Vng 1 Bn, b. C Mau.

Nguyn Vn Phi

- , b. M Tho.

Nguyn Duy Ng

3 Bn, b. Hi Dng.

Nguyn Vn Thanh

- , b. Tr Vinh.

Nguyn Duy Ng

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

Nguyn Vn Tnh

1 Bn, b. Rch Gia.

Nguyn Duy Th

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

Nguyn Vn T

2 Bn, b. Sc Trng.

Nguyn Thanh Chau 3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

Nguyn Vn Trng

- , b. C Mau.

Nguyn Trng Hng 3 Bn, b. Hi Dng.

Nguyn Vn Xm

- , b. Tr Vinh.

Nguyn Vn B

1 Bn, b. C Mau.

Nguyn Vn/Hu S4 3 Bn, b. Hi Hng

Nguyn Vn Bng

- , b. Rch Gia.

Nhan Vn Bia

- , b. Cn Th.

Nguyn Vn Bung

- , b. Cn Th.

Phm Ph Hi5

1 Bn, b. Gia nh.

Nguyn Vn C

1 Bn, b. Rch Gia.

Phm Vn Ba

- , b. Cn Th.

Nguyn Vn Dn

- , b. C Mau.

Phm Vn Bn

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

Nguyn Vn n

- , b. M Tho.

Phm Vn Bng

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

Nguyn Vn Dnh

2 Bn, b. Bn Tre.

Phm Vn B

- , b. Tr Vinh.

Nguyn Vn Do

- , b. Cn Th.

Phm Vn Cp

3 Bn, b. Nam H.

Nguyn Vn t

- , M Tho.

Phm Vn Chin

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

Nguyn Vn c

- , b. Tr Vinh.

Phm Vn Chiu6

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

Nguyn Vn Ha

1 Bn, b. Rch Gia.

Phm Vn i

2 Bn, b. Sc Trng.

Nguyn Vn Hi

2 Bn, b. Tr Vinh.

Phm Vn ng7

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

Nguyn Vn Ht

- , b. Sc Trng.

Nguyn Vn Ha

- , b. Rch Gia.

Nguyn Vn Hi

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

Headstone in G Cat Cemetery, B Ra see p.4,

not included in the list of 172.
4
Headstone in G Cat Cemetery, B Ra, see p.4.
5
Headstone in G Cat Cemetery, B Ra.
6
Headstone in G Cat Cemetery, B Ra.

Phm Vn Hoa

1 Bn, b. Sc Trng.

Trnh inh Lc

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

Phm Vn Mc

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

Trnh Vn Luyn

3 Bn, b, Hi Hng.

Phm Vn Mng

3 Bn, b. Hi Dng.

Trng Cng Bn

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

Phm Vn Ng

2 Bn, b. Tr Vinh.

V Hu Qun

1 Bn, b. Sc Trng.

Phm Vn Nhiu

2 Bn, b. Sc Trng.

V Vn Ca

3 Bn, b. Qung Nam

Phm Vn Quy

2 Bn, b. Cn Th.

V Vn Dng

3 Bn, b. Rch Gia.

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

V Vn Mt

2 Bn, b. Cn Th.

3 Bn, b. Hi Dng.

V Vn Th

- , b. Tr Vinh.

Phm Vn V

Phm Vn Vin

Quach Hu Thng 3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

V nh Chin
9

3 Bn, b. Hi Dng.
3 Bn, b. Thai Bnh.

T Quang Nguyn

3 Bn, b. Hi Dng.

V c Tn

Tng Vn Ha

- , b. Cn Th.

V Ngc c

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

Thch Cng

- , b. Tr Vinh.

V Ngc oan

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

Thch Lin

- , b. Tr Vinh

V Vn on

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

Thai Vn An

- , b. Vnh Long.

V Vn Dung

3 Bn, b. Hi Dng.

T Thnh Vn

- , b. Tr Vinh.

V Vn Duy

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

T Vn Thng

2 Bn, b. Sc Trng.

V Vn/Xun Hu

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

Trn Hu Dng

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

V Xun o10

3 Bn, b. Hi Phng.

Trn Quang Tnh

3 Bn, b. Hi Dng.

Trn Quang Tnh

3 Bn, b. Hi Hng.

Trn Vn By

2 Bn, b. Bn Tre.

Trn Vn Khoai

- , b. M Tho.

Trn Vn Kch

1 Bn, b. Rch Gia.

Trn Vn Thiu

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

Trn Vn V

2 Bn, b. Tr Vinh.

Note: A List of Martyrs at Long Tn

produced in B Ra in February 2016
and based on G Cat Cemetery records,
listed 98 martyrs (two duplicated ie = 96)
killed on 18.8.66 almost all were 275th
VC Regiment personnel. 30% were
Northerners (presumably former NVA
D605 Battalion personnel). The List of
96 included 36 names not on the List of
139. The Lists included only one martyr
born in Phc Tuy Province.

Trn Xun Mch

3 Bn, b. Thanh Ha.

7
8

Headstone in G Cat Cemetery, B Ra.

Headstone in G Cat Cemetery, B Ra.

Headstone in G Cat Cemetery, B Ra.

Headstone in G Cat Cemetery, B Ra.

10

Headstone - Nguyn Vn Huy: Section

Commander 3rd Battalion, 275 Regiment.
KIA 18-8-1966. (born Phnom Penh ?)

Headstone - o c Thin: Section 2ic

3rd Battalion, 275 Regiment.
KIA 18-8-1966.

Headstone - Nguyn Vn/Hu S :

Platoon 2ic, 3rd Battalion, 275 Regiment.
KIA 18-8-1966.

Headstone Comrade Son: Mortar Section

Commander 2nd Company, D445 Battalion
KIA 22-12-1970, Lang C, Xuyn Mc.

Appendix 2 to
Annex O
Lieutenant General Nguyn Thi Bng An Outline Biography

Early Career
Nguyn Thi Bng - known as t Thi (aka: Hng Tm), was born on 15 June
1927 in An Tinh village, Trng Bng District, Ty Ninh. He attended a French school,
and joined the Autumn Revolution in 1945 serving in the Revolutionary Youth and the
12th Armed Detachment on the Sui Su Front in Ty Ninh Province. Following a drive
against the Vit Minh in Ty Ninh by French forces, his Detachment withdrew and
developed a base area at Rng Rong. He fought in Vit Minh units and joined the
Communist Party of Vietnam in June 1947. He regrouped (tp kt) to the North in
1954, and in the period 1954-1956 was a battalion 2ic in the 330th Division. From 1956,
Nguyn Thi Bng underwent four years command and staff training in the Peoples
Republic of China. During this period, he studied Mandarin and attended the higher
Hong Ph ((Whampoa)) Military Academy and graduated as the premier student and
the most proficient in Mandarin among the 80 Vietnamese students. In August 1963, he
returned to the South (the B2 Front) a three-month trek down the Trail in a ten-man
group; and was appointed as a regiment second-in-command. In December 1964, Nguyn
Thi Bng was Deputy Commander of the 2nd Regiment (Q762 later 272 Regiment) at
the Battle of Bnh Gi.1
He subsequently became the commander of the 275th Regiment of the 5th VC
Division in May 1965. In mid-1966, the Headquarters 5th Division defector NVA
Lieutenant Colonel L Xun Chuyn (see his biodata at footnotes 34 and 36 in Annex O -

See the group photograph at http://tuoitre.vn/Chinh-tri-xa-hoi/Chinh-tri/60434/Trung-doan-Binh-Gia.html.

He is credited with the mobile ambush (Vn ng phc kch) against ARVN Airborne elements at Chi
ng in northern Phc Tuy Province on 9 February 1965 see footnote 151 in the main text.

Appendix 2 to
Annex O

and also footnote 22 in Annex K) described Nguyn Thi Bng as: Combat experienced
but still lacks good knowledge of tactics and a complete knowledge of command.2
The Battle of Long Tn the Commander ?
According to the Australian Official History and other Australian writings, on 18
August 1966, Nguyn Thi Bng (t Thi) reportedly commanded the 275th VC
Regiment at the Battle of Long Tn. Notably, post-War, both the Australian Official
Historian Dr Ian McNeill, and the Australian author Terry Burstall interviewed Nguyn
Thi Bng.3 According to Nguyn Thanh Hng4 (a 5th VC Division staff officer) - during
the Battle on 18 August 1966, Nguyn Thi Bng and his 275th Regiment Headquarters
was located on the small feature of Nui Dat 2, and Nguyn Thi Bng was
accompanied by his executive officer Major Ba Du ((Ba c)).5

On 4 July 1966, as the commander of on 45 (ie the 275th Regiment), Nguyn Thi Bng signed a
preventative medical directive as Thi over a signature block of Nguyn Thi. CDEC Log 05-1122-67.
3
However note that the Australian Official History: McNeill I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003,
p.48 conflates t Thi with Nguyn Dng (the Assistant Commissar/Political Officer of the 275 th
Regiment at Long Tn) - ie the 275th Regiment commanded by Ut Thoi (Nguyen Duong according to one
source). In June 1988, Ian McNeill met with then Lieutenant General Nguyn Thi Bng Commander
Military Region 7, at the Military Region 7 Headquarters. A photograph in the Australian War Memorial
following their meeting notes: General Bung was the commander of the Viet Cong (VC) 275 Regiment
during the Battle of Long Tan. - AWM P01509.008. Subsequently, the Australian Official History noted
that at the Battle of Long Tn: The enemy commander was Lieutenant Colonel Ut Thoi, Commander 275
Regiment. - McNeill, I., To Long Tn, 1993, op.cit., p.558 (endnote 110). Following his discussions with
Nguyn Thi Bng (t Thi) in March 1989, the Australian veteran and author - Terry Burstall wrote: He
commanded the 275 Regiment at the Battle of Long Tan. t Thi was directly in charge of the forces
during the battle, and there were two battalions and one in reserve plus some of the forces of the D445. Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, Book 2, op.cit., 1990 pp.122-123. See also the interviews of Nguyn
Thanh Hng (10 November 1987), Nguyn Thi Bng (14 March 1989), and Ba c (22 March 1989) in
Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, Part II, opcit., 1990, p.100, p.102, pp.122-123, and p.206. See also Smith,
H.A. (with McRae T.), Long Tan the start of a lifelong battle, Big Sky Publishing Pty Ltd, Newport,
2015, p.154.
4
Nguyn Thanh Hng (born 1932 in Hi M - aka Hai Hng) was a 5th VC Division staff officer present at
the Battle of Long Tn. Hng joined the Vit Minh in 1947. In 1968, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel
and Deputy Commander/COFS of the 5th VC Division. In 1971, he was promoted to Deputy Commander of
Military Region 7. Nguyn Thanh Hng became the commander of the 5th Division as a senior colonel (i
Ta) in 1979 (conducting operations in Cambodia). In 1982, he returned to Vietnam as commander of ong
Ni, before retiring in 1984.
5
See the interviews of Nguyn Thanh Hng (10 November 1987), Nguyn Thi Bng (14 March 1989),
and Ba c (22 March 1989) in Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, Part II, opcit., 1990, p.100, p.102, pp.122123, and p.206. Dr Ian McNeill the official Australian historian, also interviewed Nguyn Thanh Hng
L Thnh Ba (a former political officer of 445 Battalion September-December 1965) at Kuranda
(Queensland) on 7 September 1990 - McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, pp.562-563; and Sketch 16.1
of the enemy battle plan by Nguyn Thanh Hng opposite p.327.

Appendix 2 to
Annex O

Recently however, according to the 5th ((275th)) Regiment History (2015)6, After
the units great victory at the ng n T-junction ((mid-June 1966)), the Regiments
Commander Nguyn Thi Bng was posted to a new appointment and Comrade
Nguyn Vn Hiu7 was appointed as the Regiment second-in command and as acting
commander of the Regiment. And subsequently: Nguyn Vn Hiu the acting
commander of the 5th Regiment participated in the pre-battle reconnaissance of the Long
Tn area.8
Several reports note that in August/September/October 1966, Nguyn Thi Bng
was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the 5th VC Division9 including formal obituaries
in late January 2014: In August 1966, our Comrade ((Nguyn Thi Bng)) was made
Deputy Chief of Staff of Staff of the 5th Division.10 The List of Regimental
Commanders from Inception to 2015 in the 275th Regiment History (2015) includes
Nguyn Thi Bng as the Regiments commander in the period 1965-1967.11
In summary, Nguyn Thi Bng and two senior VC cadre at the Battle of Long
Tn, have stated during interviews that Nguyn Thi Bng commanded the 275th
Regiment at the Battle. The mid-2015 history of the 275th Regiment states that Nguyn
Thi Bng left the Regiment before the Battle, and that Nguyn Vn Hiu was the acting
commander of the 275th Regiment at the Battle of Long Tn.12
H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), Lch s Trung on Bo Binh 5 (1965-2015) - The History of the 5th
((275th)) Infantry Regiment, Nh Xut Bn Qun i Nhn Dn (The Peoples Armed Forces Publishing
House), H Ni, 2015, , p.45, p.46. See also Appendix 3 to Annex O, and footnote 9 below.
7
Nguyn Vn Hiu (Hai Hiu) is noted as the commander of the 2nd Battalion/275th Regiment in July 1965.
He led the 2nd Battalion at the Battle of VXu in mid-March 1966; at ng Qu (26-27 May 1966) and was
wounded by napalm at the Battle of ng n in mid-June 1966. H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The
History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, p.21, p.38, p.41, p.44. A 1ATF study noted that
Regt Commander Lt Colonel Hai Hieu (A recent report indicates that he may have been killed on 21
Jul 67.) Furner, J.P. Major, 5th VC Division R569-1-16, HQ 1ATF Ni t, 15 November 1967.
8
H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, p.45,
p.46. See also Appendix 3 to Annex O.
9
A 275th Regiment POW related that t Thi moved to Headquarters 5th Division in September 1966 and
was replaced by Hai Hiu, a Northerner, aged 35 VCAT Item No.F034600701813. According to the
defector NVA Senior Lieutenant Nguyn Vn Phng (assistant operations officer HQ 5th VC Division,
September 1965 February 1967) Lieutenant Colonel t Thi ((ie Nguyn Thi Bng)) commanded the
275th Regiment in Oct 66 and then became the Deputy Chief of Staff of the 5th VC Division - until he was
replaced in January 1967 and moved to COSVN VCAT Item No: F034600782214; F034600850749;
F034600900691; F034601500569. For Australian reports of Nguyn Thi Bng commanding the 275th
Regiment at the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966 see footnote 3.
10
ng ch Trung tng Nguyn Thi Bng t trn (Comrade Lieutenant General Nguyn Thi Bng
has passed away), Qun i nhn dn On Line, 22 January 2014.
11
H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, p.432.
12
See Appendix 3. It is possible that as there are criticisms in the 5th Division History (2005) of the VC
commanders conduct of the Battle, the writers of the the 2015 275th Regiment History may have elected to
disassociate the late Lieutenant General Nguyn Thi Bng (a former Vice Minister for Defence) from
the negative references in the Regiments account of the Battle. For the 5th Division History (2005)
criticisms, see footnote 292 in the main text and Annex K, p.9, p.10, f.42, relating that the 275 th Regiment
elements were caught off-guard by the Australian advance because Trn Minh Tm (Nm Tm) who was
6

Appendix 2 to
Annex O

Later Career
In December 1966, Nguyn Thi Bng was appointed Chief of Staff of the 9th
VC Division.13 In May 1967, he became the Deputy Commander of the 9th VC Division
- participating in attacks on Saigon during the 1968 Tt Offensive. In August 1970, he
was appointed Commander of the 9th VC Division.14
In mid-1967, Nguyn Thi Bng reportedly narrowly avoided capture by
elements of 18th ARVN Division in Long Khnh Province and his personal diary was
captured (see footnotes 84 and 106 in Annex O). In April 1972, he commanded the 9th VC
Division in attacks on Lc Ninh and on An Lc the capital of Bnh Long Province,
during the NVA/VC Nguyn Hu/Easter Offensive. In October 1972, he was appointed
Head, Operations Department of COSVN and held that position during the 1975 H Ch
Minh Campaign. Post-War, in May 1975, Nguyn Thi Bng was the Deputy Military
Commander of Si Gn - Gia nh City and a member of the Partys Standing Committee
for the City.
Following the fall of the South Vietnam in 1975, he held senior appointments
including Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of Military Region 7 (1976-1979). He
next served in Cambodia against the Khmer Rouge/Pol Pot forces as the Commander of
the Military Region 7 Forward Front and the Commander of Front 979. Nguyn Thi
Bng returned to Vietnam in 1988 to command Military Region 7 (headquartered in Gia
nh Province) as a Lieutenant General - and was interviewed by the Australian official
military historian - Dr I. McNeill, in June 1988.15 He was also interviewed by the
Australian author T. Burstall in H Ch Minh City on 14 March 1989. In October 1989,
Nguyn Thi Bng was appointed the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Vietnam Peoples
Army.
In the December 1992, Nguyn Thi Bng became Vice Minister for Defence
(Th trng Quc phng) with responsibility for foreign relations and a member of the
Partys Central Committee (1986-1996). He retired in January 1997 aged 74. In 2012, he
was the chief editor of a history Chronicle (ie Bin Nin S Kin Lch S Khng Chin
1945-1975) of the Nam B (ie Southern or Cochin China) Region - see the
Bibliography.
Lieutenant General Nguyn Thi Bng died in H Ch Minh City on 21 January
2014. He is survived by his wife, V Th p. His son Lieutenant General Nguyn
Chu Thanh (b.1954), retired from the Peoples Armed Forces (PAVN) in June 2015.

directly commanding the battle, had directed the observation element to temporarily withdraw We
had committed an error in our observation of the enemy, and in arranging our formations to start to attack
from a far distance because of this, we were unable to surround and destroy the enemy battalion.
13
Comrade Lieutenant General Nguyn Thi Bng has passed away, op.cit., 22 January 2014.
14
M (BQND), V tng t Li th rng Rong, Nguyn Tn Dng Website, 1 February 2013.
http://nguyentandung.org/vi-tuong-tu-loi-the-rung-rong.html .
15
See the photograph at AWM http://cas.awm.gov.au/item/P01509.008/ .

Appendix 2 to
Annex O

Nguyn Thi Bng Commander 275th Regiment at the Battle of Long Tn

(photograph circa 2011)

Lieutenant General Nguyn Thi Bng December 2013

6
Readers Notes and Comments

Appendix 2 to
Annex O

Appendix 3 to
Annex O
H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), Lch s Trung on B Binh 5 (1965-2015)
The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment,
Nh Xut Bn Quan i Nhan Dan (The Peoples Armed Forces Publishing House),
H Ni, 2015.

Appendix 3 to
Annex O
2

pp.45-49:
After commanding the unit to win a large victory at the ng n T-Junction
((mid-June 1966)), the 5th ((275th))Regiments commander - Nguyn Thi Bng, was
appointed to a new task1; and Comrade Nguyn Vn Hiu2 was appointed as the
Regiments second-in-command and concurrently the acting commander of the Regiment.
In the middle of 1966, the American and Australian forces joined with the Si
Gn puppet troops to launch Operation Hardihood and sweep into the Minh m base,
Long Phc, and our liberated areas in B Ra-Long Khanh. At the same time, the enemy
established additional bases at Da Quy Mountain ((The Horseshoe)) and Lng Tng Lake
((Bu Lng)), and further developed the Ni t base. From July 1966, the Australian
forces were the main elements conducting sweeps and pacification in the B Ra-Vng
Tu region. To assist the local armed forces resist the enemys pacification, COSVN
Headquarters directed the 5th Division to coordinate with the armed forces of B RaLong Khanh to strike the enemy, defend the liberated base regions, and destroy the
enemys pacification program in the area. In accordance with its task, the 4th ((274th))
Regiment operated against the enemy in the area to the west of Route 2 while the 5th
((275th)) Regiment coordinated with the armed forces of B Ra Province to attack and
destroy the Australian units that, together with puppet forces, launched sweeping
operations in B Ra. The victories in the Wet Season of 1966 were won in a time of
extreme difficulty and hardship for the 5th Regiment. The enemy constantly struck into
our bases and blocked our routes to move food. The Regiment was forced to constantly
move its base for protection against attacks by enemy aircraft. Although operating in an
area of great difficulties and violence, the Party Committee and leadership of the
Regiment remained resolved to direct and guide the units to hang-on in their allocated

Translators Note: See a biography of Nguyn Thi Bng at Appendix 2 to Annex O. Official Vietnamese
obituaries for Nguyn Thi Bng in late January 2014 included: In August 1966, our Comrade ((Nguyn
Thi Bng)) was made Deputy Chief of Staff of Staff of the 5 th Division. Several US reports note that in
August/September/October 1966, Nguyn Thi Bng was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the 5 th VC
Division. A 275th Regiment POW related that t Thi (ie Nguyn Thi Bng) moved to Headquarters 5th
Division in September 1966 and was replaced by Hai Hiu, a Northerner, aged 35 VCAT Item
No.F034600701813. According to the defector NVA Senior Lieutenant Nguyn Vn Phng (assistant
operations officer HQ 5th VC Division, September 1965 February 1967) Lieutenant Colonel t Thi
(ie Nguyn Thi Bng) commanded the 275th Regiment in Oct 66 and then became the Deputy Chief of
Staff of the 5th VC Division - until he was replaced in January 1967 and moved to COSVN VCAT Item
No: F034600782214; F034600850749; F034600900691; F034601500569. See the following footnote 4 for
Australian reports of Nguyn Thi Bng commanding the 275th Regiment at the Battle of Long Tn on 18
August 1966.
2
Translators Note: Nguyn Vn Hiu (Hai Hiu) is noted as the commander of the 2nd Battalion/275th
Regiment in July 1965. He led the 2nd Battalion at the Battle of V Xu in mid-March 1966; at ng Qu (2627 May 1966); and was wounded by napalm at the Battle of ng n in mid-June 1966. H Sn i
Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment, op.cit., 2015, p.21, p.38, p.41, p.44.
A late-1967 1 ATF study noted on the 275th Regiment: Regt Commander Lt Colonel Hai Hieu (A recent
report indicates that he may have been killed on 21 Jul 67.) Furner, J.P. Major, 5th VC Division R5691-16, HQ 1 ATF Ni t, 15 November 1967.

Appendix 3 to
Annex O
3

areas and to actively coordinate with the armed forces of B Ra Province to attack the
enemy and to defend the Xuyn Mc and Long Phc base area regions and to develop
plans to attack the Australian military based at Ni t. At the beginning of August 1966,
a group of cadre deployed to study the enemy at Ni t. The group comprised: the
Division second-in-command Trn Minh Tm3, the acting Regiment commander
Nguyn Vn Hiu4, together with battalion and company cadre from the Regiment.
Secretly, the area at Long Tn was closely studied.5 After many days of examining the
Translators Note: Trn Minh Tm (aka Nm Tam) was the founding commanding officer of the 4 th
Regiment (274th VC Regiment). The defectors NVA Lieutenant Colonel L Xun Chuyn and NVA Senior
Lieutenant Nguyn Vn Phng (rallied March 1967) noted Lieutenant Colonel Nm Tam as the Chief
of Staff of the 5th Division and Chuyn described Tm as: young and resolute, drinks and argues, has no
capability as far as tactics and staff work. According to the 5th Division History (2005), Tm was the
NVA/VC battlefield commander at Long Tn in August 1966 and, as a Colonel (Thng T), Tm was
later appointed commander of the 5th Division in October 1968. Tm is also noted in a major Vietnamese
account of the War as leading the 5th Division elements at Long Tn see: Nguyn Vn Minh Colonel (ed),
Lch s Khng chin chng M cu nc -Tp 4 (Vol 4), Nh Xut Bn Chnh Tr Quc Gia, H Ni,
1999. See also footnotes 260, 262, 292 and 302 in the main text of this 2015 D445 Battalion History.
4
Translators Note: See footnotes 1 and 2. On 18 January 1967, as the commanding officer of on 54 ie
the 275th Regiment, Hai Hiu signed a directive on the use of pistols. CDEC Log 04-2595-67. In midNovember 1967, 1 ATF reported the 275th Regiments strength as approx. 1200 with its commander as
Hai Hieu and its battalion commanders as Tan [sic] Bao, Ba Lieu, and Ut Hui Furner, J.O. Major, 5th
VC Division, R569-1-16, HQ 1 ATF, Ni t, 15 November 1967. Earlier, in mid-1966, there was also a
Nguyn Vn Hiu serving as a squad leader in the 11th Company of the 275th Regiments 3rd Battalion.
CDEC Log 04-2204-66. Severla years later, a Nguyn Vn Hiu is noted as the commander of the 275th
Regiment in 1974 H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment,
op.cit., 2015, p.432. In June 1988, the official Australian historian - Ian McNeill, met with then
Lieutenant General Nguyn Thi Bng Commander Military Region 7, at the Military Region 7
Headquarters. A photograph in the Australian War Memorial of their meeting notes: General Bung was the
commander of the Viet Cong (VC) 275 Regiment during the Battle of Long Tan. - AWM P01509.008.
Subsequently, the Australian Official History noted that at the Battle of Long Tn: The enemy commander
was Lieutenant Colonel Ut Thoi, Commander 275 Regiment. - McNeill, I., To Long Tn, 1993, op.cit.,
p.558 (endnote 110). Following his discussions with Nguyn Thi Bng (t Thi) in March 1989, the
Australian veteran and author - Terry Burstall wrote: He commanded the 275 Regiment at the Battle of
Long Tan. t Thi was directly in charge of the forces during the battle, and there were two battalions
and one in reserve plus some of the forces of the D445. - Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, Book 2, op.cit.,
1990 pp.122-123.
5
Translators Note: The 1991 D455 Battalion History also related planning and reconnaissance aspects ie:
Comrades Nm Truyn ((ie: Nguyn Th Truyn - aka Nm Truyn and Nm Si Gn)), Nm Ta ((ie:
Trn Minh Tm see footnote 3 above)), Ba t ((ie: Nguyn c Hot, Deputy Commander of the B Ra
Province Unit also reportedly known as Nguyn Vn t)), t ng ((ie: ng Hu Thun - also known
as ng and Thim B Ra-Long Khnh Province Unit)) together with the staff elements of the two
units, held many meetings to carefully consider and assess the situation - while delegating Comrade Nguyn
Hu Ngha ((ie: probably more correctly L Hu Ngha - either the commander or the 2ic of the
reconnaissance company of the 275th Regiment)) - the second-in-command of the reconnaissance company
of the 5th Division, and the 445 Battalions reconnaissance element to go and examine the battlefield in the
Long Ta and Long Phc region of B Ra. After three days, the reconnaissance elements of the two units
had completed their study of the battlefield. The 2004 D445 Battalion History does not relate a
reconnaissance phase merely noting: Quite careful thought was given to the preparation of the battlefield
see footnote 260 in the main text.
3

Appendix 3 to
Annex O
4

operating methods of the Australian forces, the Battle Headquarters comprising Trn
Minh Tm (the Division second-in-command) and ng Hu Thun 6 (the commander of
the Province Unit), agreed on a plan to shell the enemy combined with cutting
communication routes to force the enemy to send out troops to break the blockade, which
we would then destroy. Our combat force comprised the 5th ((275th)) Regiment, the 445
B Ra Battalion reinforced by the V Th Sau7 Assault Youth Company8 for casualty
evacuation and the movement of ammunition.
On the afternoon of 17 August, our units occupied and prepared ambush positions
along Provincial Route 52 in the area of the Long Tn rubber plantation. Our combat
formation was deployed over a main front ((killing zone)) of two kilometres with our
assigned blocking force of the 1st Company of the 3rd Battalion reinforced with a 75mm
recoilless rifle and two B-40 rocket propelled grenades. The force for the killing zone
comprised the 1st Battalion, the 2nd Battalion, and a company of 445 Battalion stationed
opposite. The units were deployed from 400 to 500 metres from the side of the road. The
rear blocking group comprised two companies of the 3rd Battalion deployed 500 metres
from the road. The reserve force was a company of 445 Battalion and one company of the
1st Battalion sited 200 metres behind the killing zone force. The Regiments reserve was
the 1st Company of the 1st Battalion. At 2300hrs [sic]9 on 17 August, as our units had
6

Translators Note: ng Hu Thun was also known as t ng, V ng, ng, and Thim. He had
infiltrated into the South in 1961, and in 1965-1966 he served at Military Region 1/T.1 (Eastern Nam B
Military Staff) as the Chief of Operations and Training with the grade of regimental executive officer
CDEC Bulletin 257, Log 03-1253-66. Thun was transferred from T.1 to B Ra on 30 June 1966 CDEC
Log 12-2459-66. ng Hu Thun (t ng) is noted in the 5th Division History (2005) as the commander
of the B Ra Province Unit. According to that History see Annex K: on 10 August 1966, the Combined
Battle Headquarters comprising Trn Minh Tm and Comrade ng Hu Thun (Commander of the B
Ra Unit) met to determine the fighting tactics to destroy an Australian battalion in the Long Ta region.
t ng is also later described in the 1991 D445 History at p.67, pp.75-76 as the commander of the B Ra
Province Unit apparently replacing Nguyn Vn Mi/Nguyn Vit Hoa (Mi Th) in mid-late1966. He
was the chief of staff of Military Region 7 in January 1969 VCAT Item No.2310510003.
7
Translators Note: In May 1950, V Th Sa , a member of the t Cng An Xung Phong was
captured. She was born in 1933 in Phc Li and joined Vit Minh at age of 14, She was sent to Cn o
(a prison island in the South China Sea) and executed in January 1952. V Th Su was made a member of
the ng Lao ng Vit Nam (Vietnamese Labour ie Communist, Party) on day before being shot. A
statue of the female martyr V Th Sa was erected in t in 1985 see the Long t District History 1986 at Annex L pp.64-65, p.99 for detail.
8
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 History (translated 2011) cites: the 80-strong V Th Su civil labour
company comprised mainly of females from the Province and led by Chn Phng as company
commander, to support the battle. According to its unit history, the C.12-65 Bnh Gi Victory Company
also assisted at the Long Tn battle: ie as the enemy artillery was very heavy and destroyed the NVA/VC
field telephone lines, they were employed in commo-liaison duties taking messages from the headquarters
to the battlefront, repairing broken field telephone lines, and evacuating casualties to "Hospital 1500" in the
area of the May To mountains.
9
Translators Note: The shelling began at 0243hrs ie pre-dawn, on 17 August (for 22 minutes). The 2004
D445 History states that: The 4th Company ((D445)) was ordered by the Battalion to set up two 82mm
mortars and a 75mm recoilless rifle (RCL) and shell the Australian military base see footnote 269 in the
main text of this D445 History (2015) for detail on the shelling, including the 1 ATF account.

Appendix 3 to
Annex O
5

completed occupying the battlefield, the Regiments recoilless rifles and mortars attacked
the enemys base at Ni t. At the same time, the Chu c District regional company10
attacked the office of the quisling village council in Long Tn.11
From the morning until 3pm on 18 August, there was no reaction at all from the
enemy at Ni t.12 Consequently, our battlefield leadership assessed that the enemy
would not launch a sweeping operation, and ordered our observation posts to withdraw
back to the 3rd Battalion Headquarters site with our elements remaining in their combat
positions. At 3.30pm, the 6th Company of our 2nd Battalion discovered that an enemy
company had secretly followed the edge of the road into the 2nd Battalions area of the
battlefield and was 600 metres from our blocking force. One kilometre behind the enemy
infantry force, their armoured vehicles13 were also advancing towards our positions. The
battlefield command group ordered our elements to be ready to open fire and block the
enemy and to get close to the road. The 6th Company moved its positions in order to
attack the enemy close to the ditches in the rubber plantation and waited until the
advancing Australian force was only 10 metres from battle area before opening fire. Eight
enemy troops were killed on the spot, and the Australians spread out and resisted fiercely.
Two of the enemys armoured vehicles fired a torrent of bullets into the 2nd Battalions
positions and inflicted casualties.
In this dangerous situation, Phan Vn Trung a company second-in-command,
bravely moved through the firing and used his B-40 to destroy the leading armoured
vehicle, and to block the enemy formation. At the same time, the Regiments recoilless
rifle team fired upon and set fire to the second armoured vehicle, creating the conditions
for the 1st and 2nd Battalion to assault and wipe out the enemy. After 30 minutes of
fighting, we had inflicted heavy losses on an enemy company and set fire to two
10

Translators Note: Involvement of Chu c District elements is not mentioned in: the D445 History
(1991), the D445 History (2004), the 5 th Division History (2005), nor the Chu c District History (2004).
11
Translators Note: There was no village council in Long Tn village in mid-August 1966. The population
of Long Tn village had been relocated by an ARVN operation on 6 April 1966, and most buildings were
razed (VCAT Item No.VA S050539). Two battalions (2/16th, 2/18th) of the 1st US Inf Div (Operation
Abilene) provided blocking support to the ARVN operation. See: McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., p243:
The inhabitants of Long Tan had already been relocated on 6 April ((1966)) as part of ongoing operations
in Phuoc Tuy and Long Khanh provinces. ARVN troops removed the villagers to Dat Do, Long Dien
and Hoa Long. the village of Long Tan soon became a burnt out shell. The village of Long Phc was
evacuated and razed by US and ARVN forces in May 1966 (Operation Hardihood). See photo: VCAT
Item No. VA027184. Subsequently, 1 ATF forces destroyed structures in Long Phc in the period 21 June
5 July 1966 (6RAR, Operation Enoggera) - pp.253-255.
12
Translators Note: This is incorrect. According to the Official Australian History: At midday on 17
August 6RAR had three separate elements searching for the enemy in the general area of the ((mortar and
RCL)) base plate positions and to the north-east At 7.05 a.m. ((18 August)), B Company commenced the
search to the east as far as the edge of Long Tan rubber plantation. D Company left the base at 11.00
a.m. . McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., pp.312-314. See also Map 14.2 Company patrol pattern
towards Long Tan, 16-18 August 1966, opposite p.326.
13
Translators Note: The 1 ATF armoured vehicles (M113A1 APCs initially seven, but two were
detached) did not depart the 1 ATF base until approximately 6.00 p.m. and did not reach the Long Tn
battlefield until about 6.30 p.m. see: McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., pp.330-332.

Appendix 3 to
Annex O
6

armoured vehicles. At his time, a large storm broke and enemy helicopters14 and
artillery struck continuously at the positions of our 3rd Battalion and 445 Battalion. Our
deploying columns faced difficulties, and 445 Battalion and the 3rd Battalion suffered a
large number of casualties. At 5pm, the battlefield headquarters ordered the units to
evacuate their wounded to the rear and to prepare to withdraw to our concentration area
positions. After more than an hour of unyielding combat, our units had wiped out an
enemy company and set fire to two armoured vehicles.15 On our side, we suffered 32
cadre and soldiers killed, and 60 comrades wounded.16
This was the first time that we had conducted an ambush operation against the
Australian forces our top-notch ((sng s)) opponent on the Eastern Nam B battlefield.
Our cadre and soldiers displayed a tremendous effort in overcoming the bombs and fierce
artillery fire to attack and wipe out the enemy. The Regiment eliminated an Australian
company of a force that was recognised as the premier specialists in counter-guerilla
warfare, and regularly lauded as such.17 The Regiment gained considerable experience
from fighting against the Australian forces at the battle at Long Tn. It was an
engagement in which the enemy did not follow rules mechanically like the American
military. To get a firm grip on the enemy, we have to organise observation of the enemy
on many fronts in order to get a hold of them. Our ambush positions must be
appropriately sited with a strong reserve force ready to attack the enemy suddenly
assaulting from a flank. During the conduct of the battle, we need to attack constantly,
and engage in close combat in order to limit the effect of the enemys air and artillery
power. Our ambush battle against the Australian forces at Long Tn concluded the
Regiments Wet Season operations on the B Ra battlefield.18*
During August 1966, the Regiment was ordered to deploy and operate to the west
of Route 20 and coordinate with the Long Khanh District armed forces to oppose the

14

Translators Note: Neither Australian (RAAF) nor US helicopters provided fire support during the Long
Tn engagement. However, during the fighting, two RAAF UH-1B helicopters (A2-1020; A2-1022)
dropped ammunition to Delta Company/6RAR on the Long Tn battlefield. These UH-1B aircraft were not
gunships, but had door gunners manning M-60 GPMGs. see: McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., p.322.
15
In the Battle, 17 Australian personnel were killed and 24 wounded one later died of wounds. No
armoured vehicles were seriously damaged. McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., p.356.
16
Translators Note: The 5th Division History (2005) similarly relates at p.91: Our forces suffered heavy
casualties 32 killed and 60 wounded. For a discussion of casualties, see Annex F.
17
Translators Note: The 5th Division History (2005) includes at p.91: Nevertheless, the battle against the
Australians at Long Tn had great importance and significance. It was the first time that we had wiped out
an Australian company on the battlefield a force that was regarded as the foremost and well-trained of all
the counter-guerilla warfare specialists, and was regularly lauded as such by the enemy. See a similar
statement at Annex K, p.13.
18
* To memorialize the Australian losses on 18 August, the Australians erected a cross at Ni t [sic]
inscribed with the names of their soldiers killed in the battle. After the South had been completely liberated,
Australian veterans returned to B Ra and asked to take the cross back to their country. Translators Note:
The wording on the Cross is: In Memory of those members of D Coy 6 RAR and 3 Tp 1 APC Sqn who
gave their lives near this spot during the Battle of Long Tan on 18th August 1966. Erected by 6 RAR/NZ
(ANZAC) Bn 18 Aug 69". For further detail on the Cross, see Annex O, p.41.

Appendix 3 to
Annex O
7

enemys sweeping operations in the areas of La Ng, Ph Cng, Phng Lm, and Bn
Nm.
At the end of 1966, the Regiments political commissar Nguyn Vn Cc,
moved to new responsibilities; Comrade Hunh Thn became the political commissar;
and Comrade Tam Phi was appointed as the Regiments commander.
The Regiments Outstanding Achievements p.402.
On 18 August 1966, the Regiment implemented its operational method of
attacking a base and destroying relief forces19 by drawing Australian forces out from
their base to destroy them. After an hour of combat, the Regiment had inflicted heavy
casualties on an Australian company and set fire to two armoured vehicles at Long Tn
Ni t.

A 275th Regiment mortar team firing on the 9th Task Force (ARVN)
at Lc Ninh April 1972

19

cng n, vin.

Appendix 3 to
Annex O
8

275th Regiment: Organisation Diagram 20 February 1969

20

Note that the organogram above does not appear in the 275 th (5th) Regiment History (2015). The
organogram was produced following the debrief of the NVA POW Captain Trn Vn Ting in late February
1969.

List of Martyrs Killed at Long Tn 18.8.66

(G Cat Cemetery List February 2016)
Nguyn Vn Kt

Thanh Ha

L Quang Mao

Thanh Ha

L Minh Nhng

Thanh Ha

V Tn Ti

Thanh Ha

L Vit Thng

Thanh Ha

V Vn Thnh

Ngh An

Nguyn Vn Bch

Qung Bnh

Phm Vn T

Qung Bnh

H Vn Ginh

Si Gn

L Vn Dn

Si Gn

Hunh Vn Khanh

Si Gn

Trng Vn Khi

Si Gn

L Kh

Si Gn

Xun Lc

Si Gn

Nguyn Vn Ti

Si Gn

Phm Vn Chi

Sng B

Hunh Vn Danh

Sng B

o Xun X (o X) Sng B
Trn Bnh Minh

Ty Ninh

Hunh Vn By

Bn Tre

Nguyn Vn n

Bn Tre

Nguyn Vn o

Bn Tre

Nguyn Vn Phng Bn Tre

Minh Th

Bn Tre

on Vn Toan

Bn Tre

Phm Vn Tng

Sc Trng

Nguyn Vn Cho

M Tho

Nguyn Vn m

M Tho

Lm Vn B

Tr Vinh

Nguyn Hng Ng

Tr Vinh

Ha Minh Li

Rch Gia

Nguyn Vn Giu

Cn Th.

L Vn Tn

C Mau

L Minh Chanh

B Ra-Vng Tu

Nguyn Vn Hng Sng B

Nguyn Vn Nhn

Appendix 4

Sng B

In 1966, Sng B was comprised of Bnh

Dng and Bnh Phc provinces.

List of Martyrs Killed at Long Tn 18.8.66

(G Cat Cemetery List February 2016)

Readers Notes and Comments

Appendix 4

Annex P
D440 LOCAL FORCE BATTALION 1
According to the 1991 D445 Battalion History, at the beginning of 1964, 440
Company 2 came into being. This Company was commanded by Comrade Nm nh,
with Comrade Nm Ninh as its political officer. 445 Company transferred a number of
cadre and soldiers to 440 Company to build its nucleus. 440 Company fought at Bnh
Gi and t in December 1964 and January 1965 - before being incorporated into 445
Battalion at the Battalions formal formation in May 1965. However, that 440
Company is not related to the subsequently-formed 440 Battalion. D440 Battalion did
not arrive in Phc Tuy Province until mid-late1967. However, some Australian accounts
have erroneously contended that D440 participated in the Battle of Long Tn on 18
August 1966.3
The 2011 D440 History relates that its predecessor: Group 211 was an element
within the structure of the 9th Regiment of the 304th Division and a reinforcement for the
battlefield in the South. The Group comprised: two battalions of infantry and a number of
subordinate sub-units such as: the 16th Company (recoilless rifle RCL), the 21st
Company (12.7mm heavy machine-gun), a communications platoon (from the 18th
Communications Company), the 17th Company (82mm mortar), the 19th Company
(engineers), the 22nd Company (sapper- reconnaissance), and a medical platoon. In
February 1967, the unit held a pre-deployment ceremony in Nh Xun District (Thanh
Ha). After travelling for more than five months and carrying heavy packs through
extraordinary willpower and firmness of purpose, the majestic Annamite Chain was
crossed with its many deep streams, high passes and abysses. (p.33).4
In November 1967, 1 ATF at Ni t reported that on 22 May 1967 the B Bin
Provincial Committee had ordered 41 cadre from 445 Battalion and other local Vit Cng
1

A discrete history of D440 Battalion was published in 2011 as: ng y B Ch Huy Qun S Tnh B
Ra-Vng Tu (The Party Committee of the Military Headquarters of B Ra-Vng Tu Province), Lch S
Tiu on 440 Anh Hng - B Ra-Long Khnh 1967-1979 (The History of the Heroic 440 Battalion - B
Ra-Long Khnh 1967-1979), Nh Xut bn Chnh tr Quc gia - S Tht (National Political Publishing
House - The Truth), Hanoi, 2011. For an English translation/exegesis/commentary, see Chamberlain, E.P.,
The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story (and the Battle of Long Tan), Point Lonsdale, 2013. In January
2015, a summary history of D440 (eight pages) appeared on the Internet in three parts ie: L M Lng
Major General, T Thi Bnh n B Ra - Long Khnh (From Thi Bnh to B Ra - Long Khnh
Parts 1 and 2), Qun i Nhn dn Online, 18, 19 January 2015. That summary notes that the Battalion was
900-strong on 10 July 1967, and was formally retitled D440 on 16 August 1967.
2
Note that the principal predecessors of the VC D445 Battalion ie until mid-1965, were the 440 and 445
Companies. In 1966-1967, a 60-strong 440 Company was also noted operating in coastal Bnh Thun
Province CDEC Report 6-075-0662-67.
3
The enemy force comprised: North Vietnamese battalion reinforcing two battalions of 275 VC Main
Force Regiment. These plus D445 and D400 [sic] made around 3,000 enemy troops. - Smith, H. A.
Lieutenant Colonel (Retd) SG, MC, No Time for Fear, Wartime Issue 35, Australian War Memorial,
Canberra, 2006. Lieutenant Colonel Smith also earlier contended that D440, D445, and 860 Battalion
were elements of the enemy force at the Battle. - Grandin, R., The Battle of Long Tan , op.cit., 2004,
p.85. The D440 error - and an NVA 806 [sic] Battalion, appear in the Harry Smith (Australian Soldier)
item in Wikipedia.
4
At a commemoration service in Long Khnh in 2010, it was related that 440 Battalion was part of 9(B)
Regiment of 304 Division more than 700 cadre and soldiers bravely sacrificed themselves in the fighting
in the B Ra-Long Khnh region. The ng Nai Monograph (2001) records that on 20 December 1967,
the COSVN Military Committee reinforced B Ra-Long Khnh with 440 Battalion. This Battalion was
created by Thi Bnh to strengthen the battlefield in the South. The Province tasked 440 Battalion to operate
in Long Khnh. The 203rd Regional Company of Long Khnh created an element that became K.9
((Company)) and was incorporated into 440 Battalion and the Battalion was called the 2nd Battalion
Long Khnh. - a Ch ng Nai (ng Nai Monograph), Nh Xut Bn Tng Hp ng Nai, Bin Ha,
2001. D2 or Second Battalion was a commonly-used cover designator for 440 Battalion.

P-2
units to assembly in Chu c District on 10 June 1967 for the formation of 440
Battalion and its first political officer was Nguyn Hu Thi, and its first assistant
political officer was Trn Vn Khi.5 On 5 November 1967, 1 ATF assessed the strength
of 440 Battalion as the Bc Ninh Battalion, as 400.6 The unit personnel were 75%
NVA, and 440 Battalion was based on the Bc Ninh/Kt Ngha Battalion and initially
located north-east of Xun Lc Town7 (see the map of Long Khnh and Bnh Tuy
Provinces at page 14).
The 1991 and 2004 D445 Battalion Histories relate that in 1968: the ((445))
Battalion passed a number of core cadre to a battalion of Northern recruits that had just
been allocated to the Province with the title of 440 Battalion (also called the 2nd
Battalion).
According to the Australian Official History, 440 Battalion was created by
COSVN in 1968 and - commanded by Comrade Ha Tinh consisted of mainly North
Vietnamese Army personnel and generally operated in Long Khnh Province.8 The
ng Nai History (1986) also notes a Hai Linh as the 440 Battalion commander.9 440
Battalion was accepted on the MACV Order of Battle holdings in May 1968 as D440
NVA Infantry Battalion with a strength of 265 plus.10
The 2011 D440 History ie a primary source, relates: On 10 July 1967, the
whole unit deployed to a position at the Sui Rt stream base (Tm Bung, Sui Nho
village, nh Qun District). After a month of rest, recuperation and restoring the health
of the troops, on 16 August, the Province Committee and the Province Unit strengthened
Group 211s structure by incorporating into the Battalion: a platoon from the B RaLong Khnh 445 Battalion; a platoon from the Bin Ha City Unit; and the 9th Company
of the Long Khnh District forces.11 A number of our Battalions cadre and soldiers with
good specialist skills were added to 445 Battalion, to the Districts, and to a number of
Province agencies such as finance and economy, rear services, and reconnaissance etc.
the personnel strength of the Battalion was 900 comrades; comprising the Battalion
Headquarters, four companies (three infantry companies: 5, 6, and 9; and the 8th Fire
Support Company) and the combat support platoons. Comrade Lng Vn [sic] Tnh
(Hai Tnh) was the Battalion Commander. Additionally, the Province Committee
decided to change the units title to 440 Battalion. This retitling reportedly occurred
formally on 16 August 1967.
At the 1968 Tt Mu Thn Offensive, according to the 2011 D440 History: In
accord with the plan, our attacking columns covertly advanced close to their targets ((in
Xun Lc Town)). At exactly H-hour (2400hrs) on 30 January 1968 (the second day of
Tt), our troops simultaneously opened fire and attacked. The 9th Infantry Company
attacked the offices of the Province Chief and the 33rd Tactical Sub-Zone. The 5th Infantry
Company attacked the offices of the village council and deployed to pursue the enemy in
the Red Cross Street area. The 8th Fire Support Company shelled the Hong Diu post,
the Long Khnh tactical airfield, and the headquarters of the puppet 18th Infantry
Division. A local history notes, that on 2 February 1968 as an element of the Tt Mu
5

1 ATF, Troops Information Sheet No.69, Ni t, 5-11 November 1967. The units Letter Box Number
(LBN) was reportedly 61140VT.
Annex A to 1 ATF Intelligence Review No.14, Ni t, 5 November 1967.
7
1 ATF, Intelligence Review No.15, Ni t, 2 December 1967.
8
McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.48.
9
Phan Ngc Danh ..., ng Nai 30 Nm , op.cit., 1986, p.142.
10
MACV Order of Battle, 1-31 May 1968, p.6, p.13 VCAT Item No.2500110005.
11
According to the Xun Lc District History (1985), 440 Battalion was formed at the end of 1967, and the
Districts 203 Long Khnh Local Company provided troops for the Battalions K9 Company under
Comrade Hng [sic] Tm.
6

P-3
Thn Offensive, 440 Battalion and the K8 District Unit attacked Xun Lc City.12
According to a US Tt 1968 After Action Report, 440 Battalion attacked Xuan Loc for
two days in succession but never held any section of the city.13 The 2011 D440 History
account which includes a sketch map of the battle, states: The enemy forces launched
frenzied counter-attacks. The US 11th Armored Regiment that hurriedly deployed from
its Sui Rm base to relieve Long Khnh, was blocked and attacked by our troops, and
many tanks and armoured vehicles were set alight. According to technical sources ((ie
NVA/VC SIGINT)) in the first wave of the General Offensive and General Uprising on
the Long Khnh Town Front, more than 100 enemy were wiped out. Three artillery bases
were destroyed, and 12 tanks and armoured vehicles were set on fire. At 5am on 3
February 1968, the Battalions attacking columns were ordered to withdraw from the
Town, return to our rear areas, consolidate our forces, and await orders from above.
Following this battle, the Military Region commended the Company with the title of
Steel Belt Unit, and many comrades were awarded the Military Exploits Medal III
Class.14
In April 1968, captured documents identified the senior cadre of 440 Battalion as
Lng Th Tnh - Commander, and Nguyen Hu Thi as its Political Officer.15 In January
1969, Phan Thanh H was noted as the units commander.16 According to captured Vit
Cng documents, in 1968-1969 the strength of 440 Battalion was 182 - with its
companies numbered from K5 to K10 inclusive.17 The 2011 D440 History relates an
attack on Cm M on 5 May 1968 in coordination with D445 Battalion (with a sketch
12

Trn Ton, Th Trn Xun Lc: Nhng Chng ng u Tranh Cch Mng V Vang (The Battle of
Xun Lc: Stages on the Road of Struggle to a Brilliant Victory), Nh Xut Bn ng Nai, Bin Ha,
1984,p.49. This included a town map of Xun Lc at p.76 with attack-lines marked.
13
Detailed US reporting on the Tt Mu Thn (1968) attacks on the Long Khnh Province capital - ie Xun
Lc Town, can be found in Annex I (III Corps Advisory Group) to Weyand, F.C. Lieutenant General,
Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACJ3-32) (K1) - Tet Offensive After Action Report (31 January 18 February 1968), Saigon, 1968 VCAT Item No.
13680112021. According to the analysis in the US MAC-V After Action Report (see above), the pre-Tt
Offensive strength of D445 Battalion was 300, and the post-Offensive strength was 225 - with the Battalion
assessed as only Marginally Combat Effective. For D440 Battalion, the strength estimates were 300 preOffensive and 250 post-Offensive see VC Order of Battle, Appendix I to Annex A, p.A-1-4 - VCAT Item
No. 13680112004.
14
On 16 February and 29 August 1968, 440 Battalions political officer Nguyn Hu Thi, submitted
award recommendations for Battalion elements and individual personnel for combat actions in Long Khnh
in the first half of February 1968 - Nguyn Hu Thi, Award Recommendation (to B Bin Province), 16
February 1968 - comprising Third Class Liberation Military Exploit Medals (two for Battalion elements,
one for an assistant squad leader); Certificates of Commendation (five for Battalion elements and 32 for
individual personnel); and Letters of Appreciation (95 for personnel) of the 5 th, 6th, 8th and 9th Companies.
These awards covered: an attack on Long Khnh City on 1 February 1968 and a raid on Bnh Lc S
hamlet on 2 February 1968; the attack on Gia Rai/Ray Sub-Sector on 14 February 1968 and two
attacks by fire on the Hong Diu area and Long Khnh Town. Almost all the recommended awards were
for junior personnel, except for Certificates of Commendation for: Nguyn Vn B Commander 5th
Company; Trng Quang Ng Political Officer 5th Company; Trng Vn Ni Commander 6th
Company; Nguyn Dng Executive Officer 6th Company; L Van Kim Commander 8th Company
CDEC Log 06-2911-70.
15
CDEC Log 04-1530-69. Lng Th Tnh was noted earlier on the staff of 445 Battalion in March 1967
in relation to finance issues see CDEC Log 05-3474-67.
16
Phan Thanh H was noted in the 2011 D440 History as the Battalion chief-of-staff during attack on Xun
Lc Town at the end of January 1968. However, this January 1969 report may be an error as Phan Thanh
H was identified as the units chief of staff in mid-May 1970 CDEC Log 05-1077-77. However, see also
footnote 35. Phan Thanh H was reportedly replaced as the 440 Battalion Commander by Hng Tam Nam
(aged 32) - Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No. 51-70, Ni t, 23 February 1970; Appendix 2 to Annex A to
1ATF INTSUM No. 56-70, Ni t, 26 February 1970.
17
CDEC Log 10-1891-69.

P-4
map of the battle): Our troops launched an assault and seized a tank as war booty (but as
there was no one to drive it, the enemy re-took it during a counter-attack). In this battle,
440 Battalion lost 28 comrades killed including Comrade Thu (the deputy commander
of the 6th Company), Comrade Lm Bu (the commander of the 6th Company) and
Comrade Kin and many other comrades were wounded.
On 26 August 1968, a further recommendation was submitted for awards to cover
440 Battalions attack on Gia Ray Sub-Sector on 14 August 1968 and the shellings of
Long Khnh Town and the Hong Diu area that reportedly killed 303 enemy troops
and wounded 65.18
In mid-March 1969, 440 Battalion was involved in engagements at Ha Long and
Bnh Ba villages - and Hai Thi (presumably Nguyen Hu Thi) was identified as its
political officer - with Hai Ngo as the assistant political officer and Hai Hiu as the units
adjutant.19 In April 1969, a rallier reported that 440 Battalions strength was 307
members in good physical condition and 48 sick and wounded.20
Although not specifically mentioned in the 1991 D445 Battalion History, a
captured report related an attack by D445 Battalion on t Town on 14-15 May 1969
by all four companies and with elements of 440 Battalion. The attack reportedly
resulted in six of the attackers killed and 31 wounded. The 445 Battalion report by its
political officer, claimed to have put out of action 107 enemy, seized five weapons and
captured a PW.21
In May 1969, D440 Battalion was ordered to Xuyn Mc District to cut Route 23
and isolate the Sub-District. However, as part of a High Point Campaign, it received an
order to return to the north-west and attack Bnh Ba village on Route 2. The 2011 D440
History relates that: On the afternoon that the Battalion was preparing to return, the
Battalion received news that Province senior cadre (including Comrade Hai H) the
Province deputy chief-of-staff, and Comrades T Lc and Hai Bnh who were both
deputy commanders of the Province Unit) - and a reconnaissance section that the
Battalion had sent as escort, had been ambushed by the Australian military22 in the area of
18

Nguyen Hu Thi, Recommendation, 29 August 1968 - comprising one medal and four Certificates of
Commendation for Battalion elements; 28 Certificates of Commendation for individual personnel; and 53
Letters of Appreciation for individual personnel CDEC Log 06-2911-70.
19
CDEC Log 07-1354-69.
20
Appendix II to Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No. 84/70, Ni t, 25 March 1970.
21
CDEC Log 07-2146-69.
22
At 8.30pm on 29 May 1969, 1 ATF elements including M113A1 APCs (2/B/3 Cavalry Regiment),
ambushed a large Vit Cng group estimated at 50-strong, moving northward on Route 328 near the
southern entrance to the abandoned Tha Tch village (YS 6180 referred to by communist elements as
Bu Lm), killing 11. Six AK47s, an RPG-2, 14 heavy packs, and a quantity of medical and surgical
equipment were recovered. Fire support to the Australian forces included an AC-47 Spooky gunship.
Captured documents indicated the Vit Cng group included elements from B Long Province, D440 and
D445. 1ATF, INTSUM No.150-69, Ni t, 30 May 1969. Photographs of the ambush aftermath are in
the Australian War Memorial (AWM) collection - including AWM BEL/69/0378/VN, BEL/69/0364/VN.
The official account of the Australian ambush at Tha Tch/Bu Lm is in Ekins, A. with McNeill, I.,
Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.145-152. Other accounts include: Anderson, P., When the Scorpion
Stings: The history of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment - South Vietnam 1965-1972, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest,
2002, pp.165-168; Walker, F., Ghost Platoon, Hachette Australia, Sydney, 2011, pp.1-70 including a
sketch map; and Bigwood, R. & A., We Were REOS, Xlibris Corporation, 2011. Recovered Vit Cng
documents included a Letter of Appreciation for Vn Minh a D440 Battalion section commander,
signed by the Province deputy political officer Nguyn Thanh Cn. Appendix 1 to the 2011 D440
Battalion History includes a photograph of the Memorial Stela Martyrs Sacrificed at the Stone Gates of
Bu Lm Village - 1969 that lists fourteen 440 Battalion personnel killed in that action . However, on the
Memorial Stela, the dates of their deaths at Bu Lm included 15-2-69 (three); 16-2-69 (three
including Ba Kim, the Battalions second-in-command); 15-12-69 (three); 1969 (one); and undated

P-5
the entrance to Bu Lm village.23 D440 despatched a small relief force, but: We were
unable to recover the bodies and, moreover, another three of our comrades were killed
including Comrade Ba Kim. In this battle, the Battalion lost nine comrades killed
(including one battalion-level cadre), while the remainder were senior cadre. These were
heavy losses, and very regrettable.24
The 2011 D440 History relates departing the Xuyn Mc area and: On 3 June
1969, the Battalion deployed from east of Route 2 (the Bu Chinh area) in order to
prepare for the combined attack with the 33rd Regiment on the Bnh Ba strategic hamlet.
At dawn on 4 June, when we were about to set up the camp and finish consolidating our
living areas, an Australian commando company entered our base area.25 Consequently, in
relation to the Bnh Ba battle, even before a shot had been fired, the Battalion was in an
adverse situation. And, for this reason, the Campaign Headquarters26 adjusted the plans
(four). The dates on the Stela are in error. 1 ATF was to observe a 24-hour ceasefire for the Buddhas
Birthday on 30 May 1969 - ie 300600H to 310600H, a temporary cessation of offensive operations - see 1
ATF, Instruction R569-1-2, OPS 874, 270600Z May 1969.
23
Bu Lm (Lm Pond) was originally a hamlet of Tha Tch village (YS 614798-614804 on Route 328,
about 23km by road or 13km directly north-west of Xuyn Mc District Town) and was the preferred Vit
Cng title for the Tha Tch area.
24
From the 2011 D440 Battalion History. Subsequently, on the afternoon of 30 May 1969, at YS 612725,
an estimated 17 Vit Cng attempted to ambush the Australian force moving south from the Tha Tch area
to Xuyn Mc Town. Five Vit Cng were killed, and one RPG-2 and one RPG-7 were recovered 1ATF,
INTSUM No.150-69, Ni t, 30 May 1969, see also AWM photograph BEL/69/0354/VN. As noted
above, the engagements are also related in detail in Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit,
2012, pp.145-152 but without detail on the involvement of D440 Battalion elements. Ba Kims death is
recorded in the 440 Battalion Martyrs List annexed to the 2011 D440 Battalion History (ie at Serial 533
b. Hi Dng Province, Battalion deputy commander, killed on 16 February 1969). Surprisingly, the late
September 1969 10-page report by 1 ATF on 440 Battalion did not include the Tha Tch/Bu Lm
engagements of 29 and 30 May 1969 in its Short History of D440 1969 ie: a short chronological
resume of D440 LF Bns operations and movements from Feb-Sep 69. Annex A to de Cure, P.F. Major,
D440 LF Battalion, HQ 1 ATF, Ni t, 29 September 1969. While citing 11 enemy killed in the ambush
at Tha Tch on 29 May 1969, Headquarters II Field Force Vietnam reported that an ambush on 30 May
resulted in ten enemy killed - II Field Force Vietnam, Operational Report Lessons Learned, Period
ending 31 July 1969, 17 December 1969.
25
1 ATFs 6RAR/NZ (Operation Lavarack) engaged several groups of enemy east of Route 2 and west and
north-west of X Bang village (ie in the vicinity of D440s Tre Base Area vicinity YS 4285) in the period
31 May-5 June 1969 resulting in 10 enemy killed see 6RAR/NZ War Diary and After Action Reports,
AWM95, 7/6/21-22. However, no engagement accurately matches the description of the 4 June dawn
engagement related in the 2011 D440 History above in terms of exact timing and location. On 4 June,
A/6RAR attacked an enemy camp and bunker system at YS 392776 and forced the withdrawal of the
enemy force presumed to be elements of the C-41 Chu c District Company (but positive
identification was not made). According to the diary of Nguyn Hong Mai the commander of C-41
Company, there was a battle when Australian troops attacked the units base camp on 4 and 5 June 1969 resulting in one C-41 soldier killed and one wounded, and in which six Australian enemy were killed. Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.241-69, Ni t, 29 August 1969. On 5 June at 0005hrs, 3/V/6RAR/NZ
killed three Vit Cng soldiers at YS 442888. 3/W/6RAR/NZ discovered a company position and bunker
system - and subsequently a staging area, and engaged an enemy platoon at 1030hrs on 5 June at YS
424844 (including with artillery and Australian and US helicopter Light Fire Team support) ie in the
vicinity of the Tre Base Area. An airstrike on the afternoon of 5 June struck an enemy base camp at that
location (YS 424844 Slope 30) 1 ATF, INTSUM No.156-69, Ni t, 5 June 1969; and SITREP, 6
June 1969. However, the 6RAR/NZ After Action Report and a senior regimental historian have stated the
enemy force engaged in that area on 5 June was the 1 st Battalion of the 33rd NVA Regiment see Johnson,
L. D., Operation Lavarack - Phuoc Tuy Province, Vietnam, 1969, Australian Army Journal, Vol VII, No.2,
Winter 2010, pp.94-95. Recovered documents indicated rear service elements of the 33rd Regiment at YS
424844 1 ATF, INTSUM No.158/69, Ni t, 7 June 1969.
26
A Campaign Headquarters is also mentioned in 33 rd NVA Regiment accounts, including directing the
33rd Regiment to assume the major occupation task at Bnh Ba - see Bo Tng Tnh - B Ra-Vng Tu, L
Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim (The Background History of the Memorial Area ), op.cit., 2011.

P-6
for the force to attack Bnh Ba. This now involved an element of the 1st Battalion of the
33rd Regiment led by Battalion commander Comrade Triu Kim Sn being given the
task of attacking the post replacing 440 Battalion.27 At dawn on 5 June 1969, our
Battalion cut through the jungle to its assembly area in the Bnh Ba area - taking the place
of the 1st Battalion, for 440 Battalion to fight in a relief force blocking position on Route
2 (in an area adjacent to Bnh Ba) together with the 2nd Battalion28 led by Comrade
Quch Thi Sn.
An Australian unit history relates that the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 33rd
Regiment of the 5th Division - supported by elements of D440 Battalion, were engaged by
battalions of 1 ATF in the Bnh Ba area (Phc Tuy Province) in the period 5-11 June
1969.29 According to an Australian analysis, the communist forces lost 60 killed and
many more wounded at Bnh Ba and when D440 personnel returned to the village a
week later to propagandize and boast of their successes against the Regional Forces and
the Australians, the local people looked on them with ridicule and laughed them out of
town.30
During the Battle of Bnh Ba, the 1st Battalion of the NVA 33rd Regiment suffered
heavy casualties and the 2011 D440 History relates: With the difficult situation faced
by our fraternal unit and as ordered by the Campaign Headquarters, the Battalion
Headquarters deployed a recoilless rifle platoon and part of an infantry company to break
through the enemy blockade from the direction of Bnh Ba Xang hamlet. However, this
force was itself decisively attacked by Australian tanks right from the edge of the hamlet,
and many of our troops were wounded. Our combat troops were brave and set fire to a
While the Campaign Headquarters is not specifically named, it was probably an element of Headquarters
Military Region 7 (but is not mentioned in the Military Region 7 History). A listing of the 39 NVA/VC
Campaigns in the South does not include a discrete Bnh Ba Campaign but does include a Long
Khnh Campaign: 5 May 20 June 1969 involving the 5th VC Division. - B Quc phng - Vin Lch s
Qun s Vit Nam (Vietnam Military History Institute Department of Defence), Tm tt cc chin dch
trong khng chin chng M cu nc (Summary of the Campaigns in the Anti-American War of National
Salvation 1954 - 1975), NXB QND (Peoples Army Publishing House), H Ni, 2003; also published in
English in 2009 as Phm Vnh Phc (ed), Operations in the US Resistance War, Th Gii Publishers, H
Ni, 2009.
27
The 33rd NVA Regiment accounts corroborate this exchange of tasks including that: 440 Battalion was
struck by an enemy sweeping operation into their base area. Consequently, the 33rd Regiments 1st
Battalion replaced them in that urgent situation. - Qu Trnh Hnh Thnh Trung on 33, op.cit., 2010;
Cu Chin Binh Trung on 33, Tm Tt Trung on 33 (Summary History), op.cit., July 2010; and
Bo Tng Tnh - B Ra-Vng Tu, L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim (The Background History of the
Memorial Area ), op.cit., 2011.
28
The involvement of the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment (2/33rd) on the Bnh Ba battlefield is also
related in an Australian military history article ie: the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 33rd Regiment of the 5th
Division together with the local force D440 Battalion, were engaged by battalions of the Australian Task
Force in the Bnh Ba area (Phc Tuy Province) in the period 5-11 June 1969 - Johnson, L., Operation
Lavarack, Winter 2010, op.cit., pp.89-114. The involvement of 2/33rd commanded by Quch Thi Sn is
also related in a 33rd NVA Regiment account - Bo Tng Tnh - B Ra-Vng Tu, L Lch Di Tch Khu
Tng Nim (The Background History of the Memorial Area ), op.cit., 2011, p.9. See also:
Chamberlain, E.P. The 33rd Regiment North Vietnamese Army: Their Story (and the Battle of Bnh Ba),
Point Lonsdale, 2014.
29
Johnson, L., Operation Lavarack,Winter 2010, op.cit., pp.89-114. The heavy weapons company, D440
LF Battalion was attached to C2 heavy weapons company of 33 NVA Regiment for the occupation of Xa
Binh Ba according to the captured 440 Battalion platoon commander, L Vn Khanh [sic] - p.112 (endnote
55) ie reporting the initial interrogation report of L Vn Nhanh, Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.
198/69, Ni t, 17 July 1969.
30
Director of Military Training, Background Paper to the Viet Cong Military Region 7, Training
Information Letter 14/70 (Notice 4), Canberra, November 1970, pp.4-16, paragraph 21. As noted above,
for the involvement of the 33rd NVA Regiment at Bnh Ba in early June 1969, see Chamberlain, E.P., The
33rd Regiment Their Story, op.cit., 2014 (free-to-read on the Internet).

P-7
M.118 [sic] tank, but were unable to break through the blocking position or defeat the
enemys frenzied counter-attack. Next, in the face of indications that the enemy could
sweep the battlefield clean, we took the initiative to withdraw. With a breaking of the
enemy blockade unsuccessful, there was no time to collect weapons - and the enemy
seized one of our two 75mm recoilless rifles31, one of the Battalions principal fire
support weapons.32
In late 1969, 440 Battalion received a circular from the Rear Service Section of B
Ra- Long Khnh Province advising that the rice ration for combatants was to be 27
kilograms per month; for rear and training personnel 25 kilograms; and for staff
personnel - 23 kilograms.33 In October 1969, 1 ATF assessed the strength of 440
Battalion as 280 and operating east of Route 2 and south of the Courtenay plantation
area.34 Documents captured by 1 ATF indicated that in late October 1969, Phan Thanh H
(Hai H) was the 440 Battalion Commander and Phung Vn Y was the Assistant Political
Officer.35 In late 1969, a captured document tabled the status of 44 personnel of 440
Battalions 5th Company ie: 21 Party members and 23 Youth Group members.36
During this period, 440 Battalion had great difficulties in acquiring supplies - with
their History noting: This hunger situation occurred for many months from the Wet
Season of 1969 through into 1970 and became progressively more severe. Our troops
could only keep body and soul together by eating manioc roots, jack-fruit buds, green
bananas that they were able to collect in the fields, and bamboo shoots and jungle roots
etc - while throughout the day, they had to exert themselves resisting enemy sweeping
operations and continuously moving our bases. We were unable to replace our casualties
and accordingly our unit strength reduced daily. Each of our companies only comprised
two platoons with each platoon only having a little over 10 riflemen. Indicatively, the
1st Platoon of the 5th Company only had 10 comrades: Comrade iu (the platoon
commander); Comrades Khu, Khi, Sinh (the section commanders); and six soldiers:
Comrades Vn, Tut, Hi, Hng, Chanh and Bt. By the middle of 1971 [sic], this
platoon only had six comrades.

31

A 75mm RCL was captured by 5RAR in Bnh Ba village at about 8am on 7 June the only 75mm RCL
recovered during the Battle. 5RAR Ops Log Sheet No.1. Serial 18, 0802hrs - AWM95, 7/5/25. The RCL
is shown being examined in Bnh Ba by the 5RAR Intelligence Section and members of B Company in the
AWM photograph BEL/69/0396 VN - see Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., p.234,
but is mistitled as being examined by members of D Company 6RAR during Operation Lavarack.
32
A 440 Battalion platoon commander (L Vn Nhanh commander of the 8th Platoon, 8th Heavy Weapons
Company) rallied in mid-July 1969 and stated that 440 Battalion had fought at Bnh Ba on 5-6 June 1969
together with the 33rd NVA Regiment, and that 440 Battalion has suffered about 60 casualties including
the commander of C2 Company and two platoon commanders and lost a 75mm RCL. Nhanh reported:
C1, C2, C3, C4, C5 rifle companies have strengths of approximately 70; C6 and C7 labourer
companies have strengths each of approximately 30; and C8 heavy weapons company: 28. Total Battalion
strength as at 13 July 1969 was 417. The C8 heavy weapons company was equipped with one 82mm
mortar and four 60mm mortars. The total strength of the two labour companies was about 70. Most of who
were women forced to join the VC. The Battalion was about 2/3 NVA - 1ATF, INTSUM No.198/69,
Ni t, 17 July 1969. Note that as L Vn Khanh, Nhanh is incorrectly identified as a member of the
33rd Regiment in Johnson, L., Operation Lavarack , op.cit., 2010, p.107, endnotes 55, 56.
33
B Thai, Rear Service Section, B Ra-Long Khnh Province, 5 October 1969 CDEC Log 06-2911-70.
34
Annex A to 1 ATF SUPINTREP No.2/69, Ni t, 6 October 1969.
35
1 ATF, INTSUM No. 338/69, Ni t, 4 December 1969. Phan Thanh H was reportedly replaced as the
440 Battalion Commander by Hng Tam Nam (aged 32) - Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.51-70, Ni t,
23 February 1970; Appendix 2 to Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.56-70, Ni t, 26 February 1970.
36
List of Party and Group Members in K5 CDEC Log 06-2911-70.

P-8
According to the 1991 D445 History: In June 1970, 440 Battalion underwent
changes in its organisation and establishment the Battalion only had three companies.37
The reason was that the Province Unit had re-deployed the 8th Company (K8 was the fire
support company) to be directly subordinate to the Province Unit leadership.38
According to a rallier, in January 1970, T Tin moved from the Long t District Unit
and joined 440 Battalion as its 2ic - and Hai Thi was the Political Officer, and Mi Sinh
37

According to the Australian official history, in mid-1970, D440 and D445 Battalions were each reduced
to an estimated strength of 150 soldiers. - Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012,
p.428. A captured B Ra-Long Khnh Province security report dated 20 May 1970 noted that D440 and
D445 had not submitted recent reports on activities due to the fact that D445 had met with serious
difficulties and D440 had been dispersed to distant parts. Annex B to 1ATF INTSUM No.153/70, Ni
t, 2 June 1970. On 12 June 1970, five members of K9 Company of 440 Battalion attempted to enter
ng Cng hamlet (Ngi Giao village) to attack a hi chnh but encountered a mine and suffered one
wounded/captured (Trng Re of A1/B2/K9/D440). 1 ATF intelligence staff commented that this was the
first contact with D440 for over three months. Annex A to INTSUM No.163/70, Ni t, 12 June 1970.
At 0745hrs on 14 June 1970, 8/C/8RAR were fired on (by AKs, RPGs) from bunkers at YS 402799 by five
VC. In the engagement, one Australian was killed and three wounded; and one VC was killed. Documents
were recovered (CDEC Log 06-2911-70, see footnote 14) from the 34-bunker complex (K Base) that
indicated the presence of K5 and K9 of 440 Battalion 1 ATF, INTSUM No.165/70, Ni t, 14 June
1970. On 22 June 1970, H Minh Quyn a section commander of K9/440 Battalion was killed at YS
396778; presumably on returning to check the bunker complex. 1ATF, INTSUM No.173/70, Ni t, 22
June 1970.
38
According to a 440 Battalion PW - ng Vn Hi, captured on 13 October 1970, at the end of August
1970, the Battalion only comprised K5, K6 and K9 Companies with K8 having been withdrawn to
Province in November 1969. In late August 1970, a visiting B Long Province cadre advised that the
Battalion would be temporarily dispersed. The members of K5 who were not ill or wounded were to
reinforce the Cao Su District Unit; K6 was to return to Province; and K9 was to reinforce 445 Battalion.
440 Battalions strength was: K5-30, K6-50, K8-80, K9-50, HQ-40 = 250. The morale of 440 Battalion
was reportedly very low - due to constant movement, heavy casualties, and being sent to smaller units as
reinforcements. The 1 ATF intelligence staff noted that their estimate of 440 Battalions strength was
approximately 190. Annex A to 1ATF INTSUM No.287/70, Ni t, 14 October 1970. On 9 December
1970, a former K8 Company junior cadre - while serving with D445 Battalion, was killed in an engagement
with Australian 7RAR elements in the Xuyn Mc area. 1 ATF, INTSUM No.343/70. Ni t, 9
December 1970. Subsequently, 1 ATF assessed that: It now appears a possibility that both the K8 Heavy
Weapons Company and K9 Company may have been subordinated to D445. However, further information
is required before any definite conclusions can be made. 1 ATF, SUPINTREP No.49/70, period 7 Dec
13 Dec 70, Ni t, 15 December 1970. A few weeks later, 1ATF assessed that, with the removal of the 3rd
Company personnel from 445 Battalion to form the C36 Company (B Ra-Long Khnh provincial
sapper/reconnaissance company) in September 1970, a new 3rd Company of 445 Battalion was created by
the integration of 440 Battalions K9 Company (all North Vietnamese) - together with some members of
other 440 Battalion companies, into 445 Battalion. Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.17/71, Ni t, 17
January 1971. A captured letter written by a former D440 cadre serving as the commander of the D445
signal platoon and written on 27 August 1971, related: In August 1970 when D2 ((D440)) was broken
up, we were re-assigned to D1 ((D445)) which also resulted in difficulties and loneliness. - Annex B to 1
ATF INTSUM No.250/71, Ni t, 7 September 1971. Some members of the signal platoon including
Northerners, had married local girls. While the unit had plenty of food, they still felt homesick since all
of them were natives of North Vietnam (letter dated 23 August 1971) Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM
No.253/71, Ni t, 10 September 1971. To enhance morale, the NVA/VC operated a complex postal and
courier system that included personal mail. Their field elements were allocated discrete Letter Box
Numbers (LBNs) that were regularly changed eg 440 Battalions LBNs included 61140/VT in 1966;
60l259/VT, B14 in 1969; and 61,202/VT. D13 in 1970 (CDEC Log 05-2772-70). The LBN 61195 VQ was
also used. The system included mail to North Vietnam. Promulgating COSVN Directive 09/CT, on 15 July
1966, the B Ra Provincial Units Command Committee directed regulations for the exchange of personal
letters between North and South Vietnam and within South Vietnam (signed by the Assistant Political
Officer, Nguyn Thanh Cn) - CDEC Log 09-1974-66; CDEC Log 08-1555-66. For a July 1966, MR 1
Directive on letters between North and South Vietnam, see CDEC Log 08-1555-66. All letters were subject
to censorship, and no more than one letter a month to close relatives and friends in North Vietnam was
allowed. For detailed regulations on the postal system, see also CDEC Log 01-1367-69.

P-9
was the Chief of Staff. That rallier also reported that 440 Battalion and 445 Battalion
were not willing to cooperate with each other because of personnel conflict between
SVN ((South Vietnamese-born)) and NVA ((North Vietnamese troops)).39
In August-September 1970, 440 Battalions K9 Company - and some elements of
its other companies, (reportedly all North Vietnamese) were integrated into 445
Battalions 3rd Company.40 At about the same time, 40 personnel from 440 Battalions K6
Company reportedly joined elements from 445 Battalion to form the B Ra-Long Khnh
provincial sapper/reconnaissance company C36 Company, under Hai B.41
According to the 2011 D440 History: In September 1971 [sic], the Sub-Region
Committee decided to disperse 440 and 445 Battalions42 (the concentrated units) back to
the local areas. As a result, the companies of 440 Battalion were deployed to operate in
Long Khnh, Xun Lc and nh Qun. The principal task of these units was to
strengthen attacks on the enemy, to expand and develop regions, and become pillars for
the development of the local revolutionary movements. Specifically, the 5th Company was
allocated to Cao Su District, the 8th Company (K8) to Xun Lc District, and the 9th
Company (K9)43 was allocated to 445 Battalion. The 6th Company was reformed as the
C36 Sapper Company44. On the allocation of cadre: Comrade Nguyn Hng Tm the
commander of 440 Battalion, became the commander of the Cao Su District Unit; and
Comrade o Cng Hiu the head of the 440 Battalion rear services committee, was
appointed as the deputy political officer of the District Unit. Comrade Nguyn Hu Thi
previously the Battalion political officer, had been re-allocated after the Battle of Bnh Ba
to become the political officer of the Xun Lc District Unit; Comrade Nguyn Hng
Chu the deputy commander of 440 Battalion, became a deputy commander of the
District Unit; and Comrade Trng Vn Ni the commander of 440 Battalions 6th
Company, became a deputy commander of the District Unit.
In early November 1970, information from POWs indicated to 1 ATF intelligence
staff that 440 Battalion had been disbanded and its personnel re-allocated to other units.45
The Australian Official History relates that 440 Battalion generally operated in Long
39

Appendix II to Annex A to 1 ATF, INTSUM No.84/70, Ni t, 25 March 1970.

The members of 445 Battalions 3rd Company reportedly became the core (50%) of Ba Ria-Long Khnhs
newly-raised C36 (Sapper/Reconnaissance Company). The new 3rd Company of 445 Battalion retained its
former company commander who was subsequently killed in action in the Xuyn Mc area on 17 March
1970. 1 ATF - Battle Intelligence Section, D445 Order of Battle, 6 May 1971.
41
Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.51/71, Ni t, 20 February 1971. Hai B - ie probably Nguyn Vn B,
a former commander of 445 Battalions 1st Company.
42
According to the 1991 D445 Battalion History (1991): 445 Battalion was temporarily divided-up in
order to reinforce the districts see Chamberlain, E.P. , D445 , op.cit., 1991, p.80. According to 1
ATF records, 445 Battalion had continued to operate as a mobile battalion until July 1971. 1 ATF first
became aware of the break-up of 445 Battalion from captured documents in early September 1971: a
captured Vit Cng document (dated 3 July 1971) related that 445 Battalions 2 nd Company, 3rd Company,
Surgical Platoon, Signals Platoon and Recce Platoon had been sent to reinforce the local forces of Long t
and Xuyn Mc Districts. For detail on the 1 ATF assessment of the De-Activation of D445, see Annex F
to 1 ATF INTSUM No.302/71, Ni t, 29 October 1971; and the comprehensive 70-page booklet:
Headquarters 1st Australian Task Force, Ba-Ria Sub Region, Vung Tau, 10 December 1971, pp.3-4 and p.7.
43
As noted earlier, 1 ATF believed that 440 Battalions 9th Company had been integrated into 445 Battalion
some time earlier ie: in September 1970 a new 3 rd Company of 445 Battalion was created by the
integration of 440 Battalions K9 Company (all North Vietnamese) - together with some members of other
440 Battalion companies, into 445 Battalion. Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.17/71, Ni t, 17 January
1971. 445 Battalions 3rd Company then 27-strong, reportedly retained its former company commander.
He was subsequently killed in action in the Xuyn Mc area on 17 March 1970. 1 ATF - Battle
Intelligence Section, D445 Order of Battle, Ni t, 6 May 1971.
44
The C36 Sapper Company had reportedly been created almost a year earlier see footnotes 38 and 40.
45
Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.309/70, Ni t, 5 November 1970.
40

P-10
Khnh Province performed poorly was eventually disbanded in August 1970, many
of its North Vietnamese soldiers being transferred to D445 Battalion46 while some
elements were regrouped into a number of specialist companies.47
On 29 November 1970, the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Companies of 445 Battalion reinforced
by K8 the heavy weapons company of 440 Battalion, attacked the Regional Forces
compound in Xuyn Mc Town.48
According the 2011 D440 History: Also in that ((1971)) Wet Season, K8 joined
with K9 and the 1st Company of 445 Battalion to wipe out an Australian company on an
ambush operation in Xuyn Mc District. Having first discovered the enemy, we used
two 12.8mm machine-guns to fire right into the middle of the enemy overpowering
them with the fire from two ammunition magazines. The enemy were still stunned when
K9 and the 1st Company attacked them from a flank and completely paralysed them. A
number were able to flee, but the remainder were wiped out. This engagement was a
complete success, and while withdrawing we were able to shoot down three Australian
helicopters that had arrived to extract the enemys dead.49
The 2011 D440 History relates that: Through 1969 and into 1970-1971, aware of
our difficulties50 on the battlefield, the enemy principally the American and Australian51
46

McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.48 and p.579 (endnote 251).
Headquarters 1st Australian Task Force, Ba-Ria Sub Region, Vung Tau, 10 December 1971, p.3.
OBrien, M., Conscripts and Regulars , op.cit., 1995, p.226.
49
No Australian infantry company was wiped out during the Vietnam War the heaviest Australian
casualties in one engagement occurred at the Battle of Long Tn on 18 August 1966 (18 killed, 24
wounded). However, the 440 Battalion account above may refer to attacks on bunker complexes in lateMarch 1971 by 3RAR and 2RAR/NZ elements during Operation Briar Patch about 9 kilometres north of
Xuyn Mc District Town (20 March) and seven kilometres north-west of Xuyn Mc District Town (31
March). During the engagement on 20 March 1971 against elements of 445 Battalion and the Xuyn Mc
guerrilla unit (Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM No.99/71, Ni t, 9 April 1971), a UH-1H Bushranger
helicopter (A2-383) was damaged by enemy fire while providing fire support. The helicopter recovered to
Fire Support Base Beth where the co-pilot died of wounds. He was reportedly the first RAAF member to be
killed in action in the field during the Vietnam War. On the following day, two RAAF UH-1H aircrew were
wounded by ground-fire during a resupply mission to 302 nd Regional Force Battalion elements at YS
463536. On 31 March 1971, companies of 3RAR and 2RAR/NZ attacked a bunker system on the western
edge of the Sng Ray River in the Tn R area (YS 584722) occupied by C2 and C3 Companies of 445
Battalion and elements of the K8 Heavy Weapons Company. A RAAF UH-1H helicopter supporting
2RAR/NZ was hit by ground-fire at YS 584722 (about 10 kilometres north-east of Xuyn Mc District
Town), and a door-gunner was wounded and later died. During Operation Briar Patch, Australian casualties
were four killed (including two RAAF personnel) and 11 wounded - while Vit Cng casualties were
reported as three killed and 10 possibly wounded/escaped. Four RAAF helicopters were hit by ground-fire
and two of these were forced to land. The enemy scored a psychological success by carrying away most of
their wounded often assisted by their practice of wearing rope ankle loops into action. - Ekins, A. with
McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit, 2012, pp.541-546, p.757; 1 ATF. INTSUM No.90/71, Ni t, 31
March 1971.
50
Homesickness among troops from North Vietnam was reported by 1 ATF - Annex B to 1 ATF
INTSUM No.253/71, 10 September 1971. Also, tensions and lack of cooperation between Southerners
and Northerners in units and between 445 and 440 Battalions, were reported by a rallier - Appendix II
to Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No.84/70, Ni t, 25 March 1970. More generally, an official communist
directive (Standing Committee B1 probably in Binh Duong Province) noted regrettable mistakes in the
treatment of northern troops who had dispara,gingly called doltish, clumsy, slow-moving, fun made of
their accent, and cited for lacking experience see: Discrimination against NVA troops in Vietnam by
southern communists, 20 December 1967, CDEC Log 06-1044-68. See also: North South Divisiveness in
the PAVN/PLAF April 1974 (within the 9th VC Division) VCAT Item No.2310513021, and Division in
Communist Ranks in 1974 VCAT Item No.2122902006.
51
The 1 ATF Headquarters (Main) moved to Vng Tu and opened at midday on 16 October 1971 see 1
ATF SITREP Ops 1821, 16 October 1971. The Australian flag at the 1 ATF Headquarters element in Ni
t was lowered on 7 November 1971. 1 ATF elements withdrew from Phc Tuy Province to Vng Tu,
and on 9 November 1971 ceased to be under the operational control of the US Third Regional Assistance
47
48

P-11
forces, increased their sweeping operations deep into our base regions with the aim of
wiping out our nerve-centre organisations - ie the Province Committee and the Province
Unit.
A 2010 press report related that at the end of 1971, 33 NVA Regiment seized the
c M (Sui Ngh Sub-Sector) with D440.52
However, D440 had ceased to operate as a battalion although its former
companies, particularly K8 remained active. A January 2015 summary history relates
that: On 15 September 1971, the Sub-Region issued an order with an historic implication
for D440 the dispersal of 440 Battalion. The companies became independent companies
and operated in the areas of Long Khnh, Xun Lc, and nh Qun. The 5th Company
returned to Cao Su District, the 8th Company went to Xun Lc, and the 6th Company
became the 26th Sapper Company. The D440 commander - Nguyn Hng Tm, became
the head of Cao Su District, and Nguyn Hu Thi was appointed as the political officer of
the Xun Lc District Unit.53
At the end of April 1975, the 2011 D440 History relates the Battalions reactivation: With the aim of taking control of the situation and firmly defending the
results of the Revolution, the B Ra-Long Khnh Province Committee and the Province
Unit decided to re-establish 440 Battalion. This force was comprised of personnel from
three of the local District companies: C34 and C41 from Chu c District; and C25
from Long t District.
The Battalion Headquarters comprised the following comrades: Nguyn Vn
Kho as the Battalion commander; Phan Thanh Bnh as the political officer; and Nguyn
Vn Tr as the Battalion deputy commander. The 1st Company was led by Comrade
Nguyn Vn Qu as the Company commander with Comrade Chu Ngc n as its
political officer. ((P. 165)): The 2nd Company was commanded by Lng Vn Cao as the
Company commander with Comrade on Minh Chu as the political officer. The 3rd
Company had Comrade Nguyn Vn Giu as its commander and Comrade Cng as the
political officer. The 4th Company was led by Comrade T as the Company commander
and Comrade Quang as its political officer.
Once established, the Battalion was stationed in B Ra Town with the task of
acting as a mobile force to suppress enemy elements that might rise up in opposition, and
to firmly defend the results of the Revolution and our not-yet-mature administration. At
the end of May 1975, after the military parade to celebrate our victory, 440 Battalion was
Command (TRAC) which had replaced the US II Field Force Vietnam (II FFV) on 2 May 1971.
Headquarters 1 ATF closed at Vng Tu on the afternoon of 29 February 1972 and the residual Australian
military training element (Australian Army Advisory Group Vietnam AAAGV) opened in Vn Kip on 6
March 1972. After the Australian Government formally declared a cessation of hostilities in January 1973,
the AAAGV returned to Australia. The Embassy guard platoon returned to Australia in July 1973.
According to the Australian official history, Australian Army casualties in Vietnam were 414 killed in
action and 2,348 wounded see McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, Appendix F,
"Statistics. The Australian Army History Unit website records that: Army casualties in Vietnam were 413
KIA/DoW; two MIA; 2,026 WIA; 64 non-battle deaths; and 999 other casualties. Note however, that the
last two Australian Defence Force MIA (RAAF aircrew officers Canberra bomber) were recovered in
mid-2009. An analysis of 1 ATF engagements (16 major battles and over 3,900 contacts) can be found in
Hall, R., 1st Australian Task Force A new operational analysis 1966-1971, Vietnam Center & Archives
Seventh Triennial Symposium, Session 5A, Lubbock Texas, 11 March 2011. VCAT Item No.999VI3155.
See also: Hall, R., Operation Wandering Souls, Wartime, Issue 55, Australian War Memorial, Canberra,
July 2011, pp.25-29.
52
L nh Thn, Trung on 33 mt thi ho hung (The 33rd Regiment an heroic time), B RaVng Tu ((magazine)), Vng Tu, 30 April 2010, p.18.
53
L M Lng Major General, T Thi Bnh n B Ra - Long Khnh (From Thi Bnh to B Ra Long Khnh), Qun i Nhn dn Online, 18 January 2015.

P-12
deployed to undertake the task of pursuing and driving away the enemy remnants in the
Long Khnh area, in the regions bordering the La Ng River-nh Qun, and in Bu
Hm-Trng Bom. Afterwards, the Battalion continued with its tasks of protecting the
National Assembly Election and the Party General Conference; participating in the
development of the socialist ideology; and training new recruits etc. Viewed overall, no
matter what tasks the Battalion was given, the tasks were always wholeheartedly
completed by the cadre and soldiers with outstanding results.
In the period 1975-1977, D440 Battalion operated against enemy remnants,
reactionaries and counter-revolutionary forces including: FULRO elements54 from
Bun Ma Thut that had spread down to Sng B; the C22 Special Guard part of the
Peoples Self-Determination Front organisation; and armed groups of the Special Task
Regiment of the Peoples Restoration Militia organisation.55
At the end of 1977, in response to attacks into Vietnamese territory by Cambodian
Pol Pot forces, the 2011 D440 History56 relates that: ng Nai Province formed two
mobile regiments, comprising: a regiment for inland action and a regiment to defend the
coastline. The regiment for coastal defence (the 5th Regiment57) that was engaged in
economic and national defence work in Vnh An, was moved down to Long Hi (Long
t) with the responsibility for protecting the coastline and opposing any seaborne
infiltration and landing. The inland regiment was stationed at H Nai 2 until August 1979
and then moved to B T (Xuyn Mc) with the title of the 746th Regiment. Its personnel
were from the 9th La Ng Regiment, 445 Battalion, and 440 Battalion.
Beginning in June 1978 [sic], the Province Unit deployed a well-armed battalion
for its task - titled the 1st ng Nai Battalion. The Battalions structure comprised three
companies with the 1st Company (of 445 Battalion) as its core, and the District-level
companies were reinforced with personnel from 440 Battalion and two combat support
platoons. ((P.185)): The Battalions total strength was 300. Subsequently, the Province
Unit created the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Battalions with structures and strengths equivalent to
those of the 1st ng Nai Battalion that, on rotation, were deployed to defend the
Fatherlands borders.58 At the end of 1979, 440 Battalion was deployed with the 5th
Regiment (coastal defence). At that time, there was a change in title for 440 Battalion,
and the Battalions tasks were also changed to conform with the situation. The great
majority of the cadre and soldiers in the unit had been demobilised in accord with Party
and State policy, and returned to their home regions of Thi Bnh, Thanh Ha, Nam nh,
ng Nai and B Ra-Vng Tu.

54

FULRO (Front Unifi de Lutte Des Races Opprimes: The United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed
Races - 1964-1992) sought independence for ethnic minorities in Vietnam and Cambodia. In September
1979, D445 troops were engaged in operations against armed FULRO elements in the Cha Chan
Mountain/ La Ng River area east of Xun Lc Nhm PV, Lt li nhng v n do Cng an ng Nai
trit ph K 5: p tan m mu gy bo lon ca Fulro - Over-turning of the charges by the ng Nai
Public Security Service wiped out Instalment 5: The FULRO plot for violent disorder completely
destroyed, Bo ng Nai, Bin Ha, 13 August 2010.
55
The Trung on c nhim of the Dn Qun Phc Quc organisation.
56
Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion, op.cit., 2013 ie pp.183-185 in the 2011 D440
History.
57
This 5th Regiment is not the 5th Regiment (ie 275th Regiment) of the 5th VC Division that had fought at
the Battle of Long Tn and other major engagements. The 5th Divisions 5th (275th) Regiment was reorganised in June 1970 during combat in Cambodia and retitled the 1st Regiment Chamberlain, E.P.,
D445 , op.cit., 2011, Annex J, p.15; and Annex O to this translation/exegisis of the 2004 D445 History.
58
Interestingly, no mention is made in the 440 Battalion History (2011) of the attacks by Chinese forces on
Vietnams northern border that began on 17 February 1979.

P-13
In April 2010, a press item reported the inauguration of a memorial for 440
Battalion and noted that in the fighting, over 700 cadre and soldiers of the Battalion had
died bravely on the B Ra-Long Khnh region.59
440 Battalion Strengths
Estimates by 1 ATF of 440 Battalions strength were included in routine 1 ATF
intelligence reports eg: 400 (November 1967 as the Bc Ninh Battalion), 400
(December 1967 as D440 Battalion northeast of Xun Lc), 400 (January 1968), 417
(July 1969 rallier), 300 (September 1979), 280 (October 1969), 170 (August 1970), 190
(October 1970).60
440 Battalion History
In 2011, a history of D440 Battalion was published: ng y B Ch Huy Qun
S Tnh B Ra-Vng Tu (The Party Committee of the Military Headquarters of B RaVng Tu Province), Lch S Tiu on 440 Anh Hng - B Ra-Long Khnh 1967-1979
(The History of the Heroic 440 Battalion - B Ra-Long Khnh 1967-1979), Nh Xut
bn Chnh tr Quc gia - S Tht (National Political Publishing House - The Truth), H
Ni, 2011.
In January 2015, a three-part summary history of 440 Battalion by Major General
L M Lng was published on the Internet as: T Thi Bnh n B Ra - Long Khnh
(From Thi Bnh to B Ra - Long Khnh) on the Armed Forces Online website see
footnote 1.

The List of Martyrs D440 Memorial Complex, Long Khnh Town

59

On 21 April 2010, a 440 Battalion memorial centre (Nh bia Tng nim) for 700 martyrs was
inaugurated in Xun Lc Town (Long Khnh). - Quc Tun, Th x Long Khnh: Khnh thnh Bia tng
nim lit s Tiu on 440, 21 April 2010. In the fighting, over 700 cadre and soldiers of the Battalion
had died bravely in the B Ra-Long Khnh region. Minh Hng, ng Nai k nim 35 nm ngy gii
phng Xun Lc (ng Nai remembers the 35th anniversary of Xun Lcs liberation), Bo Mi, 21
April 2010. Photographs of the D440 memorial - ie Bia tng nim D440, on the Internet are at:
http://www.geolocation.ws/v/P/34705927/bia-tng-nim-d440/en . The Memorial lists the details of 560
Battalion personnel ie: serial numbers 1-to-560, name, date of birth, date of death, unit, home village, place
of death, and appointment see the photograph at page 13. It is not clear whether the 700 or 560
martyrs are those killed in combat or also includes those who died of illness etc. The Memorial complex
also includes a graveyard with inscribed headstones. On 16 August 2011, more than 100 former cadre,
soldiers and relatives attended the Battalions fourth reunion in Long Khnh Town see Thanh Giang,
Hp mt truyn thng Tiu on 440 B Ra Long Khnh, ng Nai, 17 August 2011. The article
includes a photograph of D440 veterans.
60
For an all-sources list, see Chamberlain, E.P., D440 Battalion: Their Story, op.cit., 2013, Appendix 2.

P-14

Long Khnh and Bnh Tuy Provinces

Annex Q

THE AMBUSH BATTLE AT LONG TN 1

In the Resistance War of National Salvation against the Americans, the Armed
Forces of Military Region 72 not only had to directly engage in battle with the American
military and their Saigon puppets, but also had to contend with the armed forces of the
Americans allies who participated in the war in South Vietnam including the Royal
[sic] Australian armed forces.

War Veterans3 of the Royal Australian Armed Forces exchange ideas with the veterans of the 5 th Division
in the offices of the H Ch Minh City War Veterans Association (November 2014) Photo by Gia Hoi
1

Translators Note: Nguyn Vn Bch, Trn Phc Kch Long Tn (The Ambush Battle at Long Tn),
Cu Chin Binh (War Veterans) Thnh Ph H Ch Minh On-line, Thnh Ph H Ch Minh (H Ch
Minh City), 18 December 2014 (also published as Cuc ng u vi l on 1 qun i hong gia c
The Clash with the 1st Royal Australian Brigade, 3 April 2015). The article is very similar to passages in
the 5th Division History (2005) ie: H Sn i - Colonel (ed), Lch S S an B Binh 5 (1965-2005)
The History of the 5th Infantry Division (1965-2005), Nh Xut Bn Qun i Nhn Dn (The Peoples
Army Publishing House), H Ni, 2005 see translated extracts at Annex K. In late 2014, a 23-minute
documentary film featured the history of D445 Battalion and the Battle of Long Tn - V Vn Cm Director, Trng thnh t trong chin u - Coming-of-age during combat, B Ra - Vng Tu
Television, 4 November 2014.
2
Translators Note: In 1966, the Vit Cng Military Region covering Phc Tuy Province was titled
Military Region 1 (T.1) later reverting to Military Region 7 see: Military Region 7 Headquarters
(Qun Khu 7), 50 Nm Lc Lng V Trang Qun Khu 7 (The Armed Forces of Military Region 7: 50
Years), Wattpad, 1995.
3
Translators Note: The two Australian Vietnam War veterans are Dr (Lieutenant Colonel Retd, ex8RAR) R. (Bob) A. Hall left, and D. (Derrill) V. De Heer (ex-8RAR, Psyops Unit, 4RAR) holding the
booklet, of the University of NSW/ADFA (Australian Centre for the Study of Armed Conflict and Society)

Q-2

From May 1965, the 1st Brigade [sic] of the Royal Australian Armed Forces was
present and participated in the fighting on the Eastern Nam B battlefield.4 In July 1966,
the American military transferred the business of security control and pacification in the
B Ra area to the Australian military. The Australians then established their field combat
headquarters of the Royal Australian Brigade at Ni t, command by Brigadier
Hendoson [sic]5.
In order to begin their plan to build a base and conduct pacification, from the
beginning of July 1966 with the support of three flights of aircraft and nearly 100
tropical counter-guerilla warfare specialists, the Australian military in B Ra began to
launch sweeping operations around their base, conduct ambushes, and strike against and
block the junctions of our commo-liaison and supply routes.
With their tactics of secret and hidden ambush forces, including stay-behind6
elements that were mobile and rapidly strengthened, they extensively employed
maximum artillery and airborne firepower; and the Australian forces were responsible for
a very large number of crimes and created difficulties for the revolutionary movement in
B Ra. Faced with this situation, the Headquarters of the 5th Division strongly increased
its activities, coordinating with the local armed forces of B Ra Province to launch a
surprise attack on the Australian forces, destroy their pacification plans, and protect the
forces and the revolutionary movement in B Ra.
To implement the Divisions directive, the 5th ((275th)) Regiment organised an
attack on the Australian military at Ni t. In August 1966, a group of cadre from the
Division and the 5th Regiment led by Comrade Trn Minh Tm7, the Divisions second principals in Operation Wandering Souls (D an Linh hn Phiu bt) that has returned documents and
data on PAVN and PLAF casualties to Vietnamese authorities and families.
4
Translators Note. The Eastern Nam B Region ie also as Min ng, was the eastern half of Nam
B. As noted, the Vit Cng Nam B comprised those provinces in the Republic of Vietnam from the
Central Highlands to the south.
5
Translators Note: Following Operation Hardihood to secure the area, the Australian 5RAR occupied the
Ni t area on 2 June. Headquarters 1 ATF - commanded by Brigadier O. D. Jackson, arrived at Ni t
on 5 June 1966 (Brigadier W.G. Henderson took command in June 1970) the same error ie
Henderson/Herderson/ Hendoson as the first of the 1 ATF commanders, appears in both the 1991 and 2004
D445 Histories and other publications including the 5th Division History (2005) see Annex K.
6
Translators Note. The expression bc lt stay-behind, is also used in the 5th Division History
(2006), see Annex K. When vacating Fire Support and Patrol Bases (FSPB), 1 ATF often left behind a
small force to ambush NVA/VC elements that might later enter the FSPB. Also, several Vietnamese
histories relate a purported Australian piggy-back/poncho tactic that left small numbers of Australian
troops in an area, deceiving the NVA/VC forces. This piggy-back/poncho deception is described in
several Vit Cng histories including the 1991 D445 History, see: Chamberlain, E.P., D445 , op.cit.,
2011, p.73; the Ha Long Village History (2009); and the Chu c District History (2004). In a 2006
radio interview, Nguyn Vn Kim a former 445 Battalion commander (very late 1968 to mid-1969) also
related Australian helicopter-inserted troops using the piggy-back/poncho deception a good tactic:
Peters, C., Long Tn 40 years on, ABC Radio National, mid-August 2006 (see Annex A, footnote 64).
7
Translators Note: Trn Minh Tm (aka Nm Tm) was the founding commanding officer of the 4 th
Regiment (274th VC Regiment) see also footnote 125 in the 1991 D445 History. The defectors NVA

Q-3

in-command, went to Long Tn to examine the terrain and to gain knowledge of the
routine and activities of the Australian military and to discuss a coordinated tactical
plan with the local armed forces. After many days of monitoring the activities of the
Australian forces, on 10 August 1966 the battle headquarters comprising Comrades
Trn Minh Tm and ng Hu Thun8 (the B Ra Province commander), met and
agreed on a combat plan for a mobile ambush battle to wipe out an Australian battalion in
the region of the Long Tn rubber plantation.
Regarding our forces, we employed the 5th ((275th)) Regiment and the 445 B Ra
Battalion to set an ambush on a stretch of Route No.52 in the area of the Long Tn rubber
plantation (called the t Gai area9) along a front two kilometres long. The 2nd Battalion
of the 5th Regiment with a company from 445 Battalion, reinforced with B40s and a
57mm RCL, were deployed in the south and the north-west of the T-junction of Route 52
and a track with the task of blocking the head of the enemy force. The 3rd Battalion was
located about 800 metres north-west of Route 52 with the task of attacking into the killing
zone at the Tht Pagoda. The 1st Battalion was reinforced with two companies of 445
Battalion and located about 800 metres to the north-east of Route 52 with the rear
blocking task and coordinating with the 3rd Battalion to wipe out the enemy in the
designated killing zone. To provide support for the battle, the transport element
comprised 80 personnel of the V Th Sau Company and a forward surgery team from the
Division led by Comrades Hai Phong and Nguyn nh Knh.
Employing the tactic of luring the tiger from the mountain10, over the two days
of 16 and 17 August, our regional forces and the Divisions reconnaissance team
Lieutenant Colonel L Xun Chuyn and Senior Lieutenant Nguyn Vn Phng (rallied March 1967)
noted Lieutenant Colonel Nm Tm as the Chief of Staff of the 5th Division and Chuyn described
Tm as: young and resolute, drinks and argues, has no capability as far as tactics and staff work.
According to the 5th Division History (2005), Tm was the NVA/VC battlefield commander at Long Tn in
August 1966 and, as a Colonel (Thng T), Tm was later appointed commander of the 5th Division in
October 1968. Tm is also noted in a major Vietnamese account of the War as leading the 5 th Division
elements at Long Tn see: Nguyn Vn Minh Colonel (ed), Lch s Khng chin chng M cu nc Tp 4 (Vol 4), Nh Xut Bn Chnh Tr Quc Gia, H Ni, 1999.
8
Translators Note: ng Hu Thun was also known as t ng, V ng, ng, and Thim. He had
infiltrated into the South in 1961, and in 1965-1966 he served at Military Region 1/T.1 (Eastern Nam B
Military Staff) as the Chief of Operations and Training with the grade of regimental executive officer
CDEC Bulletin 257, Log 03-1253-66. Thun was transferred from T.1 to B Ra on 30 June 1966 CDEC
Log 12-2459-66. He was later the chief of staff of Military Region 7 in January 1969 VCAT Item
No.2310510003.
9
Translators Note: In a local Party history, the rubber plantation at Long Tn is referred to as the Long
Hip Plantation - Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg), Lch s ng (The History of the Party in B Ra-Vng
Tu), op.cit., 2000, Chapter VII. In the 275th Regiment casualty list, the plantation is referred to as the B
ic (Deaf Lady) Plantation see Annex F, p.10. The 1991 D445 History relates that in late May 1966:
After the battle in the Jackfruit Gardens at Sng Cu, the Americans deployed their forces to attack into
the t Gai and Long Phc areas. The 2004 D445 History refers to the 445 Companys base camp at t
Gai (Long Phc) in early 1963.
10
Translators Note: The tactic d h ly sn, is described in several Chinese and Vietnamese military
documents ie: luring the tiger from the mountain a Chinese and Vietnamese saying (Vietnamese: Dn

Q-4

employed mortars to shell the enemy base at Ni t, emplaced mines on Route 52 to

block movement and to force the Australian forces to conduct a sweeping operation to
clear the Long Tn area and for us to wipe them out.
At 2am on 17 August, elements of the 5th Division and the B Ra 445 Battalion
took up their positions from which to launch the attack, and were ready to strike the
enemy.
At 1530hrs on 18 August 1966, a reconnaissance team reported that an enemy
company had secretly advanced to within 250 metres of the battlefield position of the 2nd
Battalion.11 About 1.5 kilometres to the rear of that enemy force, there was another force
comprising approximately two infantry companies12 and four armoured vehicles13 that
were advancing along Route 52 toward our positions.
Our troops calmly waited until the enemy was very close 10 metres from our
positions, and then opened fire killing eight of the enemy on-the-spot. The Australian
force used the firepower from two armoured vehicles to fire fiercely into the assaulting
ranks of the 2nd Battalion. At that very moment, in an observation post, a brave cadre of
the reconnaissance element fearlessly exposed himself to the rain of enemy fire and
launched a B40 that wiped out the leading armoured vehicle and created the opportunity
for the Regiments RCL team to wipe out the following second vehicle. The assaulting
arrow-heads of the 2nd Battalion engaged the Australians in close combat. Our elements
and those of the enemy were intermixed, and our troops used sub-machineguns, B40s and
grenades in the close struggle with the enemy. The Australian troops fled in panic to the
edge of the rubber plantation, stumbling into the minefields14 that we had prepared in
readiness and tens of the enemy were killed, and many were wounded. After 30
minutes, the 2nd Battalion had inflicted heavy casualties on an enemy platoon.

h/cp khi ni; Sino-Vietnamese: iu h ly sn; Chinese: ). Post-War, several Vietnamese

veterans including Nguyn Vn Kim and Nguyn Thanh Hng, have explained this as the tactic for the
Long Tn Battle - ie rather than any attack against 1 ATFs Ni t base itself - McNeill, I., To Long Tan,
op.cit.,1993, pp.366-367. See footnote 270 in the main text, Annex R, Annex E p.37, and Annex O pp.1011.
11
Translators Note: The 5th Division History (2005) - see Annex K, pp.5-12, indicates that the 275th
Regiment elements were caught off-guard by the Australian advance because Trn Minh Tm (Nm Tm)
who was directly commanding the battle, had directed the observation element to temporarily withdraw
We had committed an error in our observation of the enemy, and in arranging our formations to start to
attack from a far distance because of this, we were unable to surround and destroy the enemy battalion.
12
Translators Note: The 1 ATF element initially engaged in the Battle of Long Tn was an infantry
company - D Company/6RAR strength 105, plus a three-man artillery observer team.
13
Translators Note: The Australian force D Company/6RAR was not accompanied or supported by
armoured vehicles until seven M-113 APCs carrying A Company/6RAR arrived on the battlefield at
about 1830hrs on 18 August. Sunset would be at 7.11 p.m. but the heavy rain clouds would bring darkness
earlier, favouring the enemy. McNeill, I., To Long Tn, op.cit., p.333.
14
Translators Note: In Australian reports and writing on the Battle, there is no mention of encountering
Vit Cng mines.

Q-5

At the positions of the 3rd Battalion and the 1st Battalion, our troops had moved
forward in a coordinated manner towards the sounds of the gunfire, but at that time the
heavens opened up with very heavy rain15, and our attacking columns had difficulties in
deploying. The enemy also had difficulties in observing our movement as we advanced
close to them. At this time, the enemy called in decisive artillery from their support base
including artillery from the Ni t base and naval gunfire from the sea.16 Thousands of
rounds fell on our battlefield. However, we had prepared carefully. When deploying to
prepare the battlefield, every soldier had carried a shovel17 and on their shoulders, each
was bearing a bundle of about 10 branches with every branch as thick as a wrist and
about one metre long, to use as anti-shrapnel covers for their individual pits and for our
defensive works, and so this limited our casualties.
Having awaited the enemy to enter the killing zone, the 3rd Battalion and an
element of the 1st Battalion opened fire fiercely into the enemys ranks. Panic-stricken,
the Australian troops gathered together to resist us while calling for firepower to violently
shell our attacking columns and the rear blocking elements of the 1st Battalion and 445
Battalion. At the same time, the firepower of their armoured vehicles fired decisively into
the ranks of the 3rd Battalion. However, our attacking columns still bravely assaulted into
the enemy and fought them inflicting many casualties. At 1700hrs, the battle ended. Our
headquarters ordered our units to withdraw to their regrouping positions.
This was the first time that we had organised a mobile ambush to wipe out
Australian troops, and it had an important significance: it was the first time on the
battlefield that we had inflicted heavy casualties on a battalion of the Royal Australian
Forces including wiping out a battalion of Australian soldiers, setting fire to two
armoured vehicles, and killing and wounding hundreds of Australian troops. Comrade L
Tn Tao18 used his AK rifle and a B40 to kill 36 enemy on-the-spot and seized many
15

The Australian official history notes the monsoon broke at 4.08 p.m, reducing visibility to 50 metres
and turning the ground into red mud. McNeill , I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.318. The heavy
monsoonal rain that restricted visibility is noted in Vietnamese accounts and Australian accounts (see
footnote 276 in the main text; Annex K footnote 46; and Annex M page 9).
16
Translators Note: Artillery units in the 1 ATF base at Ni t comprised: the Australian 1st Field
Regiment RAA (105mm M2A1 howitzers maximum range 10,575 metres), 161st Battery RNZA
(105mm), and A Battery of the US 2/35 Regiment (155mm M109 medium self-propelled guns maximum
range 14,600 metres). A total of 3,198 105mm and 242 155mm rounds were reportedly fired in support of
the Long Tn battle on 18 August 1966 McNeill, I., To Long Tn, op.cit., 1993, p.351. No naval gunfire
support was employed but see also the VC claims of gunfire from warships in the South China Sea at
Annex F page 12, footnote 57.
17
Bi Tn the former PAVN officer and author, refers to the short-handled spade that was effective
during the First Indochina War enabling Viet Minh troops to dig shell-scrapes while lying down. Bi Tn,
From Enemy to Friend, op.cit., 2002, p.199.
18
Translators Note: Other individual soldiers are cited for their exploits during the Battle of Long Tn in
the 1991 and D445 Histories. L Tn Tao/To was a soldier in the 275th VC Main Force Regiment either
its 1st or the 2nd Battalion (LBN 12372E-A6). Two Tt 1967 letters to his family (Khanh Bnh village,
Mi V District, C Mau Province) were recovered undelivered, by elements of the 7th ARVN Division
on 20 June 1967 at XS 315535 during Operation Cuu Long 60/58 CDEC 07-2667-67.

Q-6

weapons.The battle contributed to the shattering of the enemys plans for sweeping
operations and pacification activities, and accelerated the revolutionary movement in B
Ra Long Khanh that continued to develop further.
This victory stirred public opinion in Australia. An Australian study document
stated: The 275th Regiment (ie the 5th Regiment) of the Liberation Armed Forces and the
445 Battalion of the Vietnamese with the support of rear service units attacked the 6th
Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment (6RAR). The battle of Long Tn was the
largest battle involving Australian soldiers in the war in Vietnam, and that day 18
August (1966) became a special day for the Australian military veterans.
The battle had important significance in contributing to the the defeat of the
enemys intentions for pacification and search and destroy operations and contributed
to the creation of the brilliant traditions of the 5th Division Unity, Dedication, Mobility,
Flexibility for self-reliance and self-sufficiency, and Victory over every enemy.

Readers Notes and Comments

Annex R

The Battle of Long Tn as related by D445 rallier Hunh Vn Hoa1

Hunh Vn Hoa2 Assistant Leader of the 9th Squad, 3rd Platoon, 1st
Company/D445 rallied in mid-January 1967. He was debriefed in February 1967 at Ni
t by the Intelligence Officer (IO) of 6RAR, Captain B. (Bryan) H. Wickens.
Hoa related that: Up to the Battle of Long Tan, morale was very high. However,
although most of the battalion did not take part in the battle, morale dropped very
considerably, and has gone steadily downhill ever since.
The debriefing report of Hunh Vn Hoa notes:
The version of the Long Tan battle that he knows is as follows:
D445 - minus the heavy weapons company and a small protective element, were
ordered out of the area and went to the vicinity of YS 5668 ((about 12 kilometres east of
the 1 ATF base at Ni t)). Both the 5th 3 and 9th 4 Divisions came into the area and the
plan was to mortar the 1 ATF base and lure5 a battalion out into their area. They would
then annihilate this battalion. The mortaring took place but the plan did not eventuate as
thought. (It is the writers ((ie IO 6RARs)) opinion that the Aust Force were to have been
led past the area of Long Tan and engaged out of gun range. The enemy force at Long
Tan being used to cut off any retreat).
The reasons for not attempting to attack the Australian base were that they would
loose [sic] too many men in capturing it. When they had done this, the Americans would
surround them, and they would be trapped.6

Translators (ie Chamberlain) Note: See: Returnee from VC D445 Battalion - Annex J to 1 Fd Regt RAA,
Operational Report No.7, February 1967 (File: AWM95, 3/6/7).
2
Translators Note: Hunh Vn Hoa (b. 1946 in Hi M village) joined D445 at the age of 18 and initially
served in a 60mm mortar crew. He was dissatisfied with living conditions in the unit no leave, and poor
pay (four piastres per day for rice and 15 piastres per month for cigarettes and he had not been paid for
several months). He had suffered a severe bout of malaria and no treatment was provided by the unit.
3
Translators Note: HQ 5th VC Division was noted by SIGINT in north-east Phc Tuy in August 1966.
Senior 5th VC Division staff officers were present at the Battle of Long Tn ie: Trn Minh Tm (Nm
Tm), the Divisions deputy commander; and Nguyn Thanh Hng (Hai Hng), an operations staff officer
(see footnote 262 in the main text). The principal VC force at the Battle was the 5th VC Divisions 275th
Main Force Regiment commanded by Nguyn Thi Bng (t Thi) see Annex O.
4
Translators Note: In the second half of 1966, the 9th VC Division operated in northern Ty Ninh Province
and was engaged by US forces during Operation Attleboro. No 9th VC Division elements were active in
Phc Tuy in 1966. Earlier - before the 9th Divisions formal formation, its 271st and 272nd Regiments
defeated ARVN and Vietnamese Marine units at the Battle of Bnh Gi in December 1964 January 1965
in central Phc Tuy - see the main text pp.35-45.
5
Translators Note: For luring an Australian force into a mobile ambush, see: footnote 270 in the main
text, Preface f.11, Annex E p.37, and Annex O pp.10-11.
6
Translators Note: Captain B. H. Wickens Intelligence Officer 6RAR, added: Of course this
information cannot be relied on, but it does give food for thought.

Annex R

This page is intentionally blank.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books and Monographs
, Intelligence Vocabulary: Vietnamese-English & English-Vietnamese, Saigon,
December 1968.
, Lch s u Tranh Cach Mng Ca Nhn Dn Huyn Tn Thnh (The History of the
Peoples Revolutionary Struggle in Tn Thnh District), 2014.
http://vanhocmuonmau.blogspot.com.au/2012/11/truyen-ngan-noi-ay-mot-mua-xuan-iqua.html
, The Viet Cong Infrastructure: Modus Operandi of Selected Political Cadres, Saigon,
December 1968.
1 ATF, Provincial Data Handbook Phuoc Tuy Province and Long Thanh District, Nui
Dat, 30 October 1969.
1 Psyops Unit, Province Survey Phuoc Tuy Province, Nui Dat, 1971.
Abigail, P. Major General (Retd) - Chairman, Review of Recognition for the Battle of
Long Tan, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra, 31 March 2008.
Ahern, T.L, Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency, University Press of
Kentucky, 2009.
Army Headquarters, The Enemy 1964, Canberra, 1 July 1964.
Army Headquarters (AHQ) Battle Analysis Team, Intelligence in Counter Insurgency at
Task Force Level, Training Information Letter 13/70, Canberra, 1970.
Andrad, D., Ashes to Ashes The Pheonix Program and the Vietnam War, Lexington
Books, Lexington - Massachusetts, 1990.
Battle, M.R. & Wilkins, D.S. (eds), The Year of the Tigers, Trojan Press, Thomastown,
2009.
B Quc phng - Vin Lch s Qun s Vit Nam (Vietnam Military History Institute
Department of Defence), Tm tt cac chin dch trong khang chin chng M cu nc
1954-1975 (Summary of the Campaigns in the Anti-American War of National Salvation
1954 - 1975), NXB QND (Peoples Army Publishing House), 2003. ((for 39
campaigns)).
Bi c i, a con ca t A Son of the Soil, Vn Hc Gii Phng, H Ch Minh
City, 1975.
Bi Tn, Following Ho Chi Minh: The Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel,
Crawford House Publishing, Bathurst, 1995.

2
Bi Tn, From Enemy to Friend: A North Vietnamese Perspective on the War, Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, 2002.
Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns A Long Tan veteran discovers the other side of Vietnam,
University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1990.
http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv/UQ:190986/DA557_8_L66_B875_1990.pdf
Burstall, T., The Soldiers Story: The Battle at Xa Long Tan 18 August 1966,
University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1986.
Burstall, T., Vietnam The Australian Dilemma, University of Queensland Press, St
Lucia, 1993.
Cameron, B., Canister! On! Fire! Australian Tank Operations in Vietnam, Big Sky
Publishing, Two Volumes, 2012.
Caulfield, M., The Vietnam Years: From the Jungle to the Australian Suburbs, Hachette,
Sydney, 2009.
Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment - North Vietnamese Army: Their Story (and the
Battle of Binh Ba), Point Lonsdale, 2014.
Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story (and the Battle of Binh
Ba), Point Lonsdale, 2013.
Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2011 (an
exegesis of: Nguyn Thanh Tng, Major General (ed), Tiu on 445 Anh Hng : Lch
S/Truyn Thng (The Heroic D445 Battalion: its History and Tradition), B Ch Huy
Qun S Tnh ng Nai (Military Headquarters of ng Nai Province), ng Nai, 1991.
(Reviewed by Dr R. Hall UNSW/ADFA, in the Australian Army Journal, Vol IX,
No.1, Autumn 2012, pp.131-134).
Church. J.M., Second to None: 2RAR as the ANZAC Battalion in Vietnam 1970-71,
Army Doctrine Centre, Mosman, 1995.
Clunies-Ross, A. (ed), The Grey Eight in Vietnam the History of the Eighth Battalion
the Royal Australian Regiment: November 1969-November 1970, Brisbane, 1989.
Combined Document Exploitation Center US MACV, Identification of VC/NVA
Documents, Saigon, circa 1966.
Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) US MACV, Medical Causes on NonEffectiveness among VC/NVA Troops (Third Update), Study 69 II, MACJ231-7, Saigon,
31 August 1969.
Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) US MACV, VC/NVA Techniques of
Small Arms Fire, Study ST 67-064, Saigon, 4 August 1967. VCAT Item No.
F015900250076 ((Serialised in 1 ATF Troops Information Sheets October-November
1967)).

3
Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV), The Impact of the Sapper on the
Vietnam War, Study 69-08, MACJ231-6, Saigon, 5 July 1969.
ng b x Ha Long, Lch s ng b x Ha Long (1930-2005) - The History of the
Ha Long Village Party Chapter (1930-2005), 25 April 2009. http://thixabaria.bariavungtau.gov.vn/front-end/index . See translated extracts at Annex N to Chamberlain,
E.P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2011.
ng Tn Hng (ed) - ng B ng Cng Sn Vit Nam Huyn Xun Lc (The
Communist Party of Vietnam - Xun Lc District), Lch S u Tranh Cach Mng Ca
Huyn Xun Lc (The History of the Revolutionary Struggle in Xuan Loc District), Nh
Xut Bn ng Nai, Bin Ha, 1985.
ng y B Ch Huy Qun S Tnh B Ra-Vng Tu (The Party Committee of the
Military Headquarters of B Ra-Vng Tu Province), Lch S Tiu on 440 Anh Hng
- B Ra-Long Khnh 1967-1979 (The History of the Heroic 440 Battalion - B Ra-Long
Khnh 1967-1979), Nh Xut bn Chnh tr Quc gia - S Tht (National Political
Publishing House - The Truth), H Ni, 2011. ((for a translation/exegesis with
commentary see: Chamberlain, E. P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story (and the
Battle of Binh Ba), Point Lonsdale, 2013)).
Davies, B. with McKay, G., Vietnam: The Complete Story of ther Australian War, Allen
& Unwin, Crows Nest, 2012.
Davies, M.J. (ed authors: Fenton, J.; OFlynn, H.; Hart, S.W.; and Murray, P.), The
Unclassified History of 547 Signal Troop in South Vietnam,
http://www.angelfire.com/empire/547sigs/History%20of%20547%20Signal%20Troop.pd
f (prepared by Hare, D.C. - 1999).
Department of Army, Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam, Pamphlet 550-105,
Washington, 1966. For the Bnh Xuyn see, Chapter 19 VCAT No. 13450205001.
ng S Nguyn, The Trans-Trng Sn Route, Th Gii Publishers, H Ni, 2005.
Dng Thanh Tn (ed), Lch s ng b (ng Cng Sn Vit Nam) tnh ng Nai
(1930-2000) (The History of the Communist Party Chapter of Dong Nai Province 19302000), Tp (Volume) II (1954-1975), Chng (Chapter) IV, 2003.
Edwards, P. Dr, Australia and the Vietnam War: The Essential History, Australian War
Memorial/New South Publishing, Sydney, 2014.
Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish: The Australian Army and the Vietnam
War 1968-1975, Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial,
Crows Nest, 2012.
Fairhead, F. Lieutenant Colonel (Retd), A Duty Done: A Summary of Operations by the
Royal Australian Regiment in the Vietnam War 1965-1972, Royal Australian Regiment
Australia Association SA Inc, Linden Park, 2014.

4
Finlayson, A.R. Colonel, Marine Advisors with the Vietnamese Provincial
Reconnaissance Units 1966-1970, Occasional Paper History Division, United States
Marine Corps, Quantico, 2009. VCAT Item No. 22100101001.
Gaddy, D.W., Essential Matters: A History of the Cryptography Branch of the Peoples
Army of Vietnam 1945-1975, Gaddy, D.W. (Trans/Ed), NSA, 1994, in Vietnamese 1990.
Gilbert, J.L., The Most Secret War: Army Signals Intelligence in Vietnam, US Army
Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, 2003.
Grandin, R., The Battle of Long Tan: As Told by the Commanders to Bob Grandin, Allen
& Unwin, Crows Nest, 2004.
Hall, R.A., Combat Battalion The Eighth Battalion in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, St
Leonards, 2000.
Hall R. A. Dr, De Heer D.V., Ross A.T. Dr, & Griffin A.L. Dr, Operation Wandering
Souls (Nhng linh hn phiu bt) The Journey Home (Tr lai qu hng) The Phc
Tuy Documents (Ti liu Phc Tuy), UNSW at ADFA, Canberra, 2013.
Ham, P., Vietnam The Australian War, HarperCollinsPublishers, Pymble, 2007.
Hanyok, R.J., Spartans in the Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War (19451975), Center for Cryptologic History National Security Agency, Maryland, 2002.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a483675.pdf .
Hartley, R.W., AM & Hampstead, B.V., The Story of 547 Signal Troop in South Vietnam
1966-1972, Googong, 2014. (manuscript of 469 pages and 227 images in The Australian
War Memorial MSS2216; also as an earlier three DVD set. A Second Edition is
scheduled for March 2016).
Hartley, R.W., AM & Hampstead, B.V., The Story of 7 Signal Regiment - 1939 to 1992,
Googong, October 2014 (562 plus pages including 550 photos/graphics - 10 pages of
annexes including nominal rolls for Malaya/693 Sig Tp; 547 Sig Tp Vietnam War
pp.405-409). Manuscript in the Australian War Memorial as MS2282.
Hartley, R.W., AM & Hampstead, B.V., The Story of 693 Troop During Indonesian
Confrontation 1964 to 1966, Googong, 2014.
Headquarters 1st Australian Task Force, Ba-Ria Sub Region, Vung Tau, 10 December
1971 (70-page booklet).
H Khang - Colonel/Dr (ed), Lch s Khang chin chng M cu nc 1954-1975 (The
History of the Anti-American War of National Salvation), Tp (Volume) 6, National
Political Publishing House, H Ni, 2002.
H S Thnh, c Khu Rng Sc The Rng Sc Special Zone, Nh Xut Bn Tr,
2003.

5
H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), Lch s S an B binh 5 (1965-2005) The History
of the 5th Infantry Division (1965-2005), Nh Xut Bn Qun i Nhn Dn (The
Peoples Army Publishing House), H Ni, 2005. ((3rd Edition published 2015)).
H Sn i - Lieutenant Colonel (ed), Lch S S an 5 (History of the 5th Division),
Nh Xut Bn Qun i Nhn Dn (The Peoples Armed Forces Publishing House), H
Ni, 1995.
H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), Lch S Trung an B Binh 4 (1965-2015) The
History of the 4th ((274th)) Infantry Regiment (1965-2015), Nh Xut Bn Qun i
Nhn Dn (The Peoples Army Publishing House), H Ni, 2015.
H Sn i Senior Colonel (ed), Lch S Trung an B Binh 5 (1965-2015) The
History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment (1965-2015), Nh Xut Bn Qun i
Nhn Dn (The Peoples Army Publishing House), H Ni, 2015.
H Sn i & Trn Quang Toi, ng Nai n V Anh Hng (The Heroic Units of ng
Nai), Nh Xut Bn ng Nai (ng Nai Publishing Company), ng Nai, 1985.
Hong Cm, Chng ng Mi Nghn Ngy (Stages in a 10,000-day Journey), Nh
xut bn Qun i nhn dn, H Ni, 2001.
Hong Ngc Lung, Intelligence, US Army Center of Military History, Washington D.C.,
1982.
Hong Ngc Lung, Strategy and Tactics, General Research Corporation, Maclean, 1978.
Horner, D.M., Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam War, Canberra Papers on
Strategy and Defence No. 40, Australian National University, Canberra, 1986.
Horner, D., Phantoms of the Jungle: A History of the Special Air Service, Allen &
Unwin, 1989.
Horner, D. & Bou, J. (eds), Duty First: A History of the Royal Australian Regiment, 2nd
Edition, Allen & Unwin, 2008.
Lanning, M.L. & Cragg, D., Inside the VC and the NVA The Real Story of North
Vietnams Armed Forces, Fawcett Columbine, New York, 1992.
Larsen, S.R. Lieutenant General & Collins J.L. Brigadier General, Allied Participation in
Vietnam, Vietnam Studies Department of the Army, Washington, 1975.
L B c, Mt thi Rng Sac (A Time in the Rng Sac), Nh Xut Bn ng Nai
(ng Nai Publishing House), Bin Ha, 2000.
Le Gro, W.E. Colonel, From Cease Fire to Capitulation, United States Army Center of
Military History, Washington D.C., 1981. VCAT Item No.8850505001.
L Hong Qun, Chin thng Xun Lc-Long Khanh trong cuc t g tin cng v ni
dy mua xun 1975 (The Xun Lc-Long Khanh Victory in the General Offensive and

6
Uprising of Spring 1975), B T lnh Qun khu 7 (Military Region 7 Headquarters), Nh
Xut Bn Tng Hp ng Nai, Bin Ha, 2004.
L Hong Qun (ed), Lch s ng b ng Cng sn Vit Nam Tnh ng Nai (19752000) (The History of the Vietnam Communist Party in ng Nai Province 1975-2000),
Nh Xut Bn Tng Hp ng Nai, Bin Ha, 2007.
(Note: see below earlier editions by Trn Quang Toi (et al) for the period 1930-1995,
published in 1997 and 2000); and also the ng Nai 30-Year Liberation War ie : Phan
Ngc Danh, Trn Quang Toi & Phm Van Hy, ng Nai 30 Nm Chin Tranh Gii
Phng - 1945-1975 - published in 1986.)
L Mu Hn (ed), i Cng Lch S Vit Nam (The Fundamentals of Vietnamese
History) - Tp III (1945-2006), Nh Xut Bn Giao Dc Vit Nam, H Ni, 2010.
L Thanh Dng (et al/tg), K Yu Lit S Huyn Long in (The Summary Record of
the Martyrs of Long in District), Long in District Peoples Committee, DN M
Thut, Vng Tu, 2011.
L Thanh Dng & Phm Quang Khi (et al), Lch S Ngnh Y T B Ra-Long Khnh
(1945-2006) (The History of the B Ra-Long Khnh Medical Services 1945-2006),
Vng Tu, 2008.
Lin on Lao ng tnh B Ra Vng Tu, Lch s Phong Tro Cng Nhn, Vin Chc,
Lao ng va Hot ng Cng on B Ra-Vng Tu Giai on 1930-2006 (The
History of the Movement of the Workers, Public Servants and Labourers and Trade
Union Activities in B Ra-Vng Tu in the period 1930-2006), Vng Tu, 2011.
Long, L. & Blackburn, G.B., Unlikely Warriors: The Army Security Agencys Secret
War in Vietnam 1961-1973, iUniverse LLC, Bloomington, 2013.
(Chapter 12: The Diggers of Nui Dat).
Martin, J., History of the 6994th Security Squadron (Draft), 2014.
McAulay, L., The Battle of Long Tan, Arrow Books Limited, London, 1987.
McChristian, J.A. Major General (Retd), The Role of Military Intelligence, Vietnam
Studies, Department of the Army, Washington, 15 December 1973.
McNeill, I., To Long Tan The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950-1966, Allen
& Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, St Leonards, 1993.
McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, Allen & Unwin in association with the
Australian War Memorial, Crows Nest, 2003.
Military Region 7 Headquarters (Qun Khu 7), 50 Nm Lc Lng V Trang Qun Khu
7 (The Armed Forces of Military Region 7: 50 Years), Wattpad, 1995.
Military Region 7 Headquarters (Qun Khu 7), Chin Thng Xun Lc-Long Khnh Lc-Long Khnh Victory), Nh Xut Bn Tng Hp ng Nai, Bin Ha,
2004.
(The Xun

Mollison, C.S., Long Tan and Beyond Alpha Company 6 RAR in Vietnam 1966-67,
Cobbs Crossing, Woombye, 2006.
Moyar, M., Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War 1954-1965, Cambridge University
Press, 2006.
National Security Agency (NSA), Cryptolog, Vol II No.10, Fort George G. Meade Maryland, October 1975. (declassified and released 10 November 2012).
https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologs/cryptolog_13.pdf
National Security Agency (NSA), Focus on Cambodia - Parts 1 and 2, Cryptologic
History Series Southeast Asia, Fort George G. Meade, January 1974 (released in 2004
and 2008). http://www.governmentattic.org/docs/NSA-Cryptologic-HistorySeries_Focus-on-Cambodia_Pts-1-2_1974.pdf .
Ng Quang Trng - Lieutenant General, Territorial Forces, Indochina Monographs, U.S.
Army Center of Military History, Washington D.C., 1981.
Nguyn Cng Danh & L Minh Ngha (et al), Lch s u Tranh Cch Mng Ca ng
B V Nhn Dn Huyn Chu c (1930-2000) (The History of the Revolutionary
Struggle of the Party Chapter and the People of Chu c District 1930-2000), Nh Xut
Bn Chnh Tr Quc Gia, H Ni, 2004.
Nguyn nh Thng, Trn Ton, Trn Quang Toi & H Sn i (eds), ng H Ch
Minh Trn Bin B Ra-Vng Tu (The H Ch Minh Trail by Sea - B Ra-Vng Tu),
Nh Xut Bn Vn Ha Vn Ngh, TP H Ch Minh, 2014.
Nguyn Duy Hinh, The South Vietnamese Society, Indochina Monographs, U.S. Army
Center of Military History, Washington, 1980.
Nguyn Duy Tng, Lch S B Ra-Vng Tu Khng Chin (1945-1975) (The History
of the Resistance War in B Ra-Vng Tu 1945-1975), Nh Xut bn Qun i Nhn
dn, H Ni, 1995.
Nguyn n T - Major General, Mu Thn 1968 - Cuc i chin lch s (Mau Than
1968 An Historic Battle), Nh Xut Bn Lao ng, H Ni, 2008.
http://www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php/topic,26599.0.html
Nguyn Hu An Colonel General, Chin Trng Mi - Hi c (The New Battlefield Memories), Peoples Army Publishing House, H Ni, 2002, p.86. VCAT Item No.
16900105001
Nguyn Hu Th (et al), Chung Mt Bng C: V Mt trn Dn tc Gii phng min
Nam Vit Nam Together Under the One Flag: the National Liberation Front of South
Vietnam, Nh Xut Bn Chnh tr Quc gia, H Ni, 1993.
Nguyen, Lien-Hang T., Hanois War: An International History of the War for Peace in
Vietnam, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2012.

8
Nguyn Minh Nht, Hi ap Lch S Vit Nam (Questions and Answers on Vietnamese
History), Tp 9 (Vol 9) 1968 to 1975, Nh Xut Bn Tr, TP H Ch Minh, 2013.
Nguyn Nam Hng - Major General, Mt i Chinh Chin (A Life at War), Nh Xut
bn Chnh tr Quc gia, H Ni, 2006. ((Nguyn Nam Hng commanded the 274th VC
Regiment in 1968-1969 and the 303rd Division in 1978)).
Nguyn Thanh Nhn, Lch s S on b binh 9 (1965-2010) (The History of the 9th
Infantry Division), Nh xut bn Qun i nhn dn, H Ni, 2010.
Nguyn Thanh Tng & Phm Thanh Quang (ed), ng Nai: nhng trn anh in hnh
trong chin tranh gii phng 1945-1975 (ng Nai: Indicative Battles in the War of
Liberation 1945-1975), Tp Mt Vol 1, Nh Xut Bn ng Nai, Bin Ha,1992.
Nguyn Thanh Tng, Major General (ed), Tiu on 445 Anh Hng : Lch S/Truyn
Thng (The Heroic D445 Battalion: its History and Tradition), B Ch Huy Qun S Tnh
ng Nai (Military Headquarters of ng Nai Province), ng Nai, 1991.
Nguyn Thi Bng Dr (et al/tg), Bin Nin S Kin Lch S Khang Chin 1945-1975
(Chronicle of the Historic Events during the Resistance War in Nam B), Nh Xut bn
Chnh tr Quc gia - S Tht (National Political Publishing House The Truth), H Ni,
2012.
Nguyn Vn Minh Colonel (ed), Lch s Khang chin chng M cu nc (The History
of the Anti-American Resistance War for National Salvation), Tp 3 - Vol 3 and Tp 4 Vol 4, Nh Xut Bn Chnh Tr Quc Gia (National Political Publishing House), H Ni,
1999.
OBrien, M., Conscripts and Regulars with the Seventh Battalion in Vietnam, Allen &
Unwin, St Leonards, 1995.
Odom, T.Z. & Hoskins, R.E, History of the 6994th Security Squadron: 1 July 31
December 1966, Tn Sn Nht Air Base, 1 July 1967 (Top Secret Trine/Secret Savin
declassified 1 April 2014).
ONeill, R.J., Vietnam Task: The 5th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment 1966/67,
Cassell Australia, Melbourne, 1968.
Palazzo, A., Australian Military Operations in Vietnam, Australian Army Campaigns
Series 3, Second Edition, Australian Army History Unit, 2009.
Palmerlee, A.E., The Central Office of South Vietnam, Vietnam Documents and Research
Notes Document No.40, August 1968.
Phm Ch Thn (ed), Cn C Minh m 1945-1975 (The Minh Dam Base 1945-1975),
S Vn Ha Thng Tin Tnh B Ria-Vng Tu - B Ria-Vng Tu Province Information
and Cultural Office, 2006. See translated extracts at Annex M to Chamberlain, E.P., The
Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2011.

9
Phm Vnh Phc, Colonel (ed - et al), Operations in the US Resistance War, Th Gii
Publishers, H Ni, 2009 NLA YY 355.0330597 O61 Bib Id: 4738734 ((ie a
translation of: B Quc phng - Vin Lch s Qun s Vit Nam (Vietnam Military
History Institute Department of Defence), Tm tt cc chin dch trong khng chin
chng M cu nc (A Summary of Campaigns in the Anti-American Resistance War of
National Salvation), Peoples Army Publishing House, H Ni, 2003)).
Phan Ngc Danh, Trn Quang Toi & Phm Vn Hy, ng Nai 30 Nm Chin Tranh
Gii Phng (1945-1975) (The 30-year Liberation Struggle in ng Nai 1945-1975),
Nh Xut Bn ng Nai, ng Nai, 1986.1
Phan Ngc Danh & Trn Quang Toi 2, Lch S u Tranh Cch Mng Ca Huyn Long
t (The History of the Revolutionary Struggle in Long t District), Nh Xut Bn
ng Nai - ng Nai Publishing House, ng Nai, 1986. See translated extracts at
Annex L to Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story, Point
Lonsdale, 2011.
Picken, B., Fire Support Bases Vietnam: Australian and Allied Fire Support Base
Locations and Main Support Units, Big Sky Publishing, Newport, 2012.
Pimlott, J., Vietnam: The Decisive Battles, Michael Joseph, London, 1990; and Chartwell
Books, Edison, 2003.
Pimlott, J., Vietnam: The History and the Tactics, Orbis, London, 1982 (Note: there is no
mention of the Battle of Long Tn in this 1982 edition).
Posener, J. (ed), AN/KPQ-1 Radar South Vietnam (Detachment 131 Divisional
Locating Battery South Vietnam 1966-1970), 2009.
http://www.locatingartillery.org/ankpq-1/ankpq-1%20vietnam%20final.pdf
Pribbenow, M.L., Victory in Vietnam, University Press of Kansas, 2002 ie a translation
of: Lch s Qun i nhn dn Vit Nam, Tp III: Thi K Trng Thnh ca Qun i
Nhn Dn Vit Nam trong cuc Khang chin Chng M Cu Nc (1954-1975) The
History of the Vietnam Peoples Armed Forces, Vol III, The Coming of Age of the
Peoples Armed Forces of Vietnam during the Resistance War against the Americans for
National Salvation (1954-1975), Military History Institute of Vietnam, Peoples Armed
Forces Publishing House, Hanoi, 1994.
Price, D.L., The First Marine Captured in Vietnam A Biography of Donald G. Cook,
McFarland & Company, North Carolina, 2007. ((for the Battle of Bnh Gi December
1964)).

The AWM reportedly holds an English translation by Dien Nguyn. A S Tho (Draft) version with
Phm Vn Hy (Secretary of the Province Committee) noted as the Committee Chairman of the writing
group, is Internet-accessible.
2
An English translation of the Long t District History has reportedly been completed by Dien Nguyn
see p.529 (footnote 2 to Chapter 10) in McNeill, I., To Long Tan The Australian Army and the Vietnam
War 1950-1966, Allen & Unwin/Australian War Memorial, St Leonards, 1993. Separately translated
extracts by E.P Chamberlain were Internet-accessible via Scribd wef May 2010.

10
Rock, J.R., Kiwis Under Fire: The New Zealand Armed Forces in South Vietnam c.19651972, University of Auckland, November 1995.
Rowe, J., Vietnam The Australian Experience, Time-Life Books Australia in
association with John Ferguson - Sydney, North Sydney, 1987 and 1993. ((Major J.S.
Rowe served as the GSO2 Int at HQ 1 ATF in 1966)).
Sabben, D.R., Through Enemy Eyes, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2005.
Smith, H.A. (with McRae T.), Long Tan the start of a lifelong battle, Big Sky
Publishing Pty Ltd, Newport, 2015.
The Secretary of Defense, Know Your Enemy: The Viet Cong, DA Pam 360-518,
Washington DC, 18 March 1966. VCAT Item No.2390816001.
Skitch, R. (Bob), War in Vietnam A Surveyors Story (The Royal Australian Survey
Corps at Nui Dat in its first year: 1966-67), Four Parts, 2010. ((see Part 2, pp.54-55 for
five sketch maps by Major H.A. Smith)), 29 September 1966.
http://rasurvey.org/Viet/Part%202.pdf
Sorley, L., The Abrams Tapes 1968-1972, Vietnam Chronicles, Texas Tech University
Press, Lubbock, 2004.
Stanton, S.L. Captain (US Army, Retd), Vietnam Order of Battle, Galahad Books, New
York, 1987 and Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, 2003.
The Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)/BDM Corporation, Study of Strategic
Lessons Learned in Vietnam, Volume 1: The Enemy, Alexandria, June 1982 (VCAT Item
No.2850101001, No.2850102001).
Thomson, R.J., United States Cryptological History Series VI: The NSA Period 1952 to
the Present, Volume 5: Thomas R. Johnson, American Cryptology during the Cold War,
1945-1989: Book II: Centralization Wins, 1960-1972, NSA Fort Meade, 1995.
Tidey, B., Forewarned Forearmed: Australian Specialist Intelligence Support in South
Vietnam 1966-1971, Canberra Papers on Strategic and Defence No.160, Strategic and
Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, December 2007.
Trn nh Th Brigadier General, Pacification, Indochina Monograph, U.S. Army Center
of Military History, Washington D.C., 1980.
Trn nh Th, Pacification, Department of the Army, Washington, 10 October 1977.
Trn nh Th, The Cambodian Incursion, Indochina Monographs, US Army Center of
Military History, Washington, 1979.
Trn on Lm, The 30 Year War, Th Gii Publishers, H Ni, 2012 (English).

11
Trn L, Khu VI khang chin chng M cu nc 1954-1975 (Region VI during the
Anti-American Resistance War of National Salvation), Nh Xut bn Chnh tr Quc gia
(National Political Publishing House), H Ni, 2002.
Trn Th Minh Hong (foreword), a Ch ng Nai (The ng Nai Monograph), Nh
Xut Bn Tng Hp ng Nai, Bin Ha, 2001 ((five t five volumes)).
Trn Th Minh Hong (foreword), The History of the Armed Forces of ng Nai
Province 1945-1995 (Lch S Lc Lng V Trang Tnh ng Nai 1945-1995), Nh
Xut Bn Qun i Nhn Dn, H Ni, 1999.
Trn Quang Toi (et al), Lch s ng b ng Cng sn Vit Nam tnh ng Nai 1930
1995 (The History of the Communist Party of Vietnam in ng Nai Province 19301995), Tp I, II (Vol I, II), Nh Xut Bn ng Nai, Bin Ha, 1997 and 2000.
Trn Quang Toi & ng Tn Hng (eds), Lch S u Tranh V Xy Dng Ca ng
B, Qun V Dn Huyn t (1930-2005) (The History of the Struggle and the
Building of the Party Chapter, the Forces and the Militia of t District), Nh Xut
Bn Tng Hp ng Nai (ng Nai Collective Publishing House), Bin Ha, 2006.
Trn Quang Toi & Phan nh Dng, Lch s ng b Th x Long Khnh (1930 2007)
(The History of the Party in Long Khnh Town 1930-2007), Nh Xut Bn ng Nai,
Bin Ha, 2009.
Trn Ton, Th Trn Xun Lc: Nhng Chng ng u Tranh Cch Mng V Vang
(The Battle of Xun Lc: Stages on the Road of Struggle to a Brilliant Victory), Nh Xut
Bn ng Nai, Bin Ha, 1984.
Trn Trng Kim, Vit-Nam S-Lc (A Summary of Vietnams History), Edition 7, Tn
Vit, Si Gn, 1964.
Trn Vn Cng (et al/tg) Nguyn Vn Kim (hiu nh: checker), Chu Thnh u
Tranh v Xy Dng (1945-1985) S Tho (Chu Thnh District The Struggle and
Development 1945-1985 - Draft), Nh Xut Bn ng Nai/Nh In Thanh Nin, 1988.
Trn Vn Khnh (et al/tg) and: Ban Chp Hnh ng b tnh B Ra-Vng Tu
(Executive Committee of the B Ra-Vng Tu Party), Lch s ng b tnh B RaVng Tu 1930 - 1975 (The History of the Party in B Ra-Vng Tu Province 1930
1975), Nh Xut bn Chnh tr Quc gia (National Political Publishing House), H Ni,
2000. Including Chng VII: anh Thng Chin Tranh Cc B Ca M, Ngy v Ch
Hu 1965-1968 (Chapter 7: Defeating the Limited War of the US, Their Puppets and
Vassals 1965-68). ((Note: This local Party history only mentions 445 Battalion as the VC
force at the Battle of Long Tn)).
http://123.30.190.43:8080/tiengviet/tulieuvankien/tulieuvedang/details.asp?topic=168&su
btopic=5&leader_topic=79&id=BT7121157499
Trn Vn Tra , Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre, Vn Nghe, H Ch Minh
City, 1982.

12
United States Defense Attache Office, VC/NVA Terminology Glossary 4th Edition,
Saigon, January 1974.
United States Mission in Vietnam, The Party In Command : Political Organization and
the Viet Cong Armed Forces, Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes - Document
No.34, Saigon, May 1968.
United States Mission in Vietnam, The Viet Cong Infrastructure, Saigon, June 1970.
United States Mission in Vietnam, Viet-Cong Political Geography of South Viet-Nam
March 1971, Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes - Document No.93, March 1971.
US MACV/JGS RVNAF, Chin C Vit Cng X Dng Ti Nam V-Tuyn 17
(War Material Used By the Viet Cong South of the 17th Parallel), Edition 2, Saigon, 1964.
USMACV, Phung Hoang Advisor Handbook, Saigon, 20 November 1970.
US MACV, Viet Cong Terminology, Saigon, circa, 1965.
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Viet Cong Base Camps and Supply
Caches, Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned No. 68, MACJ343, Saigon, 20 July 1968.
US Navy, Vietnamese Time Concepts and Behaviour Patterns, Naval/Marine Personal
Response, VCAT Item No.2391109004.
Valentine, D., The Pheonix Program, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1990
and 2000.
http://www.american-buddha.com/phoenixprogtoc.htm
Veith, G.J., Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam 1973-1975, Encounter Books, New
York, 2012.
V Bm (et al), ng V Thnh Ph Mang Tn Bc (The Road Back to the City
Named After Uncle Ho), Nh Xut Bn Qun i Nhn Dn, H Ni, 2005.
V Kim Hanh (et al), Xuyn Mc Khang Chin 1945-1975 (The Resistance War in
Xuyn Mc 1945-1975), Nh Xut Bn ng Nai, Bin Ha, 1989.
White, A. (Tony) T. Dr AM, Starlight: An Australian army doctor in Vietnam, Copyright
Publishing Company Pty Ltd, Brisbane, 2011.
Wiest, A (ed), Rolling Thunder in a Gentle Land: The Vietnam War Revisited, Osprey
Publishing Ltd, Botley, 2006.
Reports, Studies and Dissertations
1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF), documents: Orders, After-Action Reports, Situation
Reports (SITREPs), Intelligence Reports (INTREPs), Intelligence Summaries
(INTSUMs), Vietnam Digests, Troop Information Sheets, Order of Battle studies etc.

13
1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF), Short History D445, early 1968. (( 13-page briefing
paper, from DMI-A Canberra archives)).
1st Australian Task Force Vietnam, Combat Operations After Action Report
Operation Smithfield, R723-1-5, December 1966 (with nine maps and the D Coy/6RAR
After Action Report).
http://vietnam-war.commemoration.gov.au/combat/images/long-tan/after-actionreport.pdf
II FFORCEV, Commanders Evaluation Report Cambodia Operations, 31 July 1970,
VCAT Item No.4900110003.
45th Military History Detachment (US), Combat After Action Report, Defense of Loc An
Base Camp 16 June 1969, San Francisco, 3 July 1969. ((Thai forces v 274th VC
Regiment)).
173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), Combat After Action Report ((Operation Toledo: 10
August 7 September 1966)), 15 December 1966.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/510789.pdf
Advanced Research Projects Agency, Basic Profile: NVA PW MR3, Summary Report
No.15, Washington, 14 January 1971, VCAT Item No.2321314001.
Bacci, J.J. Lieutenant Colonel, Consolidated Vietnamese Communist Infrastructure
Neutralisation Report Phc Tuy, Phc L, 29 May 1970.
BDM Corporation/US Defense Logistics Agency, A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned
in Vietnam, Vol 1, The Enemy, Maclean, 30 November 1979/June 1982 - Part 1: VCAT
Item No.2850101001; Part 2: VCAT Item No.2850102001.
Bennington, S. (Official History Curator), Vietnam Battle Intelligence Computer data
tapes Part 2, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 19 November 2014.
https://www.awm.gov.au/blog/2014/11/19/vietnam-battle-intelligence-computer-datatapes-part-2-3/
Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum: The Vietnamese Communists Will to
Persist, 26 August 1966. VCAT Item No.F029200030368 (309 pages including Top
Secret codeword, for Party, morale etc).
Chamberlain, E.P., A Vanguard Disguised, Denied, Dissolved: the Peoples
Revolutionary Party and Hanois Control of the War in the South (Essay), Canberra, 1
May 1987.
Chamberlain, E.P., Research Note 07/2014: Vietnam War: The Battle of Coral - 13 May
1968, Intelligence Aspects and Enemy Strengths, Point Lonsdale, 31 July 2014.
Chamberlain, E. P., Vietnam War: Commander of D445 Battalion at Long Tan Not
Nguyen Van Kiem but Bui Quang Chanh, Research Note 23, Point Lonsdale, 23
September 2010 (to the Australian War Memorial and the Australian Army History Unit).

14
Chesney, E.J. Major, The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Vietnam January 1969
through June 1970, Fort Leavenworth, 2002.
Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) US MACV, various reports and
bulletins principally by the Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC), most
sourced on-line through The Vietnam Center and Archive (VCAT), Texas Tech
University, Lubbock Texas, USA.
Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) - US MACV, D445 VC Local Force
Battalion, MACJ231-6, 17 April 1970.
Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) US MACV, D445 VC Local Force
Battalion, MACJ231-6, 11 November 1971. VCAT Item No.F015900210384
Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) US MACV, Medical Causes on NonEffectiveness among VC/NVA Troops (Third Update), Study 69 II, MACJ231-7, Saigon,
31 August 1969.
Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) US MACV, VC/NVA Signal Order of
Battle - Update, Study 67-021, Saigon, 16 September 1967. VCAT Item
No.F015900250094.
Combined Intelligence Centre Vietnam (CICV) US MACV, VC/NVA Political and
Ideological Training, Study ST 67-054, 18 May 1967. VCAT Item No. F015900240721.
Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) US MACV, Update: The NVA Soldier
in South Vietnam, Research & Analysis Study ST67-013, 3 October 1966. VCAT Item
No.F015900230173.
Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV), VC Ambush Tactics, OB Study 67-026,
Saigon, 6 January 1967. VCAT Item No.F015900210563.
Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) US MACV, VC/NVA Electronic
Warfare (EW) Capability MACV ST 67-061, Saigon, 1 July 1967.
Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), Report of the Conference to Standardize
Methods for Developing and Presenting Statistics on Order of Battle Infiltration Trends
and Estimates Report of Intelligence Conference (6-11 February 1967), Honolulu
Hawaii, 21 February 1967. VCAT Item Number 0240604014, No.F029200040138.
Conley, M.C., The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of
Organization and Strategy, The American University/The Department of the Army,
Washington, March 1967 (research and writing completed November 1966). VCAT Item
No.13530303001; DTIC AD656941.
Cubis, R.M. Lieutenant Colonel, 1st Field Regiment - Operational Report Number 3
(R569-1-2), Ni t, 14 September 1966 including: Annex B Report of Enemy
Artillery Action Night 16/17 Aug 66 ((with an appendixed map overlay)).
(AWM95, 3/5/45).

15
De Cure, P.F. Major, D445 Local Force Battalion, Ni t, 18 January 1969 (13-pages,
AWM95, 1/4/136).
De Heer, D.V., Record of Australian Forces Captured Prisoners of War - July 1966 to
July 1971, email to author (Chamberlain), 19 December 2012 ((based on data in the
Australian War Memorial file: AWM98, 493, Barcode 904597)).
De Heer, D.V, Victoria per mentum: Psychological Operations Conducted by the
Australian Army in Phuoc Tuy Province South Vietnam 1965 1971, MA Dissertation
University of NSW, Canberra.
Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal, Inquiry into Recognition for Service
with 547 Signal Troop in Vietnam from 1966 to 1971, Canberra, 7 May 2015.
Department of Army, Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam, Pamphlet 550-105,
Washington, 1966 VCAT Item No.13450205001. (for the Cao i, Bnh Xuyn, Cham
etc). For the Ha Ho, Khmer see VCAT Item No.13450206001).
Director of Central Intelligence, Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for Fighting
in South Vietnam (Special National Intelligence Estimate 14.3-67), Langley, 13
November 1967. VCAT Item No.F029200050309. Draft (21 October 1967) at VCAT
Item No.F029200050164, 12 September 1970 VCAT Item No. F031100181206.
Director of Military Training, Background Paper to the Viet Cong Military Region 7,
Training Information Letter 14/70 Item 4, Canberra, November 1970.
Directorate of Tactical Evaluation, Project CHECO Report No.94 The EC-47 in
Southeast Asia, HQ PACAF, 20 September 1968. VCAT Item No.F031100181132;
Doughty, R.A., The Evolution of US Tactical Doctrine, Leavenworth Papers, Fort
Leavenworth - Kansas, August 1979.
Hampstead, B.V, 547 Signals Troop in Vietnam: The Soldiers Perspectives
Deployment, Early Days and the Lead-up to Long Tan, Toowoomba, July 2008.
Furner, J.O. Major (GSO2 Int, HQ 1 ATF), 5th VC Division, R569-1-16, HQ 1 ATF Ni t, 22 April 1967 and 15 November 1967.
Graham, N.F. Major (GSO2 Int, HQ 1 ATF), D445 - Order of Battle, 1 ATF Battle
Intelligence Section, Ni t, 29 May 1970.
Graham, N.F. Major, Long Dat Order of Battle, 1 ATF Battle Intelligence Section, Ni
t, 24 June 1970.
Haines, E.B., Rung Sat Special Zone Intelligence Study, 1968 - VCAT Item No.
4000105007.
Johnson, J.R. (et al) - General Research Corporation, Analysis of Tactical Intelligence
Experience in Southeast Asia, Maclean, February 1976. (DTIC ADC0055059).

16
Joint Intelligence Organisation Office of Current Intelligence, South Vietnam: Activity
in Phuoc Tuy Province, OCI Report No. 2/71, Canberra, 27 September 1971.
Leahy, F.P. Lieutenant Colonel, Why Did The Strategic Hamlet Program Fail ?, Fort
Leavenworth Texas, 1990.
Peters, C.C.M. Major (GSO2 Int, HQ 1 ATF), D445 - Order of Battle, 1 ATF Battle
Intelligence Section, Ni t, 6 May 1971.
Peters, C.C.M. Major (& Oldham A.T. Lieutenant), Chau Duc - Order of Battle, 1 ATF
Battle Intelligence Section, Ni t, 23 October 1970.
Richards, T.J. Captain (OC 547 Signal Detachment), Transcript of an Audio Tape to DMI
(MI8), Nui Dat, 13 September 1966 (in response to a DMI signal to OC 547 Signal
Detachment of 30 August 1966).
Townsend, C.M. Lieutenant Colonel, 6 RAR After Action Report Operation
SMITHFIELD: 18-21 August 1966, Nui Dat, 7 September 1966.
(includes the D Company/6RAR After Action Report by Major H.A. Smith at Annex E)
USAID, Public Administration Bulletin, No.50, Saigon, 1 August 1969: including Village
and Hamlet Reorganization (Decree No.093-TT/NV), 2 June 1969, pp.41-58.
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadx813.pdf .
US Defense Attache Office (DAO) - Saigon, PLAF/PAVN Troop Strength by Unit May 1973 , Saigon, 31 May 1973. VCAT Item No.2311006085.
Westmoreland, W.C. General, Report on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 June 1968),
Section II (Section I by Admiral U.S.G. Sharp. VCAT Item No.168300010017.
Weyand, F.C. Lieutenant General, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Combat
Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACJ3-32) (K-1) - Tet Offensive After Action
Report (31 January 18 February 1968), Saigon, 1968.
Zasloff, J.J., Political Motivation of the Viet Cong: the Vietminh Regroupees, RM4703/2-ISA/ARPA, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, May 1968.
Articles
Baker, M., Cosgrove goes back to Vietnam to find foes are now his friends, The Age,
Melbourne, 10 September 2001.
Baker, M., "Stilling the ghosts of battle", Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney,17 August
1996, p.28.
Bergen, J.D., The Electronic Battlefield, Military Communications: A Test for
Technology, Military History Publication 91-12, US Army Center for Military History,
Washington D.C., 1986. http://25thaviation.org/history/id551.htm

17
B Ra-Vng Tu Province Peoples Committee (UBND tnh), Trin khai thc hin xy
dng Tng i Tiu on 445 Anh hng (The Construction of a Memorial to the
Heroic 445 Battalion), Cng Vn (Directive) 2113/UBND-VP, Vng Tu, 2 April 2015.
Braddick, K.J., Jade Warriors Aussies Leaving But Legend Stays, Stars and
Stripes, Saigon, 22 January 1972.
Bi Cnh, Hp mt k nim 50 nm ngy thnh lp Tiu on 445 (Meeting to
Commemorate the 50th Anniversay of the Founding of 445 Battalion), Bao B Ra Vng Tu in t, Vng Tu, 20 May 2015.
Bi Xun, Xy dng tng i v bia tng nim can b, chin s D445 (Erecting a
Memorial and Commemorative Stela for the Cadre and Soldiers of D445), B Ra VngTu (C quan ng b ng cng sn Vietnam BR-VT), 24 February 2011.
Burstall, T., Long Tan: The Other Side of the Hill, Duty First, 1991.
Chamberlain, E. P., The Battle of Binh Ba: a baffling mystery and SIGINT failure
No!, The Bridges Review, Issue 1, Canungra, January 2013, pp.91-92.
Chamberlain, E.P., The Battle of Long Tan 18/8/66 NVA/VC Revisited, Point
Lonsdale, 2013 and 2014.
Chamberlain, E.P., The NVA and VC Soldier: Tougher Than Us, Australian War
Memorial, Canberra, 16 August 2013. (Conference presentation and paper to:
International Perspectives on a Long War).
Chu Nh Qunh, Tm thy 38 bc phac tho xc ng v b i c H (38 moving
sketches found of Uncle Hos soldiers), Tin Mi (On-Line), H Ni, 28 September 2012.
http://www.tinmoi.vn/tim-thay-38-buc-phac-thao-xuc-dong-ve-bo-doi-cu-ho011058132.html
Cooper, W.L., Operation Pheonix: A Vietnam Fiasco Seen From Within, Washington
Post, Washington, 18 February 1972.
Ekins, A., A very close thing indeed ,Wartime, Issue 55, Australian War Memorial,
Canberra, July 2011, pp.34-38.
Ekins, A., Unravelling the riddles of Long Tan, Wartime, Issue 55, Australian War
Memorial, Canberra, July 2011, pp.42-47.
Greenland, H., The Battle Through the Eyes of the Viet Cong The Other Side, The
Bulletin, Vol. 124 - Issue 6533, Sydney, 15 August 2006.
H Nhn, B Ra-Long Khanh v k c khng th qun (B Ra-Long Khnh and
Unforgettable Memories), Communist Party of Vietnam - B Ra-Vng Tu Communist
Party Agency, Vng Tu, 29 January 2008.

18
Hall, R.A., Operation Wandering Souls, Wartime, Issue 55, Australian War Memorial,
Canberra, July 2011, pp.25-29 ((see also the presentation: Hall, R.A., 1st Australian Task
Force A new operational analysis 1966-1971, 11 March 2011 cited below)).
Hall, R.A. & Ross. A., Landmark Battles and the Myths of Vietnam, pp.186-209 in
Stockings, C., ANZACs Dirty Dozen: 12 Myths of Australian Military History,
University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2012.
Ham, P., Betrayal at Long Tan Signal Failure, The Bulletin, Vol. 124 - Issue 6533,
Sydney, 15 August 2006, p.32.
Hannigan, R. R. Lieutenant Colonel, Citation for a Rifle Company: a record of the battle
of Long Tan from Task Force HQ log, Infantry Centre, Ingleburn, 1970, pp.20-28.
http://vietnam-war.commemoration.gov.au/combat/images/long-tan/long-tan-battlerecord.pdf
Hart, S.W. with Chamberlain, E.P., A Tactical SIGINT Success Story, The Bridges
Review (Issue No. 2) Journal of the Australian Intelligence Corps, Defence Publishing
Service, Canberra, 2013 - also in: Pronto in South Vietnam, January 2014.
http://pronto.au104.org/547Sigs/547story3.html.
Howard, B.W. Major General AO, MC, ESM (Retd), The Battle for Ba Ria : 1-2
February 1968, Australian Infantry Magazine, Part 1 (October 2011 April 2012),
pp.76-83; and Part 2 (April 2012 October 2012), pp.72-81, Singleton, 2012.
Hutchinson, I. Captain, The Red Rats of Phuoc Tuy, Australian Army Journal
No.227, April 1968, pp.3-21 also as: Vol V, No.1, Autumn 2008.
http://www.army.gov.au/~/media/Army/Our%20future/Publications/AAJ/1960s/1968/AA
J_227_Apr_1968.pdf
Hu Thanh (as related by H.B.), Min ng Nam B khi la (Fire and Sword in
the Eastern Region), Thursday 28 August 2008,
http://htx.dongtak.net/spip.php?article2256.
Kim Dung, Tm gng bnh d m cao qu: Hng MARIN c b thin s (A
simple but noble example: Ms Hng of MARIN an angel, Qun i Nhn Dn, H
Ni, 19 November 2011
http://qdnd.vn/qdndsite/vi-vn/61/43/ky-su-nhan-vat/hang-marin-co-be-thiensu/167292.html
Kim Dung and An Vu, An angel to the victims of the fallen, Vietnam News, 5 March
2012.
Johnson, L., Operation Lavarack - Phuoc Tuy Province, Vietnam, 1969, Australian
Army Journal, Vol VII, No.2, Winter 2010, pp.89-114.
L M Lng Major General, T Thai Bnh n B Ra - Long Khnh (From Thi Bnh
to B Ra), Qun i Nhn Dn On-Line, 18/19/20 January 2015 ((a three-part history of
D440 Battalion including being retitled D440 on 16 August 1967)).

19
L Thin Minh Khoa, i Thanh Nin Xung Phong (The Assault Youth Unit),
Lch s Truyn thng a phng B Ra-Vng Tu, Phn II, Trang Vn Hoa-X Hi
Lch s B Ra-Vng Tu, 11 December 2009.
L Thin Minh Khoa "Qu trnh hnh thnh Thanh Nin Xung Phong" ("The Process
of Founding the Assault Youth"), T Ho s xanh B Ra-Vng Tu Ln 2 (Pride in
the History of B Ra-Vng Tu Part 2), 25 October 2010.
http://www.thanhnienbrvt.com/index.
Lu Dng, Nhng chng ng phat trin ca lc lng v trang B Ra-Vng Tu
The Stages of Development of the Armed Forces of B Ra-Vng Tu, C Quan ca
ng B ng Cng Sn Vit Nam Tnh B Ra-Vng Tu, Vng Tu, 17 December
2009.
McNeill, I., Major, Post Script to the Battle of Ba Ria ((Interview in Ba Ria June
1988)), Australian Infantry Magazine, Part 2 (April 2012 October 2012), Singleton,
2012.
Nguyn nh Khanh, Trn anh Long Tn 18/8/1966 The Battle of Long Tan
18/8/1966, http://vantuyen.net/index.php?view=author&id=297.
Nguyn nh Thng, Nhng k c khng th no qun (Memories that can never be
forgotten), Communist Party of Vietnam - B Ra-Vng Tu Agency, Vng Tu, 1
February 2008.
Nguyn Hng Phc - Major General, Truyn thng chin u ca s on BB5 Anh
hun (The Fighting History of the Heroic 5th Infantry Division), K c ngi lnh S
on 5 2010 (Memories of the 5th Division Soldiers - 2010), H Ch Minh City,
November 2005.
Nguyn Qu i, Hnh trnh t nhng con tu khng s (Voyages of the UnNumbered Vessels), in Hng hi VN - Mt thi ho hng A Heroic Time (Nhng tp
th v ca nhn tiu biu ngnh GTVT 1945-2005).
Nguyn Thanh Thy ((former unit commander)), Nh n Bit i Thin Nga
Remembering the White Swan Special Unit, 17 June 2008.
Nguyn Vn Bch, Trn Phc Kch Long Tn (The Ambush Battle at Long Tn),
Cu Chin Binh (War Veterans) Thnh Ph H Ch Minh Vit Hi Ngoi Online,
Thnh Ph H Ch Minh (H Ch Minh City), 18 December 2014.
Nguyn Vn Bch, Cuc ng u vi l on 1 qun i hong gia c (The Clash
with the 1st Royal Australian Brigade), Vit Hi Ngoi Online, 3 April 2015.
(the 18 December 2014 article above, with a You Tube video Australian footage of the
Long Tn).
Nhm PV, Lt li nhng v an do Cng an ng Nai trit pha 5: p tan m mu
gy bo lon ca Fulro (Over-turning of the charges by the ng Nai Public Security
Service wiped out Instalment 5: The FULRO plot for violent disorder completely
destroyed), Bo ng Nai, Bin Hoa, 13 August 2010.

20

Pannell, B.W., Postscript to Long Tan, Australian Infantry, 16, No.2, May 1970.
Phan L Hong H, Chuyn k v ng mn H Ch Minh trn bin: Huyn thoi
nhng con tu (Tales of the H Ch Minh Trail on the Sea: Legends of the Boats),
vietbao.vn, 30 April 2005. http://vietbao.vn/Xa-hoi/Chuyen-ke-ve-duong-mon-Ho-ChiMinh-tren-bien-Huyen-thoai-nhung-con-tau/45154282/157/
Phm Vn Hy, Tnh y B Ra-Long Khnh Vi Chin Trng Xun Lc-Long Khnh
(The B Ra-Long Khnh Province Committee and the Xun Lc-Long Khnh
Battlefield), pp.161-164 in Military Region 7 (Qun Khu 7), Chin Thng Xun LcLong Khnh (The Xun Lc-Long Khnh Victory), Nh Xut Bn Tng Hp ng Nai,
Bin Ha, 2004.
Pribbenow, M.L., "General Vo Nguyen Giap and the Mysterious Evolution of the Plan for
the 1968 Tet Offensive, Journal of Vietnamese Studies, 3 Summer 2008, pp.1-33.
Smith, H. A. Lieutenant Colonel SG, MC (Retd), No Time for Fear, Wartime Issue
35, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 2006.
Smith, H. A. Lieutenant Colonel SG, MC (Retd), The Story Behind the Battle of Long
Tan, RAAF Radio School Magazine, No.39, May 2012. (Lieutenant Colonel H.A. Smith
Retd cites: enemy, now known to be five battalions (three of 275 Regt, NVA 806, and
D440), plus supporting arms and troops.).
Race, J., "Mutual Self-limitation in Civil War: The Case of Vietnam", Southeast Asia,
II:2, Spring 1973, pp. 211-230.
Townley, J.H. AM Brigadier (Retd), Early Days in 131 Div Loc Bty, 131 Locators
Association.
http://www.131locators.org.au/james-townley.html
Trn Ngc Ton, Lieutenant (ARVN 1965), The Bnh Gi Front, 10 January 2000:
http://www.k16vbqgvn.org/tranbinhgia.htm . The 4th Marine Battalion and the Battle of
Binh Gia, 24 July 2014: https://txdung39.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/18-the-4thmarine-battalion-and-the-battle-binhgia.pdf . Also in Vietnamese as: Nhng S Tht V
Trn Bnh Gi (The Truth About Binh Gia) - http://www.k16vbqgvn.org/butky-suthattranBinhGia.htm .
Trn V, Second Lieutenant (ARVN 1965), Tiu on 4 Bnh Gi i! Cn nh mi
(I Still Recall Binh Gia) http://buonvuidoilinh.wordpress.com/2012/09/02/mx-tran-vetieu-doan-4-binh-gia-oi-con-nho-mai/
Veith, G.J. and Pribbenow, Fighting is an Art: The Army of the Republic of Vietnams
Defense of Xuan Loc 9-21 April 1975, pp.163-213 in: The Journal of Military History,
No.58, No.1 (Jan., 2004), Society for Military History, 2004.
http://freedomforvietnam.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/fighting-is-an-art-the-army-ofrepublic-of-vietnams-defense-of-xuan-loc-9-21-april-1975-3397252.pdf

21
Vnh Tng, Giao Lu K c Ma Xun i Thng (Exchanges on Memories of
the Great Spring Victory ), C Quan ca ng B ng Cng Sn Vit Nam Tnh B
Ra-Vng Tu, Vng Tu, 25 April 2005.
Willbanks, J.H., More Flags, Free World Military Forces in Vietnam, 23 September 2000.
VCAT Item No.3400102002.
Wirtz, J.J., Intelligence to Please: The Order of Battle Controversy during the Vietnam
War, Political Science Quarterly, Vol 6, No.2, Summer 1991, pp.239-263.
Xun Thanh, Tiu on 445 Trong Tn Cng Xun Lc-Long Khnh (445 Battalion
in the Attack on Xun Lc-Long Khnh), in Military Region 7 (Qun Khu 7), Chin
Thng Xun Lc-Long Khnh (The Xun Lc-Long Khnh Victory), Nh Xut Bn Tng
Hp ng Nai, Bin Ha, 2004.
Maps
1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF), VC Districts and Sub-Districts, Special Overprint
AFV/MISC/ 2187, Special Use S.E. Asia 1:100,000 Sheet 6430 Series L607, circa
1971.
1st Australian Task Force, (1 ATF), 1 ATF Special Overprint (Sheet 1), Edition 8, Special
Use S.E. Asia 1:100,000 Sheet 6430 Series L607, Correct as at 20 February 1971.
DVDs/Television Programmes/Film/Presentations
, S on B Binh 5 Ho Kh Min ng Phn 1: Trng thnh trong la n (The
5th Infantry Division Powerful and Magnanimous in the Eastern Region Part 1:
Coming-of-age in War), Military Region 7/HCM TV Film Company, HCM City, released
on 15 November 2012 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kfj-zstwEZg
Australian Screen, Terrain Study of Phuoc Tuy Province South Vietnam 1967,
National Archives of Australia, Canberra NAA: A12724, 350. Video 29 minutes, 59
seconds. For extract see http://aso.gov.au/titles/sponsored-films/terrain-study-phuoc-tuy/
Chamberlain, E.P. Lieutenant, Intelligence Agencies and their Functions Phc Tuy
Province (Presentation), 1st Divisional Intelligence Unit - Ni t, 23 May 1969.
Chamberlain, E.P. Lieutenant Colonel, Area Study Phc Tuy Province (Presentation),
Army Command & Staff College Queenscliff, 28 March 1984.
Chamberlain, E.P., Tougher Than Us The NVA/VC Soldier (presentation and paper),
Australian War Memorial Conference: International Perspectives on a Long War
(Vietnam), Canberra, 16 August 2013.
Chamberlain, E.P., The Enemy and Intelligence, in Phuoc Tuy: Successes and
Failures (presentation and paper); Conference: Phantoms Australias Secret War in
Vietnam, National Vietnam Veterans Museum, Phillip Island, 12 April 2014.

22
Hall, R.A. Dr, 1st Australian Task Force A new operational analysis 1966-1971
(presentation), Vietnam Center & Archives Seventh Triennial Symposium, Session 5A,
Lubbock Texas, 11 March 2011. VCAT Item No.999VI3155.
Hart, S.W. Lieutenant Colonel (Retd), A History of Australian SIGINT Operations, Part I
Part 2, Canberra, 2014. (presentations)
Hartley, R.W. & Hampstead, B.V., The Story of 547 Signal Troop in South Vietnam
1966-1972, Googong, 2014. (DVD - also as an earlier three DVD set)
Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan The True Story, Australian
Broadcasting Commission/Film Australia, Lindfield, 1993.
Lay, D., (Director/Producer), The Battle of Long Tan, Animax Films Pty Ltd/Red Dune
Films, Sydney, 2006 (1hr 41: 14) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8gUSq7pxux4
Pribbenow, M.L., "The Vietcong and PAVN Historical Perspective on the Battle for Tan
Son Nhut" (presentation), Vietnam Center & Archives - Sixth Triennial Symposium,
Lubbock, 13 March 2008.
Pribbenow, M.L., "General Vo Nguyen Giap and the Evolution of the Plan for the 1968
Tet Offensive (presentation), Vietnam Center & Archives - Sixth Triennial Symposium,
Lubbock, 14 March 2008.
Sabben, D.R., Was the Battle of Long Tan a VC ambush? : A presentation, Australian
War Memorial, Canberra, 1996 (F 959.704342 S114w). ((See also the Long Tn
Powerpoint presentation online at http://www.dave-sabben.com/ ))
Smith, H.A. Lieutenant Colonel (Retd) SG, MC, The Long Tan Battle & an Australian
Soldiers Perspective of the Vietnam War, 9 June 2012, pp.22-43 in Vietnamese
Community in Australia, Reflections on the Past Looking to the Future, Bonnyrigg, 810 June 2012. http://vietnamese.org.au/vca/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/VCA-BookMay-2012-National-Conference.pdf .
V Vn Cm - Director, Trng thnh t trong chin u (Coming-of-age during
combat), B Ra - Vng Tu Television, 4 November 2014. ((A 20.38 minute
documentary film on D445 Battalion. Commentators included Colonel (Associate
Professor/Dr) H Sn i, Associate Professor Dr H Minh Hng, and D445 Long Tn
veteran Major (Retd) Nguyn c Thu. Footage from Vietnamese sources and
Australian official and commercial sources is included in the program.))
http://www.btv.org.vn/vi/c803i53728/Truong-thanh-tu-trong-chien-dau.html .
Walker, M. (Director), Private Terrence Hippo Hippisley Vietnam, In Their
Footsteps, Channel 9, Melbourne, 12 June 2011.
Walsh, Martin (Producer), Danger Close the Battle of Long Tan, to be released in
2016.
http://dangerclosemovie.com/ .
Website/Blogs

23

Dng nc - Gi nc (Build the Nation, Maintain the Nation). Vietnamese military

website - includes discussion of the Battle of Long Tn.
http://www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php/topic,2976.10.html
Including: Trn Long Tn - The Battle of Long Tn, quansuvn blog. Contributors
include: altus - 8 May 2008; sudoan - 23 August 2008; danviet, soiaxm, chianshan,
ancakho, hamduthu, macbupda, lonesome, rongxanh. February/March 2011 (to 29
March 2011) ((Qun S Vit Nam site, X dc trng sn i cu nc, Mc Lc, Trn
Long Tn))
http://www.quansuvn.net/index.php/topic,2976.0/wap2.html
Hall, R.A. Dr (Lieutenant Colonel Retd); Ross, A. Dr; Kimberley, P.; Griffin, A. Dr; De
Heer, D.V.; Turner, T. Dr; Smith B.L. Australias Vietnam War: Exploring the combat
actions of the 1st Australian Task Force, University of NSW/Australian Defence Force
Academy, Canberra, 2015. (On-line access to information on nearly all ground combat
actions fought by 1 ATF during the Vietnam War, numbering over 4,665).
https://vietnam.unsw.adfa.edu.au/
K c ngi lnh S on 5 2010 (Memories of the 5th Division Soldiers)
http://www.cuuchienbinhf5.vn/gioi-thieu
Including: Nguyn Hng Phc Major General (1932-2011), Truyn thng chin u
ca s on BB5 Anh hung (The Fighting History of the Heroic 5th Infantry Division),
H Ch Minh City, November 2005.
MARIN (Trung tm t vn phap lut v tr gip phap l cho gia nh lit s Centre for
the Legal Advice and Lawful Assistance for the Families of Martyrs), Nhn tm ng i
(Seeking Information on Comrades), H Ni. http://www.nhantimdongdoi.org/
Nguyn S H, Ngi a (The Ferryman), Bnh Dng including photographs of
headstones in the B Ra-Vng Tu Martyrs Cemetery at:
http://teacherho.vnweblogs.com/post/9313/282926
Rongxanh, Phn b - qun s cac n v Qun Gii phng min Nam trn lnh th m n
Nam Vit Nam n 31/5/1973 (Deployment and Strengths of the South Vietnam
Liberation Armed Forces with the Territory of South Vietnam 31 May 1973; Note
USDAO-sourced data), Qun S Vit Nam.
http://www.quansuvn.net/index.php?topic=113.115;wap2

24

Readers Notes and Comments

INDEX
(listed by main text page number, footnote then Annex, page number, footnote)
1 ATF Preface, Main text f.194, f.230,
f.231; for location, see map rear cover.
1 ATF, defences (mid-1966) f.267;
Annex E p.27, f.154, f.161.
1 ATF, engagements (summary) f.515,
f.643; Annex F p.25, f.107.
1 ATF, intelligence assets Annex E
f.2.
1 ATF, operational priorities (May
1969) f.400.
1 ATF, strength f.230, f.637 (1966).
1 ATF, tactics (VC summary of)
pp.67-68, f.241, f.242, f.449, f.450 for
three basic tactics cited by VC.
1 ATF, withdrawal f.514-515.
1st Air Cavalry Division f.479.
1st Airborne Brigade f.584.
1st Australian Task Force - see 1 ATF.
1st Divisional Intelligence Unit (Det)
Preface f.9, Annex F f.43; Annex O f.82.
1st ng Nai Battalion pp.191-192;
Annex J p.7.
1st Field Squadron (RAE) f.373.
1st Infantry Division (US) - f.199, f.203,
f.215, f.392.
1st Key Area Vanguard Headquarters
p.27, f.445, f.446.
1RAR f.203, f.215, 369, f.373, f.380.
1st Regiment (ex-275th VC Regiment)
f.606; Annex O pp.37-38, f.7, f.10.
2nd Airborne Brigade p.107.
2nd Company/D445 (almost twice
wiped out) p.212, f.640.
2nd Corps/Coastal Zone force (PAVN)
f.589.
2nd ng Nai Battalion p.192.
2RAR (and 2RAR/NZ) f.284, f.348,
f.478, f.481, f.487.
2/75 Campaign (1975) f.571.
3rd Brigade (1st Air Cavalry Division)
p.138, f.479.
3rd ng Nai Battalion p.193.
3rd Marine Battalion p.8.

3rd NVA Division (Sao Vng) pp.176177, f.345, f.586, f.588.

3RAR f.255, f.348, f.352, f.353, f.369,
f.373, f.481, f.486, f.487, f.493; Annex
K f.14, f.19.
3rd Regiment (VC Group 13) Annex O
f.55, f.101.
4RAR (4RAR/NZ) f.373, f.511, f.515.
4th Corps (IV Corps - NVA) p.190.
4th ng Nai Battalion p.192.
4th Marine Battalion p.8, p.43, f.131,
f.147, f.150, f.151, f.588; Annex E p.38.
4th Regiment - see the 274th Regiment.
4th Tank Company (NVA) f.587.
5RAR f.194, f.223, f.231, f.238, f.239,
f.243, f.438, f.630. Annex E p.25, 27, 31,
33, 34, 37, f.48, 69, 79, 86, 96, 133, 134140, 154, 167.
5th Airborne Battalion f.151.
5th Ranger Group p.151.
5th NVA Division Annex K f.1; Annex
O f.134.
5th VC Division Preface f.6, Main
Text: p.61, 71, 73, 191, 216, f.92, 134,
135, 151, 178, 189, 190, 214, 215, 222,
223, 234, 245, 255, 256, 257, 259, 261,
262, 266, 267, 269, 270, 271, 272, 274,
276, 283, 287, 292, 293 296, 302, 305,
312, 315, 327, 328, 403, 497, 511, 512,
604, 606, 615, 635. Annex K: extract
from 2005 history (Long Tn); Annex N
p.5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, f.10, 12, 26, 27, 38;
Annex O p.2, 10, 11, 19-22, 27, 28, 34,
f.10, 11, 19, 20, 21, 33, 37, 41, 44, 51,
55, 67, 71, 74, 82, 101, 104, 105, 134,
Appendix 2, Appendix 3; Annex Q
(2014).
5th VC Division, association website
Annex K, f.1.
5th VC Division, history Preface f.6;
Annex K (Long Tn extract), videos,
(2012) see Annex K f.1, f.52.

5th VC Division, memorial (i tng

nim) Annex O f.82.
5th VC Division, strength Annex K
f.56, f.66; Annex O f.11, f.33.
5th VC Division, studies (by 1 ATF)
Annex K f.2.
5th Ranger Group p.151.
5th Regiment - see 275th Regiment.
5th Regiment (PAVN, coastal) f.606,
p.193.
6th Airborne Battalion f.151.
6th Artillery Battalion (VC) Annex O
f.61.
6th Battalion (3rd NVA Division) p.177, p.178.
6th Company (Tn Ph District) p.184,
p.185.
6th Company (D440) f.369, 498, 501.
6th Division (NVA) p.172, f.572,
f.573, f.577.
6th ng Nai Battalion p.193.
6th Engineer Battalion f.491.
6th Ranger Group f.528.
6RAR (6RAR/NZ) pp.79-80, f.137,
250, 255, 259, 260, 267, 269, 273, 275,
276, 283, 284, 287, 288, 293, 295, 310,
312, 409. Annex E p.17, 20, 26-28, 36,
39, 40.
6RAR, memorial and cross (Battle of
Long Tn) Annex O p.41 and
Appendix 3 f.18.
6th Sapper Battalion f.504-505, f.539;
Annex J f.32.
7th Airborne Battalion f.151.
7th Company (33rd NVA Regiment)
p.163, p.165, f.511, f.550, f.553.
7RAR f.165, f.348, f.456, f.468, f.472,
f.473, f.478.
7th Division (NVA) f.549, f.575, f.577.
8RAR f.283, f.284, f.417, f.453, f.456.
9th Battalion (33rd NVA Regiment)
f.550.

9th Infantry Division (US) f.331,

f.334, f.367.
9th La Ng Regiment f.608.
9th Regiment, 340B Division f.327.
9th VC Division f.131, f.151; Annex E
f.33, f.45, f.151; Annex R f.4.
10th Water Sapper Battalion f.539.
10th (18th) ARVN Division f.23, f.223,
f.301.
11th Airborne Battalion f.352.
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11
ACR) p.81, 90, 100, 110, f.297, 328,
334, 336, 369; Annex E p.17, f.63;
Annex K pp.1-2; Annex N p.10, 11, 13,
14, 15, f.2, 46, 49, 51; Annex P p.3.
12th Regiment (3rd NVA Division)
f.586.
14th [sic] Battalion p.194.
16th Regiment p.196.
18th Division (ARVN) p.101, 102,
103, 105, 106, 107, 116, 151, 157, 165,
166, 174, 181, f.23, 223, 301, 353, 372,
375, 380, 403, 517, 527, 538, 553, 583,
584, 596.
18th Sapper Battalion f.546, f.556,
f.558.
19th Regiment p.196, p.197.
20th (C20) Company p.26, p.37, f.93,
f.228, f.547.
23rd Regiment f.293; Annex O f.99.
24th Battalion (Artillery) f.549.
25th (C25) Company (Long t) p.52,
166, 167, 171, f.61, f.178, f.488, f.546,
f.547, f.556, f.565, f.567.
26th Company (Long t) f.560.
30th Ranger Battalion p.151.
31st Ranger Battalion p.84, p.151.
33rd Ranger Battalion p.43, f.150,
f.151.
33rd Regiment (NVA) p.108, 113,
145, 147, 159, 163, 165, 181, f.385, 389,
405, 491, 505, 509, 510, 511, 528, 532,
546, 549, 550, 553, 556, 572, 643;

Annex K f.66; Annex O p.35; Annex P

pp-5-6.
33rd Regiment, history outline f.511.
33rd Tactical Area (ARVN) f.23;
Annex P p.2.
34th Company (Chu c) p.163,
f.547, f.565, f.575.
35th Ranger Battalion p.8.
36th Ranger Battalion p.8.
36th Regiment Annex E f.33, f.37.
38th Ranger Battalion p.36, p.42, f.91,
f.150.
40th Company (C.40) p.13, p.218.
40th Unit f.36.
41st (C41) Company p.175, p.176,
f.328, 350, 503, 509, 539, 547, 575, 581;
Annex P f.25.
43rd [sic] Company (Chu c) f.546,
f.556.
43rd Regiment/Task Force/Brigade
(ARVN) p.151, p.165, f.369, f.370,
f.375, f.538, f.553, f.584, f.596.
44th VC Regiment f.546, f.556.
45th Company (C.45) f.109, p.13,
p.14, p.15, p.16, p.17.
45th (5th/275th) Regiment f.293;
Annex O f.45, f.91, f.99.
48th Regiment/Task Force (ARVN)
p.103, p.174, f.352, f.538, f.553, f.575.
51st Company f.83.
52nd Ranger Battalion p.94, p.95,
p.181, p.352; Annex K p.2, 15, 16.;
Annex O p.3, f.14.
52nd Regiment/Task Force (ARVN)
p.102, f.375, f.405, f.519; Annex O p.7,
31, 32, 35, f.30, 46, 130.
54th PF Platoon (Long in) f.490.
66th Regiment f.293.
75th Artillery Regiment p.196.
80th Artillery Group f.133.
83rd Artillery Regiment (US) f.355.

84 Rear Services Group f.98, f.108,

f.224, f.243; Annex F f.29, f.43, f.57;
Annex K f.21.
94th Regiment (see: 274th Regiment).
141st Battalion p.196, f.627.
141st Regiment (3rd NVA Division)
f.587.
146th ASA Squadron (US) Annex E
p.11, p.13, p.35, f.50.
173rd Airborne Brigade (US) p.55,
p.110, f.193, f.194, f.203, f.217, f.223,
f.225, f.231. Annex E p.24, 33, f.47, 67,
68, 84, 90-92, 138; Annex N p.7, 8, 9,
14, f.23, 27, 28, 35, 39, 40, 41, 44, 46;
Annex O p.19, f.74.
186th Artillery Battalion f.133, f.136.
199th Brigade, (US) f.215; Annex K
f.59.
203rd Company f.539; Annex P f.4,
f.11.
205th NVA Regiment (Cambodia)
Annex O p.36, f.10, 137, 138, 139.
207th Company (Cao Su District)
f.539, f.574.
209th Regiment (7th NVA Division)
f.575.
234th RF Battalion p.174, f.575.
240th/240C Company f.178, f.189;
Annex J f.20.
246th Independent Company f.565.
246th Battalion f.532.
250th /250A Regiment f.288; Annex M
f.39; Annex O f.24, 25, 26, 91, 99.
271st Regiment (Q761) p.38, p.40,
p.41, f.131, f.134, f.136, f.138, f.145,
f.147, f.154; Annex E p.2, f.11.
272nd Regiment (Q762) p.40, p.42,
p.43, f.135, f.136, f.138, f.145, f.147,
f.149, f.151, f.154; Annex E p.38.
274th (Artillery) Battalion f.539, 551.
274th Regiment (4th Regiment) p.61,
86, 88, 147, 149, 150, 151, 153, 158,
163, 191, f.86, 203, 215, 223, 243

(strength mid-1966), 257, 266, 268, 283,

288, 297, 305, 308, 328, 331, 334, 369,
491, 509, 512, 517, 525, 532, 551, 572,
630, 643; Annex E p.2, pp.20-26, 32-33,
38-40, 43-47, f.12, 34, 45, 49, 51, 79, 90,
97, 99, 105, 121, 122, 130, 143, 151,
161, 177, 197; Annex K p.3, 5, 6, 13, 14,
15, 17, 18; Annex L pp.1-2; Annex N numerous; Annex O p.2, 11, 28, f.1, 11,
14, 19, 21, 41, 44, 77, 74, 77, 90, 112.
274th Regiment, radios Annex N p.6,
p.7, f.23, f.27, f.45; Annex E p.22, 29,
39, f.12, 116, 133, 141, 170.
275th Regiment (5th Regiment) p.71,
p.73, f.135, 181, 203, 243, 245, 257,
259, 261, 262, 265, 266, 267, 269, 272,
274, 275, 281, 283, 285, 288, 292, 293,
295, 312, 315, 369, 512, 606, 643;
Annex E pp.1-3,16, 20-24, 26, 29-44, 49;
Annex K p.2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 15, 16, 17;
Annex L pp.1-2; Annex N pp.1-7, pp.1314; Annex O including Appendices 1
and 4 (casualties); Appendix 3 (history).
275th Regiment, account of Long Tn
battle Appendix 3 to Annex O.
275th Regiment, casualties f.278;
Annex F pp.11-12; Annex L pp.1-2, f.5;
Annex O pp.20-24 (Long Tn incl
172/139 named/listed KIA at pp.2224), f.7, 15, 17, 22, 28, 47, 70, 89, 102,
105, 116, 122, 128, 150. Lists at
Appendices 1 and 4 to Annex O.
275th Regiment, headstones (KIA
18/8/66) Annex O p.43, f.153,
Appendix 1 to Annex O.
275th Regiment, History (published
2015) Preface f.8; Annex O Appendix
3.
275th Regiment, Long Tn (senior
cadre) Annex O pp.12-13 and
Appendices 2 and 3.
275th Regiment, mail Annex O pp.3942.

275th Regiment, malaria Annex O

pp.4-5, 18, 35, f.17-20, f.40.
275th Regiment, organisation chart
(1969) Annex O Appendix 3, p.8.
275th Regiment, personnel profile
(December 1966) Annex O pp.22-24.
275th Regiment, Party and Youth Group
membership Annex O f.102.
275th Regiment, radios Annex E pp.13, 21-23, 27, 49. Annex O p.19.
275th Regiment, strengths f.266, f.295;
Annex E f.5; Annex F p.2, f.59, f.97;
Annex O p.1, 3, 7, 8-9, 15, 18, 19, 28,
34, 35, 37, f.33, 69, 82, 90, 102, 107,
119, 122, 127, 131. Appendix 3 p.8.
See also: Long Tn, numbers.
275th Regiment, wages/allowances
Annex O f.132.
302nd RF Battalion p.151, p.158,
p.163, p.171, f.238, f.553.
307th Regiment Annex A f.24.
308th NVA Division f.511.
308th RF Battalion (Long An) p.171,
f.565, f.566, f.569.
317th Division p.193.
318th Regiment (anti-communist
resistance) p.184.
324th RF Battalion (Long Khanh)
p.153.
325th NVA Division f.24, f.511, f.523,
f.527.
325th RF Battalion p.171.
326th RF Battalion p.168, p.171,
f.562.
338th Division Annex A, f.25.
340B Division f.327.
341st Division f.577.
355th RF Battalion p.163, p.171,
f.553, f.559, f.566, f.569.
356th RF Battalion p.167, p.179,
f.518, f.544, f.545.
365th RF Battalion (White Elephant)
p.161. f.545.

371st RF Battalion f.565.

386th RF Company f.472.
397th Company Annex A p.5.
397th Regiment Annex A f.24.
400 Battalion (see: D400) f.295.
440 Battalion (D440) p.88, p.100,
p.113, p.144, p187, p.188, p.193, f.21,
102, 249, 327, 367, 369, 396, 404, 405,
418, 422, 434, 468, 472, 473, 495, 501,
510, 574, 587, 596, 607, 608, 612, 618,
642; Annex L p.1; Annex M f.15;
Annex O p.22, 23, f.61, f.86, f.88;
Annex P (History - 13 pages, dispersal of
D445 at f.42, dispersal of D440 at f.53;
total casualties D440 at f.59; memorial at
p.13).
440th Company pp.32-47, f.124.
445 Battalion Intro, p.5, p.9 see also
the Index listing for D445.
445th Company pp.17-47, f.253, f.439.
480th Battalion Annex O f.23.
547 Signal Troop/Det f.190, f.417;
Annex E: numerous including pp.5-9.
604th RF Company (Bnh Ba) f.364.
605th Battalion f.273, f.274, f.288,
f.293, f.295; Annex E p.3, f.4, f.159;
Annex K f.37; Annex M f.19, f.39;
Annex O p.6, 7, 20, 23-24, f.24, 26, 28,
30, 36, 55, 77, 91, 99, 101, 151.
610 Company f.341, f.352, f.539.
611th RF Company p.20.
612th RF Company p.20, f.299.
634th Battalion f.539.
634th Sapper Battalion f.532
656th Regiment Annex A, pp.5-6.
746th Regiment p.187, f.607; Annex J
p.7.
761 (271st) Regiment p.38, p.39, p.40,
p.41, p.42, p.43.
762 (272nd) Regiment p.39, p.40, p.42,
p.43..
779th Front (Cambodia) p.193, f.195,
f.628.

800th Battalion p.23, f.86, f.87, f.98,

f.109, f.133, f.136, f.148, f.149, f.215,
f.243.
806 Battalion (NVA) f.295; Annex O
f.61; Annex P f.3.
814 Rear Services Group - f.491.
840 Battalion (MR6) Annex O p.6.
860 Battalion f.203, 231, 259, 269,
288, 295; Annex C f.3; Annex M f.39;
Annex O f.61, f.91; Annex P f.3.
980, agent f.113.
1500th Military Hospital Annex E
p.30; Annex F p.7, pp.12-14, f.56-58;
Annex O p.22.
1500th Group f.98, f.131.
1972 Offensive pp.148-149, f.520.
6994th Security Squadron (USAF)
Annex E p.11, 14, 22, 24, 35, f.44, f.50,
f.86, f.87, f.91.
7701 Group (Cambodia) p.194; Annex
J p.7.
A.31 Company (Area 3) f.539.
A.32 Company (Area 3) f.539.
AAAGV f.515.
AATTV f.352, f.515, f.517.
Abilene, Operation f.199, 203, 206,
215, 223, 392.
Aborigines, 1 ATF f.242.
Accelerated Pacification Program
p.107, p.108, pp.110-112, pp.119-120,
p.125, p.131, p.132, f.376, f.385, f.422.
Accommodations, local dtente,
mutual self-limitation- f.111, f.306,
f.410, f.448.
Addendum, D445 command
appointments (listing 99 cadre) pp.218220.
Aerial defence (2002) p.208.
Age profiles (445 Battalion) Annex G
p.4, p.5.
Agroville p.7, f.16, f.71, f.155.
AH1G helicopter (Cobra: Lp Fish)
f.221, f.486.

Airborne Brigade (ARVN) p.8,

p.107, f.150, f.584.
AK-47 rifle p.100, f.131; Annex Q
p.5.
Aliases, nicknames, aka Preface f.7,
f.445; Annex C f.15.
Allied forces, strengths f.305
(1966), f.535 (1969).
Ambush (VC types) p.52, p.53, p.60,
f.183, f.187, f.267, f.544, f.545.
American advisors p.103, f.39, f.61,
f.133, f.148, f.149, f.151, f.185, f.306,
f.314, f.340, f.341, f.375, f.402.
AN/KPQ-1 mortar locating radar
f.269, Annex O f.49 and Bibliography.
An Giang Province p.190, f.18, f.605,
f.615.
An Ngi p.23, p.120, p.149, f.77, f.91,
f.148, f.149, f.380, f.488, f.507.
An Nht p.20, p.23, p.104, p.120,
p.130, p.176, f.378, f.463, f.488, f.507.
An Ph hamlet f.239.
An Tr (administrative detention for
VCI) f.244.
Anti-American Belts/Zones f.224.
p Bc (Ha Long) p.22, p.25
p Bc (M Tho, 1963) f.151.
p Cu hamlet p.145, f.559, f.567.
AR-15 Armalite rifle p.60, p.126,
p.130, p.139, f.426, f.442, f.458.
Area I (south of Route 23) p.171.
Area 1 (1975- ie H Nai, Du Giy, Gia
Kim) p.182.
Area II (Long t) p.170.
Area 2 p.182, f.563.
Area 2 (1975- ie Route 2, Long Khanh,
the ng n T-Junction) p.182. f.564.
Area 3 (1975- ie Lc An, i An, Tn
Uyn, B Stream) p.182, f.207,
f.539.
Area 4 (1975- ie Ni Dinh, Th Vi,
Vng Tu) p.182.
Area 13 (S Bng) f.498.

Armed Propaganda p.9, 11, 13, 14,

17, 21, 28, 29, 30, 37, 45, 54, 124, 126,
127, 142, 152, f.61, f.446.
ARVN locations, Phc Tuy (mid1966) f.240, Nov 1966 f.301.
Attack (Long Tn) f.267.
Attack (planned on Ni t base,
August 1966) f.267; Annex E p.20, 21,
27, 29, pp.38-40; Annex N pp.11-12;
Annex O pp.10-11.
Artillery (Australian) f.277.
Artillery (US) f.277.
Artillery (NZ) p.66, f.237, f.277,
f.535; Annex M p.10.
Assault Youth p.42, f.125, f.257,
f.371; Annex F pp.12-13, p.21, f.54, 56;.
Annex L p.1.
Assault Youth Hill f.324.
Attrition, strategy Annex F, p.1, f.1.
Australian casualties (Long Tn)
Annex F pp.15-18.
Australian casualties, 1969 (VC
claims) f.438, f.465, f.638; Annex F
f.2; Annex P f.51.
Australian casualties (total in Vietnam
War) f.515; Annex F f.79; Annex P
f.51.
Australian forces, aborigines f.242.
Australian forces, strengths - f.230,
234, 305, (1966), 535 (1969), 637.
Australian forces, withdrawal p.148,
f.513, f.514.
Australian troops, VC comment on
p.67, f.241, 242. Annex O Appendix 3
p.5.
Australian War Memorial Preface.
Autumn f.9, f.258, f.403.
Awards (D445) see Certificates,
Letters, Medals and summary at f.613*
and Annex G f.13.
Awards (D440) Annex P p.3, f.14,
f.18.

B2 Front/Theatre p.35, f.120, f.345,

f.573, f.580; Annex J f.19.
B3 Front (see: COSVN).
B-28 Technical Reconnaissance Unit
(NVA SIGINT) f.190, f.533.
B-36 (Mike Force) - f.239, f.515.
B40 (RPG-2) f.335 (data).
B41 (RPG-7) f.335 (data).
B-46 Intelligence Unit Annex E f.53,
f.145.
B-52 (aircraft) p.108, f.309, f.387,
f.431, f.497*; Annex N p.8, f.38; Annex
O f.107, f.128.
Ba Anh f.426.
B Bin Province p.3, p.22, f.81,
f.470; Annex J f.2, p.3, f.20.
B Bn Hill p.120.
Ba Ci, Comrade p.150, p.169, f.219.
B Ch Province p.3; Annex J f.2.
Ba Cc (see: Nguyn Vn Cc).
B Ci Plantation f.556.
Ba i p.13, p.218; Annex B p.1.
B ic (Deaf Lady) Plantation (Battle
of Long Tn) f.275, f.283. Annex F
p.11.
Ba c (V c) f.266, Annex O p.9,
13, 17, f.50.
Ba Dng (Nguyn Dng) Annex O
p.2, 9, 13, 25, 26, 32, f.2, f.119.
Ba H p.13, p.14, p.15, p.218, f.53*;
Annex B p.1.
Ba Khi f.40.
Ba Kin (L Minh Kin) p.41, p.87,
p.99, p.102, p.219, f.333; Annex B p.2,
p.3.
Ba Kim (D440) Annex P f.22, f.24.
B K Slope pp.60-61, f.210.
B L Culvert p.152.
B Lang (Bnh Ba/Bnh Gi) pp.5859, f.203, f.204.
Ba Lo p.42.
Ba Lim Annex B p.6.
Ba Lin - see / Vn Lin/Chng.

B Lin see Ba Lin above.

Ba Liu (CO 3/275) Annex O p.29,
f.119.
B Long (B Ra - Long Khnh)
Province f.104, f.244; Annex J p.4,
p.5.
Ba Lng p.30, p.41; Annex B p.2.
Ba L p.36.
Ba Lng (see: Trn Vn Lng).
Ba Mu village p.23.
Ba Qung f.66; Annex B p.1.
Ba Ri District (Cambodia) p.193.
B Ra - Long Khnh Front f.338.
B Ra - Long Khnh Medical
Services f.164, f.252, f.282.
B Ra - Long Khnh Province f.62,
f.118, f.158, f.345, f.385, f.422, f.539,
f.574, f.578; Annex J f.2, f.24-f.29
(organisation).
B Ra - Long Khnh Province Unit
f.260, f.409, f.468, f.532, f.538, f.539,
f.575; Annex J incl p.5.
B Ra Province p.1, p.3, p.10, p.20,
p.32, p.35, p.39, p.45, p.55, p.56, p.180,
p.199, p.209, f.1, f.34, f.99, f.173, f.188,
f.201, f.329, f.423, f.523.
B Ra Province, VC Districts f.104;
see map on rear cover.
B Ra Province Concentrated Unit
f.40, f.159, f.160-162; Annex A p.1
(founded), f.4, f.115.
B Ra Province/Provincial Unit
p.32, p.45, p.176, f.153, f.159, f.160162, f.171, f.188, f.218, f.224, f.302,
f.495; Annex J f.2.
B Ra Sub-Region p.3, p.141, p.149,
p.152, f.346, f.488, f.489, f.491, f.492,
f.531, f.532; Annex J f.2, f.29, f. 31.
B Ra Sub-Region, COSVN criticism
of cadre ineptness mid-1972 f.531.
B Ra Sub-Region, disbanded (April
1972) p.154.

B Ra Sub-Region, study (1 ATF)

f.489, f.492, f.509; Annex J f.29.
B Ra Town, fall of (27 April 1975)
f.587.
B Ra-Vng Tu Province and
Military Headquarters, established
(August 1991) pp.197-198, f.592.
Ba Tm (see: Nguyn Thanh Tm).
B Thanh (see: Nguyn B Thanh)
Annex A p.5, f.26.
Ba Thun f.333.
B T p.13, p.14, p.23, p.134, p.148,
p.158, p.187, f.607.
Ba t (see: Nguyn c Hot, Nguyn
Vn t, Nguyn t).
Bc Ninh Battalion Annex P p.2,
p.12.
Bc Sn Regiment Annex O pp.6-7.
Balmoral, Battle of f.369.
Ban M Thut (March 1975) f.571.
Bng Lng base (ng Ngh) f.62,
f.158.
Bank, robbery by VC (November 1967)
f.332.
Bo, ARVN officer p.31.
Bo, Comrade p.30.
Bo An (Civil Guard/Civil Defence
Force) p.14, f.48, f.114, f.301, f.545..
Bo Bnh p.140, f.579.
Bo Bnh 1 (March 1975) p.173.
Bo Bnh 2 (March 1975) p.173.
Bo Bnh base f.579.
Bo Chnh Annex O p.4.
Bo Ha p.173, f.576, f.579.
Bo Lit p.173.
Bo Th - p.173, f.576.
Bo Ton f.575, f.576.
Barrier shield, tactic (by 1 ATF)
p.110, p.126, pp.128-131, p.210, f.390,
f.455.
Base Area 1 f.137.
Base Area 13 f.497.
Base Area 33 f.384; Annex F p.13.

Base Area 301 f.260.

Base Area 302 f.474, f.483.
Base Area 303 Annex N p.3, f.10,
f.35.
Battle of Bnh Ba (June 1969) f.389,
f.405, f.510; Annex P pp.4-6.
Battlefield clearance (by 1 ATF - Long
Tn, August 1966) Annex F, f.89.
Battlefield clearance (by NVA/VC), of
casualties, weapons p.36, f.124, f.371;
Annex F pp.20-21; Annex H p.5.
Bu Lm p.6, p.10, p.23, p.27, p.28,
p.29, p.34, p.204, f.100, f.137, f.384,
f.388, f.596; Annex P pp.4-5.
Bu/Bu Lm, base area f.137, f.384.
Bu Lm, re-education camp f.596.
Bu/Bu Lng p.65, p.66, f.239;
Annex K f.15.
Bu Ma p.5.
Bu Nga p.5.
Bu Nhm (Xuyn Mc) f.382.
Bu Non f.331.
Bu Su (Long t) p.5, f.518.
Bu Sen base f.328; Annex F p.12,
f.29, f.53.
Bu Thnh p.7, p.23..
By Bnh (Phan Thanh Bnh) p.169,
p.219.
By Cao (OC C-41, 1975) f.581.
By Gip, Comrade p.191, p.219.
By Kin p.48.
By Sang p.26, p.29, f.344.
B, Captain ARVN (c Thnh SubSector) f.117, f.410.
B, Comrade see B Gi.
B, Major ARVN (Sector 2ic) f.434.
B Gi (see: Trn Vn B).
B Nm, Comrade p.114.
Bn (Landing/Wharf) Li p.23.
Bn Nm (1967) Annex K p.16,
Annex J p.6, 14; Annex O p.11, 31, 32,
f.46.
Bn Tu p.14, p.15, p.16.

Bn Tre f.108.
Bin, Comrade p.16.
Bin Ha p.2, 3, 4, 8, 10, 22, 35, 55,
71, 167, 180, 182, 183, 191, 196, 197;
f.22, 23, 24, 26, 64, 81, 133, 136, 150,
193, 197, 203, 217, 262, 281, 329, 348,
369, 423, 513, 539, 556, 573, 574, 575,
592, 636; Annex J p.3, p.4, p.7, f.2, f.22,
f.30; Annex O p.33, 34, 41, f.1, 60, 67;
Annex P p.2.
Bin Ha Artillery Squadron f.133,
f.136.
Bnh Ba pp.6-7, p.12, p.13, p.23,
p.149, f.40, f.104, f.147, f.149, f.202,
f.203, f.217.
Bnh Ba (1964) pp.29-31, f.106, f.117.
Binh Ba (1968) p.99, f.364.
Bnh Ba, Battle of (June 1969) f.405,
f.511; Annex P p.4, p.5, p.6, p.9, f.26,
f.28, f.30, f.31, f.32, f.61.
Bnh Chu p.4, p.23, p.160, f.171,
f.384.
Bnh ng (Si Gn area) f.121.
Bnh Dng Province f.64, f.72,
f.155, f.369, f.513, f.617; Annex C f.42.
Bnh Gi p.9, 20, 23, pp.34-44
(Battle), p.47, p.55, p.58, f.76, f.121,
f.203, f.257, f.344; Annex E p.24, 38,
f.90, 96, 105; Annex O p.11, f.4.
Bnh Gi (271st) Regiment f.134.
Bnh Long Province f.64, f.133, f.403,
f.617.
Bnh Phc f.617, f.619.
Bnh Thun p.3, p.4, p35, p.185, f.120,
f.281, f.441, Annex O p.14, p.28, f.23.
Bnh Tuy f.1, f.6, f.23, f.274, f.474,
f.479, f.483; Annex O p.5, 6, 9, 11, 31,
f.130; Annex P p.14 (Province map)
Bnh Xuyn p.10, p.45.
Blogsite, Vietnamese military f.296.
B p p.16, p.169, f.316, f.565,
f.566.

Body count f.369, f.370, f.374; Annex

F p.1, pp.2-10, pp.19-20.
Body count, interpretation (US, 1 ATF)
Annex F f.84, f.85.
Bn, Comrade (H Vn Bn/T Bn) f.325, Annex B p.4.
Bren machinegun - f.441.
Brothers, siblings (D445) see D445
History (1991): p.51, f.180.
B p pp.191-192.
B Lp trees f.12.
Bugles p.17, p.20, p.57, p.215, f.228,
f.250; Annex E p.3, p.30, f.17, f.123.
Bi Chn [sic] p.169.
Bi Chnh p.219; Annex B p.8.
Bi Quang Chnh (Su Chnh)
Preface p.4; Main Text p.47, p.51, p.53,
p.69, f.159, f.177, f.188, f.245, f.247,
f.261, f.263, f.355; Biography: Annex A
pp.1-5; Annex B p.2, f.8. f.14; Annex D
f.2; Annex G p.4, f.19; Annex H p.1, p.3,
p.6; Annex L p.1.
Bi Quang Hnh Annex O p.43, f.93.
Bi Thanh Vn (t Lim) f.134,
f.145.
Bi Th Lan, Major General (Marine
Corps Commander) p.176.
Buick, R. (Bob) S. Sergeant, MM
(1966) Annex A p.17, p.21; Annex B
f.29; Annex F f.11.
Building 64 (Bnh Ba) f.364.
Bulldozers p.26, 90, 110, 112, 148,
160, 167, 171, f.498.
Bulldozers, Long Tn (VC burials)
Annex F p.8, f.22.
Bng Bc p.7.
Bng Lng (Hc Dch village) p.12,
p.17, p.18.
Bng Mn p.13.
Bng [sic] Ring (Xuyn Mc) p.23,
p.28, p.135, p.136, f.473.
Bunker tactic/strategy p.116, p.123,
f.411.

10

Bunkers p.36, 82, 83, 97, 110, 115,

116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124,
128, 134, 167, 177, 210, f.229, f.473,
f.478, f.487, f.559, f.638.
Bunkers, king of the bunker attacks
p.122, f.429.
Burials p.102, p.137, f.643; Annex F
p.1, p.24, p.25, p.24, f.22; Annex H p.5.
Burstall, T. interviews f.79, f.92,
f.226, f.250, f.262, f.263, f.266, f.267,
f.269, f.271; Annex A p.17, p.22, f.10,
f.11, f.12, f.37, f.66, f.68, f.73, f.75, f.81,
f.94, f.105, f.118, f.121; Annex F p.2,
f.4, f.21, f.26, f.79; Annex K f.37, f.41,
f.58; Annex O p.17, f.5, 50, 54, 63, 6668, 99, 102-104.
Bu, Miss (Ha Long) p.22
C.1 Engr-Sapper Company f.539.
C9 Company (33rd Regiment) f.505.
C.12-65 Company (Assault Youth)
f.125, f.257; Annex E p.29, p.30, f.119,
f.120; Annex F pp.12-13, p.21; Annex L
p.1; Annex M f.22.
C.20 f.62, f.93, f.559.
C-20 (274th Regiment) f.243.
C20 Company f.93, f.228, f.547.
C21 Company f.228.
C22 Special Guard (anti-communist
resistance) f.612.
C25 (see also: 25th Company) p.32,
p.102, p.140, p.141, p.145, p.147, f.87,
f.109, f.110, f.186, f.353, f.380, f.404,
f.440, f.454, f.490, f.507, f.517, f.561,
f.566.
C.25 p.60, f.539.
C-25 f.333, f.543.
C.29 (Long Xuyn) f.539.
C.30 (Long Xuyn) f.539.
C34/34th Company f.547, 565, 575.
C-36 Company (sapper/recon) f.468,
f.471, f.473; Annex P p.9, f.34, f.40,
f.44.

C41 Company (see also 41st Company)

p.175, p.176, f.350, f.503, f.547, f.580;
Annex P f.25.
C70 Company f.472, f.517.
C.187 f.260; Annex E f.155.
C.210 Annex F p.14, f.59.
C.203 Company (Xun Lc) f.539;
Annex P f.4, f.11.
C.210 (Bnh Thun Province) Annex
F, p.14, f.59.
C610 Company f.202. f.538.
C860 Battalion f.203, f.231, f.259,
f.269, f.288, f.295; Annex C p.1, p.2, f.3.
C.982 Annex E f.155.
C Thi p.106, f.382, f.383.
C Thi, ambush (31 December 1970)
f.165, f.396, pp.136-137, f.476, f.478,
f.479, f.641.
Cadre f.37; Annex G f.6, f.14; Annex
J p.2, f.9, f.16.
Cadre, grading/certification/
classification p.202.
Cai Tam Plantation (1 ATF base area
at Ni t) p.65.
Cm ng village (Cao Su) p.159.
Cm M - p.100, p.153, p.154, f.36,
f.215, f.334, f.369, f.516, f.555, f.556;
Annex P p.3.
Cambodia p.1, p.57, 187, 193, 194,
196, 198, 211, 215, f.1, f.59, 195, 200,
466, 468, 523, 527, 570, 597, 605, 606,
609, 611, 615-617, 627-629; Annex O
(275th Regiment) p.32, 35, 36, 38, f.10,
f.127, 135, 136, 139, 143, 146.
Cambodia, war with (see South-West
Border War) p.187, 191, 192, 193,
195, f.605, f.609.
Cambodia, troops (Australian training
of) f.239; Annex K f.16.
Cambodian Revolutionary Peoples
Party p.194.
Campaigns (NVA/VC) listing Annex
P f.26.

11

Can, measuring (Lon - Guigoz)

f.408.
Can Ba Mia hamlet, f.447.
Cn Gi District p.3, 4, 10, 49, 50,
209, f.34, f.108, f.171, f.636.
Cn Thnh p.50.
Cao i, temple p.6, p.103, f.17.
Cao Su Company f.539, f.574, f.575.
Cao Su District p.14, 29, 30, 31, 32,
107, 141, 154, 159, f.104; Annex P p.9.
Cap St Jacques (see Vng Tu).
Casualties, non-battle (NVA/VC)
Annex F pp.21-22, see also Malaria.
Casualty, calculations (NVA/VC)
f.271; Annex F pp.19-20; Annex O p.18,
21, 22, f.7, 20, 70, 89; Annex G p.1.
Casualties (NVA/VC), studies f.644;
Annex F p.21, p.25, f.95, f.106.
Catholics p.21, pp.36-37, p.42, p.126,
p.148, f.76, f.121, f.123, f.352, f.440.
Cu (bridge) Di p.20.
Cu c p.105.
Cu Sa (Hi M) p.120.
Cu Trng p.191, f.619.
Cu Trng p.20.
Cu Tum (Phc Hi) p.158, p.166,
f.500, f.559.
Cy Cam Slope p.14
Cy Da p.134, p.135, f.472, f.476,
f.478.
Cy Kh - p.177.
Cy Me p.25.
Cy Vng p Thu T- Junction
p.114.
Cy Vng (Sesame Bushes) p.101,
f.226.
CDEC Preface p.4, f.9.
Cell, communist system p.48, p.199,
p.201, f.311, f.506.; Annex G pp.5-6.
Central Highlands p.172, f.4, f.28,
f.345, f.389, f.511, f.571.
Central Highlands Campaign (1975)
p.172, f.571.

Central Office for South Vietnam - see

COSVN.
Certificates of Commendation (Bng
Khen) p.195, 200, 205, f.152, 153, 188,
208, 220, 279, 280, 613; Annex A p.13;
Annex D p.5, f.7, f.38; Annex F p.23,
f.73, f.99, f.101; Annex G p.3, p.5, f.13;
Annex H p.2; Annex M f.43; Annex O
p.6, 24-26, 39, f.30, 92, 151; Annex P
f.14, f.18.
CH-47 (Chinook), helicopter f.250;
Annex O p.20.
Chamberlain E.P., Lieutenant Annex
B p.9 (photograph).
Chu, Comrade (C-41, 1975) f.581.
Chu c Preface f.16 (History);
Main Text: p.3, 5, 20, 46, 47, 56, 58, 61,
63, 76, 81, 83, 88, 89, 90, 93, 96, 97, 99,
111, 112, 113, 114, 141, 145, 146, 147,
148, 154, 157, 158, 159, 163, 176, 180,
199, 203, 204; f.48, 62, 81, 90, 93, 102,
104, 106, 136, 154, 158, 171, 203, 207,
215, 217, 225, 228, 245, 275, 305, 308,
320, 321, 328, 345, 346, 350, 355, 358,
364, 401, 405, 409, 410, 489, 503, 505,
507, 508, 509, 538, 539, 546, 547, 553,
556, 575, 580, 585; see map rear cover;
Annex A p.3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16,
f.16 17, 26, 27, 29, 34, 37, 41, 44, 49,
51, 52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 89, 90, 91, 132;
Annex E p.41, p.44, f.147, f.171.
Chu c Company, attack on Long
Tn village offices on 18 August 1966
Appendix 3 to Annex O p.4.
Chu c (orbat Oct 1970) f.503.
Chu Pha p.10, p.44, p.93, p.112,
p.208, f.243, f.346; Annex K p.5, f.66.
Chu Ro p.6, p.7, p.15, p.35, p.36,
p.42, 185, f.14.
Chu Thnh Preface f.16 (History);
Main Text: p.4, 17, 19, 23, 32, 34, 37,
180183, 184, 186, 188, 197, 198, 210,
f.62, 93, 104, 158, 253.

12

Chemical attack (against VC) p.83,

p.84, p.110, p.112, p.114, p.210, f.12,
f.246, f.248, f.308, f.309.
Ch Linh (Vng Tu) p.181, f.189.
Chiu Hi (Open Arms) program
f.402, f.415, f.437, f.506; Annex G p.2,
f.9, f.11.
Chn L (see: L Chn).
Chn Hng p.14.
Chn Phn f.325; Annex B p.4.
Chn Phng Ms Annex L p.1; Annex
M p.5, p.10.
Chn T (Hunh Vn T) - p.13.
China (Nationalist/Taiwan) f.305,
f.535.
China (War with 1979) f.610, 623.
Chinese p.53, f.84, f.270, f.271.
Chinese General, account of
NVA/VC casualties at Long Tn f.271,
278; Annex F pp.10-11, f.46-f.49.
Chi ng f.131, f.151, f.154, f.215.
Chm Du (t ) p.152.
Chop Rock f.453.
Chu Hi p.23.
Chu Huy Mn f.222.
Cha Chan Mountain f.596, f.611.
Chung, medic f.269, Annex K f.40.
CIC-V Preface p.4.
Ciphers/codes, NVA/VC p.93, f.345,
f.417, f.438; Annex E p.3, p.6, p.7, f.24,
f.33, f.34, f.86, f.99, f.145.
Citadel (Thnh a) f.108.
Civil Labourers (see: Labourers).
Civil Defence Force/Civil Guard (Bo
An) p.14, 15, 18, 20, 24, 25, 30, f.49,
f.91, f.114, f.301.
Civilian Irregular Defence Groups/
Mike Force f.42, f.209, f.239, f.470,
f.515.
Claymore mines p.119, p.128, p.136,
f.318, f.19, f.487.
Clearance Diving Team 3 (RAN)
f.230.

C May Bridge f.585, f.587.

Close ambushing (tactic by 1ATF,
1970) f.449, f.450.
Code of Discipline (VC) f.311.
Codes p.93, f.345, f.417, f.438; Annex
E p.6, 7, f.24, f.33, f.34, f.86, f.99, f.145.
Codes, mislaid (Tt 1968) p.93, f.345.
Codewords Annex E p.3, 11, 41, f.79,
f.86.
Combat PSDF f.433.
Combat Youth p.36, f.116, f.170,
f.377, f.433.
Command Report D445 (mid-1966)
Annex H.
Commando/s p.13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22,
59, 60, 67, 94, 112, 114, 115, 125, 126,
129, 131, 186, f.42, f.77, f.209, f.211,
f.241, f.331, f.349, f.380, f.390, f.472.
Commandos (Australian infantry as)
p.11, p.114, p.126, p.129, p.131, f.42,
f.241, f.331, f.380, f.390; Annex P p.5.
Commando companies p.114, f.42,
f.209, f.380, f.472.
Communications, deception - Annex E
p.47, f.151, f.193, f.194.
Communications, encryption f.417.
Communications, radio (NVA/VC)
f.417; Annex E including pp.2-3.
Communications Security
(COMSEC), 1 ATF f.190, f.460;
Annex E f.99.
Communications Security
(COMSEC), NVA/VC f.417; Annex E
p.3, p.36, p.37, f.29.
Communist Party p.6, p.7, p.10,
p.198, f.3, f.196, f.345, f.617; Annex G
p.1, f.1.
Computer, intelligence (1 ATF, PDP8/L) Annex E p.44, f.178, f.179.
Con Chim Hill (Cm M) f.100,
p.101, f.369.

13

Cn o (archipelago in the South

China Sea) p.3, 4, 178, 180, 197, 198,
200, f.590.
Cn o District Unit p.200.
Con post p.23.
Con Rn post (Cm M) p.152.
Con Rn Mountain (1975) f.579.
Cn Sn (Cn o prison island)
f.244, f.590.
Concentration area/camp f.16
Concerted Uprising (ng Khi) 1960
f.16, f.26, f.58, f.639.
Cng Du (t ) p.120, p.150,
f.333.
Cng Qunh p.52.
Cng Trn T-Junction p.192.
Coral, Battle of f.369.
Cosgrove, P. Lieutenant General
Annex A p.11, f.39, f.63.
COSVN p.16, 22, 32, 35, 37, 38, 39,
40, 42, 44, 55, 58, 71, 79, 86, 88, 92,
108, 110, 113, 141, 149, 154, 161, 167,
172, 180, 181, 182, f.3, f.59, f.127;
Annex J p.4, p.6, f.4, f.7, f.9.
COSVN, directives f.393, f.543.
COSVN Directive No. 27 (re-education)
p.180.
COSVN, Resolution 15 p.172, p.211.
Counter-revolutionary groups (1975- )
p.182; (mid-May 1997) p.184, p.185,
p.186, p.188, f.633; Annex P pp.11-13.
Counter Terror Teams f.352 (later
Commando Companies - f.209, then
PRU).
Coup, 1963 (anti- Dim) p.31.
Cover designators Preface f.3; Main
Text: f.59, f.139, f.293, f.422, f.454,
f.491, f.492; Annex O (275th Regiment)
p.33, 34, f.10, 16, 30, 91, 94, 145.
Cover names Preface f.7; Main Text:
f.184, f.454; Annex A p.1, p.5, p.8, f.1,
f.34.
Crazy Buffalo Battalion f.375.

Crimes alleged, by Australian troops

f.331; Annex K p.4.
Criticism, self (kim tho) f.311;
Annex G p.7.
CTC [sic] rifle f.131.
C Bi f.151.
C Lao p.185, f.603.
Cu Nh p.5, p.6.
Ca Lp River p.21, p.177.
Cultural activities p.98, p.205; Annex
G p.3; Annex H p.4.
Currency (1975 - 1976) p.183, p.189,
f.598.
D1 Battalion f.422.
D2 Battalion f.422.
D400 VC Battalion f.295, Annex F
f.41; Annex L p.1; Annex M f.15; Annex
O f.61.
D440 Battalion (see: 440 Battalion).
D445/2nd Company (almost twice
wiped out) p.212.
D445, 50th Anniversary (19 May 2015)
Annex A p.21, p.25.
D445, awards (incl summary) f.613;
Annex G f.13; Annex F f.99; Annex H
p.2.
D445, casualties f. 278, f.644 (List of
539 KIA); Annex F (Long Tn) pp.2-6,
pp.8-10.
D445, combat operations (1,000
battles summary) f.638, f.643.
D445, command appointments/listing
Addendum at pp.218-220. See also
Annex A for biographies of key cadre.
D445, communications (see also: D445
radios) p.11, 118, 152, 153, 174, 192,
215; Annex E p.4, pp.44-45.
D445, counter-ambush tactics p.129,
p.130, p.131.
D445, demobilisation p.189, p.196.
D445, disbandment/deactivation (1971)
p.146, f.489, f.509; Preface (2008).

14

D445, dispersal ordered (1970) f.447,

f.489 (divided up 1971), f.507-f.508
(1971); Annex P f.42.
D445, divided/dispersed into four groups
(April 1968) pp.99-100, f.365.
D445, educational standards Annex D
p.5; Annex G p.5, f.19.
D445, heroic unit title awarded p.1,
p.2, p.57, p.190, p.210, f.2, f.610, f.613,
f.627.
D445, history (Vietnamese documentary
film, 2014) Preface f.14; p.179; Annex
A p.17, f.98; Annex Q f.1.
D445, key cadre Addendum (list)
pp.218-220; biographies at Annex A.
D445 (Kratie Cambodia, 1984)
p.194, f.622.
D445, Long Tn battle probable cadre
appointments Annex D.
D445, medals p.27, 79, 131, 152, 167,
168, f.94, 188, 189, 220, 228, 246, 462,
530, 561, 613.; Annex I (Submission, 10
July 1966); Annex M f.46.
D445, memorial/monument f.643.
D445, morale p.18, p.82, p.98, p.101,
p.102, p.113, p.117, p.137, f.171, f.173,
f.202, f.203, April 1967: f.253, f.313,
f.506; Annex G p.3, f.12 (September
1965); Annex H p.2, p.4 (mid-1966);
Annex O f.38, 43, f.93..
D445, movement rates (indicative)
f.254; Annex E p.47, f.160; Annex N
f.35.
D445, northern reinforcements (1972)
f.523.
D445, personnel profile (1966) Annex
D p.4, p.5, Annex G p.4, p.5; Annex H.
D445, personnel (possible photograph and discussion) Annex C p.8, f.42.
D445, pursuit operations pp.181-188,
p.195 (Cambodia - 1984).
D445, radios f.107, 117, 148, 149, 185,
186, 200, 211, 417, 466, 472, 486, 517,

529, 544, 561, 562, 567, 578; Annex E

p.4, f.23, f.24.
D445, re-concentrated (May 1972)
p.149, f.521.
D445, re-established/recreated
(November 1989) p.196.
D445, as sappers f.468.
D445, South-West Border War, f.618.
D445, studies (by 1ATF) f.250, f.344,
f.394.
D445, studies (by US) f.250.
D445, senior cadre (mid-1966) Annex
B.
D445, shortcomings p.100, p.104,
p.137, p.158, p.189 (1975).
D445, slogans p.120, p.215.
D445, strengths Annex C.
D445, strength (Long Tn) f.231,
f.261, f.266, f.295,
D445, strengths mid-1966 Annex C
pp.1-2; Annex D pp.4-5.
D445, strength Tt 1968 f.362.
D445 tactics p.60, p.129, p.130, p.131,
p.141, p.212, f.222, f.250, f.286 (1 ATF
assessment), f.287.
D445, traditions (four) pp.211-216.
D500 Battalion f.532, f.539.
D555 Rear Services Group f.98;
Annex F p.13, f.58.
D605 Battalion f.273, f.274, f.288,
f.293, f.295; Annex E p.3, f.4, f.159;
Annex K f.37; Annex M f.19, f.39;
Annex O p.6, 7, 20, 23-24, f.24, 26, 28,
30, 36, 55, 77, 91, 99, 101, 151.
D800 f.87, f.98, f.109, f.149, f.216,
f.243.
D860 Battalion (see: 860 Battalion).
a Bn(g) base f.476, f.478.
Ging/Dng p.21, 22, 43, 52, f.61,
77, 149, 180, 181, 186, 188, 189, 379.
Hoai District (Lm ng Province)
p.185.

15

Da Quy/Gia Quy (Horseshoe) p.66,

p.85, p.121, p.122, f.238, f.275, f.316,
f.525.
a ng [sic] f.180, f.184.
Dakota, aircraft p.145, f.502. See also
EC-47.
Dm Tm 36 (ARVN Operation, FebMar 66) f.197, f.202; Annex K p.15.
ang, Miss f.430.
ng Cng Quang (Quang H) p.52,
f.220; Annex D f.10.
ng Hu Thun (t ng/V ng)
p.88, p.93, f.260, f.302, f.337, f.341,
f.342; Annex J p.2, f.11, f.20, f.21, f.23;
Annex K p.7, f.32; Annex L p.1.
ng Li ch f.523; Annex G f.26.
ng Vn Bnh, Major (CO D445
1997-98) pp.199-201, p.220; Annex B
p.8.
ng Vn Hi Annex P f.38.
ng Vn K (Ba K - 274th Regiment),
Annex N p.8, f.13.
ng Vn Sach Annex A f.7.
ng Vn Tin (Nm Tin - Chu c
District) Annex A f.28.
ng Vit im Annex O p.27.
Danh Su Chin Annex D f.12.
o Cng Hiu Annex P p.9.
o c Thin Annex O f.153.
o Ngc Ha (D440) f.501.
o Thanh Xun (Hai Xun) p.41,
Annex B p.2; Annex D f.12, Annex O
f.127.
o Vn Tng (Tm Tng) p.111,
134, 140, 150, 157, 169, 219, f.143,
f.334, f.396*; Annex B p.3, 4, 8; Annex
D f.8.
o Vn Trung f.285; Annex D p.6;
Annex F p.22, f.100.
o Vn Tun f.30*, Annex D p.3,
f.19.
p Thu base (Hi M) p.152.
Darkest time (August 1969) p.114.

t - Preface f.16 (History); Main

Text: p.3, 5, 8, 23, 59, 60, 66, 78, 82, 97,
102, 105, 106, 113, 114, 116, 117, 119,
120, 122, 123, 124, 126, 131, 132, 144,
147, 150, 151, 152, 153, 157, 159, 162,
163, 166, 170, 176, 183, 190, 212, f.61,
77, 98, 104, 109, 110, 111, 147, 148,
149, 156, 210, 211, 223, 238, 253, 283,
300, 316, 333, 372, 374, 375, 386, 390,
403, 406, 411, 422, 426, 430, 432, 434,
440, 445, 447, 449, 453, 455, 456, 460,
463, 464, 468, 475, 488, 500, 507, 517,
525-530, 540, 547, 557, 587. Map: rear
cover.
t Gai p.27, f.275, Annex Q f.9.
De Heer, D.V. Annex O f.92; Annex
Q, f.3.
, Major (ARVN) p.171.
, Second Lieutenant (ARVN) pp.2324.
Dead, disposal of Annex H p.5, see
also Burials.
Death Notices (VC) Annex F pp.1415.
Deception p.21, 45, 60, 209, 212. See
also piggy-backing ruse.
Deception, communications Annex E,
p.47, f.151, f.193, f.194.
Decision-making, democratised (mid1966) f.256, f.311, f.635.
Deer (Mn) f.428.
Defenders-of-the-Church Youth
f.123.
Defense Attache Office (USDAO)
f.532, f.534, f.539, f.541, f.543.
Definitions, US f.208.
Demobilisation p.188, p.186.
Desertion p.202, p.208, f.171, f.173;
Annex D f.3; Annex G p.2, f.12, f.15;
Annex H p.4.
Determined to Win Unit title (2001)
- p.205.

16

DH10, DH5 mines f.225, f.274,

Annex M f.21.
DKB rockets (122mm) f.425, f.308,
f.422, f.426.
D An f.147.
Diaries (NVA/VC) f.165, 215, 243,
265, 283, 308, 422, 426, 468, 481, 523,
526, 630; Annex F p.4, 7, 16, f.19, f.3840, f.73, f.104; Annex N p.4, 5, 6, 11,
f.14, 15, 16; Annex O p.21, f.44, 84,
106, 107.
Dinh C - p.23, f.500, f.559.
nh Qun Annex O p.7, p.34.
DIOCC (Pheonix program) f.542.
Directive 70 (COSVN finances) f.393.
Discipline p.98, 150, 189, 195, 202,
205, 207, 208, 212, 214, f.311.
Discipline, violations of p.200, p.201,
p.13; Annex G f.13; Annex H p.2.
Directive 71 (COSVN) p.110, f.393.
Directives (COSVN) p.161, f.543.
District boundaries (VC) f.104; see
map on rear cover.
Tin Khi f.524.
Vn Chng - see also / Vn
Lin p.11, p.27, p.218, f.35, f.171,
f.175, f.204, f.354; Biography : Annex A
pp.12-15; Annex H; Annex I; Annex J
f.21.
/ Vn Lin (Ba Lin) f.35, 171,
175, 188, 246, 248, 261, 269, 280, 309,
321, 348, 354; Biography : Annex A
pp.12-15; Annex B p.3, 4, f.21, f.29;
Annex D p.1, 4, 6, f.3; Annex H, Annex
I; Annex J f.21.
on (Group) 10 f.10; Annex J f.29.
on 12B f.465; Annex J f.24.
on 45 f.293; Annex F p.25; Annex
O p.21, f.8, 10, 30, 35, 91, 94.
on 54 Annex O p.27, 39, f.10, 94.
on 80 f.139.

on (Group) 84 f.98, f.224, f.243,

Annex K f.21 see 84 Rear Services
Group.
on 125 f.98.
on 1500 f.98; Annex F p.13, f.56,
f.57; Annex O p.22.
on Vn Khoan Annex O f.122,
128, 130.
Dodo, 1 ATF operation against VC radio
Annex E pp.14-17, p.49, f.52, 53, 59.
i t p.20.
i Xim Annex K p.3.
Don Fields p.5
n (Post) Ln (Phc Hi) p.170,
f.565, f.567.
n Sp (Phc Hi) p.23, p.57, p.82,
p.83, p.170, f.299, f.304, f.565.
ng Ha village p.49, p.50.
ng Khi Movement p.9, p.16, p.45,
p.211, f.16, f.26, f.58, f.639.
ng Nai Forward Headquarters
(Kompong Thom Cambodia) p.193,
p.194.
ng Nai Province p.3, 4, 180, 183,
184, 186, 188, 189, 191-194, 196, 197,
199, f.339, f.485, f.524, f.592, f.604,
f.613, f.638; Annex J p.7.
ng Nai Province Unit p.183, p.184,
p.190, f.599; Annex J p.7.
ng Nai Regiment p.196, p.197.
ng Nai River p.184, p.185.
ng Ngh - p.68, f.62, f.158, f.547.
ng Ngc Khi hamlet p.31, p.32,
f.207.
ng Sn (anti-communist resistance)
p.184.
ng Tranh River p.183.
ng Xoai Regiment f.135.
ng [sic]Vn Chng (ie: Vn
Chng) f.35, f.175; Annex D f.3.
Dove Force (South Korea) f.197.
Dry Season f.9, f.254, f.258.
u River Annex F p.13, f.56.

17

c, Comrade Annex B p.3.

c M Hill p.21, p.36, p.38.
c M - p.29, p.158.
c Thnh p.5, 8, 20, 29, 30, 36, 38,
42, 49, 73, 77, 83, 87, 90, 95, 99, 102,
148, 176, f.62, f.104, f.158; Annex E
p.32.
Duffel Bag, sensors f.451.
Dng nc - Gi nc (Vietnamese
military website) f.296; Bibliography.
Dng Quang Ngha f.453.
Dng Vn Minh, President p.177.
Duyn Hi District p.141, p.183,
f.491.
Eastern Nam B Region p.2, 3, 4, 6,
8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 20, 35, 39, 59, 79,
169, 184, f.28, 108, 152, 253, 302, 402;
Annex J p.3, f.2, f.19.
Eastern Sea/South China Sea p.3,
p.193, f.110, f.624; Annex F p.13.
EC-47 aircraft Annex E pp.11-14,
p.24, f.50, f.58, f.87.
ch (Sp) post p.23.
Elephant Pool (Bu Voi) see Bu
Thnh.
Emulation movements p.56, 168,
204, 205, 208; Annex H p.2 (1966).
Encounter battle (Long Tn) Preface
f.12; Main text f.267; Annex M f.27.
Entry & Exit Points p.107, f.330.
Evacuation of casualties p.108, f.252;
Annex F p.3, 12, 15, 20; f.18, f.29, f.34,
f.53, f.57, f.84, f.95; Annex H p.5.
Exchange points p.115, p.116.
Excessive romanticism, Tt 1968
f.343* - see also Farewell .
Exchange rates (USD/piastre/ng)
f.48, f.332, f.420, f.598, f.634.
F-5, aircraft p.94.
Farewell to the jungle p.92, f.343*.
Farmers Association p.126.
Farmers Bank raid (B Ra) - f.332.
Fauna, in Phc Tuy p.5, f.428.

Fence of Death p.86.

Fenton J. E. Major (Retd) Annex E
f.37.
Finance p.115, p.152, p.200, f.165,
f.307, f.325, f.393, f.454; Annex J f.4.
Fire Support Base Thrust, f.405, f.411.
Fischer, T., Deputy Prime Minister
Annex A p.11.
Five-Building Complex p.51, p.52,
f.174.
Five-Storey Centre f.174.
Flags (VC use of) Annex E p.3, f.18.
Flour f.409, f.479.
Food p.5, 7, 19, 24, 34, 57, 97-98, 106,
107, 114, 115, 116, 119, 123, 124, 128,
131, 134, 135, 138, 139, 171, 181, 186,
194, 208, 212, f.117, 118, 244, 330, 384,
388, 409, 410, 421, 426, 455, 472, 479,
495.
Food, shortages (see also: Hunger)
p.107, pp.114-115, 117, 128, 135, 138,
139, 187, 212, f.117, 330, 384, 388, 426,
455, 495.
Four Good Qualities Annex G f.24.
Foreign Assistance Act (US, 1974)
f.570.
Forward Headquarters p.72 (Long
Tn)
Forward Supply Council f.118, f.330,
f.409.
Four Party Joint Group (Xun Lc)
f.537; Annex A f.108.
Four-Sided Peace Conference (Paris)
f.357.
Fred (NVA/VC radio transmitter)
Annex E p.14, f.56, f.73, f.89.
Friends (Cambodian communist antiKhmer Rouge forces) p.57, 187, 193195, 198, 211, 215; Annex O p.36.
Front 479 p.196, f.629*.
Front 779 (Cambodia) p.195, p.196,
f.628.
Front to Destroy Communism p.184.

18

FULRO p.188, f.604, f.611, f.612;

Annex P f.54.
G.4544 Province Ordnance Unit
Annex F f.53.
Gendarmerie (hin binh) p.12.
Geneva Agreement, 1954 p.8, 9, 209,
211, f.24, f.76.
Gia Cp p.6, f.137.
Gia Kim p.182, p.185, p.186.
Gia Liu Bridge p.173, f.576.
Gia Quy f.238, f.525.
Gia Ray f.36, f.168, f.352, f.516,
f.573; Annex E f.90; Annex K f.29;
Annex O p.35, f.30; Annex P p.4.
Gibbons, D.S. Dr AM Annex B p.9.
Ging Chu Pha jungle p.10, p.11.
G C p.23.
G Cat Cemetery (B Ra) Annex F
p.12, 26, f.22; Annex O p.24, 43.
G Cng p.11.
G Gng p.181.
G Ra (Ha Long) f.225.
G Sm (Vng Tu) p.21.
Grabbing the enemys belt
(NVA/VC tactic) p.63, f.222, f.287;
Annex E f.159.
Graham, S.C. Brigadier f.234, Annex
F p.7, f.19, f.35, f.38, f.40; Annex L p.1;
Annex O f.105, f.106.
Grenades (see: M26 and RKG).
Group 45 (see: on 45).
Group 54 (see: on 54).
Group 84 (see: on 84).
Group 500 Annex J f.32.
Group 211 Annex P p.1, p.2.
Group 1500 (see on 1500).
Group 7701 (Cambodia) p.194.
Group C40 (Cambodia) Annex O
p.36, f.137.
Guerrillas p.16, 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
31, 37, 45, 49, 60, 63, 64, 67, 70, 99,
102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 116, 121,
122, 124, 129, 135, 140, 142, 145, 147,

149, 152, 158, 167, 169, 178, 180, 181,

182, 185, 187, 209, 210, 213, f.39, f.244,
f.259, f.314, f.315, f.454, f.534; Annex C
p.6, p.7, p.8.
H12 rockets (107mm) f.398.
H.20 base (D445 - B Ra Town, 1989)
p.196.
H21 Rear Services School f.165;
Annex B f.12. (Nguyn Tun Gii
D445 Adjutant).
H Minh Quyn Annex P f.37.
Ha Tinh Annex P p.2.
H Vn Thun Annex J f.13.
Hc Dch p.6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17,
18, 20, 35, 44, 110, 112, 159, 160, f.15,
f.63, f.90, f.108, f.151, f.581, f.587;
Annex N p.2, 3, 8, 9, f.10, f.35, f.36 .
Hc Dch village f.15, f.63.
Hai B (Nguyn Vn B) - p.103, p.122,
f.325, f.460, 473; Annex B p.4; Annex P
f.41.
Hai Bnh Annex P p.4
Hai H (Phan Thanh H) f.447.
Hai Hiu (D440) - Annex P p.4.
Hai Hiu (Nguyn Vn Hiu) Annex
O p.9, 13, f.8, 51, 52; Annex O
Appendix 2 p.3, f.8; Annex O Appendix
3 f.1, 2, 4.
Hai Hng (see Nguyn Thanh Hng)
see also Annex O f.63 (bio note).
Hai Khanh (see: Nguyn Minh Khanh).
Hi Lc hamlet f.567.
Hai Lc (Nguyn Ngc Tn, COSVN)
f.339.
Hai Ngo Annex P p.4.
Hai Nht (V Vn Thit) Annex J
f.20.
Hai Phong, Dr Annex M f.23; Annex
L p.1.
Hai Phng Annex K p.2.; Annex O
p.2, p.8.
Hai Sng p.14.
Hai Tm Annex B p.4, p.7.

19

Hai Thi (Nguyn Hu Thi) f.327;

Annex P p.8, p.9.
Hai Thun p.17.
Hi Trung hamlet f.406, f.567.
Hai Vn (CO D445 1976) - p.219;
Annex B p.8.
Hai Xun (see o Thanh Xun;
Nguyn Vn Xun) p.30, p.33.
Hall, R.A. Dr f.478, 515, 643; Annex
O f.80, f.102, f.104, f.105; Annex Q f.3.
Ham, P., interviews f.243; Annex A
f.111, f.136, Annex N f.14.
Hm a area (Route 10) p.192.
Hm Tn p.139, f.24.
Hm Thun p.139.
Hamlet Combat Youth f.116, f.170,
f.377.
Hamlet Evaluation System (HES)
Annex C f.35.
Hampstead, B.V. f.190; Annex E f.29,
30, 31, 33, 37, 40, 41, 50, 56, 59, 65, 68,
83, 106, 147, 173, 175, 180, 195; Annex
O f.71. Bibliography.
Hng Dng p.23.
Hang Lu pagoda f.517.
Hart, S.W. Lieutenant Colonel (Retd)
Annex E f.38, 143, 184; Bibliography.
Hartley, R.W. AM Major (Retd)
f.190, f.417; Annex E f.24, 30, 33, 37,
38, 59, 65, 68, 145, 148, 173, 175, 178,
180, 185, 187, 188, 192, 195;
Bibliography.
Hu Giang Province p.4, f.592.
Headquarters Australian Force
Vietnam (HQ AFV) f.230, f.232,
f.235.
H An Hill f.328.
Health p.115, p.189; Annex G p.5,
f.19.
Henderson, W.G. Brigadier f.233.
f.234.
Heng Samrin f.622.

High Point Campaign (June 1969)

f.405.
H Ch Minh p.29, p.120, f.597.
H Ch Minh, death of (2 September
1969) p.120.
H Ch Minh Campaign p.168,
p.175, p.176, f.562.
H Ch Minh Trail (see: Trail).
H Thanh Phong f.453.
H Trm landing f.308.
H Trm, re-education camp f.596.
H Vn Phong f.153, f.188, f.325,
f.453; Annex D f.24.
H Vn Bn (T Bn) f.441, Annex
B, p.4.
H Vit Hoa/Ha Annex D f.22.
Ha, Comrade (D440) f.501.
Ha Long Preface f.16 (History);
Main Text: p.5, 7, 20, 22, 23, 24, 28, 33,
42, 48, 57, 65, 68, 94, 157, 206, 208,
f.12, f.13, f.20, f.78, f.79, f.211, f.223,
f.225, f.275, f.350, f.355, f.405, f.439,
f.449; see map rear cover.
Ha (Ha Con, 6th Coy/D440) f.501.
Hoi c p.35, f.133, f.136, f.573.
Hong, Comrade p.42, p.130.
Hong Diu, re-education camp f.596.
Hong Gia Tch Annex O f.117.
Hong Hoa Thm base f.588.
Hong Qun, plantation p.100, p.153,
p.154.
Hong Qunh (anti-communist
resistance group) p.184.
Hong Thanh, Comrade p.137.
Hong Thanh Dn Annex D p.4.
Hong T Annex O p.8.
Hong Vn L f.204.
Hong Vn Tn p.42.
Hi Bi p.4, p.23.
Hi M - p.5, 96, 103, 118, 120, 124,
145, 151, 152, 166,169, 171, f.228, 262,
310, 312, 316, 405, 424, 447, 463, 488,
507, 540, 588, 559, 564, 565, 566.

20

Hi Trng hamlet p.145.

Hng Minh Annex A f.57.
Hng Tam Nam Annex P f.16, f.35.
Horseshoe p.85, p.121, f.211, f.238,
f.275, f.316, f.333, f.472, f.525.
Hospital 1500 - Annex F p.7, 10, 12, 13,
14, f.56, f.57, f.58; Annex O p.18.
Ha Yn Ln, Colonel (ARVN) f.584.
Hu, Second Lieutenant (Marine) f.131.
Hng, Comrade (medic) f.336, p.14.
Hunger p.48, 108, 114, 115, 117, 119,
120, 124, 129, 139, 146, f.330; Annex O
(D440) p.7.
Hng p.41.
Huy Hong, hotel f.87, f.109.
Hunh Bu Sn, Lieutenant Colonel
(ARVN) f.593.
Hunh Thn Annex K p.16; Annex O
p.27, f.37.
Hunh Vn Hin, Captain (CO D445
1992) p.220; Annex B p.8.
Hunh Vn Hoa Annex R.
Hunh Vn Lin Annex B f.15;
Annex J f.26.
Hunh Vn Quyt (CO D445 1978)
p.219; Annex B p.8.
Hunh Vn Sinh f.445.
Hunh Vn Tam (Tam Quyt), Major
(PAVN) p.191.
Hunh Vn Tho Annex O f.88.
Hunh Vn T (Chn T) p.13.
Hunh Vn Xuyn Annex O f.2.
Ideological Training p.98, 99, 120,
134, 137, 183, 189, 203, 204, f.311,
f.566.
Infiltration f.24, f.25, f.37, f.135,
f.254, f.274 (D605), f.523, f.527; Annex
C f.30; Annex O f.12, f.18, f.19, f.21,
f.71.
Intelligence, 1 ATF Annex E f.2.
Intelligence Organisation p.29, p.54,
p.59, p.154, f.111, f.190, f.197, f.202,
f.244, f.259, f.260, f.396, f.533.

Intercept of NVA/VC radio

communications Annex E.
Interception of radio communications
(by NVA/VC) f.190, f.533; Annex E:
f.9, f.10, f.99.
International Commission for Control
and Supervision (ICCS) f.537.
International Duty (ie in Cambodia)
p.1, 57, 180, 189, 196, 198, 211, 215,
f.628, 629.
Irregular VC Forces f.39, f.244,
f.314; Annex C pp.6-7, f.33, f.34
Jackfruit Gardens p.61, f.225.
Jackson, O.D. Brigadier p.79, f.194,
f.231, f.232, f.234; Annex E p.18, 19, 22,
27, 40, 49, f.126, f.154, f.161.
Jade warriors (Australian troops)
f.515 (misinterpretation by a US
journalist ie J for jungle).
Japanese howitzer, 70mm f.269;
Annex E f.113, f.153.
Joint Anti-Communist Front p.184.
K Base Annex P f.37.
K8 Company (Xun Lc District Unit)
f.472, f.473, f.487, f.575, f.579; Annex
P p.2, p.8, p.9, p.11, f.38
K9 Company f.254, Annex P p.8, p.9,
p.10, f.11, f.37, f.38, f.43.
K-10 f.108; Annex P p.3.
K-50 sub-machinegun (PPSh-41)
f.131, Annex O p.23 (PPS/Type 43).
K76A Hospital f.137, Annex F p.12,
f.29, f.43, f.95.
K76B Hospital f.137.
Kampuchea, war with f.605, f.621.
Kampuchean United Front for
National Salvation p.193, f.622.
Keep, R.M. Captain Annex E p.18,
p.19, p.28, f.69, f.80, f.114, f.167.
Khi, Comrade (V Thnh Khi, OC
2/D445, 2ic D445) p.154, p.157, p.168,
p.169, p.219.

21

Khanh, Comrade (1st Company)

p.145.
Khmer Republic (see: Cambodia).
Khmer Rouge p.190, f.605, f.609,
f.615; Annex O p.29, f.4.
Kim Tn (Gia Kim) p.93.
Kin Giang Province f.605, f.615.
Kiu An, Comrade p.57.
Killed in Action (NVA/VC) by 1 ATF
f.515, f.643; Annex F p.21, p.24, f.106.
Kim Hi ambush f.181; Annex K
pp.2-3, f.11; Annex O p.3, f.14.
Kim Long p.88, f.90, f.215, f.328,
f.556.
Kompong Som (Cambodia) Annex O
p.29.
Kompong Thom Province (Cambodia)
p.193, p.194, f.625; Annex O f.107.
Korean troops f.197, f.224, f.305,
f.535; Annex K f.62.
Kratie Province (Cambodia - 1984)
p.194, f.622.
Kuranda (Qld, 1990) Annex B f.9;
Annex K f.41; Annex O f.49.
L-19 aircraft f.211.
La Van hamlet f.468.
Labour, by D445 p.106, p.199, p.201,
p.203, p.204, p.206, p.208.
Labour Unit (Province) p.34, f.118.
Labourers p.7, f.24, 25, p.42, f.1, f.88,
f.117, f.118, f.166, f.330; Annex H p.1,
p.2, p.3, p.4; Annex M f.22; Annex P
f.32.
Labour Youth, members/chapters/
groups p.10, 12, 48, 98, 106, 205, 206,
207, f.3, f.31, f.257, f.361, f.632; Annex
D p.5; Annex G p.1, p.4; Annex H p.1,
p.2, p.4; Annex O f.85; Annex P p.7.
Lm Phng (Sau Phng) p.134,
p.135, p.140, p.144, p.149, p.152, p.154,
p.157, p.193, p.219, f.325; Annex B p.4,
p.6, p.7, f.30; Annex D p.3.
Lm Sang p.5.

Lang (Waterfall) B p.23, p.126,

f.485.
Lang B base p.139, p.140.
Lng Ct p.49, p.51.
Lng C Thi (see: C Thi).
Lang Di village p.145, p.169, p.171,
p.172.
Lang Gng p.23.
Lang Ln p.160.
L Chn/Chnh (see: L nh Nhn).
L nh Nhn (L Chn/Chn L)
p.88, p.119, f.329, f.338, f.342, f.423;
Annex J f.14, f.15, f.20, f.21, f.23.
L nh Thm Annex O p.21.
L Dun f.151, f.563.
L c t, Lieutenant Colonel ARVN
f.156, f.593.
Le [sic]Hill p.18, f.67.
L Hng Sn Annex B p.1.
L Hui Annex O p.25, f.96 (as Ut
Hui).
L Hu Ngha f.260; Annex D f.24.
L Minh o, Brigadier General
(ARVN) f.583.
L Minh H (Tm H) p.11, p.39,
f.574; Annex J f.21.
L Minh Kin p.30, p.41, f.87, p.99,
p.101, p.102, p.219, f.324; Annex B p.4;
Annex D p.3.
L [sic probably Nguyn] Minh
Khanh f.522*.
L Minh Loan (Hai Loan) Annex A
f.57.
L Minh Nguyn p.176; Annex J f.21.
L Minh Quang (Sau Quang, CO D445
1984-89, Cambodia) p.194, p.219;
Annex B p.8.
L Minh Thnh (Sau Thnh) p.11,
p.12, p.16, p.22, p.218, f.41, f.108;
Annex B p.1; Annex E p.4, f.21 see
also L Thnh Cng below.
L Minh Vit (Su Vit) p.28, p.29,
p.31, p.33, p.38, p.41, p.218, f.101,

22

f.127, f.129; Annex B p.1, p.2; Annex J

f.5.
L Ph (plantation) p.5.
L Quang f.203.
L Quang Ngha Major (2ic D445,
1998-1999) p.199, 200, 201, 220.
L Sc Nghi f.338, Annex J f.23
L Tn t Annex O f.64, f.88.
L Tn Tao Annex O p.11, f.41;
Annex Q f.18.
L Thnh Ba (Ba Bi) p.14, p.15,
p.24, p.47, p.51, p.119, p.219, f.53,
f.159, f.171, f.175, f.316, f.354, f.418;
Annex B p.2, f.9; Annex O f.49.
L Thnh Cng (Su Thnh, L Minh
Thnh) f.36, f.41; Annex B p.1.
L Thanh Khoan f.481.
L Thanh Trng Annex M p.8.
L Th Bich Thy f.176.
L Th ip Annex A p.11, f.57.
L Th Minh Loan (Hai Loan) Annex
A f.57.
L Thin Thai - Annex O p.20; Annex
L p.2, f.6.
L Tranh (L Vn Tranh/Nm Tranh)
p.149, f.79, f.226; Annex B p.5, p.8,
f.19, f.31.
L Trng Tn, Major General f.589.
L Trung Dung Annex D f.24.
L Vn De Annex A f.43.
L Vn c, Captain (ARVN - District
Chief, Xuyn Mc f.156, f.383.
L Vn Khanh Annex P f.28, f.32.
L Vn Li f.325; Annex D f.24.
L Vn Long Annex O p.22.
L Vn Mt f.98.
L Vn Mu f.18.
L Vn Ngc Colonel (MR7) f.546,
f.555, f.598; Annex J p.6.
L Vn Nhanh Annex P f.29, f.32.
L Vn Sang - Annex N f.36, f.44, f.52.
L Vn Th, Captain p.220; Annex B
p.8.

L Vn Tranh (L Tranh/Nm Tranh)

p.22, p.64, f.102, p.144, p.149, p.157,
p.169, p.219, f.79, f.226; Annex B p.5,
p.8, f.19, f.31.
L Vn Trung (D445 POW, Long Tn)
f.292; Annex B f.19; Annex F f.16;
Annex O f.45, f.74.
L Vn Tng p.39.
L Vn Vin (By Vin) f.27.
L Vn Vit (Long t) p.169, f.61,
f.445.
L Xun Chuyn, Lieutenant Colonel
(NVA) f.274; Annex E p.7; Annex F
p.19, f.84, f.86, f.88, f.96; Annex K f.22,
f.30, f.37; Annex O p.4, p.18, f.1, f.4,
f.13, f.15, f.23, f.27, f.29, f.31, f.34, f.82,
f.93.
L Xun Lu (Sau An) p.39.
Leech (VC radio station) Annex E
p.49, f.52.
Length of service (D445 personnel)
Annex G p.5.
Lp Fish, AH1G (Cobra) f.221, f.486.
Letter Box Numbers (LBN) f.200,
f.527; Annex p.2; Annex G f.8; Annex H
p.2, f.25, 27; Annex J f.25; Annex O
pp.30-31, f.41, f.110, f.111; Annex P f.5.
Letter-C (bend - Route 2) p.174,
f.579.
Letter-S (bend - Route 2) p.174, f.579.
Letter-S Bend p.153, p.174, f.579.
Letters (see: Mail).
Letters of Appreciation (Giy Khen)
p.27, p.200, p.204, p.205, f.171, f.184,
f.207, f.212, f.246, f.248, f.267, f.285,
f.613; Annex F p.22, p.23, p.25, f.99;
Annex G p.3, p.5, f.13; Annex O p.6,
p.21, p.34, f.7, f.76; Annex H p.2, p.3,
p.5.
Letters of Condolence (VC) - Annex F
p.14, f.63.
Liberated villages p.158, p.165.

23

Liberation Corridor Line f.523;

Annex C f.30.
Lim, Comrade p.28.
Lin Ta Pa (Lintaba) Waterfall
p.184, p.185, f.603.
Limited War (US) p.46, p.96, p.109,
p.178, p.209.
Lintaba Falls p.185, f.603.
L Gm f.310, f.316; Annex K f.62;
Annex O p.18, pp.25-26, f.65, f.87, f.88,
f.89, f.96.
L Minh Kiu Annex D p.2.
L base p.51, p.57, p.69, p.122.
L Streams f.172.
L Than Hill (1975) p.173.
L Vi p.21, p.52.
Lc (see: Nguyn Vn Nhng).
Lc An (Xuyn Mc District) p.27,
p.34, p.38, p.82, p.203, p.208, f.98,
f.119, f.131, f.300.
Lc An (Long Thnh District Thai
Forces base attacked by 274th Regiment,
June 1969) f.512, Annex K f.57.
Lc Ninh, battle (1972) p.194, f.520.
Li, Comrade p.100.
Long B Bin Province p.71,
p.88.
Long Bnh (Long in) p.105, f.372.
Long Bnh base f.347, 400, 584;
Annex E p.9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21, 40,
43, f.1, 63, 68, 78, 164; Annex O p.28.
Long t Preface f.16 (History); Main
Text: p.1, 4, 14, 16 -18, 20, 23, 40, 43,
46-47, 52, 56, 60, 83, 85-86, 89, 96, 99,
102, 104, 105, 106, 108, 112-117, 119124, 126-129, 131-135, 138-148, 152,
154, 157-167, 169, 171, 176, 180-181,
183, 187-188, 197-198, 201, 203, 208,
210, f.8, 61, 75, 77, 87, 104, 109, 127,
148-149, 157, 159, 171, 175, 179, 186,
201, 217, 220, 224, 239, 242, 253, 275,
284, 296, 316, 353,-354, 372-373, 375,
378, 380, 390, 404, 409, 418, 426, 438,

440, 445, 447, 453,-454, 468-469, 475,

480, 488-489, 494, 500,-501, 507-519,
526, 546, 556, 560,-561, 565; Map see
rear cover.
Long in p.3, 5, 8, 20, 21-23, 48, 51,
88, 102, 105, 120, 141, 142, 147-148,
153, 163, 176, 183, 190, 212, f.11, 80,
104, 156, 223, 321, 348, 352, 353, 354,
359, 362, 372, 380, 447, 453, 463, 478,
488, 490, 507, 644.
Long Giao p.153, f.297; Annex N
p.10.
Long Hi p.8, 21, 22, 23, 38, 43, 52,
187, f.8, 75, 77, 87, 109, 148, 149, 157,
186, 188, 239, 379, 405, 431, 466, 487,
500, 559, 561.
Long Hi Mountains f.8, f.75, f.487,
f.500.
Long Hip Plantation (Battle of Long
Tn) f.275, f.283; Annex Q f.9.
Long Hi M - p.151, f.488, f.507,
f.565.
Long Hng bridge p.184.
Long Khnh Campaign Annex O
p.28; Annex P f.26.
Long Khnh Province pp.2- 4, 32, 46,
55, 57, 62, 70, 71, 81, 91, 92, 99, 101,
108, 109, 112, 129, 131, 138, 141, 148,
149, 153, 154, 156, 157, 160, 166, 167,
168, 169, 172-175, 179-182, 189, 198,
210-213, f.1, 5, 14, 104, 168, 215, 243,
274, 281, 297, 337, 339, 345, 350, 375,
582; Annex K p.6, 15, 16, 17, f.29, f.34,
f.47; Annex O p.3, 7, 9, 10, 24, 27, 28,
f.4, 25, 36, 89; Annex P p.2, 3, 4, 7, 9,
11, 12, 13, 14 (Province map)
Long Khnh Town f.338, 491, 532,
579; Annex K p.19; Annex P. See also
Xun Lc Town.
Long L - p.68, p.148, f.11, f.156, f.245,
f.355, f.586.
Long L Sub-Sector p.5, p.8, p.20,
p.26, f.245, f.345, f.586.

24

Long M - p.6, p.57, p.143, p.145,

p.161, p.162 (sketch map), p.169, p.171,
p.179 (photograph), f.544, f.545.
Long Ph hamlet (Phc Hi) p.145,
p.167, f.561.
Long Phc village p.7, 19, 20, 24,
27, 45, 57, 63, 64, 115, 158, 163, 165,
199, f.57, 79, 90, 91, 96, 105, 110, 223,
228, 240, 261, 540, 547, 548, 553, 575.
Long Phc Hi f.110.
Long Phng hamlet p.23, p.105,
f.372.
Long Sn hamlet (Long in) f.372.
Long Sn, island p.4, p.181, f.10, f.18,
f.365; Annex E f.148, f.171.
Long Tn village p.5, p.47, p.72,
p.137, p.172, f.240, f.251, f.296.
Long Tn village, evacuation of, 9 Apr
66 - Annex O Appendix 3 f.11.
Long Tn, 5th VC Division account
(2005) of the Battle Annex K.
Long Tn, 274th Regiment Annex N.
Long Tn, 275th Regiment Annex O
pp.10-22 and account at Appendix 3.
Long Tn, 1991 D445 History Annex
M.
Long Tn, as an ambush pp.74-76,
f.187, f.267, f.270, f.275, f.283, f.296;
Annex E pp.36-40; Annex K p.7, 11, 12,
f.34, f.49; Annex M f.27; Annex O pp.910; Annex Q p.3, p.5; Annex R (Hunh
Vn Hoa, February 1967).
Long Tn, artillery p.77, 79, 80, f.269,
273, 276, 277, 278, 286, 287; Annex E
pp.26-30, p.39, 40, f.113, f.159; Annex
M f.40, f.41; Annex O Appendix 3 f.9.
Long Tn, Australian accounts f.271,
f.272; and also f.268, f.295.
Long Tn, Australian feature film
(planned release - 2016) Preface f.15.
Long Tn, Australian casualties p.80,
f.283; Annex F pp.15-18.

Long Tn, Battle of - pp.71-80, 76, 100

(map VC p.76, f.275, inside front
cover); Annex K pp.6-13; Annex M.
Long Tn, battle casualties f.271,
f.278; Annex F; Annex L (summary);
Annex O Appendix 1, Appendix 4.
Long Tn, battle (VC account late
2014) Ambush Battle Annex Q.
Long Tn, battle (VC account Hunh
Vn Hoa, February 1967) Annex R.
Long Tn, burial of VC Annex F f.22.
Long Tn, captured VC documents
Annex E f.90, f.155; Annex F p.8, p.14;
Annex M f.39; Annex O pp.20-23.
Long Tn, captured VC weapons
Annex F p.9, p.20, f.18, f.26, f.89, f.94;
Annex M f.38;
Long Tn, D445 History account (1991)
Annex M.
Long Tn, D445 cadre appointments in
mid-1966 Annex D.
Long Tn, documents captured (275th
Regiment) - Annex F pp.23-24; Annex O
f.75, pp.20-23.
Long Tn, D445 organisation (probable)
Annex D.
Long Tn, encounter battle Preface
f.12; Main Text f.267; Annex M f.27.
Long Tn, film (Australian proposed
2016: Danger Close Preface f.15.
Long Tn, film (Vietnamese
documentary - 2014) Preface f.14;
Main Text p.179; Annex A f.98; Annex
Q f.1.
Long Tn, jamming of 1 ATF comms
Annex E p.25, p.26, p.36, f.98, f.101,
f.144, f.194.
Long Tn, killing ground f.274;
Annex K f.37, f.38; Annex M f.19, f.20;
Annex O Appendix 3 p.3.
Long Tn, luring the tiger Preface
f.11; Main Text p.75, f.262, f.270;
Annex E f.156; Annex M f.26; Annex R.

25

Long Tn, medals (275th Regiment)

Annex O pp.22-23.
Long Tn, memorial and cross
(6RAR/NZ) Annex O p.41 and
Appendix 3 f.18.
Long Tn, mines (laid by VC) f.274;
Annex K p.9, p.10, f.45; Annex M p.5,
p.9, f.21; Annex Q p.3, f.14.
Long Tn, numbers of VC f.265,
f.266 (1ATF: 2,650); p.80 (4,000+),
f.295 (2,500; 3,000); Annex D pp.4-5;
Annex F p.11 (3,500), f.46-f.49, p.25
(2,500); Annex K f.50; Annex O p.15,
p.18, f.69.
Long Tn, map: tactical sketch map
(D445 History 2004) p.76, f.275,
inside front cover; Annex O p.16.
Long Tn, map -area (see: translators
endnote) p.216; Annex M p.13.
Long Tn, monsoonal rain f.276;
Annex K p.10, f.46; Annex M p.9,
Annex Q f.15.
Long Tn, mortar fire (VC) f.275.
Long Tn, naval gunfire support
f.277, f.309; Annex F f.25, p.13; Annex
Q p.5, f.16.
Long Tn, post-Battle assessment of VC
(by HQ 1 ATF) f.286; Annex O p.24.
Long Tn, POWs (VC) f.293; Annex
F f.16; Annex O p.12, p.20, f.45, f.74.
Long Tn, NVA/VC forces: summary
Annex L.
Long Tn, rubber plantation (Long
Hip, B ic, t Gai) f.275, f.283;
Annex Q f.9.
Long Tn, SIGINT aspects Annex E.
Long Tn, sketches VC Annex O
p.23, f.75, f.78.
Long Tn, tactical error/s by VC
Preface f.6; Main Text f.292; Annex E
p.39, f.158, f.159; Annex K p.10, p.12,
f.42; Annex M f.32; Annex O f.34.

Long Tn, tanks f.275, f.283; Annex

K f.43, f.49; Annex M p.7, p.8, p.9, f.31,
f.45.
Long Tn, Vit Cng awards p.79
(medal), f.285; Annex F pp.22-24;
Annex O pp.21-23.
Long Tn, Vietnamese accounts (2014)
Preface including f.8, f.15; Main Text
p.179; Annex Q.
Long Tn, Vietnamese accounts (2015)
Annex O Appendix 3.
Long Tn, VC weapons recovered
f.271; Annex F pp.20-21, f.89; Annex K
f.48; Annex M f.38.
Lng Tu River p.183, f.10.
Long Thnh District p.4, p.10, p.11,
p.17, p.18, p.35, p.45, p.50, p.88, p.141,
p.188, f.136, f.491, f.636.
Long Thnh village p.50.
Long Xuyn District f.156, f.418,
f.507, f.539.
Long Xuyn, T-Junction f.355.
Loyalty p.211, p.214; Annex G p.3,
f.15.
Lng nh Chi, Captain (ARVN)
f.156.
Lng Th Tnh (probably aka: Lng
Vn Tnh) p.69, f.249; Annex P p.3,
f.13.
Lng Vn Cao (By Cao) f.581.
Lng Vn Tnh (Hai Tnh, probably
aka Lng Th Tnh) Annex P p.2
(D440).
L Pha Sang (anti-communist resistance
cadre, ex-ARVN) pp.184-186, f.603.
M Base p.95
M5, pressure switch f.316.
M-16/M16 rifle f.131, 386, 404, 426,
442, 467, 472; Annex M f.42.
M16-E3 mine p.85, p.86, p.116, f.316,
f.431, f.438.
M26, fragmentation grenade f.316.
f.435.

26

M-41, tank p.125, p.165, f.436.

M-48, tank p.125, f.297, f.334, f.369,
f.436.
M60, GPMG machine gun f.442,
f.472, f.487; Annex E f.154.
M72, light anti-tank weapon f.487.
M79, grenade launcher p.117, 139,
154, 167, 177, 182, 185, f.413, f.443,
f.561.
M area Annex O p.5
M M M Con p.69, p.70.
M/Ma Tan Tan Annex F p.25;
Annex O f.7, f.75.
Mai Phoc p.43, p.105, f.148, f.379.
Mail f.200, f.495, f.527; Annex G f.8;
Annex J f.25; Annex O pp.30-32 (275th
Regiment), f.41; Annex P f.38.
Main-force unit (ie D445 as a) p.91,
100, 109, 142, 169, 210, f.370, f.372.
Malaria Preface pp.4-5; Main Text
f.146; Annex F pp.21-22, f.7, f.95-98;
Annex K p.16; Annex O pp.4-5, 15, f.13f.15, f.33.
Malaria, Australian casualties Annex
F f.96.
Malaya p.67, p.210, f.242.
Malaysian, gun f.441.
Map (Long Khnh-Bnh Tuy Provinces)
Annex P p.14.
Map (Military Region 3/III CTZ)
Annex K p.20.
MARIN (Vietnamese NGO) Annex F
f.50, f.51; Annex L f.5; Annex O f.69.
Marriage f.495; Annex O f.85; Annex
G p.4.
Martyrs p.119, f.249, f.319, f.453,
f.459, f.468, f.478, f.644.
Martyrs, definition - Annex F f.7, f.28.
Masses organisations Annex H p.4.
My To Mountains p.4, 13. 107,
136, 204, f.6, 137, 203, 281, 474, 479;
Annex E p.24, p.30, f.90, f.93, f.195;

Annex F p.7, p.12, p,13, f.29, f.40, f.43,

f.57, f.95; Annex O p.18.
McNeill, I. Dr, interviews f.262, f.274,
f.312, f.337, f.347, f.351, f.355, f.359;
Annex A p.7, p.11, f.9, f.30, f.31, f.60;
Annex K f.35, f.41, f.48. Annex O p.13,
f.49.
Medals p.27, p.79, p.131, p.152,
p.167, p.168, f.94, f.188, f.189, f.220,
f.228, f.246, f.285, f.462, f.561, f.613;
Annex G p.3, f.13; Annex H p.1, p.3,
p.5, f.4: Annex I Medal Submission
(10 July 1966); Annex O p.7, 22, 23 28,
f.103, f.116.
Medals (Long Tn - 275th Regiment)
Annex O p.7, pp.22-23, p.29, f.103,
f.116.
Medical services p.17, 84, 102, 113,
116, 138, 190, 199, f.146, f.164, f.252,
f.282, f.454, 472, 498, 509; Annex F p.6,
7, 12, 19, f.29, f.33, f.53, f.57, f.95, f.96,
f.97; Annex J p.1, f.27; Annex M f.47,
f.48; Annex O p.8, f.9, f.13, f.14, f.64,
f.88; Annex P f.22.
Medical supplies (D445 August 1966)
f. 146; Annex B, f.11.
Medicines p.7, 107, 115, 116, 117,
124, 130, 131, 138, 212, f.146 (malarial
prophylaxis and treatment).
Mekong Delta (275th Regiment) f.108,
f.194; Annex O p.1, p.29, f.40, 75, 84,
108.
Memorial, D445 f.643.
MG-34 machinegun f.219.
Midway, meeting between Presidents
Thiu and Nixon f.405.
Min (abbreviation for COSVN) - f.59.
Mike Force f.99, 121, 255.f.42, f.209,
f.239, f.470, f.515.
Military Feats Medal 3rd Class, Long
Tn (awarded to D445) p.79, f.613;
Annex M p.11, f.46.

27

Military Management Committees

(1975 -) f.597.
Military Members Council p.205,
p.207, f.635.
Military Region 1 (VC, T.1) f.28,
f.147, f.163, f.228, f.253, f.302; Annex J
p.3, 4, 6, f.2, 11, 14, 19.
Military Region 3 (GVN - MR3/III
CTZ) Annex K p.20 (map).
Military Region 4 (Mekong Delta)
Annex O p.29, f.108.
Military Region 5 (VC) f.88, f.120,
f.345, f.490, f.523.
Military Region 6 (VC) p.35, p.44,
f.131, f.133, f.136.
Military Region 7 (VC) p.159, 181,
182, 187, 190, 191, 193, 195, 199, 200,
205, 206, f.64, 133, 136, 190, 270, 302,
385, 438, 465, 511, 532, 546, 556, 558,
572, 573, 575, 577, 578, 628, 629;
Annex F p.15, f.2, f.67, f.79, f.82; Annex
J p.2, 4, f.2, 11, 12, 18, 19, 24, 29.
Military Region 559 (the Trail)
f.25, f.523.
Military Resistance Force (anticommunist group) p.188, f.612.
Mine-clearing, post-war p.183.
Minefield p.86, p.116, p.117, p.124,
p.125, p.158, p.210, f.16, f.274, f.316,
f.317, f.436, f.450.
Mines, lifting by VC p.116, p.124,
f.317, f.435, f.434.
Mines, Long Tn (laid by VC) f.274;
Annex K p.9, p.10, f.45; Annex M p.5,
p.9; Annex Q p.3, f.14.
Minh m Mountains/Zone/Base
Preface f.16 (History); Main Text: p.4, 6,
21, 46, 52, 82, 83, 85, 102, 103, 107,
108, 112, 120, 124, 129, 130, 139, 140,
142, 145, 160, 169, 181, 182, f.8, 75, 87,
88, 109, 157, 189, 190, 197, 201, 372,
418, 425, 426, 447, 453, 487, 495, 498,
499, 500, 501, 507. Map rear cover.

Minh m Base (History Preface f.16,

Main Text: f.8, f.75.
Missing in Action, Australian f.515.
Missing in Action, NVA/VC f.643;
Annex F p.9, p.11, p.21, p.25, f.26, f.43,
f.105, f.106, f.107.
Mobile ambush p.52, 53, 60, 76, 68,
184, 212, f.77, 183, 187, 267, 544, 545;
Annex E p.38, f.23; Annex K p.12;
Annex M f.27; Annex N p.11; Annex O
p.9, p.10, Appendix 2 f.1; Annex Q p.3,
p.5.
Mobilization f.433.
Money/funds p.14, p.19, p.98, p.119,
p.132, p.201, p.208, f.244, f.472.
Morale (VC) p.18, 51, 82, 98, 101,
102, 113, 117, f.171, f.202, f.203, f.313,
f.343, f.506; Annex G pp.2-3, f.8, f.12;
Annex H p.2, p.4; Annex M p.12; Annex
O p.30, p.34, f.76.
Movement, rate of (VC) f.166
(porters), f.254 (troops); Annex E p.47,
f.160; Annex N f.35.
Mi Chin (Phan Thanh Chin)
f.478.
Mi Cng, Comrade p.126.
Mi Dm (Quach Vn Mi) p.27,
p.99, f.92, f.95, f.96, f.325; Annex B p.4;
Annex D p.4, f.28.
Mi Du p.20, p.21.
Mi i Annex B p.1.
Mi Gii (Nguyn Tun Gii) p.108,
p.154, p.157, p.169, f.165, f.510; Annex
B p.3, p.8, f.12, f.13; Annex D f.6, f.24;
Annex H f.5.
Mi Hng p.12.
Mi Nng p.17.
Mi Quang p.12, p.29, p.30.
Mi Sinh (T Hng Sinh) p.30,
p.118, p.119, f.418, f.445; Annex P p.8.
Mi Th (Nguyn Vit Hoa) p.22,
p.28, p.32, p.37, f.99, f.184, f.302, f.529,
f.599; Annex J f.10.

28

Mi Tr (see: Nguyn Vn Tr).

Mutual self-limitation f.306, see also
accommodation.
M Xun hamlet p.23.
Nam B (Zone) - f.4, f.24, f.28, f.59,
f.120, f.195, f.345.
Nm, Comrade p.137.
Nm nh p.33, f.128; Annex B p.2;
Annex P p.1
Nm Hiu p.113; f.146.
Nm Kim (see: Nguyn Vn Kim).
Nm Kin p.17.
Nm M, Miss p.48
Nm Ninh (see: Nguyn Minh Ninh).
Nm Tm (see: Trn Minh Tm) - f.260.
Nm Tin (Nguyn Vn Tin - B Ra
Sub-Region) f.62, f.158; Annex J f.29.
Nm Tin (see ng Vn Tin - Chu
c District) Annex A f.28.
Nm Thnh f.163; Annex A p.2.
Nm Tranh (L Tranh, L VnTranh)
p.219, f.79, f.226.
Nm Tr (Nguyn Sn H) Annex J
f.2.
Nm Trng (COSVN cover-title)
f.59.
Nm Truyn (see: Nguyn Th Truyn).
Nm V (Nguyn Vn Nm ?, Nguyn
Anh V) p.99, p.102, p.150, f.396,
f.468; Biography: Annex A pp.23-24;
Annex B p.6, f.23, f.24; Annex D p.4,
f.30.
Nam Xun Sn Base p.5.
National Council of National
Reconciliation and Concord f.536.
National Front to Liberate the People
p.184.
National Liberation Front of South
Vietnam (NLF) p.126, p.147, f.3,
f.224.
National Police Field Force (NPFF)
p.132, f.386, f.467.

National Restoration Front (anticommunist movement) p.188.

Naval gunfire f.277, f.309; Annex F
p.13, f.25; Annex Q p.5, f.16.
Negligence and subjectivity (VC
Tt 1968) p.100.
New Life Hamlets f.71, f.155, f.176.
New Zealand p.1, p.55, p.66, p.148,
p.21, f.192, f.224, f.234, f.237, f.277,
f.305, f.535; Annex F p.13, p.24; Annex
K f.62.
New Zealand orchestra/artillery
p.65, f.237; Annex F p.13; Annex M p.1,
p.10, f.40.
Ngha, Comrade p.154.
Ng nh Dim, President p.8, p.12,
p.23, p.31, f.17, f.72, f.87, f.109, f.155.
Ng Thnh Long Annex O p.23.
Ngh An Province - f.121
Nguyn Su p.97; Annex D p.4.
Nguyn Anh V (Hai V) p.150,
p.157, p.219, f.396.
Nguyn B Thanh (see: Nguyn Vn
Kim aka Nm Kim) Annex A p.5,
f.26.
Nguyn Ba Tr c Major/Lieutenant
Colonel (ARVN) f.352, f.593.
Nguyn Ch Thanh f.222.
Nguyn ng Mai f.599.
Nguyn nh Knh, Dr Annex L p.1;
Annex M f.23.
Nguyn c Hot (Ba t, Nguyn Vn
t) f.260; Annex F p.14; Annex J p.2.
Nguyn c Thng/Thng (Su
Thng) f.325, Annex B p.2, 4; Annex
D f.23.
Nguyn c Thu (Su Thu) p.49, 73,
77, 87, 95, 99, 102, 111, 127, 144, 149,
157, 219, f.47, f.264, f.280, f.303, f.323,
f.445, f.509; Biography: Annex A pp.1517; Annex B p.2, 3, 4, 6, f.17; Annex D
p.2, f.5, f.16, f.21; Annex M f.17, f.42.

29

Nguyn Dng (Ba Dng) Annex O

p.2, p.8, p.11, pp.21-22, f.2, f.4.
Nguyn Ha p.39.
Nguyn Hoan/Hon f.354; Annex A
f.77; Annex J f.21.
Nguyn Hong Mai Annex P f.25.
Nguyn Hong Tn Senior Captain
(PAVN) - p.201, p.220.
Nguyn Hong V Annex D p.3.
Nguyn Hng Chu Annex P p.9.
Nguyn Hu Campaign (1972) p.149,
f.520; Annex O p.29.
Nguyn Hng Mnh p.86.
Nguyn Hng Tm Annex P p.9.
Nguyn Hu Ngha p.72; Annex M
p.8, f.10, f.36.
Nguyn Hu Thi (Hai Thi) f.327;
Annex P p.3, p.4, f.18.
Nguyn Kim Tro/Tro f.308; Annex
J p.3.
Nguyn Minh Khanh (Hai Khanh)
p.87, 96, 99, 102, 111, 118, 119, 122,
157, 219, f.143, f.163, f.322, f.404,
f.418, f.426, f.447, f.457, f.460, f.521;
Biography: Annex A pp.18-19, Annex B
p.2, 3, 6; Annex D f.13. .
Nguyn Minh Ninh (Nm Ninh) - p.18,
20, 25, 26, 27, 33, 47, 57, 69, 87, 91, 95,
99, 102, 111, 149, 157, 218, 219, f. 30,
65, 66, 127, 248, 321, 346, 510, 521;
Biography: Annex A pp.18-20; Annex B
p.1, 2, 4, 7, f.4, 15, 29; Annex D f.3, 4;
Annex M nil. Noted as assisting the
compilers/editors of this D445 history.
Nguyn Minh Tr, Colonel p.198.
Nguyn Nam Hng, Major General
p.198, f.215, 243, 266, 283, 305, 308,
328, 630; Annex F p.16; Annex K f.25,
34, 54, 57, 60; Annex L pp.1-2; Annex
M f.4, f.13, f.45; Annex N p.4, 5, 9, 11,
f.14, 15, 16, 20; Annex O f.35.
Nguyn Nam Hng, notebook/diary
f.243, f.266, f.283, f.630; Annex F p.16;

Annex K f.25, f.34, f.52, f.54; Annex M

f.4, f.13, f.45; Annex N p.4, 5, 9, 11,
f.14, f.15, f.16; Annex O f.35.
Nguyn Ngc Tn (Hai Lc) f.339.
Nguyn Phi Hng p.29.
Nguyn Quc Bao Annex O f.2, f.7.
Nguyn Quang Chnh (see Bi Quang
Chnh) - f.159; Annex A pp.1-5.
Nguyn Quang o Annex O p.21.
Nguyn Quc Thanh (Ba Thanh)
pp.10-16, p.218, f.36, 53, 60; Biography:
Annex A pp.23-24; Annex B p.1.
Nguyn Quc Thng f.188; Annex F
p.14.
Nguyn Sn H (Nm Tr) Annex J
f.2.
Nguyn Sn H (Nguyn Vn Kim)
p.22, f.81.
Nguyn Tm f.355.
Nguyn Thanh (see: Su Thanh).
Nguyn Thanh Bnh (T Bnh) p.191,
p.219.
Nguyn Thanh Cn f.495; Annex J
p.3, f. 5, f.14, f.15; Annex O f.110.
Nguyn Thanh ng p.94.
Nguyn Thanh Hiu (T Hiu) f.42,
f.30, f.164; Annex B p.1, p.3; Annex D
f.33.
Nguyn Thanh Hng (Hai Hng)
f.222, f.262, f.270, f.274, f.287, f.314;
Annex K f.35, f.41, f.48; Annex L p.1;
Annex O p.13, 17, f.41, 50, 54, 63, 64,
67 (bio note), 68, 104; Appendix 2 to
Annex O, p.2, f.2, f.3 (bio note), f.4.
Nguyn Thnh Long (Nguyn Vn B)
f.478; Annex B f.25, Annex D f.11,
f.24.
Nguyn Thanh Tm (Ba Tm) p.126,
f.164, f.165, f.439, f.440, f.478; Annex B
p.3, p.6, p.7, f.10.
Nguyn Thanh Tng Colonel (PAVN)
p.193.

30

Nguyn Th Truyn (Nm Truyn,

Nm Si Gn) - f.134, f.260.
Nguyn Th Ci p.8.
Nguyn Th nh Major General
f.436.
Nguyn Th Trng p.8.
Nguyn Thi Bng (t Thi) f.135,
f.145, f.151, f.245, f.262, f.266; Annex E
p.1; Annex K p.2, f.48, f.52; Annex L
pp.1-2; Annex O (many) - including
biography at Appendix 2, see also his
diary below.
Nguyn Thi Bng, diary f.266;
Annex F f.19, f.38, f.40; Annex M f.48;
Annex O p.21, f.84, f.106.
Nguyn Trung Hiu Annex A f.15.
Nguyn Tun Cng, Major (acting
CO D445, 2001-2002) p.199, p.200,
p.201, p.203, p.220; Annex B p.9.
Nguyn Tun Gii (Mi Gii) - p.108,
p.154, p.157, p.169, f.165, f.510; Annex
B p.3, p.8, f.12, f.13; Annex D f.6, f.24;
Annex H f.5.
Nguyn Tng Annex J p.3.
Nguyn t (see: Nguyn c Hot).
Nguyn Vn i Annex D f.25.
Nguyn Vn Bo (Su Bo) - p.26,
p.97, p.111, p.190, p.191, p.219, f.92,
f.96, f.143, f.325, f.334, f.360, f.396,
f.614; Annex B p.4, f.16.
Nguyn Vn Bo Annex D p.4.
Nguyn Vn B, Captain (ARVN)
f.156.
Nguyn Vn Bi (Phc) Annex D p.4,
f.31.
Nguyn Vn B (Hai B) - p.36, p.49,
p.50, p.61, f.197, 254; Annex B p.4;
Annex P f.41.
Nguyn Vn Binh Annex D f.14.
Nguyn Vn Bnh (D500) f.532.
Nguyn Vn Ba p.39.
Nguyn Vn Bng Annex M p.8.
Nguyn Vn Cao p.14.

Nguyn Vn Ch p.39.
Nguyn Vn Chiu Annex O p.26.
Nguyn Vn Cho Annex B p.2.
Nguyn Vn Ch (Ninh) f.162.
Nguyn Vn Cc (Ba Cc) f.265;
Annex M f.13; Annex O p.2, 9, 13, 39,
f.6, 53, 56.
Nguyn Vn ang f.509.
Nguyn Vn i p.16.
Nguyn Vn - 453.
Nguyn Vn/nh Thiu (CO D605)
Annex O p.7, 9, 13, f.24, 26, 28.
Nguyn Vn c Annex D f.25.
Nguyn Vn c, Captain (NVA)
Annex O p.13, f.125.
Nguyn Vn c, Colonel p.198.
Nguyn Vn Gii (see: Nguyn Tun
Gii).
Nguyn Vn Hach f.313, f.506;
Annex F f.53.
Nguyn Vn Hiu (Nm Hiu, Nguyn
Thanh Hiu) p.42, p.48, p.113, p.197,
f.30, f.146, f.164; Annex B f.11; Annex
D p.4, f.33.
Nguyn Vn Hiu, Captain (CO D445,
1990) p.197.
Nguyn Vn Hiu (Hai Hiu) Annex
O p.9, 12, 13, 37, f.30, 52, Appendix 2 to
Annex O p.3, f.8, Appendix 3 p.1, f.2, 4.
Nguyn Vn Hot f.354.
Nguyn Vn Huy (275 Regiment POW,
Long Tn) f.293, Annex F f.16; Annex
O f.60.
Nguyn Vn Huy Annex O f.152.
Nguyn Vn Kho (CO D440, 1975)
Annex P p.11.
Nguyn Vn Khi/Khi f.65; Annex
D f.20.
Nguyn Vn Kim (Nm Kim, Nguyn
B Thanh) p.86, 91, 96, 99, 102, 111,
219, f.225, 233, 247, 263, 265, 266, 270,
278, 284, 320, 321, 337, 346, 347, 351,
355, 359, 478; Biography: Annex A

31

pp.5-12; Annex B p.4, f.14, f.17, f.18,

f.22; Annex F p.2, 5, 18, f.4, 24, 78;
Annex G p.6, 7, f.28; Annex L p.2, f.3.
Nguyn Vn Kim (Nguyn Sn H)
p.22, f.81; Annex A f.26.
Nguyn Vn Li p.20.
Nguyn Vn Lm (bugler, D445)
f.228; Annex F p.14, p.15.
Nguyn Vn L - Annex O f.101.
Nguyn Vn Minh Annex A f.27.
Nguyn Vn Mi (see: Nguyn Vit
Hoa, Mi Th).
Nguyn Vn M - Annex O p.13.
Nguyn Vn Nm (Nm V, Nguyn
Vn V, Nguyn Anh V ?) p.99,
p.102, p.150, f.396, 468; Biography:
Annex A pp.23-24; Annex B p.6, f.23,
f.24; Annex D p.4, f.30.
Nguyn Vn Nhiu Annex O p.27.
Nguyn Vn Nho, Major (ARVN - CO
33rd Ranger Battalion) p.151.
Nguyn Vn Nhng (Lc) f.415;
Annex B p.5, f.18, f.28; Annex D f.32;
Annex M f.47, f.48; Annex O p.21.
Nguyn Vn Nhng, Senior Captain
(CO D445 2003) p.220; Annex B p.9.
Nguyn Vn Oanh p.144, p.219,
f.396.
Nguyn Vn On/n/n - f.460, Annex
D p.4, f.27.
Nguyn Vn Ph p.10, f.29.
Nguyn Vn Phc, Major (ARVN)
f.111, f.410.
Nguyn Vn Phc, Lieutenant (NVA)
f.523, 527.
Nguyn Vn Phng Annex K f.29,
f.30, f.56; Annex O f.41, f.51.
Nguyn Vn Quang (Quang Hm)
p.40, 41, 57, 62, 95, 157, 170, 178, 185,
219, f.140, f.141, f.220, f.228, f.309,
f.613*, Annex B p.8, f.32 (CO D445
1978) .
Nguyn Vn R (Ba R) p.7.

Nguyn Vn Sang (3/D445, ex

K9/D440) f.473.
Nguyn Vn Sa Annex D p.4.
Nguyn Vn Sn, Captain/Major (CO
D445, 1989 and 1993-96) p.196,
Annex B p.8.
Nguyn Vn S - Annex O f.153.
Nguyn Vn Tm (Hai Mo) p.33,
f.39.
Nguyn Vn Tm (Hai Tm) p.102,
p.121, p.122, p.140, p.219, f.429, f.439;
Annex B p.4.
Nguyn Vn Tm (Tm Mo) f.439.
Nguyn Vn Thanh (275 Regiment
POW, Long Tn) f.293; Annex F f.16;
Annex O f.60, f.91.
Nguyn Vn Thanh (T Thanh) p.17,
218, f.292.
Nguyn Vn Thnh - Annex D p.3,
f.15, f.16.
Nguyn Vn Thnh (Thnh R) p.99.
Nguyn Vn Thiu President (Republic
of Vietnam) p.60, p.175, f.385.
Nguyn Vn Thiu (3/D445) p.154.
Nguyn Vn Thiu (D605) f.274;
Annex O p.7, 9, 13, f.24, 26, 28.
Nguyn Vn Thin (Ha) Annex D
p.3.
Nguyn Vn Th (D445 1966) Annex
O p.27.
Nguyn Vn Th, Captain (CO D445,
1991) p.197.
Nguyn Vn Thng Annex O p.27.
Nguyn Vn/c Thng f.163;
Annex B p.2, p.4.
Nguyn Vn Thu f.152.
Nguyn Vn Thun Annex F p.14,
f.61; Annex J f.5.
Nguyn Vn Tin (Nm Tin - B Ra
Sub-Region) f.62, f.158; Annex J f.29.
Nguyn Vn Tin (275A Regiment)
Annex O f.139.
Nguyn Vn Tng f.134, f.145.

32

Nguyn Vn Tr (Mi Tr) Major

(NVA) Annex O f.126.
Nguyn Vn Triu/Thiu Annex D
p.3.
Nguyn Vn T, Lieutenant Colonel
(ARVN) f.593.
Nguyn Vn t (Nguyn c Hot, Ba
t) f.126; Annex F p.14; Annex J p.2.
Nguyn Vn V (Nguyn Vn Nm,
Nm V, Nguyn Anh V ?) p.99,
p.102, p.150, f.396, f.468; Biography:
Annex A pp.23-24; Annex B p.6, f.23,
f.24; Annex D p.4, f.30.
Nguyn Vn Xun (Hai Xun) p.30,
p.33, p.218.
Nguyn Vit Hoa (Mi Th, Nguyn
Vn Mi) p.22, 28, 32, 37, f.99,
f.184, f.302, f.529, f.599; Annex J f.10.
Nguyn Vit Khai f.121.
Nguyn Vnh Trinh (ARVN officer)
f.106.
Nguyn Xun Th Sergeant (PAVN) Annex O p.26.
Nhn, Comrade p.17.
Nht, Comrade p.122, 123, f.430.
Nhn c hamlet p.23.
Nhn Ngha hamlet p.23.
Nhn Tm hamlet p.23.
Nhn Trch District p.10, p.35, p.88,
p.141, f.136.
Nhn Tr hamlet p.23.
Nht, Comrade p.100.
Nicknames, alias, aka Preface f.7,
f.445; Annex C f.15.
Ninh, Comrade (sapper) p.51.
North Vietnam p.34, p.86, f.3, 24, 37,
84, 98, 135, 141, 274, 293, 318, 345,
357, 389, 495, 523, 527, 537, 571;
Annex O p.1, 9, 15, 24, 25, 32, 34, 37,
38, 40, f.24, 29, 61, 69, 88, 90, 91, 102,
145; Annex P p.2, p.8, p.9, f.3, f.38, f.43,
f.50.

North Vietnamese, troop increases in

VC units f.318, f.338, f.523; Annex K
f.67; Annex O (275th Regiment) p.9, 15,
32, 34, 37, f.29, 36, 66, 67, 88, 90, 140.
Northern Border War (with China,
1979) f.610, f.623.
Northerners and Southerners
(tensions) f.495, f.642; Annex P f.39,
f.50.
NPFF (National Police Field Force)
f.386, f.467.
Ni B - p.136, p.138, p.139, f.474,
f.479, f.481, f.483.
Ni t p.65, 66, 68, 74, 79, 80, 94,
105, 111, 216, f.194, 230, 231, 234, 237,
240, 243, 245, 266, 267, 268, 297, 328,
348, 355, 483, 515, 637.
Ni t, artillery attack/shelling (17
August 1966) f.269; Annex E p.21, 28,
37-39, f.113, f.153. Annex O f.49.
Ni t, planned attack on Preface
f.11, f.12; Main Text: f.267, 269, 270;
Annex E p.27, 29, 30, 38-40, f.156,
f.157, f.198; Annex O pp.10-11, f.42.
Ni t, defences (mid-1966) f.267;
Annex E p.27, f.154, f.161.
Ni t 2 p.164 (map), p.216 (map),
f.262, f.266, f.267, f.552.
Ni Dinh p.4, p.93, p.95, p.107, p.181,
p.182, f.7, f.190, f.345.
Ni L p.18, p.139, f.67, f.511.
Ni Ln Mountain (Vng Tu) p.181.
Ni Ngh f.138, f.243.
Ni Nh Mountain (Vng Tu) p.181.
Ni Nhn p.20, p.23, p.150.
Ni Tc Tin p.197.
Ni Na f.145.
Ni Sao f.511.
Ni Th Vi p.4, p.10, p.181, p.182,
p.183, p.197, f.7, f.15, f.243, f.630.
Ni Thm (Ni t 2) p.163, f.262,
f.552.
Nng (minority group) p.23, f.84.

33

Nc Ngt p.158, p.166, f.517, f.559.

f.516
Nc Nh Stream base p.140.
NVA/VC killed in action by 1 ATF
(summary) f.514, f.644; Annex F f.94,
f.104, f.107.
NVA/VC strength estimates (including
CIA v MACV disputes) f.39, f.244,
f.318, f.338 (NVA in the South), f.534;
Annex C pp.6-8; Annex O f.90 (1966).
NVA/VC total casualties during the War
Annex F p.25, f.108.
Oath of Honour (VC) f.311.
OBrien, M.P.J. Colonel/Major General
f.1, f.468, f.472, f.478; Bibliography.
Offences p.202, p.205, Annex G f.15.
On, Comrade f.460.
ng n p.182, f.274; Annex K p.16,
f.34, f.52; Annex O p.7, 8, 11, 12, 18,
24, 26, f.28, 30, 52.
ng Long dam p.130.
ng Qu - p.99, p.173, f.438, f.574;
Annex O p.4, f.52.
Open Arms program see Chiu
Hi.
Operation Abilene f.199, f.203, f.206,
f.215, f.223, f.392.
Operation Akron Annex K p.16.
Operation Albany f.373.
Operation Ballarat Annex K f.66.
Operation Beaver Dam f.373.
Operation Boundary Rider f.373.
Operation Briar Patch f.487; Annex
P f.49.
Operation Bribie f.310, f.312.
Operation Blue Mountains f.373.
Operation Coburg f.348.
Operation Denver f.203.
Operation Darlinghurst Annex E
p.33, f.79, f.134, f.139, f.140.
Operation Goodwood f.373.
Operation Hardihood f.194, f.223,
f.231.

Operation Hayman f.10.

Operation Holsworthy Annex E p.11,
p.22, p.25, p.38, f.48, f.86, f.96, f.154.
Operation Iron Fox f.500.
Operation Ivanhoe f.511.
Operation King Hit f.373.
Operation Kings Cross Annex B
pp.10-11.
Operation Leeton Annex O p.31,
p.39.
Operation Lavarack Annex P f.25,
f.28, f.29, f.32.
Operation Marsden f.137; Annex F
p.8, p.9, f.40, f.43; Annex L p.1.
Operation Nowra f.373.
Operation Phi Hp f.449.
Operation Portsea Annex O p.39,
f.107.
Operation Santa Fe Annex B p.10.
Operation Smithfield (Long Tn)
f.266, f.267, f.269, f.272, f.276; Annex E
f.113, 149, 159, 163; Annex F f.9, f.12,
f.15, f.17, f.18, f.64, f.89; Annex O f.61.
Operation Ton Thng f.369.
Operation Toledo f.288; Annex E
p.12, 22, 24, 22, 33, f.49, 90, 91, 92,
105, 129, 133, 134, 138, 139, 154;
Annex K f.29, f.51; Annex O p.19, 28,
f.74, 91, 97; Annex N p.6, p.8, p.9, f.18,
26, 27, 34, 38, 39, 42, 43.
Orderly Departure Program (ODP)
f.593.
Ordnance Company (G.4544) f.167,
f.313, f.506.
Pacification p.22, 56, 65, 91, 99, 107,
108, 110-112, 119-120, 125, 127, 131,
132, 135, 142, 145, 148-150, 158-161,
167-169, 178, 212, f.70, f.148, f.199,
f.242, f.375, f.376, f.385, f.400, f.406,
f.422, f.437, f.483.
Pagoda, a Vng p.142, p.144.
Pagoda, Hang Lu f.517.
Pagoda, Long Phc Hi f.110.

34

Pagoda, Tht (Hi M/L Gm - vic YS

512544) Main Text - map p.162; Annex
F p.6, f.33; Annex O p.21, f.82, 83, 105,
109.
Pagoda, Tht (Long Tn) - f.274; Annex
F p.7, f.33; Annex K p.8, f.38, f.63;
Annex M f.20; Annex O p.21, f.82, 83,
105, 109.
Pagoda, Tht (Phc Hi YS 513533)
f.110, map p.32; Annex O f.82.
Palace Hotel (Vng Tu) battle for
p.177.
Paris Accords/Agreement p.97,
pp.155-158, p.160, p.161, p.168, p.171,
f.357, f.534-f.537, f.570.
Paris, negotiations/tables f.357.
Party, leads absolutely, directly and
completely p.215, pp.201-203; Annex
G f.1.
Party, transparent, honest, pure and
solidly-based (2002) p.205.
Party Chapters p.1, 6, 7, 12, 24, 29,
33, 48, 50, 87, 98, 104, 106, 108, 116,
169, 172, 199, 201, 203, 207; Annexes G
and H - multiple references; Annex P
p.7.
Party Committees Main Text: total of
283 references; Annexes G and H
(multiple references).
Party (D440) Annex P p.7, f.36.
Party, introduction into Annex G
pp.6-7, f.26.
Party members, classification p.202.
Party membership f.31, f.361, p.205;
Annexes G and H (multiple references);
Annex O f.102 (275th Regiment).
PAVN (Peoples Army of Vietnam)
Preface f.2.
Patriotic Militia Force (anti-communist
resistance group) f.602.
PDP-8/L, battle intelligence computer
(1 ATF) Annex E p.44, f.178, f.179.

Peoples Liberation Front p.37,

f.355, f.358.
Peoples Restoration Militia (anticommunist resistance group) f.611.
Peoples Revolutionary Councils (1975
- ) f.597.
Peoples Revolutionary Party f.3,
f.31, f.361; Annex G p.1, f.2, f.4, f.28.
Peoples Self Defence Force (PSDF)
p.124, p.127, p.132, p.141, p.142, p.147,
p.158, f.433, f.541.
Peoples Self-Determination Front
(anti-communist movement) f.612.
Personal History Statement (PHS)
f.94, f.105; Annex D p.5; Annex G pp.67, f.27-f.28; Annex O p.26, p.40.
PF (see: Popular Forces).
Phm Lc (T Lc) p.88, p.154,
p.169, f.338, f.555, f.599; Annex J p.6,
f.21, f.23; Annex P p.4.
Phm Ngc Ln, Lieutenant Colonel
(ARVN) f.593.
Phm Nh Tu f.360.
Phm Ph Hi Annex O f.152.
Phm Ph , Captain (CO D445 200203) - p.203, p.220; Annex B p.9.
Phm Thanh Phn (Phm Vn Vn)
Annex D p.4.
Phm Thanh Quang f.575.
Phm Vn Chiu Annex O f.152.
Phm Vn Chi Senior Lieutenant
(NVA) Annex O f.30, 101, 107, 147..
Phm Vn Cn f.75; Annex J f.36.
Phm Vn Cn (Tam Cn) f.532,
f.575, f.579; Annex J p.6, f.36.
Phm Vn ng Annex O f.152.
Phm Vn ng p.97, f.285; Annex
F p.23.
Phm Vn Giao p.102.
Phm Vn Ha Annex F p.25; Annex
O f.91.

35

Phm Vn Hy (T Hy, Phm Tin)

p.119, p.169, f.345, f.445, f.555, f.574,
f.578; Annex J p.2, 6, f.2, 12, 18, 21, 23.
Phm Vn Mo Annex A f.34.
Phm Vn Ngh Annex O p.26.
Phm Vn Phc, Colonel (ARVN)
p.175, f.575, f.582.
Phm Vn V - Annex O f.152.
Phm Vn Xut Annex O f.10.
Phan Chim Thnh, Major (CO D445,
1998-99) p.201; Annex B p.9.
Phan Chin, Colonel p.198.
Phan Rang f.194.
Phan Thanh Bnh (By Bnh) p.169,
p.219; Annex A f.96; Annex B f.3.
Phan Thanh Chin (Mi Chin)
f.478.
Phan Thanh H (Hai H) f.445, f.447,
f.468; Annex P p.3, p.4, p.7, f.16, f.35.
Phan Vn Khu Annex O p.13, 29,
43, f.93.
Phan Vn Nh (T Nh) f.204;
Annex B p.2, p.3.
Phan Vn Trung Appendix 3 to
Annex O p.4.
Pheonix Program p.125, p.160, p.181,
f.244, f.437, f.542.
Philippines f.224, f.305, f.535; Annex
K f.62.
Phnom Penh (PAVN seizure of)
f.605, f.609, f.621, f.624.
Ph Nm Cn p.105, f.174.
Photographs p.57 (24); Annex B
pp.10-11 (D445 troops ?); Annex C p.8,
f.42 (D445 troops ?).
Ph Giao District f.369.
Ph M - p.4, 8, 14, 15, 23, 42, 148,
183, f.24, f.55, f.108, f.516.
Ph Quc, island f.605, 615; Annex F
f.16; Annex O f.60.
Phng, Comrade (Hai Phng) Annex
O p.2, 3, 9, 13, f.8.
Phung Vn Y Annex P p.7.

Phc Bin Special Zone p.8, f.22.

Phc Binh (Phc Long) f.570.
Phc Bu village p.23, p.29, p.108,
p.160, f.488, f.507, f.644.
Phc Bu Liberated Zone p.108.
Phc Chanh hamlet p.95.
Phc Hi p.6, p.32 (map), p.57, p.82,
p.85, p.88, p.97, p.120, p.124, p.145,
p.153, p.157, p.167, p.170, f.8, 75, 95,
98, 110, 119, 157, 299, 300, 304, 312,
316, 406, 447, 453, 466, 468, 488, 507,
540, 547, 548, 559, 565, 566, 567.
Phc Ha, ambush f.181; Annex O
p.3, f.14.
Phc Ha village p.23, p.183, p.186,
f.181, f.346; Annex O p.3, f.14.
Phc Ha Long p.23, p.103, p.113,
p.116, p.123, p.124, p.130, p.151, f.375,
f.404, f.430, f.434, f.465.
Phc Hi village (formerly Hi M)
Annex O p.21, f.82, f.105.
Phc Hng hamlet p.216 (map),
p.95, f.262, f.274; Annex E f.118; Annex
K f.37, f.41; Annex M f.7, f.19, f.24,
f.26; Annex O p.17, f.67, f.68.
Phc Hng village (B Ra Town)
p.95.
Phc Hu p.19.
Phc L (B Ra Town) - f.1
(population), p.8, p.186, f.34, f.147,
f.259.
Phc Li p.5, 23, 48, 124, 130, 166,
170, f.375, 456, 469, 480, 488, 507, 564,
565, 566, 567.
Phc Long District f.619.
Phc Long Province p.172, f.64,
f.133, f.203, f.513, f.570, f.617; Annex
O p.6, 32, 34, 35, f.25, f.26.
Phc Long Hi p.88, p.143, p.162,
p.169, f.8, f.75, f.157, f.375.
Phc Sn hamlet p.121, p.122.
Phc Tn village p.139.
Phc Thi p.16, f.36.

36

Phc Thnh f.64, f.86, f.188.

Phc Thnh Festival Place f.86.
Phc Thnh p.5, p.23, p.60, p.103,
p.116, p.117, p.130, p.177, f.212, f.220,
f.422, f.464, f.475.
Phc Th - p.5, p.23, p.103, p.116,
p.117, p.121, p.122, p.186, f.333, f.422,
f.464.
Phc Thi p.114, p.122.
Phc Tnh p.20, p.21, p.23, p.120,
p.177, f.76, f.488, f.507.
Phc Trinh hamlet p.142.
Phc Tuy p.4, 8, 12, 13, 19, 52, 65,
85, 97, 116, 126, 158, 165, 171, 176, f.1,
5, 6, 11, 19-23, 34, 38-39, 69, 72, 76, 89,
97, 155-156, 165, 203, 215, 229, 231,
240, 244, 259, 301, 304-305, 308, 314315, 350, 352, 355, 358, 365, 370, 375376, 380, 389, 398, 402, 437, 474, 500,
505, 514, 523, 528, 531, 532, 539, 551,
580, 590, 592-593, 596, 636, 643.
Phc Tuy, areas of control, curfew,
and population (1966) f.199, f.299.
Phc Tuy, non-critical/critical
province p.27, f.97.
Phc Tuy, Province Chiefs f.593.
Phc Tuy Documents (2013 Dr R.A.
Hall et al) Annex F p.25, f.105; Biblio.
Phc Vnh Long f.422.
Phng Hong (see Pheonix) f.244,
f.437, f.542.
Piastres p.48, p.112, p.119, f.47, f.332,
f.420.
Piggy-backing poncho/raincoat ruse
f.242; Annex A f.64; Annex K p.4;
Annex Q f.6.
Pimlott, John L. Dr f.289.
PIOCC (Pheonix program) f.542.
PLAF Preface f.2.
Platoon commanders (D445 mid-1966)
Annex D pp.3-4.
Pol Pot forces pp.190-195, f.605,
f.615.

Police Field Force (NPFF) f.386,

f.467.
Political commissar (chnh y) f.614;
Annex G f.3, f.6.
Political officer (chnh tr vin) f.614;
Annex G f.3, f.6.
Political Report D445 (1966) Annex
H.
Popular Forces p.34, 50, 104, 105,
106, 132, 170, f.45, 50, 78, 116, 117,
170, 211, 301, 312, 372, 377, 441, 490.
Popular Forces, locations 1966 f.301.
Popular Militia f.433.
Population, B Ra Town/Phc L f.1.
Population, B Ra - Vng Tu f.16.
Population, Bnh Gi p.36, f.122.
Population, Long Khnh Province f.5.
Population, Phc Tnh village f.76.
Population, Phc Tuy f.1, f.38,
f.155, f.199, f.229.
Population, Rng Sc f.10.
Population, South Vietnam f.59,
f.195; Annex C f.35 (January 1968)..
Population, control f.59, f.97, f.195,
f.199, f.229; Annex C f.35 (1968).
Porters/Porterage p.48, f.125, f.166,
f.371.
Post 64 (Bnh Ba) f.364.
Postal system see mail.
POWs (NVA/VC) f.293; Annex F p.3,
f.16; Annex O p.8, 14, 15, 24, f.7, 47,
51, 60, 81, 91, 105, 116.
POWs (VC, Battle of Long Tn)
f.293; Annex F p.3, f.16; Annex O p.15,
p.24, f.7, f.60, f.91.
PRC-6 radio (walkie-talkie) f.107,
f.200.
PRC-10 radio p.10, p.36, f.107, f.149,
f.185, f.200, f.417; Annex E p.2, p.3, p.4,
f.10-13, 22, 24, 38, 98, 122, 144, 145.
PRC-25 radio p.43, 53, 60, 134, 139,
154, 161, 167, 168, 171, 172, 192, f.107,

37

148, 149, 185, 186, 200, 372, 417, 472,

517, 544, 561, 562, 620; Annex E p.3,
p.4, f.10-14, 22-24, 38, 98, 122, 145.
Presidential Citation, US (D/6RAR)
f.295; Annex F p.9, f.44.
Pro-Vit Cng (Long in) f.352.
Production units p.85, p.115, f.313.
Project 1, Project 2 pp.104-105.
Proselytising, military p.10, 16, 54-55,
124, 145, 199, f.29, 82, 191, 213, 559.
Province Chiefs (Phc Tuy ARVN)
f.593.
Province Ordnance Unit (G.4544 )
Annex F f.53.
Province Reconnaissance Company
(VC) f.468.
Province/Provincial Reconnaissance
Unit (PRU) f.352.
Provisional Revolutionary
Government (PRG) f.405, f.520,
f.536, f.537; Annex J f.7.
PSDF f.433; see Peoples Self Defence
Force.
Psychological warfare p.112, p.145,
p.169, f.402.
Puff gunship (AC-47D) f.502.
Public Security and Border Defence
Force p.188.
Purchasing network/agents p.115,
p.116, f.118, f.409.
Q563 (COSVN artillery) f.139.
Qua h Thai Sn (33rd NVA Regiment)
Annex P p.6.
Qua h Vn Mi (Mi Dm, Quch
Vn Tm) p.27, p.99, f.92, f.95, f.96,
f.325; Annex B p.4; Annex D p.4, f.28.
Qun S (Vietnamese military history
website) Annex C f.31; Annex F f.6;
Bibliography.
Quang, Comrade p.107
Quang H - p.52, f.219; Annex D f.10.
Quang Hm (see Nguyn Vn Quang).

Quang Minh Plantation p.90, p.174,

p.175.
Quislings (bn t) p.19, 36, 132,
147, 149, 158, 170, 171, 181, f.69.
Quc Hng (possibly Trn Vn Kinh)
f.415, 416; Annex B p.6.
Qu, Comrade p.138.
Qu Sn ng (anti-communist
resistance movement) p.184.
RAAF f.230, f.235, f.486, f.515;
Annex P f.49, f.51.
Rch Vang, bridge p.96, f.356.
Radio 71B f.243, f.417; Annex E p.2,
p.3, f.10-12, 18, 122, 144, 145.
Radio 102E f.417; Annex E p.2, f.10,
f.12, f.18, f.24, f.122, f.144, f.145.
Radio AN/GRC-9 f.190, f.417; Annex
E p.2, p.17, f.7, 10, 12, 18, 24, 122, 145.
Radio H Ni Annex F p.17, f.75,
f.76.
Radio HT-1 f.211, f.466; Annex E p.3,
f.16.
Radio K-63 - f.417; Annex E f.122,
f.144, f.145.
Radio Peking Annex F f.75, f.76.
Radio Research Unit (RRU), 1 ATF
Annex E p.26, f.99.
Radio Research Units, US Annex E
p.10, p.15, p.17, p.24.
Radio SCR-694 f.417; Annex E f.24,
f.155.
Radio VTS Annex E p.2, f.9.
Radios, NVA/VC in III CTZ (1967)
Annex E f.10.
Raincoat/poncho piggy-backing ruse
(by Australian troops) f.242; Annex A
f.64; Annex K p.4; Annex Q f.6.
Rallying/surrender (NVA/VC) f.402,
f.414, f.415, f.506 see also Chiu Hi.
Ranger units see: 5th, 6th Ranger
Groups; 30th, 31st, 33rd, 35th, 38th, and
52nd Ranger Battalions.

38

Ranks/titles p.218, f.37, f.537; Annex

G p.4, p.5, f.6, f.20; Annex O p.4, f.27.
Rations, entitlements p.93, p.98,
p.108, f.409, f.481, f.495; Annex G f.10;
Annex O f.132; Annex P p.7.
RD (see: Rural Development).
Rear Services, D445 p.5, 6, 14, 48-49,
97, 108, 114, 115, 118, 120, 138, 139,
190, 203, 208, 209, f.165, f.643.
Rear Services, Province level p.119,
f.167, f.532.
Rear Services, Military Region level
f.98, f.108, f.491.
Reactionary groups (1975 - ) p.186,
190, 210, f.612, 633; Annex P pp.11-13.
Recoilless rifle (RCL) (VC) p.42, 49,
50, 52, 62, 73, 74, 79, 82, 83, 99, 100,
120, 121, 123, f.52, 136, 148, 149, 188,
219, 269, 292, 292, 365; Annex K p.3, 8,
10, f.40; Annex M p.4, 8, 9, f.29, 37, 38,
39.
Reconnaissance in force f.208.
Red Haze (infra-red, airborne) Annex
E f.2, f.141.
Re-education (1975 - ) pp.180-183,
f.582, f.593, f.596.
Regional Forces f.49, f.114, f.301,
f.498, f.590 and others.
Regional Forces, locations 1966 f.301.
Regional Forces, penetration of by VC
(1 ATF reaction) f.410, f.448.
Regroupees/Regroupment p.9, f.24,
f.135, f.274; Annex A f.21, f.25; Annex
M f.19; Annex O p.7, p.26, f.24, 29, 131.
Religion - p.6, pp.36-37, f.17, f.18 (see
also Catholics).
Renovation (i Mi economic policy
from 1986) f.631.
Resolutions (COSVN) p.161, p.172,
f.196.
Resolutions (Politburo) p.9, 12, 56,
168, 169, 172, 183, f.196, f.563.
Resolution 12 f.196, f.543.

Resolution 15 (1959) p.9, f.25.

Resolution 15 (1975) p.172.
Revolutionary Development Peoples
Group f.433.
Revolutionary/Rural Development
(RD) Cadre p.11, p.181, f.189, f.316,
f.405, f.406.
Revolutionary Military Councils
f.256, f.311, f.635; Annex G f.4.
Rewards (monetary) p.112.
RF - see Regional Forces.
Rice p.7, 8, 34, 48, 51, 93, 106, 107,
108, 112, 114, 115, 116, 120, 122, 129,
130, 131, 139, 144, 145, 159, 214, f.59,
89, 117, 118, 195, 266, 281, 408, 409,
426, 472, 481, 495; Annex E p.32;
Annex N p.5, p.9, f.10, f.16; Annex O
p.14, 28, 32, f.41, f.59; Annex P p.7.
Richards, T.J. Captain (Brigadier Retd)
Annex E p.11, 16, 19, 22, 28, 31-33,
45, 48, f.28, 29, 34, 38, 44, 46, 47, 53,
56, 58-62, 65, 68, 70, 72-75, 87, 89, 125,
126, 132, 137, 167; Annex L p.2.
RKG grenade f.227.
Rockets - see H12 (107mm) f.398; DKB
(122mm) f.425; 107mm f.398.
Route 2 (now Route 56) p. 4 (plus 76
references in the main text; see map on
back cover).
Route 2 bypass f.275 (map p.76).
Route 2 Campaign p.162, p.165,
f.545, 554, 556; Annex J p.6.
Route 3 f.168, f.573.
Route 3 Campaign p.92.
Route 23 (now Route 55) p.4 (plus 23
references in the main text).
Route 52 (vicinity Long Tn) p.103,
132, 145, 163, 165, 211, f.274, 374, 375,
553, 559, 565; maps at p.76 (1966),
p.164 (1974).
Route 327 (Bnh Gi village) p.36.
Rowe, J. S. Major Annex E p.18, p.19,
p.22, f.68, 80, 82, 84, 89, 114, 167.

39

Royal Australian Navy f.230.

RPD machinegun f.131, f.478.
RPG-2 (B40) f.135.
RPG-7 (B41) f.135.
Rubber p.5, 6, 7, 30, 34, 72, 100, 115,
154, 155, 173, f.15, f.104, f.151, f.275,
f.281, f.555.
Rule of Secrecy f.310.
Rng L f.168, f.281, f.573, f.596;
Annex O p.14, p.28, f.30.
Rng Sc/ Rng Sc / Rng St p.4,
p.10, p.11, p.50, p.52, p.147, p.184, f.10,
f.11, f.108, f.169, f.539, f.600, f.636.
Rung Tre p.42.
Sabben, D. (David) R. f.267, f.276;
Annex A p.17, p.21; Annex B f.29;
Annex F f.43. Bibliography.
Safe Conduct Pass p.200.
Sn Tc District (Cambodia) p.193.
Sappers p.51, 64, 120, 121, 122, 134,
135, 145, 166, 212, f.184, 189, 225, 328,
426, 432, 453, 468, 473, 487, 504, 505,
532, 539, 546, 558, 559, 572; Annex P
p.1, p.9, f.38, f.40, f.44.
Sau Ac, re-education camp f.596.
Su Bo (see: Nguyn Vn Bo).
Su Chnh (see: Bi Quang Chnh)
Su Cht, Mr p.115.
Sau Chay p.38, p.41.
Su Chin (see: Trn Vn Chin).
Sau Dan District (Cambodia) p.193.
Sau nh p.169.
Sau Khng Annex O f.2.
Sau Lin, Comrade p.126.
Su L - p.21, p.22, f.77.
Sau Mi p.38, p.41.
Su Phng (see: Lm Phng) f.325;
Annex B p.4, p.6, p.7, f.30; Annex D
p.3.
Sau Tm (see: Trn Ngc B).
Sau Tn p.14.
Su Thanh (Nguyn Thanh) Annex K
pp.17-18; Annex O p.32, f.35, 46, 113.

Su Thnh (L Thnh Cng) - f.36, f.41;

Annex B p.1.
Su Thu (see: Nguyn c Thu).
Su Thng (see: Nguyn c Thng).
Search and Destroy p.56, p.59, f.10,
f.198, f.208 (term changed).
Seasons f.9.
Secret Self-Defense Forces (VC)
p.12, p.34, f.39, f.244, f.313, Annex C
p.6, p.7.
Sector (Tiu Khu) p.8, 13, 19, 24, 37,
46, 107, 124, 148, 153, 165, 176, f.11,
f.23, f.39, f.156, f.301, f.304, f.305,
f.314, f.375, f.434, f.566, f.590, f.602;
Annex C p.6, f.34.
Sect f.18 (T n Hiu Ngha).
Seismic Intrusion Devices, Patrol
(PSID) f.451.
Self-criticism (kim tho) f.311;
Annex G p.7.
Self-Defence Corps (Saigon Govt - Dn
V) p.13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24,
32, f.43, 49, 91, 116, 170, 377.
Self-Defense Forces (VC) f.39, f.244,
f.314; Annex C p.6.
Self Loading Rifle (SLR) f.442, f.487.
Sensors p.128, f.451; Annex E f.2.
Sewing machines p.48.
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) f.138,
f.190, f.417, f.493, f.533; Annex E (a
summary annex) including a definition at
f.1 and description at f.26; Annex P p.3.
SIGINT, access to Annex E p.28, 31,
pp.40-41, f.54, f.70, f.89, 114, 127, 167.
SIGINT, codewords p.10, 36, f.73
(listed), f.80.
SIGINT, tip-off to Thai forces (Lc
An/274th Regiment, 16 June 1969)
Annex K f.57; Annex O f.133.
SIGINT, US support to 1 ATF Annex
E p.5, 6, pp.9-13, pp.15-19, 21. 28, 32,
35, 40, f.2, 6, 28, 30, 38, 40, 42, 44, 50,
60, 61, 68, 141.

40

Sioux helicopter p.131, f.459, f.486;

Annex E p.25, p.26, p.36, f.171.
S (Plantation) Bng p.143, p.145,
f.497.
Slope 30, location f.328, f.369; Annex
N f.35.
Slope 30, Battle of (11 ACR) f.328.
Smith, H. (Harry) A. Major p.80,
p.216, f.267, f.269, f.276, f.295; Annex
E f.89, f.153; Annex F p.3, p.9, p.10,
f.16, f.17, f.18, f.22, f.40, f.41, p.42,
f.46, f.89. Bibliography.
Social status (D445 personnel) Annex
G pp.4-5.
Soldiers/Troops of Uncle H
Movement p.2, p.183, p.203, p.206,
p.208, p.211, p.215.
Sng m (Worksite) Annex O p.7.
Sng B Province p.191, f.612, f.617,
f.619.
Sng (River) Cu p.33, p.34, p.45,
p.61.
Sng Cu strategic hamlet (Ha Long)
p.34, f.113, f.147, f.239, f.439.
Sng Mng pp.191-192, f.619.
Sng Ray/Rai p.4, p.91, p.108, p.126,
p.139, f.98, f.119, f.131, f.339, f.487;
Annex O p.3, p.28, f.12.
Sng Vnh (agricultural site) p.182,
183.
Sng Xoi p.93.
South China Sea/Eastern Sea p.3,
p.193, f.110, f.624; Annex F p.13.
South Vietnam Peoples Liberation
Armed Forces (PLAF) Preface f.2;
p.16, p.96, p.157, f.188, f.256, f.495,
f.539, f.585, f.642, f.635.
South-Western Border War p.187,
f.605, f.609.
Southern Front Headquarters (1975)
f.575; Annex J f.36.
Southern Trung B - p.9, p.35, f.120.

Southerners and Northerners

(tensions) f.494, f.641; Annex P f.39,
f.50.
Spade, shovel, entrenching tool
(NVA/VC) Annex Q f.17.
Special Action Company (Xuyn Mc;
C610 B Ra) f.539.
Special Action Unit (B Ra) f.341.
Special Air Service (SAS) f.42, f.209;
Annex E p.14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 27, 32, 42,
48, 49, f.2, 40, 54, 55, 57, 61, 70, 75,
105, 131, 150, 167, 195, 198.
Special Agent Reports (SPARs)
f.417; Annex E p.10, 11, 14, 19, 34, 41,
44, 49, f.43, 79, 99, 140, 141, 178, 179;
Annex N f.24, f.37; Annex O f.76.
Special Mission Group G4231g (White
Swan) f.401, p.181; Annex G f.11.
Special Sectors (yu khu) p.14, p.148,
f.516.
Special Task Regiment (anticommunist resistance) p.184, f.612.
Special Warfare (US) p.19, p.34,
p.46, p.209.
Spectre gunship (AC-130A, AC-119)
f.502.
Spooky gunship (AC-47D) f.502.
Spratly Islands (Trng Sa) f.590.
Spring f.9, f.258.
Staley-Taylor p.19, p.34, f.70.
Steel Gate (Xun Lc) p.175, f.583.
Strategic Hamlets p.19, 20, 22, 23,
24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,
37, 38, 42, 44, 45, 46, 49, 82, 91, 119,
132, 134, 138, 147, 160, 178, 209, f.71,
72, 138, 155, 438, 439.
Strategic Reserve, ARVN p.43, f.151.
Sub-Region 4 p.88; Annex J p.4, f.22.
Sub-Region 9 f.200; Annex J p.4, f.22.
Sub-Regions (nine October 1967) Annex J p.4.

41

Sub-Sector (Chi Khu) General: p.32,

35, 124, 128, 160, f.11, 23, 43, 156, 346,
541.
Sub-Sector, t p.5, 60, 102, 122,
130, 148, 151, 152, 153, f.147, f.149,
f.156, f.253, f.372, f.403, f.434, f.526.
Sub-Sector, c Thnh p.8, 20, 30,
36, 37, 99, 148, 176, f.15, f.63, f.138,
f.142, f.147, f.156, f.215, f.328, f.364,
f.410, f.538, f.586.
Sub-Sector, Long in p.8, 20, 51,
102, 148, 153, f.156, f.586.
Sub-Sector, Long Khnh p.153;
Annex P.
Sub-Sector, Long L p.5, 8, 20, 22,
26, 148, f.156, f.245, f.355, f.586.
Sub-Sector, Xuyn Mc p.8, 23, 107,
134, 148, 150, 153, f.156, f.472.
Sub-Sub-Sectors (Phn Chi Khu)
f.156, f.541, f.566.
Suicide group f.457.
Summer f.9, f.258.
Sunrise Campaign p.20, f.72.
Sui (Stream) Ca p.153.
Sui C - p.11.
Sui Ct f.573, f.575; Annex O p.3,
p.4, p.29, f.30.
Sui Chu Pha Annex K f.6.
Sui a Bang f.250; Annex K f.19.
Sui u - f.260; Annex K f.29;
Annex M f.5.
Sui L f.172.
Sui Nc Nh base p.140.
Sui Qut p.11, f.36.
Sui Rm p.81, p.90, p.100, f.297,
f.328, f.334, f.596; Annex K p.2, p.16;
Annex N f.49, f.51; Annex O f.150.
Sui Rao/Rau p.1, 5, 47, 82, 204,
f.309, f.447, f.640.
Sui Rt Annex O p.34, 35; Annex P
p.2.
Sui Th Stream p.91, f.339.

Supplementary Pacification Program

p.125, p.132.
Surgical team (Long Tn) p.72.
T345, re-education camp f.596.
T Bao Bridge (Bnh Thun) - Annex O
p.14, p.28.
T Hng Sinh (Mi Sinh) p.30,
p.118, p.119, f.418, f.445; Annex P p.8.
T Lon, D445 base p.119, p.212,
f.640.
T Lon Stream p.212, f.640.
T L, logistic exchange point p.116.
T Minh Khm f.135, f.145.
Ti, Comrade p.100, p.145.
Tam An village f.8, f.75, f.157.
Tam axit p.14.
Tm Bao Annex O p.9, p.13.
Tm B/Tm B, Battle of (1966)
p.61, f.215; Annex E p.38; Annex K
f.52; Annex O p.11, f.14.
Tm Bung Annex O p.34, p.35.
Tm H (see: L Minh H).
Tam Hip, prison p.45; Annex A p.12.
Tam Long (three villages) p.5, f.13,
f.202, f.216.
Tm Mo (Nguyn Vn Tm) p.33.
Tm N Annex O p.36, f.10.
Tm Phi (CO 275 Regiment) Annex
K p.17; Annex O p.31, 32, f.46, 53, 112.
Tam Phc p.23, p.148, p.167, f.488,
f.507.
Tm Tng (see: o Vn Tng).
Tam Tng p.48.
Tn, Comrade Annex M p.8.
Tn Phong p.174.
Tn Ph District p.167, p.183, p.184,
p.185, p.196, p.197, f.612.
Tn Thnh District Preface f.16
(History); Main Text: p.3, p.183, p.201,
p.208, f.90, f.108, f.112.
Tn Uyn District p.182, f.369.
Tanh Linh District p.35, f.139.

42

Tanks, ARVN p.25, p.95 (?), p.97 (?),

p.105, p.142, p.144, p.151, p.152, p.158,
p.165, p.174, p.175, f.390, f.399, f.497,
f.499, f.500, f.501, f.556, f.638.
Tanks, Australian p.111, p.117,
p.122, p.125, p.131, p.142, p.144, f.275,
f.283, f.351, f.380, f.390, f.436, f.487,
f.497, f.498, f.499, f.500, f.501; Annex
K p.10, f.43, f.49; Annex M p.9, p.12,
f.31, f.45; Annex P f.6.
Tanks, NVA f.534, f.587, f.638.
Tanks, US p.81, p.88, p.90, p.91,
p.100, p.101, p.142, p.144, f.297, f.309,
f.328, f.334, f.336, f.369, f.498, f.501,
f.638; Annex P p.3.
Task Force see 1 ATF.
Taxes Annex J f.4.
Technical Means/Reconnaissance
(NVA/VC SIGINT) f.117, f.190, f.533;
Annex E f.10, f.18; Annex P p.3.
Tensions, (between Southerners and
Northerners) f.494, f.641; Annex P
f.39, f.50.
Tp Phoc p.43, p.105, f.148, f.379.
Tt (1968) Mu Thn Offensive p.91,
93, 95-101, 110-112, 146, 212, f.134,
f.245, f.321, f.337-354, f.363, f.433;
Annex K p.18; Annex M f.6; Annex O
p.33, f.122; Annex P pp.2-3 (Long
Khnh).
Tt (1968) Mu Thn Offensive: Phase
II, Phase III f.363; Annex K p.18,
Annex O p.33, f.122.
Tt (1968) Mu Thn Offensive: Xun
Lc Town f.340; Annex P pp.2-3.
Tt (1969) p.111, p.112, p.212, f.397f.399.
Tt (1971) p.139, f.483.
Texas Tech University Preface p.4.
TH6, re-education camp f.596.
Thai Armed Forces p.212, p.213,
f.305, f.512, f.535; Annex K p.15, f.57.
Thai Vn Cho p.25.

Thanh Chm, Comrade p.122.

Thanh Ha Province f.274; Annex K
f.37; Annex O p.7, p.25, f.24.
Thanh Tn hamlet (Phc Thnh)
p.130.
Tht Pagoda (Hi M, now Phc Hi)
map p.162; Annex O p.21, f.82, f.83,
f.104, f.105.
Tht Pagoda (Long Tn) f.274;
Annex F p.7, f.33; Annex K p.8, f.38,
f.63; Annex O p.21, f.82, f.83.
Tht Pagoda (Phc Hi) f.110, map
p.32; Annex F f.33; Annex O f.82.
Thy Ba p.59, p.60.
Thiu, Comrade (NVA 1972) p.150,
p.154.
Thin Nga (White Swan) f.401, p.181;
Annex G f.11.
Third Regional Assistance Command
(TRAC), US f.514.
Thom [sic], Comrade Annex B f.19.
Thompson sub-machinegun see front
cover.
Thng Nht area p.184, p.186.
Three Main Rules of Discipline and
the Eight Points of Attention f.311.
Three-pronged attacks f.82, p.22,
p.31, p.61, p.99, p.104, p.111, p.132,
p.142, p.148, p.149, p.160, p.166, p.167,
p.169, p.194, f.82, f.213, f.366.
Three spearhead attacks f.82, f.213,
f.366.
Thu (rapist, Ha Long) - p.22, f.78.
Th Bin Sub-Region f.491; Annex J
p.6.
Tha Tch village f.384, f.596.
Tha Tch (ambush, mid-1969)
Annex P pp.4-5.
Thunder and Lightning Battalion
p.103, p.104, p.106, f.374, f.375.
Thunder and Wind operation (1962)
p.20.
Thunderbolt Battalion f.375.

43

Tidey, B. Preface f.8, Annex O f.1, 21.

Tin, Comrade (reconnaissance) p.102.
Title/rank, functional f.37.
Title, Heroic Unit D445 p.1, p.2,
p.57, p.189, p.190, p.210, f.2, f.601,
f.613, f.627 (Cambodia), f.644.
T Dng (T Vn Dng) p.41, p.62,
p.70, f.163, f.218, f.250, f.253; Annex B
p.2; Annex D f.9.
T Th Nu (Ba Hong, alias Minh
Hong) f.190; Annex E p.17, f.64.
Tng, Comrade (OC 1st Coy) p.192.
Tng Vit Dng Annex K p.3, f.12.
Tt, Comrade p.25.
Townsend, C.M. Lieutenant Colonel
f.266, f.267; Annex E p.40, f.66, f.153,
f.163; Annex K f.46; Annex M f.13,
f.27; Annex O f.61.
Tr Tn 1, 2 - hamlets f.168.
Tri Nhai camp (Vng Tu) p.175.
Trail (H Ch Minh/MR 559) f.25,
f.523; Annex C f.30; Annex O f.16, f.24,
f.25, f.27, f.88.
Trail by sea f.98, f.108, f.131.
Traitors p.112, p.117, f.69, f.414,
f.415, f.416.
Trn Chng Annex A f.37.
Trn nh Bch, Lieutenant Colonel
(ARVN) f.593.
Trn nh Xu p.39, f.133.
Trn ng Hng (COSVN) f.127.
Trn Hng f.424, Annex B p.6, f.20.
Trn Hng c (Trn Thanh Sn)
Annex D f.3, f.21.
Trn Huy Tin Annex O p.40, f.150.
Trn Kim Thinh (Trn Vn ng, 2ic
274th Regiment) Annex K f.68.
Trn Lng (Ba Lng) p.14.
Trn Minh - Annex D p.4.
Trn Minh Hng f.453.
Trn Minh Tm (Nm Tm, S Nm)
f.260, f.262, f.283, f.292, f.302; Annex
K p.6, p.7, p.9, f.30, f.42; Annex L p.1;

Annex M f.7, f.9, f.24, f.25, f.26, f.32,

f.34, f.45; Annex O p.10, f.41, f.67.
Trn Ngc B (Sau Tm) p.10, p.11,
f.33.
Trn Ngc - Annex O p.26.
Trn Sn Tiu (Nm L) Annex J p.6.
Trn Tn Huy f.482; Annex B p.7
f.28.
Trn Tn Phat, Captain (ARVN)
f.156.
Trn Thanh Long, Captain (ARVN)
f.156.
Trn Trung B (Trn Vn B) Annex
D p.4, f.29.
Trn Trung Hng Annex D p.4.
Trn Vn Anh Annex D p.2.
Trn Vn B (T B/B Gi) f.102,
Annex B f.22.
Trn Vn B p.14.
Trn Vn Chin (Su Chin, Trn Vn
Hu) p.13, p.36, p.49, p.62, p.77,
p.218, f.152, f.163, f.218, f.279, f.453,
f.644; Annex B p.2; Annex D f.7, f.12;
Annex F p.6, f.28; Annex M f.43.
Trn Vn Cng p.14, f.62.
Trn Vn ng (Trn Kim Thinh 2ic
274th Regiment) Annex K f.68.
Trn Vn c f.463.
Trn Vn G (Nm Lu n) p.97.
Trn Vn Hng, President p.175.
Trn Vn Kha h (historian) f.33.
Trn Vn Khi f.163; Annex D f.20.
Trn Vn Khi/Khi f.327; Annex D
p.3, f.20; Annex P p.1, f.5.
Trn Vn Kinh (see: Quc Hng).
Trn Vn Knh (anti-communist
resistance) f.602.
Trn Vn Lm Annex O f.105.
Trn Vn Li Annex D p.4.
Trn Vn Long p.137; Annex B p.6.
Trn Vn Lng (Ba Lng) Annex
A p.10, f.28, f.41, f.44, f.51.
Trn Vn On/n/n Annex D p.4.

44

Trn Vn Su Annex O p.35, f.128.

Trn Vn Thc (Ngc Chu) Annex
D p.3.
Trn Vn Ting, Captain (NVA - 275th
Regiment) f.281, f.293, f.312; Annex E
p.32, f.7, 122, 124, 144; Annex K f.47,
f.64, f.65; Annex M f.39, f.48; Annex O
p.4, 7, 8, 14, 18, 21, 28, 29, f.1, 13, 16,
22, 30, 47, 58, 59, 72, 81, 100, 104, 106,
107, 116, 122, 125, 131, 132.
Trn Vn Tra, General (PAVN)
f.120, f.573, f.580.
Trn Vn Tranh f.285; Annex F p.22.
Trng Bng (Ty Ninh Province)
Annex O p.33.
Trng Bom f.516.
Tranh, Comrade p.25.
Tre Base Area Annex P f.25.
Trin Vn f.375.
Triu Kim Sn (33rd NVA Regiment)
Annex P p.6.
Trnh Vn Lim p.137, f.478; Annex
B p.7, f.26; Annex D p.4.
Trnh Vn M - Annex O p.25.
Trng Tn Bu (Saigon Government
Campaign) - see p.3 in D445: Their
Story (1991).
Trng Thanh Tng p.48.
Trng Vn Ni Annex P p.9.
Trng Vn Tinh Annex F p.24,
f.101; Annex O p.26, p.41, f.151.
Trng Vn Van f.152.
T n Hiu Ngha (sect) f.18.
T B (see: Trn Vn B aka B Gi)
f.102; Annex B p.6, f.22.
T B - Annex O f.128.
T Bnh (Nguyn Thanh Bnh) p.191,
p.192.
T Bn (H Vn Bn) - f.325, Annex B
p.4.
T Chnh (V Quc Chanh) Preface
p.4; Main Text: p.15, 17, 25, 26, 29, 30,
31, 47, 69, 73, 86, 218, 219, f.65, f.66,

f.143, f.159, f.161, f.247, f.263, f.319;

Annex A p.3, Biography: pp.21-23, f.5,
f.104, f.115, f.119; Annex B p.1, p.2,
p.3, f.8, f.14; Annex D p.1, f.2, f.5.
T Chu (D445, Coy OC) p.151.
T Chc p.48.
T c f.325; Annex B p.4.
T Hiu (see: Nguyn Thanh Hiu).
T Hy (see: Phm Vn Hy).
T Lc (see: Phm Lc).
T Li (sapper) p.121.
T Minh p.13, p.14.
T Ngn p.131, f.460.
T Ngha f.160; Annex B p.2, f.7.
T Nh (see: Phan Vn Nh).
T Oanh, Comrade p.126; Annex B
p.6.
T Phat p.170, p.219.
T Phng Annex O f.2.
T Quy Annex B p.6.
T Thi f.333.
T Thut p.157, Annex B p.7.
T Tin Annex P p.8.
T Tu ( Quang Tu) Annex O f.8.
T Tun p.14.
T p.14, p.15, p.21, f.53, f.66,
Annex B p.1.
Tun, Comrade (NVA 1972) p.150.
Tun, Comrade (OC 3/D445) p.154.
Tun, Comrade (recon section) p.135.
Tc Trng f.516 (Special Sector);
Annex O p.3, 32, f.12 (strategic hamlet).
Tng, Comrade p.15.
Tng, First Lieutenant (Marines) - f.131.
Tunnels p.112, p.116, p.117, f.90.
Tunnels, Hc Dch f.90.
Tunnels, Kim Long f.90.
Tunnels, Long Phc 1963: pp.24-27;
1966: pp.63-64.
Tunnels, Long Tn f.240.
Tu, Miss f.430.
T, Comrade Annex O p.2, f.8.

45

Typhoon No.5 (Typhoon Linda)

p.201.
U1 (Bin Ha Province) Preface f.3;
Main text: p.84, f.204, f.265; Annex A
f.26; Annex J p.6, f.14, f.22, f.30.
U2 (Phc Tuy Province) Preface f.3;
Annex J p.3, f.2, f.30.
U4 (Bnh Dng Province) Preface f.3.
U5 (Ty Ninh Province) Preface f.3.
U8 (Long Khnh Province) Preface f.3.
U9 (Phc Thnh Province) Preface
f.3.
UH-1H helicopter f.473, f.486.
Uniforms, insignia (VC) p.48, p.49,
p.92, f.37, f.197; Annex O p.4, f.27.
Unit nomenclature/designator/prefix
(NVA/VC) Preface f.3.
United Front p.36.
Urban combat D445: B Ra Town
(1968) p.97; B Ra Town (1969) p.111;
t (1972) p.148, pp.151-152.
Urban combat D440: Xun Lc Town
(1968) Annex P pp.2-3.
US forces, strengths f.305 (end of
1966), f.535 (1969).
US troops, VC comment on p.63,
f.242.
USDAO (see: Defense Attache Office).
t Ba (CO 275th Regiment) Annex O
f.128.
t ng (see: ng Hu Thun).
t Hui (275th Regiment) - Annex O
p.33, f.8, f.119.
t Lim (Bi Thanh Vn) f.134.
t Thi (see: Nguyn Thi Bng).
Valiant Killer of Americans/armoured
vehicles p.64, p.90, f.224, f.228;
Annex K p.16, f.62.
Vn Kip p.66, p.105, p.111, p.175,
p.176, p.177, p.181, f.74, f.305, f.350,
f.352, f.359, f.362, f.380, f.398, f.515,
f.541, f.587; Annex K p.13, p.14, f.53,
f.54, f.55.

Vn Kip, attack by 274th Regiment (9

December 1966) f.305.
Vanguard Headquarters - 1970: p.127,
f.445; 1974-75: p.169, f.564.
Vassals (chu hu - Australian forces)
p.108, p.212, p.213, f.192, f.224, f.355,
f.498, f.534; Annex K f.62.
VCAT Preface p.4.
Ven hamlet p.50.
Vessel 56 f.131.
Vit Cng, districts f.104.
Vit Cng Infrastructure (VCI)
f.199, f.244, f.352, f.372, f.385, f.401,
f.402, f.406, f.437, f.455, f.456, f.559,
p.7, 9, 10, 13, 20, 21, 22, 31, 33, 34, 35,
36, 68, 89, 104, 107, 113, 114, 115, 122,
123, 124, 128, 132, 133, 145, 147, 158,
166, 168, 180, 194, 214; Annex J f.7.
Vit Cng Supporters (VCS) f.244.
Vit Cng, terminology (pejorative)
Preface, f.2; Main Text f.46.
Vit Cng, three types/categories of
forces p.27, 47, 56, 61, 108, 149, f.213,
f.556.
Vit Cng, uniforms, insignia p.48,
p.49, p.92, f.37, f.197; Annex O p.4,
f.27.
Vit Minh f.8, f.20, f.24, f.27, f.52,
f.75, f.135, f.157; Annex A f.25, f.126;
Annex K f.39; Annex M f.22.
Vietnam Center and Archive (VCAT)
Preface p.4.
Vietnam Workers Party (Lao ng
Party) f.3, f.96; Annex G p.1, p.6, f.1,
f.26.
Vietnam Restoration (anti-communist
movement) p.188.
Vietnamese Missing In Action
Database f.643; Annex F p.25, f.106,
f.107.
Vietnamization p.110, p.178, f.391,
f.502.
Vnh, Comrade Annex M p.8.

46

Vnh An p.187.
Vinh Chu p.36.
Vinh H p.36.
Vinh Sn (anti-communist resistance
group) f.604.
Vinh Trung p.36.
Violations of discipline p.201,
p.202, p.205, p.208; Annex G f.15.
V/V t/c f.36, Annex O p.5.
V Quc Chanh (T Chanh) - Preface
p.4; p.15, 17, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 47, 69,
73, 86, 218, 219, f.65, f.66, f.143, f.159,
f.161, f.247, f.263, f.319; Annex A p.3,
Biography: pp.21-23, f.5, f.104, f.115,
f.119; Annex B p.1, p.2, p.3, f.8, f.14;
Annex D p.1, f.2, f.5; Annex L p.1, f.4.
V Su/Xu f.274; Annex E p.38, f.5;
Annex K f.52; Annex M f.19; Annex O
p.6, p.11, f.19, f. 21, f.52.
V Th Ngy (B T) p.7.
V Th Su p.151; Annex K p.9, f.39;
Annex L p.1; Annex M p.5, p.10, f.22.
V Th Su Company Annex K f.39.
V Vn Khai f.319; Annex B f.3.
V Vn Long Annex A f.13, f.100.
V Vn Lt (Unit 316) f.111.
V Vn Mu Annex O p.26.
V Vn Mn, Colonel (Bnh Xuyn) p.10.
V Vn Quang Annex A f.33.
V Vn Thit (Hai Nht/Nht) Annex
J f.21.
V Xu/Su f.274; Annex E p.38, f.5;
Annex K f.52; Annex M f.19; Annex O
p.6, p.11, f.19, f. 21, f.52.
Vong A Sang, General (Nng) f.84.
V c f.36.
V c Tn Annex O f.153.
V Hnh Annex O p.2, f.2.
V Ngc Khuyn f.274; Annex K
p.17, f.37; Annex O p.13, 14, 29, f.24,
f.55, f.101.
V Tm (Su Tm) p.15, f.36, f.53.

V Thnh Khi (OC 2/D445, 2ic D445

- 1973) p.157.
V/V Vn Mu Annex O p.26.
V Xun o Annex O f.152.
Vng Tu pp.3-6, 8, 21, 55, 147, 148,
154, 176, 178, 180-183, 189, 191, 193,
198, 210, f.10, f.23, f.34, f.151, f.189,
f.199 (population), f.243, f.283, f.368,
f.574, f.585, f.588.
Vng Tu, Australian forces p.66,
p.78, f.194, f.230, f.231, f.236, f.515.
Vng Tu, fall of (1975) pp.176-178.
Vng Tu, history f.1.
Vng Tu, shelling attack, (March
1966) f.189; Annex K p.3, f.13.
Vng Tu, shelling attack, (April 1968)
f.365.
Vng Tu, VC forces p.129, p.181,
p.191.
Vn Mt (Jackfruit Gardens) p.61,
f.225.
Vn Xoi f.283.
Vng, Comrade p.86, p.89.
Wages (275th Regiment) Annex O,
f.132.
Wandering Souls, project (D n nhng
linh hn phiu bt) f.473, f.515, f.643;
Annex F p.24, f.81, f.103, f.105, f.106;
Annex O f.92.
War Zone D p.9, p.10, p.44, p.47,
p.147, f.86, f.108, f.513.
Waterfall Clearing f.476.
Way stations (binh trm), on the Trail
Annex C f.30.
Weak areas/zones p.133, p.134,
p.135, p.210.
Weapons, captured (by 1 ATF, Battle of
Long Tn) f.251; Annex F pp.20-21,
f.89; Annex K f.48; Annex M f.38.
Websites (Australian) f.295, f.515,
f.643.
Websites (Vietnamese) f.283, f.296,
f.539, f.604.

47

Wedding, Vit Cng f.176.

Westmoreland W.C. General f.107,
f.131, f.132, f.208; Annex F p.1, f.1,
f.88.
Well trained and well led (D445
described by Comd 1 ATF, July 1966)
f.250.
Well armed, well led, and well
motivated (D445 described by 1 ATF
intelligence staff, 11 June 1968) f.370.
Wet Season f.9, f.254, f.258, f.276,
f.447, f.571.
Wickens B.H. Captain (IO 6RAR 1966)
Annex E pp.27-28, f.109; Annex O
f.92.
White Bridge p.191, f.619.
White Swan (see: Thin Nga).
Winter f.9, f.258, p.35, p.38, p.56.
X2 Campaign (re-education, 1975)
p.183, p.189.
X3 Campaign (currency exchange,
1975) p.183, p.189, f.598.
X Bang village/plantation p.7, p.14,
p.15, p.175, f.215, f.334.
Xa Bridge (Hi M) p.96.
Xm Bn hamlet p.105.
Xm Cat hamlet p.139.
Xm Ry hamlet p.23.
Xun Lc p.4, 8, 17, 18, 101, 140-142,
154, 157, 172-176, 184, 186, 191, 196,
f.4, f.23, f.168, f.281, f.297, f.334, f.340,
f.369, f.537, f.539, f.555, f.573, f.575584, f.589, f.603, f.611; Annex P p.2,
p.9, p.12, f.11, f.12, f.13, f.16, f.53, f.58.
Xun Lc Campaign (1975) f.575f.584.
Xun Lc Town f.4 (population). See
also Long Khnh Town.
Xun Sn p.5, p.6, p.7, p.199, p.204,
f.151, f.207, f.217.
Xuyn Mc Preface f.16 (History);
Main Text: p.5, 8, 13, 14, 20, 23, 27, 38,
46, 106, 107, 133-135, 139, 142, 148,

149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 198, 203, 204,

210, f.24, f.36, f.47, f.83, f.156, f.165,
f.217, f.269, f.306, f.313, f.331, f.383,
f.384, f.409, f.410, f.472, f.473, f.476,
f.478, f.488, f.489, f.507, f.517, f.519,
f.596, f.644. See map on the rear cover.
Xuyn Mc (VC) District (incorporated
into Long t as Long Xuyn) f.418.
Xuyn Mc, history Preface f.16;
Main Text f.24.
Xuyn Mc Unit f.217, f.472, f.517,
f.539; Annex P f.49.
Xun Trng (Si Gn area) f.121.
Xuyn Phc C base area f.24.
Yellow Jacket program Annex E,
p.38 f.93, f.164, f.165.
Youth, Defenders of the Church
f.123.
Youth Group, Labour p.10, p.12,
p.48, p.98, p.106, p.205, p.206, p.207,
f.3, f.31, f.257, f.361, f.632; Annex D
p.5; Annex G p.1, p.4; Annex H p.1, p.2,
p.4; Annex O f.102; Annex P p.7.
Z-39 Artillery Battalion f.269; Annex
L p.1.
Zohhn [sic], Lieutenant Colonel
(Australian Army) f.284*.

48

Readers Notes and Comments