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ANALYSIS
OF CONSCIOUSNESS
IN T H E W O R K S
OF MARX*
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economic processes, to their volitions, motivations, etc. What is investigated is the entire, self-developing organic whole. The contribution of
Marx can be seen precisely in the fact that he was able to open up such
a path to science, that he revealed the hidden anthropological constitution of the subjects carrying them. Excluded also are all references to
the subjects' understanding, to economic processes, to their volitions,
motivations, etc. What is investigated is the entire, self-developing
organic whole. The contribution of Marx can be seen precisely in the
fact that he was able to open up such a path to science, that he revealed
the hidden anthropologism of previous political economy which consisted in abstract and unexamined anti-historical assumptions about
man, about his needs and interests, and so on. Marx' method of
investigation of economic phenomena is objective and does not use the
psychic processes and consciousness of individuals as a point of
departure (although all the various processes and content of consciousness do appear in the investigations).
However, in what form do we find here consciousness, its phenomena and its relations? It exists and something is assumed about it.
There is the interesting fact that it is an' objective, materialistic method
of analysis of social phenomena that contained the key to understanding consciousness as a special modality. This approach also made
possible distinctions among its various functions, and among basic
conceptions of its nature, its functions and the diversity of its form.
The fact is that Marx had his own way of describing social systems:
in each case, he would construct his investigation in such a way that
from the beginning he had to do with systems actualizing and functioning through consciousness; i.e. such that they contained reflection as
a necessary element (or, again, such that they contained the researcher's
consciousness as an element intrinsic to the act of researching). Systems
of this kind were for him, by definition, social-economic systems;
whence it was possible to consider consciousness as a function or
attribute of social systems of activity, drawing its content and structures
(or forms)from the differentiated systemic links, and not restricted
simply to the reflection of an object in the perception of a subject. The
consequence of this type of analysis of consciousness is that socialobjective forms and social things turn out to be applicable to it as the
extension thereof to the level of human subjectivity. Here is the pivotal
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point, that in the investigation of consciousness it be seen as independent of the psychologically conscious expressions of the spiritual life of
the individual, of his various forms of self-assessment and self-understanding, of motivational language, etc.
The consciousness that exists in subjects can in principle be studied
completely objectively, according to its "objectivities", and according to
the meaningful objects that are seen as generated by the self-development and differentiation of the system of social activity as a whole. As
we have seen, it is just here that Marx wants to do his reconstruction.
He wants to find the determinants and formative mechanisms of the
objects of knowledge that are "representatives" (or "replacements") for
something else. He wants to know their objective content and the role
they play in the behavior of the individual. He wants also to find the
social fabric of these mechanisms -- the real interplay between people
(even though the mechanisms of the formation of consciousness are not
directly given).
Thus, while for classical philosophy -- which was a "philosophy of
self-consciousness" -- consciousness had a teleological structure and
was measured uniquely by perception and representation as actualized
in the reflexive knowledge of the individual, Marx was the first to place
consciousness into the domain of scientific determinism, and to reveal
its social transformation and social mechanisms.4
Instead of being monochromatic and "flat", consciousness reveals its
archeological depths; it turns out to be polychromatic, and penetrated
with determinants from simultaneously active levels -- the level of
social mechanisms, of the unconscious, of cultural systems of signs, etc.
What is more, there is the genetic side, with various causes acting at
various times according to various laws. Of course, consciousness of
these depths and diverse parameters could not be found in the selfconscious work of the individual thinking about himself and about the
world; and the products of consciousness could not be traced back to
this individual activity. Consciousness is only one of the metamorphoses
of the extensive and diverse whole -- only the tip of the iceberg. It has
to be studied along with its hidden parts and in dependence on them.
From the structure of the Marxian analysis of consciousness flow
the elements of a whole series of theories: (1) the theoretical model of
the social conditioning of consciousness; (2) the theory of fetishism and
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system, and from their place and differentiation among these relations.
Separate objects now appear as deposits or "sedimentations" of the
system, in which wider links and relations "peek out", as it were. Their
form can be detected via analysis as soon as they arise from the
relations in this structure. Perception thereof in consciousness -- which
we will examine more carefully below -- is marked by the fact that the
relations and bonds are voided of their primitive content. The form
serves to represent (or replace) them in consciousness and individual
thought is not able to grasp this representativity. Whence it is understandable that relative to consciousness one can find only "causation"
induced in the isolated members of the system by the system in general;
it is a matter of "systems causality" and of no other sort. Marx' contention that social consciousness is conditioned by social being and that
the contents of ideological, legal and other superstructural phenomena
and directly influenced by economic relations, etc. have to be seen in
the light of these abstractions and idealizations which underlie the
Marxian schemata of the causal link between social being and social
consciousness. It suffices to cleanse them and to bend this schema in an
anthropological direction to make it senseless (as happens, e.g., among
"economic materialists"). Precisely in conjunction with the revelation of
systemic causality and of the first forms of the structural analysis of
consciousness, appear in Marx the first elements of his materialist
approach -- namely, the extension to the life of consciousness of the
principles of social determinism -- which makes it possible to understand more complex and relatively autonomous forms and branches of
consciousness.
Using the schema of systemic causality Marx actually detects the
effects of the action of the system simultaneously on subject and on
object, and makes an interesting discovery -- relative to these simultaneously seized (or grasped) effects it is senseless to distinguish object
from consciousness or real from perceived. It is difficult not to draw
attention to the fact that Marx always goes to those points, where
relations "involve exactly what they in fact represent" (Sog., t.23, str.83).
This is particularly the case when Marx turns to analyze the "miracles"
and "ghosts" of the commodity world which cannot at all be derived
from the acts of the thinking individual. It is interesting to note the
phenomena Marx treats as consciousness: "commodity form", "value
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that between the real relation or thing as they are and how they are
present in consciousness there is a field not covered by individual
perception and completed by the social mechanism which provides the
individual with some sort of perception of reality, either external or
internal. Therefore, to answer the question as to the objective forms
that are not different from consciousness and whence they come, is the
same as answering the question as to which "agent" presents (or
subjects) things to consciousness (the movement occurring outside of
consciousness itself). Marx assumes that reality is perceived in a certain
form -- in the form of constant and irreducible objects of knowledge,
properties, objective meanings, intentions, just as the eye perceives not
the subjective impressions on the retina, but the "objective form of
things that are outside the eye" (Sod. t.23, str.82). The character of
people's activity is re-reflected in their consciousness in the form of a
certain set of significant objects. Precisely this revolution in consciousness sets the stage for the representativity of real structures. In the case
of the commodity, for example, the proper social relationship of people
of common labor (value) is presented by consciousness as occuring
outside the social relations of things, as consciousness of the suprasensible properties of these things (or, in other cases, of the social
relations of gods, relations of physical symbols of need, of symbols of
social "statuses" and "roles", and so on).
We l~now the importance that Marx attributed to the phenomena of
projection and objectivation. We should recall, however, that the
projection he had in mind is not the product of consciousness; but consciousness is the reverse adaptation of the projection and objectivation
that are going on independent of the individual, they are "elaborated" in
the social system (as its objective attachment to the social form of the
exchange of activity, mediated by things), and that are now cited by
individuals who thereby develop in themselves the internal measure of
consciousness. It is here not assumed that consciousness is at all
objectified. Something else is objectified. Marx very definitely "strikes"
the model of consciousness that prevailed during the enlightenment and
traditional rationalism, according to which man establishes external,
objectified products, modelled on one or another of his psychological
properties or states. Marx eliminates such argumentation from the
explanation of the incarnate products of consciousness, and from the
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dependence on immediate consciousness that is spontaneously accumulating in social structures. He has various names for it: consciousness
"intertwined in the immediate language of real life"; "spiritual-practical
mastery of reality"; "conceptual forms of practical approaches"; "ordinary consciousness". But the linkage of externally autonomous rationalizations of the life of ideas with this type of consciousness always
occurs in the same way -- it is analyzed by Marx along the lines of the
linkage of what is said and what is not said (expressed) as a special
form of causalilty. He characterizes transformed consciousness by
introducing what can be called the "indirect pragmatic objects of
thought".
On the whole, the structure of this consciousness corresponds to the
structure of the distorted forms, which as special forms of linkage were
revealed and elaborated by Marx, and which contain in general the
structure of a whole series of indirect, symbolic-illusory expressions,
found in the most diverse realms of the life of human consciousness
and activity. But, this is not the place to analyze the structure of this
form; we will assume that it is known (it occurs frequently in Capital).
Let us now look at some indirect objects.
What is an "indirect pragmatic object of thought"? It is a simple
object which indirectly or "textually" supposes an idea but which in fact
indirectly asserts another object, another objectivity of consciousness,
which is not directly expressed as an analytic object of thought. The
first replaces the second and moves according to its own logic. For
example, when Hegel speaks of the "reign of reason in history", this can
be seen as indirect affirmation of another basic Hegelian thought, the
rupture of the links of spirit and reality, as well as the idea that
perception independent of consciousness is inimical to consciousness
and evades its rational control. Marx sees these second types of
conceptual objectivations as flowing from social structures and reality
itself. They are born there in the form of "direct language of consciousness" and indirectly express them at this level, without going beyond the
sense they contain. Whence, a rationalization is a consciousness which
reflects a definite objective, socially necessary appearance but, at the
same time, views itself as something independent and unconditioned
relative to reality.
This link with reali~ can be the object of special scientific analysis,
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is the relationship between the primary and secondary forms of consciousness. He generally considers the appearance of such indirect
forms of ideology a secondary phenomenon, concealing in its systematizations the primary objectivities of consciousness, combining them in
a certain form and turning them into seemingly autonomous and
independent entities (this schema can be used to view, e.g., the relationship between objective appearance, on the one hand, and the systems of
mythology, religion, etc., on the other). Marx' analysis has before it,
therefore, the task of (1) establishing the primary forms of consciousness according to their objects and not according to the relationships
where they appear in ideological systematizations (representing a
reduction of the latter), and (2) understanding the internal course of the
rationalizing judgements, evolving it from the clear dependence of
logical thought on the properties of objective appearance and of the
quasi-objects which are formed in the structures of the mechanisms of
social systems.
It thus appears that the rationalization that penetrates ideology is derived from just a single principle. This principle systematically explains
and makes theoretically possible and intelligible for man that which already exists as intentional object of consciousness, what this object "dissimulates", and what is already affirmed by it (but it remains unknown
just as the causes and origins of taboos in primitive societies remain unknown). The introduction into ideology of such a systematization makes
logically available and intelligible that which exists, but exists unknown
as to why and whence. This is its task and "apologetic" role, to which it
is limited. Thus, for example, such a "yellow algorithm" as the "value of
labor" which is an element of everyday life became in practice fundamental to bourgeois, vulgar political economy. It became the link for a
theoretical derivation out of some systematic principles (just as, let us
say, a baseless taboo can acquire a base in a given mythological system).
But, in fact, the content of the quasi-object is a form of movement in
the system, but it is not an active, autonomous thought.
Marx very clearly says in this regard:
It is clear what importance accrues to the conversion of value and the price of labor
power into the form of wage labor, i.e. the value and price of work itself. In this form of
appearance, hiding the true relation and establishing an apparently directly opposite
relation, reside all of the legal representations both of the worker and of the capitalist,
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all the mystificationsof the capitalist mode of production, all the illusions of freedom it
generates, and all the apologetic evasions of vulgar political economy. (Sog. t.23,
str.550).
We will add only that when Marx shows, for example, that the thought
of the classics of bourgeois political economy, occupied in analysis of
its internal links, nevertheless adopts its own concepts like "labor price"
(cf. also str.547--549), what he explains and describes are not the laws
of knowledge but the mechanism of consciousness that depends on the
correlation of its primary and secondary forms. The first encircles and
circumscribes the second; they include and outline the whole range of
secondary forms (mythology, religion, pragmatic rationalizations) which
form the field of their possibilities, combined anew on a new level -that of the secondary (mythological, "rational", etc.) elaboration of the
content of consciousness. This constitutes the dependence of the
secondary on the primary forms. But the secondary forms of consciousness can distort and mask the primary. In any case, the former
hide the latter. On this plane, Marx' objective-reductive analysis of
consciousness -- i.e. analysis of it as effect of the play of relations in
real social systems -- is a way of detecting primary objectivities and of
the "meanings" of consciousness, as well as the classification of all
secondary forms. These latter, in subsequent systematizations and
clarifications, are merely developing what is already inherent in the
properties of these special objects of consciousness.
This schema of Marx also serves to expose the apologetic stance that
bourgeois political economy takes relative to the bases of capitalist
production; i.e., that vulgar form of ideological consciousness which has
penetrated and become constant in economics. Marx does not at all
reduce this position to the expression of naked self-interest of evil
persons who construct festishized forms of consciousness. He does,
however, picture them as "ideologists" who are mediating social relations that are typical of mass society, r
Marx' approach leads to another important and interesting problem
that of the role of consciousness in the personal (and not socially
mediated) development of individuals, social groups, etc. This theme
beeomes very important when it is a matter of the violation of the
normal functioning of social-economic systems, or of a social-historical
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s i t u a t i o n , w h e r e it is c l e a r l y felt t h a t c h a n g e is n e e d e d . H e r e , t o o , t h e
w o r k o f M a r x o f f e r s g r e a t h e l p to t h e r e s e a r c h e r .
NOTES
"While Marx did not do a 'Logic' (in capitals), he did do the logic of Capital ..."
(V. I. Lenin, So6. t.29, str.301)
2 It is interesting and important to note that Marx simultaneously constructs both a
theory of the objective (economic) process and a theory of its reflection in the heads of
its direct agents. He studies and criticizes not so much the individual errors and
mistakes of consciousness (although he certainly does do that), but exposes the
objective-conceptual expressions of the real process. He derives and defines the
conditions of the necessary appearance of the "distorted forms" (verwandelte Formen).
3 Unfortunately, the philosophic public is acquainted with them mostly in this false
form.
4 For our subsequent exposition, it is necessary to clarify what we mean by the
"philosophy of self-consciousness" that was typical of the classics. Beginning with
Descartes, it was assumed that philosophy defines the conditions of thought, revealing
how the content of consciousness (whether it has to do with thought, conduct, interests,
or feelings) can be reproduced and fixed so that, controlled by consciousness, it can be
used as a teleological reconstruction of the object, beginning with some naturally
existing coincidence of thought and object. It thus begins with some sort of "true state
of affairs", already existing prior to the reconstruction in the spontaneous process of
consciousness (e.g., the Cartesian cogito, the "I am I" of classical German philosophy,
etc.). Whether it is question of what really exists or of what affects the investigation
thereof, the whole process appears as teleologically organized and occurring within the
confines of "pure consciousness" (i.e., non-empirical consciousness, cleansed and
exfoliated self-consciousness). For the classics, any form of consciousness is a comparison of this trend toward coincidence with reality with consciousness and, therefore,
is viewed in analogy with it, as an approximation to it, etc.
5 We find among Soviet philosophic writings a striking example of an objective Marxist
analysis of the subjective forms through a study of purely objective appearances of the
economic system. We have in mind E. V. II'enkov's analysis of the nature of the ideal
(el. 'Ideal' in the Filosofskafa enciklopedifa, t.II)
6 Here "to go beyond the phenomenon" does not mean to grasp, in the epistemological
sense, an external measure lying beyond the phenomenon, and as independent of the
social activity that generates the phenomenon. On the contrary, the point is to explain
the mechanism that generates in it phenomena as essential "forms of reality or, more
exactly, f o r m s . . , of actual existence" (K. Marks, Teoriyapribavo6noj stoimosti, 6.1II, M.
1961, str.460).
7 Consequently, the contents of consciousness are simultaneously given in another
place, in another form than in the consciousness of the psychological, cognitive, relating
unity of the 'T' -- the conscious phenomena of the individual; namely, in the social
system of action. The possibility of measuring consciousness at the same time as one
measures something other than consciousness is the essential demand of the Marxian
procedure.
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8 Marxian analysis constantly deals with such practical appearances. For example, in
examining the definitions of capital when correlated with other capital, Marx shows
that the theoretical view holding that profit follows equally from all forms of capital
expresses a practical fact; to depart from it, one would have to take capital as a whole
-- a mystery for the capitalist. In this sense coming to consciousness (osoznanie) is the
emergence of objective appearances (it is interesting that from the viewpoint of the
practical fact consciousness as actual internal bond is a mystery).
9 Cause and effect are heterogeneous here; one is not contained in the other as content
in form.
10 Here we find a relation that is analogous to that which Marx notes in the real economic acts of individuals. We should recall Marx' words in the preface to Capitalwhich
were designed to avoid any confusion: "The persons of capitalists and landowners are
not, in my book, depicted in rose-tinted colours; but if I speak of individuals, it is only
in so far as they are personifications of economic categories, representatives of special
class relations and class interests. Inasmuch as I conceive the development of the
economic structure of society to be a natural process, I should be the last to hold the
individual responsible for conditions whose creature he himself is, socially considered,
however much he may raise himself above them subjectively." (So(. T.23, str.550)
Institute of Philosophy,
Tbilisi, Georgia,
USSR.