Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
WRIT OF KALIKASAN
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY OFFICERS V. LIM,
G.R. NOS. 187836 & 187916, NOVEMBER 25, 2014
Facts:
The consolidated cases involve the validity of Ordinance No. 8187 enacted
by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila on 14 May 2009.
Ordinance No. 8187 amended Ordinance No. 8119 which is otherwise
known as THE MANILA COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN AND
ZONING ORDINANCE OF 2006.
Ordinance No. 8187 created a MEDIUM INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-2) AND HEAVY
INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-3) and provided for its enforcement. The creation of a
medium industrial zone (1-2) and heavy industrial zone (1-3) effectively lifted
the prohibition against owners and operators of businesses, including herein
intervenors Chevron Philippines, Inc. (Chevron), Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (Shell), and Petron Corporation (Petron), collectively referred to
as the oil companies, from operating in the designated commercial zone
an industrial zone prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 1and
Ordinance No. 81192.
The aforementioned intervenors claim that their rights with respect to the oil
depots in Pandacan would be directly affected by the outcome of these
cases.
These petitions are a sequel to the case of Social Justice Society v. Mayor
Atienza, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as G.R. No. 156052), where the Court
found: (1) that the ordinance subject thereof Ordinance No. 8027 was
enacted to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of the inhabitants
of Manila; (2) that it had passed the tests of a valid ordinance; and (3) that it
is not superseded by Ordinance No. 8119. Declaring that it is constitutional
and valid, the Court accordingly ordered its immediate enforcement with a
specific directive on the relocation and transfer of the Pandacan oil
terminals.
Herein petitioners now seek the nullification of Ordinance No. 8187, which
contains provisions contrary to those embodied in Ordinance No. 8027.
Allegations of violation of the right to health and the right to a
healthful and balanced environment are also included.
After the war, the oil depots were reconstructed. Pandacan changed as
Manila rebuilt itself. The three major oil companies resumed the operation of
their depots. But the district was no longer a sparsely populated industrial
zone; it had evolved into a bustling, hodgepodge community. Today,
Pandacan has become a densely populated area inhabited by about 84,000
people, majority of whom are urban poor who call it home. Aside from
1
Ordinance No. 8027 entitled AN ORDINANCE RECLASSIFYING THE LAND USE OF THAT PORTION OF
LAND BOUNDED BY THE PASIG RIVER IN THE NORTH, PNR RAILROAD TRACK IN THE EAST, BEATA ST.
IN THE SOUTH, PALUMPONG ST. IN THESOUTHWEST AND ESTERO DE PANDACAN IN THE WEST, PNR
RAILROAD IN THE NORTHWEST AREA, ESTERO DE PANDACAN IN THE NORTHEAST, PASIG RIVER IN
THE SOUTHEAST AND DR. M. L. CARREON IN THE SOUTHWEST, THE AREA OF PUNTA, STA. ANA
BOUNDED BY THE PASIG RIVER, MARCELINO OBRERO ST., MAYO 28 ST. AND THE F. MANALO STREET
FROM INDUSTRIAL II TO COMMERCIAL I.
2
Ordinance No. 8119 entitled AN ORDINANCE ADOPTING THE MANILA COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE
PLAN AND ZONING REGULATIONS OF 2006 AND PROVIDING FOR THE ADMINISTRATION,
ENFORCEMENT AND AMENDMENT THERETO.
Natural Resources and then Mayor Atienza, together with other residents and
taxpayers of the City of Manila, also alleges violation of the right to health of
the people and the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Sections
15 and 16 of the Constitution.
In his Memorandum, former Mayor Lim, through the City Legal Officer,
attacks the petitioners lack of legal standing to sue. He likewise points
out that the petitioners failed to observe the principle of hierarchy of
courts. On the other hand, the oil companies sought the outright dismissal
of the petitions based on alleged procedural infirmities, among others,
incomplete requisites of judicial review, violation of the principle of hierarchy
of courts, improper remedy, submission of a defective verification and
certification against forum shopping, and forum shopping.
Issue:
Whether or not the enactment of the assailed Ordinance allowing the
continued stay of the oil companies in the depots is, indeed, invalid and
unconstitutional.
Ruling:
Ordinance No. 8187 is invalid and unconstitutional with respect to the
continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals and should be stricken down
without delay!
We first rule on the procedural issues raised by the respondents and the oil
companies. At the outset, let it be emphasized that the Court, in G.R. No.
156052, has already pronounced that the matter of whether or not the
oil depots should remain in the Pandacan area is of transcendental
importance to the residents of Manila. We may, thus, brush aside
procedural infirmities, if any, as we had in the past, and take cognizance of
the cases.
Rule 65 specifically requires that the remedy may be availed of only when
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Shell argues that the petitioners should have sought
recourse before the first and second level courts under the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, which govern the enforcement or
violations of environmental and other related laws, rules and
regulations. Petron additionally submits that the most adequate remedy
available to petitioners is to have the assailed ordinance repealed by
theSangguniang Panlungsod. In the alternative, a local referendum may be
had. It would appear, however, that the remedies identified by the
intervenors prove to be inadequate to resolve the present
controversies in their entirety owing to the intricacies of the
circumstances herein prevailing.
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases are limited in
scope. While, indeed, there are allegations of violations of environmental
laws in the petitions, these only serve as collateral attacks that would
support the other position of the petitioners the protection of the right to
life, security and safety.
From another perspective, Shell finds fault with the petitioners direct
recourse to this Court when the Supreme Court exercises only appellate
jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an
ordinance. To further support its position, it said that although the instant
petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the
declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of
the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of
the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court
has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.
Assuming that a petition for declaratory relief is the proper remedy,
and that the petitions should have been filed with the Regional Trial
Court, we have, time and again, resolved to treat such a petition as
one for prohibition, provided that the case has far-reaching
implications and transcendental issues that need to be resolved, as in
these present petitions.
On a related issue, we initially found convincing the argument that the
petitions should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court, it having
concurrent jurisdiction with this Court over a special civil action for
prohibition, and original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.
However, as we have repeatedly said, the petitions at bar are of
transcendental importance warranting a relaxation of the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed.
Petitioners have a legal right to seek the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027
because the subject of the petition concerns a public right, and they, as
residents of Manila, have a direct interest in the implementation of the
ordinances of the city. We have ruled in previous cases that when
a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to
compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution
of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they
need not show any specific interest. Besides, as residents of Manila,
petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the citys
ordinances.
Thus, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,
the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest. The preservation of the life,
security and safety of the people is indisputably a right of utmost
importance to the public. Certainly, the petitioners, as residents of
Manila, have the required personal interest to seek relief from this
Court to protect such right.
When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review,
however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and
prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality
of statutes, and indeed, of acts of other branches of government.
On the issue of Forum Shopping, Shell contends that the petitioners in G.R.
No. 187836 violated the rule against forum shopping allegedly because all
the elements thereof are present in relation to G.R. No. 156052. We are not
persuaded. It bears to stress that the present petitions were initially filed, not
to secure a judgment adverse to the first decision, but, precisely, to
enforce the earlier ruling to relocate the oil depots from the Pandacan
area. The filing of the instant petitions is not barred by res judicata.
Now on the substantial issues, the very nature of the depots where millions
of liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products, regardless of
whether or not the composition may cause explosions, has no place in a
densely populated area. Surely, any untoward incident in the oil depots, be it
related to terrorism of whatever origin or otherwise, would definitely cause
not only destruction to properties within and among the neighboring
communities but certainly mass deaths and injuries.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and
safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. It
therefore became necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the
threat. Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and validity
of Ordinance No. 8027. Without a doubt, there are no impediments to its
enforcement and implementation. Any delay is unfair to the inhabitants of
the City of Manila and its leaders who have categorically expressed their
desire for the relocation of the terminals.
ARIGO V. SWIFT,
G.R. NO. 206510, SEPTEMBER 16, 2014
Facts:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US
Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic
clearance for the said vessel to enter and exit the territorial waters of the
Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship
replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty. On January 6, 2013, the ship left
Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel
in Okinawa, Japan.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port
of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting
the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the
Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan.
No
one
was
injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
In a petition for the privilege of writ of Kalikasan, petitioners claim that the
grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and
continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to the affect the
provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negors Occidental, Negros
Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu , and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate
their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a
directive from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits
for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection
with the grounding incident.
Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US
respondents under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry (Section 19); non-payment
of conservation fees (Section 21 ); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section
30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and disturbing resources
(Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for being
unconstitutional.
Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the
VFA. Likewise, they invoke federal statutes in the US under which agencies of the
US have statutorily waived their immunity to any action. Even under the common
law tort claims, petitioners asseverate that the US respondents are liable for
negligence, trespass and nuisance.
Held:
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops
and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote "common security interests"
between the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to
govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United
States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment,
materials and supplies. The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common
law is thus improper considering that it is the VF A which governs disputes
involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of
the objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance
of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules
that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental
law is to be filed separately:
In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or nonapplication of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may
be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature
and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it
unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is
indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted
from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of
damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a
separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the
same violation of an environmental law.
On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the
petition to order a review of the VFA and to nullify certain immunity provisions
thereof.
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora, 41 the
VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a
treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized
representative of the United States government. The VFA being a valid and binding
agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its
terms and provisions. The present petition under the Rules is not the proper
remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions. WHEREFORE, the petition for
the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is hereby DENIED.
WRIT OF AMPARO
CARAM V. SEGUI,
G.R. NO. 193652, AUGUST 05, 2014
FACTS:
A petition for Certiorari via Rule 45 and Sec. 19 of writ of Amparo was filed in SC in
order to set aside the decision of the RTC. The RTC had dismissed petitioners
petition for the issuance ofa writ of amparo which petitioner filed in order for her to
regain parental authority and custody of Julian Yusay Caram (Baby Julian), her
biological child, from the respondent officers of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD).
Caram bore a child out of wedlock and convinced her boyfriend that the child was
aborted. She intended to have the child adopted. When she delivered the child,
the expenses were borne by the Sun and Moon Home for Children who will process
the adoption. The child then underwent the adoption and matching process and
was matched with the Medina Spouses.
Carams boyfriend died without knowing of the child but she divulged the info to
the bfs family. When they learned about it they promised to help Caram gain back
the custody of the child. She then wrote to the DSWD stating she changed her
mind about the adoption and wanted to bring back her family together. DSWD
Assistant Secretary told Caram that should she should bring the matter to the
regular court.
Thus, Caram filed a petition for issuance of writ of amparo in the RTC seeking
custody of the child against the Legal Division of the DSWD and Assistant
In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her
"enforced separation" from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an
"enforced disappearance" within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her
position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's
whereabouts. The DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the
hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010.36 There is therefore, no "enforced
disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth
elements are missing.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of
extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature,
regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public
official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and
guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and
threats that vitiate the quality of life.
Petitioners allege that the persons responsible for the forced disappearance of Mr.
Burgos were government personnel, specifically from the AFP as identified by
eyewitness accounts.
The writ of amparo was sought by the petitioner due to the failure of the PNP-CIDG,
AFPs Provost Marshal, and even the initial CHR investigation wherein there were
significant lapses in the handling of the investigation.
On the part of respondents, the abduction of Burgos was said to be a military
operation whose objective was to capture persons involved with the CPP-NPA, of
which Burgos was said to be a member of the NPA, as an intelligence officer.
Petitioner, in this instance, prayed for the issuance of a new writ of amparo,
considering that the initial findings of the CHR had lapses and were unsatisfactory.
Despite the prayer of a 2nd writ of amparo, the CHR continued with its investigation
into the forced disappearance of Mr. Burgos, as ordered by the court with the
additional order to conduct its investigation with extraordinary diligence.
Issue:
WON the issuance of the 2nd writ of amparo was proper
Held:
Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela of petitioner DENIED
The Supreme Court held that the issuance of another writ of amparo is
unnecessary and redundant since the purpose of a writ of amparo, as it said, is to
determine whether there has been an enforced disappearance, as well as to
determine who are responsible and accountable, and to provide remedies for it. A
writ of amparo, is also meant to expedite the investigation of enforced
disappearances, and not to complicate it.
The Supreme Court decided the Ex Parte Motion in this wise, to wit:
B. On the Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela
After reviewing the newly discovered evidence submitted by the
petitioner and considering all the developments of the case, including
the March 18, 2013 CA decision that confirmed the validity of the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo in the present case, we resolve to deny
the petitioner's Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.
We note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted above,
that the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the
present case. As we held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis , 23 the writ merely
embodies the Court's directives to police agencies to undertake
specified courses of action to address the enforced disappearance of
an individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and a
curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators through the investigation and remedial action that it
directs. 24 The focus is on procedural curative remedies rather than on
the tracking of a specific criminal or the resolution of administrative
liabilities. The unique nature of Amparo proceedings has led us to define
terms or concepts specific to what the proceedings seek to achieve. In
Razon Jr. v. Tagitis , 25 we defined what the terms "responsibility" and
"accountability" signify in an Amparo case. We said:
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
FACTS:
This is the case about the minor then-graduating students of St. Theresas College,
Cebu City, whose pictures were posted on Facebook -- depicting them, among
others, to be drinking hard liquor, smoking cigarettes, and walking on the streets
practically clad in just brassieres.
Mylene Escudero, a high school computer teacher, learned that some graduating
seniors posted pictures of them scantily-dressed and depicting bad behavior. She
asked some of her students, who pointed out to her the names of the seniors in the
pictures. What is more, Escuderos students claimed that there were times when
access to or the availability of the identified students photos was not confined to
the girls Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her students
Facebook page, showed the photos to Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STCs Disciplinein-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found
9.
10.
11.
The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for
posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a
birthday beach party;
The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at Friends
Only. They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be
respected.
Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have
known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents
knew or ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy has been
invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after
viewing the photos, the minors were called immoral and were punished
outright;
The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and
reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by
saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to
STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners children were
intruded upon;
The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of
information, data, and digital images happened at STCs Computer
Laboratory; and
All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted
by respondents through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in
connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.
the
Writ
of
Habeas
Data
Sec. 2. Who May File. Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of
habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may be filed by:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a)
(b)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to
cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored
portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not
have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse
in the information age.17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the
Rule prepared by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after
explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed
out that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent
remedy to enforce ones right to privacy, more specifically the right to
informational privacy.
The remedies against the violation of such right can include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files in
possession or in control of respondents.18 (emphasis Ours)
Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in
cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Meaning of engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information
Respondents contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it
not being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall
be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of
gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the
Rule:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the various
photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been times when these
photos were public i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook.
In this regard, We cannot give much weight to the minors testimonies for one key
reason: failure to question the students act of showing the photos to Tigol
disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of them.
Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were visible
only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escuderos claim that the
other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, selfserving, thus deserving scant consideration.42cralawlawlibrary
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escuderos sworn account that
her students, who are the minors Facebook friends, showed her the photos using
their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be
able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escuderos
students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in
reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is Public, it can be
surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on
Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners children positively limited the
disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement
in
US
v.
Gines-Perez44
is
most
instructive:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake
and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances
such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices
that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph
itself.45chanrobleslaw
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that [t]he more open the method of
transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the
public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to
correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.
That the photos are viewable by friends only does not necessarily bolster the
petitioners contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the
digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones
of privacy in view of the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
Facebook allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its
users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way;47
A good number of Facebook users befriend other users who are total
strangers;48
The sheer number of Friends one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
A users Facebook friend can share49 the formers post, or tag50 others
who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only
to his or her own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a posts or profile details privacy to
Friends is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is
not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The users own Facebook
friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto,
regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with
the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged
can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at Friends.
Held:
We find for respondent.
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules
of Court.20 As provided:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of
habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The
writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court
belongs.
However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the
presiding judge of the Family Court, provided, however, that the regular court shall
refer the case tothe Family Court as soon as its presiding judge returns to duty.
The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where
there are no Family Courts.
The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the
judicial region where they belong.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or
with any of its members and, if so granted,the writ shall be enforceable anywhere
in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any
regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor
may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on custody of minors. The
appellate court, or the member thereof, issuing the writ shall be furnished a copy
of the decision. (emphasis added)
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may
therefore be filed with any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where
enforcement thereof is sought.
In view of the afore-quoted provision it is indubitable that the filing of a petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family court in any of the cities
enumerated is proper as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within the
National Capital Judicial Region, as here.
In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan
City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region,
the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City.
Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the
above rule.
Lastly, as regards petitioners assertion that the summons was improperly served,
suffice it to state that service of summons, to begin with, is not required in a
habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 0304-04-SC. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat
comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ,
the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
EVIDENCE
IN RE ONG, A.M. NO. SB-14-21-J, SEPTEMBER 23, 2014
FACTS
This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation
into certain allegations that surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Hearing indicated prima facie violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by an
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.
Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice
formulated the charges against the respondent, as follows:
1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case
while it was pending in the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is the
Chairman;
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that
fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. Public confidence in the
Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A judge must
avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant
public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere
suggestion of partiality and impropriety. Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct states that "[p ]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to
the performance of all the activities of a judge."
In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper
acts were committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under constant public
scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which
may cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution. As what transpired in this case,
respondent's association with Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into
the "Pork Barrel" controversy which initially involved only legislative and executive
officials. Worse, Napoles' much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft cases.
ON DISHONESTY
Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to
doubt the honesty and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and the
integrity of our courts of justice. In his letter to the Chief Justice where he
vehemently denied having attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles, he
failed to mention that he had in fact visited Napoles at her office. Far from being a
plain omission, we find that respondent deliberately did not disclose his social calls
to Napoles.
The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even
before the administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of
Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness;
lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness
and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." Dishonesty,
being a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. Indeed,
dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the Judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory
S. Ong GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in
violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which
he is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits,
except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any
branch, agency or instrumentality of the government including government-owned
or -controlled corporations.
DIMAGUILA V. SPOUSES MONTEIRO,
G.R. NO. 201011, JANUARY 27, 2014
Facts:
On July 5, 1993, the respondent spouses, Jose and Sonia Monteiro (Spouses
Monteiro) filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages before the RTC, against
the petitioners, Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria Dimaguila
(The Dimaguilas). The complaint alleged that all the parties were co-owners and
prayed for the partition of a residential house and lot located at Gat. Tayaw St.,
Liliw, Laguna, with an area of 489 square meters, and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 1453. Spouses Monteiro anchored their claim on a deed of sale executed in
their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila (Pedro).
In their Answer, the Dimaguilas countered that there was no co-ownership to
speak. They alleged that the subject property, then owned by Maria Ignacio
Buenaseda, had long been partitioned equally between her two sons, Perfecto and
Vitaliano Dimaguila, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, with its southern-half
portion assigned to Perfecto and the northern-half portion to Vitaliano. They
claimed that they were the heirs of Vitaliano and that Spouses Monteiro had
nothing to do with the property as they were not heirs of either Perfecto or
Vitaliano.
On January 2, 2001, Spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for Leave to Amend and/or
Admit Amended Complaint.
The RTC granted their motion. The amended
complaint abandoned the original claim for partition and instead sought the
recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property occupied by the
Dimaguila, specifically, the portion sold to the couple by the heirs of Pedro.
In amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the Dimaguilas' admission
in their original answer that the subject propetiy had already been partitioned
between Perfecto and Vitaliano, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, dated
October 5, 1945, and that during their lifetime, the brothers agreed that Perfecto
would become the owner of the southern-half portion and Vitaliano of the northernhalf portion, which division was observed and respected by them as well as their
heirs and successors-in-interest.
Spouses Monteiro further averred that Perfecto was survived by Esperanza,
Leandro and Pedro, who had divided the southern-half portion equally amongst
themselves, with their respective 1 /3 shares measuring 81.13 square meters each;
that Pedro's share pertains to the 1 /3 of the southern-half immediately adjacent to
the northern-half adjudicated to the Dimaguilas as heirs of Vitaliano; that on
September 29, 1992, Pedro's share was sold by his heirs to them through a Bilihan
ng Lahat Naming Karapatan (Bilihan) with the acquiescence of the heirs of
Esperanza and Leandro appearing in an Affidavit of Conformity and Waiver; and
that when they attempted to take possession of the share of Pedro, they
discovered that the subject portion was being occupied by the Dimaguilas.
In their Answer to the amended complaint, the Dimaguilas admitted that the
subject property was inherited by, and divided equally between Perfecto and
Vitaliano, but denied the admission in their original answer that it had been
actually divided into southern and northern portions. Instead, they argued that the
Extrajudicial Partition mentioned only the division of the subject property "into two
and share and share alike." In effect, they argued the existence of a co-owenrship,
contrary to their original position.
Issues:
1. Whether there was a partition of the subject property.
2. Whether the 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the subject property was sold to
the respondent spouses.
Ruling:
1.There was partition of the subject property.
Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had the burden of proof to
establish their case by a preponderance of evidence, which is the weight, credit,
and value of the aggregate evidence on either side, synonymous with the term
"greater weight of the evidence."
To prove their claim of partition, the respondent spouses presented the following:
(1) the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, dated October 5, 1945, executed by and
between the brothers Perfecto and Vitaliano;
(2) the cadastral map of Liliw Cadm-484, dated August 6, 1976, showing that the
subject property had been divided into southern and northern portions,
registered as Lot Nos. 876 and 877; and
(3) the Municipal Assessor's recordsshowing that the said lots were respectively
claimed by Buenaventura and Perfecto.
It is undisputed that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition stated that Perfecto and
Vitaliano agreed "to divide between them into two and share and share alike"
the subject property, including the house situated thereon. It appears, however,
that the property was actually partitioned into definite portions, namely,
southern and northern halves, as reflected in the cadastral map of Liliw, which
were respectively claimed by an heir of Vitaliano and Perfecto himself. It, thus,
appears that the subject property had already been partitioned into
definite portions more than 20 years prior to the original complaint for
partition filed in 1993, and that such division had been observed by the
brothers' heirs.
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made
by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not
require proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake.
The petitioners argue that such admission was the palpable mistake of their
former counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not provided to
them. This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim
unsupported by any iota of evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Furthermore, the Court notes that this
position was adopted by the petitioners only almost eight (8) years after their
original answer was filed, in response to the amended complaint of the
respondent spouses. In their original answer to the complaint for partition, their
claim that there was already a partition into northern-half and southern-half
portions, was the very essence of their defense. It was precisely this admission
which moved the respondent spouses to amend their complaint. The petitioners
cannot now insist that the very foundation of their original defense was a
palpable mistake.
Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission
is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be
denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. The
respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners' admission and so
amended their original complaint for partition to one for recovery of possession
of a portion of the subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from
denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition of the property.
Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of the
petitioners would actually be sufficient to prove the partition even without the
documents presented by the respondent spouses. If anything, the additional
evidence they presented only served to corroborate the petitioners' admission.
Alleged Violation of the Rule on Hearsay and Best Evidence Rule
The petitioners argue that they timely objected to the cadastral map and the list
of claimants presented by the respondent spouses, on the ground that they
violated the rule on hearsay and the best evidence rule.
Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except
when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued
by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that
the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody or the record.
Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of
claimants of the area covered by the map were presented by two public officers.
The first was Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor's Office, a
repository of such documents. The second was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR
employee, who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps records of surveyed
land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps and the list of
claimants, as certified true copies of original public records, fall under
the exception to the best evidence rule.
As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly
provides that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The
rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty
of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring
the official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions
in the course of his duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department
tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is,
therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants
qualify as entries in official records as they were prepared by the DENR, as
mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Even granting that the petitioners had not admitted the partition, they presented
no evidence to contradict the evidence of the respondent spouses. Thus, even
without the admission of the petitioners, the respondent spouses proved by a
preponderance of evidence that there had indeed been a partition of the subject
property.
2. The 1/3 of the southern-half was sold to Spouses Monteiro.
To prove that 1/3 of the southern-half portion of the subject property was sold to
them, Spouses Monteiro presented a deed of sale entitled Bilihan ng Lahat
Naming Karapatan, dated September 29, 1992, wherein Pedro's share was sold
by his heirs to them, with the acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza and
Leandro in an Affidavit of Conformity and Waiver.
The petitioners argue that the Bilihan should not have been admitted into
evidence because it lacked the documentary stamp tax required by Section 201
of the NIRC.
On August 29, 1994, the petitioners filed a motion for the production and/or
inspection of documents, praying that Spouses Monteiro be ordered to produce
the deed of sale, which they cited as the source of their rights as co-owners. On
November 20, 1995, Spouses Monteiro submitted their compliance, furnishing
the RTC and the petitioners with a copy of the Bilihan. On January 3, 1996, the
petitioners filed a notice of consignation, manifesting that they had attempted
reiterating what AAA allegedly told them. The same question, whether res
gestae as an exception to the hearsay rule must be appreciated from the factual
circumstances of the case, is now before this Court in this automatic review.
Ruling:
ACCUSED IS ACQUITTED
In essence, the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule provides that the
declarations must have been "voluntarily and spontaneously made
so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction
which they illustrate and explain, and were made under such
circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or
deliberation."
AAA's statements to the barangay tanod and the police do not qualify as
part of res gestae in view of the missing element of spontaneity and the
lapse of an appreciable time between the rape and the declarations
which afforded her sufficient opportunity for reflection.
In People v. Manhuyod, Jr., 51 the Court stressed that in appreciating res
gestae the element of spontaneity is critical. Although it was acknowledged that
there is no hard and fast rule to establish it, the Court cited a number of factors to
consider, already mentioned in Dianos. The review of the facts below constrains
this Court to take a view opposite that of the RTC and the CA.
There is no doubt, however, that there was nothing spontaneous, unreflected or
instinctive about the declarations which AAA made to the barangay tanodand later
that night to the police. Her statements were in fact a re-telling of what she had
already confessed to her mother earlier that afternoon; this time however, her
story to thetanods and the police was in clear, conscious pursuit of a newly formed
resolve, exhorted by her mother, to see her father finally exposed and put behind
bars. AAA made her declarations to the authorities precisely because she was
seeking their help to punish the accused-appellant. There was then nothing
spontaneous about her so-called res gestae narrations, even as it is remarkable to
note that while AAA was giving her said statements to the police, her father was
already being held in detention, and the investigation was conducted exactly to
determine if there was a basis to hold him for trial for rape.
Res gestae speaks of a quick continuum of related happenings, starting with the
occurrence of a startling event which triggered it and including any spontaneous
declaration made by a witness, participant or spectator relative to the said
occurrence. The cases this Court has cited invariably reiterate that the statement
must be an unreflected reaction of the declarant, undesigned and free of
deliberation. In other words, the declarant is spontaneously moved merely to
express his instinctive reaction concerning the startling occurrence, and not to
pursue a purpose or design already formed in his mind. In People v.
Sanchez, 53 the Court belabored to explain that startling events "speak for
themselves, giving out their fullest meaning through the unprompted language of
the participants:" 54 DCcAIS
Res gestae means the "things done." It "refers to those exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime,
when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and
there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement." A spontaneous exclamation is defined as "a statement or exclamation
made immediately after some exciting occasion by a participant or spectator and
asserting the circumstances of that occasion as it is observed by him. The
admissibility of such exclamation is based on our experience that, under certain
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PESTILOS V. GENEROSO,
G.R. NO. 182601, NOVEMBER 10, 2014
Facts:
on February 20, 2005, at around 3:15am, an altercation ensued between the
petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso(Atty. Generoso) at , Barangay Holy Spirit,
Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batasan Hills Police
Station) to report the incident. 4 Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPO1 Primitivo
Monsalve (SPO1 Monsalve) dispatched SPO2 Dominador Javier (SPO2 Javier) to go
to the scene of the crime and to render assistance. 5 SPO2 Javier, together with
augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel
Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged
altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten. 7
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This
prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police
Station for investigation. 8
The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station. 9 At
the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the
petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso
fortunately survived the attack.
In an Information, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder allegedly
later, the petitioners moved for Regular Preliminary Investigation 12 on the
ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid
warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge
that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were
just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and
a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed
pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. 13
subsequently, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation. The court likewise denied the petitioners' MR.
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA via R65. They
attributed GAD, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the RTC for the
denial of their motion for preliminary investigation. 16
the CA, however, issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of
merit(affirming the RTC decision). 17 The CA ruled that the word "invited" in the
Affidavit of Arrest executed by SPO2 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The
arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of
Atty. Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid
warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for as a
consequence.
Petitioners filed an MR on the CA decision but the latter still denied the
same 18 hence, the present petition.
The Issues
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED
WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED
WHEN THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE
FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED. SaHIEA
HELD:
PETITION IS WITHOUT MERIT.
The criminal proceedings against the petitioners should now proceed.
Anent the first issue:
. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule
113, Section 5 which states that:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5 (a)
above has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under
Section 5 (b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. 44
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5 (b) the provision
applicable in the present case. This provision has undergone changes through the
years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence.
Section 5(b) has underwent a lot of changes. (1940 rules, 1964, 1985, and now
the present rules)
proceeding
for
the
issuance
of
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should
base his determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the
public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on the evidence
submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts,
evidence or available information that he must personally gather within a limited
time frame.
Hence, in Santos, 66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of
determining probable cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its
determination in these instances. The Court held that one should not expect too
committed/personal
that the person
alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners
reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for
his mauling and, notably, the petitioners 85 and Atty. Generoso 86 lived almost in
the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted
by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with
Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired. 87
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which
they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have
arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we
deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These
circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and
evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police
officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge,
prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
PETITION DENIED.
PEOPLE V. FELICIANO,
G.R. NO. 196735, MAY 05, 2014
Facts:
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the
afternoon, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the
Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of the Philippines,
Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats
and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One
of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information for murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q95-6113 3, was filed
against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano,
Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L. Zingapan, Robert Michael Beltran Alvir,
Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George Morano,
Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict Guerrero, and Rodolfo
Penalosa, Jr. with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219. The
information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise, conspiring,
confederating with other persons whose true names, identities and whereabouts
have not as yet been ascertained, and mutually helping one another, with intent to
kill, qualified with treachery, and with evident premeditation, taking advantage of
superior strength, armed with baseball bats, lead pipes, and cutters, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person of DENNIS F. VENTURINA, by then and there hitting him
on the head and clubbing him on different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon
him serious and mortal injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said DENNIS F. VENTURINA.
(Emphasis supplied)
Separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of
Sigma Rho fraternity members Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Cristobal Gaston, Jr., and
Leandro Lachica, and the frustrated murder of Sigma Rho fraternity members
Mervin Natalicio and Amel Fortes. Only 11 of the accused stood trial since one of
the accused, Benedict Guerrero, remained at large.
On February 28, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision with the finding that
Robert Michael Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla,
and Warren Zingapan were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and
attempted murder and were sentenced to, among other penalties, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The trial court, however, acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo
Jolette Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay, George Morano, and Raymund Narag. The case
against Benedict Guerrero was ordered archived by the court until his
apprehension.
Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua, the case was
brought to this court on automatic appeal. However, due to the amendment of the
Rules on Appeal,105 the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals.
On December 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in a Special First Division of Five,
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Argument:
It is the argument of appellants that the information filed against them violates
their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them. They argue that the prosecution should not have included the
phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information since
they were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the accused were wearing
masks or that their masks fell off.
Held:
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended pary; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
The trial court correctly held that "considering the swiftness of the incident," there
would be slight inconsistencies in their statements. In People v. Adriano Cabrillas, it
was previously observed that:
It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime
to give varying details as there may be some details which one witness may notice
while the other may not observe or remember. In fact, jurisprudence even warns
against a perfect dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it could mean
that their testimonies were prefabricated and rehearsed.
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a starting
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect
to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So,
also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving
it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca, this court has previously discussed the
admissibility of testimony taken as part of res gestae, stating that:
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
xxxx
The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances
are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
CIVIL PROCEDURE
MURPHY VS. DY,
G.R. NO. 187557, NOVEMBER 12, 2014
FACTS:
Murphy is one of the heirs of decedent Alcoran, a co-owner of the subject property.
Murphy averred that a sale and donation of the portions of the subject property
were consummated by her co-heirs without her knowledge; that she was neither
informed by her co-heirs of the said sale nor was given the chance to exercise her
pre-emptive right; that the sale and the donation of the subject property were
executed without a deed of partition and her co-owners merely arrogated into
themselves their respective portions without her consent.
Petitioner prayed that she be allowed to exercise her right of redemption over the
portions of the subject property conveyed to third persons and that the subject
property be partitioned and raffled among the heirs.
The complaint was dismissed motu proprio for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC ruled
that petitioner failed to allege the value of the subject property and to attach the
tax declaration evidencing the assessed value of the lot.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners action fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
RULING:
The petition is without merit.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined
by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts
or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum
of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money and are
cognizable exclusively by the Regional Trial Courts.
In the present case, the main purpose of the petitioner in filing the complaint was
to redeem the subject property which was conveyed by her co-heirs without her
knowledge. Her cause of action was based on her right as a co-owner of the
subject property based on Article 1623 of the Civil Code.
Without a quibble, petitioners complaint was one which was not beyond pecuniary
estimation. An exercise of the right of redemption of a co-owner involves a title to
real property or any interest therein. Accordingly, the complaint should have
alleged the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the
interest thereon to determine which court had jurisdiction over the action.
Facts:
Severo Basbas was married to Ana Rivera. Severo . . . died on July 14, 1911. They
had a child named Valentin (Basbas). During Severo's lifetime, he acquired a parcel
of land in Santa Rosa, Laguna otherwise known as Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa
Detached Estate. Lot No. 39 is adjacent to Lot No. 40 of the Santa Rosa Detached
Estate which lot was acquired, by purchase, by Valentin Basbas.
Sometime in 1995, [herein petitioners Heirs of Valentin Basbas] discovered that
[respondents] Crispiniano and Ricardo Basbas were able to secure for themselves
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-294295 over Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa
Detached Estate. Sometime in 1987, [respondents], through Crispiniano Basbas,
filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Title before the Regional Trial Court, Bian,
Laguna, docketed as LRC Case No. B-758, covering Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa
Detached Estate.
Subsequently thereafter, or on June 1, 1989, an Order was issued by the RTC
granting the aforesaid petition. On the basis of said Order, the title covering Lot
No. 39 was ordered reconstituted in the name of the heirs of Severo Basbas and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 (N.A.) was issued. On November 13, 1993,
[therein] defendants Crispiniano Basbas y Talampas and [respondent] Ricardo
Basbas y Talampas executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of deceased
Severo Basbas . . . stating among others that the only heirs of Severo Basbas are
Felomino Basbas and Melencio Casubha. On the basis of said Extra-Judicial
Settlement . . ., the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna cancelled Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. T294295 was issued in the names of [therein] defendants Crispiniano Basbas and
[respondent] Ricardo Basbas
Issue:
WON there is a need to settle the issue on heirship in a special proceeding.
Ruling:
NO.
The Court finds no need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of the heirs of
Severo in order to resolve petitioners' Action for Annulment of Title and
Reconveyance of the subject property.
In ruling in favor of petitioners, Heirs of Valentin, the trial courts found that
petitioners fully established their filiation with the decedent Severo, the original
titleholder of Lot No. 39 and from whom all parties trace their claim of ownership
over the subject property. Oppositely, the trial courts found wanting, lacking
documentary evidence, the different claims of heirship of Crispiniano and herein
respondent Ricardo, through Severo's purported other son or nephew, Nicolas. The
MTC, affirmed in toto by the RTC, declared, thus:
[Petitioners] have fully established their true filiation with the late Severo
Basbas from whom the subject property came from. Through
their own evidence, testimonial and documentary, it was
established that Severo Basbas was married to Ana Rivera. They
had one (1) child named Valentin Basbas . . . . Valentin Basbas
had no other brother nor sister. He (Valentin) was married to
Irene Beato. Valentin bore four (4) children, namely: (1) Pedro
Basbas; (2) Lucas Basbas; (3) Feliz Basbas, Sr.; and (4) Remigia
Basbas. . . . .
his role in this pernicious attempt to relitigate the already settled issue regarding
Matildes exclusive right in the four properties.
On July 22, 2013, Atty. Mahinay submitted a so-called Compliance (With Humble
Motion for Reconsideration) containing his explanations, praying that he not be
sanctioned for violating the rule against forum shopping.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Mahinay committed forum-shopping.
Ruling:
The Court considers Atty. Mahinays explanations unsatisfactory.
Atty. Mahinay claims that he could not be deemed guilty of forum shopping
because the previous cases did not involve the issues raised in Civil Case No. CEB24293; hence, res judicata would not apply. He maintains that Civil Case No. CEB24293 was based on the agreement between Palicte and Marcelo Sotto (as the
then Administrator of the Estate) to the effect that Palicte would redeem the
properties under her name using the funds of the Estate, and she would thereafter
share the same properties equally with the Estate.
To establish the agreement between Palicte and Marcelo Sotto, Atty. Mahinay cites
Palictes filing of a motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. CEB-24293 on the ground,
among others, of the complaint failing to state a cause of action whereby Palicte
hypothetically admitted the complaints averment of the agreement.
Atty. Mahinays reliance on Palictes hypothetical admission of her agreement with
Marcelo Sotto to buttress his explanation here is unjustified. The filing of the
motion to dismiss assailing the sufficiency of the complaint does not hypothetically
admit allegations of which the court will take judicial notice of to be not true, nor
does the rule of hypothetical admission apply to legally impossible facts, or to facts
inadmissible in evidence, or to facts that appear to be unfounded by record or
document included in the pleadings.7
For the ground to be effective, the insufficiency of the complaint must appear on
the face of the complaint, and nowhere else. To stress, the admission of the
veracity of the facts alleged in the complaint, being only hypothetical, does not
extend beyond the resolution of the motion to dismiss, because a defending party
may effectively traverse the factual averments of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading only through the authorized responsive pleadings like the answer. Given
the foregoing, the complaint was properly dismissed because of res judicata. There
is no question that the ultimate objective of each of the actions was the return of
the properties to the Estate in order that such properties would be partitioned
among the heirs. In the other cases, the petitioners failed to attain the objective
because Palictes right in the properties had been declared exclusive.
Secondly, Atty. Mahinay asserts good faith in the filing Civil Case No. CEB24293.1He points out that an associate lawyer in his law office prepared and filed
the complaint without his law firm being yet familiar with the incidents in the
intestate proceedings involving the Estate, or with those of the previous three
cases mentioned in the decision of June 13, 2013.
A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. 13 He is
expected to make a thorough study and an independent assessment of the case he
is about to commence. As such, his claim of good faith was utterly baseless and
unfounded.
Even assuming that Atty. Mahinay did not himself prepare the complaint, it remains
that he subsequently personally handled the case. In so doing, he had sufficient
time to still become fully acquainted with the previous cases and their incidents,
and thereby learn in the due course of his professional service to the petitioners
that the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-24293 was nothing but a replication of the
other cases.
Thirdly, Atty. Mahinay states that his filing of the Motion To Refer Or Consolidate
The Instant Case With The Proceedings In The Intestate Estate Of Filemon Sotto
Before RTC Branch XVI In SP Proc. No. 2706-R 15 disproved deliberate forum
shopping on his part.
The Court disagrees. The dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-24293 on
November 15, 199916prompted Atty. Mahinay to file a motion for reconsideration on
December 3, 1999.17 But he did not await the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration, and instead filed the Motion To Refer Or Consolidate The Instant
Case With The Proceedings In The Intestate Estate Of Filemon Sotto Before RTC
Branch XVI In SP Proc. No. 2706-R on May 9, 2000 obviously to pre-empt the trial
courts denial of the motion. 18 His actuations did not manifest good faith on his
part. Instead, they indicated an obsession to transfer the case to another court to
enable his clients to have another chance to obtain a favorable resolution, and still
constituted deliberate forum shopping.
And, lastly, Atty. Mahinay argues that his disclosure of the pendency of Civil Case
No. CEB-24293 proved that forum shopping was not in his mind at all.
The insistence cannot command belief. The disclosure alone of the pendency of a
similar case does not negate actual forum shopping. Had Atty. Mahinay been
sincere, the least he could have done was to cause the dismissal of the action that
replicated those already ruled against his clients. The records show otherwise.
The acts of a party or his counsel clearly constituting willful and deliberate forum
shopping shall be ground for the summary dismissal of the case with prejudice,
and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as be a cause for administrative
sanctions against the lawyer.20
Forum shopping can be committed in either of three ways, namely: (1) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet (litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case
having been finally resolved (res judicata); or (3) filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where
the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). If the forum
shopping is not willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be dismissed
without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above. But if the forum
shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions
shall be dismissed with prejudice.21
In view of the foregoing, Atty. Mahinay was guilty of forum shopping. Willful
and deliberate forum shopping by any party and his counsel through the
filing of multiple petitions or complaints to ensure favorable action shall
constitute direct contempt of court.
TZE SUN WONG V. KENNY WONG,
G.R. NO. 180364, DECEMBER 03, 2014
Facts:
Petitioner is a Chinese citizen who immigrated to the Philippines in 1975 and
subsequently acquired a permanent resident status in 1982. As the records would
show, he studied, married, and continued to reside in the country, and even owned
a company called Happy Sun Travel and Tours.
Finding probable cause, the Special Prosecutor filed with the BOI the applicable
deportation charges9against petitioner, 3
In a Judgment14 dated October 2, 2002, the BOI Board of Commissioners ordered
the deportation of petitioner on the grounds of: (a) illegal use of alias, i.e., Joseph
Wong, which was the name appearing in his drivers license application; and (b)
misrepresenting himself as a Filipino citizen in the same application, in violation of
Section 37 (a) (7) and (9)15 of Commonwealth Act No. 613,1
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 20 which was eventually denied by the
BOI in a Resolution 21dated December 4, 2002. As such, petitioner filed an appeal
before the Secretary of Justice.
In a Resolution22 dated March 22, 2004, Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas
N. Gutierrez affirmed the ruling of the BOI.24
Petitioner moved for reconsideration25. Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez
rendered a Resolution27 dated September 9, 2005, rejecting petitioners argument
on the basis of Section 8 of the Immigration Act .29
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari30 before the CA.
In a Decision31 dated May 15, 2007, the CA denied32 the certiorari petition.
Preliminarily, it found that petitioner chose the wrong remedy considering that the
decisions of the BOI Board of Commissioners are directly appealable to the CA
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court..35
Petitioner sought reconsideration 36 but was denied in a Resolution 37 dated October
23, 2007, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
The sole issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not the CA correctly denied
petitioners petition forcertiorari.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is without merit.
The Court first discusses the propriety of petitioners recourse before the CA.
Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court clearly states that decisions of any quasijudicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions (except to
judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines) shall be
appealed to the CA under this rule.
RULE 43
Appeals From the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the
Court of Appeals
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final
orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social
Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks
and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy
Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of
Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance
System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board,
Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of
Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary
arbitrators authorized by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The statutory basis of the CAs appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered
by quasi-judicial agencies (except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of
the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442) in the abovementioned
respect is Section 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, 38 as amended:39
Notably, in Cayao-Lasam v. Spouses Ramolete,40 it was clarified that the
enumeration of the quasi-judicial agencies under Section 1, Rule 43 is not
exclusive:
The Rule expressly provides that it should be applied to appeals
from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasijudicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The
phrase among these agencies confirms that the enumeration
made in the Rule is not exclusive to the agencies therein
listed.41Thus, although unmentioned in the enumeration, the
Court, in the case of Dwikarna v. Hon. Domingo42(Dwikarna), held
that the decisions rendered by the BOI Board of Commissioners
may be appealable to the CA via Rule 43 in the event that a
motion for reconsideration therefrom is denied:
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to nullify the order for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition.
Before the Supreme Court, petitioners point out that the Court of Appeals
erroneously gave its imprimatur to the trial courts issuance of the assailed Status
Quo Order without first requiring and accepting from respondent the requisite bond
that is required under the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Controversies.
On the other hand, respondent claims that a valid ground for the issuance of the
assailed Status Quo Order did exist and that the alleged failure of the trial court to
require the posting of a bond prior to the issuance of a status quo order was
mooted by the assailed Order which required respondent and Reynante to file a
bond in the amount of P300,000.00 each.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in disregarding the
provisions of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-corporate controversies
pertaining to the issuance of a Status Quo Order.
RULING:
Yes. The Status Quo Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
A status quo order is merely intended to maintain the last, actual, peaceable and
uncontested state of things which preceded the controversy. It further states that,
unlike a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, a status quo order
is more in the nature of a cease and desist order, since it neither directs the doing
or undoing of acts as in the case of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief.
Pertinently, the manner of the issuance of a status quo order in an intra-corporate
suit such as the case at bar is governed by Section 1, Rule 10 of the Interim Rules
of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies which reads:
SECTION 1. Provisional remedies. - A party may apply for any of the provisional
remedies provided in the Rules of Court as may be available for the purposes.
However, no temporary restraining order or status quo order shall be issued save
in exceptional cases and only after hearing the parties and the posting of a bond.
In the present case, the trial courts Status Quo Order conflicted with the rules and
jurisprudence in the following manner:
First, the directive to reinstate respondent to her former position as school director
and curriculum administrator is a command directing the undoing of an act already
consummated which is the exclusive province of prohibitory or mandatory
injunctive relief and not of a status quo order which is limited only to maintaining
the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things which immediately
preceded the controversy. It must be remembered that respondent was already
removed as trustee, member of the corporation and curriculum administrator by
the Board of Trustees of St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite, Inc. months
prior to her filing of the present case in the trial court.
Second, the trial courts omission of not requiring respondent to file a bond before
the issuance of the Status Quo Order is in contravention with the express
instruction of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies.
Even the subsequent order to post a bond did not cure this defect because a
careful reading of the nature and purpose of the bond would reveal that it was
meant by the trial court as security solely for the teachers retirement fund, the
possession of which was given by the trial court to respondent and Reynante. It
was never intended and can never be considered as the requisite security, in
compliance with the express directive of procedural law, for the assailed Status
Quo Order.
Third, it is settled in jurisprudence that an application for a status quo order which
in fact seeks injunctive relief must comply with Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court: i.e., the application must be verified aside from the posting of the requisite
bond. In the present case, the Manifestation and Motion, through which respondent
applied for injunctive relief or in the alternative a status quo order, was merely
signed by her counsel and was unverified.
In conclusion, we find that the issuance of the Status Quo Order was unwarranted
for non-compliance with the rules. Therefore, the said status quo order must be set
aside.
RTC granted the ATO's urgent motion for execution and issued a Writ of
Execution dated June 2 2005. A notice to vacate was given to Miaque. Miaque
filed an MR with prayer to set aside the write of execution and notice to vacate. At
the same time he filed a motion in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 praying that the CA order
the RTC judge and the concerned sheriffs to desist from implementing the writ of
execution.
After CA denied the MR of Miaque in the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the
ATO filed with the RTC a motion for the revival of the writs of execution dated
August 16, 2004 and June 2, 2005. Miaque opposed. RTC granted the ATO's motion
and revived the writs of execution dated August 16, 2004 and June 2, 2005. Miaque
filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it.
On March 28, 2006, Miaque filed a petition for certiorari (with prayer for issuance
of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction) in the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-SP
No. 01603. He prayed, among others, that the implementation of the writs of
execution be enjoined. It is here where the CA issued the Resolutions being
challenged in this case, namely, the Resolution dated March 29, 2006 issuing a
TRO effective for 60 days, and Resolution dated May 30, 2006 issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the writs of execution dated
August 16, 2004 and June 2, 2005.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 which granted
petitioner's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in CAG.R. CEB-SP No. 01603.
Ruling:
As culled from Section 21, Rule 70, Section 4, Rule 39 and Section 8 (b), Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court and Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, the
following significant characteristics of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case
appealed to it:
(1) The judgment of the RTC against the defendant-appellant is
immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal
that may be taken therefrom; and
(2) Such judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken
therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the RTC or, in the
appellate court's discretion, suspended or modified.
The first characteristic the judgment of the RTC is immediately executory is
emphasized by the fact that no resolutory condition has been imposed that will
prevent or stay the execution of the RTC's judgment. The amendatory procedure
introduced by the present Section 21 of Rule 70, the judgment of the RTC shall
be immediately executory and can accordingly be enforced forthwith. It
shall not be stayed by the mere continuing deposit of monthly rentals by the
dispossessor during the pendency of the case in the Court of Appeals or this Court,
although such execution of the judgment shall be without prejudice to that appeal
taking its due course.
Teresa T. Gonzales La'O & Co., Inc. v. Sheriff Hatab: Unlike Rule 70 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court where the defendant, after perfecting his appeal, could
prevent the immediate execution of the judgment by taking an appeal and making
a periodic deposit of monthly rentals during the pendency of the appeal thereby
preventing the plaintiff from taking possession of the premises in the
meantime, the present wording of Section 21, Rule 70 explicitly provides
that the judgment of the regional trial court in ejectment cases appealed
to it shall be immediately executory and can be enforced despite the
perfection of an appeal to a higher court.
of jurisdiction in resolving, one way or the other, the plea for injunctive relief. In
the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by one who
seeks an injunctive writ, an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction will be nullified. Thus, where the right of one who seeks an injunctive
writ is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary injunction is not proper. The possibility of
irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a
preliminary injunction.
The sole basis of the CA in issuing its Resolution dated May 30, 2006 is its view
that the RTC "has no jurisdiction to order the issuance of [the] writ of execution"
because, when it gave due course to the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No.
79439, the RTC was already divested of jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the
third paragraph of Section 8 (a), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals
is mistaken. It disregards both (1) the immediately executory nature of the
judgment of the RTC in ejectment cases, and (2) the rule that such judgment of the
RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom. It ignores the nature of the RTC's
function to issue a writ of execution of its judgment in an ejectment case as
ministerial and not discretionary.
RTC was validly exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court when it issued the writs of execution dated August 16, 2004 and
June 2, 2005. The said writs of execution need not even be revived because they
continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by
motion, that is within five years from entry of judgment, pursuant to Section 14,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 6 of the same Rule.
Thus, the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the
Resolution dated May 30, 2006 in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603.
DUYON V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 172218, NOVEMBER 26, 2014
FACTS:
Certificate of Land Transfer(CLT) No. 0-005224 over 6,358 square meters parcel of
land, Duyon had been tilling since 1957 was issued to him on August 27, 1979.
However, the same parcel of land was also covered by TCT E.P. No. 44097 under
Emancipation patent issued to respondent Bunag-Cabacungan on June 6, 1989.
When Duyon discovered the double registration, he filed a complaint with the
ombudsman for misconduct or abuse of authority (administrative aspect), and
violation of R.A 3019 and Falsification of Public documents (criminal aspect)
against Bunag-Cabacungan, who was an employee of the Municipal Agriculture
Office of Nueva Ecija under the Department of Agriculture, and her husband,
Eutiquio Cabacungan (Cabacungan), who then worked at the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) for allegedly taking advantage of their official positions to
cause the issuance of the TCT in favor of Bunag-Cabacungan. Ombudsman found
spouses guilty of simple misconduct and recommended the filing of criminal case,
and suspended the spouses for 6 months. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by
Cabacungan spouses, ombudsman dismissed the complaint agaisnt her husband,
and reduced the suspension to 3 months but still affirming the filing of criminal
case agaisnt Bunag-Cabacungan. Cabacungan filed with the CA under Rule 43 for
the reversal of the decision but only for the admistrative aspect, while Duyon filed
a Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the order and motion to consolidate the case.
CA denied the petition of Duyon stating that his remedy was improper because it
should have been Rule 43 which provides for appeal of orders of ombudsman
regarding administrative matter, and not Rule 65. Rule 43 only allows 15 days to
appeal to decision, and since Duyon filed his petition 60 days from receipt of the
assailed order, thus the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman (as to the
administrative aspect of the case) was already final at the time this petition was
filed. For the criminal aspect, it has no jurisdiction over it. However, when CA
authorization from said alleged corporation or its members to file the Complaint.
Thus, the Complaint is deemed filed only by petitioners and not by SBGSI.
The reliefs sought in the Complaint, namely that of enjoining defendants from
acting as officers and Board of Directors of the corporation, the appointment of a
receiver, and the prayer for damages in the amount of the decrease in the value
of the shares of stock, clearly show that the Complaint was filed to curb the alleged
mismanagement of SBGCCI. The causes of action pleaded by petitioners do not
accrue to a single shareholder or a class of shareholders but to the corporation
itself.
However, as minority stockholders, petitioners do not have any statutory right to
override the business judgments of SBGCCIs officers and Board of Directors on the
ground of the latters alleged lack of qualification to manage a golf course.
Contrary to the arguments of petitioners, Presidential Decree No. 902-A, which is
entitled REORGANIZATION OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION WITH
ADDITIONAL POWERS AND PLACING THE SAID AGENCY UNDER THE
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, does not grant
minority stockholders a cause of action against waste and diversion by the Board
of Directors, but merely identifies the jurisdiction of the SEC over actions already
authorized by law or jurisprudence. It is settled that a stockholders right to
institute a derivative suit is not based on any express provision of the Corporation
Code, or even the Securities Regulation Code, but is impliedly recognized when the
said laws make corporate directors or officers liable for damages suffered by the
corporation and its stockholders for violation of their fiduciary duties.
At this point, we should take note that while there were allegations in the
Complaint of fraud in their subscription agreements, such as the misrepresentation
of the Articles of Incorporation, petitioners do not pray for the rescission of their
subscription or seek to avail of their appraisal rights. Instead, they ask that
defendants be enjoined from managing the corporation and to pay damages for
their mismanagement. Petitioners only possible cause of action as minority
stockholders against the actions of the Board of Directors is the common law right
to file a derivative suit. The legal standing of minority stockholders to bring
derivative suits is not a statutory right, there being no provision in the Corporation
Code or related statutes authorizing the same, but is instead a product of
jurisprudence based on equity. However, a derivative suit cannot prosper without
first complying with the legal requisites for its institution.
Section 1, Rule 8 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate
Controversies imposes the following requirements for derivative suits:
1) He was a stockholder or member at the time the acts or transactions subject
of the action occurred and at the time the action was filed;
2) He exerted all reasonable efforts, and alleges the same with particularity in
the complaint, to exhaust all remedies available under the articles of
incorporation, by-laws, laws or rules governing the corporation or partnership
to obtain the relief he desires;
3) No appraisal rights are available for the act or acts complained of; and
4) The suit is not a nuisance or harassment suit.
The RTC dismissed the Complaint for failure to comply with the second and fourth
requisites above.
Upon a careful examination of the Complaint, this Court finds that the same should
not have been dismissed on the ground that it is a nuisance or harassment suit.
Although the shareholdings of petitioners are indeed only two out of the 409
alleged outstanding shares or 0.24%, the Court has held that it is enough that a
member or a minority of stockholders file a derivative suit for and in behalf of a
corporation.
With regard, however, to the second requisite, we find that petitioners failed to
state with particularity in the Complaint that they had exerted all reasonable
efforts to exhaust all remedies available under the articles of incorporation, bylaws, and laws or rules governing the corporation to obtain the relief they desire.
The Complaint contained no allegation whatsoever of any effort to avail of intracorporate remedies. Indeed, even if petitioners thought it was futile to exhaust
intra-corporate remedies, they should have stated the same in the Complaint and
specified the reasons for such opinion. Failure to do so allows the RTC to dismiss
the Complaint, even motu proprio, in accordance with the Interim Rules. The
requirement of this allegation in the Complaint is not a useless formality which
may be disregarded at will. We ruled in Yu v. Yukayguan:
The wordings of Section 1, Rule 8 of the Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies are simple and do not leave room
for statutory construction. The second paragraph thereof requires that the
stockholder filing a derivative suit should have exerted all reasonable efforts
to exhaust all remedies available under the articles of incorporation, by-laws,
laws or rules governing the corporation or partnership to obtain the relief he
desires; and to allege such fact with particularity in the complaint. The
obvious intent behind the rule is to make the derivative suit the final
recourse of the stockholder, after all other remedies to obtain the relief
sought had failed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81441 which affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Olongapo City dismissing the Complaint filed thereon by herein
petitioners is AFFIRMED.
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
when it rendered a resolution dismissing the criminal complaint for violation of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against its own investigators and the private
respondent.
Held:
The petition is lack of merit. No grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the
Office of the Ombudsman.
The Court adheres to a policy
of non-interference with the
investigatory and prosecutorial
powers of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with
the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily
interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise
of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts will not
interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of
the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions
seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will
grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same
way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on
the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or
dismiss a complaint by a private complainant
The Ombudsmans determination of probable cause may only be assailed
through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground that such
determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion defined as such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. For there to be a finding of grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown
that the discretionary power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
Petitioner failed to clearly demonstrate
grave abuse of discretion by the Office
of the Ombudsman that would have
justified the issuance of a writ of
certiorari by the Court.
It falls upon Agdeppa, as petitioner for the writ of certiorari, to discharge the
burden of proving grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the
Ombudsman, in accordance with the definition and standards set by law and
jurisprudence.
The term grave abuse of discretion has a specific meaning. An act of a court or
tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is
done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
team approached the scene at once and arrested Constantino, from whom SPO2
Taguiam recovered the buy-bust money.
Thereafter, Constantino was brought to the police station where the recovered
drugs and money were turned over to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang. The
recovered drugs were then marked with the initials "A-1" and "A-2." The incident
was recorded in the police blotter with an inventory of the recovered drugs and
money.
Constantino alleged that there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, particularly, on the marking of the two plastic sachets
containing shabu allegedly confiscated from him. Different people claim to have
made the marking "NBT" on the two plastic sachets and gave various explanations
as to what the initials "NBT" stand for. In short, Constantino argues that the
prosecution failed to establish a crucial link in the chain of custody of the shabu in
this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish chain of custody.
RULING:
In a prosecution for the sale of a dangerous drug, the following elements must be
proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
Simply put, "[in] prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti as evidence." And in the prosecution of these offenses,
the primary consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized
drugs and other related articles have been preserved from the time they were
confiscated from the accused until their presentation as evidence in court.
Section 1 (b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002, defines
"chain of custody" as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time
of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in
the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.
The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turn
over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the marked
illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
After a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court
finds glaring inconsistencies affecting the integrity of the shabu purportedly
confiscated from Constantino. The inconsistent testimonies of PO3 Domingo, PO3
Hernandez, and P/SInsp. Tulauan as to who, when, and where the two plastic
sachets of shabu were marked lead the Court to question whether the two plastic
sachets of shabu identified in court were the very same ones confiscated from
Constantino. The doubtful markings already broke the chain of custody of the
seized shabu at a very early stage.
Herein, the prosecution is completely silent as to why PO3 Domingo, the poseurbuyer, despite having immediate custody of the two plastic sachets
of shabu purchased from Constantino, failed to immediately mark the seized drugs
before turning over the custody of the same to another police officer. This lapse in
procedure opened the door for confusion and doubt as to the identity of the drugs
actually seized from Constantino during the buy-bust and the ones presented
before the trial court, especially considering that three different people, during the
interval, supposedly received and marked the same. To clarify the matter, the
prosecution could have presented as witness either SPO2 Tamang or SPO2 Taguiam
to directly validate the marking in court, but unfortunately, the prosecution chose
to dispense with the testimonies of both officers. This omission diminished the
importance of the markings as the reference point for the subsequent handling of
the evidence. As a consequence, an objective person could now justifiably suspect
the shabu ultimately presented as evidence in court to be planted or
contaminated.
The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidence's chain of custody is fatal
to its case as the Court can no longer consider or even safely assume that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated dangerous drug were properly
preserved
Constantino is acquitted of the crime charged.
PEOPLE V. CALANTIAO Y DIMALANTA,
G.R. NO. 203984, JUNE 18, 2014
Facts:
Calantiao was charged with illegal possession of a dangerous drug, marijuana.
The facts of the case started with a traffic dispute between a truck and a taxi,
which turned into a shooting incident. The police officers on duty then were PO1
NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ. PO1 Mariano testified that they
immediately responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th
Street, Caloocan City where they found the white taxi. While approaching said
vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police
officers) and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were
subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing two (2)
bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with
ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from Calantiaos companion [a] .38
revolver.
The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 PABLO
TEMENA, police investigator at Bagong Barrio Police Station for investigation.
Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the bricks of marijuana contained in a black bag
with his initials, "NM". Thereafter, said specimen were forwarded to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the examination conducted
by P/SINSP. JESSSE DELA ROSA revealed that the same was positive for
marijuana, a dangerous drug.
The foregoing testimony of PO1 MARIANO was corroborated by PO3 RAMIREZ who
testified that he personally saw those bricks of marijuana confiscated from the
accused. He confirmed that he was with PO1 Mariano when they apprehended
said accused and his companion and testified that while PO1 Mariano recovered
from the accused a black bag containing marijuana, on his part, he confiscated
from accuseds companion a .38 revolver.
ISSUES:
I. WON the marijuana is inadmissible because its discovery disputedly violated
the Plain View doctrine.
Ruling:
There was a valid search and seizure of Marijuana. The Plain View Doctrine is not
applicable in this case. Instead, what applies is searches and seizure incident to a
lawful arrest.
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of
evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the
suspects person and premises under his immediate control. This is so because
"[o]bjects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence."16 "The
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to supplement the prior justification
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful
arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a
search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure."17
The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiaos situation
because the police officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police
officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in Calantiaos
possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to
Calantiaos lawful arrest.
This Court finds no merit in Calantiaos arguments.
On the other hand, searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed
by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 13.Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful
arrest is "to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person
arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the
latter from destroying evidence within reach."13 It is therefore a reasonable
exercise of the States police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury
that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2)
evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of
the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under the control and
within the reach of the arrestee.
In People v. Valeroso,14 this Court had the occasion to reiterate the permissible
reach of a valid warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, viz:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the
person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order
to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officers safety might well be
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable
for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestees
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of
the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latters reach. Otherwise
stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either
on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The
phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a
table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the
arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.
(Citations omitted.)
In Valeroso, however, the Court held that the evidence searched and seized from
him could not be used against him because they were discovered in a room,
different from where he was being detained, and was in a locked cabinet. Thus,
the area searched could not be considered as one within his immediate control
that he could take any weapon or destroy any evidence against him.15
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiaos
possession and within his immediate control. He could have easily taken any
weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the black
bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiaos possession, it was within the
permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct a
warrantless search.
II. WON there was non-compliance with the rules on chain of custody when the
item was marked at the police station; WON this non-compliance would affect the
admissibility of the marijuana as evidence.
Ruling:
The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized
marijuana from the time the police officers confiscated it, to the time it was
turned over to the investigating officer, up to the time it was brought to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination. This Court has no reason to overrule
the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which both found the chain of custody of the
seized drugs to have not been broken so as to render the marijuana seized from
Calantiao inadmissible in evidence.
Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering
of the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been
preserved will remain. The burden of showing the foregoing to overcome the
presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity, and
that they properly discharged their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately,
Calantiao failed to discharge such burden. Calantiao failed to show clear and
convincing evidence that the apprehending officers were stirred by illicit motive
or failed to properly perform their duties, their testimonies deserve full faith and
credit.
Inventory and Chain of
Custody of Evidence
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 provide as follows:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.
The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as
Facts:
Morate was charged of possession and selling of illegal drugs, it was alleged that
he was in possession of marijuana leaves contained in a heatsealed transparent
plastic sachet and sold to a poseurbuyer the marijuana leaves. Morate asked
PO1 Manamtam and Edwin to go with him to a nearby basketball area where the
accusedappellant produced four transparent plastic sachets containing dried
leaves and handed three sachets to PO1 Manamtam. The police officer asked the
accusedappellant to place the sachets inside the formers backpack.
Upon receiving PO1 Manamtams message, PO1 Bayaban and PO3 Eva rushed in to
arrest the accusedappellant. The accusedappellant noticed the approaching
police officers and dropped the sachet that he was holding. PO3 Eva saw what the
accusedappellant did and picked up the sachet from the ground. Thereafter, he
proceeded to bodily search the accusedappellant to look for the marked money
but did not find it. The accusedappellant was arrested. The accusedappellant
and PO1 Manamtam were then brought to the police station.
Upon arrival at the police station, the items confiscated during the buybust were
counted, marked and inventoried. The marking and inventory of the seized items
were witnessed by Barangay Kagawad and, a local newsman, both of whom signed
the Certification of Inventory. The seized items were all transferred to PO3 Eva as
the evidence custodian.
PO3 Eva thereafter prepared a Receipt of Seized Evidence/Property before handing
the seized items to PO1 Reynaldo Borromeo who signed the receipt upon taking
hold of the items. PO1 Borromeo proceeded to the PNP Crime Laboratory in
Legazpi City bringing with him the seized items and a Request for Laboratory
Examination.
The seized items were received by the PNP Crime Laboratory in Legazpi City where
PSInsp. Josephine Macura Clemen, a forensic chemist, examined them. PSInsp.
Clemen subsequently presented the seized drugs to the trial court as the
prosecutions
evidence
in
the
course
of
her
testimony.
For his part, accusedappellants defense was denial. According to him, after
finishing his work at around he went out of the premises of the Tabaco Pier to go
home. He was suddenly accosted by SPO3 Eva and Edwin Morate.
Issue:
WON the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt on account
of the prosecutions noncompliance with the chain of custody requirement under
Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations.
NO
Ruling:
Initially, it must be emphasized that accusedappellants defense of alleged non
compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 was raised belatedly and for
the first time on appeal. Failure to raise the issue of nonobservance of the chain
of custody requirement during trial is fatal to the case of the accusedappellant. As
explained in People v. Sta. Maria25 : The law excuses noncompliance under
justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police
officers involved in the buybust operation in this case from complying with
Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial
the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers alleged
violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before
the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance
did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the
safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value.
Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when
a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state
in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the
question for the first time on appeal.
In this case, the accusedappellant never questioned the chain of custody during
trial. Specifically, the records show that the accusedappellant never assailed the
propriety and regularity of the process of marking and inventory of the seized
items during the prosecutions presentation of evidence on that matter during the
testimony of PO1 Manamtam. Also, when the prosecution formally offered the
Certification of Inventory as evidence for the purpose of proving the immediate
and accurate inventory, marking and packing of the purchased and the seized
marijuana to maintain and preserve [their] identities and integrity and the four
sachets of marijuana as evidence for the purpose of proving the identities and
integrity of the purchased and the seized marijuana as those were immediately
inventoried, marked and documented/recorded, the accusedappellants comment
was simply Denied as to the purposes for which they are being offered for being
self[]serving pieces of evidence and said nothing about noncompliance with the
chain of custody requirement.
More importantly, the accusedappellants counsel himself has dropped the bomb
that demolished the accusedappellants defense. He admitted the identity and
integrity of the specimens.
These two circumstances (1) the omission of the accusedappellant to raise the
issue of noncompliance with the chain of custody requirement on time, and (2)
the admission of the accusedappellant as to the identity and integrity of the
seized items that the PNP Tabaco City submitted to the Crime Laboratory,
subjected to examination by the forensic chemist and presented in court as
evidence are sufficient to defeat the claims of the accusedappellant.
Nevertheless, even the consideration of the compliance with the chain of custody
requirement calls for the denial of the accusedappellants appeal.
The chain of custody is basically the duly recorded authorized stages of transfer of
custody of seized dangerous drugs, from their seizure or confiscation to receipt in
the forensic laboratory for examination to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. The function of the chain of custody requirement is to ensure that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that
unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. Thus, the
chain of custody requirement has a twofold purpose: (1) the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, and (2) the removal of
unnecessary
doubts
as
to
the
identity
of
the
evidence.
The law recognizes that, while the presentation of a perfect unbroken chain is
ideal, the realities and variables of actual police operation usually makes an
unbroken chain impossible. With this implied judicial recognition of the difficulty
of complete compliance with the chain of custody requirement, substantial
compliance is sufficient as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending police officers.
In this case, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the chain of custody
requirement has been substantially complied with. The police officers duly
recorded the various authorized stages of transfer of custody of the dangerous
drugs confiscated from the accusedappellant
that its cause of action is not predicated on the improper negotiation of the letter
of credit but on the breach of the terms and conditions of the trust receipt.
Issue: Whether or not plaintiff correctly availed of Rule 45.
Ruling:
No.
The Banks petition suffers from a fatal infirmity. In particular, it contravenes the
elementary rule of appellate procedure that an appeal to this Court by petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall raise only questions
of law. The rule is based on the nature of this Courts appellate function this
Court is not a trier of facts and on the evidentiary weight given to the findings of
fact of the trial court which have been affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals
they are conclusive on this Court. While there are recognized exceptions to the
rule, this Court sees no reason to apply the exception and not the rule in this case.
The conceptual distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is wellsettled in case law:
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other
hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
The issue of whether or not the Bank was able to establish its cause of action by
preponderant evidence is essentially a question of fact. Stated in another way, the
issue which the Bank raises in this petition is whether the evidence it presented
during the trial was preponderant enough to hold LCDC and the spouses Ley liable.
The required burden of proof, or that amount of evidence necessary and sufficient
to establish ones claim or defense, in civil cases is preponderance of evidence.
Preponderance of evidence is defined as follows:
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
greater weight of evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence.
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability to truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
As preponderance of evidence refers to the probability to truth of the matters
intended to be proven as facts, it concerns a determination of the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts based on the evidence presented. Thus, a review of the
respective findings of the trial and the appellate courts as to the preponderance of
a partys evidence requires that the reviewing court address a question of fact.
Moreover, a demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. Evidence is the means, sanctioned by the Rules of Court,
of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. As
such, the question of sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence, the basic issue
presented by the Bank, pertains to the question of whether the factual matters
alleged by the Bank are true. Plainly, it is a question of fact and, as such, not
proper subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. It was incumbent upon the Bank to demonstrate that this case fell under
any of the exceptions to this rule but it failed to do so.
The Bank attempts to avoid the only questions of law rule for appeals filed under
Rule 45 by invoking the misapprehension of facts exception. According to the Bank,
the trial and the appellate courts misapprehended the facts with respect to the
determination of the basis of the Banks cause of action. In particular, the Bank
contends that both the trial and the appellate courts erred in the consideration of
the proper actionable document upon which the Bank based its cause of action.
The Bank asserts that its cause of action is not grounded on the Letter of Credit but
on the Trust Receipt.
The Banks reference to the Trust Receipt as its primary actionable document is
mistaken and misleading. The nature of the cause of action is determined by the
facts alleged in the complaint. A partys cause of action is not what the party says
it is, nor is it what the designation of the complaint states, but what the allegations
in the body define and describe. In this case, the Banks allegations as to the basis
of its cause of action against LCDC and the spouses Ley, however, belie the Banks
claim. The Banks cause of action was hinged on the Letter of Credit is
unmistakable. Taken as a whole, the Banks allegations make a cause of action
based on the Letter of Credit.
PEOPLE V. PAREJA Y CRUZ,
G.R. NO. 202122, JANUARY 15, 2014
FACTS:
Pareja was charged with two counts of rape and one count of attempted rape.
AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and
sexual abuse took place on three (3) different dates, particularly in December
2003, February 2004, and March 27, 2004.
First incident happened when AAAs mother was away. While AAA was asleep,
Pareja placed himself on top of her, sucked her breasts and inserted his penis in
her anus. Despite the experience, AAA never told anyone.
It did not happen once. In the second incident, Pareja once again placed himself on
top of her, sucked her breasts and caressed and inserted a finger in her vagina.
The last incident happened with AAAs mother catching Pareja lift AAAs skirt while
she was asleep. Outraged, the mother brought AAA to the barangay officials to
report the incident.
Pareja denied raping AAA but admitted that he knew her as she is the daughter of
his live-in partner and that they all stay in the same house.
He alleged that there was no way the sexual abuses could have happened, as the
house was too small that AAA had to sleep with her sibling. Also that the house
was located in a thickly populated vicinity. He could not have consummated the
sexual abuses as this would wake the siblings up.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court was correct in relying on the testimony of AAA to
warrant conviction.
RULING:
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique
1. At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the
validity of his arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis that "[a]ny objection,
defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused
enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the
information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now
estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was
cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial courts jurisdiction."53 Be
that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in
flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a
buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a),
Rule 11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made
without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the
warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of
the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. We held in People v.
Cabugatan that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures,
however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and
may be agreed upon between them, up to a week later. Chiok and Nuguid had
been dealing in this manner for about six to eight years, with their transactions
running into millions of pesos. For this purpose, Chiok maintained accounts with
petitioners Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) and Global
Business Bank, Inc. (Global Bank), the latter being then referred to as the
Asian Banking Corporation (Asian Bank). Chiok likewise entered into a Bills
Purchase Line Agreement (BPLA) with Asian Bank. Under the BPLA, checks drawn
in favor of, or negotiated to, Chiok may be purchased by Asian Bank. Upon such
purchase, Chiok receives a discounted cash equivalent of the amount of the check
earlier than the normal clearing period.
On July 5, 1995, pursuant to the BPLA, Asian Bank bills purchased Security Bank
& Trust Company (SBTC) Managers Check (MC) No. 037364 in the amount of
P25,500,000.00 issued in the name of Chiok, and credited the same amount to the
latters Savings Account No. 2-007-03-00201-3.
On the same date, Asian Bank issued MC No. 025935 in the amount of
P7,550,000.00 and MC No. 025939 in the amount of P10,905,350.00 to Gonzalo
Bernardo, who is the same person as Gonzalo B. Nuguid. The two Asian Bank
managers checks, with a total value of P18,455,350.00 were issued pursuant to
Chioks instruction and was debited from his account. Likewise upon Chioks
application, Metrobank issued Cashiers Check (CC) No. 003380 in the amount of
P7,613,000.00 in the name of Gonzalo Bernardo. The same was debited from
Chioks Savings Account no. 154-42504955.
Chiok then deposited the three checks (Asian Bank MC Nos. 025935 and 025939,
and Metrobank CC No. 003380), with an aggregate value of P26,068,350.00 in
Nuguids account with Far East Bank & Trust Company (FEBTC), the predecessorin-interest of petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). Nuguid was supposed
to deliver US$1,022,288.50,4 the dollar equivalent of the three checks as agreed
upon, in the afternoon of the same day. Nuguid, however, failed to do so,
prompting Chiok to request that payment on the three checks be stopped. Chiok
was allegedly advised to secure a court order within the 24-hour clearing period.
On July 6, 1995, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
directing the spouses Nuguid to refrain from presenting the said checks
for payment and the depositary banks from honoring the same until further
orders
from
the
court.6
Asian Bank refused to honor MC Nos. 025935 and 025939 in deference to the TRO.
Metrobank claimed that when it received the TRO on July 6, 1995, it refused to
honor CC No. 003380 and stopped payment thereon. However, in a letter also
dated July 6, 1995, Ms. Jocelyn T. Paz of FEBTC, Cubao-Araneta Branch informed
Metrobank that the TRO was issued a day after the check was presented for
payment. Thus, according to Paz, the transaction was already consummated and
FEBTC had already validly accepted the same. In another letter, FEBTC informed
Metrobank that the restraining order indicates the name of the payee of the check
as GONZALO NUGUID, but the check is in fact payable to GONZALO BERNARDO. We
believe there is a defect in the restraining order and as such should not bind your
bank.7 Alice Rivera of Metrobank replied to said letters, reiterating Metrobanks
position to comply with the TRO lest it be cited for contempt by the trial court.
However, as would later be alleged in Metrobanks Answer before the trial court,
Metrobank eventually acknowledged the check when it became clear that nothing
more can be done to retrieve the proceeds of the check. Metrobank furthermore
claimed that since it is the issuer of CC No. 003380, the check is its primary
obligation and should not be affected by any prior transaction between the
purchaser (Chiok) and the payee (Nuguid).
In the meantime, FEBTC, as the collecting bank, filed a complaint against Asian
Bank before the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) Arbitration
Committee for the collection of the value of Asian Bank MC No. 025935 and
025939, which FEBTC had allegedly allowed Nuguid to withdraw on July 5, 1995,
the same day the checks were deposited.
On July 25, 1995, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction.
Before the RTC, Asian Bank pointed out that SBTC returned and issued a Stop
Payment Order on SBTC MC No. 037364 (payable to Chiok in the amount of
P25,500,000.00) on the basis of an Affidavit of Loss & Undertaking executed by a
certain Helen Tan. Under said Affidavit of Loss & Undertaking, Tan claims that she
purchased SBTC MC No. 037364 from SBTC, but the managers check got lost on
that day. Asian Bank argued that Chiok would therefore be liable for the dishonor of
the managers check under the terms of the BPLA, which provides for recourse
against the seller (Chiok) of the check when it is dishonored by the drawee (SBTC)
for
any
reason,
whether
valid
or
not.
On October 18, 1995, FEBTC filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, it claimed that it
allowed the immediate withdrawal of the proceeds of Asian Bank MC Nos. 025935
and 025939 on the ground that, as managers checks, they were the direct
obligations of Asian Bank and were accepted in advance by Asian Bank by the
mere issuance thereof. FEBTC presented the checks for payment on July 5, 1995
through the PCHC. Asian Bank, as admitted in its Answer before the RTC, received
the same on that day. Consequently, Asian Bank was deemed to have confirmed
and booked payment of the subject checks in favor of FEBTC or, at the latest,
during the first banking hour of July 6, 1995, when payment should have been
made. FEBTC claimed that Asian Bank exhibited bad faith when, in anticipation of
the TRO, it opted to float the checks until it received the TRO at 12:00 noon of July
6,
1995
to
justify
the
nonpayment
thereof.
In their own Answer, the spouses Nuguid claimed that Gonzalo Nuguid had
delivered much more dollars than what was required for the three checks at the
time of payment. By way of special affirmative defense, the spouses Nuguid also
claims that since the subject checks had already been paid to him, Chiok is no
longer entitled to an injunction (to hold the payment of the subject checks), and
Civil Case No. Q-95-24299 has already become moot.
ISSUE:
WON Chiok is entitled to the writ of injunction.
RULING.
Neither could Chiok be validly granted a writ of injunction against Metrobank and
Global Bank to enjoin said banks from honoring the subject managers and
cashiers checks. It is elementary that (a)n injunction should never issue when an
action for damages would adequately compensate the injuries caused. The very
foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction rests in the fact that the
damages caused are irreparable and that damages would not adequately
compensate.45Chiok could have and should have proceeded directly against
Nuguid to claim damages for breach of contract and to have the very account
where he deposited the subject checks garnished under Section 7(d) 46 and Section
8,47 Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Instead, Chiok filed an action to enjoin Metrobank
and Global Bank from complying with their primary obligation under checks in
which
they
are
liable
as
both
drawer
and
drawee.
It is undisputed that Chiok personally deposited the subject managers and
cashiers checks to Nuguids account. If the intention of Chiok was for Nuguid to be
allowed to withdraw the proceeds of the checks after clearing, he could have easily
deposited personal checks, instead of going through the trouble of purchasing
managers and cashiers checks. Chiok therefore knew, and actually intended, that
Nuguid will be allowed to immediately withdraw the proceeds of the subject
checks. The deposit of the checks which were practically as good as cash was
willingly and voluntarily made by Chiok, without any assurance that Nuguid will
comply with his end of the bargain on the same day. The explanation for such
apparently reckless action was admitted by Chiok in the Amended Complaint itself:
That plaintiff [Chiok] due to the number of years (five to seven years) of business
transactions with defendant [Nuguid] has reposed utmost trust and
confidence on the latter that their transactions as of June 1995 reaches millions
of pesos. x x x.48(Emphases supplied.)
As between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the consequences of a
breach of trust, the one who made it possible by his act of confidence must bear
the loss.49 Evidently, it was the utmost trust and confidence reposed by Chiok to
Nuguid that caused this entire debacle, dragging three banks into the controversy,
and having their resources threatened because of an alleged default in a contract
they
were
not
privy
to.
Let it be emphasized that in resolving the matter before Us, We do not detract from
well-settled concepts and principles in commercial law regarding the nature,
causes and effects of a managers check and cashiers check. Such checks are
primary obligations of the issuing bank and accepted in advance by the mere
issuance thereof. They are a banks order to pay drawn upon itself, committing in
effect its total resources, integrity, and honor. By their peculiar character and
general use in the commercial world, they are regarded substantially as good as
the money they represent. However, in view of the peculiar circumstances of
the case at bench, We are constrained to set aside the foregoing
concepts and principles in favor of the exercise of the right to rescind a
contract upon the failure of consideration thereof.50 (Emphases ours,
citations omitted.)
In deviating from general banking principles and disposing the case on the basis of
equity, the courts a quo should have at least ensured that their dispositions were
indeed equitable. This Court observes that equity was not served in the
dispositions below wherein Nuguid, the very person found to have violated his
contract by not delivering his dollar obligation, was absolved from his liability,
leaving the banks who are not parties to the contract to suffer the losses of
millions
of
pesos.
In the case at bar, the managers and cashiers checks were personally deposited
by Chiok in the account of Nuguid. The only knowledge that can be attributed to
the drawee banks is whatever was relayed by Chiok himself when he asked for a
Stop
Payment
Order.
Chiok
testified
on
this
matter,
to
wit:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Now, Mr. witness, since according to you the defendant failed to deliver
[this] amount of P1,023,288.23 what action have you undertaken to
protect your interest Mr. witness?
I immediately call my lawyer, Atty. Espiritu to seek his legal advise in this
matter.
Prior to that matter that you sought the advise of your lawyer, Atty.
Espiritu insofar as the issuing bank is concerned, namely, Asian Bank,
what did you do in order to protect your interest?
I immediately call the bank asking them if what is the procedure for stop
payment and the bank told me that you have to secure a court order as
soon as possible before the clearing of these checks. 52 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Asian Bank, which is now Global Bank, obeyed the TRO and denied the clearing of
the managers checks. As such, Global Bank may not be held liable on account of
the knowledge of whatever else Chiok told them when he asked for the procedure
to secure a Stop Payment Order. On the other hand, there was no mention that
Metrobank was ever notified of the alleged failure of consideration. Only Asian
Bank was notified of such fact. Furthermore, the mere allegation of breach on the
part of the payee of his personal contract with the purchaser should not be
considered a sufficient cause to immediately nullify such checks, thereby eroding
their
integrity
and
honor
as
being
as
good
as
cash.
In view of all the foregoing, we resolve that Chioks complaint should be denied
insofar as it prayed for the withdrawal of the proceeds of the subject managers
and cashiers checks. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
enjoining Metrobank and Global Bank from honoring the subject managers and
cashiers
checks
should
be
lifted.
Since we have ruled that Chiok cannot claim the amounts of the checks from
Metrobank and Global Bank, the issue concerning the setting off of Global Banks
judgment debt to Chiok with the outstanding obligations of Chiok is hereby
mooted.
RISOS-VIDAL V. COMELEC,
G.R. NO. 206666, JANUARY 21, 2015
FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada,
for the crime of plunder. Accordingly, the accused Former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual
absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo (former President Arroyo) extended executive clemency, by way
of pardon, to former President Estrada.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for a
local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila. Risos-Vidal, the
petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President
Estrada before the COMELEC. Risos-Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that
[Former President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his
Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. The COMELEC,
dismissed the petition for disqualification declaring categorically that [former
President Estradas] right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the
pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Risos-Vidal invoked
the Courts jurisdiction by filing the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to
vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by
former President Arroyo.
HELD:
The petition for certiorari lacks merit. Former President Estrada was granted an
absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy.
The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified.
Risos-Vidal theorizes that former President Estrada is disqualified from running for
Mayor of Manila in the May 13, 2013 Elections, and remains disqualified to hold
any local elective post despite the presidential pardon extended to him in 2007 by
former President Arroyo for the reason that it (pardon) did not expressly provide for
the remission of the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, particularly the
restoration of his (former President Estrada) right to vote and be voted upon for
public office. She invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code as the
foundations of her theory.
The proper interpretation of Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
All that the said provisions impart is that the pardon of the principal penalty does
not carry with it the remission of the accessory penalties unless the President
expressly includes said accessory penalties in the pardon. It still recognizes the
Presidential prerogative to grant executive clemency and, specifically, to decide to
pardon the principal penalty while excluding its accessory penalties or to pardon
both.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada
shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory
penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive
clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter
is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The
sentence that followed, which states that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights, expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification
were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The pardon granted to former President Estrada admits no other interpretation
other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the pardon granted to him, he
regained his FULL civil and political rights including the right to seek elective
office.
The third preambular clause of the
pardon did not operate to make the
pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon,
i.e., [w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek
any elective position or office, neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate
against the conclusion that former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to
seek public elective office have been restored. This is especially true as the pardon
itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the
unqualified use of the term civil and political rights as being restored.
Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an
introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment,
usually introduced by the word whereas. Whereas clauses do not form part of a
statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of
the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the
decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
Absent any contrary evidence, former President Arroyos silence on former
President Estradas decision to run for President in the May 2010 elections against,
among others, the candidate of the political party of former President Arroyo, after
the latters receipt and acceptance of the pardon speaks volume of her intention to
restore him to his rights to suffrage and to hold public office. However, the
statement [h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights, to the mind of
the Court, is crystal clear the pardon granted to former President Estrada was
absolute, meaning, it was not only unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope,
complete and plenary in character, as the term political rights adverted to has a
settled meaning in law and jurisprudence.
The COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed Resolutions.
In light of the foregoing, contrary to the assertions of Risos-Vidal, the COMELEC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed Resolutions.
The Court has consistently held that a petition for certiorari against actions of the
COMELEC is confined only to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
patent and substantial denial of due process, because the COMELEC is presumed
to be most competent in matters falling within its domain.
As settled in jurisprudence, grave abuse of discretion is the arbitrary exercise of
power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to
be condemned as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, such an abuse
must be patent and gross.
The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual
or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a
whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or
refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or were so patent and gross
as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
value-added tax (VAT) was not yet imposed on the sale of real properties. Republic
Act No. 7716 (the Expanded Value-Added Tax [E-VAT] Law),19 which took effect on
January 1, 1996, restructured the VAT system by further amending pertinent
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 100 of the old
NIRCwas so amended by including real properties in the definition of the term
goods or properties, thereby subjecting the sale of real properties to VAT.
While prior to Republic Act No. 7716, real estate transactions were not subject to
VAT, they became subject to VAT upon the effectivity of said law. Thus, the sale of
the parcels of land by petitioner became subject to a 10% VAT, and this was later
increased to 12%, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9337.20 Petitioner afterwards
became a VAT-registered taxpayer.
The petition in G.R. No. 180035 seeks to correct the unauthorized limitation of the
term real properties to improvements thereon by Revenue Regulations 7-95 and
the error of the Court of Tax Appeals and Court of Appeals in sustaining the
aforesaid Regulations.42 This theory of petitioner is the same for all three cases
now before us.
THEORY OF PETITIONER
Petitioner claims that the 10% value-added tax is based on the gross selling price
or gross value in money of the goods sold, bartered or exchanged.53 Petitioner
likewise claims that by definition, the term goods was limited to movable,
tangible objects which is appropriable or transferable and that said term did not
originally include real property.
Republic Act No. 7716 (E-VAT Law, January 1, 1996) expanded the coverage of the
original VAT Law (Executive Order No. 273), specifically Section 100 of the old
NIRC. According to petitioner, while under Executive Order No. 273, the term
goods did not include real properties, Republic Act No. 7716, in amending
Section 100, explicitly included in the term goods real properties held primarily
for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of trade or business.
Consequently, the sale, barter, or exchange of real properties was made subject to
a VAT equivalent to 10% (later increased to 12%, pursuant to Republic Act No.
9337) of the gross selling price of real properties.
Goods or properties refer to all tangible and intangible objects which are capable
of pecuniary estimation and shall include:
1. Real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the
ordinary course of trade or business.
The Courts pronouncements in the decided cases regarding these issues are
discussed below. The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means
to abide by, or adhere to, decided cases,112 compels us to apply the rulings by
the Court to these consolidated cases before us. Under the doctrine of stare
decisis, when this Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a
certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases,
where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and
property are the same.113 This is to provide stability in judicial decisions, as held
by the Court in a previous case:
Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means
that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied
to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties
may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any
powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.114
More importantly, we cannot depart from the legal precedents as laid down by the
Court En Banc. It is provided in the Constitution that no doctrine or principle of
law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.115
What is left for this Court to do is to reiterate the rulings in the aforesaid legal
precedents and apply them to these consolidated cases.
As regards the main issue, the Court conclusively held that petitioner is entitled to
the 8% transitional input tax on its beginning inventory of land, which is granted in
Section 105 (now Section 111[A]) of the NIRC, and granted the refund of the
amounts petitioner had paid as output VAT for the different tax periods in
question.116
Rep. Act No. 7716 clarifies that it is the real properties held primarily for sale to
customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of trade or business that are
subject to the VAT, and not when the real estate transactions are engaged in by
persons who do not sell or lease properties in the ordinary course of trade or
business. It is clear that those regularly engaged in the real estate business are
accorded the same treatment as the merchants of other goods or properties
available in the market. In the same way that a milliner considers hats as his goods
and a rancher considers cattle as his goods, a real estate dealer holds real
property, whether or not it contains improvements, as his goods.
On April 27, 1992, fire gutted one of the buildings of GOYU. GOYU filed a claim for
indemnity with MICO, which was, however, denied by the latter on the ground that
the insurance policies were the subject of writs of attachment issued by various
courts or otherwise claimed by other creditors of GOYU. Respondent-Intervenor
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), one of GOYUs creditors, also filed
with MICO a claim for the proceeds of GOYUs insurance policies, including fire
insurance policy numbers F-114-07402 and F-114-07525. RCBC claims that the
insurance policies in question were purchased by GOYU pursuant to the terms and
conditions of the mortgage executed by GOYU to ensure the payment of its
obligations with RCBC. MICO likewise denied RCBCs claims on the same ground.
On April 6, 1993, GOYU filed against MICO, RCBC, and two RCBC officers
a complaint for specific performance and damages in the RTC of Manila. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65442 and raffled to Branch 3 of
said court. The complaint prayed, among other things, that MICO be ordered to
pay GOYU the total amount of P74,040,518.50 representing ten insurance policies
it secured from MICO including fire insurance policy numbers F-114-07402 and F114-07525.
In the meantime, SOLIDBANK filed an action for collection of sum of money
with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment, also with the RTC of Manila,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-62749, and raffled to Branch 14 of
said court, against GOYU, the INDIVIDUAL GUARANTORS with their spouses, and
MICO.
In Civil Case No. 93-65442, Branch 3 of the RTC of Manila issued an interlocutory
order requiring the proceeds of GOYUs ten insurance policies (including fire
insurance policy numbers F-114-07402 and F-114-07525) to be deposited with the
said court, less P14,938,080.23 (which were the subject of writs of attachment
from various courts in connection with claims from GOYUs other creditors, namely
Urban Bank, Alfredo Sebastian, and Philippine Trust Company). Pursuant thereto,
MICO deposited the amount of P50,505,594.60.
The case eventually reached the SC on petitions by RCBC and MICO, which were
docketed as G.R. Nos. 128833, 128834 and 128866. On April 20, 1998, this Court
rendered its Decision in the consolidated cases, reversing the Decision of the Court
of Appeals by ordering, among other things, the Clerk of Court to release the
amount of P50,505,594.60 including the interests earned to RCBC instead of GOYU.
On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 92-62749 , RCBC filed a Motion for
Intervention, claiming that the two insurance policies in question were purchased
by GOYU pursuant to the terms and conditions of the mortgage executed by GOYU
to ensure the payment of its obligations with RCBC. The RTC denied the motion on
the ground that RCBCs rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding, in
particular, Civil Case No. 93-65442.
The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of SOLIDBANK. It ruled that the
endorsements in the two insurance policies made SOLIDBANK the beneficiary in
the said policies.SOLIDBANK then filed a Motion for Execution against all
defendants except MICO. Thereafter, the RTC ordered that a writ of execution
issue for the enforcement of the Decision with respect to all the defendants except
Malayan. On the same day, a writ of execution was issued by Sheriff Conrado
Bejar of the RTC of Manila. On February 5, 1996, said sheriff served a Notice of
Garnishment to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila requesting the delivery of
the amount of P23,070,730.83 to said sheriff to be applied to the partial
satisfaction of the Writ of Execution issued in Civil Case No. 92-62749. SOLIDBANK
withdrew the amount of P22,493,682.58 as evidenced by the Disbursement
Voucher issued therefor.
ISSUES: