VAWC - Cases No. 5-10

G.R. No.
170701
January 22, 2014
RALPH P. TUA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 22,
Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite; and ROSSANA HONRADOTUA, Respondents.
Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 9262, otherwise known as the

"Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) effective for thirty (30) days from
date of receipt is hereby issued against respondent Ralph P. Tua.
For the purpose of the implementation of the Temporary Protection
Order, the respondent (herein petitioner Ralph) is hereby ordered
to:
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul
the Decision1
dated October 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in CAG.R. SP No. 89939.
On May 20, 2005, respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua (respondent)
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite a Verified
Petition2 for herself and in behalf of her minor children, Joshua
Raphael, Jesse Ruth Lois, and J ezreel Abigail, for the issuance of
a protection order, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the AntiViolence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, against
her husband, petitioner Ralph Tua. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 0464-05 and raffled-off to Branch 22. Respondent
claimed that she and her children had suffered from petitioners
abusive conduct; that petitioner had threatened to cause her and
the children physical harm for the purpose of controlling her actions
or decisions; that she was actually deprived of custody and access
to her minor children; and, that she was threatened to be deprived
of her and her childrens financial support.
Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10, 1998 in
Makati City. They have three children, namely, Joshua Raphael
born on February 9, 1999, Jesse Ruth Lois, born on June 27, 2000,
and Jezreel Abigail, born on December 25, 2001. In her
Affidavit3 attached to the petition, respondent claimed, among
others, that: there was a time when petitioner went to her room and
cocked his gun and pointed the barrel of his gun to his head as he
wanted to convince her not to proceed with the legal separation
case she filed; she hid her fears although she was scared; there
was also an instance when petitioner fed her children with the fried
chicken that her youngest daughter had chewed and spat out; in
order to stop his child from crying, petitioner would threaten him
with a belt; when she told petitioner that she felt unsafe and
insecure with the latter's presence and asked him to stop coming to
the house as often as he wanted or she would apply for a
protection order, petitioner got furious and threatened her of
withholding his financial support and even held her by the nape and
pushed her to lie flat on the bed; and, on May 4, 2005, while she
was at work, petitioner with companions went to her new home and
forcibly took the children and refused to give them back to her.
On May 23, 2005, the RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO),4 which we quote in full:
1. Enjoin from committing and threatening to commit

personally or through another, physical, verbal and
emotional harm or abuse against the herein petitioner
(respondent) and other family and household members;
2. Restrain from harassing, annoying, texting, telephoning,
contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner
(respondent) whether directly or indirectly or engaged in
any psychological form of harassment;
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.
The Sheriff of this Court, the PNP Imus, Cavite, or any Officers of
the Law are hereby commanded to effect this Order immediately
and to use necessary force and measures under the law to
implement this Order.
Let the hearing for Permanent Protection Order be set on June 9,
2005 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.5
In his Comment6 to respondent's Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift
TPO, petitioner denied respondents allegations and alleged,
among others, that he had been maintaining a separate abode from
petitioner since November 2004; that it was respondent who
verbally abused and threatened him whenever their children's stay
with him was extended; that respondent had been staying with a
certain Rebendor Zuiga despite the impropriety and moral
implications of such set-up; that despite their written agreement that
their minor children should stay in their conjugal home, the latter
violated the same when she surreptitiously moved out of their
conjugal dwelling with their minor children and stayed with said
Zuiga; and, that respondent is mentally, psychologically, spiritually
and morally unfit to keep the children in her custody. Petitioner
contended that the issuance of the TPO on May 23, 2005 is
unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Without awaiting for the resolution of his Comment on the petition
and motion to lift TPO, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction and hold departure order assailing the May 23, 2005
TPO issued by the RTC.
On June 9, 2005, the CA, in order not to render the petition moot
and to avoid grave and irreparable injury, issued a temporary
restraining order to temporarily enjoin the parties and their agents

from enforcing the assailed May 23, 2005 TPO issued in Civil Case
No. 0464-05.7
Petitioner later filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction with Manifestation,8 praying that the
enforcement of all orders, decision to be issued by the RTC and all
the proceedings therein be restrained. A hearing9 was,
subsequently, conducted on the motion.
On October 28, 2005, the CA issued its assailed decision, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
assailed Temporary Protection Order dated May 23, 2002 (sic)
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22 in
Civil Case No. 0464-05 is UPHELD.10
In so ruling, the CA found that the petition filed by respondent under
RA 9262 is still pending before the RTC; thus, the factual matters
raised therein could not be passed upon in the petition for certiorari
filed with it. The CA noted that during the pendency of the herein
proceedings, petitioner filed an urgent motion to quash warrant
issued by the RTC and which matter could not also be a subject of
this petition which assails the TPO dated May 23, 2005 and that the
motion to quash should have been filed with the RTC.
The CA found that the TPO dated May 23, 2005 was validly issued
by the RTC and found no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance
thereof as the same were in complete accord with the provision of
RA 9262.
As to petitioner's argument that there was no basis for the issuance
of the TPO, considering that the provision authorizing such
issuance is unconstitutional, the CA ruled that since the matter
raised herein was the RTCs alleged grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the TPO, such matter could be resolved without having to
rule on the constitutionality of RA 9262 and its provisions. And that
the requisites that the constitutionality of the law in question be the
very lis mota of the case was absent.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN REFUSING
TO RULE ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
PROVISIONS OF RA 9262 HAS DECIDED THE CASE IN
A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH ESTABLISHED
LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERING THAT
CONTRARY TO ITS FINDINGS THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SAID LAW IS THE LIS
MOTA OF THE CASE.11
Petitioner claims that contrary to the stance of the CA in not
deciding the issue of the constitutionality of RA 9262, the issue
presented is the very lis mota in the instant case.
The issue of constitutionality of RA 9262 was raised by petitioner in
his Comment to respondent's Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift
TPO dated May 23, 2005 filed with the RTC. However, without
awaiting for the resolution of the same, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA assailing the TPO issued for violating the due
process clause of the Constitution. Contrary to the CA's finding that
the matter raised in the petition filed with it was the RTCs alleged
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO which could be
resolved without having to rule on the constitutionality of RA 9262
and its provisions, we find that since petitioner is assailing the
validity of RA 9262 wherein respondent's right to a protection order
is based upon, the constitutionality of the said law must first be
decided upon. After all, the alleged unconstitutionality of RA 9262
is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance
of a protection order.12 Notwithstanding, however, we still find no
merit to declare RA 9262 unconstitutional.
Petitioner particularly directs his constitutional attack on Section 15
of RA 9262 contending that had there been no ex parte issuance of
the TPO, he would have been afforded due process of law and had
properly presented his side on the matter; that the questioned
provision simply encourages arbitrary enforcement repulsive to
basic constitutional rights which affects his life, liberty and property.
We are not impressed.
Section 15 of RA 9262 provides:
Dissatisfied, petitioner files the instant petition raising the following

issues:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WITH DUE
RESPECT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING AND
FINDING IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED
RULES AND JURISPRUDENCE THAT PUBLIC
RESPONDENT COMMITTED NO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN THE LATTER ISSUED THE
TEMPORARY PROTECTIVE ORDER (TPO) DATED 23
MAY 2005 WITHOUT OBSERVING DUE PROCESS OF
LAW AND CONSIDERATIONS OF JUSTICE AND BASIC
HUMAN RIGHTS.
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary

Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by
the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte
determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant
in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and
shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a
hearing on the issuance of a [Permanent Protection Order] PPO
prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall
order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent
by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law
enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of
the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.
In Garcia v. Drilon,13 wherein petitioner therein argued that Section
15 of RA 9262 is a violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution, we struck down the challenge and held:
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of

violence against women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the
opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure
that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies
necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This
serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to
accord the victim and any designated family or household member
safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from
committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the
victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of
minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing,
signed and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full
responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since
"time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be
prevented," the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after
raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property
of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the
immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such
violence, which is about to recur.
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational
basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to
verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her
witnesses' affidavits to the petition.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as
violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary
attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the
time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the
defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way,
the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing
experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even
death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could
be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is
protection of women and children from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the
court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the
respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days
from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of
the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by
the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days
from service on the respondent.
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order
the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the
respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within
five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference
and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall
verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall
show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should
not be issued.
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition
for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to
him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. x x x. The
essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.14
Petitioner also assails that there is an invalid delegation of
legislative power to the court and to barangay officials to issue
protection orders.
Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the
Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section
5 hereof." Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the
function of the legislature.15 The act of Congress entrusting us with
the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to
settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the
redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.16
As to the issuance of protection order by the Punong Barangay,
Section 14 pertinently provides:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and
How. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection
order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to
desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.
A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall
issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after
ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong
Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the
application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order
must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad
that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the
issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days.
Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of
the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect
its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any
proceeding before the Punong Barangay.1wphi1
Hence, the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his

unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders
the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the
woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her
child physical harm.
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical

harm;
Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in

nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code
to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order
in the barangay."17
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her

child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her
child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat
of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or
other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or
child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following
acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or
conduct:
Petitioner assails that the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO dated May 23,
2005 as the petition was bereft of any indication of grounds for the
issuance of the same. Petitioner claims that while the issuance of
the TPO is ex parte, there must be a judicial determination of the
basis thereof. He contends that the allegations in respondent's
affidavit attached to the petition, and without admitting the same to
be true, are nothing more than normal or usual quarrels between a
husband and wife which are not grave or imminent enough to merit
the issuance of a TPO.
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent

physical harm;
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving

the woman or her child of custody to her/his
family;
We are not persuaded.

We quote again Section 15 of RA 9262 for ready reference, thus:
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary
Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by
the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte
determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant
in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and
shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a
hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the
expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal
service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may
obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service.
The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the
merits of the issuance of a PPO.
Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the
filing of the application after ex parte determination that there is
basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent
need not be notified or be present in the hearing for the issuance of
the TPO. Thus, it is within the courts discretion, based on the
petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that the
violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a
TPO have been committed.
And Section 5 of the same law provides:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.The crime of violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the

woman or her children of financial support legally
due her or her family, or deliberately providing the
woman's children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the
woman or her child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any
legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity or controlling the victim's own money or
properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or
common money, or properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on
oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or
decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child
to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute
rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through
intimidation directed against the woman or her child or
her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,
personally or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited
to, the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in

public or private places;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical

harm;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the

residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the

property of the woman or her child against her/his
will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal
belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of
the woman or her child; and
G.R. No. 201043
June 16, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Armed

Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC), Petitioner,
vs.
DAISY R. YAHON, Respondent.
DECISION
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or

violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and
denial of financial support or custody of minor children of
access to the woman's child/children.
In this case, the alleged acts of petitioner among others, i.e., he
cocked the gun and pointed the same to his head in order to
convince respondent not to proceed with the legal separation case;
feeding his other children with the food which another child spat
out; and threatening the crying child with a belt to stop him from
crying which was repeatedly done; and holding respondent by her
nape when he got furious that she was asking him not to come
often to their conjugal home and hold office thereat after their
agreed separation and threatening her of withholding half of the
financial support for the kids, while not conclusive, are enough
bases for the issuance of a TPO. Petitioner's actions would fall
under the enumeration of Section 5, more particularly, paragraphs
a, d, e (2), f, h, and i.
It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion when
there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.18We find that the CA did not err when it found no grave abuse
of discretion committed by the RTC in the issuance of the TPO.
The factual matters herein raised by petitioner should be presented
during the hearing on the merits on the issuance of the Permanent
Protection Order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October
28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 89939,
upholding the Regional Trial Court's issuance of the Temporary
Protection Order dated May 23, 2005, is AFFIRMED. The Regional
Trial Court of
Imus, Cavite is hereby ORDERED to resolve with dispatch
respondent's Petition for a Permanent Protection Order.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
which seeks to nullify and set aside the Decision1 dated November
29, 2011 and Resolution2 dated March 9, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-MIN.
The CA affirmed the orders and decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22 granting temporary and
permanent protection orders, and denying the motion to lift the said
temporary protection order (TPO).
Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of
protection order under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262,3 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004," against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A.
Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), an enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army
who retired in January 2006. Respondent and S/Sgt. Yahon were
married on June 8, 2003. The couple did not have any child but
respondent has a daughter with her previous live-in partner.
On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, as follows:
Finding the herein petition for the Issuance of Protection Order to
be sufficient in form and substance and to prevent great and
irreparable injury to the petitioner, a TEMPORARY PROTECTION
ORDER is forthwith issued to respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A.
YAHON directing him to do the following acts:
1. Respondent is enjoined from threatening to commit or
committing further acts of physical abuse and violence
against the petitioner;
2. To stay away at a distance of at least 500 meters from
petitioner, her residence or her place of work;
3. To refrain from harassing, annoying, intimidating,
contacting or communicating with petitioner; 4.
Respondent is prohibited from using or possessing any
firearm or deadly weapon on occasions not related to his
job;
5. To provide reasonable financial spousal support to the
petitioner.
The Local Police Officers and the Barangay Officials through the
Chairman in the area where the petitioner and respondent live at
Poblacion, Claveria, Misamis Oriental and Bobuntogan, Jasaan,
Misamis Oriental are directed to respond to any request for
assistance from the petitioner for the implementation of this order.
They are also directed to accompany the petitioner to their conjugal

abode at Purok 2, Bobuntogan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental to get her
personal belongings in order to insure the safety of the petitioner.
The Deputy Sheriff of this Court is ordered to immediately serve the
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) upon the respondent personally
and to seek and obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents, if
needed, for purposes of effecting the smooth implementation of this
order.
In the meantime, let copy of this order and petition be served upon
the respondent for him to file an OPPOSITION within a period of
five (5) days from receipt hereof and let a Preliminary Conference
and hearing on the merits be set on October 17, 2006 at 2:00
oclock in the afternoon.
To insure that petitioner can receive a fair share of respondents
retirement and other benefits, the following agencies thru their
heads are directed to WITHHOLD any retirement, pension and
other benefits of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON, a
member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned at 4ID,
Camp Evangelista, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City until further orders
from the court:
1. Commanding General/Officer of the Finance Center of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio
Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
2. The Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo,
Quezon City;
3. The Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St.,
Cagayan de Oro City.
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.
IF THE RESPONDENT APPEARS WITHOUT COUNSEL ON THE
DATE OF THE PRELIMINARYCONFERENCE AND HEARING ON
THE MERITS OF THE ISSUANCE OF A PERMANENT
PROTECTION ORDER, THE COURT SHALL NOT RESCHEDULE
OR POSTPONE THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND
HEARING BUT SHALL APPOINT A LAWYER FOR THE
RESPONDENT AND IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE SAID
HEARING.
IF THE RESPONDENT FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE DATE OF
THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE
MERITS DESPITE PROPER NOTICE, THE COURT SHALL
ALLOW EX-PARTE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE
PETITIONER AND RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE
PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD. NO DELEGATION
OF THE RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE SHALL BE ALLOWED.
own counsel. However, he did not hire a counsel nor file an

opposition or answer to the petition. Because of his failure to
appear in the subsequent hearings of the case, the RTC allowed
the ex-parte presentation of evidence to determine the necessity of
issuance of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO).
Meanwhile, as prayed for by respondent who manifested that
S/Sgt. Yahon deliberately refused to give her spousal support as
directed in the TPO (she claimed that she had no source of
livelihood since he had told her to resign from her job and
concentrate on keeping their house), the RTC issued another order
directing S/Sgt. Yahon to give respondent spousal support in the
amount of P4,000.00 per month and fifty percent (50%) of his
retirement benefits which shall be automatically deducted and given
directly to respondent.5
In her testimony, respondent also said that S/Sgt. Yahon never
complied with the TPO as he continued making threats and
inflicting physical abuse on her person, and failed to give her
spousal support as ordered by the court.
On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision,6 as follows:
After careful review and scrutiny of the evidence presented in this
case, this court finds that there is a need to permanently protect the
applicant, Daisy R. Yahon from further acts of violence that might
be committed by respondent against her. Evidences showed that
respondent who was a member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines assigned at the Headquarters 4ID Camp Evangelista,
Cagayan de Oro City had been repeatedly inflicting physical,
verbal, emotional and economic abuse and violence upon the
petitioner. Respondent in several instances had slapped, mauled
and punched petitioner causing her physical harm. Exhibits G and
D are medical certificates showing physical injuries suffered by
petitioner inflicted by the respondent at instances of their marital
altercations. Respondent at the height of his anger often poked a
gun on petitioner and threatened to massacre her and her child
causing them to flee for their lives and sought refuge from other
people. He had demanded sex from petitioner at an unreasonable
time when she was sick and chilling and when refused poked a gun
at her. Several police blotters were offered as evidence by
petitioner documenting the incidents when she was subjected to
respondents ill temper and ill treatment. Verbally, petitioner was not
spared from respondents abuses by shouting at her that he was
wishing she would die and he would celebrate if it happens and by
calling and sending her threatening text messages. These incidents
had caused petitioner great psychological trauma causing her [to]
fear for her life and these forced her to seek refuge from the court
for protection. Economically, petitioner was also deprived by
respondent of her spousal support despite order of the court
directing him to give a monthly support of Php4,000.00. In view of
the foregoing, this court finds a need to protect the life of the
petitioner not only physically but also emotionally and
psychologically.
SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis supplied.)

S/Sgt. Yahon, having been personally served with copy of the TPO,
appeared during the scheduled pre-trial but informed the court that
he did not yet have a counsel and requested for time to hire his
Based on the evidence presented, both oral and documentary, and

there being no controverting evidence presented by respondent,
this Court finds that the applicant has established her case by
preponderance of evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

GRANTING the petition, thus, pursuant to Sec. 30 of A.M. No. 0410-1-SC, let a PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER be issued
immediately and respondent, S/Sgt. CHARLES A.YAHON is
ordered to give to petitioner, DAISY R. YAHON the amount of
FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (Php4,000.00) per month by way of
spousal support.
Pursuant to the order of the court dated February 6, 2007,
respondent, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon is directed to give it to
petitioner 50% of whatever retirement benefits and other claims that
may be due or released to him from the government and the said
share of petitioner shall be automatically deducted from
respondents benefits and claims and be given directly to the
petitioner, Daisy R. Yahon.
Let copy of this decision be sent to the Commanding
General/Officer of Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City; the Management
of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City and the Regional
Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City for their
guidance and strict compliance.
SO ORDERED.7 (Emphasis supplied.)
Herein petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center
(AFPFC), assisted by the Office of the Judge Advocate General
(OTJAG), AFP, filed before the RTC a Manifestation and Motion (To
Lift Temporary Protection Order Against the AFP)8 dated November
10, 2008. Stating that it was making a limited and special
appearance, petitioner manifested that on August 29, 2008, it
furnished the AFP Pension and Gratuity Management Center
(PGMC) copy of the TPO for appropriate action. The PGMC, on
September 2, 2008, requested the Chief, AFPFC the temporary
withholding of the thirty-six (36) Months Lump Sum (MLS) due to
S/Sgt. Yahon. Thereafter, on October 29, 2008, PGMC forwarded a
letter to the Chief of Staff, AFP for the OTJAG for appropriate action
on the TPO, and requesting for legal opinion as to the propriety of
releasing the 36 MLS of S/Sgt. Yahon. Petitioner informed the RTC
that S/Sgt. Yahons check representing his 36 MLS had been
processed and is ready for payment by the AFPFC, but to date said
check has not been claimed by respondent.
Petitioner further asserted that while it has initially discharged its
obligation under the TPO, the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction
over the military institution due to lack of summons, and hence the
AFPFC cannot be bound by the said court order. Additionally,
petitioner contended that the AFPFC is not a party-in-interest and is
a complete stranger to the proceedings before the RTC on the
issuance of TPO/PPO. Not being impleaded in the case, petitioner
lamented that it was not afforded due process and it was thus
improper to issue execution against the AFPFC. Consequently,
petitioner emphasized its position that the AFPFC cannot be
directed to comply with the TPO without violating its right to
procedural due process.
In its Order9 dated December 17, 2008, the RTC denied the
aforesaid motion for having been filed out of time. It noted that the
September 28, 2006 TPO and July 23, 2007 Decision granting
Permanent Protection Order (PPO) to respondent had long become

final and executory.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied under
the RTCs Order10 dated March 6, 2009.
On May 27, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA praying for the nullification of the aforesaid orders and decision
insofar as it directs the AFPFC to automatically deduct from S/Sgt.
Yahons retirement and pension benefits and directly give the same
to respondent as spousal support, allegedly issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Respondent
filed her Comment with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary
Injunction, manifesting that there is no information as to whether
S/Sgt. Yahon already received his retirement benefit and that the
latter has repeatedly violated the TPO, particularly on the provision
of spousal support.
After due hearing, the CAs Twenty-Second Division issued a
Resolution11 granting respondents application, viz:
Upon perusal of the respective pleadings filed by the parties, the
Court finds meritorious private respondents application for the
issuance of an injunctive relief. While the 36-month lump sum
retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon has already been
given to him, yet as admitted by petitioner itself, the monthly
pension after the mentioned retirement benefits has not yet been
released to him. It appears that the release of such pension could
render ineffectual the eventual ruling of the Court in this Petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION issue enjoining the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Finance Center, its employees, agents, representatives, and any all
persons acting on its behalf, from releasing the remaining pension
that may be due to S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon.
SO ORDERED.12
By Decision dated November 29, 2011, the CA denied the petition
for certiorari and affirmed the assailed orders and decision of the
RTC. The CA likewise denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
In this petition, the question of law presented is whether petitioner
military institution may be ordered to automatically deduct a
percentage from the retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel,
and to give the same directly to the latters lawful wife as spousal
support in compliance with a protection order issued by the RTC
pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.
A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further
acts of violence against women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other necessary relief. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the
opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.13 The protection
orders issued by the court may be a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO) or a Permanent Protection Order (PPO), while a protection
order that may be issued by the barangay shall be known as a

Barangay Protection Order (BPO).14
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that may be
included in the TPO, PPO or BPO, to wit:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to
commit or committing, personally or through another, any
of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing,
annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the
residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of the
residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting
the petitioner, or permanently where no property rights are
violated, and if respondent must remove personal effects
from the residence, the court shall direct a law
enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the
residence, remain there until respondent has gathered his
things and escort respondent from the residence;
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner
and any designated family or household member at a
distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the
residence, school, place of employment, or any specified
place frequented by the petitioner and any designated
family or household member;
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an
automobile and other essential personal effects,
regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law
enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the
residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is
safely restored to the possession of the automobile and
other essential personal effects, or to supervise the
petitioners or respondents removal of personal
belongings;
(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a
child/children to the petitioner;
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the
woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support.
Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall
order an appropriate percentage of the income or salary of
the respondent to be withheld regularly by the
respondent's employer for the same to be automatically
remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit and/or
withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the
woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall
render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect
contempt of court;
(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or
possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and order
him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate
disposition by the court, including revocation of license

and disqualification to apply for any license to use or
possess a firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement
agent, the court shall order the offender to surrender his
firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to
investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on
matter;
(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence
inflicted, including, but not limited to, property damage,
medical expenses, child care expenses and loss of
income;
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to
provide petitioner temporary shelter and other social
services that the petitioner may need; and
(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court
deems necessary to protect and provide for the safety of
the petitioner and any designated family or household
member, provided petitioner and any designated family or
household member consents to such relief. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTCs directive for
the automatic deduction of 50% from S/Sgt. Yahons retirement
benefits and pension to be given directly to respondent, as it
contravenes an explicit mandate under the law governing the
retirement and separation of military personnel.
The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1638,15 which states: Section 31. The benefits authorized under this
Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to
attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever;
neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third
person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted
man who is entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled
money and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the active
service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or
other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors
under this Decree may be withheld and be applied to settle such
accountabilities. (Emphasis supplied.)
A similar provision is found in R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as
the "Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997," which
reads:
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien -- x x x
xxxx
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the
benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this
Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy
or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or
administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA)
disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members,
including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or
occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions
or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or

work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is
in favor of the GSIS.
In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court,16 we held that a court
order directing the Philippine National Bank to refrain from
releasing to petitioner all his retirement benefits and to deliver onehalf of such monetary benefits to plaintiff as the latters conjugal
share is illegal and improper, as it violates Section 26 of CA 186
(old GSIS Law) which exempts retirement benefits from execution.
The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which governs execution of
judgments and court orders. Section 13 of Rule 39 enumerates
those properties which are exempt from execution:
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other,
shall be exempt from execution:
xxxx
(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained
as such support, or any pension or gratuity from the Government;
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable
conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being
the more recent expression of legislative will.17 Statutes must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence.18 However, if several laws cannot be
harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the later enactment.
The later law is the latest expression of the legislative will.19
We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later
enactment, should be construed as laying down an exception to the
general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from
execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the
withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of the
respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted
directly to the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."
Petitioner further contends that the directive under the TPO to
segregate a portion of S/Sgt. Yahons retirement benefits was illegal
because said moneys remain as public funds, citing the case of
Pacific Products v. Ong.20 In that case, this Court sustained the CA
when it held that the garnishment of the amount of P10,500
payable to BML Trading and Supply while it was still in the
possession of the Bureau of Telecommunications was illegal and
therefore, null and void. The CA therein relied on the previous
rulings in Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion21 and
Avendano v. Alikpala, et al.22 wherein this Court declared null and
void the garnishment of the salaries of government employees.
Citing the two aforementioned cases, we thus declared in Pacific
Products:
A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in

the hands of public officers, although it may be due government
employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the
process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of
its sovereignty may not be sued in its own courts except by express
authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to
garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly.
Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as
they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the
Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in
garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still
another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every
consideration of public policy forbids it.23
We disagree.
Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer,"
which includes in its coverage the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahons
employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether
private or government.
It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child
support, is a support enforcement legislation.1wphi1In the United
States, provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act24 allow
garnishment of certain federal funds where the intended recipient
has failed to satisfy a legal obligation of child support. As these
provisions were designed "to avoid sovereign immunity problems"
and provide that "moneys payable by the Government to any
individual are subject to child support enforcement proceedings,"
the law is clearly intended to "create a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity so that state courts could issue valid orders directed
against Government agencies attaching funds in their
possession."25
This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional
and does not violate the equal protection clause. In Garcia v.
Drilon26 the issue of constitutionality was raised by a husband after
the latter failed to obtain an injunction from the CA to enjoin the
implementation of a protection order issued against him by the
RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial
distinctions which justify the classification under the law: the
unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
widespread bias and prejudice against women.
We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to the
purpose of the law, viz:
The distinction between men and women is germane to the
purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed
against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy,
as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State
values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full
respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to
protect the family and its members particularly women and children,
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence
committed against women and children in keeping with the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a
party.27
Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support
specifically address one form of violence committed against women
economic abuse.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a
woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to
the following:
1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim
from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral
grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial
resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the
conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. Destroying household property;
4. Controlling the victims' own money or properties or
solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.28
The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of
restoring the dignity of women who are victims of domestic violence
and provide them continued protection against threats to their
personal safety and security.
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure
that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies
necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This
serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to
accord the victim and any designated family or household member
safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from
committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the
victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of
minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."29
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated November 29, 2011 and Resolution dated March 9,
2012 of the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No.
02953-MIN are AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 182521

Appellee,
ERNESTO FRAGANTE y AYUDA, Promulgated:
Appellant. February 9, 2011
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
On appeal is the 28 September 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 01980, affirming with modification the 4 July 2003
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Paraaque City, Branch 260,
convicting appellant Ernesto Fragante y Ayuda of nine (9) counts of acts
of lasciviousness and one (1) count of rape, all committed against his
minor daughter, AAA.
The Facts
In ten (10) Informations filed on 14 July 1998, appellant was charged
with nine (9) counts of acts of lasciviousness and one (1) count of rape all
committed against his own minor daughter AAA. The Informations read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98-651 for Violation of Art. 336 of the

RPC, as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A.
7610, committed as follows:
That in between the period of April-May 1993, in Paraaque,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, above-named accused, by taking
advantage of his then ten (10) year old biological daughter,
[AAA], and with lewd designs, did then willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously fondled (sic) the breast of [AAA].
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 652 for Violation of Art. 336 of the
That sometime in May 1993, in Paraaque, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, by taking advantage of his then ten (10) year old
biological daughter, [AAA], and with lewd designs, did
then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fondled (sic) the
breasts of [AAA], touched (sic) and inserted (sic) his finger into
the vagina of said minor-victim.
That sometime in between the period commencing in June 1993

until August 1993, in Paraaque, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, by
taking advantage of his then ten (10) year old biological
daughter, [AAA], and with lewd designs, did then willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fondled (sic) the breasts of [AAA],
touched (sic) and inserted (sic) his finger into the vagina of said
minor-victim.
That sometime in September 1997, in Paraaque, Metro Manila

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, abovenamed accused, by taking advantage of his then fifteen (15) year
old biological daughter, [AAA], and with lewd designs, did
then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched (sic) and
sucked (sic) the breasts of [AAA], licked (sic) her vagina and
inserted (sic) his finger into the private part of said minorvictim.


That sometime in between the period of October to December

1993 at Shaolin Chinese Restaurant located
at Sucat Road, Paraaque, Metro Manila and within the
taking advantage of his then eleven (11) year old biological
unlawfully and feloniously fondled (sic) and sucked the breasts
of [AAA], and thereafter touched the vagina of said minorvictim.
That sometime in (sic) October 25, 1997, in Paraaque, Metro

Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above-named accused, by taking advantage of his then fifteen
(15) year old biological daughter, [AAA], and with lewd
designs, did then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched
(sic) and sucked (sic) the breasts of [AAA], licked (sic) her
vagina and inserted (sic) his finger into the private part of said
minor-victim.

That sometime in December 1993 at Shaolin Chinese Restaurant
located at Sucat Road, Paraaque, Metro Manila and within the
unlawfully and feloniously fondled (sic) and sucked the breasts
of [AAA], and thereafter touched the vagina of said minorvictim.
That sometime in between the period commencing in January
1994 to August 1994, in Paraaque, Metro Manila and within the
unlawfully and feloniously touched (sic) and sucked the breasts
of [AAA], licked (sic) her vagina and inserted (sic) his finger
into the private part of said minor-victim.
That sometime in between the period commencing in August
1994 until September 1995, in Paraaque, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, by taking advantage of his then twelve (12) year old
biological daughter, [AAA], and with lewd designs, did
then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched (sic) and
sucked (sic) the breasts of [AAA], licked (sic) her vagina and
inserted (sic) his finger into the private part of said minorvictim.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 660 for Violation of Article 335 of

the RPC, as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A.
That sometime in September 1995, in Paraaque, Metro Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above
named accused, by taking advantage of his then thirteen (13)
year old biological daughter [AAA], and with lewd designs, did
then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lie and had carnal
knowledge with the said minor victim, against her will.
The Court of Appeals narrated the facts as follows:

Ernesto A. Fragante (Ernesto hereafter) married CCC on
October 6, 1975, in Sta. Cruz Manila, and such marriage was
ratified on December 7, 1995 celebrated in San Sebastian Parish
Church. Thatunion, produced three offsprings. [AAA], the
victim herein, is their third child. She was born on August 23,
1982. x x x
Sometime in April 1993 to May 1993, three or four months
before her eleventh (11) birthday, [AAA] woke up one early
morning to prepare for the driving lessons which her father
Ernesto, promised to teach them that day. [AAA] was the first to
wake up. She was in her room when her father entered and lay
on her bed. He then asked [AAA] to lie beside him to which
[AAA] obeyed. While lying beside her, Ernesto was talking to
her about a lot of things, and as he talked he started to fondle her
breast and suck her nipples.
xxxx
The incident was repeated sometime between June 1993 and
August 1993. Ernesto told [AAA] to get inside his room, then he
would lock the door. Once inside the room, he would scold
[AAA] for reasons unknown to her. When she would start to cry,
her father would start to touch her breast, then he would suck
her nipples while he was rubbing her vagina.
On two occasions, between October 1993 and December 1993,
at Shaolin Chinese Restaurant located in Sucat, Paraaque, which
the Fragante family owned, there was a small back room used as
an office which later was converted into a room where they
could rest. [AAA] was told by her father to rest in that room and
once inside, while talking to her, he covered the windows
with manila paper. He lay down beside her in the folding bed.
He fondled her breast, squeezed them and then later inserted his
hand under her shirt as he pull it up and put his mouth on her
breast to suck it alternately. He started stroking her genitals with
her shorts on. She did not do anything as she was in shock at
that time.
x x x They later proceeded to the NBI, Taft Ave. Manila to

report the incidents and where [AAA] executed her complaintaffidavit. Her mother and siblings also executed their affidavits.
xxxx
During arraignment on April 26, 1999, the accused entered
separate pleas of Not Guilty to all the crimes charged.
Joint trial ensued thereafter.
In December 1993, [AAA] and her father bought food from

Jollibee. She was instructed to eat it at the back room of
their Shaolin Chinese Restaurant so that other employees would
not see it. After eating, Ernesto asked her to lie down in the
folding bed and he again lay down beside her and massaged her
breast and sucked her nipples while continuously rubbing her
vagina by inserting his hand inside her shorts.
Sometime in January 1994, around 10 o'clock in the evening,
while [AAA] was sleeping in another room, Ernesto entered her
room. He lay beside her, and started sucking her breast. He
removed her shorts and then touched her vagina. He then
inserted his finger inside her vagina.
In August-September 1994, she was around twelve (12)
years old, Ernesto molested her again inside his room, by
massaging her private parts and sucking her nipples while
continuously rubbing her vagina and afterwards inserting his
finger inside it.
In September 1995, at the age of thirteen (13), [AAA] was
raped by her father Ernesto. She was told to get inside his room
and was scolded by him before she was made to lie down in his
bed. Her shirt was removed, and her breast and vagina were
fondled by him. Thereafter, he sucked her nipples while
continuously touching her vagina. He removed her shorts and
panty, then spreaded her legs and inserted his penis in her
vagina. She struggled and begged him to remove his penis. She
said she could not recall the exact details of what her father was
doing. He stayed on top of her despite her pleas. x x x
Ernesto was not able to find time to molest [AAA] in
September 1995-1996, because he was hardly home and was
busy with his bookstore business in Visayas and Mindanao.
xxxx
In the evening of October 25, 1997, Irma, together with their
brother Marco accompanied their mother Gaudencia to a wake
of their mother's friend. [AAA] wanted to go with them but she
was left home alone with Ernesto who refused to allow [AAA]
to go with them. x x x
xxxx
Her father started massaging her breast and [AAA] removed his
hands and stood up but she was bitten and pushed towards the
bed. Her father strangled her and asked whether she preferred to
be strangled first and she answered no. He started touching her
private parts again and this time she continued warding off his
hands and when she heard their car entering their garage, she
told her father that her mother had arrive. That was the only time
she was allowed to leave but was stopped by her father and
warned not tell her mother what happened.
Prosecution presented the following witnesses: [AAA], BBB,

CCC, and Dr. Bernadette Madrid. The defense presented
Ernesto Fragante as the sole witness.7
The Ruling of the Trial Court

On 4 July 2003, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting appellant
for the crimes charged. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, after careful perusal of the evidence presented,

this Court finds as follows: for (sic)
Criminal Case No. 98-651 For Violation of Art. 336 of the RPC,
as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610 finds
the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion temporal of FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN
(15) YEARS SIX (6) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS.

Criminal Case No. 98-658 for Section 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610
finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to SIX
(6) YEARS.
Criminal Case No. 98-659 for Section 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610
finds the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND
imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to SIX
(6) YEARS.
Criminal Case No. 98-660 for RAPE this court finds the
accused ERNESTO AYUDA FRAGANTE GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and is hereby sentenced to DEATH.
He is ordered to pay the complainant P50,000.00 as civil
liability and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
1.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 98-651, 98-652, 98-653, 98-654, 98655, 98-656, 98-657, accused-appellant Ernesto A. Fragante is
hereby sentenced to suffer Indeterminate Penalty, the minimum
of which is fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal minimum and the maximum of which is seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium,
for acts of lasciviousness under Article III, Section 5 (b) of
Republic Act No. 7610, and is also ordered to pay [AAA] the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of acts
of lasciviousness;
2.
In pursuant with Section 31(f), Article XII, of Republic Act No.

7610, a FINE in the amount of Thirty Thousand (Php30,000.00)
Pesos for each count of the nine (9) counts of lascivious conduct
is hereby imposed;
3.
The penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. 98-658 and Criminal

Case No. 98-659 by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED
without modification;
4.
In Criminal Case No. 98-660, the penalty imposed is hereby

reduced to reclusion perpetua by virtue of R.A. No. 9346, which
prohibits the imposition of death penalty.
5.
In view of the jurisprudential trend, the amount of moral

damages for Criminal Case No. 98-660 is
hereby INCREASED to Seventy Five Thousand
(Php 75,000.00) Pesos and the civil indemnity is likewise
increased to Seventy Five Thousand (Php 75,000.00) and an
additional amount of Twenty Five Thousand (Php 25,000.00) as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming appellant's conviction for nine (9) counts of acts of
lasciviousness and one (1) count of rape.
SO ORDERED.
The Ruling of this Court
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the crimes charged. In upholding appellant's conviction, the Court of
Appeals gave credence to AAA's testimony narrating how appellant
sexually abused her repeatedly. The Court of Appeals junked appellant's
contentions that (1) AAA's testimony lacked specific details such as the
actual date of commission of the acts of lasciviousness, and was
inconsistent with respect to the charge of rape; (2) AAA was ill motivated
in filing the criminal complaints; (3) the charge of rape was
unsubstantiated by medical findings; and (4) the delay in reporting the
incidents to the proper authorities renders the charges dubious.
On 28 September 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,

of Paraaque City, Branch 260, dated July 4, 2003 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION as follows:
We sustain appellant's conviction for seven (7) counts of acts of

lasciviousness and one (1) count of rape. We acquit appellant for two (2)
counts of acts of lasciviousness on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Criminal Case No. 98-660 for Rape

Appellant contends that the Court of Appeals erred in convicting him for
the crime of rape since the prosecution failed to overthrow the
presumption of innocence. Appellant alleges that (1) AAA's testimony was
full of inconsistencies and improbabilities which cast serious doubts on the
truthfulness of her account; (2) the medical findings do not support the
charge of rape; (3) AAA's delayed reporting of the incident renders the
charges dubious; and (4) AAA and her mother harbored a grudge against
appellant.
We are not persuaded. The prosecution sufficiently established appellant's

guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed
by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, all the essential elements of

rape are present in this case. The evidence on record clearly proves that
appellant had carnal knowledge of his own minor daughter AAA.
We reject appellant's contention that AAA's testimony was full of
inconsistencies. On the contrary, AAA's testimony that she was raped by
appellant was very consistent and straightforward. Notably, appellant did
not point out the supposed inconsistencies, and proceeded in arguing that
his moral ascendancy over his daughter was insufficient to intimidate
AAA.
It must be stressed that the gravamen of rape is sexual congress with a
woman by force and without consent. In People v. Orillosa, we held that
actual force or intimidation need not be employed in incestuous rape of a
minor because the moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient
to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires. When a father
commits the odious crime of rape against his own daughter, his moral
ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and
intimidation. The absence of violence or offer of resistance would not
affect the outcome of the case because the overpowering and overbearing
moral influence of the father over his daughter takes the place of violence
and offer of resistance required in rape cases committed by an
accused who did not have blood relationship with the victim.
In this case, AAA's testimony clearly showed how appellant took
advantage of his relationship with and his moral ascendancy over his
minor daughter when he had carnal knowledge of her. As found by the
Court of Appeals, appellant instilled fear on AAA's mind every time he
sexually molested her, thus:
[AAA] also admitted that after accused-appellant has started
sexually molesting her until she was raped, she was so
frightened of him. In fact she could not tell her mother of her
ordeal, mindful of the serious threats on her life and of the chaos
it would cause their family.
We likewise find appellant's claim that the medical findings do not support
the charge of rape untenable. Aside from AAA's positive, straightforward,
and credible testimony, the prosecution presented the medical certificate
issued by Dr. Bernadette Madrid and the latter's testimony which
corroborate AAA's claim that appellant raped her.
The Court is not impressed with appellant's claim that AAAs failure to
immediately report the incidents to the proper authorities affected her

credibility. Delay could be attributed to the victim's tender age and the
appellant's threats. A rape victim's actions are oftentimes influenced by
fear, rather than reason. In incestuous rape, this fear is magnified because
the victim usually lives under the same roof as the perpetrator or is at any
rate subject to his dominance because of their blood relationship.
We also find appellant's imputation of ill-motive on the part of the victim,
including his wife and AAA's sister, in filing the criminal charges devoid
of merit. Suffice it to state that the resentment angle, even if true, does not
prove any ill motive on AAAs part to falsely accuse appellant of rape or
necessarily detract from her credibility as witness. Motives, such as those
arising from family feuds, resentment, or revenge, have not prevented the
Court from giving, if proper, full credence to the testimony of minor
complainants who remained consistent throughout their direct and crossexaminations.
For appellant's guilt for the crime of rape committed against his own
minor daughter AAA, we sustain the penalty
of reclusion perpetua imposed on appellant. While the Court of Appeals
correctly reduced the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua, the Court of
Appeals failed to indicate that the reduction of the penalty
to reclusion perpetua is without eligibility for parole in accordance with
Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 9346.
As regards appellant's civil liability, we affirm the award of moral
damages and civil indemnity, which are automatically granted without
need of proof or pleading, each in the sum ofP75,000. However, we
increase the award of exemplary damages from P25,000 to P30,000
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.
Criminal Case Nos. 98-651, 98-652, 98-653, 98-654,

98-655, 98-656, 98-657, 98-658,
and 98-659 for Acts of Lasciviousness
Appellant argues that the Court of Appeals erred in convicting him for
nine counts of acts of lasciviousness since the prosecution failed to
establish with particularity the date of the commission of the offense.
Appellant contends that AAA's testimony was a sweeping generalization
of the crimes committed. According to appellant, AAA's statement that the
said acts were allegedly committed so many times on certain occasions is
clearly inadequate and grossly insufficient to sustain a conviction.
We are not convinced.
Appellant was charged with violation of Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act
No. 7610. These provisions state:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit
any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under
any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article,
shall be punished by prision correccional.
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period

to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No.
3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the
penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period; x x x
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act
No. 7610 are as follows:
1.
The accused commits the act of sexual

intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2.
The said act is performed with a child

exploited in prostitution or subjected to
sexual abuse.
3.
The child, whether male or female, is below

18 years of age.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, all the elements of sexual

abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are present here.
First, appellant's repeated touching, fondling, and sucking of AAA's
breasts and inserting his finger into AAA's vagina with lewd designs
undoubtedly constitute lascivious conduct under Section 2(h) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610, to wit:
(h) Lascivious conduct means the intentional touching, either directly or
through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent
to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire
of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals
or public area of a person.
(a) Children refers [to] persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those
over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition;
Since all three elements of the crime were present, the conviction of
appellant for acts of lasciviousness was proper.
As to the alleged failure of the prosecution to establish with particularity
the date of the commission of the acts of lasciviousness, suffice it to state
that the date and time of the commission of the offense are not material
ingredients of such crime. Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 11. Time of the commission of the offense. It is not
necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise
time at which the offense was committed except when time is a
material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to
have been committed at any time as to the actual date at which
the offense was committed as the information or complaint will
permit.
In People v. Losano, the Court held:
Thus, as early as 1903, this Court has ruled that while the
complaint must allege a specific time and place when and where
the offense was committed, the proof need not correspond to this
allegation, unless the time and place is material and of the
essence of the offense as necessary ingredient in its description.
Evidence so presented is admissible and sufficient if it shows 1)
that the crime was committed at any time within the period of
the statute of limitations; and 2) before or after the time stated in
the complaint or indictment and before the action is commenced.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in debunking appellant's claim that
AAA's testimony was overly generalized and lacked specific details on
when appellant sexually abused the victim. The records are replete with
details on when and how appellant sexually abused her. AAA testified that
appellant habitually molested her whenever he had the opportunity to do
so, to wit:
Atty. Rosanna Elepao-Balauag:

How many times[,] because the witness answered that his father
was sexually abusing her.
Second, appellant, as a father having moral ascendancy over his daughter,

coerced AAA to engage in lascivious conduct, which is within the purview
of sexual abuse. In People v. Larin, we held:
Court:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
(a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion
or influence of any adult, syndicate or group.
Witness may answer.

Atty. Rosanna Elepao-Balauag:
Third, AAA is below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the
offense, based on her testimony which was corroborated by her Birth
Certificate presented during the trial. Section 3(a), Article I of Republic
Act No. 7610 provides:
How many times if you remember?
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -
xxxx
A: Many times.
Q: When was (sic) [did] the incident happened?
A:
Sa bahay po namin at madaling araw po iyon dahil nagpapaturo
kami ng driving
at ako po iyong unang nagising at sabi ko nga po magdriving na
turuan niya akong magmaneho at tapos po pinahiganiya ako sa t
abi nya at tapos po kinausap po niya ako at habang kinakausap n
iya ako, he started touching my private parts and later
on he sucked my nipple, mam.
Q: What else did he do?

A: That's all mam.
Q: And what happened after that?

A: He did you (sic) it again, mam.
xxxx
Q: What she did you to? [sic]
A: Ganoon pa rin po, he sucked my breast
at tapos po niyon, papasukin niya ako sa kanyang room at ilalock niya iyong pinto; minsan po naman, pagagalitan niya ako n
a walang kabagay bagay athindi ko naman po alam kung ano iyo
n; ganoon po lagi, hinawakan niya iyong breast, papagalitan ako,
iyon paulit ulit na lang po, mam.
considered aggravating. In that case, the Court considered relationship as

an aggravating circumstance since the informationsmentioned, and the
accused admitted, that the complainant is his daughter.
In the instant case, the informations expressly state that AAA is
appellants daughter, and appellant openly admitted this fact. Accordingly,
we modify the penalty imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 98-657 and 98-659.
Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 prescribes the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Since
there is an aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the
penalty shall be applied in its maximum period reclusion
perpetua. Besides, Section 31 of Republic Act No. 7610 expressly
provides that The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its
maximum period when the perpetrator is [a] x x x parent, x x x. In People
v. Montinola and People v. Sumingwa, where the accused is the biological
father of the minor victim, the Court appreciated the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of relationship and accordingly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus, appellant herein is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case Nos. 98-657 and 98659.
In Criminal Case Nos. 98-651, 98-653, 98-654, 98-655, and 98656, where AAA was still below 12 years old at the time of the
commission of the acts of lasciviousness, the imposable penalty
is reclusion temporal in its medium period in accordance with Section
5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. This provision specifically
states [t]hat the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period. Considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
relationship, as explained, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum
period. In People v. Velasquez, which involved a two year old child
sexually abused by her grandfather, the Court imposed the indeterminate
sentence of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 17
years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, appellant herein is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day
of reclusion temporal as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
Q: After he scolded you what happened next?
Q: And after that incident what transpired next?
Also, we modify the amount of moral damages and fine awarded by the
Court of Appeals. We reduce the amount of moral damages
from P50,000 to P15,000 and the amount of fine from P30,000 to P15,000
for each of the seven (7) counts of acts of lasciviousness. In addition, we
award civil indemnity in the amount of P20,000, and exemplary damages
in the sum of P15,000, in view of the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of relationship, for each of the seven (7) counts of acts of
lasciviousness.
A: Paulit ulit po niyang ginagawa, lagi po niya akong hinhahawa

kan ang breast ko at vagina and then nirarub po nang kamay niya.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 28 September 2007 Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01980
with MODIFICATIONS. We find appellant Ernesto Fragantey Ayuda:
A: Iyon pag umiiyak na po ako, uumpisahan po niyang hawakan

muli iyong mga private parts.
xxxx
However, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-652 and 98-658, we agree with the
Office of the Solicitor General, representing the People, that the
prosecution failed to prove appellant's guilt for acts of lasciviousness
beyond reasonable doubt. While AAA testified that appellant habitually
molested her, there was no specific evidence supporting the charge that
appellant committed acts of lasciviousness in May 1993 and September
1997, or on or about those dates. Hence, we find appellant not guilty for
two counts of acts of lasciviousness (Criminal Case Nos. 98-652 and 98658) on the ground of reasonable doubt.
As regards the other criminal cases for acts of lasciviousness, where
appellant's guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt, we affirm
appellant's conviction. In these cases, the alternative circumstance of
relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code should be
considered against appellant. In People v. Fetalino, the Court held that, in
crimes against chastity, like acts of lasciviousness, relationship is
1.
GUILTY of RAPE in Criminal Case No.

98-660. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole and ordered to pay AAAP75,000 as
civil indemnity, P75,000 as moral damages,
and P30,000 as exemplary damages.
2.
3.
4.
GUILTY of ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS in Criminal Case Nos.
98-657 and 98-659, with relationship as an
aggravating circumstance. He is sentenced
to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay
AAA (1) moral damages of P15,000; (2) a
fine of P15,000; (3) civil indemnity
of P20,000; and (4) exemplary damages
of P15,000 for each count.
GUILTY of ACTS OF
98-651, 98-653, 98-654, 98-655, and 98656, with relationship as an aggravating
circumstance. He is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day
of reclusion temporal as minimum to 17
years of reclusion temporal as maximum
and ordered to pay AAA (1) moral damages
of P15,000; (2) a fine of P15,000; (3) civil
indemnity of P20,000; and (4) exemplary
damages of P15,000 for each count.
NOT GUILTY of ACTS OF
98-652 and 98-658 on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
On January 14, 2005, appellant was charged with two counts of

rape. The first Information reads as follows:
That on or about the year 1999, in the
Municipality of x x x, Province of La Union,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means
of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have sexual
intercourse with his stepdaughter M, an eight (8) year
old minor, against her will, to her damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The second Information reads:
That on or about the year 2002, in the
Municipality of x x x, Province of La Union,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means
of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have sexual
intercourse with his stepdaughter M, a[n] eleven (11)
year old minor, against her will, to her damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. The two
cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
Associate Justice
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175830, Appellee,

- versus - Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
MANUEL BOY HERMOCILLA,
Appellant. Promulgated:
July 10, 2007
x
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For review is the Court of Appeals Decision [1] in CA-G.R. CR

No. 01294, which affirmed with modifications the judgment [2] rendered by
the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31, in Family Case
Nos. A-435 and A-436, convicting appellant Manuel Boy Hermocilla of
two counts of rape committed against M.
The records show that M was born out of wedlock on May 30,
1989 to S and L. After they separated, M stayed with her mother L who
subsequently cohabited with appellant. Sometime in 1999, while M was
preparing dinner, appellant suddenly grabbed and pulled her to the bed. He
ripped off her shorts and underwear and made her lie on the bed. After
undressing himself, appellant inserted his finger into Ms vagina then
penetrated her with his penis. M cried and begged appellant to stop.
Thereafter, appellant would insert his finger into Ms vagina
whenever her mother is out of the house. Such abuse temporarily ceased
when M lived with her father S inBaguio City. But when he left to work
abroad, M went back to live with her mother and appellant. The abuse
resumed and culminated in a second rape incident which took place
sometime in 2002. On said day, while M was cleaning their house,
appellant suddenly grabbed and pulled her towards the bed. He took off
her clothes, undressed himself and inserted his finger into her vagina.
Sometime in December 2004, appellant furiously hit M on the
head and chased her out of the house with a bolo because she resisted his
advances. M fled but appellant caught up with her and forced her to come
back to the house. When M went to school the next day, her cousin saw
her crying. M eventually broke down and revealed her ordeal.
M was subsequently examined by Dr. Donna C. Villanueva, a
Medical Officer at the Ilocos Training and Medical Center. The
examination showed the following:
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
xxxx
The trial court found Ms testimony to be credible:
Genitoperineal Area: triangular pubic hair

distribution; hymen circular with healed laceration at
3, 6 & 9 oclock position.
The accuseds defense was denial. He said

that the charges were made up because Ms relatives
did not like him. He was once suspected of selling the
fertilizers which he did not own. He could not have
done those charges against him because he loved his
stepdaughter, M.
Speculum Examination: cervix-smooth, (-)

erosions, (-) lesions, (-) bleeding.
Who should be believed?
Internal Examination: Introitus admits 2

fingers with ease; Cervix-firm, closed. Uterus-small,
no palpable adnexal mass/tenderness.
The Court believes the private complainant.

She could not have made these stories up. x x x
LABORATORY RESULTS:
When she was testifying she cried several
times. The Judge of this Court observed that her cries
were expressions of outrage, reminding her, when
being questioned by the lawyer, of those incidents that
her stepfather did to her. While she could not pinpoint
the exact dates, she could vividly remember the things
done to her.
xxxx
Gram stain: No spermatozoa seen.
x x x.
Appellant denied the charges against him and testified that
sometime in 2004 he was summoned by their barangay captain to answer
questions regarding a complaint lodged against him by M. When he
denied Ms accusations, appellant claimed that he was mauled by several
persons and was forcibly taken to the Police Station at Rosario, La Union
where he was incarcerated. Appellant claimed that he treated M like his
own daughter. He bought her clothes and shoes and attended to her other
needs.
On June 30, 2005, the trial court rendered judgment finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death for each count.
After his motion for reconsideration was denied, appellant
appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modifications the
decision of the trial court by reducing the penalty of death to reclusion
perpetua and ordering appellant to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, for each count of rape.
In this appeal, appellant assails Ms credibility claiming that her
failure to confide the alleged rape to her mother, father and grandmother
despite several opportunities to do so renders such accusations
doubtful. We find this contention untenable.
Time and again, we have held that when a woman, more so if a
minor, states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that rape was committed. For no woman, least of all a child,
would weave a tale of sexual assaults to her person, open herself to
examination of her private parts and later be subjected to public trial or
ridicule if she was not, in truth, a victim of rape and impelled to seek
justice for the wrong done to her.
Conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie
heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court because the trial judge
enjoys the peculiar advantage of observing directly and at first hand the
witnesses deportment and manner of testifying. He is, therefore, in a better
position to form accurate impressions and conclusions on the basis
thereof.
It is the finding of the Court that accused

Manuel Boy Hermocilla raped his stepdaughter. x x x
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court, to

wit:
The aforequoted testimony of the
complainant reveals that the same was marked by
spontaneity, honesty and sincerity. It is a cardinal rule
that when the testimony of the victim is simple and
straightforward, the same must be given full faith and
credit. We reiterate the rule that the accused could be
convicted solely on the basis of the victims testimony
if credible. Here, We see no reason to deviate from the
trial courts determination as to the credibility of
complainants testimony.[17]
Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and

conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted. No such facts or circumstances exist in the instant case.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found
appellant guilty of two counts of rape. In the rape incident committed in
1999, the prosecution proved that appellant had carnal knowledge of M by
inserting his penis into her vagina through force and intimidation. Under
Art. 266-B, in relation to Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, carnal
knowledge of a woman through force or intimidation shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in Family Case No. A-435.
The second incident committed in 2002 whereby appellant
inserted his fingers into Ms vagina likewise constituted rape through
sexual assault. In People v. Palma,[19] we held that the insertion of the
appellants finger into the victims vagina constituted the crime of rape
through sexual assault under Republic Act No. 8353 or The Anti-Rape
Law of 1997 which in part provides:
Art. 266-A. Rape; when and how committed.

- Rape is committed 1) By a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through
force,
threat
or
intimidation;
b) When the offended
party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious;
c) By
means
of
fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended
party is under twelve (12) years of
age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
Law, the penalty should be within the range of prision mayor or 10 years
and 1 day to 12 years as minimum, and 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As to the amount of damages, complainant is entitled in Family
Case No. A-435 to P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages for rape through sexual intercourse. In Family Case No. A-436,
M is entitled to P30,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral
damages for rape through sexual assault. [22] Civil indemnity is separate and
distinct from the award of moral damages which is automatically granted
in rape cases. Moral damages are additionally awarded without need of
pleading or proof of the basis thereof. This is because it is recognized that
the victims injury is concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the
odiousness of the crime to warrant per se the amount of moral damages.
[23]
In addition, we held in People v. Catubig,[24] that the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, such as Ms minority, entitles her to an award of
exemplary damages. The amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for
each count of rape is appropriate under the circumstances. [25]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that in Family Case No. A-435,
appellant Manuel Hermocilla is found guilty of rape through sexual
intercourse and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
and to pay M the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. In Family Case
No. A-436, appellant is found guilty of rape through sexual assault and is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor,
as minimum, up to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
pay M the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
2) By any person who, under any of the

circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis
into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person. (Emphasis supplied)
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Rape by sexual assault is punishable by reclusion temporal if

committed with any aggravating or qualifying circumstances. [20] The
Information in Family Case No. A-436 mentioned the victim as appellants
stepdaughter and an 11-year old minor. A stepdaughter is a daughter of
ones spouse by previous marriage, while a stepfather is the husband of
ones mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person
spoken of is the offspring. In the instant case, appellant and Ms mother
were never married. Hence, appellant is not Ms stepfather; vice-versa, M
is not appellants stepdaughter. Appellant is the common law spouse of Ms
mother. However, since this relationship was not specifically pleaded in
the information, it cannot be considered in the imposition of the proper
penalty.
On the other hand, the aggravating circumstance of minority
was specifically pleaded in the information and proved during
trial. Conformably with the ruling in People v. Esperanza,[21] when either
one of the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted
or lacking, that which is pleaded in the information and proved by the
evidence may be considered as an aggravating circumstance. As such, Ms
minority may be considered as an aggravating circumstance. However, it
may not serve to raise the penalty in Family Case No. A-435 because in
simple rape by sexual intercourse, the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua which is single and indivisible. In Family Case No. A-436,
however, the penalty for rape by sexual assault with any aggravating
circumstance is reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 172226,

Appellee, - versus - Chairperson, HERMINIGILDO
SENIERES, VELASCO, JR., JJ., Appellant,
P
rom
ulg
ate
d:
March 23, 2007
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On automatic review is the Decision [1] dated 6 December

2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6,
convicting Herminigildo Senieres of raping AAA [2] on two (2)
occasions. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Initiated by AAAs sworn statement, accused Senieres was

charged with two (2) counts of rape in the following
Informations, to wit:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 16691-R
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered

as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 16691-R, the Court

finds the accused Herm[e]nigildo Senieres
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of rape as charged in the
Information, defined and penalized under
Section 2, Par. 1 (a) and (d) of Republic Act
[No.] 8353 which amended Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify the
complainant [AAA] the sum of P100,000.00
as Moral Damages without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to
pay the costs.
The accused Herm[e]nigildo Senieres,
being a detention prisoner, is entitled to be
credited
4/5
of
his
preventive
imprisonment in the service of his sentence
in accordance with Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.
2. In Criminal Case No. 16692-R, the Court
finds the accused Herm[e]nigildo Senieres
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic)
the offense of rape committed on
December 17, 1998 as charged in the
Information, defined and penalized under
Sec. 2, Par. 2 of Republic Act [No.]
8353 and hereby sentences him, applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer
imprisonment ranging from four (4) years
two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as Minimum to ten (10) years
and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
Maximum, to indemnify the offended party
[AAA] the sum of P20,000.00 as Moral
Damages without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The accused Herm[e]nigildo Senieres,
being a detention prisoner, is entitled to be
credited
4/5
of
his
preventive
imprisonment in the service of his sentence
in accordance with Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.
The undersigned accuses HERM[E]NIGILDO

SENIERES [a.k.a.] EMING of the crime of
RAPE DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER R.A.
[No.] 8353, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22 nd day of November
1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then
and
there
willfully,
unlawfully
and
feloniously and by means of force and
intimidation lie down and have carnal
knowledge of the complainant [AAA], a
minor[,] 11 years of age, against her will
and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 16692-R
The undersigned accused HERM[E]NIGILDO

SENIERES [a.k.a.] EMING of the crime of
RAPE DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER R.A.
[No.] 8353, committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of December
1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then
and
there
willfully,
unlawfully
and
feloniously by means of force, threat or
intimidation, commit an act of sexual
assault upon the person of [AAA], a
minor[,] 11 years of age, by inserting his
penis into the anal orifice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment on 18 June 1999 for both cases,

Senieres with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea
of not guilty to the two (2) counts of rape. Joint trial on the
merits of the criminal cases ensued. The prosecution
presented as witnesses, the victim AAA, her aunt BBB and
Dr. Vladimir Villaseor, the physician who conducted an
examination on AAA.
AAA testified that on the night of 22 November 1998, she
fell asleep on the floor of the sala of her aunt CCCs house
at T. Alonzo Street, Baguio City. She awoke when she felt
the presence of someone beside her. When she opened her

eyes, she saw that it was Senieres, her uncle, who had
then started removing her shorts and underwear. She said,
No! but Senieres threatened to harm her younger sister if
she did not allow him to proceed. Next, Senieres turned her
body to face him. AAA clipped together her legs to resist
him but Senieres separated them using his feet. AAA
shouted but Senieres covered her mouth with her hands.
Senieres then inserted his penis into her vagina and made
push and pull movements. AAA cried in pain. AAA also felt
a mucous-like substance enter her vagina. After satisfying
himself, Senieres repeated his threat of harm to AAAs
sister and then went back to sleep at the sofa in the sala.
AAA put her panty and shorts back on and went back to
sleep still crying.
When AAA awakened the following day, Senieres was no
longer around. She, however, did not report the incident to
her aunt CCC or to anyone else as she was afraid that
Senieres would make good his threat to harm her younger
sister.
After the incident, AAA stayed at her godmothers house
which is a few houses away. On 16 December 1998, she
returned to her aunt CCCs house as she thought that
Senieres no longer stayed there.
On 17 December 1998, while AAA was watching TV,
Senieres arrived. In fright, AAA invited her male cousin
DDD to go to sleep already. She and DDD slept on the floor
facing each other. Again, she awoke when she felt Senieres
go down to the floor next to her. Then she felt him remove
her panty and shorts. AAA kicked Senieres feet but he
managed to remove her shorts and panty. AAA tried to
rouse DDD from sleep by elbowing him but he could not be
awakened. AAA was lying on her left side, facing DDD, with
her thighs bent forward and lower legs bent backwards.
Next, Senieres inserted his penis into her anus. She felt a
slippery substance and then Senieres pulled his penis out
of her anus. He went back to sleep at the sofa. Senieres
left the house the following morning.
Sometime after the incident, AAA left for her uncle EEEs
house, in a town somewhere in Benguet, in order to be
away from Senieres. On 28 January 1999, her aunt BBB
arrived and took AAA to another town in Benguet.
have only been caused by the insertion of a male genital

organ into the vagina. Dr. Villaseor issued a medico-legal
report containing his findings.
For his part, Senieres denied the charges against him. He
claimed that he could not have raped AAA on 22 November
1998 as he was in the house of a relative in San
CarlosHeights, Baguio City and
AAA
was
still
in Manila. On 17 December 1998, he was likewise at his
relatives house in San Carlos Heights, Baguio City.
The trial court favored AAAs version of the events and

convicted Senieres of the crimes charged, ruling in this
wise:
The Court cannot give credence to the

assertion of the accused that he could not
have raped AAA on the night of November
22, 1998 at x x x T. Alonzo Street, because
she was not yet inBaguio City at that time.
AAA categorically testified that she arrived
in Baguio on November 7, 1998 and since
then stayed at x x x T. Alonzo Street until
she was raped on the night of November
22, 1998. There is no reason to doubt her
testimony since, as already discussed
previously, it bears the earmarks of
credibility.
xxx
Likewise, the Court cannot give weight to
the claim of the accused that on the night
of November
22,
1998[,]
as
well
as December 17, 1998, he was at San
Carlos Heights, Baguio City with his relative
Mary Jane Tumbagahan and the latters
family.
In April 1999, AAA reported for the first time what had
happened to her aunt BBB. AAA was emboldened by the
courage of a child who had reported a similar incident of
sexual
abuse
against
her
father. AAA and her aunt BBB then traveled to Baguio City.
On 27
April
1999, AAA, accompanied by her aunt BBB, gave her sworn
statement to the Baguio City Police. On 28 April 1999, she
was examined by Dr. Vladimir Villaseor.
He failed to present his alleged

relative Mary Jane or any other member of
the latters family or any other person to
corroborate his claim. It should not be
difficult for him to secure their presence in
court if indeed he was with his relatives on
those nights or that he spent those nights
at San Carlos Heights.
Dr. Villaseor testified that he found a shallow, healed

laceration located at 7 oclock and 9 oclock positions and a
deep, healed laceration at 3 oclock position. He explained
that a shallow laceration is a laceration that does not
extend to the base of the hymen while a deep laceration is
a laceration which extends from the periphery to the base
of the hymen. He also discussed that a healed laceration is
one that is more than seven (7) days old. He stated that
based on their number and depth, the lacerations could
Besides, granting for the sake of argument

that he was at San Carlos Heights on the
nights of November 22 and December 17,
1998, it is not impossible for him to be at T.
Alonzo at the precise time the sexual acts
were committed. San Carlos Heights is just
a jeepney ride away from T. Alonzo
Street as
both
places
are
within Baguio City. Such that if accused
travels from San Carlos Heights to T. Alonzo

Street, or vi[c]e versa, it would only take
him 20 minutes, more or less.
The judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court for

automatic review. In a Resolution dated 27 September
2004 of the Court in G.R. Nos. 147286-87, the cases were
transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Courts
ruling in People v. Mateo.
In a Decision dated 20 December 2005, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. The appellate
court held that AAAs story bears the marks of a credible
testimony coming from a truthful witness and, therefore,
must be given full faith and credit. AAA described in a
positive, natural, sincere and spontaneous manner how she
was forcibly ravished by Senieres on 22 November and 17
December 1998. The appellate court noted that AAA could
not have narrated her ordeal so convincingly if it was not
true. Moreover, medical evidence on record corroborates
AAAs testimony.
The Court of Appeals also held that Senieres defenses of
denial and alibi have no leg to stand on. Senieres failed to
present convincing proof that he was present at some
other place about the time of the alleged crime and that he
was at such other place for so long a time that it was
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when
the crime was committed. Senieres likewise failed to
substantiate his claim that AAA was not in Baguio on 22
November 1998 and that she was neither at T. Alonzo
Street on 17 December 1998.
The Court of Appeals, however, modified the award of
moral damages to P50,000.00 for each count of rape and
imposed an additional amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for each count of rape.
In the Courts Resolution dated 3 July 2006, the parties were
required to submit their respective supplemental briefs.
Senieres,
through
the
Public
Attorneys
Office,
manifested that he will adopt all the issues and discussion
in his appellants brief dated 16 April 2002. The Office of
the Solicitor General likewise manifested that it will adopt
the discussions in its appellees brief dated 4 September
2002 as its supplemental brief. The case is again before us
for final disposition.
First, it should be reiterated that in a rape case, what is

most important is the credible testimony of the victim. A
medical examination and a medical certificate are merely
corroborative and are not indispensable to a prosecution
for rape. The court may convict the accused based solely
on the victims credible, natural and convincing testimony.
In this case, both the courts are in agreement that AAA was
candid, natural, forthright and unwavering in her testimony
that Senieres raped her on two occasions. AAAs credibility
is strengthened by the absence of evidence showing that
she had any ill-motive in testifying against Senieres.
Secondly, Dr. Villaseors report revealed that AAA suffered
shallow, healed lacerations at 7 and 9 oclock positions and
a deep healed laceration at 3 oclock position and that she
was in a non-virgin state. It should be noted that the
examination was made in April 1999, months after the
incidents of rape occurred in November and December
1998. The presence of such healed lacerations is consistent
with and corroborative of AAAs testimony that she had
indeed been raped by Senieres months before the date of
the examination. Hymenal lacerations, whether healed or
fresh, are the best evidence of forcible defloration. And
when the consistent and forthright testimony of a rape
victim is consistent with medical findings, there is sufficient
basis to warrant a conclusion that the essential requisites
of carnal knowledge have been established.
Thirdly, AAA categorically said that Senieres
inserted his penis into her vagina and that she felt pain
when he did. Dr. Villaseors testimony supports AAAs
assertion, to wit:
PROS. CENTENO:
Q Now, going back to the 7:00 oclock, 9:00

oclock and 3:00 oclock deep healed
lacerations which you found on the
hymen of the victim, Doctor, what
could have been the possible cause
of
these 7:00
oclock, 9:00
oclock and 3:00 oclock lacerations?
A This is caused by [the] insertion of a
foreign object or instrument, sir.
After a careful and meticulous review of the records of the

case, the Court finds no reason to overturn the findings of
fact and conclusions commonly reached by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. The Court affirms Senieres
conviction.
Q Now, what would be the possible foreign

object or instrument which could have
been inserted in the vagina of the victim
which could have caused these kinds of
laceration?
Senieres contends that no rape occurred on 22 November

1998 as AAAs injuries could have been sustained even
before said date. He also maintains that AAAs injuries
could have been caused only by a finger as it was not
established that what was inserted inside AAAs vagina was
Senieres penis. If at all, he claims he should only be held
liable for the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
A Possible instruments like a fully erect

male genital organ, finger, or any
blunt object that is inserted into
the genital organ, sir.
Senieres contentions are bereft of merit.
Q Now, in your examination as a medicolegal officer of the Philippine

National Police, Doctor, what would
be the most possible foreign object
that would cause [these kinds] of
lacerations?
A The [sic] fully erect male genital organ,
sir.
Q Now, why do you say that the most
possible foreign object which could
have cause [these kinds] of
lacerations would be a fully erect
male genital organ?
A Considering, sir, that there were three
lacerations and there was a
laceration that was considered
deep, that may be caused only by
the insertion of a male organ, sir.
AAA likewise clearly testified that Senieres inserted
his penis into her anus, to wit:
Q And after your uncle Eming was able to
remove your shorts and panty,
what happened next?
A Itudtodok na diay buto na diay ubet
ko (He was inserting his penis into
my anus).
It may be well to point out that the trial court found

AAAs testimony to be truthful, viz.:
There is no reason to doubt [AAAs]
testimony. She was candid, natural,
forthright and unwavering. In short, her
testimony bears the earmarks of credibility.
Further
strengthening
[AAAs]
credibility is her lack of ulterior motive
against the accused and the absolute
absence of evidence that even remotely
suggested that she could have been
actuated by ill motive. It is settled that
where there is no evidence indicating that
the principal witness for the prosecution
was actuated by improper motive, the
presumption is that she was not so
actuated and her testimony is entitled to
full faith and credit.
It is a settled principle that the trial courts evaluation of the

credibility of witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to
the highest respect because it is more competent to so
conclude, having had the opportunity to observe the
witnesses demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the
manner in which they gave their testimony. Unless the trial
judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and

value which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case, his assessment on credibility must be respected.
AAAs alleged act of casually putting on her
underwear after the rape and her failure to immediately
report the two (2) incidents of rape do not vitiate the
credibility of her account. The Court has repeatedly
observed that no standard form of behavior can be
anticipated of a rape victim following her defilement,
particularly by a child who could not be expected to fully
comprehend the ways of an adult. People react differently
to emotional stress and rape victims are no different from
them.
Moreover, long silence and delay in reporting the crime of
rape has not always been construed as an indication of a
false accusation. The principle applies with greater force
where, as in this case, AAA was only 11 years old and was,
in all likelihood, susceptible to intimidation and threats of
physical harm especially from a close relative.
Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution,
Senieres merely interposed the defenses of denial and
alibi. He claimed that on both occasions, he was
somewhere else and could not have been at the scene of
the crime.
Having been positively and unmistakably identified by AAA
as her rapist, Senieres weak defenses of denial and alibi
cannot prosper. The settled jurisprudence is that
categorical and consistent positive identification, absent
any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying thereon, prevails over the defenses of denial and
alibi which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
proof, as in the cases at bar, constitute self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law.
Alibi, like denial, is also inherently weak and easily
fabricated. For this defense to justify an acquittal, the
following must be established: the presence of the
appellant in another place at the time of the commission of
the offense and the physical impossibility for him to be at
the scene of the crime. These requisites have not been
met. Senieres claimed to be at a relatives house on both
occasions of rape. Considering that this relatives house is a
jeepney ride away from the house where the two (2)
incidents of rape were committed, it would have still been
physically possible for him to be present at the scene of
the crimes at the time of their consummation.
In sum, the guilt of Senieres was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court therefore affirms his
conviction for two (2) counts of rape in Criminal Case Nos.
16691-R and 16692-R.
With respect to Senieres civil liability, the Court affirms the
award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages in favor of AAA for being a victim of simple
statutory rape. However, the award of P50,000.00 civil
indemnity
and P50,000.00 moral damages adjudged by the appellate
court for the crime of rape by sexual assault are excessive
and should be reduced. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence, AAA is entitled to an award of P25,000.00
civil indemnity andP25,000.00 moral damages for being a

victim of rape by sexual assault.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 20 December
2005 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01448 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case
No. 16691-R, appellant HERMENIGILDO SENIERES is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. In Criminal
Case No. 16692-R, appellant HERMENIGILDO SENIERES is
sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from four (4)
years two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay AAA the
amounts ofP25,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00
as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
That sometime in the month of June to the

middle of August, [sic] 1993, when
the aforenamed [AAA] was still 10 or 11
years old, in the Municipality of Rosario,
Province of La Union, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by using force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the aforenamed offended girl
and against her will and without her
consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to both
charges. Trial promptly ensued thereafter. The prosecution
presented the following witnesses: (1) AAA, the minor
victim; (2) BBB, mother of the victim; and (3)
Dr. Elflida Bautista,
Medico-Legal
Officer
II
of
the Doa Gregoria Memorial Hospital, Agoo, La Union. The
prosecution sought to establish the following facts:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 170840, AAA is the natural child of BBB, born on 20 October
Appellee, vs. GREGORIO CARPIO @ GORIO, Appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
For review before the court is the Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals affirming with modification the Judgment [2] dated 6
August 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) [3]Branch 32,
of Agoo, La Union, finding appellant
Gregorio Carpio @ Gorio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two counts of the crime of statutory rape and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each
case.
On 4 March 1994, appellant was charged with two counts
of rape in two (2) separate Informations filed by
2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rogelio C. Hipol, the
texts of which read:
Criminal Case No. A-2758
That sometime in the year 1991, when
the aforenamed [AAA] was still 9 years old,
in the Municipality of Rosario, Province of La
Union,
Philippines,
and
within
the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by using force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the aforenamed offended girl
against her will and without her consent, to
her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. A-2759
1982. At the time of her pregnancy and after giving birth,

BBB stayed with her aunt Gloria Carpio and the latters
husband Gregorio, appellant herein. The Carpio spouses
wanted to adopt AAA, but BBB did not consent to such.
When she was capacitated to return to work, BBB
entrusted her child to the care of her mother CCC, and not
the Carpio spouses.
The sexual assault on AAA began sometime in 1991, when
the child was nine (9) years old and a Grade 2 pupil
at Damortis Elementary School in Nagtagaan, Rosario, La
Union. She was living with her grandmother CCC
in Nagtagaan, about 25 meters away from the house of
appellant. She lived there and not with her mother
because Nagtagaan was nearer her school.
Around after lunch on the day she was raped, the appellant
summoned AAA from her home to remove his earwax. He
brought her to a nipa hut, about only six (6) meters away
from his house. After removing the earwax of appellant, he
brought her to the room of his house. The appellant locked
the door, lay the victim on the bed and undressed her.
Thereafter, he removed her panties and forcibly inserted
his finger and penis in her vagina. The victim cried in pain,
but every time she would cry out Mama, the appellant
would spank or pinch or slap her.
When the appellant had finished ravishing the victim, he
dragged her to the bathroom to perform fellatio on him.
AAA refused. She was later allowed to go home, but not
before the accused threatened her to keep silent about
what had happened. When AAA went home, she did not
report the incident to her grandmother or to anyone else.
According to AAA, the abuse continued until 1993.
In the three (3) years that AAA was repeatedly raped by
the appellant, she never told anyone of her ordeal.
According to AAA, the rape would always occur after lunch,
when the appellants wife and children were not
around. She was afraid to tell her mother out of fear that
she might be castigated or reprimanded.
On 25
December
1993,
BBB
invited Julieta Flores, a kumadre and
neighbor
in Nagtagaan, to join them for Christmas celebrations in
their house in Agoo. On the same day, AAA was with CCC
in Nagtagaan for festivities thereat. It was on this occasion
that BBB learned from Julieta Flores the perfidious acts
committed by the appellant. Flores told her that sometime
a few years back, she had seen appellant drag AAA to a
dark place behind his house. Although it was almost dusk,
she could see that appellant kissing AAA. When she saw
them in that position, she made a coughing sound which
prompted the appellant to look back and bring AAA to the
front of his house.
BBB was unnerved by her talk with her kumadre. Thus,
on 27 December 1993, she went to Nagtagaan to see her
daughter. When she asked her daughter about what she
had heard, it was then that AAA broke down and told her
mother about what appellant had been doing to her.
The following day, on 28 December 1993, BBB took AAA to
the Doa Gregoria Memorial Hospital. The
medical
examination
conducted
on
AAA
revealed
that
AAAsgenetalia bore
reddish
discoloration,
with
old hymenal lacerations at 9 and 3:00 oclock positions.
Dr. Elflida Bautista (Dr. Bautista), who examined AAA,
testified that she examined AAA when the child was just
eleven (11) years old and found old lacerations of the
hymen which could have been obtained two (2) months to
two (2) years prior to the examination. Dr. Bautista opined
that the two lacerations she found on the hymen of AAA
are not normal to an 11-year old child whose hymen should
still be intact.
In his defense, appellant, on the other hand, unsurprisingly
espoused an altogether different scenario. He presented
the following witnesses to bolster his claims: (1) DDD,
great-grandmother of AAA and mother-in-law of the
appellant;
(2) Cipriano Lagao,
teacher
at Damortis Elementary School; (3) Gloria Carpio, wife of
appellant and half-sister of CCC; (4) Lydia Mapalo, friend of
appellant; (5) Bartolome De Mesa, owner of a cockpit
in Aringay, La Union; (6) Santiago Reyes, manager of a
cockpit in Sto. Tomas, La Union; and (7) EEE, sister of BBB.
Appellant likewise testified on his behalf.
The defense of appellant consisted of denial and alibi. He
asserted that in 1991, AAA was staying in the house of
Gloria Dumo, sister of BBB, and the formers husband
AlfredoDumo, in Damortis, Sto. Tomas, La Union. He further
maintained that AAA stayed with the Dumo couple from
the time she was in Grade 1 until Grade 4. Appellant
denied that he raped AAA in 1991 in their nipa hut and
house in Nagtagaan.
Appellant
endeavored
to
prove
that
he
was
a sentenciador in four (4) cockpits within the La Union
area, presenting several certifications to that effect. He
explained that he would report for work between 9
oclock and 9:30 in the morning and would leave work at 5
oclock in the afternoon. Therefore, although AAA would
frequently visit his house from 1991 to 1993 to play with
his daughter, he was never home or that he would not talk

to her and leave the house. His duty at the cockpits would
be from Thursday to Sunday. On Mondays to Wednesdays,
the appellant claims to have been in the house of Gregorio
and witness Lydia Mapalo where they played mahjong. This
was corroborated by the testimony of appellants wife,
Gloria Carpio, who averred that whenever she would see
AAA, her husband would either be playing mahjong or
working at the cockpit. Moreover, although she was
a barangay official, her work did not require her to be
constantly present at the barangay hall. Thus, she would
be home everyday to care for the house and her small
child.
Appellant theorizes that the charges against him might
have been propelled by the quarrel between the victims
mother and his wife. This alleged quarrel happened more
than a decade past, sometime in 1980, with BBB
purportedly uttering the words, I will make an accusation
against your husband.
Appellant
further
implicates
another
relative,
Alfredo Dumo, as the possible perpetrator of the rapes
imputed to him. Alfredo Dumo is the husband of BBBs
sister, and an uncle by affinity of AAA. Appellant claims
that after he was apprehended and detained in the
provincial jail of San Fernando, La Union, he was visited by
his mother-in-law, DDD, who then told him that it
was Dumo who had raped AAA. This claim was attested to
by DDD in her testimony before the trial court. She
narrated that after she was hospitalized, she stayed in the
house of CCC for three (3) months in 1993. During one of
her stays in the house of CCC, at around 12 oclock in the
evening, she witnessed Alfredo Dumo, in his briefs,
bending and walking towards AAA, who was asleep in
the sala of the house with CCC and the formers cousin.
Allegedly, Alfredo went under AAAs blanket, on top of the
victim and started the push and pull movement.
Notwithstanding, the trial court found appellant guilty of
rape on both counts and sentenced him in each case
to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the victim for damages
in the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay costs of the
proceedings.
Conformably with this Courts decision in People v.
Mateo, appellants appeal by way of automatic review was
transferred to the Court of Appeals. On 17 October 2005,
the appellate court rendered its decision affirming the
appellants conviction, but with modification as to damages
awarded to the private complainant. The dispositive
portion of the said decision states:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, in Criminal
Case Nos. A-2758 and A-2759, finding
accused-appellant
Gregorio Carpio guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
statutory rape and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each
case
is
hereby
AFFIRMED
with
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is
ordered
to
pay P50,000.00
as
civil
indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral
damages in each case.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant maintains that the court a quo gravely erred: (1)
in giving weight and credence to the incredible and
inconsistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses; and
(2) in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
charged despite the fact that his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
In the Appellants Brief, appellant reiterates his innocence
of the crimes charged. He argues that in rape cases, the
victims testimony must be clear, convincing and free from
material contradictions. Contrariwise, appellant maintains
that private complainants testimony lacks elements of
truthfulness.
record. For generally, the evaluation of the credibility of

witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best
undertaken by trial courts, because of their unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor,
conduct
and
attitude,
especially
under
crossexamination. In this case, we find no cogent reason to
depart from this settled rule. The evidence fully sustains
the trial courts findings and conclusions.
AAA was all of nine (9) years old when her sufferings
began. It is ludicrous to believe that a child of such tender
years would concoct such grave accusations against her
granduncle if the same were not true. Even more, it is
preposterous to imagine that a child of her age would
already have such intimate knowledge of the sexual acts
she described in her testimony, with such clarity and
coherence, unless the same were borne of personal
experience.
Particularly, appellant points out that AAAs recollection of

her ordeal in the hands of the accused-appellant and with
her uncle Alfredo Dumo is very uniform and without
difference in the way the alleged acts were committed. He
underscores the fact that the crimes were alleged in
the Informations to have been committed sometime in the
year 1991 and sometime in the month of June to the
middle of August 1993, yet private complainant could not
even remember the precise dates when the dastardly acts
were committed.
During direct examination, AAA recounted the crime

against her in particular detail, and with obvious distress
testified that:
Moreover, appellant asserts that while AAA readily

revealed to her mother that appellant allegedly raped her,
she was afraid to reveal her same experience with
Alfredo Dumo.
A He called for me to remove his earwax

from his ear and after that he
brought me to their house.
xxxx
Q When you were still in Grade 4[,] what did
the accused Gregorio Carpio do to
you?
ATTY. RIVERA:
It is apparent that appellant advocates that the actual
violator of AAA was not himself, but Alfredo Dumo. He finds
it significant to point out that his wife and Alfredos wife are
both called Glory. Appellant seeks to cast doubt on the
credibility
of
the
alleged
eyewitness
account
of Julieta Flores because in her testimony, BBB confirmed
that the exact words said to her by the former was that she
saw AAA and the husband of Glory behind the house. He
likewise capitalizes on the failure of the prosecution to
put JulietaFlores on the witness stand.
May we make of record that the witness is

crying.
FISCAL:
Q Where were you at that instance when he
called for you to clean his earwax?
A At our house.
Any review of a rape case begins with the settled reality

that accusing a person of this crime can be done with
facility. Thus, the testimony of the complainant must
always be scrutinized with great caution. It may not be
easy for her to prove the commission of rape; yet it is even
more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove
his guilt. This principle must be viewed in relation to that
which holds that the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits; it cannot draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
After a judicious and painstaking study of the arguments of
the parties and of the records a quo, we reach the
inescapable conclusion that the prosecution has effectively
established its case and as thus, appellants contentions
deserve scant consideration.
Findings of facts of trial courts carry great weight and will
not be disturbed on appeal unless shown to be contrary to
facts or circumstances of weight and substance in the
Q [AAA] are [sic] you able to continue

testifying now because you are
crying?
A Yes, sir.
Q And to what particular place did the
accused bring you?
A To their house.
Q By the way, when the accused came to
your house to call for you to clean
his earwax[,] who were your
companions?
A My grandmother.
Q And what was the comment of your

grandmother when the accused
called for you to clean his earwax?
Q When you came from the hut going to the

house of the accused[,] were there
any persons inside the house?
A My
A None, sir.
grandmother
clothes.
was
then
washing
xxxx
Q Did the accused ask permission from your
grandmother so that you would go
with the accused to clean his
earwax?
A No, sir.
Q And what did you answer Gorio when he
was calling for you to clean his
earwax?
COURT:
Q Was there a bed inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did he lay you down on the bed?
A Yes, sir.
A The first time he called for me I went.

Q And he brought you to their house?
A Yes, sir at (sic) their hut.
Q That hut or kubo[,] how far is it from
the accuseds house?
A It is very near.
Q Again, with your seat now as a point of
reference[,] will you please look
outside and point to any object to
indicate the house of the accused,
will you please point outside where
the hut is?
Q When Gorio undressed you[,] what else

did he do[?] [D]id he remove his
clothes?
A He removed his pants and then he did the
push and pumping.
Q About you [sic] when he did the push and
pumping were you lying on the bed?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where is [sic] Gorio[?] [W]here was he?
A I was lying and he was on top of me.
Q Did you see his penis?
A Very near. (Witness pointing to a distance

of around 6 meters.)
Q By the way [AAA], in proceeding to that
hut[,] could you pass by the house
of the accused?
A No, sir you must have to pass first the
hut.
A Yes, sir.
Q What other part of your body did he
touch?
A He even touched my breast.
Q Did he kiss your breast?
Q What did the accused do to you when he

brought you inside the nipa hut?
A No, sir.
A When
Q About you [sic] did he kiss your lips, your

face or any part of your body?
I had already removed the

earwax[,] he took me to their room
and undressed me and removed my
panty and forcibly inserted his
finger as well as his penis.
A Yes, sir.
Q Where what part of your body?
Q That room which you mentioned[,] is that

the room of the hut or house?
A Here on my lips.
A The room of their house.
Q Where else?
A On my lips only.
FISCAL:
Q You said that before the accused inserted
his penis he first inserted his finger
into your vagina is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Which finger did he use?
A His right thumb.
Q After the accused had inserted his right

thumb inside your vagina[,] what
else did he do?
A After that he forcibly inserted his penis
into my vagina and dragged me into
their bathroom and wanted me to
suck his penis but I refused to do so.
Q Before the accused actually brought you
inside the bathroom[,] was he able
to insert his penis inside your
vagina?
Q What did you feel when he was inserting

his finger inside your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
A It is (sic) painful (naapges).
Q Was his penis then erect?
Q Did you shout?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q And what did you feel when the accused

inserted his erect penis inside your
vagina?
Q By the way, how old are (sic) you when

you were in Grade 4?
A It
A Nine (9) years old.
Q In spite of the fact because (sic) of pain
did the accused insist on inserting
his finger inside your vagina?
is
[sic]
painful
and
(naapges and nasakit).
hurting
xxxx
Q Did you actually see the erect penis of
the accused?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Was he able to insert his finger inside
your vagina?
Q And up to what extent was his penis

inserted into your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q And according to you you felt pain?
A Yes, sir.
Q About what time of the day was it when
the accused brought you inside that
room of their house?
A I did not notice or did not see what (sic) I

know he was able to insert it.
Q And did you shout when the accused
inserted his erect penis inside your
vagina?
A When I said Mama, he will (sic) spank me
and pinch me or slap me.
A After lunch.
Q You said that the accused inserted his
right thumb inside your vagina was
the
accused
able
to
insert
the entirement of his finger?
A Yes, sir.
Q How long was the accused able to insert
his right thumb inside your vagina?
Q And were you then crying when the

accused was then inserting his erect
penis?
A Yes, sir.
Q In spite of your crying did the accused
still persist on inserting his erect
penis inside your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
A For quite a long time.

xx
xx
Q How far is the bathroom from the room

where he took you?
Q When you arrived home

grandmother there?
was
your
A Very near, a distance of 6 meters.
A Yes, sir.
Q When the accused took you inside the

bathroom you are [sic] still naked?
Q Did you report to her what happened?

A No, sir because I was afraid.
A I was already dressed up.

Q Afraid of whom?
Q About [sic] the accused did he put on his
pants?
A I was afraid to tell because of the

threatening words.
A He was already on his pants.

Q Of whom?
Q Did you say that he brought you to the
bathroom so he could put his penis
inside your mouth?
A Of Gregorio Carpio.
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you also report what happened to

your mother [BBB]?
Q Was he able to put his penis on (sic) your

mouth?
A No, sir. [I]t was a certain Kumadre of hers

who told her.
A No, sir, I did not suck it.
Q Do
you
know
the
name
that kumadre of your mother?
of
FISCAL:
A Julieta.
Q When the accused brought you inside
that bathroom did he lock the room?
Q What is her surname?
A Yes, sir.
A Munar.
xx
xx
FISCAL:
Q This Gregorio Carpio alias Gorio[,] will you
be able to identify him?
xxxx
Q After that first incident[,] [AAA][,] did the
accused do it to you again for the
second time when you were still in
Grade 4?
A Yes, sir[.] [H]e did it again.
A Yes, sir.
xx
Q If Gregorio Carpio alias Gorio is inside the
courtroom[,] will you please point to
him?
A That one[,] sir. (Witness pointing to the
accused who is now seated inside
the courtroom and when asked his
name
he
answered
Gregorio Carpio.)
Q By the way, when you refused to suck the
penis inside the bathroom what
happened next?
A He told me to go home and he also said
do not ever tell your Mama about
this and told this in a very
threatening manner.
xx
Q Can you recall for how many times?
A I cannot count how many times but it was
for many times.
Q In those succeeding times[,] where did
the accused insert his penis inside
your vagina?
A There at their house.
Q On those other occasion [sic] where were
the wife and the 3 children of the
accused?
A They went somewhere else.
A Yes, sir[.] [T]hat was in 1991 and 1992

when I was still in Grade 4.
Q Did you report also what happened on

those
occasions
to
your
grandmother?
Q About the time when you were in Grade 5

what was the date?
A I did not tell it to anybody.
A In 1993.
Q Why not?
Q That was last year is it not?
A Because I was afraid.
A Yes, sir.
Q Let us go to the time when you were

already in Grade 5, where were you
residing when you were in Grade 5?
x
x
A My mother took me here in Agoo.
x
x
Q Before you were brought by your mother

to Agoo when [you were] in Grade
5[,] did the accused again did (sic)
to you again when you were still in
Grade 4?
Q Just for the record when you were already

in Grade 5 on those other occasions
when the accused did it to you what
does it exactly mean?
A Yes, sir.
A The same thing.
Q About for how many times did the

accused do that again to you when
you were in Grade 5?
Q You mean to say he inserted his penis

inside your vagina?
A For many times more.
A Yes, sir.
In its decision, the trial court made the following
telling observations of private complainant:
Q Can you recall how many times did (sic)

the accused insert his penis inside
your vagina when you were already
in Grade 5?
A For many times more.
Q In what place did the accused do that to
you?
A There in their room of their house.
x
x
x x x x [T]he Honorable Court observed the

deportment
and
demeanor
of
the
complainant as she testified in Court. The
minor look[ed] very young at fourteen
years. She was of tender age, fragile and
innocent in looks. She is a typical Filipina
girl, shy and demure. She spoke in a soft
but audible voice. Being in 5th grade[,] she
was able to to [sic] answer all questions
thrown to her in an intelligent manner. She
answers in a clear, positive and straight
forward manner, She did not look scared
although she cried several times in the
course of her testimony.
x
xxxx
x
COURT:
Q Do
you remember the date when

the kumadre of
your
mother
saw Gorio Carpio[,] the accused[,]
drag you at (sic) the back of their
house?
The Honorable Court finds the victim to

have testified in a clear, straightforward
and convincing manner. Her testimony is
credible. The Honorable Court finds nothing
extraordinary about it x xx x.
Having reviewed the testimonies adduced by the
prosecution and the recounting of events by the victim
herself, the Court finds that indeed the crimes as charged
have been committed against AAA. AAA withstood the
difficulties of not only her direct examination, but the rigors
of cross-examination by the defense as well. Although at

times having broken down and cried, AAA nonetheless
managed to give an unambiguous, categorical and
forthright testimony. Her apparent vulnerability from the
recent traumatic events in her life only serve to reinforce
the strength and plausibility of her allegations.
We have no reason to believe that AAA was motivated by
any other reason than to seek justice and vindication for
the wrong done against her. As the Court of Appeals aptly
pointed out, the revelation of an eleven year-old child
whose chastity was abused deserves full credit as her
willingness to face police investigation and to undergo the
trouble of humiliation of a public trial is eloquent testimony
of the truthfulness of her complaint.
Moreover, the medical certificate and testimony of Dr.
Bautista corroborate AAAs allegations of rape. Dr. Bautista
found two old hymenal lacerations at 9 oclock and 3
oclockpositions in her examination of AAA. The rupture of
AAAs hymen, she explained, was caused by the insertion of
a hard object, possibly an erect human penis.
Appellant discredits the private complainants testimony as
replete with inconsistencies and he calls attention to AAAs
failure to remember the dates on which she claimed to
have been raped by appellant. To these, the Court has
repeatedly held that it is natural for inconsistencies to
creep into the testimony of a rape victim who is of tender
age. Courts expect minor inconsistencies when a childvictim narrates the details of a harrowing experience like
rape. Inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony do not
impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer
to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the
commission of rape. It should be pointed out that victims of
rape hardly retain in their memory the dates, number of
times and manner they were violated, and it is for this
reason that the exact date of the commission of the rape is
not an essential element of the crime. If nothing more,
these minor inconsistencies in fact are badges of
candidness and naturalness on the part of the witness.
The inconsistencies, if any, in AAAs testimony are minor
details. They are too inconsequential and immaterial to
affect the heart of the issue. These lapses do not detract
from the overwhelming testimony of the prosecution
witnesses who positively identified the malefactor. What is
material is that all the elements of statutory rape have
been properly alleged and adequately proved in this case.
In statutory rape, only two elements need to be
established: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of
the offended party; and (2) that the offended party was
below twelve (12) years of age at the time of the sexual
assault. Force or intimidation, not being an essential
element of the crime, need not be proven.
Appellant avers that AAAs recollection of her ordeal in his
hands and with Alfredo Dumo was very uniform. Thus, he
asserts that this engenders the suspicion that AAAs
testimony was coached, rehearsed or contrived.
The Court finds no reason to reverse the assessment of the
trial court that private complainant is a trustworthy witness
and that the crimes as alleged have satisfactorily been
proved. It must be stressed that the allegation that
Alfredo Dumo raped private complainant is independent of
the allegations against appellant. Indeed, while it appears

that
testimonies
were
introduced
in
trial
to
demonstrate Dumos culpability for raping AAA, the claim
that another person is also responsible for other dastardly
acts does not negate the commission of rape by appellant
when this has been demonstrated in vivid detail by private
complainant herself. The preparations made by BBB and
counsel
to
file
complaints
for
rape
against
Alfredo Dumo highlight the autonomy of the charge of rape
against the separate culprits.
Moreover, AAAs unequivocal recounting of her horrific
experiences by both men vastly differ in circumstances. For
example, appellant was alleged to have raped AAA in the
daytime and in his home when his family was out.
Furthermore, AAA could no longer count the multitude of
times she was sexually abused by appellant. On the other
hand, the alleged rapes by Dumo were purported to have
been done at night, with relatives within the immediate
surroundings of the scene of the crime, and
after Dumo supposedly drank with CCC until the latter was
intoxicated, in order to facilitate the rape. Dumo allegedly
raped AAA on eight (8) weekends, both on Saturdays and
on Sundays.
Thus, appellant has miserably failed to demonstrate that
AAA is confused by her circumstances. Conversely, AAA
has in fact shown a clear-headed remembrance of her
sufferings from each of her offenders.
It is of no moment that as appellant puts it, private
complainant readily revealed to her mother that the
accused-appellant allegedly raped her, [yet] she was afraid
to reveal her same experience with Alfredo Dumo. Contrary
to his assertions, the records amply show that private
complainant has had the tendency to carry the burden of
her ordeals by herself. AAA was simply forced by
circumstances to divulge her experiences when confronted
by her mother, in the case of appellant, and when
testifying in court, in the case of Alfredo Dumo.
In the same manner, the attempt to discredit the credibility
of the eyewitness account as told to BBB by her kumadre is
without merit. Albeit BBB admits that appellant was only
referred to as the husband of Glory and although both
appellants and Alfredo Dumos wives are named Glory, the
circumstances of time and place coupled with the
unambiguous identification of appellant by AAA as the
rapist for these cases at bar, can lead to no conclusion
other than that it was appellant who committed the
deplorable acts as charged. We note the prosecutions
attempts to subpoena Julieta Flores to testify in trial,
however for naught. The court orders and subpoena
return demonstrate the earnest efforts made by the
prosecution to present the testimony of the eyewitness.
Ultimately, Julieta Floress testimony would merely have
been corroborative and not essential to establishing the
fundamental elements of the instant cases.
Upon the other hand, appellants alibi and denial of the
crimes charged are inherently weak. It is in fact the
defense of alibi that should be considered with suspicion
and always received with caution, not only because it is
inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it is easily
fabricated. For alibi to prosper, the appellant must not only
prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed. He must also convincingly demonstrate the

physical
impossibility
of
his
presence
at
the locus criminis at the time of the incident.
In the case at bar, appellant failed to show that it would
have been physically impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime on the occasions of the rape. Not only were
the alleged locations of his alibi all within the same
province, there is no evidence that appellant never
absented
himself
from
work
or
the
purported mahjong sessions with his friends in the three
years that the rapes were alleged to have been committed.
It is likewise inconceivable that appellants wife never once
left him alone in their home, as it is absurd to believe his
claim that he never spoke with AAA whenever she was at
his house.
On the contrary, it was adequately established that
appellant lived but a few meters from AAAs home. It is
easy to see how the crimes could have been committed
with facility. Moreover, being the husband of a grandaunt,
he exercised moral ascendancy over the child. Not only
that, as observed by the trial court, the appellant is a bulky
and hulking man. A nine-year old child would have been no
match for his physical size.
Thus, we sustain the finding of guilt and the consequent
penalty imposed as pronounced by the RTC and the Court
of
Appeals.
Noteworthy
is
the
fact
that
both Informations for statutory rape allege that the crimes
were committed prior to both the passage of the law
imposing death for rape cases, as well as the new rape
law. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code then provided:
Article 335. When and how rape is
committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1.
intimidation;
By
using
force
or
2.
When the woman is
deprived
of
reason
or
otherwise
unconscious; and
3.
When the woman us
under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The minority of the private complainant was alleged in the

Information and proven with certainty. There is thus no
impediment
in
affirming
the
sentence
of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.
Anent the civil liability of appellant, we modify the award
of damages in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
Consequently, the court finds Carpio liable to AAA in the
amount ofP75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for
each count of rape. The award of civil indemnity, which is
in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is
mandatory upon a conviction of rape. On the other hand,
the award of moral damages is automatically granted in
rape cases
without need of further proof other than the commission of
the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has
actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award.
Finally, the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
minority necessitates the award of exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC in Criminal Case Nos.
A-2758 and A-2759, as well as the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R.CRH.C. No. 01339, are AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant GREGORIO CARPIO @
GORIO is sentenced, in each of the criminal cases subject
of
this
review,
to
suffer
the
penalty
ofreclusion perpetua and to pay the victim AAA (to be
identified through the Informations in this case), the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
plus costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice

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G.R. No.

January 22, 2014

RALPH P. TUA, Petitioner,

Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 9262, otherwise known as the

1. Enjoin from committing and threatening to commit

restraining order to temporarily enjoin the parties and their agents

Dissatisfied, petitioner files the instant petition raising the following

SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of

Hence, the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his

(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical

Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her

(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent

(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving

We are not persuaded.

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the

(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in

(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the

G.R. No. 201043

June 16, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Armed

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

They are also directed to accompany the petitioner to their conjugal

own counsel. However, he did not hire a counsel nor file an

SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis supplied.)

Based on the evidence presented, both oral and documentary, and

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

Permanent Protection Order (PPO) to respondent had long become

order that may be issued by the barangay shall be known as a

disposition by the court, including revocation of license

or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or

A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 182521

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98-651 for Violation of Art. 336 of the

That sometime in between the period commencing in June 1993

That sometime in September 1997, in Paraaque, Metro Manila

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 654 for Violation of Art. 336 of the

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 659 for Violation of Art. 336 of the

That sometime in between the period of October to December

That sometime in (sic) October 25, 1997, in Paraaque, Metro

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 655 for Violation of Art. 336 of the

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98 660 for Violation of Article 335 of

The Court of Appeals narrated the facts as follows:

x x x They later proceeded to the NBI, Taft Ave. Manila to

In December 1993, [AAA] and her father bought food from

Prosecution presented the following witnesses: [AAA], BBB,

The Ruling of the Trial Court

WHEREFORE, after careful perusal of the evidence presented,

the accused Ernesto Ayuda Fragante GUILTY BEYOND

In pursuant with Section 31(f), Article XII, of Republic Act No.

The penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. 98-658 and Criminal

In Criminal Case No. 98-660, the penalty imposed is hereby

In view of the jurisprudential trend, the amount of moral

The Ruling of this Court

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,

We sustain appellant's conviction for seven (7) counts of acts of