Grsting Gy 1480 Par ediegns aac cavelants 906 Unkintsihy oy Mote Dass Pas, Nore Dasa REASON, TRADITION, AND THE, PROGRESSIVENESS OF SCIENCE M.D. KING “The sociology of knowledge is concerned with “the relationship be- tween human thought and the socal cootet in which it arses"! So, om this reading, the sociology of sciente may be taken tobe con: czmed with the analysis ofthe socal esaext of sclentie thought. But sciatic thought, most sociologists oncede, Is distinguished from olher modes of thought prociely by virtue of it immunity from social determination ~ insofar as thought is sclentife t fs gowe ‘emed by reason rather than by tradition, and insofar as its ratlonal Iteseapes determination by “non-logial social forces. IF the ratio: ality of science inthis sensei adeited, what can we hope to lear by studying seientifo eas in their socal context? The majority of sociologists of sclence Inve implicitly or explicitly answered. this ‘question by drawing a sharp distinction between science as a “sys {tem of ideas” governed by an “inner logis” and science at a “social system” shaped by nee-logeal forces, and by arguing tht though soctological analysis ean add litle or noth to cur appredation of the former, Bis the obviows meane of understanding the ltter. They hve, in other words, accepted a clearly dawn «vision of labor. Science as a sytem of knowledge i, they acopt, simply not their Dasines: itis the province ofthe history or perhaps the piloophy of science. The aim ofthese disiplines is teat the internal struc tue and iotelectual affinities of sclentie ides, rather than tie social oxigias or influences. They seck to comprehend ideas within tn intellectual rather than a socal cone to ealibit ther “cogni- tive” rather than their “behavioral antecedents and coneequences Sociologists, on the other hund, are conoemed with science as socal activity o,f chooge at randoun some ofthe avaiable phrases, with “Science as a social sytem,” or aa pater ent of chavion ‘with “the human side of science,” or with ts communal” character? ‘And s0 sociology, from this view, cocks tb explain the bebivioe of Scientists whether toward one another or toward outsiders—and, In line with the fonctionalst thinking which has dominated the Beld, toexplainit cle in tems of the values and worms to which scien:Wists gua Scietsts ate committed. The majority of sociologists ap- pear, then, have accepted that there is no intine coanection feweon the ia seientnts hold and the way thoy behave, that scien Uist choice of Idea is governed by reason while their behavior 1s, dictated by anon-logial tradition, and thatthe ater may be under- ‘ood without reference to the former. "This division between the history of tientife ideas and the £0- clology of sseatie conduct, between the study of science as “a Durtcular sor of knowledge” and as “a particular sort of behavior” Has met withthe ready consent of historians and sociologists alike. ‘One can see why such 4 division of Iabor should appear so attractive to both sides-whatever its intellectual astieation, Te saves ints Jectual historians from the indignity of being told that the “real” causes of ssimtife growth Ke beyond their professional compechion- Sons and it wlleves toclogists of the necessity of understanding, fiend ideas. “However, last one figure as spoken out agaat this “divorce ‘of conveniene.” T. S. Kuhn in his book The Strictre of Scientific Recolution® moves fcely backward and forward across the bounds ary between the history of ideas and the sociology of sclentie be- Ivor. Whatever the merit ofthe particular acooint be gives of scientife change, his work forces us t0 reopen the question of Whether its intellectual and social dimensious ean be properly undes- ood in folaton froma ove another. «The “behavior” or “fonetional” appreach tothe sociology of science [can be traced} back tit roots in R. K. Meton’s efforts to weld together an antirationalstie sociology and a rationalistio view of science. ...This approach is rooted in an extended analogy be- ‘ween science and economi activity hus it teats science as"Wwork” Scientists as workers, and scent ideas as commoaites oF as “prod ‘ucts of sien research, Accordingly it ses the social system of Science a a system forthe production and dssonination of slenific des, and it postulates the vrtalbifeeation of scent “pric” and the proceses of scientific‘ prodaction,"of sient idea: and the ‘concrete practices which give ro to them By thes treating as ex- trinsic the conection between the practice of scence and the nowledge it produces, sciologiets have been able to sndertake a. ‘eciologieallterpretatioa of the former without concerning them selves svth the question of the social determination of the Inter. Furtar, they have wd the parallel with economic life to sugzest precisely in what seas the practice of scence might be thought of 4 being socially eternned both stienoe and the economy afc, sceoeding to is view, ake in being, propelled by “nom logical” social sentimeats, values, and motivations, while boing nally goy- ‘emed by an inflexible social logie. This Inge sin the one eate ‘expressed in fued canons of sdentifc methodology and athe other, inthe “iron laws of economlescience, ‘Kuhn's alysis of scientile development mises serious doubts concerning the validity of this acount ofthe relationship of scen- tie practice and scientific ides. In particular it challenges the view that the pracze of science isetractired around a niveral aoc logic of procedure, and instead treats it as being governed by’ con- crete, discrete, “local” traditions which indeed resist rationalization, «What kind of sociology of science might be developed from Kuln's conception of research traditions? Signcanty, as we shall, se, Kun hinself when speaking of the socal charactor of science ject it to tallectual analysis, Secondly, Oakeshott conceives science ‘sa single tradition, and scientsts as engaged in a single “conversa tion” conducted, down the yeas, in a single idiom. Kuhn is forced ‘by his conteation that research tradition stm fom paradigms, fox parteulepces of seni work, to see the history of seienco in terns of a succession of dierte traditions each dened by a paradigm ort of paradigms, each wit is own distinctive idiom, ich holding the undivided attention of a community of scientists for a certain period of time, and each destined eventually to be Aisearded, Sdence, for Kubn, i not a single conversation, but a tadley of conversations conducted in diferent idioms, the speakers none idiom aot beng able to comprehend fully speakers in another, for as Kula hinself puts "those who subseribe to alternative, Sncomnensurable paadigas are bound to.a degree to talk past each other” This picture of scence must ralse doubts about its overall pro- gresivenes if normal” scence progresses beeause scientists sub- {mio being governed by a pevadign, what gvaratee is there that Changes fromone paradign to another, one“idioe” to another, will, flo be progressive? 0 Normal science as Kuhn conceives it is progresive almost by de- Snition, Its ragning paridigne define for a community of scents ‘what problems, procedures, and solutions are admisible, or in other words what, fr them, is counted as science. Further, the whole in {Blutional apparatus of a normal selentie community controlling tit does the raining and sodalzation of recruits, acces to research facilities and chantels of communication and publication, and the stebution of rewards geared toward Keeping the practice of feience withia the bounds set by the ruling paradigms, and thus Preventing the energies of seientists from being dissipated by their ‘engaging in interminable disputes over basic assumptions, or tack ling insoluble problems, or engaging ia debates with “deviants” ‘who do not secept the roles of the game. Consequently, insofar as ‘thas the power to enforce coafomlty tits paradigms, the sietifc fcommounity “an immencly effekent instrument for solving the ‘problems or pazzles that [sheis] paradigms define. "The progresiveness of science, in its normal phase, depends there- {ore on the vigor with which the authority of paradigms is asserted 0 to channel available resources into finding soltions for alinit- fd range of problems. However, science does not always progress “hora.” Inthe bistory of sence periods of normal development, sccording to Kubn, are separated by comparatively brief “revlution- fy” uphenvale-ectraordinary epliodes during which a scientific ‘community loses confidence inthe ability of ts governing paradigns to generat research statogies that will solve all the legitimate prob- Tems before tem, casts around for alterative models, and dnally tranafers its lopalies to a new paradigm which promises better. But ‘what guarantee there that such paradigm changes are progressive? ulin maintain that choos between paradigms are not dictated by Ingicor by evidence. Consequently if they are progressive then the ‘explanation mast be psychoogial or sociological it most ie in the character of the scientific community that makes them. However, ‘ila sat ain to ates that choices between paradigms that cha fcterize “extraordinary” science are very different in kind from the ‘hoices that face practitioners of “normal” paradigndominated sei ‘nee; the former sre mada, and justified, without the possiblity of « ial appeal to principle or prcedent. Ta fact, ho likens them t such phenomena as gestallswitehes or religious conversion; they are ie Trosions into normality, rather an outgrowths from it ‘So we end with the paradox that the selentifie community which ‘ensures the progressives of normal scence by the single-minded fess with which i enforoes conformity to is reigning paradigns, msls guarantees the progressiveness of extraordinary science by the ‘qualities i brings to the task of discrediting these paradigms and ‘putting others in their place. Kubn extracts himself frm tis paradox by changing his original poston, a change which may oF may not sive a comncing explanation of the progresivenes of science, but which clea, in my view at leas, greatly detracts from the socior Jogieal value of his account of sefntife change, Having atthe outset asserted thatthe scientists" primary commitment is to the concrete ways of doing science exempliied in paradigms, Kuhn finally man. tains that scientists have a yet more basio commitment to certain | (3D Sparamount values" which underrites thee acceptance of patie Tae paradigms, and sees them though the uieasy periods when the authority of these paradigms is wavering. In effec Kuhn maintains {hat sciences governed bya kind of politcal eltue which prevents, scents from losing thle heads daring periods of ersis2 Kuhn's scientists are thoroughgoing constitutionaliss, They are reformers, not revolutionaries, They are devoted to fading solations to problems within the framework of an established tradition of thought, notto undermining its foundations. They ae by nature and traning ingenious puzle-slvers who will only lose faith tn accepted Procedures if they eoutiaally fil to produce solutions. Only then ‘ill they look around fr alternative ways of playing the games and only when they can see that an alternative promises sete futare of puzelesching will they commit themselves to Scientific revolutions, on this account, say be intellectually mo ‘mentous afr, but socially they generally prove ta be peettyinnoe- ‘wus. Scientists have no stomach for onder. They will note therm selves of from the old order until the new is clearly before thelr eyes, But as soon as this is the ease, they make the change without inch friction, They quickly adopt the new ways of play and re- sroup themselves into puzziesolving communities, leaving behind only’ few dichards. That the intellectual discontinuity of the paradigm-switch is compensated for by the continuity ofthe “polity cal eultre” thelr paramount commitment to unanimity and to nor ality. Therein, atowding 9 Kuhn, ley the final sunrantee of te Drogressvenes of slentile revolutions: scientists will only take wp ‘new paradigm if they are convinced that twill aot requiee them to negate the achievements ofthe past, and will enable them to ze tum to the satisfying routines oF nonnal sience, Scientists will wot entertain a new way of doing slence unless it can preace eorsensus tnd normality, To accuse Kuhn, as Lakatos does of making slew tile progress the hostage of mab psychology may be excusable a uz thetovic but itmisrepresents the spvt of Kuhn's argument: collective psychology perhaps, but the eallective peychology of a group of men whose wery activity engende.s arespect for order, a group more akin toa body of myers than to revolutionary mob. ‘Whether or nat Kuhn's recet account ofthe paramount values of science stands as a socio psycologieal explanation ofthe progres- SHvaness of slace in gencral, [doubt very much that i contributes a5 much to ou understanding of particular instances of selentife ‘change as does the notion of a paradigm. Indeed it leads us away {rom the latter problem. If we asert that sclentsts at the lst are committed not any particular pattera of normal seionce but merely to “normality” a such, and not to any ove particular seeatie om munity but mery to "group wmanimity” at uch, then the problem ‘of explaining changes in the mode of practice and the sola sruc- ture of science virtually dsappears; for what is made to stike the ‘eye snot the changes but the continuity in paramount ves Te is remarkable how close Kuh epistemological interest in x. plaining progtesiveness drives han to Merton's sociological position, Merton makes sient values lend social weight to the wsocal canons of scientific method which guarantee the progresveness of Science: Kuh dspenses with such metiodological eanons, but gets out of difficulty by recruiting his “paramount values”—which finally te no less abstract and achintril than Merton's logic of procedure “to stand in thi place. This ira yeat pity: it comes from bending sociology for epistemologio’ reasons to an "estentals™ or “neces {asian view of ence with the aim of catching its “spin” or driving force and so expaning its progrssiveness. This is to repeat once again Merton's confusion of an atcount ofthe essence or meaning oF Science with an explanation of it historical development over a pare ticular period of time. More valuable is Kubris original conception that the day-today practi of science ie governed by concrete re search traditions, by “living laws" rather than by abatract rules, values, oF esenes. This opens a whole new feld for socuiogieal inquiry. T invites us to study the contingent relstionshipe between therrise and dedine of such tradition-bound ways of doing science, the movement ef more or les rationalysupported ideas, and th development of socially-constuned scatie istitutions. The way shead for the sociology of scence, I would argue, lies ot in the laboration of theories of scientific man, whether we give him the appearance of Merton's rational "methodist or Kuhn's pazeosaving ‘rastittionaist bue in the study of the intereations of modes of thought, workstjles, and the sacal postions of scientife men, em- rythn does the notion of sclentife authorty-rational or ollectual or social -a the key Diking concept 1 have tried to show tn this paper that writers hike Merton and Xun who have allowed their soiology of science tobe dictated by the problem of Finding a socal bass forthe rationality or, as in Kuhn's ease, the progresivenes of science have heen forced to tert thatthe scientists ultimate commitment sto a set of highly abstract values, values which are supposed to generate or confirm a ‘constant mode of fe which remains undsrupted by changes in elem. tie thought. would argue that to postulate the exltenee of such a value system does little to uminate the actual course of scientific change. Rather the reverse-to the extent that scientists are repre~ sented as being able to alter on demand their paterns of thought and practice without doing viclene to these ultimate comsitments, Scientie changes appear to be unproblematic. Sientife values come tobeseen asa kind of frame within which any “sentfe” picture of the world can be fitted without strain, For Merton such a pture fs bound tof, because the frame was preformed to accommodate the prodvcts of rational scletie activity; for Kuhn it ft, because only lctures that dot count a scentife, However, to assume, in the intrests of epistemology, a spon- taneous alignment between scientific values, practice, and thought is to deny ones the means of comprehending the reel couse of scien tife change. What T would advocate fs a kind of “epstemologial agnosticism,” similar to the atitide of “methodologies! atheism” taken up by Berger in his sociology of religion, which sould give socialgists th opportunity of developing the kind of approach that serves more toilominate actual historical processes of cane in the pattems of thought, mode of practice and socal situation of sien Ast than to meet the demands of epistemology. Kuhn's Stricture of Sclentif Revolutions sketches in the broad conttnes ofthis approach. But, as have teed to show, more nce Iie has appeared to alter the tee of his analyst, perhaps to meat the crticim fvelled agaast him by the philosophers of scence, However there isa weakness ven ia the euler su. I falls olive ‘quite upto is title. Te doesnot present a convincing analysis of the internal structure oF scent revolutions; indeed ft concedes that they ae intrinsically unanalyznble events by likening them to gestalt switches or acts of religious conversion. As a consequence Kulm docs rot succes in developing a sociological theory of scent change He fails to do s0 because from the outset he separates scientific igomth into ditnct phases. In periods of “normal” science, seien- mt tis’ basic commitments-cenceptua,ethodeogel, technial-are vistully comtant. Dusing the intervals of "extrardinay” scence Thr cele swt commits Inthe ‘nal pave fhe empha fille onthe stabity of commitments, an ‘pth traton bound aubertysurtre at wars hem. periods of seelition, on th ther hand slats break with one Set of commitments and adapt anther. Ia the one case change nario inthe oer Is epresented ae an tanalyzable mutation, ‘Sociologists cannot, then expect to nd in Kuhn's work a ready male theory of sient change But what Kun bas done is show hw such a theory anight be developed by attacking the problem of low conretoways of doing scence, or more speteall the author ity structures tnt uphold than, re modied, crt apd perhaps ‘vethzown inthe faca of changes in scent hough ad technique NorEs 1, Peter Berger and Thomas Luchman, The Socal Contraction of Rely (Landon, 1867) 18 ds: ft stance, NW. Store, Th Soil Sytem of Selene (ew ork 186 in which sce tr dncribed a prc sat of Sakae Jolin Zeman, Publis Knooledger The Social Dimension of Sot ‘ace (Cambridge, 1008), 10, ase that “Tete sacloy of scence 6 conse) he ca intact eta sett Ne ‘lieague" ek. Stephen Cotgove, "The Socbloey of Selence ‘Tochnolog” uth Journal of Socology 21 (2070), 115, 25a, T'S of Sei eats (Changs, wh, This i sing point of ovesap between Merton and Marist ister of sree fro Be Hesen aad De Boao Chastopher Hl They sare theinclination taste sci to “werk andtstrs the ‘pons sigue ff wt oh ee moreent ed the groups they rand se Beng economically the most progressive st tive pote tne, thy eat fn he seventh cetary ofthe ‘eke n he wert ery Sex my scsi i]. Beal a Se {ne and the Fufestions! Dilroma in Pengui Soe Selnces Survey, elas Could (Lenton, 1969, 51.08. 2g tc Meron “lotsa Sie Deon A Choe in the Soceligy of Scenes Ameren Sociol Review 28 (1957), 615659. (8%, Kuh, “Histor Strate of Seetie Dovey” Science 10 (1903, 70.4 ‘thi, Meron Priors” ot, 8 Hall Merton Revit” 19-14, us10, See esp, Imre Lato, “Citic and the Methodoony of Selec Hseurch Prgms” Proceedings of the Arollion Sotety, ns, {1067 6), 1186 sd Dudley Shaper, review of The Structure 1 Seti Reva nie vane 1 Kulm, true cf Sctentife Heslatos, 4 1h Scenate 10 Ti. See W. Fexdnana, Legal Theory, th ed (Londo, 1960), Chap 23, which ny acm largely ets, Tg 1:8. Runa Logi of Daxovory or aycholoy of Research” in Grier andthe Geowth of Knowledge, el lave Lakatos and Al Mungave (Cambrian, 1970, "a Scecapeialy Shape i the wohume,e=p, p. 20; and Stephen ‘Tous, “Concept Reveltions Scene Bason Stadles fn the hiowpiy of Senco RS Coon ad MW. Wartesky (Dordrecht, 196m, I, 337-34. If, Tou, Fright nd Uaderending onto, 1061), Ch sand’ TR! Kut, Str of Sint Relations 1, 1%, Madhel Oneshot, atonal in Polis” (1947) sepeinted tn Rational in Polis (oon, 105), 136 tid 18 BL tha 22, See the esay on “Rational Conde” (1950) repented in Rational fam in Pais 80.110 On po 102105 there i dseson of the nate tt setetc acini ch tingly sma to at of Kua. “2 Kul, Suto of Scent evolutns, 1, 2k bid 165 BE The hott of "paramount vals” i itode by Kuba he final sects of hr oper “Laie of Discovery or Peony of Research Scone 13 "2 L Lakator, "Citic andthe Methodology of Seine Research Programe" us