INFERENCE

3.2.3 There is a marked contrast between these three; the first is neutral on the subject
of whether the chain is actually to be pulled or not; that is why 'Penalty for improper
use 5' has to be added. The second is not neutral; it has a strong flavour of the simple,
non-hypothetical imperative 'Drive slowly', and 'or' might be replaced by 'because if
you don't'. The third is an oddity; like 'If you want to break your springs, go on driving
as you are at the moment', it is ironic and actually has the purpose of dissenting from
the clause 'Omit regular lubrication'. It is adapted, with the omission of a trade name,
from an actual advertisement.
To the extent that an imperative is hypothetical, it has descriptive force in much the
same way as a value-judgement may (7.1). Understanding or supplying the
hypothetical clause is like knowing the standard of values that is being applied. It is not
easy to say, in any individual case, in which there is no 'if'-clause actually included, to
what extent the imperative is to be treated as hypothetical. We must not assume that all
non-moral imperatives are hypothetical, for this is far from being true. Operating
instructions for machinery form an interesting borderline case. Are we to say that 'Plug
in to a supply of the voltage indicated on the label!' is hypothetical, and that we have to
understand 'if you want your vacuum cleaner to clean your carpets without
necessitating expensive repairs'? It is hard to answer this question; we could certainly
understand and obey the instruction without knowing what its purpose was. This case
shows, not that there is no difference between hypothetical and non-hypothetical
imperatives, but that the line is hard to draw.
It would probably be misleading to say that hypothetical imperatives are 'really
indicatives'. They have indeed descriptive force, and are entailed by indicatives; but 'x2
= 4' is entailed by 'x = 2', and yet we should not say that the former was not really a
quadratic equation. It would not, for one thing, be intelligible to someone who did not
know the meaning of the 'squared' symbol. This symbol, moreover, does not have here
a special meaning different from its other uses. In somewhat the same way, 'If you want
to go to the largest grocer in Oxford, go to Grimbly Hughes' is not an indicative; it
would not be intelligible to someone who had learnt the meaning of indicative verbforms but not that of imperative verb-forms; and the latter do not have in it a special
meaning. The best way of describing the matter has been suggested by Kant: the
imperative element in a hypothetical imperative is analytic ('Who wills the end . . . wills
also the means'), because the imperatives in the two parts, so to say, cancel one another
out. It is an imperative, but, qua imperative, has no content; the content which it has is
that of the indicative minor premises from which it is derived.2