ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCE

G.R. No. L-8578

1913

November 17,

1. US vs DIRIS
Fact:
Fulgencio Seal, who lived in the pueblo of
Calauag, Province of Tayabas, received from the
railroad company, more than P400 in payment of
certain land expropriated by that company, and
that the defendant Tomas Olea, a nephew of
Fugencio Seal, was present when the money
was counted and paid over to his uncle.
Thereafter, after Fulgencio Seal left the house
leaving his wife in charge of their tienda, the
three defendants appeared at the tienda and
Eustaquio Siaga engaged the woman in
conversation while the other two defendants
went upstairs, broke open the trunk, and took
the money, amounting to P353, and a receipt for
P100. After the discovery of the commission of
the crime, The nephew when found admitted the
theft of the money and promised that if the uncle
would not make any trouble about it he would try
and recover it from the other defendants.
At the trial the defendants denied that they were
the authors of the crime; Olea and Diris denied
that they were present at the house on the
morning in question. However, they were
convicted for the crime of robbery. On appeal,
defendant Eustaquio Siaga, who remained
below in the tienda and engaged the woman in
conversation while the other defendants went up
into the house, should only be held as a
complice (accessary before the fact) as defined
in the Penal Code, and not as a principal.

Issue:

Indanan had an order to that effect from the

governor.

Whether or not defendant Eustaquio Siaga

should only be held liable as accomplice?

?
The CFI found Indanan guilty of the
crime of murder & sentencing him to be hanged.

Held:

Issues: WON Indanan is guilty of murder by

inducement?

The defendant Siaga acted concurrently with the

other defendants, and must be held to have
been present with them aiding and abetting
them in the commission of the crime by
remaining below and talking with the woman in
order to distract her attention from what was
going on upstairs. In doing so he was evidently
serving as a guard to warn his companions in
case there should arise any necessity for giving
an alarm. When the other defendants came
down out of the house he went away with them.
This court has repeatedly held that one
who shares the guilty purpose and aids and
abets the commission of a crime by his
presence at the time of its perpetration, even
though he may not have taken an active part in
its material execution, is guilty as a principal. We
have also held that one who stands as guard
near the place where a crime is committed to
keep others away or to warn his companions
and fellow conspirators of danger of discovery,
takes a direct part in the commission of the
crime and is therefore guilty as a principal under
article 13 of the Penal Code

2. UNITED STATES v. INDANAN [24

Phil. 203 (1913)]
Panglima Indanan, accussed is the
headman of Parang.
?
On Mar. 24, 1912, Indanan ordered the
killing of Sariol to his men Akiran, Kalyakan &
Suhuri in the Chinese Cemetary asserting that

?
YES. A13(2), of the Penal Code declares
those to be principals in a crime who directly
force or induce others to commit it.
?
says:

Commenting upon this paragraph, Viada

?
They force another to commit a crime
who physically by actual force or grave fear, for
example, with a pistol in hand or by any other
threatening means, oblige another to commit the
crime. In our commentary on par. 9 of A8 (page
28), we have already said that he who suffers
violence acts w/o will & against his will, is no
more than an instrument, & therefore is guilty of
no wrong. The real culprits in such case, the
only guilty persons, are those who use the
violence, those who force the other to commit
the crime.
?
One is induced directly to commit a
crime either by command, or for a consideration,
or by any other similar act w/c constitutes the
real & moving cause of the crime & w/c was
done for the purpose of inducing such criminal
act & was sufficient for that purpose. Weve
already seen in our commentary on par. 12 of A8
that the 1 who physically commits the crime may
escape criminal responsibility by showing that
he acted w/ due obedience to an order; in such
case the criminal responsibility falls entirely
upon the 1 who orders, i.e., upon him who by his
commands has directly induced the other to
commit the act. But in case the obedience of the
inferior isnt due to the superior & thus not
necessary, & doesnt, thus, exempt him from

criminal responsibility as the physical author of

the crime, he who thus, by his command,
directly induced him to the criminal act is
considered by the law also as principal in the
crime.
?
The pacto by virtue of w/c 1 purchases
for a consideration the hand w/c commits the
crime makes him who gives, promises, or offers
the consideration the principal in the crime by
direct inducement, because w/o such offer or
promise the criminal act would never have been
committed. But this doesnt mean that the 1 who
actually commits the crime by reason of such
promise, remuneration or reward is exempted
from criminal responsibility; on the contrary, such
circumstance constitutes an aggravation of his
crime.
?
We have heretofore said that in addition
to the precepto & the pacto there are similar
means by w/c another may be induced to
commit a crime w/c also make the 1 who offers
the inducement the principal in the crime by
virtue of the provisions of A13(2). But it must be
borne in mind that these acts of inducement do
not consist in simple advice or counsel given
before the act is committed, or in simple words
uttered at the time the act was committed. Such
advice & such words constitute undoubtedly an
evil act, an inducement condemned by the moral
law; but in order that, under the provisions of the
Code, such act can be considered direct
inducement, it is necessary that such advice or
such words have a great dominance & great
influence over the person who acts; it is
necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious,
as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as
violence itself.

3. People vs Ong Chiat

Facts:

Appellant and two others, Ong Ban Hua

and Kua Sing, were jointly informed against by
the provincial fiscal of Zamboanga, charging
them with having feloniously burned a building in
which was located a store belonging to the
appellant. Upon a plea of "not guilty," appellant
and his codefendants were tried jointly upon
said information; and, after trial, while Ong Ban
Hua and Kua Sing were acquitted, appellant was
found guilty of the crime of arson

Issue:
Whether or not the appellant is criminally liable
as principal by direct participation?

July 24, 1935

Defendants-Appellants: Kiichi Omine, Eduardo
Autor, Luis Ladion, Agapito Cortesano
APPEAL from a judgment of the CFI of Davao
FACTS:
Defendants Autor, Ladio, and Cortesano were
working on the hemp plantation of Angel Pulido
under the direction of their co-defendant Kiichi
Omine, who was the overseer or manager, with
a compensation of 10% of the receipts.
Omine asked Pulido for permission to open a
new road through the plantation, but there was a
misunderstanding because Pulido contends that
he refused to grant this request because there
was already an unfinished road. On the other
hand, Omine contends that Pulido gave him the
permission.

Held:
In order to convict a defendant as
principal in the commission of a crime, it must be
shown either (1) that he took a direct part in the
execution of the criminal act; (2) that he directly
forced or induced another or others to commit it;
or (3) that he cooperated in the commission of
the offense by an act without which it would not
have been accomplished. (Revised Penal Code,
article 17.) They take direct part in the execution
of a criminal act who, participating in the criminal
design, proceed to carry out their plan and
personally take part in its execution by acts
which directly tend to the same end. (Viada,
Codigo Penal, 5th ed., vol. 1, p. 341; Albert's
Revised Penal Code Ann., 144.)
In the instant case, it is not claimed that
appellant had taken a direct part in the burning
of the building. In fact, the prosecution lays
stress on appellant's absence from the scene of
the fire as one of the suspicious circumstances
indicating his guilt.

4. People v Kiichi Omine

When Pulido, with his son Hilario, accompanied

by Saito Paton and a moro named Barabadan,
were returning home from a cockpit they noticed
that a considerable number of hemp plants had
been destroyed for the purpose of opening a
new road.
Angered by the destruction of hemp plants,
Pulido and his party went to the house of the
defendants where the crime happened.
According to the prosecution:
While offended part was talking with Omine,
Autor attempted to intervene but was prevented
by Hilario and so he attacked him with a bolo but
wounded him only on the left thumb. Ladion and
Coretesano then held Pulido by the arms and
Autor struck Pulido in the breast with his bolo.
According to the defendants:
First to arrive was Hilario, who after applying to
Omine an offensive epithet, struck him in the
breast with brass knuckles. When Autor
attempted to intervene, Pulido and his son
attacked him with their fists, HIlario striking him

on the right cheek. Ladion and Cortesano ran

away before Pulido was wounded by Autor.
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO:
1) WON there was conspiracy among the
defendants? -- NO
Evidence did not prove that Ladion and
Cortesano took any part in the fight
they ran away and were not present
when Pulido was wounded and were not
included in the original complaint
If they were present, there was also no
need for them to hold Pulido in order to
enable Autor to strike him with his bolo
or for Omine to induce him to do so by
shouting pegale y matale (hit him and
kill him)
Hilario and Autor had already struck
each other in the face before Angel
Pulido intervene in the fight and he did
so, Autor, who had already drawn his
bolo, would strike him without a need for
an inducement from Omine.
Even if Omine uttered those words, they
would not be sufficient to make him a
principal by induction because it does
not appear that these words caused
Autor to strike Pulido.
Although Autor was working under the
direction of Omine, it does not appear
that Omine has any influence over
Autor.
US v Indanan: In order that a person may be
convicted of a crime by inducement, it is
necessary that the inducement it is necessary
that the inducement be made directly with the
intention of procuring the commission of the
crime and that such inducement be the
determining cause of the commission of the
crime.
SC of Spain: Although the phrases pronounced
were imprudent and culpable, they were not so
to the extent that they may be considered the
principal and moving cause of the effect

produced. Direct inducement cannot be inferred

from such phrases, as in inducement must be
precede the act induced and must be so
influential in producing the criminal act that
without it the act would not have been
performed.
It is necessary that such advice or such words
have great dominance and great influence over
the person who acts, that it is necessary that
they may be as direct, as efficacious, as
powerful as physical or moral coercion or as
violence itself.
2) WON Autor intended to kill the offended party
NO
Although the wound was serious and in a vital
part of the body (11 inches in length, extending
from breast to the lower ribs on the right side), it
was not a stab wound and was probably given
during a commotion and without being aimed at
any particular part of the body. He only struck
Pulido once when he could have easily killed
him.
However, there is no merit in the contention of
Autor that Angel Pulido was accidentally
wounded in a struggle for the possession of the
bolo. It was proven that he snatched out his bolo
and struck Pulido in the stomach.
Decision appealed reversed as to Omine,
Ladion and Cortesano and they were acquitted.
As to Autor, the decision is modified. He is
convicted of lesion graves and sentenced to
suffer 1 year, 8 mos, and 21 days of prision
correctional, to indemnify in sum of P540.

5. PEOPLE v. MONTEALEGRE
[161 SCRA 700 (1988)]

?
Edmundo Abadilla was eating in a resto
when he detected the smell of marijuana smoke
coming from a nearby table.
?
Intending to call a policeman, he quietly
went outside and saw Pfc. Renato Camantigue.
Camantigue joined Abadilla in the resto and they
both smelled the marijuana smoke from the
table of Vicente Capalad and Napoleon
Montealegre.
?
Camantigue collared the 2 & said
Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano? He forced them
up, holding 1 in each hand but Capalad pulled
out a knife & started stabbing Camantigue at the
back. Camantigue let go of Montealegre to get
his gun but Montealegre restrained
Camantigues hand to prevent the latter from
defending himself.
?
They grappled & fell on the floor.
Capalac fled and Camantigue pursued him firing
some shots. Then he stopped and asked to be
brought to a hospital. Capalac was found
slumped in the street, with a bullet to his chest.
Both he and Camantigue died the next day.
Montealegre on the other hand, escaped
through the confusion. He was later
apprehended.
Issue: WON Montealegre was rightly considered
a co-principal for having corroborated with
Capalad in the killing of the police officer.
?
YES. The two acted in concert, with
Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue 7 times
and Montealegre holding on to victims hands to
prevent him from drawing the pistol and
defending himseld, as Abadilla had testified.
?
While it is true that Montealegre did not
himself commit the act of stabbing, he was
nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having
prevented Camantigue for resisting the attack
against him.
?
Montealegre was a principal by
indispensable cooperation under A17(3), RPC.
The requisites of this provision
o
Participating in the criminal resolution,
i.e., theres either anterior conspiracy or unity of
criminal purpose & intention immediately before
the commission of the crime charged; &

o
Cooperation in the commission of the
offense by performing another act w/o w/c it
would not have been accomplished.
?
But although there was no evidence of
prior agreement between Capalad &
Montealegre, their subsequent acts should
prove the presence of such conspiracy. The
Court has consistently upheld such view in
previous cases (People v. Laganson, People v.
Cercano, People v. Garcia Cabarse, Dacanay v.
People)
?
Montealegre was correctly convicted of
the complex crime of murder, qualified by
treachery, w/ assault upon a person of authority.
G.R. No. L-32624 February 12, 1980

7. People vs Nierra
accused whose death sentence is under
automatic review.
Facts:
Juliana Gadugdug-Nierra and Pagano Nierra,
her brother-inlaw, were competitors in the
businesses of launch transportation and the sale
of soft drinks in Barrio Tinago, General Santos
City.
In order to monopolize those businesses in the
locality, Paciano Nierra conceived the Idea of
liquidating his competitor, Juliana. For that
purpose, Felicisimo Doblen, a cousin-in-law of
Paciano, accompanied to Paciano's house
Gaspar Misa, a convicted murderer who had
escaped from the Davao Penal Colony
Thereafter, Doblen, in behalf of Pagano Nierra,
delivered to Misa at the beach a package
containing a caliber .38 pistol with five bullets.
Misa contacted his friend, Vicente Rojas, and
apprised him that he (Misa) had been hired to
kill Juliana. Misa asked Rojas to act as lookout
when the killing would be perpetrated.

Thereafter, the unwary Juliana went to the

beach where she was accustomed to void and
when she squatted, Misa unexpectedly
appeared behind her, held her hair, thus tilting
her face, and while in that posture, he inserted
into her mouth the muzzle of the pistol and fired
it. Paciano and Gaudencia, who were near the
beach, witnessed the actual killing.
On August 7, 1969, Misa was interrogated by
Patrolman A.B. Vencer Jr. of the city police
department. He signed a confession admitting
the killing of Juliana Nierra and implicating the
other accused therein. , Misa testified at the
preliminary in-vestigation. In his testimony, he
admitted again the killing and confirmed his
confession implicating Paciano Nierra, his wife
Gaudencia, Doblen and Rojas
Thereafter, Misa, Doblen, Rojas and the Nierra
spouses, as co-conspirators, were charged with
murder aggravated by reward, treachery, evident
premeditation, nocturnity, ignominy and abuse of
superiority and, as to Misa, recidivism, since he
had been sentenced to reclusion perpetua for
the murder of Antonio Abad Tormis in Cebu City.

Issue:
Wheather or not Dublin and Rojas are criminally
liable as accomplice?

Held:
After a conscientious reflection on the complicity
of Doblen and Rojas, we have reached the
conclusion that they should be held guilty as
accomplices. It is true, strictly speaking, that as
co-conspirators they should be punished as co-

principals. However, since their participation was

not
absolutely
indispensable
to
the
consummation of the murder, the rule that the
court should favor the milder form of liability may
be applied to them (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil.
38 and other cases).
In some exceptional situations, having
community of design with the principal does not
prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an
accomplice if his role in the perpetration of the
homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of
a minor character (See People vs. Ubia, 97
Phil. 515; U.S. vs. Doming 1st, 37 Phil. 446;
People vs. Daligdig, 89 Phil. 598; People vs.
Largo, 99 Phil. 1061).

8. PEOPLE v. DOBLE [114 SCRA

131 (1982)]
Nature: Automatic review of the decision of CFI
Rizal. 1982
FACTS: Late in the night of June 13, 1966, 10
men, almost all heavily armed w/ pistols,
carbines and thompsons, left the shores of
Manila in a motor banca & proceeded to
Navotas,Rizal to rob the beach-bank Prudential
Bank & Trust Co. Said bank wad an unusual
banking hours, open from midnight till 8AM.
Once docked in Navotas and taking advantage
of the darkness of the night, 8 men disembarked
from the banca and proceeded to their mission.
Once inside, they started firing at the banks
ceiling, walls & door of the vault. The 8 men
then returned to the waiting motor banca w/
about P10.5K & sped away. As a result of the
shooting, many people got killed & injured.
Among those who got killed were agents of the
law.
Only 5 of the 10 men were brought to trial, the
rest still remain at large. 2 of the 5 accused
were acquitted. It is only Cresencio Doble,
Simeon Doble and Antonio Romaquin appealing
in the charge of bank robbery committed in
band, w/ multiple homicide, multiple frustrated

homicide and assault upon agents of persons in

authority.
HELD: First, as to appellant Simeon, evidence
shows that the malefactors met in his house to
discuss the plan to rob the bank. This
circumstance alone doesnt conclude his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The facts do not
show that he performed any act tending to the
perpetration of the robbery, nor that he took a
direct part therein or induced other persons to
commit, or that he cooperated in its
consummation by some act w/o w/c it would not
have been committed. At most, his act
amounted to joining in a conspiracy w/c is not
punishable. Simeon then was not a principal
both by agreement and encouragement for his
non-participation in the commission of the
crime. Nor was it clearly proven that he had
received any part/fruits of the looted money as
to make him an accessory. As recommended by
SolGen, Simeon Doble is entitled to acquittal w/
no sufficient evidence to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Next, as regards Romaquin & Doble, the
malefactors who waited in the banca, both
contend that their extra-judicial statements upon
w/c their conviction was principally made to rest,
are inadmissible for having been allegedly
obtained by force and intimidation, torture and
maltreatment, and in violation of basic constil rts
to counsel and against self-incrimination.
However, it must be noted that they didnt
present any medical cert to attest to the injuries
allegedly inflicted. More so that their testimonies
match each others. And it should also be noted
that Celso Aquinos testimony, as one of the
accused, admitted that no violence was inflicted
on him to procure his statement. This is
evidence enough that the appellants could not
have been dealt w/ differently as their coaccused Aquino who was allowed to give his
statement freely.
The extra-judicial statements of the appellants
are convincing to show that their liability is less
than that of a co-principal by conspiracy or by

actual participation. Cresencio was merely incharge of the banca and had no knowledge of
the concrete plan and execution of the crime.
The mastermind obviously did not extend
confidence in him as he was only asked to
provide a banca just a few hours before the
commission of the crime. Nor was Romaquin
considered a principle malefactor as there was a
gun pointed at him by Cresencio to prevent him
from fleeing away from the scene, evident to
show that he never joined in the criminal
purpose and that his acts were not voluntary.
An accomplice is one who, not being principal as
defined in Art 17 RPC, cooperates in the
execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts. There must be a community
of unlawful purpose between the principal and
accomplice and assistance knowingly and
intentionally given to supply material and moral
aid in the consummation of the offense. In this
case, the appellants cooperation is like that of a
driver of a car used for abduction w/c makes the
driver a mere accomplice.
But it isnt established by evidence that in the
mtg held in the house of Simeon that they all
agreed to kill and not just rob. The finding that
appellants are liable as mere accomplices may
appear too lenient but evidence fails to establish
their conspiracy w/ the real malefactors who
actually robbed the bank and killed several
people.
Wherefore, Doble & Romaquin are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as accomplices for the crime
of robbery in band. The penalty imposable upon
appellants is prision mayor min. The
commission of the crime was aggr by nighttime
& the use of a motorized banca. There being no
MC, both appellants should be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of prision correccional
from 5 yrs, 4 mos, 21 days to 8 yrs of prision
mayor as maximum.

G.R. No. 131866 August 20, 2001

Facts: because of the death of victim
Ganongan, an information was filed against
respondent on Novermber of year 1996. The
shooting incident took place during an
altercation between the groups of Carlos Garcia
and the victim. The latter was fired at by
respondent when he, the victim, was about to
run away. The lower court convicted respondent
as charged to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the victims family
with P50,000, P300,000 moral, and P227,808.80
actual damages.
Issue: Whether or not the award of damages
was proper
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court modified the
lower courts decision in convicting the
respondent as charged and held the latter only
guilty of homicide. The qualifying circumstance
of treachery was disregarded because the same
was not proven by the prosecution. Also, the
award of damages was modified to P112,413.40
as actual damages, excluding expenses for
customary practices of 9th day, 40th day and 1st
death anniversary. Moral damages was
lessened to P50,000 and P50,000 was fixed as
civil indemnity.

10. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accusedappellant.
G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997

9. PEOPLE VS DOCTOLERO

FACTS:
Right against cruel and
unusual punishment

Accused-apellant Leo Echegaray was charged

and convicted for the crime of raping his tenyear old daughter. The crime having been
committed sometime in April, 1994, during which
time Republic Act No. 7659, commonly known
as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect,
accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the
supreme penalty of death.
In appealing the conviction, it raised the
constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law as
being severe and excessive, cruel and unusual
in violation of the constitution. He invokes the
ruling in Furman vs. Georgia wherein the US
Supreme Court categorically ruled that death
penalty is cruel and degrading. He also argues
that death is an excessive and cruel punishment
for a crime of rape because there is no taking of
life in rape. He invokes the ruling in Coker vs.
Georgia which said that while rape deserves
serious punishment, it should not involve the
taking of human life. In rape, life is not over for
the victim. Death penalty should only be
imposed where the crime was murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not Death Penalty is cruel
and unusual punishment.
HELD:
NO. The penalty is neither cruel,
unjust nor excessive. In the US case of
Kemmler, it was held that punishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death. It
implies there something inhuman, barbarous,
something more than the extinguishment of life.
It is degrading if it involves public humiliation.
The severity is not sufficient, but must be
disproportionate to the crime committed.
Excessiveness is measured by 1) seriousness of
the crime, 2) policy of the legislative, 3)
perversity of the accused.
The issue in Furman vs. Georgia is not so
much the death penalty itself, but the
arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which
the death penalty was imposed by the jury. It
was nullified because the discretion in which the

statute vested in trial judges and sentencing

juries was uncontrolled and without any
parameters, guidelines, or standards.
With regard to the case of Coker vs. Georgia,
the SC held that this case has no bearing on
Philippine experience and culture. Such a
premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical
notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye,
a tooth for a tooth". But, the forfeiture of life
simply because life was taken, never was a
defining essence of the death penalty in the
context of our legal history and cultural
experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed
in heinous crimes because the perpetrators
thereof have committed unforgivably execrable
acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person
or criminal acts with severely destructive effects,
and because they have so caused irreparable
and substantial injury to both their victim and the
society and a repetition of their acts would pose
actual threat to the safety of individuals and the
survival of government, they must be
permanently prevented from doing so.
RA 7659 already sufficiently defined what are
heinous crimes crimes punished with death
are those that are grievous, odious, and hateful
by reason of inherent viciousness, atrocity and
perversity, those that are repugnant and
outrageous to common standards of norms and
decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society. They also include crimes which
are despicable because life is callously taken, or
the victim is treated as an animal or
dehumanized.

Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of

Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued
by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal
Case No. 9010941.
The warrant had issued on an information
signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
prosecutors composed of Senior State
Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City
Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging
Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the
crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder allegedly committed during the
period of the failed coup attempt from November
29 to December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight
at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila,
without bail, none having been recommended in
the information and none fixed in the arrest
warrant. The following morning, February 28,
1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal
in Quezon City where he was given over to the
custody of the Superintendent of the Northern
Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator
Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for
habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a
supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his
constitutional rights.
Issue:

11. Enrile vs Salazar

G.R. No. 92163
June 5, 1990
Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate
Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested by law enforcement officers led by

(a) Whether the petitioner has committed

complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an
offense being a necessary means for committing
another, which is referred to in the second
clause of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?
Held:

There is one other reason and a fundamental

one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code
cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder
were not complexed with rebellion, and the two
crimes were punished separately (assuming that
this could be done), the following penalties
would be imposable upon the movant, namely:
(1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not
exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present, but never
exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for
the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. In other
words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be
imposed upon him. However, under Article 48
said penalty would have to be meted out to him,
even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed
in conformity with the theory of the prosecution,
would be unfavorable to the movant.
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is
charged with a crime that does not exist in the
statute books, while technically correct so far as
the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the
occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed
as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context
of Hernandez, the information does indeed
charge the petitioner with a crime defined and
punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple
rebellion.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the
right to bail. In the light of the Court's
reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to
petitioner's case, and of the logical and
necessary corollary that the information against
him should be considered as charging only the
crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable
before conviction, that must now be accepted as
a correct proposition. But the question remains:
Given the facts from which this case arose, was

a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the

appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or
vindicating its denial? The criminal case before
the respondent Judge was the normal venue for
invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional
liberty pending trial and judgment. The original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said
respondent. The correct course was for
petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a
petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to
bail per se by reason of the weakness of the
evidence against him. Only after that remedy
was denied by the trial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and
even then, not without first applying to the Court
of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
available there.

confederated

The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine

enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners
Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco
and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging
simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are
entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a
matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character,
the proceedings in both cases are ordered
remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners.
Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of
the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied
with this Court shall become functus oficio. No
pronouncement as to costs.

him unconscious, he tied Igancio's hands and

feet

12. NAPOLIS v COURT OF

APPEALS

spouses.

and helped one another, with the intent to gain

and
armed with Grease Gun, pistols and revolvers,
entered the dwelling of the spouses Iganacio &
Casimira Penaflor by boring a hole under the
sidewall of the ground floor of the house.
Nicanor assaulted and hit Ignacio with the
gun causing him to fall on the ground and
rendering

and then leave him. Then the accused

approached
Casimira, threatened her at gun point and
demanded
money. He tied the hands of Mrs Penaflor and
her two
sons. Nicanor searched and ransacked the
place and
carried away cash and articles belonging to the
said

Complex Crime
PENALTIES, IN VIEW:
FACTS:

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision

About 1am of Oct 1, 1956, accused Nicanor

of the trial court convicting Napolis an his band

oF

Napolis and some other men conspired,

SC HELD:
the crime of robbery committed by armeD
persons, in

1. Yes. The elements of both provisions (Arts

299

an inhabited house, entry therein having been

made

(a) & 294 (5)) are present calling for the

by breaking a wall, as provided in ART 229 (a)

of

imposition, as provided in Art 48 of the RPC, of

the

RPC and sentencing Napolis to an

indeterminate

penalty for the most serious offense, in its

maximum

penalty ranging from 10 yrs & 1 day (prision

mayor)

period.

as minimum, to 17 yrs & 4 mos & 1day

(reclusion

2. SC modified the penalties imposed and

affirmed
the decision of Ct of Appeals. Penalty should be

temporal) as maximum.
In performing said acts: used violence
against Ignacio and intimidation against his
wife ,

imposed in its maximum period- from 19 yrs, 1

mo &
11 days to 20 yrs of reclusion temporal- owing
to

to prision mayor (in its medium pd).

Hence, Art 224 is lighter than that
prescribed in ARt 229.

ISSUE:
1. W/n the facts of the case constitute complex
crime?
2. W/n the penalties imposed by Ct of Appeals
correct?

Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in

Manila. Jose's three children had stayed in
Manilaalso since 1964. Antonio decided to go to
Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora
tellinghim that she would give him money.

To have money for his expenses, Antonio killed

a pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife for
sixtypesos. Jose decided to go with Antonio in
order to see his children. He was able to raise
eighty-five pesos for his expenses.

the prsence of the aggravating cicumstances of

Leonora gave her father P50. Antonio's

grandson, gave him P30. Antonio placed the
eightypesos in the right pocket of his pants.

nighttime.

thereby infringing ART 224 (5) which prescribes

penalty of prision correctional (in its maximum
pd)

(
both the accused
), twins, both married, are natives of
BarrioNenita Samar. They are illiterate farmers
tilling their own lands.

People v
Toling ( NO
Issues/
Held)
13.

Complex Crimes
FACTS:

Antonio Toling
and
Jose Toling

After buying their tickets home, they boarded the

night Bicol express train at about five o'clockin
the afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that
evening. The twins were in coach No. 9.

Each seat in the coach faced an opposite seat.

An aisle separated the two rows. The
brotherswere seated side by side on the
fourth
three-passenger seat from the rear, facing the
back door.Jose was seated between Antonio,
who was near the window, and a three-year old
boy. Besidethe boy was a woman breast-feeding
her baby who was near the aisle. That woman

wasCorazon Bernal. There were more than one

hundred twenty passengers in the coach.
Somepassengers were standing on the aisle.

Sitting on the
third
seat and facing the brothers were two men and
an old woman who wassleeping with her head
resting on the back of the seat. on the twopassenger seat across theaisle in line with the
seat where the brothers were sitting, there were
seated a fat woman, whowas near the window,
and one Cipriano Reganet who was on her left.
On the opposite seat wereseated a woman, her
daughter and Amanda Mapa with an eightmonth old baby. They were infront of Reganet.

The train stopped at Cabuyao, Laguna, and not

long after it resumed regular speed,
Antoniostood up and stabbed the man sitting
directly in front of him with scissors. Jose
stabbed thesleeping old woman sitting in front of
him with a knife.

The twins ran amuck and started stabbing the

people in the coach. They were finally
stoppedwhen Constabulary soldiers aboard the
train heard about the incident. At that
time,Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Rayel was
not on duty and was simply taking his wife child
toQuezon. He was at the dining car when the
incident happened. Constabulary Sargeant
VicenteAldea was in the dining car as well.

The dead amounted to twelve. Eight suffered

from stab wounds while others died after
they jumped off the train, apparently trying
to escape the violence. Seven were injured,
though oneof them was reported to have died as
well

14. People vs SalvillaApril 26,

1990Melencho Herrera, J
Facts:

Petitioner: Bienvenido Salvilla

April 12, 1986, at about noon time Petitioner,

together with Reynaldo, Ronaldo and Simplicio
(all surnamedCanasares), staged a robbery at
the New Iloilo Lumber Yard

They were armed with homemade guns and a

hand grenade

On their way inside the establishment, they met

Rodita Habiero, an employee there who was on
her way out for her meal break, and informed
her that it was a hold-up.

They went inside the office and the petitioner

pointed his gun at Severino Choco, the owner,
and his two daughters, Maryand Mimmie. They
informed Severino that all they needed
was money.

Severino asked Mary to get a paper bag wherein

he placed P20,000 cash (P5000 acc to the
defense) and handed it to the petitioner.

Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and

wristwatch of Severino after which the latter, his
2 daughters and Rodita werekept inside the
office.

According to the appellant, he stopped Severino

from getting the wallet and watches.

At about 2:00 of the same day, the appellant told

Severino to produce P100,000 so he and the
other hostages can bereleased. Severino told
him it would be hard to do that since banks are
closed because it was a Saturday

The police and military authorities had

surrounded the lumber yard. Major Melquiades
Sequio, Station Commander of the INP of Iloilo
City, negotiated with the accused and appealed
to them to surrender. The accused refused to
surrender and release the hostages.

Rosa Caram, OIC Mayor of Iloilo City, joined the

negotiations. Appellant demanded P100,000, a
coaster, and someraincoats. Caram offered
P50,000 instead. Later, the accused agreed to
receive the same and to release Rodita
to beaccompanied by Mary in going out of the
office. One of the accused gave a key to Mayor
Caram and with the key,Mayor Caram unlocked
the door and handed to Rodita P50,000, which
Rodita gave to one of the accused.

Rodita was later set free but Mary was herded

back to the office.

The police and military authorities decided to

assault the place when the accused still wouldnt
budge after moreultimatums. This resulted to
injuries to the girls, as well as to the accused
Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares. Marysright
leg had to be amputated due to her injuries.

The appellant maintained that the money, wallet

and watches were all left on the counter and
were never touched bythem. He also claimed
that they never fired on the military because they
intended to surrender.Issues:

WON the crime of robbery was consummated

WON there was a mitigating circumstance of

voluntary surrender
Ratio:

Yes. The robbery shall be deemed

consummated if the unlawful taking is
complete.
o
Unlawful taking of personal property of another
is an essential part of the crime of robbery. The

respondentclaimed that none of the items

(money, watches and wallet) were recovered
from them. However, based on theevidence, the
money demanded, the wallet and the wristwatch
were within the dominion and control of
theappellant and his co-accused and thus the
taking was completed.
o
It is not necessary that the property be taken
into the hands of the robber or that he should
have actually carriedthe property away, out of
the physical presence of the lawful possessor, or
that he should have made his escapewith it.

No. The surrender of the appellant and his coaccused cannot be considered in their favour to
mitigate their liability.
o
To be mitigating, a surrender must have the
following requisites: that the offender had not
been actuallyarrested, that the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority or to
his agent, and that the surrender
wasvoluntary. The surrender by the appellant
and his co-accused hardly meets these
requirements. There is novoluntary surrender to
speak of.
Note: The nature of the linked offenses
(robbery with serious physical injuries and
serious illegal detention) was also
discussed.The detention in the case at bar was
not only incidental to the robbery but was a
necessary means to commit the same so
thenature of the offense was affirmed.
Held:
Judgment appealed is AFFIRMED

16. People v. Simon

234 SCRA 555, 569 (1994)G.R. No.
93028Facts:
Accused-appellant Martin Simon was charged
with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an
indictment alleging he sold four tea bags of

marijuana to a NarcoticsCommand (NARCOM)

poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of P40.00.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant Simon should
be given a lighter punishment of sixmonths to
six years instead of reclusion perpetua,
pursuant to the amendments of Republic Act
No. 7659 to Republic Act No. 6425
Held:
Yes, since Republic Act No. 7659 was effected on
December 31, 1993.

Mando ng ungol mula sa loob. Pilit niyang

binuksan ang pintuan sa pamamagitan ng
balisong na lagi niyang dala para proteksyon sa
sarili. Nang nabuksan na niya ang pinto, nakita
niya ang asawa at si Jaime na nagtatalik.
Sinipa ni Jaime si Mando sa mukha. Sinaksak
naman ito ni Mando. At dahil mabilis ang pagatake, nawalan ng balanse si Jaime at nahulog.
Sinaksak siya ni Mando sa tiyan. Samantala,
kumuha si Linda ng isang bote at ipinukpok sa
ulo ni Mando habang sumisigaw na "patayin mo
siya, Jaime, patayin mo, Jaime."

19. People vs Oyanib

( Tagalog Version) wala english
Misis, naaktuhang nakikipagtalik sa iba
IKAW AT ANG BATAS Ni IKAW AT ANG BATAS
ni Atty.Jose C. Sison | Updated February 1,
2003 - 12:00am
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LABINLIMANG taon nang kasal sina Mando at
Linda. Dalawa ang anak. Sa loob ng panahong
iyon, marami nang beses silang nagkaroon ng
samaan ng loob kaya sila ay nagdesisyong
maghiwalay.
Kahit hiwalay na, sinubukan pa ring suyuin ni
Mando si Linda na makipagbalikan ito para sa
mga bata. Subalit ipinagyabang pa ni Linda na
mayroon siyang kasintahan, si Jaime. Minsan ay
nakita ni Mando ang dalawa at binantaan ang
asawa ngunit tinakot pa siya ni Linda na
papatayin nito at ni Jaime.
Isang gabi matapos ang hapunan, kinailangang
puntahan ni Mando si Linda upang hilingin na
dumalo ito sa pulong ng mga magulang dahil
ang grado ng anak nilang lalaki ay bumagsak.
Nang makarating sa bahay ni Linda, nakarinig si

Dalawang beses sinaksak ni Mando si Jaime sa

tiyan samantalang sinaksak naman ni Linda ang
braso ni Mando ng basag na bote. Nagalit si
Mando kaya sinaksak niya si Linda sa kaliwang
dibdib at tatlong beses pa sa iba pang bahagi ng
katawan nito. Namatay ang dalawa samantalang
si Mando ay sumuko sa awtoridad.
Naakusahan si Mando ng murder at parricide.
Inamin niya ang mga pagpatay subalit sinabi
niyang ginawa niya ito sa ilalim ng "exceptional
circumstances" dahil nahuli niya ang kanyang
asawa at ang kalaguyo nito sa aktong pagtatalik
o pagkatapos na pagkatapos nito. Subalit
nahatulan siya ng Korte sa salang homicide at
parricide at nasentensiyahan ng reclusion
perpetua sa pagpatay niya sa asawa at
pinakamabigat na walong taong pagkakakulong
sa pagpatay kay Jaime. Tama ba ang hatol ng
Korte?
Mali. Kahit na aminin ni Mando ang mga
pagpatay, ang parusa rito ay hindi pa rin
maipapataw. Nang makita ni Mando ang asawa
at ang kalaguyo nito na nagtatalik, nanaig ang
kanyang selos at galit kaya’t sinaksak
niya si Jaime nang lumaban at nanipa. Ibinaling
niya ang galit sa asawa nang sa halip na

pumanig sa kanya ay ipinagtanggol pa ang

kalaguyo kaya sinaksak niya ito nang maraming
beses. Napatunayan na sinorpresa ni Mando
sina Linda at Jaime habang nagtatalik. Ang
kanyang aksyon ay saklaw ng Artikulo 247 ng
Kodigo Penal na ang mga elemento ay: (1) na
sinorpresa ng legal na asawa ang kanyang
asawa habang ito ay nakikipagtalik sa ibang tao;
(2) pinatay ang kanyang asawa at ang kalaguyo
sa akto ng pagtatalik o pagkatapos na
pagkatapos nito; (3) at hindi niya pinahintulutan
ang asawa sa pangangaliwa.
Ang pagtatanggol sa dangal ng isang tao ay
kinikilala dahil sa iskandalong maidudulot ng
nangangaliwang asawa; ang batas ay istriktong
pinapayagan na kastiguhin ang asawa
hanggang kamatayan.
Si Mando ay nahatulan ng dalawang taon at
apat na buwan na destierro. Batay sa parusang
ito, hindi siya pinapayagan ng Korte na pumasok
sa siyudad kung saan siya nakatira o sa lugar
ng pinangyarihan ng krimen o sa radius na 100
km. ng nasabing siyudad. (People of the
Philippines vs. Oyanib G.R. No. 130634-35
March 12, 2001)

21. . Pc formigones
Facts: In the month of November 1946,
Abelardo was living on his farm in Camarines
Sur with his wife, Julia Agricola and their 5
children. From there they transferred in the
house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones
in the same municipality to find employment as
harvesters of palay. After a month, Julia was
sitting at the head of the stairs of the house
when Abelardo, without previous quarrel or
provocation whatsoever, took his bofo from the
wall of the house and stabbed his wife Julia, in
the back, the blade penetrating the right lung
and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in
her death. Abelardo then took his dead wife and
laid her on the floor of the living room and then

lay down beside her. In this position, he was

found by the people who came in response to
the shouts made by his eldest daughter, Irene
Formigones.
The motive was admittedly that of jealousy
because according to his statement, he used to
have quarrels with his wife for reason that he
often saw her in the company of his brother,
Zacarias; that he suspected the two were
maintaining illicit relations because he noticed
that his wife had become indifferent to him.
During the preliminary investigation, the accused
pleaded guilty. At the case in the Courts of First
Instance, he also pleaded guilty but did not
testify. His counsel presented the testimony of
two guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo
was confined to the effect that his conduct was
rather strange and that he behaved like an
insane person, at times he would remain silent,
walk around stark naked, refuse to take a bath
and was his clothes etc... The appeal is based
merely on the theory that the appellant is an
IMBECILE and therefore exempt fromcriminal
liability under article 12 of the RPC.
Issue: Whether or not Abelardo is an imbecile at
the time of the commission of the crime and
therefore exempted from criminal liability
Held: No. He is not an imbecile. According Dr.
Francisco Gomes, he was suffering only from
feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he
could distinguish between right and wrong. In
order that a person could be regarded as an
imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the
RPC so as to be exempt from criminal liability,
he must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of will at the time of
committing the crime.
As to the strange behavior of the accused during
his confinement, assuming it was not feigned to
stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to
his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a
morbid mental condition produced by remorse at

having killed his wife. A man who could feel the

pangs of jealousy and take violent measures to
the extent of killing his wife who he suspected of
being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing
so, he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be
regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not the
suspicions were justified, is of little or no
importance. The fact is that he believed
her faithless. Furthermore, in his written
statement, he readily admitted that he killed his
wife, and at the trial he made no effort to deny of
repudiate said written statements, thus saving
the government all the trouble and expense of
catching him and securing his conviction.
There are however 2 mitigating circumstances
present:
1) Passion or obfuscation (having killed his wife
in a jealous rage)
2) Feeblemindedness
In conclusion, the appellant is found guilty of
parricide and the judgment of the lower court is
hereby affirmed with the modification that
he appellant will be credited with one-half of any
preventive imprisonment he has undergone
(because of the 2 mitigating circumstances)

22. PABLO C. FRANCISCO v.

COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS G.R.
No. 108747. April 6, 1995
FACTS:
Pablo Francisco was accused of multiple grave
oral defamation by his employees. The
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati sentenced him
of prision correccional in its minimum period in
each crime committed on each date of each
case. Francisco then elevated the case to the
RTC in which they sentenced him only of eight
straight months for appreciating mitigating
circumstances.

Francisco failed to make an appeal on the RTCs

decision making it final. The MTC issued a
warrant of arrest, but before Francisco was to be
arrested, he filed an application for probation
which the MTC denied. He went to the Court of
Appeals on certiorari which was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether Pablo Francisco is still qualified
to avail of probation.
RULING:
No. Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.
First, Francisco violated Sec.4 of the Probation
Law in which no application for probation shall
be entertained after the judgement is final.
Second, Francisco misunderstood when he
thought that his prison sentence held by the
MTC was not qualified for probation. Multiple
prison terms should not be added up.
Consequently, Francisco lost his right to
probation when he appealed the MTC decision
to the RTC. The law considers appeal and
probation mutually exclusive remedies.
Third, Franciscos appeal to the RTC was not for
reducing his penalties but for his assertion of his
innocence. The Probation Law prevent
opportunism when petitioners apply for
probation when their appeal was dismissed.
Lastly, the application for probation was filed
way beyond the period allowed by law.

26. In Baclayon v. Mutia,

the Court declared that an order placing
defendant on probation is not a sentence but is
rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition
of sentence. We held that the grant of probation
to petitioner suspended the imposition of the
principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as
the accessory penalties of suspension from
public office and from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage.

We thus deleted from the order granting

probation the paragraph which required that
petitioner refrain from continuing with her
teaching profession.

27.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES VS. ROGELIO
BAYOTAS Y CORDOVA
236 SCRA 239, September 2, 1994
Facts:
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, accused-appellant,
was charged with rape before Branch 16, RTC
Roxas City (Criminal Case No. C-3217). He was
convicted on June 19, 1991. Pending appeal of
his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4,
1992, at the National Bilibid Hospital due to
cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma
gastric malingering.
The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal
aspect of the appeal in a resolution dated May
20, 1992.
Issue:
Does death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
Held:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the
death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directlyarising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives

notwithstanding the death of accused, if the

same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained
in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing
a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained
above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not
fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In
such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that
should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.
The appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is
dismissed with costs de oficio.

30. PEOPLE VS PATRIARCA

Facts: Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., a
member of the NPA, was found guilty by the trial
court of the crime of murder for the death of
Alfredo Arevalo and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant
appealed the decision of the RTC.

Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under

Proclamation No. 724. His application was
favorably granted by the National Amnesty
Board concluding that his activities were done in
pursuit of his political beliefs.

accused-appellants were grantedconditional

pardon. But the Court ruled in resolution that the
conditional pardon granted to accusedappellants is void for having been extended
during the pendency of their appeal. Prior to the
resolution, the NAC favorably acted on the
applications for amnesty of accused-appellants.

Issue: What is the effect of the grant of amnesty

to the conviction of the accused-appellant?

While the pardon in this case was void for

having been extended during the pendency of
the appeal or before conviction by final judgment
and,therefore, in violation of the first paragraph
of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant
of amnesty, for which accused-appellants
voluntarilyapplied under Proclamation No. 347
was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in
by both Houses of Congress.

Issue: Whether or not the release of accusedappellants is valid

Held: Amnesty commonly denotes a general
pardon to rebels for their treason or other high
political offenses, or the forgiveness which one
sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who
have offended, by some breach, the law of
nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes
and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which
he is charged, that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense.
Paragraph 3 of Art. 89 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by amnesty, which completely
extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
The grant of amnesty serves to put an end to the
appeal. Accused-appellant is acquitted of the
crime of murder.

31. P Vs casido gr 116512 mar 7,

1997
Facts: In an effort to seek their release at the
soonest possible time, accused-appellants
William Casido and Franklin Alcorin applied for
pardon before the Presidential Committee on the
Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as
well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty
Commission (NAC). The PCGBRP was
constituted in line with the confidence-building
measures of the government. Thereafter,

Held: The release of accused-appellants was

valid solely on the ground of the
amnesty granted them and not by the pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as
such it is a private act which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned because the
courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
the Proclamation of theChief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act
of which the courts should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while
amnesty is to classes of persons or communities
who may be guilty of political offenses, generally
before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender
from the consequences of an offense of which
he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or
forgives the punishment, and for that reason
it does not work the restoration of the rights to
hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless
such rights be expressly restored by the terms of
the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit
from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon him by the sentence. While amnesty looks
backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion
the offenseitself, it so overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged that the
person released by amnesty stands before the
law precisely as though he had committed
no offense.

32. Barrioquintos et al vs.

Fernandez
FACTS
Petitioner Norberto Jimenez and Loreto
Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of
murder. Barrioquinto had not yet been arrested.
The case proceeded against Jimenez and he
was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Before the period of perfecting an appeal had
expired, Jimenez availed of Proclamation No. 8.
However, the Amnesty Commission had their
cases returned to the CFI-Zamboanga, without
deciding whether or not they are entitled to the
benefit s of the said Amnesty Proclamation, on
the ground that neither Barrioquinto alleged that
it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed the
victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of
amnesty.
ISSUE
WON petitioners are precluded from availing the
benefits of Amnesty as they have not admitted to
the commission of the crime.
RULING
No. Respondents fail to differentiate between
amnesty and pardon.

In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the

Amnesty Proclamation of 1946, it is not
necessary that he should, as a condition
precedent or sine qua non, admit having
committed the criminal act or offense with which
he is charged and allege the amnesty as a
defense; it is sufficient that the evidence either of
the complainant or the accused, shows that the
offense committed comes within the terms of
said Amnesty Proclamation.

34. Florencio Pelobello vs

Gregorio Palatino

Absolute Pardon
Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos,
Marinduque. Pelobello filed a quo warranto
proceeding alleging that Palatino is no longer
qualified to hold office because he was already
convicted before and was even imprisoned.
Because of such conviction and imprisonment,
Peleobello averred that Palatino is already
barred from voting and being voted upon.
Palatino also invoked par (a), sec 94 of the
Election Code which supports his contention.
ISSUE: Whether or not Palatino is eligible for
public office.
HELD: Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional
pardon by the then Gov-Gen but such pardon
was converted into an absolute pardon by
President Quezon who succeeded the Gov-Gen.
The pardon was already after Palatinos election
but prior to him assuming office. The SC then
held that since there is an absolute pardon, all
the former disabilities imposed and attached to
the prior conviction had been removed and that
Palatino is therefore eligible for the public office
in question.
35. G.R No. L-4164, December 12, 1952

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION

OF INFANTE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
ANTONIO INFANTE, PETITIONER
AND APPELLE,
Vs
THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF
NEGROS ACCIDENTAL,
RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT
TUASON, J.:
FACTS:
Antonio Infante (petitioner), herein, was
convicted of murder and was sentenced to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day. After serving 15
years, 7 months, and 11 days of his sentence,
he was granted a conditional pardon and
released from imprisonment. The period of the
sentence remaining to be served was 1 year and
11 days. The condition of the pardon was that
he shall not again violate any of the penal law
of the Philippines. After 10 years on the date he
was released from imprisonment, Antonio
Infante was convicted of a violation of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law for driving a jeep
without a license and was sentenced to pay P10
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Infante can be rearrested and serve the unexpired term or period
of his sentence for breach of the conditions of
the aforesaid pardon
HELD:
A conditional pardon delivered and
accepted has been said to constitute a contract
between the sovereign power or the executive
and the criminal that the former will release the
latter upon compliance with the conditions.

According to article 93 of the Revised

Penal Code the period of prescription of
penalties commences to run from the date when
the culprit should evade the service of his
sentence. It is evident from the provision that
evasion of the sentence is an essential element
of prescription. There has no such evasion in
this case.
The condition of the pardon which the
prisoner was charged with having breached was
no longer operative when he committed a
violation of Motor Vehicle Law.
Pardon is an act of grace, and there is
general agreement that limitations upon its
operation should be strictly construed (46 C.J.
1202); so that, where a conditional pardon is
susceptible of more than one interpretation, it is
to be construed most favorably to the grantee.
(39 Am. Jur., 564) Thus, in Huff vs. Dyer, 40
Ohio C.C. 595, 5. L R A, N S, Note 1064), it was
held that the duration of the conditions
subsequent, annexed to a pardon, would be
limited to the period of the prisoner's
sentence unless an intention to extend it
beyond that time was manifest from the nature
of the condition or the language in which it was
imposed. In that case, the prisoner was
discharged on habeas corpusbecause the term
of the pardon in question did not, in the opinion
of the court, imply that it was contemplated to
have the condition operated beyond the term of
his sentence. The herein petitioner's pardon, it
will be noted, does not state the time within
which the conditions thereof were to be
performed or observed. In adopting, which we
hereby do, the rule of strict construction, we take
into account, besides the benevolent nature of
the pardon, the fact that the general run out
prisoners are unlettered or at least unfamiliar
with the intricacies and legal implications of
conditions subsequent imposed in a pardon.

36.
Carpio

vs.
Doroja
( Kulang
Ruling)
G.R. No. 84516 December 5, 1989DIONISIO
CARPIO, petitioner,vs.HON. SERGIO
DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch IV,
Zamboanga City) and EDWIN RAMIREZ Y
WEE, respondents
Facts:Edwin Ramirez, while driving a passenger
Fuso Jitney owned and operated by
EduardoToribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a
pedestrian crossing the street, as
a consequence of which the latter suffered from
a fractured left clavicle as reflected in the
medico-legalcertificate and sustained injuries
which required medical attention for a period of
(3) three months.T h e C o u r t h e l d t h e
accused
EDW IN RAMIREZ y W EE guilty
a s a p r i n c i p a l b e y o n d reasonable
doubt of the Amended Information to
which he voluntarily pleaded guilty and
appreciating this mitigating circumstance in his
favor, hereby sentences him to suffer
thep e n a l t y o f O n e ( 1 ) m o n t h a n d O n e
( 1 ) d a y t o Two ( 2 ) m o n t h s o f Ar r e s t o
M a y o r i n i t s minimum period. The accused
is likewise ordered to indemnify the complainant
Dionisio A.Carpio . Thereafter, the accused filed
an application for probation.A writ of
execution dated March 10, 1988 was duly
served upon the accused but was,
h o we ve r, r e t u rn e d u n sa t i sf ie d d u e t o
the insolvency of the accused as
s h o w n b y t h e sheriffs return. Thus,
complainant moved for a subsidiary writ
of execution against the subsidiary liability
of the owner-operator of the vehicle. The same
was denied by the trialcourt on two grounds,
namely, the decision of the appellate court made
no mention of thesubsidiary liability of

Eduardo Toribio, and the nature of the

accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and
not culpa-contractual." A motion for
reconsideration of the said order
wasdisallowed for the reason
that complainant having failed to raise
the matter of subsidiary liability with the
appellate court, said court rendered its
decision which has become finaland
executory and the trial court has no power to
alter or modify such decision.
Issue:Whether or not the subsidiary liability of
the owner-operator may be enforced in the
samecriminal proceeding against the
driver where the award was given, or in a
separate civilaction.
Ruling:The law involved in the instant case
is Article 103 in relation to Article 100,
both of theRevised Penal Code, which reads
thus:Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other
persons. The subsidiary liability established in
then e x t p r e c e d i n g a r t i c l e s h a l l a p p l y
to employers, teachers, persons, an
d c o r p o r a t i o n s engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their servants,
pupils, workmen,apprentices, or employees in
the discharge of their duties

39. Crim Law 1 Case Digest: Quinto

V.

Andres 2005

Quinto v. Andres

G.R. No. 155791 March 16, 2005

Lessons Applicable: Proximate cause, EX to
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.
Laws Applicable:
FACTS:

November 13, 1995 7:30 am: Edison

Garcia, 11 year-old and Grade 4
elementary school pupil, and his
playmate, Wilson Quinto saw Dante
Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the
mouth of a drainage culvert.
Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to
go fishing with them inside the drainage
culvert. Wilson agreed while Garcia
seeing that it was dark inside, opted to
remain seated in a grassy area about
two meters from the entrance of the
drainage system
Only Pacheco had a
flashlight. Pacheco, who was holding a
fish, came out of the drainage system
and left without saying a word. Then,
Andres came out, went back inside, and
emerged again carrying Wilson who was
already dead. He laid his body down in
the grassy area.
Garcia, shocked, fled from the
scene. Andres went to the house of
Melba Quinto, Wilsons mother, and
informed her that her son had
died. They rushed to the drainage
culvert. Wilson was buried without any
complaints filed.
November 28, 1995: National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) took the sworn
statements of Pacheco, Garcia and
Quinto
Pacheco alleged that he had
never been to the drainage system
catching fish with Andres and Wilson
Dr. Dominic Aguda of the NBIs autopsy
showed that the cause death is
drowning with traumatic head injuries as
contributory
NBI filed a criminal complaint for
homicide against Andres and Pacheco
with the RTC
Dr. Dominic Aguda testified that
Wilson could have fallen, and that the
occipital portion of his head could have
hit a blunt object, That the 14x7-

centimeter hematoma at the back of

Wilsons head could have rendered the
him unconscious so he drowned. The
4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right
side of Wilsons face could have also
been caused by rubbing against a
concrete wall or pavement, or by contact
with a rough surface. He also stated
that the trachea region was full of mud,
but that there was no sign of
strangulation.
RTC: granted demurer to evidence on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence
CA: Affirmed RTC

o
ISSUE: W/N Acquittal in criminal case bars a
civil action where the judgment of acquittal holds
that the accused did not commit the criminal
acts imputed to them

HELD: YES. petition is DENIED

Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.
The civil liability of such person established in
Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal
Code includes restitution, reparation of the
damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages
GR: When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action
EX: the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action
With the implied institution of the civil
action in the criminal action, the two
actions are merged into one composite
proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil.
The prime purpose of the criminal action
is to punish the offender in order to deter
him and others from committing the
same or similar offense, to isolate him

o
o

from society, to reform and rehabilitate

him or, in general, to maintain social
order.
The sole purpose of the civil action is
the restitution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended
party for the damage or injury he
sustained by reason of the delictual or
felonious act of the accused
While the prosecution must prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged, it is required to prove the cause of
action of the private complainant against the
accused for damages and/or restitution.
Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is
concerned, the prosecution or the private
complainant is burdened to adduce
preponderance of evidence or superior weight of
evidence. failed
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally
foreclosed because even Garcia testified that
the drainage culvert was dark, and that he
himself was so afraid that he refused to join
respondents Andres and Pacheco inside
failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part
of either respondent to kill the deceased before
or after the latter was invited to join them in
fishing
GR: The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil action.
EX: civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the civil action that the act or
omission from where the civil liability may arise
does not exist
a person committing a felony is
criminally liable for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting
therefrom although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he
intended
Natural - an occurrence in the ordinary course of
human life or events
Logical - a rational connection between the act of
the accused and the resulting injury or damage

The felony committed must be the

proximate cause of the resulting injury
o Proximate cause
cause which in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred
acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately, or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor
o There must be a relation of cause and effect,
cause = felonious act of the offender
effect = resultant injuries and/or death of the
victim.
The cause and effect relationship is
not altered or changed because of the
o pre-existing conditions
pathological condition of the victim
predisposition of the offended party
physical condition of the offended party
o concomitant or concurrent conditions
negligence or fault of the doctors
conditions supervening the felonious act
tetanus
pulmonary infection
gangrene
not the proximate cause of the resulting
injury when:
1. there is an active force that intervened between
the felony committed and the resulting injury,
and the active force is a distinct act or fact
absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the
accused; or
2. the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of
the victim
The offender is criminally liable for the
death of the victim if his delictual act
caused, accelerated or contributed to
the death of the victim.
the prosecution was burdened to prove
the corpus delicti which consists of two
things:
1. first, the criminal act - objective

2.

second, defendants agency in the commission

of the act - subjective element of crimes

In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the

prosecution is burdened to prove:
1. the death of the party alleged to be dead
2. that the death was produced by the criminal act
of some other than the deceased and was not
the result of accident, natural cause or suicide
3. that defendant committed the criminal act or
was in some way criminally responsible for the
act which produced the death

40. Heirs of Castro vs. Bustos

Facts:

Respondent Apolonio Bustos was charged in th

e Court of First Instance of Pampanga on
October 26, 1962 with the crime of murder for
the killing of Raymundo Castro whose heirs are
now the petitioners. The trial court found Bustos
guilty only of homicide and, crediting him with
two mitigating circumstances, namely, passion
or obfuscation and voluntary surrender,
sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term
of2 years, 4 months and 1 day of
prision correccional
, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor
, as maximum, and to indemnify the petitioners,
who were represented in the case by a private
prosecutor, in the sum of six thousand pesos
(P6,000) "without prejudice to whatever the
accused (respondent) is entitled from the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
for his services of around twenty-six (26) years
as a public schoolteacher, prior to October 20,
1962." Both respondent and petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals,
respondentasking that appellate, court acquit
him and petitioners praying, on the other hand,
that respondent be convicted ofmurder, that the
portion regarding what said respondent
willreceive from the GSIS be deleted and that he
be ordered topay petitioners "the aggregate sum
of P50,764.00 as indemnity and actual,

moral, temperate and exemplary damages." For

the purposes of their appeal, petitioners even
filed unnecessarily a printed record on appeal.
On October18, 1965, the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment modifying that of the trial
court insofar as it concerned (1) the amount of
damages to be awarded petitioners thus: ...
Aside from the P6,000 indemnity awarded by the
trial court, which we uphold, we feel justified,
in the exercise of our discretion, to award to the
heirs of the deceased moral damages in the
amount of P6,000 plus P13,380.00 to
compensate for the loss of earning of the
decedent at the annual salary ofP2,676.00 ....
The arguments interposed by the appellant in
his Motion for consideration to support the
complete reversal of the judgment appealed
from, have been considered and passed upon in
our decision, and we see no reason to alter the
same in so far as the appellant's guilt of the
crime is concerned. On the other hand,
we agree with the appellant that in the interest of
justice and equity and in view of the presence of
two mitigating circumstances, without any
aggravating one to offset them, the award of
moral and compensatory damages should be
eliminated.

petitioners have appealed to Us. The prayer in t

heir petitionfor certiorari asks for nothing more
than that the amended decision of the Court
of Appeals be revoked and reversed, and its
original decision be affirmed
in toto
insofar as the award of indemnity and damages
is concerned
Held: Petition granted.

Court discussed damages (YES, all the kinds O

_O)

"every person criminally liable for a felony is als

o civilyliable." (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code).
This civil liability, incase the felony involves

death, includes indemnification for consequential

damages (Art. 104,
id
.) and said consequential damages in turn
include "... those suffered by his family or by a
third person by reason of the crime." (Art.107,
id
.) Since these provisions are subject, however,
as above indicated, to certain provisions of
the Civil Code, We will now turn to said
provisions.

GR: In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant

shall be liablefor all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. It is not necessary that
such damages have been foreseen or could
have reasonably been foreseen by
the defendant. (Art. 2202)

When w/ death: 2206

The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above

article hasalready been increased by this Court
first, to P6,000.00 in
People v. Amansec
, 80 Phil. 426, and lately to P12,000.00 inthe
case of
People v. Pantoja
, G. R. No. L-18793,promulgated October 11,
1968, and it must be stressed thatthis amount,
as well as the amount of moral damages, maybe
adjudicated
even without proof
of pecuniary loss, theassessment of the moral
damages being "left to thediscretion of the court,
according to the circumstances ofeach case."
(Art. 2216)

Stated differently, when death occurs as a

result of a crime,the heirs of the deceased are
entitled to the following itemsof damages:

1.
As indemnity for the death of the victim of the off
ense


P12,000.00, without the need of any evidence
or proof ofdamages, and even though there may
have been mitigatingcircumstances attending
the commission of the offense.

2.
As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the d
eceased

an amount to be fixed by the Court according to

thecircumstances of the deceased related to his
actual incomeat the time of death and his
probable life expectancy, thesaid indemnity to
be assessed and awarded by the court asa
matter of duty, unless the deceased had no
earningcapacity at said time on account of
permanent disability notcaused by the accused.
If the deceased was obliged to givesupport,
under Art. 291, Civil Code, the recipient who is
notan heir, may demand support from
the accused for not morethan five years, the
exact duration to be fixed by the court.

3. As moral damages for mental anguish,

an amount to befixed by the court. This may be

recovered even by theillegitimate descendants
and ascendants of the deceased.

4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is att

ended byone or more aggravating
circumstances,

an amount to befixed in the discretion of the

court, the same to be consideredseparate from
fines.

5. As attorney's fees and expresses of litigation,

theactual amount thereof, (but only when

a separate civil actionto recover civil liability
has been filed or when exemplarydamages are
awarded).

6. Interests in the proper cases.

7.
It must be emphasized that the indemnities for lo
ss ofearning capacity of the deceased and
for moral damages are
recoverable separately from and in addition
to the fixed sumof P12,000.00 corresponding to
the indemnity for the solefact of death, and that
these damages may, however, berespectively
increased or lessened according to themitigating
or aggravating circumstances, except items
1 and4 above, for obvious reasons.

Court of Appeals erred in eliminating in its amen

deddecision, the items of moral damages
and compensation forloss of earning capacity of
the deceased

We, therefore, overrule the prayer for additional

damages inpetitioners' brief and We hold that,
on the basis of the factsnot questioned by
respondent, they are entitled only to
theP6,000.00 as moral damages and the
P13,380.00 ascompensatory damages for the
loss of earning capacity ofthe deceased
awarded in the original decision of the Court
of Appeals in addition, of course, to the
indemnity for deathfixed also by said court at
P6,000.00

41. The world in the eyes of a law student

LABELS: PERSONS
AND
FAMILY
RELATIONS, PERSONS CASES
THURSDAY, MAY 8, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROGELIO
BAYOTAS Y CORDOVA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

VS. ROGELIO BAYOTAS Y
CORDOVA
236 SCRA 239, September 2, 1994

Facts:
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, accused-appellant,
was charged with rape before Branch 16, RTC
Roxas City (Criminal Case No. C-3217). He was
convicted on June 19, 1991. Pending appeal of
his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4,
1992, at the National Bilibid Hospital due to
cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma
gastric malingering.
The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal
aspect of the appeal in a resolution dated May
20, 1992.
Issue:
Does death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
Held:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the
death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directlyarising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso
strictiore.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained

in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing
a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained
above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not
fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In
such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that
should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.
The appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is
dismissed with costs de oficio
Instigation and entrapment are distinguished
and determine

Fifth, the evidence on record belies that the

appellants were instigated to sell marijuana.
Instigation means luring the accused into a
crime that he, otherwise, had no intention to
commit, in order to prosecute him.[26] On the
other hand, entrapment is the employment of
ways and means in order to trap or capture a
lawbreaker.[27] Instigation presupposes that the
criminal intent to commit an offense originated
from the inducer and not the accused who had
no intention to commit the crime and would not
have committed it were it not for the initiatives by
the inducer.[28] In entrapment, the criminal
intent or design to commit the offense charged

originates in the mind of the accused; the law

enforcement officials merely facilitate the
apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses
and schemes.[29] In instigation, the law
enforcers act as active co-principals. Instigation
leads to the acquittal of the accused, while
entrapment does not bar prosecution and
conviction.[30]
To determine whether there is instigation or
entrapment, we held in People v. Doria[31]that
the conduct of the apprehending officers and the
predisposition of the accused to commit the
crime must be examined:
[I]n buy-bust operations demands that the
details of the purported transaction must be
clearly and adequately shown. This must start
from the initial contact between the poseurbuyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the
promise or payment of the consideration until
the consummation of the sale by the delivery of
the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner
by which the initial contact was made, whether
or not through an informant, the offer to
purchase the drug, the payment of the buybust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug,
whether to the informant alone or the police
officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by
courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not
unlawfully induced to commit an offense.
Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At
the same time, however, examining the conduct
of the police should not disable courts into
ignoring the accuseds predisposition to commit
the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of
habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal
proclivity, then this must also be considered.
Courts should look at all factors to determine the
predisposition of an accused to commit an
offense in so far as they are relevant to
determine the validity of the defense of
inducement
ordinary folk so they will know what is good and
bad for them, and that making them aware of the

law will help us all improve society as a whole.

This is free legal advice for everybody!
Entrapment
Entrapment is a form of arrest where police
resort to ways and means to capture a criminal
in the act of committing a crime. Its
most common form is the "Buy-bust Operation."
It has become increasingly common because of
the proliferation of smuggling, drugs and other
illegal
operations.
There
is,
however,
a precaution when
using entrapment as
a
means of arrest. Its effectivity is apparently
obvious, but can give way to abuse as well. It is
recognized as a valid defense that can be raised
by an accused and partakes the nature of a
confession by avoidance. It's a positive defense.
Entrapment vs. Instigation/Inducement
While entrapment requires
the
use
of
intelligence-gathering to identify criminals and
devise
stratagems
to
capture
them,
instigation/inducement employs trickery on the
part of the arresting officer, with the criminal
intent within his mind, to make an otherwise
innocent person commit a crime so he can be
arrested.
Entrapment enjoys a presumption of regularity,
so that if you want to prove that you're innocent
and you were instigated, you have to come up
with clear and convincing evidence. One way to
get that evidence is to ask the court for a reinvestigation.
You have to ask the question of whether the
conduct of the police was likely to make a
normally law-abiding person commit a crime.
Normally, most people will resist the temptation
to commit a crime. But if it can be proven that
the police acted overbearingly by badgering,
cajoling or importuning, or the opposite:
appealing to sentiments like pity, sympathy,

friendship, desperate illness or even patriotism,

there can be a ground for acquittal.
The courts have recognized the fact that there
are operatives in the police who have used this
method of arrest for illegal and wrongful

purposes. One such story is here. I wrote it

before. It's the one where the police framed a
man who was visiting his brother-in-law. The
courts recognize the danger of abuse
in entrapment, sometimes calling it "Vice
Legislation" and it's important that checks and

balances must be made inside and outside the

police force to protect the public from dirty cops
and the cops themselves from unwanted
elements.