FM 3-20.

15 [FM 17-15]
November 2001

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their

contractors. This publication contains technical or operational information that is for official
Government use. This determination was made on 1 October 2001. Other requests for this
document will be referred to G3/DPTM, Security Division, ATTN: PTF, Fort Knox, KY 401215000.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or
reconstruction of the document.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

* FM 3-20.15 (FM 17-15)

Field Manual
No. 3-20.15

Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 1 November 2001

TANK PLATOON
CONTENTS
Page
Preface ............................................................................................................................

ii

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................

1-1

Chapter 2

BATTLE COMMAND ........................................................................

2-1

Chapter 3

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS .............................................................

3-1

Chapter 4

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS .............................................................

4-1

Chapter 5

OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS ..................................................

5-1

Chapter 6

COMBAT SUPPORT ........................................................................

6-1

Chapter 7

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT .......................................................

7-1

Chapter 8

URBAN OPERATIONS ....................................................................

8-1

Appendix A

DIGITIZATION ..................................................................................

A-1

Appendix B

ORDERS AND REPORTS ...............................................................

B-1

Appendix C

LIGHT/HEAVY OPERATIONS .........................................................

C-1

Appendix D

CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS .........................................................

D-1

Appendix E

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, AND SMOKE

OPERATIONS ..............................................................................

E-1

Appendix F

STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS ..........

F-1

Appendix G

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ..................................................

G-1

Appendix H

RISK MANAGEMENT ......................................................................

H-1

Appendix I

FRATRICIDE PREVENTION ............................................................

I-1

Glossary

.......................................................................................................

Bibliography

..............................................................................................

Index

......................................................................................................

Glossary-1
Bibliography-1
Index-1

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their

contractors. This publication contains technical or operational information that is for official Government use.
This determination was made on 1 October 2001. Other requests for this document will be referred to
G3/DPTM, Security Division, ATTN: PTF, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5000.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction
of the document.
*This manual supersedes FM 17-15, 3 April 1996.

FM 3-20.15

PREFACE
This manual describes how the tank platoon fights. It focuses on the principles of platoon operations and
the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) the platoon uses to exploit its combat power and minimize its
vulnerabilities while conducting move, attack, and defend operations.
FM 3-20.15 is for leaders and crew members of all M1, M1A1, M1A2, and M1A2 SEP tank platoons.
Because weapons and equipment vary among units, users should adapt information to fit their specific
situations. Where capabilities of the various systems differ significantly, this manual examines alternative
considerations and techniques for their use.
In addition to FM 3-20.15, two publications are critical reference sources for the tank platoon. ARTEP
17-237-10-MTP, the mission training plan for the tank platoon, contains collective platoon tasks and outlines
training procedures and exercises. The other resource, FKSM 17-15-3, contains a detailed example of tactical
standing operating procedures (TSOP). Each tank platoon can modify the TSOP to meet its unique mission
requirements. For information on obtaining Fort Knox Supplemental Material (FKSM) publications, call (502)
624-2987/5848 (commercial) or 464-2987/5848 (DSN).
The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Users and readers of FM 3-20.15 are invited to
submit recommendations that will improve its effectiveness. Send comments and recommendations to
Commander, USAARMC, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-PG, Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121-5000. For additional
information, call (502) 624-2005/3539 or DSN 464-2005/3539.

ii

FM 3-20.15

CHAPTER 1

Introduction
The fundamental mission of the tank platoon is to close with and destroy the enemy. The platoons ability
to move, shoot, and communicateand do so with armored protectionis a decisive factor on the modern
battlefield. It moves, attacks, defends, and performs other essential tasks to support the company team or troop
mission. In accomplishing its assigned missions, the tank platoon employs firepower, maneuver, and shock
effect, synchronizing its capabilities with those of other maneuver elements and with combat support (CS) and
combat service support (CSS) assets. When properly supported, the platoon is capable of conducting sustained
operations against any sophisticated threat.
The tank platoon can survive and win in battle, however, only if it is well trained, effectively led, and
highly motivated. Crews must be aggressive, and their tactics must reflect the tempo and intensity of maneuver
warfare. Platoon training must prepare them to operate effectively in hostile territory with the enemy to their
front, flanks, and rear.

CONTENTS
Section 1.
Section 2.
Section 3.

Organizations ..................................................................................
Capabilities and Limitations ..........................................................
Responsibilities ..............................................................................

Page
1-1
1-3
1-4

SECTION 1 - ORGANIZATIONS
TANK PLATOON
By itself, any tank can be vulnerable in the face of diverse battlefield hazards (such as enemy forces or
unfavorable terrain) and situations; these vulnerabilities are significantly reduced when tanks are employed as
units.
The tank platoon is the basic element within the tank company. It consists of four main battle tanks
organized into two sections, with two tanks in each section. Section leaders are the platoon leader, who is the
tank commander (TC) of the vehicle designated as Tank 1, and the platoon sergeant (PSG), the TC of Tank 4.
Tank 2 is the wingman in the platoon leaders section, and Tank 3 is the wingman in the PSGs section (see
Figure 1-1).
The tank platoon is organic to tank companies and armored cavalry troops. The platoon may be crossattached to a number of organizations, commonly a mechanized infantry company, to create company teams. It
may also be placed under the operational control (OPCON) of light infantry organizations.
NOTE:

For information on light infantry organizations and their relationship with the tank platoon, refer to
the discussion in Appendix C of this manual and to FM 3-21.20 (FM 7-20). Additional information
concerning task organized company teams is found in Appendix C of this manual and in FM 3-90.1
(FM 71-1).

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FM 3-20.15

Figure 1-1. Tank platoon organization.

Under battlefield conditions, the wingman concept facilitates control of the platoon when it operates in
sections. The concept requires that one tank orient on another tank on either its left or right side. In the absence
of specific instructions, wingmen move, stop, and shoot when their leaders do. In the tank platoon, Tank 2
orients on the platoon leaders tank, while Tank 3 orients on the PSGs tank. The PSG orients on the platoon
leaders tank (see Figure 1-2).

Figure 1-2. The wingman concept.

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FM 3-20.15

TANK COMPANY
The tank company is organized, equipped, and trained to fight pure; it can also be task organized by
higher headquarters to fight with infantry as a company team. The tank company consists of a headquarters and
three tank platoons. The company headquarters is equipped with two tanks, one M113A2 armored personnel
carrier (APC), two M1025 or M998 high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV), and one cargo
truck with a 400-gallon water trailer (see Figure 1-3). A maintenance section from the battalion maintenance
platoon is normally attached to the tank company. The maintenance section consists of one APC, one heavy
recovery vehicle, and one utility truck with trailer carrying spare parts based on the prescribed load list (PLL).
A medic, normally attached from the battalion medical platoon, travels in another APC.

Figure 1-3. Tank company organization.

ARMORED CAVALRY TROOP

The armored cavalry troop is organized, equipped, and trained to protect and conserve the combat power
of other combined arms forces. While its primary missions are reconnaissance and security, the cavalry troop
may be called upon to execute attack, defend, and delay missions as part of squadron and regimental missions.
The armored cavalry troop consists of a headquarters, two tank platoons, two scout platoons, a mortar
section, and a maintenance section. The headquarters section is equipped with one main battle tank, one
command post (CP) carrier, one APC, one cargo truck, and two utility trucks. The scout platoons consist of six
M3 cavalry fighting vehicles (CFV). Equipment in the mortar and maintenance sections includes two 120-mm
mortars mounted in self-propelled carriers, one APC, one heavy recovery vehicle, one utility truck with cargo
trailer, and two cargo trucks with cargo trailers (see Figure 1-4).

Figure 1-4. Armored cavalry troop organization.

SECTION 2 - CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

To win in battle, leaders must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of their
equipment. This knowledge will assist the tank platoon leader in evaluating transportability, sustainment, and

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FM 3-20.15

mobility considerations for his own vehicles and for those with which the platoon may operate as part of a
company team or troop.

CAPABILITIES
Tanks offer an impressive array of capabilities on the modern battlefield: excellent cross-country
mobility, sophisticated communications, enhanced target acquisition, lethal firepower, and effective armor
protection. In combination, these factors produce the shock effect that allows armor units to close with and
destroy the enemy in most weather and light conditions.
Todays tanks can move rapidly under a variety of terrain conditions, negotiating soft ground, trenches,
small trees, and limited obstacles. In addition, global positioning systems (GPS) and inertial position navigation
(POSNAV) systems allow tanks to move to virtually any designated location with greater speed and accuracy
than ever before. Use of visual signals and the single channel ground/airborne radio system (SINCGARS)
facilitates rapid and secure communication of orders and instructions. This capability allows tank crews to
quickly mass the effects of their weapon systems while remaining dispersed to limit the effects of the enemys
weapons.
On-board optics and sighting systems enable tank crews to acquire and destroy enemy tanks, armored
vehicles, and fortifications using the main gun or to use machine guns to suppress enemy positions, personnel,
and lightly armored targets. The tanks armor protects crew members from small-arms fire, most artillery, and
some antiarmor systems.
Perhaps the most important technological advance available to the tank platoon is the digital information
capability of its vehicles. Some tank crews now employ the intervehicular information system (IVIS) and its
successor, the Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) system, to improve situational
understanding, command and control, and navigation. The enhanced capabilities provided by these digitized
systems represent a distinct advantage for the platoon leader. They enable him to gain and maintain the
initiative on the battlefield by synchronizing his elements with other units through the use of faster, more
accurate tactical information. Additional details on the capabilities and operational considerations of IVIS and
FBCB2 are provided in Appendix A and in discussions throughout this manual.

LIMITATIONS
Tanks require extensive maintenance, proficient operators, and skilled mechanics, as well as daily
resupply of large quantities of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) products. They are vulnerable to the
weapons effects of other tanks, attack helicopters, mines, antitank guided missiles (ATGM), antitank guns, and
close attack aircraft. When tanks operate in built-up areas, dense woods, or other restricted terrain, reduced
visibility leaves them vulnerable to dismounted infantry attacks as well. In such situations, they are usually
restricted to trails, roads, or streets; this severely limits maneuverability and observation. Existing or
reinforcing obstacles can also restrict or stop tank movement.

SECTION 3 - RESPONSIBILITIES
The tank crew is a tightly integrated team. Though all members have primary duties, success depends on
their effectiveness as a crew. They must work together to maintain and service their tank and equipment, and
they must function as one in combat. Crews must cross-train so each member can function at any of the other
crew positions.

PLATOON LEADER
The platoon leader is responsible to the commander for the discipline and training of his platoon, the
maintenance of its equipment, and its success in combat. He must be proficient in the tactical employment of
his section and of the platoon, both by itself and in concert with a company team or troop. He must have a solid

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FM 3-20.15

understanding of troop-leading procedures and develop his ability to apply them quickly and efficiently on the
battlefield.
The platoon leader must know the capabilities and limitations of the platoons personnel and equipment;
at the same time, he must be well versed in enemy organizations, doctrine, and equipment. He must serve as an
effective TC. Most important of all, the platoon leader must be flexible, capable of using sound judgment to
make correct decisions quickly and at the right times based on his commanders intent and the tactical situation.
Platoon leaders must know and understand the task force mission and the task force commanders intent.
They must be prepared to assume the duties of the company commander in accordance with the succession of
command.

PLATOON SERGEANT
The PSG is second in command of the platoon and is accountable to the platoon leader for the training,
discipline, and welfare of the soldiers in the platoon. He coordinates the platoons maintenance and logistics
requirements and handles the personal needs of individual soldiers. The PSG is the most experienced TC in the
platoon. His tactical and technical knowledge allow him to serve as mentor to crewmen, other NCOs, and the
platoon leader. His actions on the battlefield must complement those of the platoon leader. He must be able to
fight his section effectively, either in concert with the platoon leaders section or by itself.

TANK COMMANDER
The TC is responsible to the platoon leader and PSG for the discipline and training of his crew, the
maintenance of assigned equipment, the reporting of logistical needs, and the tactical employment of his tank.
He briefs his crew, directs the movement of the tank, submits all reports, and supervises initial first-aid
treatment and evacuation of wounded crewmen. He is an expert in using the tanks weapon systems, requesting
indirect fires, and executing land navigation.
The TC must know and understand the company mission and company commanders intent. He must be
prepared to assume the duties and responsibilities of the platoon leader or PSG in accordance with the
succession of command. These requirements demand that the TC maintain constant, thorough situational
understanding. He does this in several ways: by using all available optics for observation, by eavesdropping on
radio transmissions, and by monitoring the IVIS or FBCB2.

GUNNER
The gunner searches for targets and aims and fires both the main gun and the coaxial machine gun. He is
responsible to the TC for the maintenance of the tanks armament and fire control equipment. The gunner
serves as the assistant TC and assumes the responsibilities of the TC as required. He also assists other crew
members as needed. Several of his duties involve the tanks communications and internal control systems:
logging onto and monitoring communications nets; maintaining digital links if the tank is equipped with the
IVIS or FBCB2; inputting graphic control measures on digital overlays; and monitoring digital displays during
the planning and preparation phases of an operation.

DRIVER
The driver moves, positions, and stops the tank. While driving, he constantly searches for covered and
concealed routes and for covered positions to which he can move if the tank is engaged. He maintains his
tanks position in formation and watches for visual signals. If the tank is equipped with a steer-to indicator, the
driver monitors the device and selects the best tactical route. During engagements, he assists the gunner and TC
by scanning for targets and sensing fired rounds. The driver is responsible to the TC for the automotive
maintenance and refueling of the tank. He assists other crew members as needed.

1-5

FM 3-20.15

LOADER
The loader stows and cares for ammunition, loads the main gun and the coaxial machine gun ready box,
and aims and fires the loaders machine gun. He is also responsible to the TC for the maintenance of
communications equipment. Before engagement actions are initiated, the loader searches for targets and acts as
air guard or ATGM guard. He also assists the TC as needed in directing the driver so the tank maintains its
position in formation. He assists other crew members as necessary. Because the loader is ideally positioned
both to observe around the tank and to monitor the tanks digital displays, platoon leaders and TCs should give
strong consideration to assigning their second most experienced crewman as the loader.

1-6

FM 3-20.15

CHAPTER 2

Battle Command
Battle command is the process of assimilating thousands of bits of information and using the data to
visualize the battlefield, assess the situation, and direct military action required to achieve victory. Thinking
and acting are simultaneous activities for leaders in battle.
The process known as command and control is the biggest challenge faced by combat leaders on the
modern battlefield. Command involves directing various combat, CS, and CSS elements; control entails the
measures taken to make sure these directions are carried out. Even the most knowledgeable tactician will be
ineffective if he cannot properly use the techniques available to direct and control his combat elements.
In exercising command and control, the tank platoon leader, assisted by the PSG, employs a variety of
techniques to prepare for operations, issue orders, employ the platoon, and communicate. The success of this
process rests mainly on decisive leadership, realistic training, thoroughly understood standing operating
procedures (SOP), and the effective use of communications equipment. For maximum efficiency, the platoon
leader must keep command and control as simple as possible while ensuring that he provides the platoon with
all required information and instructions.

CONTENTS
Section 1.
Section 2.

Command ...................................................................................
Control .......................................................................................

Page
2-1
2-12

SECTION 1 - COMMAND
Command has two vital components: decision-making and leadership. This section examines in detail
how the platoon leader and his subordinate leaders use these elements to develop the flexible, productive
command structure that is the catalyst for success on the battlefield.

DECISION-MAKING
Decision-making is a conscious process for selecting a course of action (COA) from two or more
alternatives. At platoon level, many decisions are based on SOPs and standard unit drills. SOPs and drills
cover an array of routine and emergency actions, such as evacuation of wounded soldiers, rearming and
resupply procedures, and individual crew responsibilities; they allow the platoon to operate quickly and
efficiently without constant guidance from the platoon leader. SOPs are especially critical in helping to
maintain combat preparedness when leaders are tired or under stress as a result of continuous operations.
Because of this, it is absolutely necessary that everyone in the platoon thoroughly understand all applicable
SOPs. Refer to FKSM 17-15-3 for a sample SOP that can be adapted for use in various tank platoon
organizations.

Troop-leading procedures
Troop-leading is a dynamic process that begins when the platoon receives a new mission or is notified by
warning order that a new mission is imminent. Most tactical decisions are made by the company or troop
commander, who then announces them in the form of orders that include his intent and concept of the operation.

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FM 3-20.15

Based on these orders, the platoon leader uses troop-leading procedures to organize his time during planning
and preparation and to translate the operation into instructions his soldiers can understand. He can then lead the
platoon more effectively in the execution of the mission.
Whenever possible, the eight steps of troop-leading procedures are integrated and accomplished
concurrently rather than sequentially. Time management is the key. The platoon leader maximizes available
planning time by starting as soon as he receives the first bit of information about the upcoming operation. He
normally uses one-third of the available time to plan, prepare, and issue the order; his TCs then have the
remaining two-thirds of the time available to prepare their tanks and crews for the operation. This time
allocation, known as the one-third/two-thirds rule, is applicable in planning and preparation at all levels and
for virtually all tactical situations.
The troop-leading process, although discussed here with the eight steps in traditional order, is not rigid,
and the steps are not necessarily sequential. The tasks involved in some steps (such as initiate movement, issue
the warning order, and conduct reconnaissance) may recur several times during the process. Although listed as
the last step, activities associated with supervising and refining the plan and other preparations occur throughout
troop-leading.
The following discussion focuses on the eight steps of troop-leading procedures:

Receive and analyze the mission.

Issue the warning order.
Make a tentative plan.
Initiate movement.
Conduct reconnaissance and coordination.
Complete the plan.
Issue the order.
Supervise and refine.
Step 1 - Receive and analyze the mission. The platoon leader normally receives his orders as an oral
operation order (OPORD) or as a fragmentary order (FRAGO) updating a previously issued OPORD. Graphics
may be copied from the commanders overlay or sent by digital transmission (see the discussion on pages 2-16
and 2-17). Initial coordination with other platoon leaders and the company or troop fire support team (FIST)
should be accomplished upon receipt of the mission. (NOTE: Before the OPORD or FRAGO arrives, the
platoon leader may receive a series of warning orders from the company commander providing advance notice
of an impending operation. The platoon leader should disseminate all pertinent information contained in the
warning orders as quickly as possible after they are received.)
Initial actions. Upon receipt of the order, the platoon leaders first task is to extract his mission from
the commanders overall plan. The key to understanding the platoon mission as part of the company team or
troop mission lies in two elements of the plan: the commanders intent and the concept of operations. One
platoon will be designated as the company/troop main effort. This platoons performance is critical to the
higher units success. The other platoons are supporting efforts; their purpose will be to assist the main effort in
some way. The platoon leaders knowledge of the intent and purpose allows him to use his initiative, exploit
battlefield opportunities, and accomplish the commanders plan. If he does not understand the intent or
purpose, he should ask the commander for clarification.
Although mission analysis is continuously refined throughout the troop-leading process, the platoon
leaders initial actions are normally based only on the initial warning order from higher. These include an
initial analysis covering the terrain and enemy and friendly situations. The platoon leader may also conduct his

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FM 3-20.15

initial time analysis, develop an initial security plan, and issue his own initial warning order to provide guidance
and planning focus for his subordinates. At a minimum, the initial platoon warning order should cover the
enemy and friendly situations, movement instructions, and coordinating instructions such as an initial timeline
and security plan. (NOTE: The initial analysis is normally conducted as quickly as possible to allow the
platoon leader to issue the initial warning order in a timely manner. He then conducts a more detailed
METT-TC analysis, as outlined in the following discussion, after the initial warning order is put out.)
NOTE:

The technique of using multiple warning orders is a valuable tool for the platoon leader during the
troop-leading process. He can issue warning orders for several purposes: to alert subordinates of the
upcoming mission, to initiate the parallel planning process, and to put out tactical information
incrementally as it is received (ultimately reducing the length of the OPORD). Refer to FM 3-90.1
(FM 71-1) for a discussion of how warning orders are employed at various stages of the troop-leading
procedures.

METT-TC analysis. The platoon leader analyzes the mission using the factors of METT-TC: mission,
enemy, terrain (and weather), troops, time available, and civilian considerations. These factors allow the
platoon leader to identify the platoons purpose; the specified, implied, and essential tasks it must perform; and
the timeline by which the platoon will accomplish those tasks. The following outline of METT-TC factors will
assist the platoon leader in analyzing the mission and creating a timeline. (NOTE: Refer to Figure 2-1 for a
visual depiction of the IPB process).

Figure 2-1. Steps in intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

Mission. The platoon leaders analysis includes the following points:

What is the battalion commanders intent?

What are the company or troop commanders intent and purpose?
What tasks did the commander say must be accomplished (specified tasks)? In the OPORD,
specified tasks are contained in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5.

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FM 3-20.15

What other tasks must be accomplished to ensure mission success (implied tasks)? Implied tasks

are those that are not specified in the OPORD but that must be done to complete the mission.
They do not include tasks that are covered in the unit SOP. The platoon leader identifies implied
tasks by analyzing the enemy, the terrain, friendly troops available, and the operational graphics.
As an example, the commander may direct the platoon to occupy a support-by-fire position near
a known enemy observation post (OP). The platoon leader will immediately recognize that he
must occupy the designated position (the specified task); through his analysis, he will probably
determine that the platoon must also destroy or neutralize the enemy OP because it can affect the
platoon and/or company mission (the implied task). If time is available, the platoon leader
should confirm implied tasks with the commander.

Enemy. The analysis of the enemy situation includes these considerations:

What have been the enemys recent activities?

What is the composition of the enemys forces?
What are the capabilities of his weapons?
What is the location of current and probable enemy positions?
What is the enemys most probable COA? The platoon leader must apply knowledge of the
enemys doctrine and his most recent activities and locations to answer these questions:
Will the enemy attack or defend?
What is the enemys objective?
What formations will he use?
Where are his engagement areas?
Where and when will he execute his operations?

Enemy information is included in paragraph 1 of the OPORD. It is important that the platoon leader
analyze this information in terms of the platoons role in the operation. For example, if the company
commander only identifies platoon-size center-of-mass locations for a defending enemy, the platoon leader
should identify probable enemy vehicle locations based on the terrain and the enemys doctrine.
Terrain (and weather). The platoon leader analyzes the terrain using the factors of OCOKA (observation
and fields of fire; cover and concealment; obstacles; key terrain; and avenues of approach). Elements of the
OCOKA and weather analysis include the following:

Observation and fields of fire. These are influenced by key terrain that dominates avenues of
approach. The following factors may apply:

Where can the enemy observe and engage the platoon (danger areas)?
Where are the natural firing positions the platoon can use to observe and engage the enemy,
including locations for battle positions (BP), support by fire and attack by fire positions, and
overwatch positions?

Cover and concealment. These factors may apply:

What routes within the area of operations offer cover and concealment for the platoon or for
enemy elements?
Do the natural firing positions in the area of operations offer cover and concealment for the
platoon or enemy?

Obstacles. These factors may apply:

Where are natural and existing obstacles located, and how can they affect maneuver?
Where are likely areas for enemy-emplaced obstacles, and how can they affect maneuver?
Are there bypasses, or must obstacles be breached?

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FM 3-20.15

Key terrain. These factors may apply:

Where is the key terrain?
How can key terrain be used to support the mission?

Avenues of approach. Where are the most favorable avenues of approach (mounted and
dismounted) for enemy and friendly forces?

Weather. The platoon leader can use these questions as he analyzes the impact of weather and
other environmental factors on the mission:

What are the light conditions (including percentage of night illumination) and visibility? What
are the times for beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT), sunrise, sunset, end of
evening nautical twilight (EENT), moonrise, and moonset?
How has recent weather affected the area of operations?
Will weather become better or worse during the mission?
How will fog, rain, dust, heat, snow, wind, or blowing sand affect the crew and equipment
during the mission?
NOTE:

This analysis should also cover the effects of weather on smoke and nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) weapons.

Troops. The analysis of friendly forces and other personnel-related issues includes these considerations:

What is the supply status of ammunition, fuel, and other necessary items?
What is the current physical condition of the soldiers, as well as of vehicles and equipment?
What is the training status of the platoon?
What is the state of morale?
How much sleep have the soldiers had?
How much sleep will they be able to get before the operation begins?
Does the platoon need any additional assets to support or accomplish its mission?
What attachments are available to help the platoon accomplish its mission?
Time available. The platoon leaders analysis includes the following factors:

What times were specified by the commander in the OPORD for such activities as movement,
reconnaissance, rehearsals, and logistics package (LOGPAC) operations?

What priorities of work can the platoon accomplish (examples include security, maintenance,
resupply, coordination, rehearsals, inspections, and sleep) in the time available?

How much time is available to the enemy for the activities listed in the previous items?
How does the potential enemy timeline for planning and preparation compare with that
developed for friendly forces?

As part of this analysis, the platoon leader conducts reverse planning to ensure that all specified, implied,
and essential tasks can be accomplished in the time available. He develops a reverse planning schedule
(timeline) beginning with actions on the objective and working backward through each step of the
operation and preparation to the present time. This process also helps the platoon in making efficient use of
planning and preparation time.

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FM 3-20.15

Civilian considerations. The platoon leader uses this analysis to identify how the platoon will handle
situations involving civilians and/or nonmilitary agencies or organizations. Considerations that may affect the
platoon mission include the following:

What are the applicable rules of engagement (ROE) and/or rules of interaction (ROI)?
What procedures and guidelines will the platoon use in dealing with refugees, prisoners, and
other civilians?

Will the platoon be working with civilian organizations, such as governmental agencies, private
groups, or the media?

Will the platoon be tasked to conduct stability operations (such as peace operations or

noncombatant evacuation) or support operations (such as humanitarian or environmental

assistance)?

Mission statement. Once his METT-TC analysis is complete, the platoon leader can then write the
platoon mission statement answering the questions of WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY. This is a
clear, concise statement of the purpose of the operation and the essential task(s) that will be crucial to its
success. The essential tasks (the WHAT) should be stated in terms that relate to enemy forces, friendly forces,
and/or the terrain (for example, SUPPRESS THE ENEMY; OVERWATCH 2D PLATOON; or SEIZE
AN OBJECTIVE). The purpose (the WHY) explains how the platoon mission supports the commanders
intent. The elements of WHO, WHERE, and WHEN add clarity to the mission statement.
NOTE:

Simultaneous planning and preparation are key factors in effective time management during the
troop-leading procedures. The next five steps (issue a warning order, make a tentative plan, initiate
movement, conduct reconnaissance and coordination, and complete the plan) may occur
simultaneously and/or in a different order. As noted, the final troop-leading step, supervise and
refine, is on going throughout the process.

Step 2 - Issue the warning order. The platoon leader alerts his platoon to the upcoming operation by
issuing a warning order that follows the five-paragraph OPORD format (see Appendix A). Warning orders
maximize subordinates planning and preparation time by providing essential details of the impending operation
and detailing major timeline events that will support mission execution. The amount of detail included in a
warning order depends on the available time, the platoons communications capability, and the information
subordinates need to initiate proper planning and preparation. The warning order may include the following
information:

Changes to task organization.

Updated graphics (platoons equipped with IVIS or FBCB2 send new overlays).
Enemy situation.
Company or troop mission.
Commanders intent (if available).
Platoon mission.
A tentative timeline, to include the following:
Earliest time of movement.
Readiness condition (REDCON) and vehicle preparation schedule. See Appendix C for a
discussion of REDCON levels.
Reconnaissance.

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Training/rehearsal schedule. (NOTE: The platoon leader may initiate some individual and
collective training before he issues the OPORD; this technique maximizes preparation time
and allows the platoon to focus on tasks that will support the anticipated operations. For
example, a tank platoon equipped with a plow tank may practice the crew task of dropping the
plow as well as platoon-level actions at an obstacle.)
Time and location at which the platoon OPORD will be issued.

Service support instructions (if not included in the timeline).

Step 3 - Make a tentative plan. The platoon leader begins developing his maneuver plan as he listens to the
commander issue the company OPORD. Based on the commanders plan and the results of his mission
analysis, the platoon leader develops a tentative plan that addresses all specified, implied, and essential tasks
using the OPORD format (see Appendix B of this manual). The tentative plan also covers reconnaissance and
coordination requirements between the platoon and adjacent and supporting units. The PSG and TCs are
excellent sources of ideas concerning the platoon plan. Refer to Chapters 3 and 4 of this manual for more
detailed discussions of planning considerations in offensive and defensive operations.
Step 4 - Initiate movement. Many company-level operations require movement to forward assembly areas
and BPs during the planning phase of an operation. The platoon leader addresses movement in his timeline; he
orders the platoon to begin moving in accordance with the company plan. Activities may include sending
platoon representatives to an assembly area with the company quartering party or beginning priorities of work.
Step 5 - Conduct reconnaissance and coordination. Effective reconnaissance takes into account the
factors of METT-TC and OCOKA from both friendly and enemy perspectives. As a minimum, the platoon
leader conducts a detailed map reconnaissance. If time and security considerations permit and authorization is
obtained from higher headquarters, an on-site ground reconnaissance is the best way to survey the area of
operations. The platoon leader should take as many TCs as possible on his reconnaissance.
For offensive operations, the platoon leader should attempt to find a vantage point that will allow him to
see as much of the objective as possible. Ground reconnaissance for offensive operations usually is limited to
checking routes to the start point (SP), the line of departure (LD), and the axis just beyond the LD. For
defensive operations, the platoon leader should conduct a reconnaissance of the engagement area, all platoon
BPs, and the routes to be used.
During the reconnaissance (or during company-level rehearsals), the platoon leader or his representative
should coordinate routes, movement speed, and sectors of observation and fires with other platoon leaders and
with adjacent and supporting units.
Step 6 - Complete the plan. The platoon leader refines the plan based on the results of the reconnaissance
and coordination. He then completes the plan using these results and any new information from his
commander, other platoon leaders, and members of his platoon. He should keep the plan as simple as possible,
at the same time ensuring that the platoon scheme of maneuver supports the commanders intent.
Step 7 - Issue the order. If possible, the platoon leader issues the order from a vantage point overlooking
the terrain on which the platoon will maneuver. If not, he uses a terrain model, sand table, sketches, or his map
to orient the platoon. He can also build a model of the area of operations using a briefing kit that contains such
items as engineer tape, colored yarn, 3-by-5-inch index cards, and micro armor vehicle models.
As time and security permit, the platoon leader issues the order to as many members of the platoon as
possible. As a minimum, he assembles the TCs and his gunner. He briefs the platoon using the five-paragraph
OPORD format (see Appendix B).
To ensure complete understanding of the operation, the platoon leader and TCs conduct confirmation
briefings immediately after the OPORD is issued. The TCs brief the platoon leader to confirm their
understanding of his intent, the specific tasks their crews must perform, and the relationship between their tasks
and those of other units in the operation. If time permits, the platoon leader should lead the TCs in a walkthrough using a sand table.

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Step 8 - Supervise and refine. Flexibility is the key to effective operations. The platoon leader must be
able to refine his plan whenever new information becomes available. If he adjusts the plan, he must inform the
platoon and supervise implementation of the changes. Once the operation has begun, the platoon leader must be
able to direct his platoon in response to new situations and new orders.
Crew orders, rehearsals, and inspections are essential elements of the supervision process as the platoon
prepares for the mission. The following discussion examines these procedures in detail.
Crew orders. The platoon leader and PSG make sure all crew members have been briefed by their TCs
and understand the platoon mission and concept of the operation.
Rehearsals. A rehearsal is a practice session conducted to prepare units for an upcoming operation or
event. The platoon leader should never underestimate the value of rehearsals. They are his most valuable tools
in preparing the platoon for the upcoming operation. Effective rehearsals require crewmen to perform required
tasks, ideally under conditions that are as close as possible to those expected for the actual operation.
Participants maneuver their actual vehicles or use vehicle models or simulations while interactively verbalizing
their elements actions.
In a platoon-level rehearsal, the platoon leader selects the tasks to be practiced and controls execution of
the rehearsal. He will usually designate someone to role-play the enemy elements he expects to face during the
operation. Refer to FM 6-99 (FM 101-5) for a detailed discussion of rehearsal types, techniques, and
procedures.
NOTE:

A rehearsal is different from the process of talking through what is supposed to happen. For
example, in a rehearsal, TCs should actually send spot reports (SPOTREP) when reporting enemy
contact, rather than simply saying, I would send a SPOTREP now.

Rehearsal purposes. The platoon leader uses well-planned, efficiently run rehearsals to accomplish the
following purposes:

Reinforce training and increase proficiency in critical tasks.

Reveal weaknesses or problems in the plan.
Synchronize the actions of subordinate elements.
Confirm coordination requirements between the platoon and adjacent units.
Improve each soldiers understanding of the concept of the operation, the direct-fire plan,

anticipated contingencies, and possible actions and reactions for various situations that may arise
during the operation.

Rehearsal types. The platoon leader can choose among several types of rehearsals, each designed to
achieve a specific result and with a specific role in the planning and preparation timeline. The primary types of
rehearsals available to the tank platoon are the following:

Confirmation brief. The confirmation brief is, in effect, a reverse briefing process routinely

performed by subordinate leaders immediately after receiving any instructions, such as an

OPORD or FRAGO. They confirm their understanding by repeating and explaining details of
the operation for their leader. The platoon leader should conduct confirmation briefs after his
TCs have received the OPORD, but before other phases of the platoon rehearsal begin.

Backbrief. Leaders perform this type of rehearsal throughout the planning and preparation

timeline to help clarify their intent for their subordinates. The backbrief allows the platoon
leader to identify problems in his own concept of the operation and his subordinates
understanding of the concept; he also uses the backbrief to learn how subordinates intend to
accomplish their missions.

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Combined arms rehearsal. A maneuver unit headquarters normally conducts this rehearsal
after subordinate leaders have issued their orders, to ensure that subordinates plans are
synchronized and that their plans will properly achieve the higher intent. The tank platoon takes
part in combined arms rehearsals as part of a larger tactical element.

Support rehearsal. Support rehearsals are normally conducted within the framework of a single
operating system, such as fire support or CSS, or a limited number of operating systems. The
goals are to ensure that support elements can achieve their missions within the higher
commanders plan and that their support plans are synchronized with the overall maneuver plan.
The rehearsals are conducted throughout the planning and preparation timeline.

Battle drill or SOP rehearsal. This rehearsal, conducted throughout the planning and

preparation timeline, is used to ensure that all participants understand a technique or a specific
set of procedures. It does not necessarily cover a published drill or SOP, giving the commander
or leader flexibility in designing the rehearsal. For example, the platoon leader could rehearse
procedures for marking obstacle lanes or establishing local security.

Rehearsal techniques. The platoon leader can choose among several techniques in conducting rehearsals,
which should follow the crawl-walk-run training methodology to prepare the platoon for increasingly difficult
conditions. Considerations in selecting a rehearsal technique include the following:

Time. How much will be needed for planning, preparation, and execution?
Multiechelon. How many echelons will be involved?
Operations security (OPSEC). Will the rehearsal allow the enemy to gain intelligence about
upcoming operations?

Terrain. What are the applicable terrain considerations?

As noted in FM 6-99 (FM 101-5), techniques for conducting rehearsals are limited only by the
resourcefulness of the commander or leader; that manual outlines six basic techniques. Listed in descending
order in terms of the preparation time and resources required to conduct them, these techniques are the
following:

Full dress rehearsal. This rehearsal produces the most detailed understanding of the mission,

but is the most difficult to conduct in terms of preparation and resources. It involves every
soldier and system participating in the operation. If possible, units should conduct the full dress
rehearsal under the same conditions (such as weather, time of day, terrain, and use of live
ammunition) that they will encounter during the actual operation. The platoon generally will
take part in full dress rehearsals as part of a larger unit.

Reduced force rehearsal. This rehearsal normally involves only key leaders of the unit and is
thus less extensive than the full dress rehearsal in terms of preparation time and resources. The
commander decides the level of leader involvement. The selected leaders then rehearse the plan,
if possible on the actual terrain to be used for the actual operation. The reduced force rehearsal
is often conducted to prepare leaders for the full dress rehearsal.

Terrain model rehearsal. This is the most popular rehearsal technique, employing an

accurately constructed model to help subordinates visualize the battle in accordance with the
commander or leaders intent. When possible, the platoon leader places the terrain model where
it overlooks the actual terrain of the area of operations or is within walking distance of such a
vantage point. Size of the model can vary, but it should be large enough to depict graphic
control measures and important terrain features for reference and orientation. Participants walk
or move micro armor around the table or model to practice the actions of their own vehicles in
relation to other members of the platoon.

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Sketch map rehearsal. Units can use the sketch map technique almost anywhere, day or night.

Procedures are similar to those for the terrain model rehearsal. The sketch must be large enough
to allow all participants to see as each subordinate walks through an interactive oral
presentation of his actions. Platoon elements can use symbols or micro armor to represent
their locations and maneuver on the sketch.

Map rehearsal. Procedures are similar to those for the sketch map rehearsal except that the

commander or leader uses a map and operation overlay of the same scale as he used to plan and
control the operation. This technique is useful in conjunction with a confirmation brief or
backbrief involving subordinate leaders and vehicle commanders. The platoon leader uses the
map and overlay to guide participants as they brief their role in the operation.

Radio/digital rehearsal. The leader conducts this rehearsal by sending the OPORD and overlay
digitally (if equipped). He then may review this information by FM. The radio rehearsal may be
especially useful when the situation does not allow the platoon to gather at one location.
Subordinate elements check their communications systems and rehearse events that are critical to
the platoon plan. To be effective, the radio rehearsal requires all participants to have working
communications equipment.

Inspections. Precombat inspections (PCI) allow the platoon leader to check the platoons operational
readiness. The key goal is to ensure that soldiers and vehicles are fully prepared to execute the upcoming
mission. Inspections also contribute to improved morale.
It is essential that the entire platoon chain of command know how to conduct precombat checks (PCC)
and PCIs in accordance with applicable SOPs (FKSM 17-15-3 or the platoons own SOP) or based on the
procedures outlined in ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. Procedures for a comprehensive inspection include the
following:

Perform before-operation maintenance checks, and report or repair deficiencies, if necessary.

Perform prepare-to-fire checks for all weapons, and report or repair deficiencies, if necessary.
Weapons are boresighted, and all sights are referred. Machine guns are test-fired, if possible.

Perform communications checks of voice and digital systems.

Ensure that crews understand the plan and are in the correct uniform and mission-oriented protective
posture (MOPP) level.

Upload vehicles in accordance with the platoon SOP. The standardization of load plans allows
the platoon leader and PSG to quickly check accountability of equipment. It also ensures
standard locations of equipment in each vehicle; this can be an important advantage if the
platoon leader is forced to switch to a different vehicle during an operation.

Review the supply status of rations, water, fuel, oil, all types of ammunition, pyrotechnics, firstaid kits, and batteries (for such items as flashlights, night-vision devices, and NBC alarms).
Direct resupply operations as necessary.

Ensure vehicles are correctly camouflaged so they match the area of operations.
The platoon leader and/or PSG should observe each crew during preparation for combat. They should
conduct the inspection once the TCs report that their crews and vehicles are prepared.

Abbreviated troop-leading procedures

When there is not enough time to conduct all eight troop-leading steps in detail, such as when a change of
mission occurs after an operation is in progress, the platoon leader must understand how to trim the procedures
to save time. Most steps of these abbreviated troop-leading procedures are done mentally, but the platoon
leader skips none of the steps.

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Once the order is received, the platoon leader conducts a quick map reconnaissance, analyzes the mission
using the factors of METT-TC, and sends for the TCs. He makes sure the TCs post the minimum required
control measures on their maps and issues a FRAGO covering the key elements of the enemy and friendly
situations, the platoon mission, and the concept of the operation. The service support and command and signal
paragraphs can be deleted if they are unchanged or covered by SOP. FRAGOs are discussed in Appendix A.
The platoon leader and TCs may also conduct a quick walk-through rehearsal of critical elements of the
maneuver plan using a hastily prepared terrain model or sand table.
In some cases, there may not be enough time even for these shortened procedures. The platoon may have
to move out and receive FRAGOs by radio or at the next scheduled halt. It then becomes critical for the platoon
leader to send FRAGOs of his own to the TCs explaining the platoons purpose within the overall company
maneuver plan.
Digital systems, such as IVIS and FBCB2, and GPS devices are valuable tools when the platoon is forced
to use abbreviated troop-leading procedures and FRAGOs. They allow the platoon leader to designate
waypoints to assist in navigation and target reference points (TRP) to assist in weapons orientation.
Other keys to success when abbreviated procedures are in effect include a well-trained platoon; clearly
developed, thoroughly understood SOPs; and an understanding by all members of the platoon of the current
tactical situation (situational understanding). The platoon leader and PSG must keep the platoon informed of
the ever-changing enemy and friendly situations. They accomplish this by monitoring the company or troop net
and issuing frequent updates to the other crews using the radio and digital information systems.

SPECIAL NOTE
Whenever time is available, there is no substitute for effective, thorough troop-leading procedures.
The odds of success increase still further when detailed planning and rehearsals are conducted prior to an
operation, even if time is limited. Successful platoon leaders make the most of every available minute.

LEADERSHIP
Competent, confident leadership inspires soldiers, instilling in them the will to win and providing them
with purpose, direction, and motivation in combat. Leadership involves numerous important personal principles
and traits:

Taking responsibility for decisions.

Exemplifying and demanding loyalty.
Inspiring and directing the platoon toward mission accomplishment.
Fostering a climate of teamwork that will engender success.
Demonstrating moral and physical courage in the face of adversity and danger.
FM 22-100 (FM 6-22) and FM 3-0 (FM 100-5) further describe the qualities of effective leadership. The
following are the five characteristics of successful combat leaders, as described in the 1984 study titled
Leadership in Combat: An Historical Appraisal conducted by the History Department at the United States
Military Academy:

Terrain sense. Understand terrain; match tactics and weaponry with the terrain at hand.
Single-minded tenacity. This is the quality that compels the successful platoon leader to

harness the combat power necessary to overwhelm the enemy. The platoon leader sees the
mission through and never gives up.

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Practical, practiced judgment. Common sense and constant practice allow the platoon leader

to prioritize effectively, enabling him to separate critical tasks from the noncritical and
preventing him from being overwhelmed by the demands of the information-rich battlefield.

Ferocious audacity. Risk-taking is a must if the platoon is to exploit enemy weaknesses as they
present themselves.

Physical confidence. Leaders can maintain their ability to meet the demanding requirements of
leadership only if they are in top physical condition.

SECTION 2 - CONTROL
SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING
Situational understanding is the ability to maintain a constant, clear mental picture of the tactical
situation. This picture includes an understanding of relevant terrain and of the relationship between friendly
and enemy forces. It also includes the ability to correlate battlefield events as they develop. For platoon leaders
and PSGs, situational understanding is the key to making sound, quick tactical decisions. It allows them to
form logical conclusions and to make decisions that anticipate future events and information. A critical benefit
of situational understanding on the part of TCs is a reduction in fratricide incidents. Situational understanding
also gives leaders the ability to compress the time necessary to conduct troop-leading procedures; this is
especially critical when there is limited time to plan and prepare for an operation.
The commander will structure the battlefield based on his intent and the conditions of METT-TC. How
he does this affects the tank platoon leaders mission planning and his ability to maintain situational
understanding. The framework of the battlefield can vary from a highly rigid extreme, with obvious front and
rear boundaries and closely tied adjacent units, to a dispersed and decentralized structure with few secure areas
and unit boundaries and no definable front and/or rear boundary.
Between these extremes are an unlimited number of possible variations. Maintaining situational
understanding becomes more difficult as the battlefield becomes less structured. Modern, highly mobile
operations involving small forces lend themselves to a less rigid framework that challenges the platoon leaders
ability to maintain an accurate picture of the battlefield.

Battlefield visualization
To see the battlefield accurately, the platoon leader must have virtually perfect knowledge of the
friendly situation one level higher than his own (the company team or troop situation). It is also important that
he update the TCs periodically regarding the higher situation. The platoon leader must also have a relatively
complete knowledge of the terrain and the enemy situation. He must be able to visualize enemy and friendly
elements through time and to picture how the terrain will affect their actions. (NOTE: This requirement to
maintain a real-time awareness of the battlefield one level higher does not relieve the platoon leader of his
responsibility to understand the situation and commanders intent two levels higher than his own. The
difference is that his understanding of the situation two levels higher does not have to be as specific or as
timely.)
Most of the information the platoon leader requires comes from what he can observe from his tank and
from reports he receives through his communications systems. Although few voice and digital reports are
specifically addressed to him, particularly on the company team or troop net, the platoon leader must monitor
them by eavesdropping. He then can track enemy and friendly elements and plot all movement on his map
and/or his digital display (IVIS or FBCB2). This allows him to adjust his own movement so the platoon makes
contact with the enemy from positions of advantage, which are identified during the map/ground reconnaissance
step of the troop-leading procedures.

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How effectively the platoon leader can keep track of events on the battlefield is, to some degree,
experience-dependent. No matter what his experience level, however, he is responsible for learning techniques
that allow him to relate the information he is receiving to his map or display and thereby track the tactical
situation.

Battle space
The ability to see the battlefield provides the platoon leader with important tactical information, including
friendly and enemy positions and relevant terrain. In turn, complete understanding of the military significance
of this picture requires knowledge of the concept of battle space; this is the key element in the intellectual
process of visualizing the battlefield.
At the most fundamental level, battle space is the three-dimensional area in which the platoon can
acquire enemy forces and influence them with effective fires. This space is defined by several battlefield
factors: the locations of friendly forces, including the platoons individual tank crews and OPs; the effects of
terrain, weather, and movement; and the ranges of all available platoon weapons and sensing systems. Each
tank crew has its own battle space (see Figure 2-2). The platoons total battle space is the sum of the individual
tanks battle spaces. Platoon battle space is not restricted by boundaries; it can overlap the battle space of
adjacent units.

Figure 2-2. Individual tanks battle space (two-dimensional view).

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Battle space has applications in all phases of mission planning, preparation, and execution. During the
planning process, it is a critical factor in the selection of routes, tentative positions, and potential engagement
areas. In the preparation phase, battle space information aids in the synchronization of tactical movement and
overwatch. Once mission execution begins, the platoon leaders knowledge of his battle space is critical to his
ability to issue timely and effective orders as the situation changes.
The importance of battle space demands that the platoon leader direct most of his battle command effort
toward managing and enhancing his space. He must be aware at every moment of how battle space is changing
as friendly and enemy forces move and as terrain and visibility conditions change (see Figure 2-3). As the
operation progresses, the platoon leader must take active measures to shape the battle space to his best
advantage.

Figure 2-3. Effects of movement and terrain on battle space.

One vital step in this process is to eliminate or reduce any gaps, or dead space, that exist within the
platoons battle space. The platoon leader can accomplish this in several ways. In the offense, for example, he
can maintain a section in overwatch during movement through a choke point or a danger area. In the defense,
he can emplace OPs or reposition individual tanks to cover potential gaps in the platoons battle space (refer to
Figures 2-4A and 2-4B). In all cases, the platoons position in relation to other friendly elements is an
important factor in defining and enhancing the battle space. The platoon leader can shape his space more
effectively if he applies the principles of mutual support and thorough coordination with adjacent units.

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Figure 2-4A. Shaping platoon battle space.

Figure 2-4B. Shaping platoon battle space (continued).

MAPS, OVERLAYS, GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES, AND NAVIGATION

Maps and overlays
Purposes. The most important role of maps and the accompanying overlays is in helping the platoon to
understand and visualize the scheme of maneuver. They are the primary tools the platoon leader uses to
organize information concerning the battlefield and to synchronize his assets once the battle begins. They also
provide TCs with a visual reference they can consult as needed. The platoon leader must ensure that each TC
has an updated map with the latest graphic control measures posted on the overlays.
The map and overlays also assist the platoon leader in performing a variety of other functions. He
consults them constantly during reconnaissance operations, which can vary in complexity from a quick map
reconnaissance to a fully mounted ground reconnaissance of the area of operations. The map and overlays help
him to communicate the company or troop commanders concept while he is issuing the OPORD or briefing the

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TCs on the plan. During mission execution, the map and overlays play an invaluable role in helping leaders to
maintain situational understanding.
Types of overlays. Overlays can be prepared either in traditional fashion (written out by hand) or digitally.
The platoon leader may receive one or more types of overlays from the commander covering such areas as
maneuver, enemy forces, obstacles, fire support, and CSS. All of the information is important; the key for the
platoon leader is to combine, augment, and declutter the overlays so the information needed for a specific
situation is readily available to the platoon on one simple, combined overlay.
Traditional overlays. Copied on acetate, traditional overlays display graphic control measures as
illustrated in Figure 2-5. They should be prepared even if a platoon is equipped with IVIS or FBCB2 digital
systems in case the platoon loses digital data or has its digital link broken.

Figure 2-5. Traditional overlay.

Digital overlays. The IVIS and FBCB2 allow the platoon leader to receive and transmit graphics
virtually on a real-time basis within the platoon and to and from higher headquarters. When these systems are
integrated with automatic position/location updates, the platoon leader has a nearly perfect situational
understanding link. His display shows the positions of his platoon and adjacent unit leaders as well as the
most current enemy disposition. These positions and locations are displayed on a menu of overlays using the
most recent graphics. The platoon leader can combine, augment, and declutter the overlays as needed; when
appropriate, he can choose not to display any of them on his digital screen. Figure 2-6 illustrates a sample
FBCB2-generated overlay.

Figure 2-6. Sample FBCB2 with overlay.

Although fairly accurate, digital systems suffer from minor flaws that detract from their effectiveness as a
stand-alone battle command tool. Until these systems become more reliable and less cumbersome and can

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display terrain relief features, they will serve as an enhancement to, not a substitute for, the platoon leaders
map with traditional, handwritten overlays.

Graphic control measures

The following paragraphs and the accompanying illustrations (Figure 2-7 through 2-23) explain and
illustrate graphic control measures commonly used at the company and platoon level. They are entered on
overlays to illustrate the commanders intent and scheme of maneuver. In addition, they provide clarity when
an order is issued and assist in the battle command process once the tank platoon begins executing the
operation. Exact definitions are found in FM 6-99.1 (FM 101-5-1).
Unless they are specified as such, graphic control measures are not considered rigid and unchangeable.
For example, if the map location of a support-by-fire position does not allow the platoon leader to mass direct
fires on the enemy, he can, in most situations, inform the commander and adjust the position as needed to
accomplish the platoon mission. Control measures do not restrict the platoons battle space; instead, they assist
the platoon leader in identifying the necessary coordination that must be accomplished with adjacent platoons.
Boundary. Boundaries delineate areas of tactical responsibility between units. They are usually designated
down to task force level. Coordination with adjacent units along boundaries is the key to enhancing
synchronization and decreasing the risk of fratricide. The platoon leader must be aware of adjacent platoons
within his company, adjacent companies within the battalion, and adjacent units along the task force boundary
that may operate in the platoons battle space. (See Figure 2-7.)

Figure 2-7. Boundary (graphic control measure).

Phase line. Phase lines are used to control and coordinate movement and synchronize tactical actions.
Platoons may report crossing phase lines, but they normally do not halt unless directed to do so. The
abbreviation on overlays is PL. (See Figure 2-8.)

Figure 2-8. Phase line (graphic control measure).

Assembly area. Abbreviated AA on overlays, this is a location at which the platoon gathers (usually as
part of the company or troop) to conduct maintenance and resupply activities and to make other preparations for
future operations. The platoon must be able to defend from the assembly area. (See Figure 2-9.)

Figure 2-9. Assembly area (graphic control measure).

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Route. This is the prescribed course of travel from a specific point of origin (the SP) to a specific destination,
usually the release point (RP). The route should be named, and checkpoints should be designated at key
locations. The abbreviation on overlays is RTE. (See Figure 2-10.)

Figure 2-10. Route (graphic control measure).

Checkpoint. Checkpoints are used to control and direct the maneuver of the tank platoon and tank section.
They are usually placed on identifiable terrain features. (See Figure 2-11.)

Figure 2-11. Checkpoint (graphic control measure).

Attack position. This is the last position the platoon occupies or passes through before crossing the LD. The
platoon assumes the proper formation and performs last-minute checks of its weapon systems. The abbreviation
on overlays is ATK POS. (See Figure 2-12.)

Figure 2-12. Attack position (graphic control measure).

Contact point. A contact point is a designated location, usually an easily identifiable terrain feature, where
two or more units are required to physically meet. The headquarters assigning the contact point must specify
what sort of activity is required when the units meet. The platoon leader may be tasked to man or move to a
contact point for coordination. (See Figure 2-13.)

Figure 2-13. Contact point (graphic control measure).

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Passage lane. This is the area or route through which a passing unit moves to avoid stationary units and
obstacles. Tank platoons may move on a lane or serve as the overwatch for a passing unit moving through a
lane. (See Figure 2-14.)

Figure 2-14. Passage lane (graphic control measure).

Passage point. This is the place where a unit physically passes through another unit. Tank platoons may
move through a passage point or overwatch other units moving through a passage point. The abbreviation for a
passage point is PP. (See Figure 2-15.)

Figure 2-15. Passage point (graphic control measure).

Objective. The objective is the physical object or area (such as enemy personnel, a man-made object, or a terrain
feature) to be seized or held. Tank platoons usually occupy some portion of the company objective. The abbreviation
on overlays is OBJ. (See Figure 2-16.)

Figure 2-16. Objective (graphic control measure).

Axis of advance. This is the general route and direction of advance extending toward the enemy. It
graphically portrays the commanders intent, such as envelopment of the enemy. The unit may maneuver and
shoot supporting fires to either side of the axis provided it remains oriented on the axis and the objective. For
example, platoons may maneuver on or to the side of the axis assigned to their company as long as deviations
do not interfere with the maneuver of adjacent units. (See Figure 2-17.)

Figure 2-17. Axis of advance (graphic control measure).

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Direction of attack. This is the specific direction and route that the main attack or center of mass of the unit
will follow. Tank platoons move along directions of attack specified by the commander to take advantage of
terrain or to ensure maximum control of the moving unit. The overlay abbreviation is DOA. (See Figure 2-18.)

Figure 2-18. Direction of attack (graphic control measure).

Assault position. This is the location from which a unit assaults the objective. Ideally, it is the last covered and
concealed position before the objective. Tank platoons may occupy an assault position or serve as overwatch for
occupation of the position by the assault force. The abbreviation on overlays is ASLT POS. (See Figure 2-19.)

Figure 2-19. Assault position (graphic control measure).

Attack by fire position. This is the location from which a unit employs direct fire to destroy the enemy from
a distance. Tank platoons occupy an attack by fire position alone or as part of the company or troop. From this
position, the platoon can attack the enemy on the objective when occupation of the objective is not advisable;
the position can also be used in an attack on a moving enemy force. In addition, this type of position can serve
as a counterattack option for a reserve force. The overlay abbreviation is ABF. (See Figure 2-20.)

Figure 2-20. Attack by fire position (graphic control measure).

Support by fire position. This is another type of position from which a maneuver element can engage the
enemy by direct fire, with the fires providing support for operations by other units. The tank platoon usually
occupies a support by fire position when providing supporting fires for an assault or breach force or when
serving as the overwatch for a moving force. The overlay abbreviation is SBF. (See Figure 2-21.)

Figure 2-21. Support by fire position (graphic control measure).

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FM 3-20.15

Battle position. This is a defensive location, oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of approach, from
which a unit defends. Tank platoon BPs and direct-fire orientations are designated in the OPORD. (See
Figure 2-22.)

Figure 2-22. Battle position (graphic control measure).

Target reference point. This is an easily recognizable point on the ground (either natural or man-made)
used to locate enemy forces or control fires. TRPs can designate either the center of an area on which the
platoon can mass its fires or the left or right limit of such an area. The tank platoon leader controls platoon fires
by designating platoon TRPs as necessary to supplement company or troop TRPs issued by the commander.
When designated with target numbers issued by the FIST or fire support officer (FSO), TRPs become indirect
fire targets. (See Figure 2-23.)

Figure 2-23. Target reference point (graphic control measure).

Navigation
To protect his platoon, the platoon leader must learn to use terrain to his advantage. Land navigation of
armored vehicles requires him to master the technique of terrain association. This entails the ability to identify
terrain features on the ground by the contour intervals depicted on the map. The platoon leader analyzes the
terrain using the factors of OCOKA and identifies major terrain features, contour changes, and man-made
structures along his axis of advance. As the platoon advances, he uses these features to orient the platoon and to
associate ground positions with map locations.
The intellectual concept of battle space is vital to the platoons survival during navigation and movement.
The platoon leader must constantly be aware of key terrain and enemy fields of observation and fire that may
create danger areas as the platoon advances. This allows him to modify movement techniques, formations,
and routes and to maintain cross talk with overwatch elements to make sure the enemy does not surprise the
platoon.
Navigation under limited visibility conditions is especially challenging. Vehicle thermal sights and nightvision devices provide assistance, but leaders nonetheless can easily confuse terrain features and become
disoriented. See Appendix C for a discussion of limited visibility operations.
The platoon can employ a variety of techniques and equipment to assist in navigation. These are
summarized in the following discussion.
Compass and odometer. This method of navigation entails use of a dismounted compass and the vehicles
odometer. Follow these steps:

Divide the route or operation into legs or parts, each with a unique direction and distance and a
checkpoint at both ends.

Measure the map distance of each leg or part.

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FM 3-20.15

Determine the magnetic azimuth of each leg or part.

Develop a chart listing the legs or parts, azimuths, and distances. Write a description of each leg
or part (refer to Figure 2-24 for an example).

For each leg or part, move the gun tube to the direction of the magnetic azimuth. Maintain turret
stabilization at all times; do not traverse the turret except at the start of the next leg or part.

Use the odometer to measure the distance traveled for each leg or part.
Review the written description of the route to help prevent navigational errors.
LEG/ PA RT

AZIM UTH

DISTA NCE

DESCRIPTION OF ROUTE
TRA V ELED

A A BLUE
t o SP

180

2 . 5 m iles

From A A Blue, t rav el dow nhill t o

t he SP, a t hree-w ay , hardt op
int ersec t ion.

SP t o RP

90

5 . 5 m iles

A t t he SP, t urn lef t and t rav el on

a f lat hardt op road f or about 4
m iles. The road bec om es uphill
as y ou approac h t he f our-w ay
int ersec t ion (RP). A dow nhill
grade on azim ut h w ill m ean t he
RP has been passed.

RP t o PP1

183

6 . 3 m iles

A t t he RP, t urn right and t rav el

dow nhill f or 6 . 3 m iles, link ing up
w it h t he X O at PP1 . The PP is
4 0 0 m et ers past a bridge and is
near t w o houses.

PP1 t o 1 2

92

12 to 5

60

7 . 4 m iles

5 . 5 m iles

A t PP1 , t urn lef t and t rav el a f lat ,

c ross-c ount ry st ret c h f or 7 . 4 m iles
unt il y ou reac h t hree houses (1 2 ).
Reac hing an uphill grade or a hardt op road along t he sam e azim ut h
w ill m ean 1 2 has been passed.
From 1 2 , t rav el on a 6 0 azim ut h
uphill f or about 5 . 5 m iles, c rossing
a dirt road and a hardt op road. A t
hill (5 ), t ank s w ill be orient ed on a
9 0 azim ut h.

AA
BLUE

SP

RP
5

OBJ ECT
GOLD

ROUTE GREEN

PP
1

12

Figure 2-24. Route chart for compass and odometer

navigation method.
Fires. Using field artillery (FA) or mortars to fire smoke (during the day) or ground-burst illumination (day or
night) can provide a useful check on estimated locations or preplanned targets.

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FM 3-20.15

Global positioning systems. GPS devices receive signals from satellites or land-based transmitters. They
calculate and display the position of the user in military grid coordinates as well as in degrees of latitude and
longitude. Most GPS navigation readings are based on waypoints, the known positions entered into the
systems memory. The platoon leader identifies points along the route or at the destination and designates them
as waypoints. Once waypoints are entered in the GPS, the device can display information such as distance and
direction from point to point. Leaders must still know how to employ terrain association while navigating in
case satellite or land signals are inoperative or unavailable.
Inertial navigation systems. Based on an initial calculation of the vehicles location from a known point,
inertial navigation systems use the rotation of the track to determine the location of the vehicle. The M1A2s
POSNAV system is an example. POSNAV allows the TC to determine his exact location and gives him the
ability to plot up to 99 waypoints. Tank drivers can then use the steer-to function on their drivers integrated
display (DID) as they move toward the designated waypoints. To compensate for track slippage that could
affect the accuracy of the inertial system, TCs should reinitialize their systems often, using a GPS or a known
point.
NOTE:

In using the GPS or POSNAV, the platoon leader must remember that waypoints are only one of
several navigational tools he can use. He must still be prepared to use terrain association and mapreading skills in case of digital system failures. In addition, the platoon leader must not disregard the
effects of terrain on the direction of movement. Terrain features that do not show up on the digital
display (such as hills, valleys, and cliffs) may cause deviations in the route the platoon must take to
reach the next waypoint.

Shift from a known point. Shifting from a known point is a convenient tool for the platoon leader to use as
he maneuvers the platoon and disseminates control measures. The known point is usually a previously
distributed graphic control measure. Referencing a location from a known point is done in kilometers. For
example, 500 meters is given as POINT FIVE, 1,000 meters as ONE, and 3,500 meters as THREE POINT
FIVE. Cardinal directions are used. Shifts to the east or west are given first, followed by shifts to the north or
south. Consider the following transmission: RED SET FROM CHECKPOINT SEVEN EAST ONE POINT
EIGHT NORTH ONE POINT SEVEN. This means, We (the Red element) are set at a position 1,800
meters east and 1,700 meters north from checkpoint 7. Figure 2-25 illustrates this example.
609

608

Comb

pher d Cemet ar y

AT I ON

150

136

(APPROX )

Bullet Lick Creek

607

85 45'
38 00'
42 0 6

42 0 5

Bill' s La k e

42 0 4

150

Fr oman Lake

Figure 2-25. Example of shifting from a known point.

Shifts from known points are used routinely to control combat operations. They make reporting of
current platoon and enemy positions easier. The platoon leader could report his location by referencing a
graphic control measure, such as a checkpoint as shown in Figure 2-26, or a grid location. The enemy,
however, will quickly figure out the known points if they are continually used in the clear on a nonsecure net.
The platoon leader should avoid using the same point more than twice. Instead, he should use a different

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FM 3-20.15

known point to reference the same location. Enemy locations are identified only by using shifts from TRPs (see
Figure 2-27).
NOTE:

Many units routinely use the terrain index reference system (TIRS) or the grid index reference system
(GIRS) to make shifts from a known point. TIRS identifies locations based on terrain points
previously designated on an overlay; GIRS uses intersections of four grid squares as the known
points.

Figure 2-26. Platoon reports own position using

shift from a known point (checkpoint).

Figure 2-27. Platoon reports enemy position using

shift from a known point (TRP).

COMMUNICATIONS
During virtually all maneuver and combat operations, dispersion will force the tank platoon to rely
heavily on effective communications by means of wire, visual signals, radio, and digital systems. The platoon
must understand the proper procedures for using the available systems, the proper application of operational
terms, and procedures for constructing and sending effective, concise messages using each type of system. The
platoon leader is responsible for the planning, training, and employment related to the use of the platoons
communications systems. He is also responsible for maintaining communications within the company or troop
communications system.

Means of tactical communications

The tank platoon has several available means of communications. Whether it is using messenger, wire,
visual, sound, radio, or digital communications, the platoon must remain flexible enough to react quickly to new

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FM 3-20.15

situations. The platoon leader must carefully plan the use of these resources, ensuring there is redundancy in
the platoons communications systems while avoiding dependence on any single means.
SOPs play a critical role in ensuring that platoon communications enhance situational understanding and
contribute to mission accomplishment. They prescribe hand-and-arm and flag signals that can aid in platoon
movement and clear, concise radio transmissions that help to reduce transmission times. On digitally linked
vehicles, crews can monitor the commanders integrated display (CID), with its standardized graphics; this
significantly reduces the need to send voice updates of friendly vehicle positions.
Messenger. Messenger service is the most secure means of communications available to the tank platoon.
When security conditions and time permit, it is the preferred means. It is generally very flexible and reliable. A
messenger can be used to deliver platoon fire plans, status reports, or lengthy messages. When possible,
lengthy messages sent by messenger should be written to prevent mistakes and confusion.
Wire. This method of communications is especially effective in static positions. The platoon will frequently
employ a hot loop in initial defensive positions, OPs, and assembly areas. Unit SOPs, tailored to counter the
enemys electronic warfare capability, prescribe conditions and situations in which the platoon will employ
wire. Tank crews can communicate directly with dismounted infantry by routing wire from the VIC-3 system
(AM-1780) through the loaders hatch or vision block to a field phone attached to the outside of the tank.
Visual. Visual communications are used to identify friendly forces or to transmit prearranged messages
quickly over short distances. Standard hand-and-arm or flag signals work well during periods of good visibility.
Crews can use thermal paper, flashlights, chemical lights, or other devices during periods of limited visibility,
but they must exercise extreme care to avoid alerting the enemy to friendly intentions. TCs must clearly
understand visual signals as they operate across the battlefield; each TC must be ready to pass on visual signals
from the platoon leader to other vehicles in the platoon. See STP 17-19K1-SM (the skill level 1 soldiers
manual for MOS 19K) and FM 3-25.60 (FM 21-60) for a description of hand-and-arm signals.
Pyrotechnics. Pyrotechnic ammunition can be used for visual signaling. The meaning of these signals is
identified in paragraph 5 of the OPORD and in the signal operation instructions (SOI). The main advantage of
pyrotechnics is the speed with which signals can be transmitted. The main disadvantages are the enemys
ability to detect and imitate them and to use them to identify friendly positions.
Sound. This form of communications is used mainly to attract attention, transmit prearranged messages, and
spread alarms. Sound signals, however, carry only short distances, and their range and clarity are greatly
reduced by battle noise. In addition, since they are open to enemy interception, use of sound signals may be
restricted for security reasons. They must be kept simple to avoid creating confusion. Prearranged meanings
for sound signals are covered in the unit SOP and SOI.
Radio. The radio is the platoons most flexible, most frequently used, and least secure means of
communications. It can quickly transmit information over long distances with great accuracy. Secure
equipment and the ability of the SINCGARS to frequency-hop provide the platoon with communications
security against most enemy direction-finding, interception, and jamming capabilities. Sophisticated directionfinding equipment, however, can trace almost any radio signal, allowing the enemy to locate and destroy the
transmitter and its operator. Survival of the tank platoon depends on good communications habits, especially
when it is using the radio; the platoon leader must strictly enforce radio discipline. The most effective way to
use the radio is to follow standard radiotelephone procedures (RTP), including brevity and proper use of
authentication tables and approved operational terms; these techniques are covered later in this section.
Digital. IVIS and FBCB2 enable the platoon leader to transmit digitally encoded information over the
SINCGARS radio to other similarly equipped vehicles. Linkup refers to the ability of the tanks radio to
transmit and receive digital information. When properly linked, the platoon leader receives continuously
updated position location information for the platoons vehicles, as well as for those of the company or troop
commander and executive officer (XO) and of adjacent platoon leaders and PSGs. Using the digital link with
other platoon vehicles and the company/troop commander, the platoon leader can also send and receive

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FM 3-20.15

preformatted reports and overlays with graphic control measures. FKSM 17-15-3 provides an example SOP for
use of digital systems, including IVIS-specific log-on and linkup procedures.

Tank platoon nets

The platoon leader, PSG, TCs, and crewmen employ and/or monitor the following radio nets.
Platoon. The tank platoon net is the key to command and control of the platoon and is the primary net in the
conduct of all platoon operations. All tanks within the platoon must have the ability to monitor and transmit on
this net at all times. Some units do not use platoon radio nets; in such a situation, it is critical that all platoon
vehicles adhere to communications SOPs and observe strict radio discipline. Every crewman in the platoon
should understand the net control guidelines, including proper RTP and techniques for effective
communications, discussed later in this section. In addition, every soldier must be trained how to provide the
platoon leader with essential information efficiently and without redundancy.
Company/troop command. The commander uses this net to maneuver the company or troop as well as to
process routine administrative/logistical (A/L) reports. Platoon leaders and PSGs monitor this net to keep
abreast of the current tactical situation from the reports of the commander, XO, and other platoon leaders. They
transmit on it to keep the commander informed and to talk to other platoon leaders to coordinate the tactical
actions of their platoons. Both the platoon leader and PSG must always have the ability to monitor and transmit
on this net. All TCs must be able to switch to this net to send reports and receive guidance if they are unable to
contact their platoon leader or PSG.

Net control
The smooth functioning of the platoon net allows accurate information to be passed quickly to and from
the platoon leader. This information flow is critical in maintaining the platoon leaders situational
understanding. It becomes especially important when contact has been made and the volume of traffic on the
platoon and company/troop nets increases drastically. The following techniques and suggestions will help to
ensure that information flowing over the net is organized and controlled in a manner that permits the platoon
leader both to understand it and to issue orders in response to it.
Digital traffic. Digital traffic may precede, replace, or follow voice transmissions; in many cases, it will
reduce the need for and redundancy of voice traffic. Do not duplicate digital traffic with voice messages if
digital transmissions precede or can replace voice traffic in a timely manner. Because digital systems are not
totally reliable, it may be necessary to verify the receipt of critical digital traffic.
Routine traffic. The PSG normally receives and consolidates A/L reports and other routine communications
from the TCs and passes the reports to the platoon leader or higher headquarters using the procedures prescribed
in unit SOPs.
Initial contact. Any vehicle can alert the platoon to an enemy. The section leader in contact (platoon leader
or PSG) deploys and fights his section according to the platoon leaders intent. The section leader not in contact
forwards the report to higher headquarters. If the entire platoon is in contact, the platoon leader fights the
platoon while the PSG reports the contact to the commander.
Reporting. In keeping the platoon leader informed, TCs must avoid redundant voice and digital reports. They
monitor the platoon net so they can avoid reporting information the platoon leader has already received from
other TCs. The PSG pays close attention to the company or troop net while the platoon net is active; he then
relays critical information to the platoon. This technique allows the platoon leader to concentrate on fighting
the platoon. Once the platoon leader begins to develop the situation, he is responsible for reporting the
platoons tactical situation to the commander using SPOTREPs and situation reports (SITREP). Refer to FKSM
17-15-3 for information on report formats.

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FM 3-20.15

Radiotelephone procedures. Proper RTP is the cornerstone of effective command and control in the tank
platoon. Every platoon member must be an expert in communications procedures. This ensures efficient
communications within the platoon and allows members of the platoon to communicate effectively with outside
elements such as other platoons or the company or troop headquarters.
Depending on the enemys electronic warfare capability, the company commander may elect to use
standardized call signs to simplify RTP. These call signs allow all users of a net to instantly recognize the
calling station. Examples would be the use of RED, WHITE, and BLUE to designate 1st, 2d, and 3d platoons,
respectively, and the use of bumper numbers to identity tanks within a platoon.
Techniques of effective communications. The platoon leader and PSG must ensure that every member
of the platoon understands and adheres to the following techniques and guidelines, which can contribute to
more effective, more secure tactical communications.
Minimize duration. All messages sent within or from the tank platoon must be short and informative.
The longer the message, the greater the opportunity for enemy elements to use electronic detection to pinpoint
the platoons location. Message length can be controlled in several ways:

Write down the message and then eliminate all unnecessary words from the written message
before sending it.

Read the message as written when sending it.

Use brevity codes that reduce the need to explain the tactical picture in detail.
Break long messages into several parts and send each part separately.
Minimize signature. When sending a message, every tanker must be conscious of the size and nature
of the electronic signature that he is emitting. To reduce the size of the signature, he can use terrain to mask his
transmissions from known or suspected enemy positions. He should set the transmitter to the lowest possible
power that will provide sufficient range.
Know the system. Each crewman must be an expert in the technical aspects of his voice and digital
communications systems. In particular, he must understand how to maintain each system, how to place it into
operation, and how to troubleshoot it whenever he suspects it is not functioning properly.
Use an effective format. A thorough knowledge of report formats is critical in ensuring timely
reporting of enemy information, especially in fast-moving tactical situations. Every crewman should be
familiar with the report formats that are outlined in FKSM 17-15-3 and know how to use them effectively. At
the same time, however, they must never delay reports only to assure the correct format. ALWAYS REPORT
ACCURATE INFORMATION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE!
As a basic guideline, reports of enemy activity should follow the SALUTE format, which covers these
factors:

Size. This includes the number of sighted personnel, vehicles, or other equipment.
Activity. This covers what the enemy is doing.
Location. This is usually reported as the grid coordinates of enemy elements.
Unit. This covers any indications useful in unit identification, such as patches, signs, and
vehicle markings.

Time. This item details when enemy activity was observed.

Equipment. This includes description or identification of all equipment associated with the
enemy activity.

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FM 3-20.15

FIRE DISTRIBUTION AND CONTROL

To maximize the effects of its fires, the platoon must know how to effectively focus, distribute, and
control them. Depending on the situation, fire distribution and control may be accomplished by individual
tanks, by section (each section leaders tank and his wingman), or by the platoon as a whole. On many
occasions, particularly in defensive operations, the platoon leader will be in a position to direct the fires of the
entire platoon. At other times, especially during offensive operations, fire distribution and control may begin
with the PSG or a wingman; as the situation develops, the platoon leader then takes control of the platoon fires
and distributes them effectively.
This discussion provides standardized methods for directing and controlling fires applicable to the
individual tank, the section, and the entire platoon. It covers the procedures used from the time targets are
acquired, through the placement of fires on those targets, to the reporting of the effects of those fires to the
company or troop commander. Also included are considerations for fire distribution and control during
offensive and defensive operations. Although the discussion focuses on actions at the platoon and section level,
these actions are always integrated into, and become part of, the company or troop plan.
Refer to FM 3-20.12 (FM 17-12-1-1 and FM 17-12-1-2) for further information on controlling direct fires,
including a complete explanation of target acquisition and destruction procedures during direct-fire
engagements.
NOTE:

The following discussion focuses on platoon-level operations only.

company-level operations, see FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1).

For more information on

Fundamentals of directing and controlling direct fires

Focus. The platoons ability to focus fires on the enemy is critical to combat survival. Proper scanning
techniques and the immediate, violent execution of battle drills (refer to the discussion in Chapter 3) will
initially orient the platoon toward the enemy. At that point, the platoon leader must supplement the drills using
the techniques and considerations covered in the following discussion. These factors include the following:

Employment of TRPs to mass the platoons fires at one location.

Knowledge of the wingman concept in controlling platoon and section fires.
Use of platoon SOPs to aid in controlling fires.
Use of TRPs. Once he has oriented the platoon, the platoon leader identifies and references each TRP
using a terrain feature or by means of a digital overlay. When TRPs are used to delineate the left and right
planning limits for platoon fires, he should designate a TRP near the center of the sector. The center TRP roughly
divides the left and right sectors in which each section will scan and engage targets. Each section should have
the ability to engage targets in the other sections sector of fire from its primary, alternate, or supplementary
position. This allows the platoon leader to distribute fires in response to changes in the enemy situation.
One section will then scan for and engage targets to the left of the center TRP while the other section does
the same to the right of the TRP. (NOTE: If he has M1A2 target designation capability, each TC can lase in the
vicinity of the TRP and orient his main gun on the TRP using the commanders digital display.) The outer
limits of the sector of fire can be supplemented with TRPs identified by the section leader or can be left to the
discretion of individual TCs based on the tactical situation.
Platoon/section fires and the wingman concept. As described in Chapter 1 of this manual, the
tank platoon is the smallest maneuver element that conducts operations. Even though platoons may separate
into sections as the situation requires (for example, during execution of traveling overwatch or bounding
overwatch), the platoon leader is still responsible for controlling all four tanks in his platoon. Sections, which
consist of a section leader (platoon leader or PSG) and a wingman, do not normally conduct missions or
operations separate from those of the platoon.

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FM 3-20.15

During combat operations, the platoon leader must not become absorbed in firing his own tank; survival
of the platoon depends on his ability to command and control the entire platoon. The platoon leader should
have the most experienced gunner on his vehicle. The gunner must be able to understand the fire plan or
operation so he can actively participate in the engagement process without the platoon leaders direct
supervision. During an engagement, the platoon leader must first ensure that the platoon is firing in concert.
He then must pass critical combat information (such as calls for fire, report criteria, and instructions) to his
crews using the appropriate communications techniques and nets.
The wingman concept assists the platoon leader in the command and control of the platoon. During
operations, the wingman orients his tank on the section leaders tank and, in the absence of orders, moves,
stops, and shoots when his leader does, as dictated in the platoon SOP. Anytime the wingman of a section is
engaged or begins an engagement, the section leader supports the wingmans effort.
Role of platoon SOPs. When specific orders are too time-consuming or not possible, a well-rehearsed
platoon SOP ensures fast, predictable actions by all tank crews. The SOP must be drilled repetitively so each
tank within the platoon will react automatically to any tactical situation. It should precisely cover guidelines
and procedures in such areas as target acquisition responsibilities, drills, reaction procedures, and use of
engagement areas and TRPs. Crewmen must then learn these SOP items by memory to provide direction in the
absence of orders.
FKSM 17-15-3 provides standardized methods for operations within the tank platoon.
guidance on the following:

It includes

Command and control.

OPSEC.
Organizing for combat.
Tactical operations.
Personnel.
Logistics.
In addition to guidance in these general categories, FKSM 17-15-3 covers specific operational factors that
the platoon leader must take into account in fire distribution and control. These additional SOP items include
the following:

Vehicle positions (for example, Tank 2 will always be the left flank tank).
TRP marking procedures and materials.
Sectors of fire for each tank.
Engagement bands (based on ammunition capabilities and expected enemy forces).
Procedures for coordination with adjacent units.
Guidelines for identifying and covering dead space.
The platoon leader should supplement his SOP by developing standardized procedures for offensive and
defensive fire planning. These procedures should be detailed enough to allow rapid fire planning after the
terrain has been analyzed. This initial planning may be refined and improved as time permits.
NOTE:

Visual control measures (and the accompanying SOP actions) may be used to start and stop
engagements, shift fires, and signal prearranged actions. On the other hand, an important
consideration for the platoon leader in developing the unit SOP is that the dynamics of battle will
normally require that fires be controlled using the radio. The radio instructions used to initiate SOPs
(as well as issue fire commands) must be brief and precise.

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FM 3-20.15

Distribution. The platoon leader employs two primary methods to ensure effective distribution of direct fires:
fire patterns and firing techniques.
Fire patterns. The entire platoon must thoroughly understand the three basic fire patterns: frontal,
cross, and depth. In addition, each tank crew must understand its responsibilities, by SOP, in using the fire
patterns for target engagement. The basic fire patterns cover most situations and promote rapid, effective
platoon fire distribution. They are normally used in the defense, but may be modified for employment with
techniques of movement. They may be used at both platoon and section level.
Regardless of the fire pattern used, the goal is to engage near and flank targets first, then shift fires to far
and center targets. Tanks should engage targets near to far and most dangerous to least dangerous in their
sector. A most dangerous enemy is any enemy antitank system preparing to engage the platoon. The platoon
sector is defined by TRPs, which are used to mass platoon fires at specific locations and to mark the left and
right planning limits for platoon fires. As directed or when he determines it is necessary, the section or platoon
leader may make exceptions to the most dangerous to least dangerous guideline; an example would be
engagement of designated priority targets (such as command and control vehicles).
Frontal fire pattern. The frontal pattern is used when all tanks within the platoon can fire to their front
(see Figure 2-28). Flank tanks engage targets to their front (right tank shoots right target, left tank shoots left
target) and shift fires toward the center as targets are destroyed. The frontal fire engagement rule is near to far,
flank to center.

Figure 2-28. Frontal fire pattern.

Cross fire pattern. The cross fire pattern is used when obstructions prevent some or all tanks within the
platoon from firing to the front or when the enemys frontal armor protection requires use of flank shots to
achieve penetration. In this pattern, each tank engages targets on the flank of its position. The right flank tank
engages the left portion of the target area while the left flank tank engages the right portion. As targets are
destroyed, tanks shift fires inward. The cross-fire engagement rule is outside in, near to far. An example of
the cross pattern is shown in Figure 2-29.

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FM 3-20.15

Figure 2-29. Cross fire pattern.

Depth fire pattern. The depth fire pattern is used when targets are exposed in depth. Employment of
depth fire is dependent on the position and formation of both the engaging platoon and the target. For example,
the entire platoon may be required to fire on a column formation in depth; in other cases, individual tanks
engaging in their sector may have to fire in depth. If the whole platoon is firing, it may be possible for each
tank to fire in depth on a portion of the enemy formation (see Figure 2-30). The far left tank engages the far target
and shifts fire toward the center of the formation as targets are destroyed; the left center tank engages the center
target and shifts fire toward the rear as targets are destroyed. The right center tank engages the closest (front)
target and shifts fire to the rear as targets are destroyed; the far right tank engages the center target and shifts
fire to the front as targets are destroyed.

Figure 2-30. Depth fire pattern.

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FM 3-20.15

Firing techniques. In addition to employing fire patterns, the platoon leader may choose one of three
firing techniques to distribute and control the direct fires of the platoon: simultaneous, alternating, and
observed. Figures 2-31 through 2-36 (pages 2-33 through 2-38) illustrate a variety of situations in which the
firing techniques are employed; the illustrations include the applicable fire commands. (NOTE: Refer to the
discussion of fire commands later in this section.)
Simultaneous fire. This is the primary firing technique used by the platoon. It is employed during most
offensive engagements when the unit encounters surprise targets. It is also used in most defensive engagements
when the enemy array is numerous enough to require multiple engagements by each tank in the unit. In that
case, all tanks engage simultaneously in their assigned sectors. Figures 2-31 through 2-34 (pages 2-33 through
2-36) illustrate various simultaneous fire situations.
Alternating fire. Alternating fire is normally used when the platoon is in a defensive position or is
undetected. Each tank alternates firing and observing in conjunction with the other tank in the section until both
are satisfied that they are hitting the target consistently. Subsequent fire, by command, is then simultaneous.
During alternating fire, Tanks 2 and 3 (the wingmen in each section) are normally the first to fire at their outside
targets. The section leaders (the platoon leader and PSG) provide observation before firing at their outside
targets. The process continues until all targets are destroyed or the leader switches to simultaneous fire. Refer
to Figure 2-35 (page 2-37) for an illustration of how alternating fire is employed.
Observed fire. Observed fire is normally used when the platoon is in protected defensive positions and
engagement ranges are in excess of 2,500 meters. The first tank to fire in each section engages designated
targets while the second tank observes. The second tank prepares to engage targets in the event the first tank
misses consistently, experiences a malfunction, or runs low on ammunition. This technique maximizes
observation and assistance capabilities for the observing tank while protecting its location. See Figure 2-36
(page 2-38) for an example of observed fire.

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Figure 2-31. Use of cross fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique
to engage enemy PCs (with platoon leaders fire command).

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Figure 2-32. Use of frontal fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique
to engage multiple enemy tanks (with platoon leaders fire command).

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FM 3-20.15

Figure 2-33. Use of different fire patterns in each section

(with simultaneous fire technique) to engage enemy targets
(with platoon leaders fire command).

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FM 3-20.15

Figure 2-34. Use of depth fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique
(with section fire command).

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FM 3-20.15

Figure 2-35. Use of cross fire pattern and alternating fire technique
(with section fire command).

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FM 3-20.15

Figure 2-36. Use of observed fire technique

(with section fire command).
Control. The platoon leader uses two processes to control fires: fire planning and fire commands. He
decides how to control fires based on the factors of METT-TC, especially the specific tactical situation
and the time available to plan and prepare.
Fire planning. The more thoroughly the platoon leader can plan an operation, the more effective the
platoons fires are likely to be. The amount of time available for fire planning, however, depends almost
entirely on the collective factors of METT-TC. There are also important considerations based on whether the
operation is offensive or defensive in nature.
For example, some defensive operations may allow the platoon leader hours or days to conduct fire
planning. Intelligence assets may be able to acquire, track, and report enemy elements as they move toward the
platoon. The platoon leader can then initiate fires with a platoon fire command or a predetermined event (such
as the enemy crossing a trigger line). He can also rely on detailed planning and preparation to assist him in
distributing fires effectively during the fight. Further fire commands may be required, but the object of the
planning phase is to anticipate events and coordinate fires before the fight starts. A well-planned defense

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requires minimum radio traffic over the platoon net during execution; trigger points, priority of engagements,
and targets are established in advance.
In other situations, especially during offensive operations (such as a meeting engagement or in a
movement to contact), the platoon will have only limited time to plan and prepare. At best, the platoon leader
may have time to issue a full platoon fire command; on the other hand, a member of the platoon may acquire
and engage a most dangerous target before the platoon leader has an opportunity to initiate his fire command.
In the absence of adequate planning time, the platoon leader must initially rely on preestablished, wellrehearsed SOPs to distribute and control fires and ensure fast, predictable engagement by all tanks.
NOTE:

Fire planning for offensive and defensive situations is covered in detail in a discussion later in this
section and in Chapters 3 and 4 of this manual.

No matter what kind of situation it expects to face, the platoon must learn and rehearse target acquisition
responsibilities, use of TRPs and fire patterns, and procedures for initiating, shifting, and stopping fires. Its
survival depends on it.
Fire commands. The effective use of fire commands is a function of the leaders knowledge of the
enemy and the fire control process and of the time available to plan, prepare, and rehearse. Using a standard
format for a platoon or section fire command ensures that all essential information and control measures are
given in minimum of time. It enables the unit to react instantly and effectively, even under the most adverse
conditions. Standardized platoon and section fire command formats must be established by unit SOP and then
practiced by platoon leaders and PSGs (the section leaders) for optimum proficiency. Brevity and clarity are
essential. Abbreviated methods for identifying target locations are encouraged; however, these methods must
be familiar and understandable.
The platoon leader may provide coordinating instructions or additional information to individual TCs; this
information is not part of the platoon fire command. When one tank sends a contact or spot report and it is
reasonable to believe all other tanks in the section or platoon have received it, the section or platoon leader
issues only the elements needed to complete the fire command. In all cases, a TC has the freedom to engage
a target without a section or platoon fire command if he is under immediate enemy contact.
The battlefield situation and/or platoon SOP dictate the number of elements used in a fire command. The
standard platoon fire command includes up to six elements, transmitted in the following order:

Alert.
Weapon or ammunition (optional)
Target description.
Orientation.
Control (optional).
Execution.
Alert. The alert element addresses the tanks that are being directed to fire; it does not require the
individual initiating the fire command to identify himself. (NOTE: Wingman tanks or sections not designated
to engage should sense the target effects and be prepared to engage targets as necessary.)
The platoon or company/troop SOP may specify code words to be used to standardize the alert element, as
in the following example:

RED. Entire platoon prepare to fire.

ALPHA. Platoon leader and his wingman prepare to fire.
BRAVO. PSG and his wingman prepare to fire.

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Weapon or ammunition (optional). The weapon is not announced unless specific control measures are
required. Ammunition is not announced unless a specific type is dictated by the situation. The TC selects
ammunition based on the platoon SOP, the number and type of enemy targets, and the supply status of
ammunition (how much of each type is on hand).
Target description. This element briefly describes the target in terms of number, type, and activity
(THREE TANKS MOVING EAST TO WEST). If the target is stationary, the activity may be omitted.
Orientation. Target location is described using one of two methods:

Reference point or terrain feature. This method is used for most defensive engagements and

can also be applied to offensive situations. If the platoon leader designates separate targets for
each section, he assigns responsibility and clarifies target location in the orientation element. For
example: ALPHA TWO TANKS TRP 3126 BRAVO BMPs AND TROOPS ROAD
JUNCTION.

Direction of target. This method is used most often in the offense when no TRP or definitive

terrain feature is near the target. Direction is indicated from the projected line of movement
(LOM) of the platoon in the offense or from the center of sector (COS) in the defense (for
example, LEFT FRONT or RIGHT FLANK). The clock option indicates direction starting
with the LOM or COS at 12 oclock (for example: TWO OCLOCK; NINE OCLOCK).
The
cardinal direction may also be used (for example: NORTHWEST or SOUTHWEST).
When using the direction method, the platoon leader will announce a range to help his TCs
locate the targets. Examples of this method: RIGHT FRONT ONE EIGHT HUNDRED or
TEN OCLOCK TWO FOUR HUNDRED.

Control (optional). The platoon leader can use the control element to provide the platoon with critical
firing information in several areas, including the following:

Fire pattern. The platoon leader may specify which pattern (frontal, cross, or depth) he has

selected based on his plan for fire distribution. As noted, if the control element is omitted, the
platoon engages targets using frontal fire. Refer to the discussion of fire patterns earlier in this
section.

Firing technique. The platoon leader may designate which of the three firing techniques

(simultaneous, alternating, or observed) he wants to employ. If no technique is specified, all

tanks engage simultaneously. If the platoon leader wishes to designate a firing tank or section,
he specifies which tanks will fire in the alert element of the fire command. Refer to the
discussion of firing techniques earlier in this section.

Ammunition or weapon. The platoon leader may designate the amount or type of ammunition

or weapons to be fired. For example, he might direct four bursts from the coax machine gun for
every two main gun rounds fired. (NOTE: This information may also be provided in the
weapon or ammunition element of the fire command. Refer to the discussion of that element.)

Execution. The execution element indicates when firing will begin. Normally, this is simply the
command FIRE. If simultaneous fire is desired or if the platoons fire is to be coordinated with other direct or
indirect fires, the execution element AT MY COMMAND is given first. The resulting delay allows the
coordination of all fires to be completed while the individual crews select their targets, issue their own fire
commands, and prepare to engage. If for any reason a tank is not prepared to fire (for example, because it is
conducting ammunition transfer or has experienced an equipment malfunction), the TC informs the platoon
leader or PSG immediately. The TC estimates and reports the time required for the tank to become ready to
fight.

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As he prepares and issues the fire command, the platoon leader must remember that tanks have to occupy
hull-down positions before firing. A proword (for example, TOP HAT) can be used in the execution element
to signal this move.
NOTE:

Once engagement of the enemy begins, the platoon leader controls fires by issuing subsequent fire
commands or individual elements of the fire command; this serves to focus and distribute the fires of
individual tanks, a section, or the entire platoon. Figure 2-37 illustrates an example of a platoon fire
command; note that the optional element specifying the weapon or ammunition has been omitted.
Refer to Figures 2-31 through 2-36 (pages 2-34 through 2-39) for examples of how fire commands
are used to control and distribute fires in a number of tactical situations. The engagement is
terminated when all targets are destroyed or when the platoon leader announces CEASE FIRE.

Alert

RED

Target description

THREE TANKS

Orientation

VICINITY TRP ZERO ZERO SIX

Control (optional)

CROSS

Execution

AT MY COMMANDFIRE

Figure 2-37. Example platoon fire command.

Fire distribution and control in the offense

While operating as part of a company team in the offense, a tank platoon conducts three types of
missions:

Movement to contact.
Attack (hasty or deliberate).
Fire and movement. (NOTE: This mission has been called advance in contact in some previous
doctrinal and training publications, including FM 3-90.1 [FM 71-1].)

Although each of these missions is distinct and serves individual purposes, they all require coordination of
platoon fires (both direct and indirect) and movement, which are the components of the tactical concept of
maneuver. The major difference among the types of missions is the amount of information about the enemy
and preparation time available. Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a detailed discussion of offensive
operations.
Offensive fire planning. It is not possible to develop fire plans in the offense in the same detail as in a
defensive operation. As a result, the platoon leader must take advantage of the available resources that will
make it easier for him to effectively distribute the platoons firepower; these include advance planning,
reconnaissance (including leaders and map reconnaissance), TRPs, platoon targets, and platoon SOPs.
Before moving out, the platoon leader should plan how the platoon will engage known or suspected
enemy locations. He should identify and assign sufficient TRPs and platoon targets to allow him to adjust fields
of fire quickly. In doing this, he must consider tactical aspects of the operation, including the following:

The mission to be accomplished.

Enemy strengths and weaknesses.
Likely or known enemy locations. (NOTE: The platoon leader will establish additional platoon
targets as the platoon moves during the operation.)

Indirect fire support and smoke employment (preplanned targets).

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Friendly forces.
Control measures, including phase lines, checkpoints, the limit of advance (LOA), and TRPs.
The route to be followed.
The movement technique to be used.
Section and individual tank sectors of responsibility.
The operational status of platoon equipment.

An important part of offensive fire planning is the assignment of overlapping sectors of fire for each
element in the platoon (see Figure 2-38). These sectors, also called sectors of responsibility, are covered in the
platoon SOP and are based on the formation and movement technique the platoon will use. During the
operation, as the situation requires, the platoon leader then adjusts the sectors he assigned initially. Factors that
may necessitate a change in sectors of fire include the following:

Changes in terrain or visibility.

Contact with previously unknown enemy positions.
Use of fires or smoke to conceal or cover the platoons movement.
The scheme of maneuver of adjacent units.

Figure 2-38. Example sectors of fire in a moving engagement

(platoon moving in wedge formation).
Engaging targets. Once movement begins but before contact is made, the platoon leader maneuvers the unit
to take full advantage of his tanks, whose capabilities are maximized in the offense. Crews should stay aware
of visible TRPs and control points as they come into view. The platoon leader uses these to adjust sectors of
responsibility. He may also use the clock or cardinal direction method to designate sectors of responsibility. As
noted, he modifies assigned sectors of fire as necessary while the platoon is moving.
Each TC identifies the tanks sector of fire for his gunner and then monitors the gunners target search to
make sure it covers the entire sector and does not stray beyond it. In addition, some offensive situations may
require the platoon to operate in an area where the line of sight between tanks in the sections is interrupted by
terrain or vegetation. The platoon leader and TCs must ensure that each crew conducts a 360-degree search for
air and ground targets and maintains effective communications with the other tanks.

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Moving engagements. Most moving engagements begin with one tank in the platoon acquiring
surprise targets. These targets should be engaged immediately. The TC who makes first contact gives a contact
report after he has engaged a target. The other tanks orient their gun tubes in the direction the tank in contact is
firing. The tanks do not change direction unless the platoon leader orders an action drill; they scan and return
fire on additional targets.
When targets are identified, the platoon leader or PSG sends a contact or spot report (depending on the
enemy situation and the amount of time available) to the company team commander. The commander and/or
platoon leader will already have assigned engagement priorities according to the mission and other factors. As
an example, offensive engagement priorities might be the following:

Priority 1. Most dangerous targets (tanks, ATGMs).

Priority 2. Dangerous targets.
Priority 3. Command and control assets (vehicles with the most antennas).
Priority 4. Air defense assets.
Priority 5. Engineer assets.
Priority 6. Least dangerous targets (supply vehicles).
After initial contact, the platoon leader controls the platoon fires by issuing fire commands and additional
instructions as appropriate. He must keep the company team commander informed and then develop the
situation.
Developing the situation. One platoon will normally attack while one or more platoons provide
overwatch. The platoon leader should adjust his tanks sectors based on the current, or the last known, enemy
positions. Even while attacking, the platoon must maintain a 360-degree watch for attacking aircraft and targets
that may appear between its position and that of the overwatching element. If overwatching elements are not
available, the platoon may be directed to conduct bounding overwatch.

Fire distribution and control in the defense

The tank platoon is the basic firing unit in defensive operations; therefore, effective control of the
platoons fires is critical. Given the potentially large number of enemy targets, each tanks limited on-board
ammunition, and the logistical burdens of resupply, the platoon must make every round count. It must be
proficient in gunnery skills, have operational fire control systems that are ready for instant employment, and
know how to effectively maintain control of its fires during the fight. Refer to Chapter 4 of this manual for a
detailed discussion of defensive operations.
Defensive fire planning. When the platoon leader receives a defensive mission, he immediately analyzes it
to determine how his platoon can best accomplish its assigned objectives. He begins a backward planning
process based on the defend NLT time specified in the company team OPORD. Establishing priorities of
tasks and managing the available time are critical steps in the process; failure in either of these areas is likely to
result in an uncoordinated effort that is doomed to failure.
Reconnaissance of the engagement area. Based on his knowledge of enemy doctrine and the
terrain and weather, the platoon leader visualizes the enemy attacking through the engagement area. He then
considers how the enemy is likely to be equipped and what capabilities his platoon has to defeat the enemy.
If possible, the platoon leader, along with his TCs, physically inspects the ground where the company
team commander has directed him to orient his platoon to engage the enemy. Looking back toward the BP, the
platoon leader selects the platoons primary firing positions, alternate positions (50 to 100 meters from each
tanks primary position), and supplementary positions (to orient platoon fires into another engagement area or
TRP).

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As the platoon leader walks the engagement area, he identifies dead space based on how the enemy is
expected to move through the area. He either adjusts the firing positions or plans indirect fires to cover the dead
space. He verifies grids using the GPS.
Firing positions and TRPs. The platoon leader then moves to the selected firing positions. He
checks the positions for correct orientation toward the engagement area and determines whether suitable TRPs
are available. TRPs must be visible through both daylight and thermal channels and should be visible to
friendly elements only. If existing terrain or man-made objects are inadequate, a field-expedient TRP must be
constructed. (NOTE: Materials that can be used in constructing TRPs include target panels, heated with Class
VIII heating pads, and caliber .50 or 7.62-mm ammunition cans filled with charcoal or a mixture of sand and
diesel fuel.)
The two main types of firing positions are defilade and keyhole. In defilade positions, tanks are
vulnerable from the flanks and to enemy overwatch fire. Keyhole positions (also called window positions)
provide greater protection by taking advantage of terrain features that create a keyhole around the position.
Ideally, the platoon should employ a combination of defilade and keyhole positions whenever possible to take
advantage of their respective advantages and negate their weaknesses.
Defilade positions. There are three types of defilade positions:

Turret-down. A turret-down position uses terrain to mask most of the tank, with only the

highest parts of the vehicle (such as the GPS and CITV) exposed to the enemy. Targets cannot
be engaged with the main gun from this position.

Hull-down. A hull-down position exposes only as much of the tank as needed to engage targets
with the main gun.

Hide. The platoon leader may assign a hide position to the rear of the BP for each tank to

occupy after the initial preparation of its firing positions. The hide position serves two purposes.
A well-constructed, effectively camouflaged hide position may delay enemy acquisition of the
platoon; a hide position located away from the prepared position may protect the platoon from
the full effects of enemy artillery fires. (Locations of hide positions are terrain-dependent, but
they should offer cover and concealment.)

Keyhole positions. These afford the firing tank a measure of protection from enemy overwatching fires
(see Figure 2-39). They restrict observation, and thus limit vulnerability, to only one segment of the platoons
engagement and; therefore, only those targets that can be seen (and engaged) by the tank can return fire on it.
The platoon leader must select each keyhole position carefully so the ability to interlock fires with other tanks in
the platoon is not degraded. Moving into or away from the opening to the position can vary the width of the
field of fire. Weaknesses of keyhole positions are limited sectors of fire and excessive dead space. In built-up
areas, dismounted infantry should be used to provide protection from infiltration.

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Figure 2-39. Keyhole firing positions.

Weapon planning range. The weapon planning range for a tank is the distance at which the platoon
leader intends to begin engaging enemy targets. In determining this range, he must know the lethality of the
kinetic energy rounds his crews will be firing versus the specific vulnerabilities of the enemy armor he expects
to face. Lethality, and as a result the weapon planning range, is based on the two factors known as probability
of hit (PH) and probability of kill (PK). While actual values of PH and PK are classified, it is obvious that PH
decreases as range increases, as does PK for kinetic energy penetrators. This is because velocity decreases with
range; penetration is largely dependent on velocity.
Evaluating and determining the planning range. With limited rounds available on board each vehicle,
the platoon leader must weigh the tactical alternatives and try to make every round count. A key factor in
determining the weapon planning range is METT-TC. The commander must consider the capabilities and
limitations of friendly forces as well as those of enemy troops. In addition, the planning range for a tank cannot
be separated from the number of rounds the platoon leader is prepared to expend. While it is possible to hit an
enemy tank at 3,000 meters, the probability of doing so on the first round is low. Further, even when a hit is
made, PK will be very low against turret frontal armor.
Taking into account these factors, the platoon leader will usually direct his TCs to engage targets from
closer ranges, especially in frontal engagements. Considering only PK, frontal tank engagements should begin
at less than 2,500 meters. Several factors combine to make frontal engagements of enemy tanks beyond 2,500
meters only marginally effective. Enemy armor is difficult to penetrate frontally. The sides, top, and rear have
relatively thin armor; therefore, flank and rear engagements give greater PK at extended ranges. (NOTE: The
PK assumes the round hits the target.)
NOTE:

Frontal engagements of enemy fighting vehicles with lighter armor can begin at longer ranges; the PK
is higher due to the difference in protection levels.

Obviously, there is a balance that the platoon leader must strike. Engaging at too close a range frontally
will increase PH and PK but reduce the number of targets that can be destroyed before that attacker reaches the
friendly position. Further, the attacker may close with more systems and combat power. If mission
considerations take priority (as in a delay mission), the engagement ranges may be extended at the cost of the
number of kills possible before resupply is required.
Long-range engagement considerations. When the decision is made to engage the enemy at longer
ranges, several additional planning factors must be considered. In choosing long-range engagement, the platoon

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leader is almost certain to compromise his positions and loses the element of surprise. At the same time,
however, the forward placement of a platoon may deceive the enemy as to the location of the main defensive
position and cause the enemy to deploy sooner than he had planned. While long-range engagements have lower
PH and PK, they can disrupt enemy command and control (by causing tanks to button up) and achieve mobility
kills.
Long-range engagements require the use of sensing tanks and observed fire techniques; as a result, the
platoon leader should always attempt to conduct them from an elevated firing position. He should task only his
most proficient firing crews and most accurate tanks to execute the long-range gunnery mission.
NOTE:

Refer to FM 3-20.12 (FM 17-12-1-2) for an in-depth discussion of the training issues involved in
preparing crews for long-range engagements.

Planning range summary. If the tactical situation permits, the optimum weapon planning range against
tanks in the frontal 60-degree arc is 1,500 meters. This can be extended with recognition of degraded PH, of
degraded PK against turret frontal armor, and of reduced kills per on-tank load of ammunition. The planning
range can also be reduced based on terrain, weather, and obscuration. As noted, engagement of enemy fighting
vehicles with lighter armor can begin at longer ranges based on the increased PK; however, due to their smaller
size, the PH for these vehicles will normally be lower than that for tanks.
Final planning considerations. As he conducts his troop-leading procedures, the platoon leader
mentally rehearses the battle. After reconnaissance of the engagement area or sector, he gathers all the TCs
(and gunners, if possible) where they can view the area. He ensures that everyone can identify the assigned
TRPs, obstacles, avenues of approach, prominent terrain features, and dead space.
Using TRPs, terrain features, or man-made objects, the platoon leader ensures that each tank has a welldefined and well-understood sector of fire. An individual tank sector should be wide enough to allow some
overlap with adjacent vehicles, but narrow enough to prevent overkill of targets. This reduces the scanning
requirements for the gunner and the potential for overkill; it also ensures that the entire engagement area or
platoon sector is covered by main gun fire. Based on the commanders guidance, the platoon leader also
establishes the trigger line for initiation of the direct-fire fight (this should be a company team control measure)
and takes other actions that are time- or space-dependent.
The platoon leader will decide whether to have all his tanks orient on the TRPs assigned by the company
team commander or to have sections or individual tanks orient in slightly different areas (platoon-level targets).
For example, if the platoon leader is tasked to orient on TRP 006, he might decide on one of the following
missions for his subordinates, based on the enemy and terrain:

All tanks orient on TRP 006.

Alpha section orients to the left of TRP 006 while Bravo section orients to the right.
When the platoon leader decides how to use his tanks to best execute the company team commanders
intent, he checks each firing position he has selected, identifying and confirming sectors of fire to ensure he has
mutual support between tanks. The platoon leader must know where friendly infantry and combat support
elements (such as ADA), if any, will be positioned. He must then plan machine gun fires for each tank to
protect itself as well as other tanks in the platoon and adjacent friendly elements. He does this by assigning
final protective fires (FPF), with the platoon using its coax machine guns to fire on dismounted enemy infantry,
and by planning for additional indirect fire support.
Preparing the defense. When he completes his defensive fire planning, the platoon leaders next step is to
conduct preparation activities. As detailed earlier, he has already oriented his TCs on the engagement area,
TRPs, and supplementary positions and has designated specific sectors of fire for each tank and each position.

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Initial preparation activities. The platoon leader directs and oversees a variety of activities designed
to ensure the most effective positioning and preparation of his tanks on the ground. He must remember that if
he fails to check an item, or fails to have another leader check it when necessary, the platoon may not be ready
for combat.
Selection and digging of firing positions. The platoon leader first designates where, and in what order,
he wants the supporting equipment to dig the firing positions (individual TCs must make sure that the TRPs that
were covered prior to digging are visible after the position is constructed). He gives each TC specific
instructions for handover of engineer assets, such as bulldozers or armored combat engineer vehicles (ACE),
between tanks. Ideally, he assigns one individual in the platoon to supervise and escort the engineers from
position to position. Whenever possible, the platoon leader selects existing terrain (such as wadis, depressions,
or road embankments) that can be modified by engineer assets to create positions. If OPs are used, positions
must be constructed to protect the dismounted crewmen from direct and indirect fire. As work is completed,
each crew camouflages its position.
Ammunition prestock. If Class V prestock is available, the platoon leader or PSG determines a location
that is accessible to all platoon tanks. The location should provide cover and concealment for the tanks while
they are uploading the ammunition. The prestock site should be protected from indirect fires, either by
completely digging in the position and preparing overhead cover or by improving existing terrain.
Prepare-to-fire checks. When preparing for combat, the platoon leader ensures that crews have
completed their prepare-to-fire checks. Boresighting is one of the most critical tasks in preparing the tank to
kill the enemy. When the tactical situation permits, the platoon leader ensures that tanks are boresighted daily
and after major temperature changes (typically, in the morning, at midday, and at dusk). If a building or some
other man-made object is not available in the engagement area or the platoon is not carrying its own boresight
panel, the platoon leader must prepare a field-expedient target for boresighting. (NOTE: If preparation time is
limited, the platoon leader may direct the PSG to check prepare-to-fire activities.)
Limited visibility. The platoon leader should develop a limited visibility plan. It should cover actions the
platoon will take if the battlefield is obscured to the extent that the laser range finder (LRF), thermal imaging
system (TIS), and CITV are ineffective. Examples of these actions include plotting and registering indirect
illumination and adjustment of battlesight ranges. The plan should also cover the use of listening posts to detect
enemy movement during limited visibility.
Sketch cards. As each tank crew prepares its position, it completes a sketch card, a rough
topographical sketch of the tanks assigned sector showing its deliberate or hasty defensive fighting position.
The sketch card aids the crew in target acquisition and enables the platoon leader to develop his platoon fire
plan. The crew makes two copies, one to keep and one to send to the platoon leader. Sketch cards are prepared
either traditionally (handwritten) or using the tanks digital equipment (IVIS or FBCB2).
Traditional sketch card development. The ability to create traditional, handwritten sketch cards, while
important for all tank crewmen, is especially critical for crews of the M1 and M1A1. These tanks lack the
digital capabilities that provide valuable assistance to crews of later-model vehicles in preparing their sketch
cards. The process begins with the platoon leader designating the primary and supplementary positions for his
tanks and each TC selecting his alternate fighting position. After the positions have been designated and
reconnoitered (time permitting), the platoon leader will designate the sector limits of fire for each tank and the
TRPs within the sector. The platoon leader must give the TC the number designators for the TRPs.
As the positions are prepared, the TC and gunner will prepare the sketch cards for each position. When
the cards are completed (normally within 20 minutes), one copy will be sent to the platoon leader and the other
copy will be kept with the tank.
When the tank is moved into position, and before engineer assets are released from the position, the crew
will make sure the target areas and obstacles within the sector can be fired upon, and determine if assigned
TRPs can be engaged. A TRP that could be engaged before the position was prepared may be masked when the

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tank is dug in. The platoon leader must be informed of any inability to engage assigned TRPs and may direct a
change in position. If time permits, the TC will make physical contact with his wing or flanking elements to
determine overlapping fire within the sectors and the position of friendly OPs.
As a minimum, the traditionally drawn sketch card, which is illustrated in Figure 2-40, will depict the
following:

All key terrain features.

TRPs. TRPs should be marked with a cross and their assigned number in the upper right
quadrant of the cross. Mark all TRPs that are visible, whether they are in your sector or not.

High-speed avenues of approach.

Symbol indicating north.
Preplanned fires (direct and indirect). These may be added after the platoon leader receives

this information from the FIST officer and constructs a platoon fire plan. These should be
marked with a cross, with the letter designation in the top left block and numeric designation in
the top right.

Range bands. These will help when the LRF fails. The number of bands will be determined by

the terrain or mission. (If terrain permits, range bands of 1,200, 1,800, and 2,400 meters will be
used.) A minimum of three range bands should be used.

Right and left limits of assigned sector. These limits are marked by double lines beginning at
the tanks position and extending through the terrain feature that designates the boundary limit.

Reference point. This is located near the center of the sector and, ideally, at or beyond the

tanks maximum engagement range. The reference point should be a prominent, immovable, and
readily identifiable feature; it should not be a target and should not be easily destroyed. The
reference point should be depicted using a military map symbol, sketch of feature, or brief word
description, and marked with the letters Ref Pt inside a circle.

Obstacles and dead space. Obstacles should be marked on the sketch card using approved
military symbols. Dead space should be marked using diagonal lines with the words DEAD
SPACE.

The positions of elements to the left and right and of friendly OPs/LPs. These positions
should be marked with standard symbols. (This information will be omitted if the tactical
situation does not allow enough time to make contact with wing and flank elements, or otherwise
determine their exact location).

Identification data. This consists of the vehicle bumper number, placed directly below the tank

symbol, and the firing position (primary, alternate, or supplementary), marked with a capital P,
A, or S and placed below the vehicle bumper number.

Marginal information. Placed in the bottom left third of the sketch card, this information
includes the following:
List of TRPs.
Range to TRPs.
Reference points.
Description of TRPs.
Description of obstacles and other likely target areas visible to your position.
Range to obstacles and other likely targets.

Legend. The legend, placed in the bottom right third of the sketch card, includes the following:
Explanation of symbols used on the card.
Other control measures and pertinent information, as required.

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FM 3-20.15

Figure 2-40. Traditional tank sketch card.

Creating sketch cards using IVIS (M1A2). In the defense, IVIS can be used for basic sector sketch
functions. The tank crew can create a sketch card using the ENEMY OVERLAY selection in the MISSION
PLANNING menu.

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FM 3-20.15

Before creating the sketch card, the TC directs the vehicle into the designated firing position. With the
platoon leaders guidance, the TC and gunner will make a detailed search and analysis of the tank sector with
the GPS and CITV. Based on this search, they will establish interlocking sectors of observation with other
tanks. As the crew determines limit markers, reference points, range bands, and other unique features within
their sector, the gunner lases to each point. As the gunner lases to each point, the TC does one of the following:

Records the grid location of the enemy icon, the range, and what that location is to be labeled.
(Later, he will use this information to create the sketch card in the MISSION PLANNING
menu.)

Marks each point on the tactical screen with a yellow grease pencil. Later, he can go to the
MISSION PLANNING menu, select the ENEMY overlay, and simply retrace the sketch card
with the thumb controller and the GRAPHICS menu.

After the TC has searched his sector and either recorded or marked his range card data on the tactical
screen, he can begin to prepare his tank sketch card using IVIS. First, he selects the MISSION PLANNING
menu, the ENEMY overlay, and the FREE DRAW function. Then, using the first entry of the LABEL function,
he marks the left and right sector limits (LL and RL). (See Figure 2-41.) These limits should extend out past
the tanks visibility limits. This will allow the TC or platoon leader to monitor movement in his sector through
updated reports (enemy icon) on enemy locations.

Figure 2-41. IVIS line limit graphic.

Using the FREE DRAW function, the TC marks the remaining sketch card graphics:

Trigger line. Use the first entry of the LABEL function to mark the TL. (See Figure 2-42.)
Dead space. Outline the dead space areas. Place an X inside the dead space, and use the first
entry of the LABEL function to label the X DS. (See Figure 2-43.)

Target references. Use the TARGET REFERENCE POINT function and its numeric points, as

shown in Figure 2-44, to mark TRPs in your sector (platoon targets and prominent features). Use
the CONTACT POINT function, illustrated in Figure 2-45, to mark platoon targets and other
prominent features in the sector. Use the first entry of the LABEL function and mark the
CONTACT POINT with an abbreviation (for example, intersection [INT], building [BLDG],
infantry [INF], hill [HILL]). Use the second entry of the LABEL function to mark the range.
These contact points may be used to mass fires and index range to targets during degraded
operations.

Figure 2-42. Trigger line graphic.

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FM 3-20.15

Figure 2-43. Dead space graphic.

Figure 2-44. TRP graphic.

Figure 2-45. Target graphic

(contact point function).
The completed IVIS-generated is similar to the one illustrated in Figure 2-46.

Figure 2-46. Completed sketch card graphic for M1A2.

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FM 3-20.15

IVIS helps orient the weapon systems to the direction of an enemy (icon), as received in an incoming
report. When the TC displays an incoming report, he sees how the enemy (icons) is moving toward his sector.
This early warning may help the TC determine which avenue of approach the enemy will take. This is
especially beneficial during hours of darkness or reduced visibility.
On command, each tank sends the ENEMY overlay to the platoon leader. As the platoon leader receives
the ENEMY overlays, he uses the POST function to combine the sketch cards. When the sketch cards are
combined and displayed, the platoon leader can see whether the platoons sector is covered and the dead space
within the sector. The platoon leader then declutters the combined ENEMY overlay to display only limit
markers and dead space. Then, he sends the dead space uncluttered ENEMY overlay to the company
commander. (The commander consolidates all platoon sketch cards to make sure the company's sector is
covered.) This procedure helps when establishing a hasty defense or occupying defensive positions at night.
This also allows each tank crew to create a sketch card for each battle position. When the need arises to
displace to the different battle positions, the tactical display automatically scrolls as the tank moves. As the
tank reaches and occupies its alternate battle position, that sketch card is displayed.
IVIS message protocol determines who can send, receive, and update various reports and overlays.
(TM 9-2350-288-10-2, Appendix J, explains IVIS protocol, based on assigned duty positions.) To update some
overlays, the crew may need to change the vehicle USER ID. Internal SOPs and command guidance determine
when this may be done.
During the battle, tanks can reference their sketch cards. Using the DISPLAY overlay function, the TC
switches between the unit OPERATIONS overlay and the sketch card. Depending on the size of the
OPERATIONS overlay, the TC may leave the sketch card data superimposed over the OPERATIONS overlay.
Creating sketch cards using FBCB2 (M1A1D and M1A2 SEP). While FBCB2 currently does not have
the capability to produce a tank sketch card, crews can use the overlay tool to produce a rough, nondoctrinal
sketch card. Upon receipt of these tank sketch cards, the platoon leader must redraw them onto the platoon fire
plan before forwarding it to the commander. Future software upgrades of the FBCB2 will include the sketch
card function.
Sketch card verification. As he receives the platoons sketch cards, the platoon leader must verify them.
Either he or the PSG mounts each tank and views its sector through the gunners primary sight, gunners
primary sight extension (GPSE), or CITV. The sketch card check should ensure that the TCs have covered each
of the following considerations:

Tank sectors are mutually supporting and overlapping.

Each tank crew understands and has recorded the designated TRPs and FPF.
All TRPs assigned to the platoon are covered by fire.
Each crew has marked ranges to all TRPs or identifiable targets within the tanks sector. These
ranges are especially critical in limited visibility or degraded (LRF) operations.

The risk of fratricide between platoon tanks and adjacent elements has been evaluated and

appropriate adjustments or restrictions implemented. (NOTE: Each crew member needs to

know the location of adjacent vehicles and OPs and what they look like through the tanks sights.
Using pickets to indicate left and right limits for individual tank main gun fire can help TCs to
observe their limits of fire. Rehearsals are the best method of achieving fratricide reduction.)

The sketches show friendly obstacles, with each obstacle covered by machine gun or main gun
fire from at least one tank.

Dead space is covered by indirect fire or alternate positions.

Each tank and the platoon as a whole has identified alternate positions that cover the same area
as the primary positions and supplementary positions that cover additional areas of responsibility
assigned to the tank or platoon.

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FM 3-20.15

Backbriefs. The sketch card verification process provides an optimum opportunity for the platoon leader
to conduct backbriefs to confirm each TCs understanding of his mission. If time permits, the backbrief
includes a field-expedient sand table or chalkboard exercise (using a chalked side-skirt, micro armor, or a
rough terrain model scratched in the dirt). The platoon leader can use the exercise to reinforce operational
considerations for the mission, including the following:

Individual tank responsibilities (which tank will engage where within the platoon sector).
Tactical contingencies, such as which tank will pick up a sector if another tank is knocked out or
what happens if a particular tanks sector is overloaded with targets.

Adjustments to positions, such as when a tank is unable to cover its entire assigned sector.

(NOTE: This should be verified immediately after the position has been prepared, while
engineer assets are still on site.)

Platoon fire plan development. The platoon leader compiles the individual tank sketch cards (by
either traditional or digital means), consolidates them, and develops the platoon fire plan. He then coordinates
the fire plan with adjacent platoons and adjusts the individual tank positions as necessary. An effective platoon
fire plan provides the entire platoon with the information necessary to distribute and control the fires of all
available direct fire and indirect fire weapons, both organic and attached. An important point is that
development of the platoon fire plan within the platoon, as at all levels of fire planning, is conducted from the
top down.
Graphics, maps, and overlays. These are critical elements of fire plan development. As discussed earlier
in this chapter, they are the platoon leaders primary tool for organizing information and synchronizing his
assets on the battlefield. They assist him in depicting the fire plan accurately.
The platoon leader must have both maneuver and fire support graphics posted on his map and make sure
that all the TCs have done the same. He then prepares the overlay, which, like the fire plan, can be developed
by either traditional (handwritten) or digital means. The overlay technique eliminates the tedious process of
recopying operational graphics onto a sketch. As an example, if the platoon leader believes a TRP should be
added to the company graphics, he marks it on his overlay. He also places at least two reference marks on the
overlay to ensure proper alignment with his map.
The platoon leader prepares two copies of the overlay. He gives one copy to the company commander
during the OPORD confirmation brief. The commander can then apply the platoon overlays to ensure his
assigned engagement area is covered. After evaluating the platoon overlays, he may wish to adjust platoon
positions or assign supplementary positions if the entire engagement area is not covered by either observation or
direct fire. If a portion of the engagement area appears as dead space on all platoon overlays, the commander
may wish to plan indirect fires to cover the area.
Depiction of the fire plan. With the information from the individual tank sector sketches, the platoon
leader uses the available tools to prepare the platoon fire plan. As with other tactical products, the fire plan
product can be handwritten or displayed on the tanks digital display. Figure 2-47 shows a handwritten fire
plan; Figure 2-48 illustrates a digital fire plan developed for the M1A2.

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FM 3-20.15

TRP DESCRIPTION

120MM .50 CAL 240

001 WEST
WOODLINE

13,14,12 13,14,12 13,14, 13,14

12
,12

002 NW WOODLINE 13,14

13,14

13

003 OPEN AREA

11,12

11,12

ARTY

13,14

12

11,12

004 INTERSECTION 14,12

14,12

005 TRAIL

13,14

13,14

006 MINEFIELD

13,14

13,14

13,14 13,14

WIT FPF

ALL

ALL

ALL

ALL

Figure 2-47. Traditionally prepared fire plan (handwritten).

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FM 3-20.15

Figure 2-48. M1A2 fire plan.

To enhance the platoons understanding of the fire plan and the operation itself, the platoon leader must
know how to make effective use of marginal data. These notations cover numerous types of tactical
information. They may vary according to mission, means of fire plan development (handwritten or digital), and
higher unit guidance. As an example, marginal data required on the fire plan for an M1 or M1A1 platoon might
include the following types of entries:

Unit designation.
Date.
Type of position (primary, alternate, or supplementary).
Information on TRPs (description, range, list of tanks that can engage each TRP).
Additional notes as necessary, covering such areas as specific coordination with adjacent units
and engagement criteria and priority.

NOTE:

On digitally equipped vehicles, much of the information normally included in marginal data can be
developed and transmitted using IVIS or FBCB2.

Rehearsals. Once the preliminary preparations are complete, the platoon leader requests permission
from the company team commander to rehearse the defense and conduct any final activities to conclude the
preparation phase. The rehearsal should cover as many aspects of the operation as possible, including any
movement. If time permits, it is conducted in both day and night conditions and in MOPP 4. The platoon
leader should rehearse the platoon fire commands and actions, to include calling for indirect fires and requesting
their time of flight. (NOTE: He must know the time of flight for the indirect fire mission to synchronize the
available direct and indirect fires.)
At a minimum, the rehearsal must include the TC and gunner of each tank. It is absolutely critical that
these key crewmen understand the complete plan. Each TC must know what actions he is required to execute at

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FM 3-20.15

each point in the mission. Each gunner must understand what his exact sector is and under what conditions
engagement priorities will change. (NOTE: The gunners on the platoon leaders and PSGs tanks should be
the most experienced at their positions within the platoon, capable of executing the plan without further
guidance from their TCs. This frees the platoon leader and PSG to fight the battle rather than spend too much
time controlling their individual tanks.)
If it is not possible to assemble men and equipment for a large-scale rehearsal, the platoon leader conducts
the rehearsal on the ground from a position that allows the platoon to see the battlefield. One technique is to
construct a field-expedient sand table of the engagement area or platoon sector. The platoon leader can then
drill the platoon on the fire plan, using rocks, sticks, or other available material to depict enemy formations on
the sand table. He can issue fire commands and then require the TCs to explain their actions for different
situations and enemy arrays.
Preparation summary. The platoon leader must be resourceful and thorough in making sure all crews
understand and can execute the plan under all conceivable conditions. This includes planning, preparing, and
conducting rehearsals for supplementary and successive BPs that he has been directed to prepare. If time does
not permit all of these steps, he must prioritize his preparation activities.
The end product of the platoon leaders fire planning and preparation is not merely a thorough, accurate
fire plan, although this is an indispensable component of the defense. To be successful in battle, he must
complete these phases of the defensive operation with tank crews that understand in detail what they are
supposed to do and a platoon that, as a package, is completely prepared to fight.
Executing the defense. Once the platoon has completed fire planning and preparation activities, the platoon
leader directs execution of the defense. The following discussion covers a number of key considerations in the
distribution and control of fires during the execution phase.
Observation. When occupying a prepared defensive position, an observer may be dismounted to
acquire targets while the tanks are in turret-down or hide positions. When the platoon is alerted to targets in its
sector, the tanks move to turret-down, optics-up positions before the observer remounts his tank. A platoon in a
hasty defensive position will already be in a turret-down, optics-up position, and an observer will probably not
be deployed.
Initial contact. When targets are identified, the platoon leader or PSG sends a contact or spot report
(depending on the enemy situation and time available) to the company team commander. The platoon leader
issues a fire command with AT MY COMMAND as a control element. At this time, TCs take the following
actions:

Observe the target array and select the target(s) each tank must engage, as indicated by the fire

pattern given in the platoon fire command. (NOTE: If the fire command does not include a fire
pattern, tanks use the pattern specified in the platoon SOP; if the SOP is not applicable, they use
the frontal pattern).

Issue a fire command to the crew, using the ammunition element prescribed by SOP and target
description indicated by the platoon fire command.

Ensure that the gunner acquires and ranges to his first target.
Indirect fire support. While the individual crews select targets, determine ranges, and prepare to
engage, the platoon leader calls for indirect fire (if this responsibility has been assigned to him) and asks for
time of flight. He uses the time of flight to coordinate his fires so the indirect fire arrives at the same time, or
just after, the direct fires of his platoon. If the indirect fire arrives too soon, the enemy will increase speed,
change directions, or take other actions that may degrade the effects of the direct fires. The tank platoon leader
has the responsibility to request indirect fire support using the FBCB2 system first.

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FM 3-20.15

Engagement procedures. On the command FIRE, each tank in the platoon moves to a hull-down
firing position and begins to engage. (NOTE: The platoon leader may move the platoon to hull-down
positions by announcing TOP HAT, TOP HAT before issuing the command to fire.) If a crew receives the
command to fire before it has completed all of its preparations, it must complete the preparations and fire as
soon as possible.
As the engagement proceeds, thorough planning and preparation helps the platoon to execute the defense
with minimal instructions. Aggressive use of indirect fires slows and confuses the enemy. Each TC adjusts fire
and switches targets in accordance with the platoon fire command or platoon SOP. The commander and/or
platoon leader will already have assigned engagement priorities according to the mission and other factors. As
an example, defensive engagement priorities might be the following:

Priority 1. Most dangerous targets (tanks, ATGMs).

Priority 2. Dangerous targets.
Priority 3. Command and control assets (vehicles with the most antennas).
Priority 4. Air defense assets.
Priority 5. Engineer assets.
Priority 6. Least dangerous targets (supply vehicles).
How long each tank can safely remain in a hull-down position will depend on the enemy situation.
Whenever possible, a tank should remain in position to kill enemy targets. Taking the time to move between a
turret-down position and a hull-down position, however, increases the enemys probability of a hit because he
will be closing on the tanks position. If the enemy is within 2,000 meters, relatively numerous, closing rapidly,
and the mission requires a defense (as opposed to delay), a defending tank will normally be more successful
continuing to fire and not moving to his turret-down position. On the other hand, if the enemy is stationary
and/or has tanks or ATGMs in overwatch, the crew should fire no more than two rounds before returning to a
turret-down position. When the crew is not engaging enemy targets, the tank should return to a turret-down
position and provide observation or assistance to other tank crews.
NOTE:

Similar considerations, problems, and criteria also apply to movement between primary and alternate
positions.

Contingencies. After direct fire has been initiated, platoon fire commands will be used only to cover
previously unanticipated contingencies. For example, the platoon leader might have one section engaging to the
left side of the sector and the other to the right after anticipating an enemy company deployed on line across the
platoons sector. If the entire enemy force arrives along the right side, use of a fire command gives the platoon
leader the flexibility to adapt his distribution of fires rapidly and economically to the new situation. He issues
the appropriate fire command to initiate the direct-fire fight.
Ammunition transfer. Important considerations as the engagement continues are each tanks supply
of ready ammunition and the related requirement for ammunition transfer. No tank should totally deplete its
ready ammunition before initiating the transfer of rounds from its semiready storage area. The loader must
maintain a running count of ready ammunition available and keep the TC informed of the tanks ammunition
status. In turn, the platoon leader and PSG must monitor the status of their wingmen. In addition, because all
four tanks cannot transfer ammunition at the same time, the platoon leader must issue guidance on how and
when each tank will conduct the transfer.
As ready ammunition is depleted, each crew must be ready to transfer rounds. Based on the platoon
leaders guidance, the tank backs into its hide position and completes ammunition transfer when the situation
allows.

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FM 3-20.15

Movement out of a defensive position. Changes in the mission or battlefield situation may require
the platoon to move out of a BP, either to move to a successive position or to conduct another mission such as a
delay.
Movement considerations. When the situation requires the platoon to move, the platoon leader and his
TCs must make sure the movement does not expose the flank or rear of their tanks to enemy fire. If a covered
route out of the position is not available, the TC should mask the tanks movement with terrain before turning
around. To accomplish this, he turns over control of the main gun and coax machine gun to the gunner. He
faces the rear and quickly guides the tank backward to a covered route by giving the driver short commands (for
example, LEFT FAST or HARD RIGHT). The gunner acquires, engages, and adjusts fire on targets using
the same commands and procedures used by the TC when the tank must conduct an engagement with a threeman crew.
Use of covering smoke. The tank smoke systems can be used to screen the move when the unit is in
contact. The TC may use grenade launchers during initial movement, then switch to the vehicle engine exhaust
smoke system (VEESS) after the tank has built up speed and momentum. The gunner uses battlesight gunnery
while the tank is obscured. He must use exhaust smoke judiciously, however; improper employment or careless
movement techniques may cause the tank to become silhouetted against its own smoke.
NOTE:

If exhaust smoke prevents the crew from seeing where the tank is going and the tank is no longer
screened by the first salvo of smoke grenades, the TC should use a second salvo of grenade-launched
smoke.

CAUTION
VEESS will be used only when the vehicle is burning diesel fuel. Use of VEESS when burning
any other type of fuel will cause a fire hazard.
Completion of the defense. When the platoon completes the engagement, the platoon leader
determines the number and type of rounds fired, the effects of the fire, and the status of the platoon. He sends a
SPOTREP to the company or troop commander and issues the appropriate instructions directing the platoon to
continue the mission.

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FM 3-20.15

CHAPTER 3

Offensive Operations
Offense is the decisive form of war. While tactical considerations may call for the platoon to execute
defensive operations for a period of time, defeat of the enemy requires a shift to offensive operations. To
ensure the success of the attack, the tank platoon leader must understand the fundamentals of offense and apply
troop-leading procedures during the planning and preparation phases of the operation.

CONTENTS
Section 1.

Fundamentals of the Offense ...............................................................

Page
3-1

Section 2.

Planning .................................................................................................

3-3

Section 3.

Preparation ............................................................................................

3-5

Section 4.

Execution - Tactical Movement ............................................................

3-6

Section 5.

Execution - Actions on Contact ...........................................................

3-14

Section 6.

Execution - Platoon Tactical Tasks ......................................................

3-33

Section 7.

Execution - Consolidation and Reorganization ..................................

3-41

SECTION 1 - FUNDAMENTALS
OF THE OFFENSE
PURPOSES OF THE OFFENSE
The main purpose of the offense is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize an enemy force. Additionally,
offensive operations are undertaken to secure key terrain, gain information, deprive the enemy of resources,
deceive and divert the enemy, hold the enemy in position, disrupt his attack, and set the conditions for
successful future operations.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE

FM 3-0 (FM 100-5) describes the common characteristics of all offensive operations: surprise,
concentration, tempo, and audacity. To maximize the value of these characteristics, tank platoons must apply
the following considerations:

Surprise. Platoons achieve surprise by following OPSEC procedures and making the best
possible use of vehicle speed and covered and concealed routes during tactical movement.

Concentration. Platoons achieve concentration by massing the effects of their weapon systems

without necessarily massing platoon vehicles at a single location. Modern navigation and
position location/reporting systems allow the platoon leader to disperse his vehicles while
retaining the ability to quickly mass the effects of the platoons weapon systems whenever
necessary. In addition, these advanced systems allow him to maintain command, control, and
OPSEC at all times. The platoon leader must remember that it is more important to move using
covered and concealed routes to positions from which the platoon can mass fires and engage the
enemy than it is to maintain precise formations and predetermined speeds.

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FM 3-20.15

Tempo. Tempo, the rate of speed of military action, can range from fast to slow. While a fast

tempo is preferred, the platoon leader must remember that synchronization sets the stage for
successful platoon operations. To support the commanders intent, he must ensure that his
platoons movement is synchronized with the movement of other company or troop elements as
well as with adjacent and supporting units. If the platoon is forced to slow down because of
terrain or enemy resistance, the platoon leader reports this change so the commander can alter the
tempo of company or troop movement to maintain synchronization.

Audacity. At the platoon level, audacity is marked by violent execution of the mission and a
willingness to seize the initiative. Knowledge of the commanders intent two levels up allows the
platoon leader to take advantage of battlefield opportunities whenever they present themselves,
enhancing the effectiveness of the platoons support for the entire offensive operation.

FORMS OF OFFENSE
The four general forms of tactical offense described in FM 3-0 (FM 100-5) are movement to contact,
attack, exploitation, and pursuit. Characteristics include the following:

Movement to contact is conducted to develop the situation and to establish or regain contact
with the enemy force.

An attack is conducted to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy. The attack can be deliberate
or hasty, depending on the amount of planning time available.

An exploitation extends the destruction of the enemy by maintaining offensive pressure.

A pursuit is conducted against a retreating enemy force and follows a successful attack to
complete the destruction of the enemy force.

The company can execute movements to contact and either hasty or deliberate attacks on their own; the
nature of these operations depends largely on the amount of time and enemy information available during the
planning and preparation phases. Companies execute an exploitation or pursuit as part of a larger force.

ROLE OF THE TANK PLATOON

The tank platoon is an integral part of company team or troop maneuver. The platoon conducts tactical
movement, actions on contact, consolidation, and reorganization in support of higher operations. It can destroy,
fix, or bypass an enemy as required by the commanders intent, the tactical situation, and the ROE.

OPERATING SYSTEMS
In conducting his planning and preparation for offensive operations, the platoon leader pays close
attention to the considerations applicable for the operating systems, which are outlined in the following
discussion. The operating systems, which help the platoon leader to logically organize his thoughts to cover the
mission, are the following:

NOTE:

3-2

Maneuver.
Fire support.
Intelligence.
Mobility and survivability.
Air defense.
CSS.
Command and control.

Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter, which cover, respectively, the planning and preparation phases of the
offense, are organized using the operating systems in the order listed above. Included in each section
is a discussion of the human aspect of operations, an unofficial operating system focusing on
intangible, soldier-related factors.

FM 3-20.15

SECTION 2 - PLANNING
The planning phase begins when the platoon receives the higher warning order or OPORD and ends when
the platoon leader issues his own OPORD or FRAGO. During this phase, the platoon leader conducts troopleading procedures as outlined in Chapter 2. In developing his OPORD or FRAGO, the platoon leader must
take into account the considerations applicable for the operating systems, which are outlined in this section.
After he issues the warning order, the platoon leader may initiate rehearsals of tactical movement, battle
drills, or breaching actions. These generic rehearsals allow the platoon to begin preparing for the mission.
Once the platoon leader completes his plan, the generic rehearsals are matched to the actual terrain and
anticipated actions on enemy contact.

MANEUVER
Movement
The platoon leader develops the platoon maneuver plan so that it matches the commanders intent and
specific instructions and supports the company main effort. He determines the platoons route, movement
technique, and formation based on his battle space (including terrain factors), the company scheme of
maneuver, and the likelihood of enemy contact. He pays particular attention to fields of observation and fire;
these factors can help him to define potential enemy engagement areas. The platoon leader war-games
anticipated actions on contact and execution of essential tasks. He also addresses actions on the objective
(consolidation and reorganization).

Direct fires
The platoon leader identifies attack-by-fire and support-by-fire positions from which the platoon can
engage known or suspected enemy positions. He designates TRPs and assigns sectors of fire, observation, and
weapons orientation. He specifies platoon fire patterns (if different from those identified by SOP) and
addresses restrictions on direct fire imposed by the ROE in effect for the operation.

FIRE SUPPORT
Most fire support planning is conducted at company level and higher. The platoon leader reviews the plan
to ensure that responsibilities for initiating, lifting, and shifting indirect fires are designated. As necessary, he
identifies additional indirect fire targets on known or suspected enemy positions and submits recommendations
to the company FIST. The platoon leader evaluates and recommends the use of smoke to help conceal or
obscure movement and suppress likely enemy positions while the platoon is moving through danger areas; in
addition, he evaluates the need for illumination or smoke rounds for marking and/or to assist in navigation. See
the discussion of navigation in Chapter 2 of this manual.

INTELLIGENCE
Enemy
Most analysis of the enemy situation and probable enemy COAs is done at the battalion and company
level; however, it is the platoon leaders responsibility to understand how the enemys disposition and possible
COAs may affect the platoons battle space and the accomplishment of its mission. The platoon leader
identifies and plots on his overlay all known and suspected enemy positions that affect his battle space and
identifies indirect and direct fire range fans of enemy weapon systems. The enemy overlay for IVIS or FBCB2
should also be updated to include the latest enemy information.
The platoon leader then identifies terrain features or determines the standoff distance of friendly weapon
systems that will negate the effects of enemy weapons. Next, he determines the enemys most probable COAs.
Using information from his own analysis and from higher headquarters, he identifies anticipated contact
situations. This process includes estimating whether the enemy will defend in place, delay, or counterattack

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upon contact; when and where contact is most likely to be made; and what type and size of enemy force the
platoon will face. Finally, the platoon leader must develop specific plans for the platoons actions against the
enemy. Refer to the discussion of enemy analysis in the explanation of troop-leading procedures in Chapter 2
of this manual.

Terrain
The platoon leader conducts a map reconnaissance and uses the factors of OCOKA, as discussed in
Chapter 2, to systematically analyze the terrain in his battle space. He pays close attention to key terrain that
could support positions offering unobstructed observation and fields of fire. These are danger areas that can be
used by enemy or friendly forces when contact is made during the execution of the mission. This analysis is
followed by a ground reconnaissance, conducted with the commander as far forward as possible and as
extensively as time and security considerations permit. The ground reconnaissance covers the platoons
movement routes to the LD, routes to the objective, and the objective itself. The platoon leader should check
and record the time-distance factors to any SPs or to the LD.

MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY

Obstacle types
The platoon will encounter two types of obstacles, existing and reinforcing. The platoon leader can
expect the enemy to employ both types in executing his defensive plan.
Existing obstacles. Existing obstacles are those that are present on the battlefield but were not emplaced
through military effort. They may be natural (such as streams, lakes, thick forests, and mountains) or cultural
(towns or railroad embankments).
Reinforcing obstacles. These are obstacles that are placed on the battlefield through military effort to slow,
stop, turn, or canalize the enemy. Examples include minefields, wire, road craters, log cribs, and tank ditches.

Breach planning
The commander will designate his platoons to be part of the support force, the breach force, or the assault
force. The support force usually leads the company during movement and identifies the obstacle. It then
suppresses any enemy elements overwatching the obstacle to give the breach force the opportunity to penetrate
the obstacle. A tank platoon can conduct breach force operations only if it is equipped with the assets required
to breach the type of obstacle encountered; such assets include demolitions, grappling hooks, rakes, mine plows,
and mine rollers. The breach force is responsible for creating, proofing, and marking a lane through the
obstacle and for securing the far side. It then suppresses remaining enemy forces as the assault force moves
through the breach to continue the attack. (See Chapter 5 of this manual for more information on breaching
operations.)
NOTE:

NBC defensive operations are a critical consideration within the mobility and survivability operating
system. These are discussed in detail in Section 5 of this chapter (as part of the execution of battle
drills) and in Appendix E.

AIR DEFENSE
Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for a discussion of planning considerations for air defense, including
employment of ADA.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

The platoon leader ensures that soldiers are familiar with procedures for maintenance and medical
treatment and evacuation; these as outlined in paragraph 4 of the platoon OPORD or in the unit SOP. See
Chapter 7 of this manual for more details concerning logistics operations.

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COMMAND AND CONTROL

The platoon leaders key function in this operating system is conducting troop-leading procedures.
Immediately after the company order is issued or during the company rehearsal, he should coordinate
unresolved issues with the other platoon leaders, the XO, and the company commander. The coordination
should specify routes, intervals, movement speed, orientations, fire control measures, and signals between
platoons.

THE HUMAN ASPECT

Although the human aspect is not considered a formal operating system, it is a crucial factor in the
success of any mission. Soldiers are the key to combat power. They win battles; systems are only their tools.
At the same time, soldiers are human, with repetitiveand predictablephysical and emotional needs. A
leader who is 100-percent mission first, with no considerations of this human dimension, will see his
command degrade quickly. Success in combat depends more on the human aspect than it does on numerical
and technological superiority.
Leaders in the tank platoon must strive at all times to ensure that their soldiers are disciplined, competent,
and confident. They must also understand that soldiers do not have an unlimited store of morale and endurance;
the constant exposure to the dangers and hardships of combat can drain the fighting spirit. The guiding
principle in handling the human aspect of operations is that leaders can tap their units full combat potential
only when soldiers are healthy physically, mentally, and spiritually. Every leader must take all necessary
actions to enhance his troops health, morale, welfare, and overall readiness to fight.

SECTION 3 - PREPARATION
The preparation phase ends when the platoon crosses the LD and deploys for the attack. The platoon
leader takes into account the following operating system considerations.

MANEUVER
Following the last company rehearsal, the platoon should conduct a final rehearsal of its own to
incorporate any adjustments to the company scheme of maneuver. The platoon rehearsal should follow the
procedures outlined in Chapter 2 of this manual. It should cover the following subjects:

Movement from current positions.

Routes.
Platoon and company formations and movement techniques.
Vehicle positions within the platoon formation.
Weapons orientation and fire control.
Decision points.
Actions on contact.
Actions on the objective (consolidation and reorganization.)
Reporting procedures.
Signals.

FIRE SUPPORT
During the rehearsal, the platoon leader should address responsibility for targets in the platoon battle
space. He should cover any scheduled indirect fires and the effects of smoke on the battlefield. In addition, he
should discuss the direct-fire plan, with emphasis on platoon responsibilities, known and suspected enemy
locations, friendly unit locations, and applicable ROE.

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INTELLIGENCE
During the preparation phase, the platoon leader will receive updated SPOTREPs listing known and
suspected enemy locations as well as the latest friendly actions. He should plot the updated enemy and friendly
locations on his overlay and on the enemy overlay (digital systems); based on his terrain reconnaissance, he
adjusts the maneuver plan accordingly.

MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY

Actions at obstacles should be rehearsed during the preparation phase. Breaching equipment should be
checked during PCCs and PCIs.

AIR DEFENSE
Air defense preparations during this phase should include a rehearsal of the react to air attack drill, which
is outlined in Section 5 of this chapter.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

During the preparation phase, tank crews conduct resupply operations to replenish their combat loads.
They also perform preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on their vehicles and equipment.
Rehearsals should cover aspects of the logistical plan that will support the upcoming operation, including
emergency resupply and personnel and vehicle evacuation procedures. For more information on logistics, refer
to Chapter 7 of this manual.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

During the preparation phase, the platoon leader continues with his troop-leading procedures and conducts
rehearsals and inspections to ensure the platoon is ready for the upcoming operation. Near the end of the phase,
the platoon leader conducts a PCI of his soldiers and equipment. The soldier inspection includes checking each
crewmans personal knowledge of the operation as well as the readiness of his equipment. As a rule, TCs must
understand the company scheme of maneuver; other crewmen must understand the platoon scheme of
maneuver. The equipment inspection consists of checking each tank crews ability to move, shoot, and
communicate. The inspection should be as thorough as time permits; for a detailed PCI checklist, refer to
FKSM 17-15-3. Rehearsals and inspections are discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of this manual.

THE HUMAN ASPECT

Activities aimed at enhancing each soldiers health, morale, welfare, and overall readiness to fight
continue during the preparation phase. Additional discussion of the human dimension of operations is in
Section 2 of this chapter.

SECTION 4 - EXECUTION - TACTICAL MOVEMENT

The company OPORD will normally specify company and platoon formations and techniques of
movement. This allows the commander to position his elements where they will optimize the companys battle
space and facilitate execution of his scheme of maneuver. The platoon leader has the responsibility to
recommend a different formation or technique of movement if a change will allow the platoon to more
effectively contribute to the accomplishment of the company mission and protection of the force. If no
formation or technique of movement is given in the order, the platoon leader selects the one that will make the
most efficient use of his battle space and that will best support the company scheme of maneuver.

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USE OF TERRAIN FOR COVER AND CONCEALMENT

While moving, the platoon uses terrain to provide cover and concealment, employing the following rules:

Do not move forward from an overwatch position or BP. Back away from your position and go
around on the low ground.

Stay on low ground as much as possible. Moving on top of ridgelines and over hilltops will
silhouette (skyline) platoon vehicles.

Scan the ground for disturbed earth, out-of-place features, and surface-laid mines. These are
indicators of an obstacle or minefield.

Select the formation and movement technique that will maximize the platoons battle space
while minimizing gaps and dead space.

If your move is being covered by an overwatch element, remember that the overwatch element
cannot cover all of the platoons gaps and dead space.

If the move is being overwatched, also keep in mind that the distance of each move (or bound)
must not exceed the direct-fire range of the overwatch element.

Always plan actions at danger areas. If necessary, direct the TC or loader to dismount and either
observe around blind spots or check the trafficability of a route or defile before the tank moves
over or through these locations.

TECHNIQUES OF MOVEMENT
The commander or platoon leader selects a technique of movement based on several battlefield factors:

The likelihood of enemy contact.

The availability of another element to provide overwatch for the moving element.
The terrain over which the moving element will pass.
In open terrain, such as deserts, one company will normally overwatch the movement of another
company. In close terrain, such as rolling hills or countryside, platoons will normally overwatch other platoons.
In restricted terrain, such as mountains, forests, or urban areas, a tank section will rely on another tank section
or dismounted infantry to overwatch movement.
The tank platoon must be able to employ any of the following techniques of movement:

Traveling. Characterized by continuous movement of all elements, traveling is best suited to

situations in which enemy contact is unlikely and speed is important.

Traveling overwatch. Traveling overwatch is an extended form of traveling that provides

additional security when contact is possible but speed is desirable. The lead element moves
continuously. The trail element moves at various speeds and may halt periodically to overwatch
the movement of the lead element. The trail element maintains dispersion based on its ability to
provide immediate suppressive fires in support of the lead element. The intent is to maintain
depth, provide flexibility, and sustain movement in case the lead element is engaged.

Bounding overwatch. Bounding overwatch is used when contact is expected. It is the most secure,
but slowest, movement technique. Bounding may be no greater than one-half the weapons planning
range. This allows the overwatch section to have effective fires forward of the bounding section.
There are two methods of bounding:

Alternate bounds. Covered by the rear element, the lead element moves forward, halts, and
assumes overwatch positions. The rear element advances past the lead element and takes up
overwatch positions. The initial lead element then advances past the initial rear element and
takes up overwatch positions. Only one element moves at a time. This method is usually
more rapid than successive bounds. (Refer to Figure 3-1.)

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Figure 3-1. Movement by alternate bounds.

Successive bounds. In this method, the lead element, covered by the rear element, advances
and takes up an overwatch position. The rear element advances to an overwatch position
abreast of the lead element and halts. The lead element then moves to the next position, and
so on. Only one element moves at a time, and the rear element avoids advancing beyond the
lead element. This method is easier to control and more secure than the alternate bounding
method, but it is slower. (Refer to Figure 3-2.)

Figure 3-2. Movement by successive bounds.

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FORMATIONS
Formations are used to establish tank positions and sectors of responsibility during tactical operations.
They facilitate control, alleviate confusion, and increase protection, speed, and the effectiveness of fires.
Formations are not intended to be rigid, with vehicles remaining a specific distance apart at every
moment. The position of each tank in the formation depends on the terrain and the ability of the wingman
driver to maintain situational understanding in relation to the lead tank. At the same time, individual tanks
should always occupy the same relative position within a formation. This will ensure that the members of each
crew know who is beside them, understand when and where to move, and are aware of when and where they
will be expected to observe and direct fires. Weapons orientation for all tanks should be adjusted to ensure
optimum security based on the position of the platoon in the company formation.
The following paragraphs and illustrations describe the six basic movement formations the platoon will
use. (NOTE: In these examples, vehicle numbers are used to illustrate the wingman concept. In the field, the
location and sequence of vehicles in the formation will be prescribed in the platoon SOP and/or the orders for
the operation. The tactical situation will also influence vehicle location.)

Column
The column provides excellent control and fire to the flanks, but permits less fire to the front (see Figure
3-3). It is used when speed is critical, when the platoon is moving through restricted terrain on a specific route,
and/or when enemy contact is not likely.

Staggered column
The staggered column is a modified column formation with one section leading and one section trailing
behind to provide overwatch (see Figure 3-4). The staggered column permits good fire to the front and flanks.
It is used when speed is critical, when there is a limited area for lateral dispersion, and/or when enemy contact is
possible.

Figure 3-3. Column formation.

Figure 3-4. Staggered

column formation.

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Wedge
The wedge permits excellent firepower to the front and good firepower to the flanks (see Figure 3-5). It is
employed when the platoon is provided with overwatch by another element and is moving in open or rolling
terrain. Depending on the platoon location within the company formation, the platoon leader and PSG (with
wingmen) can switch sides of the formation. When the platoon leaders tank is slightly forward, one flank has
more firepower.

Echelon
The echelon formation permits excellent firepower to the front and to one flank (see Figure 3-6). It is
used to screen an exposed flank of the platoon or of a larger moving force.

Figure 3-5. Wedge formation.

Figure 3-6. Echelon formation.

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Vee
The vee formation provides excellent protection and control, but limits fires to the front (see Figure 3-7). This
formation is used when terrain restricts movement or when overwatch within the platoon is required.

Figure 3-7. Vee formation.

Line
The line formation provides maximum firepower forward (see Figure 3-8). It is used when the platoon crosses
danger areas and is provided with overwatch by another element or when the platoon assaults enemy positions.

Figure 3-8. Line formation.

Coil and herringbone

These formations are employed when the platoon is stationary and 360-degree security is essential.
Figure 3-9 illustrates the coil and herringbone.
Coil. When it is operating independently, the platoon uses the coil formation to establish a perimeter defense
during extended halts or lulls in combat. The lead vehicle, normally the platoon leader, will halt his vehicle in
the direction of travel (12 oclock) while the other vehicles position themselves to form a circular formation
covering all suspected enemy avenues of approach.
Herringbone. The herringbone formation is used when the platoon must assume a hasty defense with 360degree security while remaining postured to resume movement in the direction of travel. It is normally

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employed during scheduled or unscheduled halts in a road march. If terrain permits, vehicles should move off
the road and stop at a 45-degree angle, allowing passage of vehicles through the center of the formation.

Figure 3-9. Coil and herringbone formations.

OVERWATCH
Overwatch is the tactical mission in which an element observes and provides direct fire support for a
friendly moving element. Situational understanding is a crucial factor in all overwatch missions, whose
objective is to prevent the enemy from surprising and engaging the moving unit.
The overwatch force must maintain communications with the moving force and provide early warning of
enemy elements that could affect the moving force. It also scans gaps and dead space within the moving
elements formations. If the overwatch is unable to scan dead space and engage the enemy, it must alert the
moving element of the lapse in coverage. The overwatch must also be able to support the moving force with
immediate direct and indirect fires.
The overwatch element can be either stationary or on the move. Figure 3-10 illustrates what to look for
and where to look during an overwatch mission. (NOTE: While the main function of overwatch is to provide
early warning and/or timely supporting fires for a moving element, overwatch crews must also maintain 360degree observation and security for themselves.)

Stationary overwatch
The section or platoon occupies hull-down firing positions that provide effective cover and concealment,
unobstructed observation, and clear fields of fire. (NOTE: Firing positions are discussed in Chapter 4 of this
manual.)
The section or platoon leader assigns sectors of fire. Individual crews aggressively scan their sectors
using applicable search techniques to identify enemy positions. They employ all available sights, including the
thermal channel (using various polarities) and daylight channel of the gunners primary sight, binoculars,
PVS-7s, and CITV. (NOTE: See FM 3-20.12 [FM 17-12-1-1] for a discussion of search techniques.)

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The overwatch element scans the battle space of the moving element, paying close attention to gaps and
dead space. If contact is made, the overwatch element initiates a high volume of direct and indirect suppressive
fires; it moves as necessary between primary and alternate positions to avoid being decisively engaged.

Figure 3-10. Overwatch locations and techniques.

Overwatch on the move

The trail section or platoon maintains a designated location in the formation. It continuously scans the
lead elements battle space, closely monitoring gaps and dead space. The trail element maintains an interval
dictated by the capabilities of its weapon systems and the effects of terrain. As needed, it can execute a short
halt on key terrain to provide more effective overwatch.

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SECTION 5 - EXECUTION - ACTIONS ON CONTACT

In both offensive and defensive operations, contact occurs when any member of the platoon observes
enemy personnel or vehicles, observes or receives direct or indirect fire, or encounters any situation that
requires an active or passive response to the enemy. This includes reports of enemy contact through the chain
of command or from an adjacent friendly element. The platoon initiates actions on contact when it recognizes
one of the defined contact situations or on order from higher headquarters.
As discussed in Section 2 of this chapter, the platoon leader should use the planning process to anticipate
the actions on contact that the platoon may be required to execute based on the enemy situation. The platoon
can then rehearse these potential actions during the preparation phase of the operation.
The commanders OPORD will assist the platoon leader in two ways. First, the commanders scheme of
maneuver will direct the platoon leader in planning how to kill the templated or anticipated enemy force. The
scheme of maneuver will define the platoons role in maneuver and direct fire as part of the company or task
force plan. Second, the commanders coordinating instructions should specify for the platoon leader the actions
on contact that, based on the size and activity of the anticipated enemy force, are related to the maneuver plan.
These specific instructions may include engagement criteria, bypass criteria, displacement criteria, and the
COAs the commander expects to employ. By learning and planning for these details in advance, the platoon
leader will be able to develop contact situations rapidly and determine the most effective COA.

THE FOUR STEPS OF ACTIONS ON CONTACT

The following four steps allow the platoon leader to execute actions on contact using a logical, wellorganized decision-making process:

Deploy and report.

Evaluate and develop the situation.
Choose a COA.
Execute the selected COA.
The four-step process is not a rigid, lockstep response to the enemy contact. Rather, the goal is to provide
an orderly framework that enables the platoon to survive the initial contact, then apply sound decision-making
and timely actions to complete the operation. In simplest terms, the platoon must react instinctively and
instantly to the contact, and the platoon leader must decide, with equal dispatch, whether to execute a
preplanned battle drill or COA or to recommend and execute an alternate drill or action.
At times, the platoon leader, and the platoon, will have to execute several of the steps simultaneously.
This makes thorough preparation an absolute requirement in contact situations. To ensure the platoon functions
as a team, reacting correctly and yet instinctively, the platoon leader must establish SOPs and conduct
comprehensive training and rehearsals covering each step.

Deploy and report

The platoon leader deploys the platoon when he recognizes one of the general categories of initial contact
or receives a report of enemy contact. Contact situations include (but are not limited to) the following:

Visual contact (friendly elements may or may not be observed by the enemy).
Physical contact (direct fire) with a superior, inferior, or unknown enemy.
Indirect fire contact.

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Contact with obstacles of enemy or unknown origin.

Contact with enemy or unknown aircraft.
Situations involving NBC conditions.
Situations involving electronic warfare tactics (such as jamming, interference, and imitative
deception).

When the platoon makes contact with the enemy, it responds according to the circumstances of the
situation. The tank that makes initial contact must react as appropriate. This covers a range of actions that
correspond to the nature of the contact. Most critically, if the contact entails enemy antitank fire, the tank
returns fire immediately. In all cases, it alerts the rest of the platoon with a contact report (see FKSM 17-15-3
for report formats).
The platoon leader has several choices in deploying the platoon. In many cases, he will initiate one of the
seven battle drills. This usually will be a contact or action drill, with the platoon attempting to acquire and
engage the enemy. (NOTE: Refer to the discussion and illustrations of the battle drills in Section 5 of this
chapter.) The platoon leader can also order his tanks to immediately seek the best available covered and
concealed position. The position should afford unobstructed observation and fields of fire and allow the platoon
to maintain flank security. Tank crews will also seek cover and concealment in the absence of a deployment
order from the platoon leader.
This step concludes with the platoon leader or PSG sending a contact report to the commander, followed
as soon as possible by a SPOTREP.

Evaluate and develop the situation

While the platoon deploys by executing a battle drill or occupying a covered and concealed position, the
platoon leader must begin to evaluate the situation and, as necessary, develop it. His primary focus is on
determining and/or confirming the size (inferior or superior), composition (available weapon systems), activity,
and orientation of the enemy force. He analyzes how obstacles and terrain in the area of operations will affect
enemy and friendly capabilities and possible COAs. The platoon leader uses SPOTREPs from the TCs, other
platoon leaders, the company commander, and the XO to make his evaluation. (NOTE: Because the tank
platoon usually operates as part of a company team or cavalry troop, additional infantry, scout, or tank platoons
will usually be available to assist the commander and platoon leader in developing and confirming the enemy
situation.)
There are no hard and fast rules for determining the superiority or inferiority of an enemy; the result is
dependent on the situation. An inferior force is defined as an enemy element that the platoon can destroy while
remaining postured to conduct further operations. A superior force is one that can be destroyed only through a
combined effort of company- or battalion-level combat and CS assets.
The platoon leader bases his evaluation on the enemys capabilities, especially the number of lethal
weapon systems the enemy force is known to have, and on the enemys current activity. Lethality varies; the
enemy may employ rapid-fire antitank weaponry, slow-firing wire-guided systems, or dismounted soldiers with
automatic weapons. Likewise, enemy activity can range from an entrenched force using prepared fighting
positions to a unit conducting refueling operations with little security.
After making contact and evaluating the situation, the platoon leader may discover that he does not have
enough information to determine the superiority or inferiority of the enemy force. To make this determination,
he can further develop the situation using a combination of techniques, including maneuver (fire and
movement), reconnaissance by direct and/or indirect fire, and dismounted surveillance. In such a situation,
however, the platoon leader must exercise caution, ensuring that his actions support the commanders intent.

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Mission accomplishment and the survivability of the platoon are crucial considerations. Once he determines
what the platoon is up against, the platoon leader sends an updated SPOTREP to the commander.

Choose a course of action

Once the platoon leader develops the situation and determines that he has enough information to make a
decision, he selects a COA that both meets the requirements of the commanders intent and is within the
platoons capabilities. He has several options in determining the COA:

Direct the platoon to execute the original plan. The platoon leader selects the COA specified by
the company commander in the OPORD.

Based on the situation, issue FRAGOs to refine the plan, ensuring it supports the commanders
intent.

Report the situation and recommend an alternative COA based on known information in
response to an unforeseen enemy or battlefield situation.

Direct the platoon to execute tactical movement (employing bounding overwatch and support by

fire within the platoon) and reconnaissance by fire to further develop the situation and gain the
information the platoon leader needs to clarify a vague battlefield picture.

Considerations in choosing a COA. Because he will have little time for analysis at this point, the platoon
leader should already have developed a clear understanding of the available COAs. As noted earlier in this
section, he first analyzes the commanders OPORD to determine how it will affect his choice of a COA. In
most cases, the commander will have identified the criteria for anticipated actions on contact in terms of the
enemys capabilities (that is, whether the enemy is a superior or inferior force). He also will have specified
criteria for destroying, fixing, and bypassing the enemy as well as the applicable disengagement criteria. The
platoon leader can then evaluate various responses to possible enemy actions during the planning phase, in the
company rehearsal, and in informal war-gaming and rehearsals with the platoon.
Refinements to the original plan or development of a new COA may change the scheme of maneuver. In
most situations, the intent of maneuver is to gain positions of advantage over the enemy, forcing him to fight in
two directions. One element moves to the position of advantage while another element overwatches and
supports.
If necessary, the platoon leader should issue a revised set of graphic control measures as part of the
FRAGO. Examples include waypoints to assist in navigation along desired routes to a position of advantage
and TRPs to help the platoon orient weapons and fires.
Use of platoon tasks as COAs. During execution of actions on contact, the platoon collective tasks
described in Section 6 of this chapter are available as COAs. These include destroy an inferior force; attack by
fire; overwatch/support by fire; assault; bypass; reconnaissance by fire; hasty defense; and in-stride breach. If
the commanders plan has already addressed the situation adequately, the platoon leader directs the platoon to
execute the specified task or COA. If the situation dictates adjustments to the plan, he can recommend an
alternative COA to the commander.

Execute the selected course of action

Once he has chosen a COA, the platoon leader continues his evaluation of the situation by determining
whether or not the COA is the same one directed by the commander in the OPORD or during the rehearsal. If it
is, he orders the platoon to execute it and reports his intentions to the commander.
If the situation dictates a change to the COA specified in the original plan, however, the platoon leader
must recommend a new COA to the commander. He then directs the platoon to execute the COA selected by

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the commander, who may or may not follow the recommendation. The platoon leader cross-talks with other
platoon leaders as necessary to obtain support in accordance with the commanders intent.
More information will become available as the platoon executes the COA. The platoon leader and/or
PSG keep the company commander abreast of the situation with SPOTREPs and SITREPs; accuracy of these
reports is critical because the task force commander and S2 use them to confirm or deny the situational
template.
Key information the commander needs includes the number, type, and location of enemy elements the
platoon has observed, engaged, destroyed, or bypassed. Additionally, the platoon leader must inform the
commander of the platoons current location (or that he is moving to or set at a particular location). Finally, he
must inform the commander of any changes in the platoons combat power or logistical status.
Based on details of the enemy situation, the platoon leader may have to alter his COA during execution.
For example, as the platoon maneuvers to destroy what appears to be a lone enemy tank, it discovers six more
tanks in prepared fighting positions; in this situation, the platoon leader would inform the commander and
recommend an alternate COA, such as an attack by fire against the enemy tank company. (Figures 3-12A
through 3-12D later in this section illustrate a similar situation in which changes to the COA become
necessary.)
The platoon continues to execute the selected or refined COA until it accomplishes the original mission,
receives a FRAGO from the commander changing the mission or COA, or is ordered to execute consolidation
and reorganization on the objective.

EXAMPLES OF ACTIONS ON CONTACT

The following examples illustrate actions on contact for two potential situations. The illustrations are
organized to show the four-step process for executing actions on contact.

Actions on contact with an anticipated inferior force

Figures 3-11A through 3-11C show actions on contact when the platoon encounters an inferior enemy
element. In this case, the commander and platoon leader have anticipated contact with such a force and have
planned for actions on contact by including possible COAs in their OPORDs and/or rehearsals.

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Figure 3-11A. Platoon makes initial contact,

deploys using an action drill, and reports.

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Figure 3-11B. Platoon develops the situation.

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Figure 3-11C. Platoon leader chooses a COA;

platoon executes the assault.

Actions on contact with an unanticipated superior force

Figures 3-12A through 3-12D show actions on contact when the platoon unexpectedly encounters a
superior enemy force.

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Figure 3-12A. Platoon makes initial contact,

deploys, and reports.

Figure 3-12B. Platoon executes a battle drill; platoon leader

evaluates the situation as the drill is executed.

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Figure 3-12C. Platoon develops the situation and identifies

a superior enemy force.

Figure 3-12D. Platoon leader chooses and recommends

an alternate COA; platoon executes the new COA.

BATTLE DRILLS
When the tank platoon makes contact with the enemy, the platoon leader usually initiates a battle drill.
Drills can be initiated following reports or observation of enemy activity, but are most commonly ordered upon
receipt of enemy fires.
Battle drills provide virtually automatic responses to situations in which the immediate and, as
appropriate, violent execution of an action is vital to the platoons safety or to its success in combat. Drills
allow the platoon leader to protect the platoon from the effects of enemy fires, to quickly mass the platoons
combat power and fires, or to move the platoon to a position of advantage over the enemy.

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Drills are standardized collective actions, executed by each tank crew with minimal instruction and
without application of a deliberate thought process. They can be carried out under almost any type of battlefield
conditions and from any formation or technique of movement, although execution can be affected by the factors
of METT-TC. (NOTE: Platoon leaders must always keep in mind that the use of battle drills does not relieve
them of the requirement for logical, timely decision-making when critical situations arise on the battlefield.)
The platoon can expect to execute any of the following standard battle drills:

Change of formation drill.

Contact drill.
Action drill.
React to indirect fire drill.
React to air attack drill.
React to a nuclear attack drill.
React to a chemical/biological attack drill.
Commanders and leaders at all levels must be ready to augment or adjust these seven basic drills based on
the enemy, terrain, and ROE. In addition, they must ensure their platoons rehearse battle drills until they are
able to execute the drills perfectly no matter what command and control problems arise.
NOTE:

In the figures that accompany the following discussion of the seven battle drills, vehicle numbers are
used to illustrate the wingman concept. In the field, the location and sequence of vehicles during the
drill will be prescribed in the platoon SOP and/or the orders for the operation. The tactical situation
will also influence vehicle location.

Change of formation drill

This drill is executed to accomplish a rapid change of formation in response to a change in terrain or
enemy situation. The platoon leader must ensure that each TC knows the new formation and the relative
position of each tank in the new formation. He uses visual signals and/or the radio to initiate the drill. Figure
3-13 illustrates the movement of individual tanks during a change of formation from column to wedge to line.

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Figure 3-13. Change of formation drill.

Contact drill
The contact drill enables the platoon to orient weapon systems and engage an enemy without changing its
direction or speed of movement along the axis of advance. This drill is used when contact is made with small
arms fire or when the platoon sights the enemy without being engaged and does not want to stop or slow its
movement. The platoon leader initiates the contact drill using visual signals and/or the radio. Over the radio,
he uses the contact report format and adds the execution element FIRE as a platoon fire command.
Figure 3-14 illustrates a contact drill from a wedge formation. Note the main gun orientation for
wingman Tank 2. If a tanks weapon systems are masked by another tank, the masked tank maintains weapons
orientation and flank security as prescribed in the OPORD; this helps to prevent fratricide.

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Figure 3-14. Contact drill.

Action drill
The action drill permits the entire platoon to change direction rapidly in response to terrain conditions,
obstacles, FRAGOs from the commander, or enemy contact. The platoon leader uses visual signals or the radio
to order the action drill, which can be initiated with or without enemy contact.
Action drill without enemy contact. The platoon leader can execute an action drill to avoid a danger area
or obstacle or to respond to FRAGOs from the commander. When the platoon leader initiates the action drill,
tanks come on line and continue to move in the prescribed direction unless the platoon leader directs a change
of formation. Figures 3-15A and 3-15B illustrate tanks relative positions during various action drills without
contact.

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Figure 3-15A. Action drill without enemy contact.

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Figure 3-15B. Action drill without enemy contact (continued).

Action drill with enemy contact. Following a contact report alerting the platoon that enemy contact
involves antitank weapon systems, the platoon leader can direct an action drill to orient his platoons frontal
armor toward the antitank fire while moving to cover and concealment. If the platoon cannot reach a covered
and concealed position or achieve weapon standoff, the platoon leader directs the platoon to assault the enemy.
Figures 3-16A through 3-16D illustrate examples of action drills in reaction to enemy contact.

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Figure 3-16A. Action drill with enemy contact.

Figure 3-16B. Action drill with enemy contact (continued).

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Figure 3-16C. Action drill with enemy contact (continued).

Figure 3-16D. Action drill with enemy contact (continued).

React to indirect fire drill

When the platoon receives unexpected indirect fire, it moves out of the impact area unless it is also
engaged in direct fire contact or is directed to remain stationary. TCs place their hatches in the open protected
position; other crewmen close their hatches. Crews also close ballistic doors. M1A2 and M1A2 SEP crews
stow the CITV. Crew members mask based on the automatic masking criteria established in the OPORD or if
they suspect the use of chemical agents. The platoon leader sends a SPOTREP to the commander.
If the platoon is moving when it receives suppressive artillery fire, it executes an action drill to avoid the
impact area or continues to move to clear the impact area and continue the mission (see Figure 3-17). If it is
stationary, the platoon should attempt to clear the impact area. (NOTE: Several factors, such as the

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commanders orders or the enemy situation, may prevent the platoon from moving during direct-fire
engagements or defensive operations. For example, the commander may require the platoon to occupy hide or
turret-down positions while continuing the mission. In such a case, the platoon leader must request permission
from the commander before clearing the impact area.) Once the platoon clears the artillery impact area,
individual crews place their hatches in the appropriate position, open ballistic doors (M1A2 and M1A2 SEP
crews turn on the CITV), check antennas, and return to positions or continue the mission.
The commander should address the platoons reaction to anticipated indirect fires in the actions on contact
subparagraph of the OPORD. When the platoon receives anticipated indirect fires, it reacts according to the
commanders guidance, which it should already have analyzed and rehearsed. If the platoon needs to execute a
COA different from that directed by the commander, the platoon leader should request permission from the
commander before executing the alternate action.

Figure 3-17. React to indirect fire drill.

React to air attack drill

When the platoon observes high-performance aircraft, helicopters, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)
that could influence its mission, it initially takes passive air defense measures unless the situation requires
immediate active measures. In a passive air defense, the platoon takes actions (such as dispersing or stopping)
to avoid detection altogether and/or to minimize the aircrafts target acquisition capability. The platoon also
prepares for active air defense measures. (NOTE: When the platoon is operating as part of a company team or
troop, tank crews must be familiar with required actions in the company-level battle drill.) Passive air defense
involves three steps:
Step 1.

Alert the platoon with a contact report.

Step 2.

Deploy or take the appropriate actions. If the platoon is not in the direct path of an
attacking aircraft, the platoon leader orders tanks to seek cover and concealment and halt
with at least a 100-meter interval between vehicles; the platoon also may be ordered to
continue moving as part of the company.

Step 3.

Prepare to engage. TCs and loaders get ready to engage the aircraft with machine-gun and/or
main-gun fire on order of the platoon leader.

If the platoon leader determines that the platoon is in the direct path of an attacking aircraft, he initiates
the active react to air attack drill, which entails these actions:
Step 1. The platoon initiates fire. The primary intent is to force aircraft to take self-defense
measures that alter their attack profile and reduce their effectiveness. The platoon
leader may use a burst of tracers to designate an aim point for platoon machine gun
antiaircraft fires (see Figure 3-18). Volume is the key to effectiveness of these fires;

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tanks throw up a wall of steel through which aircraft must fly. The main gun is effective
against hovering attack helicopters. The platoon leader may also direct some vehicles to
engage high-performance aircraft with MPAT main gun rounds.
Step 2. Tanks create a nonlinear target by moving as fast as possible at a 45-degree angle
away from the path of flight and toward attacking aircraft (see Figure 3-19). The
platoon maintains an interval of at least 100 meters between tanks, forcing aircraft to
make several passes to engage the entire platoon.
Step 3.

Tanks move quickly to covered and concealed positions and freeze their movement for at
least 60 seconds after the last flight of aircraft has passed.

Step 4. The platoon leader sends a SPOTREP to update the commander.

Figure 3-18. Machine gun aim points.

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Figure 3-19. Evading enemy aircraft.

React to a nuclear attack drill

When the platoon observes a brilliant flash of light and a mushroom-shaped cloud, crew members must
act quickly to minimize the effects of a nuclear detonation. This drill involves the following four steps:
Step 1.

Take immediate protective actions, including the following:

If mounted, button up and close the breech and ballistic doors (M1A2 and M1A2 SEP
crews stow the CITV). If time permits, position the vehicle behind a protective terrain
feature, and turn off the master power until the effects of the blast have passed.

Dismounted crewmen drop to the ground and cover exposed skin until blast effects have
passed.

Step 2.

Implement SOPs and accomplish related actions in the following areas:

Reestablish communications.
Prepare and forward an NBC-1 report.
Implement continuous monitoring.
Submit a SITREP to the commander.
Step 3.

Reorganize the platoon, taking the following actions:

Evacuate casualties and fatalities.

Redistribute personnel as needed.
Conduct essential maintenance.
Step 4.

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Continue the mission.

FM 3-20.15

React to a chemical/biological attack drill

The platoon initiates this drill during an operation whenever an automatic masking event occurs, the
chemical agent alarm sounds, M8 detection paper indicates the presence of chemical agents, or a soldier
suspects the presence of chemical or biological agents. (NOTE: Refer to Appendix E of this manual for more
information on NBC operations.) This drill involves the following four steps:
Step 1.

Crewmen recognize and react to the hazard, taking these actions:

Put on protective mask (and hood) within 15 seconds.

Alert the remainder of the platoon and company.
Within 8 minutes, assume MOPP 4 (refer to the discussion in Appendix E), then button
up and/or activate the tank overpressurization system.

Step 2.

Implement SOPs in these areas:

Administer self-aid and buddy-aid to crewmen with symptoms of chemical/biological

agent poisoning (see Appendix E).

Ensure individual crewmen decontaminate their skin.

Conduct operators spraydown and decontamination of equipment as necessary.
Initiate continuous monitoring with M256/M256A1 detection kits, and submit NBC-1
and follow-up reports as needed.

NOTE:

Step 3.

Continue the mission.

Step 4.

Monitor for chemical/biological agents; as the situation warrants, initiate actions to reduce
MOPP levels and discontinue agent monitoring. (NOTE: See Appendix E for additional
information.)

If the M256/M256A1 detection kit records a negative reading inside an overpressurized M1A2 or
M1A2 SEP tank, the crew can initiate unmasking procedures.

SECTION 6 - EXECUTION - PLATOON TACTICAL TASKS

The commander may direct the platoon to execute the collective tactical tasks described in this section as
part of the companys planned scheme of maneuver. He will cover employment of the tasks in the company
OPORD. In addition, the platoon can use the tactical tasks as COA when it executes actions on contact (refer to
the discussion in Section 5 of this chapter).

DESTROY AN INFERIOR FORCE

To maintain the tempo of an attack, the commander may order the platoon to destroy an inferior force,
based either on his original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader. The platoon leader usually
employs maneuver techniques (fire and tactical movement) in executing this task or COA. When the platoon is
in contact with the enemy, he designates one section to overwatch or support by fire to suppress and/or destroy
the enemy while the other section moves.
The moving element uses appropriate movement techniques as well as covered and concealed routes to
move to a position of advantage over the enemy. This position may offer dominating terrain that allows the
platoon to attack enemy positions by direct fire, or it may provide covered routes that enable the section to close
with and assault the enemy.

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After the platoon leader designates the route to the next possible overwatch position, the overwatch leader
identifies graphic control measures and assigns responsibility for suppression of identified enemy positions.
Cross-talk among sections and vehicles is important in ensuring mutual support while the overwatch is
providing supporting fires during the other sections movement to the position of advantage.
After successfully destroying the inferior enemy force, the platoon positions itself where it can most
effectively prepare for subsequent actions. Figure 3-20 illustrates three potential situations in which a platoon is
ordered to destroy an inferior force.

ATTACK BY FIRE
The commander may order the platoon to execute this task, either as specified in his original plan or on
recommendation of the platoon leader. The purpose is to destroy the enemy using long-range fires from
dominating terrain or using standoff of the main gun. The platoon can use an attack by fire to destroy inferior
forces when the platoon leader does not desire to close with the enemy or when the platoon is part of a
company-level effort. In addition, the platoon may occupy an attack by fire position as part of a company-level
hasty defense with the goal of destroying a superior force.
In executing this task, the platoon uses tactical movement to move to a position that allows it to employ
weapon standoff or that offers cover for hull-down firing positions. It also must be ready to move to alternate
firing positions for protection from the effects of enemy direct and indirect fires.
As time permits, the platoon leader designates TRPs and assigns sectors of fire and tentative firing
positions for individual tanks. He issues a platoon fire command specifying the method of fire, firing pattern,
and rate of fire the platoon must sustain to accomplish the task in support of the company.
A successful attack by fire destroys the enemy force. Figures 3-21A and 3-21B illustrate attack by fire
situations.

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Figure 3-20. Scenarios for destruction of an inferior enemy force.

Figure 3-21A. Company employs attack by fire against a convoy.

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Figure 3-21B. Platoon uses attack by fire against an enemy

reconnaissance platoon as part of a hasty defense.

OVERWATCH/SUPPORT BY FIRE
Either as specified in his original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader, the commander may
order the platoon to provide overwatch or support by fire during the movement of a friendly force. The purpose
is to suppress the enemy using long-range direct and indirect fires from a dominating piece of terrain or using
the standoff of the main gun. This support sets the conditions that allow moving (supported) friendly elements
to engage and destroy the enemy.
The techniques involved in occupying an overwatch or support-by-fire position and in focusing and
controlling fires are similar to those for an attack by fire. Some specific considerations exist, however. As
noted, the overwatch/support-by-fire task is always tied directly to the movement and/or tactical execution of
other friendly forces. In executing overwatch or support by fire, the platoon must maintain a high level of
situational understanding relative to the supported force so it can lift and shift direct and indirect fires as
required to prevent fratricide. Throughout this type of operation, the supporting platoon maintains cross talk
with the moving force on the company net. In addition to reducing fratricide risk, cross talk allows the platoon
to provide early warning of enemy positions it has identified and to report battle damage inflicted on the enemy
force.
A successful overwatch/support-by-fire operation suppresses the enemy, permitting the moving
(supported) force to conduct tactical movement, breaching operations, or an assault. Figure 3-22 illustrates a
support by fire situation in support of an assault.

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Figure 3-22. Platoon supports by fire to suppress

an enemy element during a company assault.

ASSAULT
The commander may direct the platoon to execute an assault, either on its own or as part of a larger
assault force. The purpose of the assault is to seize key terrain or to close with and destroy the enemy while
seizing an enemy-held position. Designation of the platoon as the assault force may be made as part of the
commanders original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader.
The platoon usually assaults the enemy while receiving supporting fires from an overwatch element. If
supporting fire is not available, the platoon conducts tactical movement to a position of advantage over the
enemy, then conducts the assault. A successful assault destroys the enemy elements or forces them to withdraw
from the objective.
To prepare for the assault, the assault force occupies or moves through an assault position. This should be
a predetermined covered and concealed position that provides weapon standoff from the enemy. The platoon
leader receives updated enemy information from support-by-fire elements. He assigns targets or weapons
orientations and confirms the axis of advance and the LOA for the assault. On order, the platoon assaults on
line, moving and firing as quickly as possible to destroy the enemy and seize the objective.
The assault must be extremely violent. If the platoon assaults buttoned up, machine gun fire from the
support force or wingman tanks can provide close-in protection against dismounted enemy elements on the
objective. If tanks are unbuttoned, the TCs and loaders use personal weapons, hand grenades, and machine
guns to provide close-in protection.
Following a successful assault, the assault force occupies a defensible position, either on the objective or
on the far side of it, and begins consolidation and reorganization procedures. Figures 3-23A and 3-23B
illustrate two assault situations.

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Figure 3-23A. Tank section assaults an inferior force

as another section supports by fire.

Figure 3-23B. Platoon executes an assault

as two other platoons support by fire.

BYPASS
As part of his original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader, the commander may order the
platoon to bypass the enemy to maintain the tempo of the attack. This COA can be taken against either an
inferior or superior force. The commander may designate one platoon to suppress the enemy, allowing the
other platoons to use covered and concealed routes, weapon standoff, and obscuration to bypass known enemy
locations. (NOTE: Units may have to execute contact drills while conducting the bypass.)

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Once clear of the enemy, the supporting platoon hands the enemy over to another force, breaks contact,
and rejoins the company. If necessary, the platoon leader can employ tactical movement to break contact with
the enemy and continue the mission; he can also request supporting direct and indirect fires and smoke to
suppress and obscure the enemy as the platoon safely breaks contact. See Figures 3-24A and 3-24B for an
example of a bypass.

Figure 3-24A. Bypass.

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Figure 3-24B. Bypass (continued).

RECONNAISSANCE BY FIRE
Based on his original plan or a recommendation from the platoon leader, the commander may direct the
platoon to execute reconnaissance by fire when enemy contact is expected or when contact has occurred but the
enemy situation is vague. The platoon then conducts tactical movement, occupying successive overwatch
positions until it makes contact with the enemy or reaches the objective.
At each overwatch position, the platoon leader may designate TRPs. He then either requests indirect fires
or employs direct fires on likely enemy locations to cause the enemy force to return direct fire or to move, thus
compromising its positions. He directs individual tanks or sections to fire their caliber .50 and/or coax machine
guns into targeted areas. (NOTE: In some situations, main-gun fire can also be used.)
Individual tanks and sections not designated to reconnoiter by fire observe the effects of the firing tanks
and engage enemy forces as they are identified. Focus of the reconnaissance by fire is on the key terrain that
dominates danger areas, on built-up areas that dominate the surrounding terrain, and on uncleared wooded
areas.
NOTE:

A disciplined enemy force may not return fire or move if it determines that the pattern or type of fires
employed will be nonlethal. The platoon leader must analyze the situation and direct the use of
appropriate fires on suspected positions. For example, he would use small-arms fire against
suspected dismounted elements but employ main guns to engage bunkers or other fortified positions.

HASTY OCCUPATION OF A PLATOON BATTLE POSITION (HASTY DEFENSE)

The platoon may use this task if it is fixed or suppressed by enemy fire and no longer has the ability to
move forward or bypass. It may also set up a hasty defense when the enemy executes a hasty attack. The
platoon maintains contact or fixes the enemy in place until additional combat elements arrive or until it is
ordered to move. When the platoon must conduct a hasty defense, the commander has responsibility for
continuing to develop the situation.

IN-STRIDE BREACH
When they expect to make contact with enemy obstacles, the commander and platoon leader must plan
and rehearse actions at an obstacle, tailoring their preparations to templated locations for the expected obstacles.

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FM 3-20.15

They must ensure the platoon knows how to accomplish early detection of both anticipated and unexpected
obstacles and how to react instinctively when contact is made.
A critical consideration is that the tank platoon has only limited ability to deal independently with an
obstacle or restriction. If it is equipped with mine plows or other breaching assets, the platoon can create trackwidth lanes through most wire, mine, and other reinforcing obstacles. The commander and platoon leader must
keep in mind, however, that the platoon cannot internally accomplish all of the SOSRA elements of the breach
(suppress the enemy; obscure the breach; create the lane; secure the far side; reduce the obstacle; and assault
through the obstacle). Refer to the discussion of breaching operations, including SOSRA procedures, in
Chapter 5 of this manual.
When tanks encounter an unexpected obstacle, crew members must assume that the enemy is covering the
obstacle with observation and fire. They must immediately seek cover and establish an overwatch to evaluate
the situation. The overwatch tanks scan for evidence of enemy forces in and around the obstacle and on
dominant terrain on the far side of the obstacle. They attempt to locate a bypass so the operation can continue
without delay. If no bypass is found, the overwatch determines the dimensions of the obstacle and sends a
report to the commander so he can designate a COA.
NOTE:

It is critical that the tank platoon initially remain under cover while evaluating the situation. The
platoon must NEVER attempt to approach the obstacle area or breach the obstacle without first
killing or obscuring enemy elements overwatching the obstacle.

If he needs to develop the situation further, the commander ideally will use scouts or infantry to
reconnoiter the obstacle, with the tanks continuing to provide overwatch. This usually requires him to move
mounted or dismounted elements to the far side. If this reconnaissance locates a bypass route, the commander
often will order the unit to execute a bypass as the preferred COA. If a bypass is not possible, he may order a
breaching operation, with the tanks either executing an in-stride breach within their capabilities or supporting a
deliberate breach.

SECTION 7 - EXECUTION - CONSOLIDATION AND

REORGANIZATION
The platoon executes consolidation and reorganization on the objective to ensure that it is prepared to
destroy an enemy counterattack or is prepared to resume the attack as soon as possible.

CONSOLIDATION
Consolidation consists of actions taken to secure an objective and to defend against an enemy
counterattack. The company commander designates platoon positions and weapons orientations. The platoon
takes these steps:

Eliminate remaining enemy resistance and secure enemy prisoners of war (EPW).
Establish OPSEC and coordinate mutual support with adjacent platoons.
Occupy positions on defensible terrain as designated in the OPORD or FRAGO. Tanks move to

hull-down positions, and the platoon leader assigns sectors of fire. If the location designated in
the OPORD/FRAGO is not defensible, the platoon leader notifies the commander and searches
for terrain that is defensible and supports the commanders intent. The platoon leader informs
the commander of the new location.

Execute procedures for a hasty defense to prepare for possible counterattacks (see Chapter 4 of this
manual for details on hasty defense).

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FM 3-20.15

REORGANIZATION
Reorganization, the process of preparing for continued fighting, is normally accomplished by SOP.
Responsibilities during reorganization include the following:

TCs take these actions:

Reload machine guns and redistribute main gun ammunition to ready areas.
Move crewmen who are wounded in action (WIA) to a covered position and provide first aid.
Send a SITREP to the PSG reporting casualties and supply status of equipment, ammunition,
and fuel.
Conduct essential maintenance.

The PSG takes these actions:

Compile SITREPs from TCs and, as required by unit SOP, submit a consolidated report to the
platoon leader or 1SG.
Direct cross-leveling of supplies within the platoon.
Oversee evacuation of casualties.
Coordinate the movement of EPWs to the EPW collection point.

The platoon leader takes these actions:

Forward a consolidated SITREP to the commander.
Redistribute personnel as necessary to maintain combat readiness.
Oversee consolidation of soldiers who have been killed in action (KIA).
Reestablish communications with elements that are out of contact.
NOTE:

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SITREPs are sent using voice or digital format (or a combination). Refer to FKSM 17-15-3 and unit
SOPs for additional information.

FM 3-20.15

CHAPTER 4

Defensive Operations
The immediate purpose of any defensive operation is to defeat an enemy attack. Military forces defend
until they gain sufficient strength to attack. Additionally, defensive operations are undertaken for purposes that
include the following:
To gain time.
To hold key terrain.
To preoccupy the enemy in one area so friendly forces can attack elsewhere.
To erode enemy resources at a rapid rate while reinforcing friendly operations.

CONTENTS
Section 1.
Section 2.
Section 3.
Section 4.

Fundamentals of the Defense ..................................................

Planning .....................................................................................
Preparation ................................................................................
Execution ...................................................................................

Page
4-1
4-3
4-8
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SECTION 1 - FUNDAMENTALS OF THE DEFENSE

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSE
FM 3-0 (FM 100-5) describes several characteristics of an effective defense: preparation; security;
disruption, mass, and concentration; and flexibility. To optimize these characteristics in the defense, the tank
platoon leader must consider the factors examined in the following discussion.

Preparation
The critical element affecting preparation is time management, beginning with receipt of the warning
order, OPORD, or FRAGO. Effective use of the available time allows the platoon leader to conduct a thorough
reconnaissance of engagement areas, BPs, displacement routes, and the axis for possible counterattacks.
Section 3 of this chapter describes preparation at the platoon level in detail.

Security
The OPSEC measures discussed in Appendix D of this manual will assist the platoon leader in
maintaining security during the planning, preparation, and execution of the defense. The platoon leader must
integrate his security plan with that of the company or troop. He enhances the platoons early warning
capability by identifying potential mounted and dismounted avenues of approach and then positioning early
warning devices and OPs to cover these avenues.

Disruption, mass, and concentration

Augmenting the platoons direct fires with reinforcing obstacles and indirect fires is a key step in
disrupting enemy operations. Platoons achieve mass and concentration by maximizing the number of tanks that
can fire into an engagement area or that can move from primary positions to alternate and supplementary
positions to concentrate fires on the enemy.

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FM 3-20.15

Flexibility
The platoon leader contributes to the flexibility of company or troop operations by developing a thorough
understanding of the company/troop plan, including on-order and be-prepared missions. He must be alert to any
possible contingencies that have not been addressed by the commander. During the preparation phase of the
defense, the platoon increases flexibility by conducting thorough reconnaissance and mounted rehearsals of all
possible plans. A crucial indicator of platoon flexibility is the ability to move quickly, and under all battlefield
conditions, between primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions as well as subsequent BPs.

DEFENSIVE PATTERNS, MISSIONS, AND TASKS

The two patterns described in FM 3-0 (FM 100-5) are mobile and area defenses. A mobile defense is
executed to destroy the attacking force by permitting the enemy to advance into a position that exposes him to
counterattack by a mobile reserve. The focus of area defenses is on retention of terrain; defending units engage
the enemy from an interlocking series of positions and destroy him, largely by direct fires. In support of mobile
and area defenses, a company team may be tasked to execute one or more of these missions and tasks:
Defend BPs.
Defend in sector.
Defend a strongpoint.
Counterattack.
Screen.
Delay.
Execute a reserve mission.
Withdraw.

ROLE OF THE TANK PLATOON

Tank platoons participate in the company team or troop defense by performing one or more of the
following operations:
Defend a BP.
Displace.
Counterattack.
Perform reserve missions.
When defending a BP, the platoon may be tasked to destroy, block, or canalize enemy forces; to
retain terrain; or to displace to occupy subsequent BPs based on the commanders intent. In a
counterattack or reserve mission, the tank platoon conducts tactical movement to occupy BPs or attack by
fire positions; it executes hasty attacks, assaults, or other actions on contact based on the commanders
intent for the counterattack.

OPERATING SYSTEMS
In conducting planning and preparation for defensive operations, the platoon leader must pay close
attention to the considerations applicable for the operating systems, which help him to logically organize his
thoughts to cover the mission. The operating systems are the following:

4-2

Maneuver.
Fire support.
Intelligence.
Mobility and survivability.

FM 3-20.15

Air defense.
CSS.
Command and control.
NOTE:

Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter, which cover, respectively, the planning and preparation phases of the
defense, are organized using the operating systems in the order listed above. Included in each section
is a discussion of the human aspect of operations, an unofficial operating system focusing on
intangible, soldier-related factors.

SECTION 2 - PLANNING
The planning phase of a defensive operation is a continuous process that begins when the platoon leader
receives the higher order (warning order, FRAGO, or OPORD). It ends when the platoon leader issues his own
OPORD or FRAGO. Planning may continue into the preparation phase as the platoon gains more information
through the higher headquarters plan and from further reconnaissance and rehearsals.

RECONNAISSANCE AND TIME MANAGEMENT

The keys to a successful, coordinated platoon defense that is effectively integrated into the
company or troop scheme of maneuver are reconnaissance and efficient time management during the
planning phase. Whether time permits a thorough ground reconnaissance or only a quick map
reconnaissance, it is critical that the platoon leader understand where the commander wants to kill
the enemy. It is also essential that he identify platoon sectors of fire and tentative platoon BPs as
well as TRPs that define the company/troop engagement area.
Ideally, the platoon leader takes part in two reconnaissance operations during the planning phase. He is
normally part of the commanders reconnaissance, along with the XO, other platoon leaders, the FIST, and the
1SG. The platoon leaders own reconnaissance includes his TCs and PSG. To save time, the commander and
platoon leader attempt to issue their OPORDs or, as a minimum, a detailed warning order during the respective
ground reconnaissance operations.
During the commanders reconnaissance, the platoon leader must identify, record, and mark the tentative
TRPs, decision points, fighting positions, and routes he thinks the platoon will use in executing the defense. It
is important for him to have sufficient day and night marking materials such as engineer stakes and tape, chem
lights, or thermal paper. He records the eight-digit grid coordinates of each position; this will allow him to
provide precise locations that the platoon can use in navigation or orientation. Ideally, the platoon leader can
record positions electronically using a hand-held GPS or the POSNAV system; if neither is available, he must
rely on his map-reading skills to manually identify and record accurate position locations.

OPERATING SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS

As planning progresses, it is important that the platoon leader make a careful evaluation of the
considerations outlined in the following discussion, which is organized using the operating systems.

Maneuver and command and control

The platoon leader must understand the company or troop plan and decision points; he develops his plan
based on these factors as well as the commanders intent. The commander normally determines operational
considerations such as OPSEC, occupation of firing positions, initiation of direct fires, primary and
supplementary platoon sectors of fire, and disengagement criteria; however, he may allow the platoon leader to
make decisions covering some or all of these areas.

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The primary concern in selecting fighting positions is the platoons ability to concentrate and mass lethal
fires into its sectors of fire. Whenever possible, primary and alternate fighting positions should allow
engagement of the enemy in the flank and from two directions. Supplementary fighting positions should always
be planned to allow the platoon to defend against enemy forces that penetrate adjacent platoon positions or that
move along additional avenues of approach for which the commander has assumed risk. Dispersion among
fighting positions reduces vulnerability of platoon vehicles to enemy fires; however, dispersion increases the
demands for local security in the area between vehicles.
Ideally, the platoon will occupy hull-down firing positions as the enemy crosses the direct fire trigger line.
The trigger line should optimize weapon standoff, while the firing positions and the designated firing pattern
should be selected to create the opportunity for flank engagements.
NOTE:

Primary and alternate fighting positions are oriented on the same sectors of fire. Supplementary
fighting positions orient on different sectors of fire (see Figure 4-1). Subsequent BPs are oriented on
sectors of fire along the same avenue of approach as the primary/alternate positions. Supplementary
BPs are oriented on sectors of fire along different avenues of approach (see Figure 4-2).

Figure 4-1. Fighting positions.

Figure 4-2. Battle positions.

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Disengagement criteria and the resulting disengagement plan should identify a break point and provide for
internal overwatch if it is not provided by another platoon (see Figures 4-3A and 4-3B). The plan should
designate covered routes to alternate and supplementary fighting positions and BPs.

Figure 4-3A. Displacement by platoon.

Figure 4-3B. Displacement by section.

As the planning phase progresses, individual TCs, under the direction of the PSG, should begin executing
priorities of work to prepare their vehicles and soldiers based on guidance contained in the platoon warning
order. In addition, crews may conduct rehearsals of standard actions, such as berm drills and ammunition
transfer.

Fire support
The platoon leader posts targets on his overlays (in both traditional and digital format). Although most
fire support planning is done by the company or troop FIST, the platoon leader can, if necessary, provide the
FIST with nominations for additional targets for inclusion in the battalion fire support plan. As these targets are
approved, the platoon leader plots them on his overlays. If a target is disapproved, he notes its grid coordinates
so he can, if needed, submit a speedy call for fire using the grid method. See Chapter 6 of this manual for
methods of transmitting calls for fire.
The platoon leader should plan and request artillery targets on potential avenues of approach, at choke
points along the avenues of approach, at possible enemy support by fire positions, at obstacles, and in dead
space within the platoons battle space. He should also be prepared to request a mix of smoke and dual-purpose
improved conventional munitions (DPICM) rounds in front of his BP to disrupt an enemy assault or behind his
BP to help the platoon disengage from the enemy.

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Each artillery target should have a decision point overwatched by at least a crew or section. The decision
point triggers the call for fire on a target to ensure that the impact of the rounds coincides with the enemys
arrival. The platoons laser range finders or target designation capabilities (on digitally equipped tanks)
enhance its effectiveness in triggering artillery fires using decision points. The location of the decision point is
based on the enemys expected rate of advance over the terrain, the time of flight of the rounds, and the priority
of fires. The company or troop FIST should assist in determining all decision points.
The platoon leader should plan and coordinate mortar targets on dismounted avenues of approach. In
addition, because mortar smoke is generally more responsive than smoke delivered by FA, he may be able to
gain a tactical advantage by employing mortar support in certain situations. (See Appendix E of this manual for
information on smoke operations.)

Intelligence
Security decisions are based on enemy capabilities. Platoons use OPs to provide early warning of the
enemys actions; their REDCON status and other OPSEC preparations then enable them to respond in a timely
manner. See Appendix D of this manual for more information on OPSEC measures.
OPSEC is especially critical during the platoon leaders ground reconnaissance. The platoon leader
ensures that he provides security for the reconnaissance based on the commanders guidance. Because it is
probable that enemy elements are already in the area, he must ensure that platoon reconnaissance elements have
the capability to protect themselves effectively.
As he conducts the reconnaissance, the platoon leader orients his map and references graphic control
measures to the terrain. He conducts a terrain analysis, using the results in conjunction with his knowledge of
possible enemy COAs to identify key terrain that may define potential enemy objectives. He identifies mounted
and dismounted avenues of approach and determines the probable formations the enemy will use when
occupying support by fire positions or when assaulting the platoons position. Based on his analysis and
available fields of observation and fire, the platoon leader confirms vehicle positions that will allow the platoon
to mass fires into the company or troop engagement area.
The platoon leader should complete his reconnaissance by conducting initial coordination with adjacent
platoons to establish mutual support and to cover dead space between the platoons. At the conclusion of the
reconnaissance, he may leave an OP to report enemy activity in the area of operations.

Mobility and survivability

The platoon leader may be responsible for supervising engineer efforts. He should incorporate plans for
linkup, supervision, and handoff of engineer assets into his timeline.
Countermobility considerations (obstacles). Key factors for the platoon leader to consider in
countermobility planning are a thorough understanding of the commanders intent for each planned obstacle and
knowledge of the time and personnel he must allocate to supervise or assist emplacement of the obstacle. He
must keep in mind that both the platoon and the company or troop have only limited ability to transport and
emplace obstacles. This means that in most situations the platoon will have to depend on the task force or
squadron for obstacle planning and transport and on engineers for emplacement.
The commanders intent will guide the emplacement of obstacles based on the following principles and
characteristics:
Obstacles are integrated with and reinforce the scheme of maneuver and the direct fire plan.
They are integrated with existing obstacles.
They are employed in depth and positioned where they will surprise enemy forces.
They should be covered by direct and indirect fires at all times.

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In general, obstacles are used to disrupt, turn, fix, and block the enemy based on the factors of METT-TC.
Figure 4-4 illustrates considerations for obstacle employment in relation to platoon BPs. If the commander does
not specify an intent for obstacles, the platoon leader should analyze the situation and plan hasty or engineeremplaced obstacles to meet these purposes:
To block the final assault of an enemy force to the front of the platoon (the circled number 1 in
Figure 4-4).
To block the seams between vehicles or between adjacent platoons (the circled 2).
To disrupt enemy forces that are assaulting on the flanks of the platoon (the circled 3).
To shape the engagement area by forcing enemy elements to turn, slow down, stop, or flank
themselves at known ranges in the engagement area (the circled 4).

Figure 4-4. Considerations for obstacle employment.

Survivability considerations. The platoon leader must plan the priority of survivability efforts. His plan
should specify the sequence (first through fourth) in which his tanks will receive digging assets. When
designating priorities, he considers the survivability of unimproved positions and the relative importance of
each firing position within the BP. The engineer platoon leader, section leader, or dozer operator can estimate
how much time it will take to improve firing positions. These estimates will range from 45 minutes to 2 hours
depending on soil and light conditions and the type and amount of engineer equipment available. Figure 4-5
illustrates dug-in positions and lists considerations for their construction and use.

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Figure 4-5. Dug-in firing positions.

Air defense
Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for a discussion of air defense planning and employment, including
considerations for ADA assets.

Combat service support

The platoon leader conducts resupply operations to replenish basic loads in accordance with the company
or troop plan. Ammunition may be pre-positioned on the battlefield to facilitate resupply once the battle begins.
The platoon leader determines prestock requirements based on the commanders intent and scheme of
maneuver. He discusses prestock requests with the commander, identifying resupply locations, the types
(usually ammunition) and amounts of supplies involved, the time required to conduct resupply, and any
necessary security considerations.

The human aspect

As noted previously, the human aspect is not considered a formal operating system, but it is a crucial
factor in the success of the defensive mission. The platoon leader must plan for and conduct activities aimed at
enhancing each soldiers health, morale, welfare, and overall readiness. For a more complete discussion of the
human dimension of operations, refer to Section 2 in Chapter 3 of this manual.

SECTION 3 - PREPARATION
Preparation of a BP begins after the platoon leader has issued his order and ends at the defend not later
than time specified in the OPORD. (NOTE: Some preparation activities may occur while the platoon leader
is preparing his order.) The platoon leader designates these preparations as priorities of work and identifies
them in the platoon warning order or OPORD. He must weigh competing demands of security, firing position
and obstacle preparation, rehearsals, and coordination against the amount of time available for the preparation;
this requirement places a premium on effective troop-leading procedures and time management during the
preparation process.

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LEVELS OF PREPARATION
The commander may designate the level of preparation for each BP. There are three levels, listed here in
descending order of thoroughness and time required: (NOTE: The platoon leader may raise the level of
preparation directed by the commander, but may not lower it.)
Reconnoiter. This level of preparation consists of the steps conducted during the ground
reconnaissance of the planning phase.
Prepare. This level includes the steps conducted during the planning and preparation phases for
the deliberate occupation of a BP.
Occupy. This is complete preparation of the position from which the platoon will initially
defend. The position is fully reconnoitered, prepared, and occupied prior to the defend NLT
time specified in the OPORD.

PREPARATION TASKS
Hasty occupation
Tank platoons conduct a hasty occupation under a variety of circumstances. During a movement to
contact, the platoon may prepare to destroy a moving enemy force by conducting a hasty occupation of BPs or
attack by fire positions in defensible terrain. During defensive operations, hasty occupation may take place
during counterattack missions, after disengagement and movement to subsequent BPs, or in response to
FRAGOs reflecting a change of mission.
Initial occupation activities and information. Hasty occupation of a BP usually occurs in response to a
prearranged signal or a FRAGO. Often, only a minimum of planning time and information is available prior to
execution, although in some situations, such as after disengagement, the platoon may occupy prepared positions
it has previously reconnoitered. As a minimum, the platoon leader must have the following information
when he orders a hasty occupation:
Where the commander wants to kill the enemy. The commander designates company or troop
TRPs either to define the company/troop engagement area and platoon sectors of fire or to
identify locations where the platoon will mass its fires.
The tentative location of the BP.
The platoon leader must pass this information to the platoon. He may supplement it with tentative
section or vehicle fighting positions within the BP and platoon TRPs defining section sectors of fire. As an
alternative, he can elect to use the company or troop TRP alone to mass platoon fires to the left and to the right
of the TRP. Depending on the situation, the platoon leader issues the information in person, over the radio, or
by digital overlay (if available).
A TRP is a recognizable point on the ground that leaders use to orient friendly forces and to focus and
control direct fires. In addition, when TRPs are designated as indirect fire targets, they can be used in calling
for and adjusting indirect fires. Leaders designate TRPs at probable enemy locations and along likely avenues
of approach. These points can be natural or man-made. A TRP can be an established site, such as a hill or
building, or an impromptu feature designated as a TRP on the spot, like a burning enemy vehicle or smoke
generated by an artillery or mortar round. Friendly units can also construct markers to serve as TRPs (see
Figure 4-6). TRPs should be visible in three observation modes (unaided, passive-IR, and thermal) so all forces
can see them. Examples of TRPs include the following features and objects:

Prominent terrain feature (for example, a large hill mass).

Distinctive man-made structure (for example, a grain silo).
Observable enemy position.
Destroyed vehicle.
Ground-burst illumination.
Smoke round.
Laser point.

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Figure 4-6. Examples of constructed TRP markers.

Approaching the position. The platoon leader then directs the platoon to approach the position from the
flank or rear. Based on terrain factors, the platoon assumes a modified line formation facing the center of the
engagement area. Vehicle dispersion is generally 100 to 250 meters between tanks, again based on engagement
area and terrain considerations. TCs automatically move to turret-down positions; they execute a short halt and
overwatch the engagement area.
Developing the situation. The platoon leader continues to develop the situation. He identifies additional
TRPs defining the company or troop engagement area and/or platoon or section sectors of fire; he also
designates tentative vehicle positions (as necessary), routes into and out of the BP, and the location of
subsequent BPs. As time permits, the platoon leader establishes the following fire control measures:
The trigger line and engagement criteria.
The fire pattern to be used.
Disengagement criteria and the disengagement plan.
The platoon is now ready to move to hull-down firing positions to engage the enemy. The platoon
leader reports ESTABLISHED to the company/troop commander. If the enemy has not reached the
trigger line and time is available, the platoon leader initiates the steps necessary for a deliberate occupation of
the BP.

Deliberate occupation
The tank platoon can conduct deliberate occupation of a BP when all of the following conditions exist:
Time is available.
The enemy is not expected or has not been located within direct fire range.
A friendly element is forward of the BP with the mission of providing security for the occupying
force.
The platoon begins by occupying a hide position behind the BP. It assumes a formation that will provide
360-degree security based on considerations of METT-TC and OCOKA. TCs move to the platoon leaders
vehicle and prepare to reconnoiter the position. The platoon leader briefs his gunner on actions to take if the
reconnaissance group does not return by a specified time or if contact occurs.
Reconnaissance of the BP. The platoon leader, TCs, and a security element (usually the loaders from the
wingman tanks) dismount and move to the BP. If possible, platoon vehicles provide overwatch for the
reconnaissance group. Otherwise, the platoon leader positions dismounted OPs as necessary. The
reconnaissance group can then move mounted or dismounted around the BP and engagement area.

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If the platoon leader has already conducted a leaders reconnaissance with the commander, he uses
information from his own reconnaissance to acquaint his TCs with the BP, briefing his OPORD from an
advantageous location within the BP. If there has been no prior leaders reconnaissance, the platoon leader
should, if possible, conduct a complete ground reconnaissance with the TCs. This allows him to confirm his
map reconnaissance and tentative plan before he issues the OPORD. (NOTE: If he is unable to issue the full
OPORD during the reconnaissance, the platoon leader should, as a minimum, issue a detailed warning order.)
Members of the reconnaissance party should use marking materials (for daylight and limited visibility
recognition) to indicate key locations. They should record the eight-digit grid coordinates for these locations,
either manually on their maps or by using electronic means such as the GPS or POSNAV system (if available).
To be most effective, the reconnaissance begins from the enemys perspective in the engagement area,
with the party looking toward the BP. (NOTE: The platoon leader must receive permission from the
commander to move in front of the BP.) The platoon leader should explain the enemy situation, outlining
probable COAs and the effects of terrain on enemy movement. He also identifies the enemys potential support
by fire positions as well as assault avenues through the platoons BP.
The platoon leader and TCs then mark the company/troop engagement area with platoon and section
sectors of fire. They may also mark artillery TRPs, decision points, and tentative obstacle locations. As
necessary, fire control measures may be designated and/or marked using easily identifiable terrain features.
When reconnaissance of the engagement area is complete and all TCs are sure of where the platoon leader
wants to kill the enemy, the platoon leader and TCs move back to the BP. They discuss details of the platoon
fire plan, including the trigger line, engagement criteria, fire pattern, disengagement criteria and disengagement
plan, and routes to supplementary or subsequent BPs. They also make plans to identify and mark primary and
alternate fighting positions.
Prior to departing the BP, the platoon leader briefs the OPs on actions to take if the platoon does not
return on time or if contact is made with the enemy. He also must coordinate with adjacent platoons to establish
overlapping fields of fire and to eliminate gaps and dead space between the platoons. More information on
coordination is found later in this section.
Occupation procedures. After completing the reconnaissance and coordination, the platoon leader and TCs
move back to their vehicles. The TCs remount, start vehicles simultaneously, and move to hide positions
behind their primary fighting positions. On order, the platoon moves simultaneously into turret-down firing
positions (see Figure 4-7A). These positions allow the tanks to fire only their caliber .50 or loaders M240
machine gun. Observation can be executed using the CITV (if available); the gunners primary sight also
provides observation capability.

Figure 4-7A. Turret-down positions.

The platoon leader checks with the OPs to ensure that the enemy situation has not changed, then orders
platoon vehicles to occupy their primary hull-down firing positions (see Figure 4-7B). Tank crews orient on the
engagement area and complete their sketch cards. Each crew sends its completed sector sketch to the platoon
leader, either by messenger or by digital transmission (IVIS or FBCB2, if available); the crew retains a copy of

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the sketch card for its own reference. Tanks then move individually to their hide positions and assume the
appropriate REDCON status. (NOTE: See Appendix D of this manual for a discussion of REDCON levels.)

Figure 4-7B. Hull-down positions.

Sector sketches and platoon fire plan. Using the sector sketches and his knowledge of the
situation, the platoon leader prepares the platoon fire plan. He begins this process by plotting grid lines on a
piece of acetate placed over a map of the engagement area and platoon BP. He then plots the following
information:
Individual tank positions.
Platoon sector or engagement area.
TRPs.
Range lines, trigger points, and break points (these may coincide).
OPs (if used).
Obstacles (if used).
Indirect fire targets, including FPF, if allocated.
Dead space.
The platoon leader completes the fire plan, entering all required marginal information. He reports,
ESTABLISHED to the commander and forwards the fire plan to him by runner or digital transmission; he
also disseminates the plan within the platoon. Figure 4-8 illustrates a traditional handwritten platoon fire plan.
Priorities of work. At this point, the platoon executes its defensive priorities of work. (NOTE: Some
tasks will be performed simultaneously. Figure 4-9 is an example of a platoon timeline to assist the platoon
leader in managing the defensive preparation and division of labor based on the defend NLT time.) Priorities
of work include, but are not limited to, the following tasks:
Maintain platoon OPSEC and surveillance of the engagement area. (NOTE: See Appendix D
for more information.)
Verify each vehicles location, orientation, and sector of fire.
Supervise any allocated engineer assets.
Conduct reconnaissance and mark supplementary engagement areas and subsequent BPs as time
permits.
Conduct rehearsals.
Oversee vehicle maintenance and prepare-to-fire checks.
Improve the position by emplacing M8 alarms and hot loops and by upgrading camouflage
protection.

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Figure 4-8. Example platoon fire plan.

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Figure 4-9. Sample platoon timeline.

Building the engagement area

The engagement area is where the commander intends to trap and destroy an enemy force using the
massed fires of all available weapons. The success of any engagement depends on how effectively the
commander can integrate the obstacle plan, the indirect fire plan, and the direct-fire plan within the engagement
area to achieve the company tactical purpose.
At the company level, engagement area development is a complex function, demanding parallel planning
and preparation if the company is to accomplish the myriad tasks for which it is responsible. Despite this
complexity, however, engagement area development resembles a drill in that the commander and his
subordinate leaders use an orderly, fairly standard set of procedures. Beginning with evaluation of METT-TC
factors, the development process covers these steps:
Identify all likely enemy avenues of approach.
Determine likely enemy schemes of maneuver.
Determine where to kill the enemy.
Plan and integrate obstacles.
Emplace weapon systems.

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Plan and integrate indirect fires.

Rehearse the execution of operations in the engagement area.
Tank leaders need to be experts in building their sectors of the company engagement area using the same
seven steps outlined above. By doing this, they will be able to destroy the enemy force where the command
wants. A detailed discussion of each of the seven steps can be found in FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1).

Fire distribution and control

Effective fire distribution and control requires a unit to rapidly acquire the enemy and mass the effects of
fires to achieve decisive results in the close fight. When planning and executing direct fires, the commander
and subordinate leaders must know how to apply several actions of subordinates. Applied correctly, they help
the troop to accomplish its primary goal in any direct-fire engagement: to both acquire first and shoot first; they
give subordinates the freedom to act quickly upon acquisition of the enemy. This discussion focuses on the
following principles:
Mass the effects of fire.
Destroy the greatest threat first.
Avoid target overkill.
Employ the best weapon for the target.
Minimize friendly exposure.
Prevent fratricide.
Plan for extreme limited visibility conditions.
Develop contingencies for diminished capabilities.
Mass the effects of fire. The troop must mass its fires to achieve decisive results. Massing entails focusing
fires at critical points and distributing the effects. Random application of fires is unlikely to have a decisive
effect. For example, concentrating the troops fires at a single target may ensure its destruction or suppression;
however, that fire control COA will probably not achieve a decisive effect on the enemy formation or position.
Destroy the greatest threat first. The order in which the troop engages enemy forces is in direct relation
to the danger they present. The threat posed by the enemy depends on his weapons, range, and position.
Presented with multiple targets, a unit will, in almost all situations, initially concentrate fires to destroy the
greatest threat, and then distribute fires over the remainder of the enemy force.
Avoid target overkill. Use only the amount of fire required to achieve necessary effects. Target overkill
wastes ammunition and ties up weapons that are better employed acquiring and engaging other targets. The
idea of having every weapon engage a different target, however, must be tempered by the requirement to
destroy the greatest threats first. In most situations, however, it is necessary for the troop to overwhelm the
enemy with a tremendous volume of fire to compensate for its lack of direct-fire assets.
Employ the best weapon for the target. Using the appropriate weapon for the target increases the
probability of rapid enemy destruction or suppression; at the same time, it saves ammunition. The troop has
many weapons with which to engage the enemy. Target type, range, and exposure are key factors in
determining the weapon and ammunition that should be employed, as are weapons and ammunition availability
and desired target effects. Additionally, leaders should consider individual crew capabilities when deciding on
the employment of weapons. The commander task organizes and arrays his forces based on the terrain, enemy,
and desired effects of fires. As an example, when he expects an enemy dismounted assault in restricted terrain,
the commander would employ his dismounted scout squads, taking advantage of their ability to best engage
numerous, fast-moving targets.
Minimize friendly exposure. Units increase their survivability by exposing themselves to the enemy only
to the extent necessary to engage him effectively. Natural or man-made defilade provides the best cover from

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kinetic-energy direct-fire munitions. Crews and squads minimize their exposure by constantly seeking effective
available cover, attempting to engage the enemy from the flank, remaining dispersed, firing from multiple
positions, and limiting engagement times.
Prevent fratricide. The commander must be proactive in reducing the risk of fratricide and noncombatant
casualties. He has numerous tools to assist him in this effort: identification training for combat vehicles and
aircraft; the units weapons safety posture; the weapons control status; recognition markings; FBCB2 and
situational understanding. Knowledge and employment of applicable ROE are the primary means of preventing
noncombatant casualties. (NOTE: Because it is difficult to distinguish between friendly and enemy
dismounted soldiers, the commander must constantly monitor the position of friendly dismounted squads.)
Plan for extreme limited visibility conditions. At night, limited visibility fire control equipment enables
the troop to engage enemy forces at nearly the same ranges that are applicable during the day. Obscurants such
as dense fog, heavy smoke, and blowing sand, however, can reduce the capabilities of thermal and infrared
equipment. The commander should therefore develop contingency plans for such extreme limited visibility
conditions. Although decreased acquisition capabilities have minimal effect on area fire, point target
engagements will likely occur at decreased ranges. Typically, firing positions, whether offensive or defensive,
must be adjusted closer to the area or point where the commander intends to focus fires. Another alternative is
the use of visual or infrared illumination when there is insufficient ambient light for passive light intensification
devices. (NOTE: Vehicles equipped with thermal sights can assist dismounted scout and infantry squads in
detecting and engaging enemy infantry forces in conditions such as heavy smoke and low illumination.)
Develop contingencies for diminished capabilities. Leaders initially develop plans based on their
units maximum capabilities; they make backup plans for implementation in the event of casualties or weapon
damage or failure. While leaders cannot anticipate or plan for every situation, they should develop plans for
what they view as the most probable occurrences. Building redundancy into these plans, such as having two
systems observe the same sector, is an invaluable asset when the situation (and the number of available systems)
permits. Designating alternate sectors of fire provides a means of shifting fires if adjacent elements are knocked
out of action.

Coordination
Throughout the preparation phase, the platoon leader coordinates with adjacent platoons and other
elements to ensure that platoon sectors of fire overlap and that CS and CSS requirements are met. Coordination
is initiated from left to right and from higher to lower. The platoon leader, however, should initiate CS and CSS
coordination if he desires support not specified in the company or troop OPORD. He must also ensure that the
platoon conducts necessary internal coordination.
Adjacent unit coordination. The information that the platoon exchanges with adjacent elements includes
the following:
Locations of primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions and locations of flanks.
Overlapping fields of observation and direct fire.
Locations and types of obstacles.
Locations of any dead space between units and procedures for how dead space is to be covered.
Indirect fire targets and SOI information.
Locations of OPs and patrol routes.
Routes into and out of BPs and routes to subsequent BPs.
Platoon coordination. Effective internal coordination within the platoon enhances the situational
understanding of tank crews and alerts them to the actions needed to prepare the defense. One method of
ensuring this coordination is dissemination of enemy and friendly information in the form of intelligence
updates, which were discussed earlier in this chapter. In addition, sector sketches and the platoon fire plan
facilitate coordination of fires before the fight begins.

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Rehearsals are especially effective in helping the platoon to practice and coordinate necessary tactical
skills, including these:
Occupation procedures.
Calls for fire.
Initiation, distribution, and control of direct and indirect fires.
Movement to alternate and supplementary fighting positions.
Displacement to subsequent BPs.
Rehearsals can begin as soon as the platoon receives the company or troop warning order, with individual
crews practicing berm drills, snake board exercises, and ammunition transfer drills. Initial walk-through
rehearsals on a sand table can focus on deliberate or hasty occupation procedures, fire distribution, and the
disengagement plan. The platoon can then conduct mounted movement rehearsals and force-on-force
rehearsals, continually raising the level of difficulty by conducting the rehearsals at night and at various MOPP
levels. The platoon leader should integrate voice and digital radio traffic as well as calls for fire during all
rehearsals.

OPERATING SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS

Fire support
The platoon leader should confirm locations of artillery and mortar targets, adjust them as necessary, and
mark them for daylight and limited visibility recognition. He should also mark decision points that will be used
to request artillery on moving targets; these locations are based on the enemys doctrinal rates of movement, the
terrain, the time of flight of artillery rounds (the company FIST has this information), and the priority of the
target. Marking of decision points also may be necessary when readily identifiable terrain features are not
available.
The platoon leader can use either of two methods to accurately mark decision points and target locations.
In one method, a member of the platoon moves to the locations using the map, GPS, or POSNAV and marks the
sites. In the second, a member of the platoon notes the impact location of rounds during artillery registration
and moves to and marks these target locations. In both methods, markings must be visible under daylight and
limited visibility conditions.

Intelligence
OPSEC is critical during defensive preparations. The platoon should adhere to the procedures outlined in
Appendix D of this manual to limit the effectiveness of enemy reconnaissance efforts.
Intelligence is constantly updated by higher headquarters as the battlefield situation develops, such as
when the enemy fights through a screening or covering force. The platoon leader keeps the platoon informed
with periodic intelligence updates. The updated information may force him to reevaluate and adjust his timeline
to ensure preparations are as complete as possible. For example, the platoon leader may determine that
engineer assets only have time to dig hull-down firing positions rather than turret-down and hide positions; in
another situation, he may direct the engineers to prepare fighting positions for only one section because the
other section has access to terrain that provides excellent natural hull-down firing positions.
During the preparation phase, the platoon leader may conduct reconnaissance of subsequent or
supplementary BPs. Simultaneous planning for these positions during the preparation of initial positions is a
critical component in effective time management.

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Mobility and survivability

Because engineer assets are at a premium during defensive preparations, they should never be allowed to
remain idle for any reason other than maintenance checks and services. A member of the platoon, either the
platoon leader or a designated TC, must physically link up with the engineers as directed in the platoon OPORD
and escort them to each firing position. The escort provides local security and instructions to the engineers.
Survivability considerations. Engineers improve the platoons survivability by digging or improving hide,
turret-down, or hull-down positions (see Figure 4-5 on page 4-8). Each TC should be responsible for the
improvement of his firing position. He must make sure that the location, orientation, and depth of the hole are
correct before the engineer departs for the next fighting position. He should also be aware of the importance of
selecting a site with a background that will break up the silhouette of his vehicle (see Figure 4-10); this helps to
prevent skylining.

Figure 4-10. Using background to prevent skylining.

Several factors can help the platoon to significantly increase the number of kills it achieves while
executing the defense. Firing positions should maximize weapon standoff and/or the platoons ability to mass
fires from survivable positions. As discussed previously, firing positions and obstacles should be
complementary. The platoon leader must coordinate with engineers to ensure that the platoons direct fires can
cover the entire area of any obstacle that the commander intends to emplace in the platoons sector of fire.
Additionally, the platoon should know the exact location of the start point, end point, and turns of the obstacle.
This knowledge contributes to the accuracy of calls for fire. The platoon leader can also locate a TRP on the
obstacle to ensure more accurate calls for fire.
Mobility considerations. Engineer mobility operations in the defense normally are of lower priority than
those involving survivability and countermobility. Engineers can improve routes from the platoons hide
position to its primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions as well as to subsequent BPs. Such
efforts are labor-intensive, however, and should be evaluated carefully based on the commanders priority of
work for the engineers.

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Air defense
Refer to the discussion of air defense considerations in Chapter 6 of this manual.

Combat service support

Resupply methods and procedures are discussed in detail in Chapter 7 of this manual. If the commander
authorizes pre-positioning, the platoon leader determines the amount and type of prestock (normally
ammunition) that will be required for the operation. For example, to calculate ammunition requirements, he
evaluates the number and type of enemy vehicles the platoon expects to engage and the amount of time
available to conduct resupply between engagements. He then directs the PSG to select and prepare the prestock
location and coordinate the delivery of the prestock supplies.
Prestock resupply can be accomplished successfully in virtually any location where supplies can be
hidden and protected, such as in or behind the primary fighting position, along the displacement route, or in the
firing positions of a subsequent BP. Preparation of the site includes providing cover, concealment, and
protection for platoon and delivery personnel and vehicles during the transfer process. The site must also
protect the supply materials from enemy observation and the effects of artillery and weather.
Once the supplies are delivered, the prestock site should be concealed. The platoon should conduct
periodic security checks or keep the site under constant surveillance to ensure safekeeping of the prestock.

The human aspect

Activities aimed at enhancing each soldiers health, morale, welfare, and overall readiness to fight
continue during the preparation phase. Refer to the discussion of the human dimension of operations included
in Section 2 of Chapter 3.

SECTION 4 - EXECUTION
This section contains a best case, chronological discussion of the procedures and considerations that
apply during the execution of a typical tank platoon defensive mission.

HIDE POSITION
The platoons hide positions are located behind its primary battle and/or fighting positions. The platoon
occupies hide positions in one of two ways: either as a unit, using perimeter defense techniques discussed in
Chapter 5 (this method is used when hide positions are behind the BP), or with individual vehicles occupying
hide positions behind their primary fighting positions.
While in the hide position, the platoon employs all applicable OPSEC measures to limit aerial, thermal,
electronic, and visual detection. It deploys OPs as discussed in Appendix D of this manual to provide
surveillance of its sectors of fire and early warning for vehicles in the hide position. It also maintains the
REDCON status prescribed in the OPORD. The hide position should not be located on or near obvious artillery
targets.
NOTE:

The platoon leader may decide to occupy turret-down positions rather than hide positions based on
terrain considerations, such as availability of cover and concealment, or if the enemy situation is
vague and observation of the engagement area is necessary.

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OCCUPATION OF FIRING POSITIONS

The platoon leader monitors intelligence reports provided on the company or troop net and upgrades the
platoons REDCON status as the enemy approaches or as directed. When previously identified occupation
criteria are met, he orders the platoon to occupy its primary fighting positions. Based on reconnaissance,
rehearsals, and known time-distance factors, each TC moves to his position along a previously reconnoitered
route. If the GPS or POSNAV is available, TCs use waypoints to assist in controlling movement. Ideally, the
platoon occupies turret-down positions with enough time to orient weapon systems and acquire and track targets
before the enemy crosses the direct fire trigger line.
Because the observation range of OPs is usually limited to the engagement area, OP reports should not be
the sole criterion triggering the platoons occupation of fighting positions. If the enemy situation becomes
unclear, the platoon leader may request permission to occupy turret-down positions for the purpose of scanning
the engagement area.

CALLS FOR FIRE

As the enemy approaches the direct-fire trigger line, the platoon leader keeps his crews updated on the
situation being reported on the company or troop net. He monitors the SPOTREPs and calls for fire being sent
on the company/troop net and compares these reports with the SPOTREPs from his platoon net. He reports any
new enemy information higher using the SPOTREP format (see FKSM 17-15-3). The platoon leader employs
available artillery to engage targets that are not being requested by other platoon leaders or the company/troop
commander. He initiates calls for fire on moving enemy elements using previously identified decision points
and the AT MY COMMAND method of control (calls for fire are discussed in Chapter 6 of this manual).
Crews of M1A2 tanks can track enemy vehicle movement toward a target location by employing the
vehicles far target designate capability; they can use this information to initiate artillery fires. Additionally,
they can use the far target designate capability to determine the location of stationary targets and to quickly
process a tactical fire (TACFIRE) direction system or IVIS/FBCB2 call-for-fire message to attack unplanned
targets.

DIRECT FIRES
Fire commands
The platoon leader initiates tank direct fires using a fire command as discussed in Chapter 2 of this
manual. The fire command enables him to engage single targets (for example, a reconnaissance vehicle) using
a single section or an individual vehicle without exposing the entire platoon. It also allows the platoon to
maintain the element of surprise by simultaneously engaging multiple targets with a lethal initial volley of tank
fires. Sectors of fire and the preplanned fire pattern should be selected to help prevent target overkill and the
resulting waste of ammunition.

Trigger line
The trigger line is a backup to the fire command. In the absence of communications from the platoon
leader, a preestablished direct fire trigger line allows each TC to engage enemy vehicles in his sector of fire.
The criteria for the direct fire trigger line should specify the number of enemy vehicles that must pass a
designated location before the TC can engage without any instructions from the platoon leader. Selection of the
trigger line is dependent on METT-TC factors. Considerations might include the following:
A maximum range or a point, such as an obstacle, at which the platoon will initiate fires to
support the company or troop scheme of maneuver.
The survivability of enemy armor.

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The fields of fire that the terrain allows.

The planning ranges for the platoons weapon systems. The planning range for the 105-mm
main gun is 2,000 meters; for the 120-mm main gun, it is 2,500 meters.

Movement considerations
Individual TCs move from hull-down to turret-down firing positions within their primary and alternate
positions based on two considerations: the necessity to maintain direct fire on the enemy and the effectiveness
of enemy fires. Influencing each TCs decision to move between firing positions are such factors as enemy
movement rates, the number of advancing enemy vehicles, the accuracy with which the enemy is acquiring and
engaging friendly fighting positions, and the lethality of enemy weapon systems.

Reporting
During the direct-fire fight, TCs describe the situation for the platoon leader, who in turn describes what
is happening for the commander. Contact reports, SPOTREPs, and SITREPs are used as appropriate. In the
defense, contact reports are used to alert the platoon to previously unidentified enemy targets. SPOTREPs and
SITREPs are sent to list the number, types, and locations of enemy vehicles observed, engaged, and/or
destroyed and to provide the strength and status of friendly forces. Everyone involved in the reporting
process must avoid sending redundant or inflated descriptions of the situation. Such reports not only are
confusing, but also may trigger unnecessary, and possibly dangerous, actions by higher headquarters.

Resupply
The platoon may expend main gun ammunition quickly in a direct-fire fight. Based on the terrain and
expected enemy situation, the platoon leader must develop and execute resupply procedures to maintain a
constant supply of main gun rounds. He must balance the necessity of maintaining direct fires on the enemy
against the demands imposed on the platoons crews by the ammunition transfer process and the retrieval of
prestock supplies.

DISPLACEMENT
Displacement may become necessary in several types of situations. For example, a numerically superior
enemy may force the platoon to displace to a subsequent BP. In another situation, a penetration or enemy
advance on a secondary avenue of approach may require the platoon or section to occupy supplementary BPs or
fighting positions.

Disengagement criteria and disengagement plan

The company commander establishes disengagement criteria and develops the disengagement plan to
support the company or troop scheme of maneuver. Disengagement criteria are primarily based on a specified
number and type of enemy vehicles reaching a specified location (normally called the break point) to trigger
displacement. Other considerations, such as ammunition supplies and friendly combat power, also influence the
decision to displace.

Methods of displacement
The platoon leader chooses between two methods of displacement depending on whether or not the move
is conducted with overwatch (and cover) by an adjacent platoon.
Displacement with cover. If the displacement is covered, the entire platoon usually displaces as a whole
(see Figure 4-11). It employs smoke grenades and on-board smoke generators to screen the displacement.

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CAUTION
On-board smoke (VEESS) will be used only when the vehicle is burning diesel fuel. Use of
VEESS when burning any other type of fuel will cause a fire hazard.
The platoon leader issues instructions or uses a prearranged signal to initiate movement. The platoon
simultaneously backs down to hide positions, keeping front hulls toward the enemy until adequate cover
protects each tank. Individual tanks orient weapon systems toward the enemy as they move to the subsequent
or supplementary positions along previously identified and reconnoitered routes.

Figure 4-11. Displacement with cover from another element

(entire platoon moves at once).
Displacement without cover. If the displacement is not covered by another element, the platoon leader
designates one section to overwatch the displacement of the other section. The overwatch section is responsible
for providing suppressive fires covering the entire platoon sector of fire. It also initiates artillery calls for fire,
mixing smoke with tank-killing munitions, to help cover the displacement. When overwatch is no longer necessary
to cover the displacing sections movement, the overwatch section may request one last artillery call for fire in
front of its own position, then displace to the subsequent BP.
NOTE:

In some instances, the platoon may have to use bounding overwatch to the rear during tactical
movement to the subsequent or supplementary position (see Figure 4-12). This may become
necessary when such factors as the distance to the new position, the enemys rate of advance, and
terrain considerations (fields of fire) do not allow the original overwatch section to displace without
the benefit of an overwatch of its own.

Figure 4-12. Displacement without cover from another element

(sections move using bounding overwatch).

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Completion of displacement
The displacement is complete when the platoon has occupied the subsequent BP and all vehicles are
prepared to continue the defense. If the platoon leader and TCs were able to reconnoiter and rehearse the
disengagement and occupation, the occupation should go quickly. If reconnaissance and rehearsals were not
possible, the platoon leader must conduct the steps of a hasty occupation outlined earlier in this chapter.

COUNTERATTACKS
The platoon is capable of conducting limited counterattacks, either alone or as part of a larger force
(usually the company team). It can employ one of two methods: counterattack by fire and counterattack by fire
and movement.

Purposes
The platoon may conduct (or take part in) a counterattack to accomplish the following purposes:
Complete the destruction of the enemy.
Regain key terrain.
Relieve pressure on an engaged unit.
Initiate offensive operations.

Coordination and control

Coordination and control are critical to the success of the counterattack. Locations of routes and positions
must be planned and disseminated to all units; this assists the counterattack force and other elements in
controlling indirect and direct fires. If adjustments to any route or position become necessary, the counterattack
force must take immediate action to ensure that other forces lift and shift fires; otherwise, fratricide becomes a
distinct danger.

Counterattack methods
Counterattack by fire. When the company team executes a counterattack by fire, one platoon conducts
tactical movement on a concealed route to a predetermined BP or attack by fire position from which it can
engage the enemy in the flank and/or rear. The remaining platoons hold their positions and continue to engage
the enemy (see Figure 4-13). The intent of this method is to use weapon standoff and/or cover to full advantage
and destroy the enemy by direct fires.

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Figure 4-13. Counterattack by fire.

Counterattack by fire and movement. The intent of this method is to close with and destroy the enemy.
The counterattack force uses tactical movement to gain a position of advantage from which it attacks the enemy
(from the flank, whenever possible) (see Figure 4-14). It conducts hasty attacks and assaults based on the
particular situation and the factors of METT-TC.

Figure 4-14. Counterattack by fire and movement.

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CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION

Once an enemy assault is defeated, leaders must ensure their soldiers are ready to continue with defensive
operations, to shift to the offense, or to displace. If the platoon is directed to hold its current positions, it must
consolidate and reorganize quickly so it will be ready to destroy follow-on enemy forces and to execute any
other required tasks.

Consolidation
To consolidate a defensive position, the platoon takes these steps:
Eliminate remaining enemy resistance by conducting a counterattack as directed by the
commander.
Reestablish communications.
Ensure positions are mutually supporting; check all sectors of fire to eliminate gaps and dead
space that result when tanks are disabled.
Secure EPWs.
Reestablish OPSEC by emplacing OPs and early warning devices (such as M8 alarms) and
enhancing camouflage for platoon positions.
Replace, repair, or fortify obstacles.
Improve positions in accordance with procedures for a deliberate defense and established
priorities of work.

Reorganization
Reorganization, the process of preparing for continued fighting, is usually conducted by unit SOP.
Reorganization in the defense is accomplished in the same manner as in the offense. Refer to Section 7 in
Chapter 3 of this manual for a detailed discussion.

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CHAPTER 5

Other Tactical Operations

This chapter describes additional tasks the tank platoon may have to conduct to complement or support its
primary operations of move, attack, and defend. The platoon executes these additional tasks separately or as
part of a larger force.

CONTENTS
Section 1.
Section 2.
Section 3.
Section 4.
Section 5.
Section 6.
Section 7.
Section 8.
Section 9.
Section 10.
Section 11.
Section 12.

Tactical Road March ..............................................................................

Assembly Areas .....................................................................................
Actions at a Contact Point ....................................................................
Convoy Escort .......................................................................................
Passage of Lines ...................................................................................
Breaching Operations ...........................................................................
Follow and Support ...............................................................................
Perimeter Defense .................................................................................
Screen ....................................................................................................
Delay .......................................................................................................
Relief in Place ........................................................................................
Withdrawal .............................................................................................

Page
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5-8
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SECTION 1 - TACTICAL ROAD MARCH

Tank platoons conduct tactical road marches to move long distances and position themselves for future
operations. The main purpose of the road march is to relocate rapidly, not to gain contact. It is conducted using
fixed speeds and timed intervals. Road marches are planned at the battalion and company levels. They are,
however, executed by platoons.

PREPARATION AND SOPs

The success of a road march depends on thorough preparation and sound SOPs.
Platoon preparations should address the following considerations:

Movement to the SP.

Speed control.
Formations.
Intervals.
Weapons orientation.
Actions at scheduled halts.
Actions at the RP.
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SOPs should cover the following factors:

Actions at unscheduled halts.

Actions in case a vehicle becomes lost.
Actions if a vehicle becomes disabled.
Actions on contact.
COMPOSITION
A road march is composed of three elements:

The quartering party (or advance party).

The main body.
The trail party.
The tank platoon normally travels as a unit in the main body. Before the march begins, the platoon may
provide individual soldiers or a vehicle and crew to assist with quartering party activities (see Section 2 of this
chapter).

MARCH COLUMNS
The following discussion focuses on the three primary road march techniques. (NOTE: The commander
bases his decision on the formation to be used during the march on which technique is employed. The road
march is usually executed in column or staggered column formation.)

Open column
The open column technique is normally used for daylight marches. It can be used at night with blackout
lights or night vision equipment. The distance between vehicles varies, normally from 50 meters to 200 meters
depending on light and weather conditions.

Close column
The close column technique is normally used for marches conducted during periods of limited visibility.
The distance between vehicles is based on the ability to see the vehicle ahead; it is normally less than 50 meters.

Infiltration
The infiltration technique involves the movement of small groups of personnel or vehicles at irregular
intervals. It is used when sufficient time and suitable routes are available and when maximum security,
deception, and dispersion are desired. It provides the best possible passive defense against enemy observation
and detection. (NOTE: Infiltration is most commonly used by dismounted elements.)

CONTROL MEASURES
The following discussion covers control measures the platoon leader can use in effectively controlling his
platoon during the conduct of a road march.

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Map with overlay

As a minimum, the overlay must show the SP, the RP, and the route. The SP location represents the
beginning of the road march route. It should be located on easily recognizable terrain. It is far enough away
from the units initial position to allow the platoon to organize into the march formation at the appropriate speed
and interval. If time is available, the platoon leader should determine the time-distance factor to the SP. This
will help the platoon to arrive at the SP at the time designated in the commanders OPORD. The RP location is
at the end of the route of march. It also is located on easily recognizable terrain. Elements do not halt at the
RP. They continue to their respective positions with assistance from guides, waypoints, and/or graphic control
measures. The route is the path of travel connecting the start and release points.

Digital overlays
When available, digital overlays serve as the platoons primary source of information on terrain and
positions, although the traditional hard-copy map and overlay are maintained as a backup. Digital overlays
display waypoints and information concerning unit locations along the route of march that can assist TCs in
navigation and help them in maintaining situational understanding.

Critical points
These are locations along the route of march where interference with movement may occur or where
timing is critical. They are represented using checkpoints. The SP, RP, and all checkpoints are considered
critical points.

Strip maps
A strip map can be used to assist in navigation. It must include the SP, RP, and checkpoints and must list
the distances between these points. Detailed blow-up sketches should be used for scheduled halt locations and
other places where confusion is likely to occur. Strip maps are included as an annex to the movement order; if
possible, a copy should be provided to all TCs. See Figure 5-1 for an example of a strip map.

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Figure 5-1. Example strip map.

Visual signals
Because the platoon observes radio silence during most road marches, hand-and-arm signals provide the
primary means of passing messages between vehicles.

Traffic control
Road guides and traffic signs may be posted at designated traffic control points by the headquarters
controlling the march. At critical points, guides assist in creating a smooth flow of traffic along the march
route. Military police, members of the battalion scout platoon, or designated elements from the quartering party
may serve as guides. They should have equipment that will allow march elements to identify them during
periods of limited visibility.

ACTIONS DURING THE MARCH

Moving to the start point
The platoon must arrive at the SP at the time designated in the company or troop OPORD. Some
commanders will designate a staging or marshaling area that enables platoons to organize their march columns
and conduct final inspections and briefings before movement. Other units require platoons to move directly to
the column from their current positions. To avoid confusion during the initial moveout, the platoon leader and

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TCs conduct a reconnaissance of the route to the SP, issue clear movement instructions, and conduct thorough
rehearsals, paying particular attention to signals and timing.

March speed
An elements speed in a march column will change as it encounters variable routes and road conditions.
This can produce an undesirable accordion effect. The movement order establishes the march speed and
maximum catch-up speed. During the march, the platoons lead vehicle must not exceed either the fixed march
speed or the top catch-up speed. In addition, it should accelerate slowly out of turns or choke points; this allows
the platoon to gradually resume the march speed after moving past the restriction.

Orientation
Each tank in the platoon has an assigned sector of gun-tube orientation (see Figure 5-2). TCs assign
sectors of observation to crewmen both to cover their portion of the platoon sector and to achieve 360-degree
observation.

Figure 5-2. Sectors of gun-tube orientation.

Halts
While taking part in a road march, the platoon must be prepared to conduct both scheduled and
unscheduled halts.
Scheduled halts. These are conducted to permit maintenance, refueling, and personal relief activities and to
allow other traffic to pass. The time and duration of halts are established in the movement order; unit SOP
specifies actions to be taken during halts. The first priority at a halt is to establish and maintain local security
(see Appendix D of this manual). A maintenance halt of 15 minutes is usually taken after the first hour of the
march, with a 10-minute break every two hours thereafter.
During long marches, the unit may conduct a refuel-on-the-move (ROM) operation. Depending on
OPSEC considerations and the company or troop OPORD, the platoon may conduct ROM for all vehicles
simultaneously or by section. The OPORD will specify the amount of fuel or the amount of time at the pump
for each vehicle. It will also give instructions for OPSEC at the ROM site and at the staging area to which
vehicles move after refueling.
Unscheduled halts. Unscheduled halts are conducted under a variety of circumstances, such as when the
unit encounters obstacles or contaminated areas or if a disabled vehicle blocks the route. Whenever an

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unscheduled halt occurs, each TC sends a messenger to the vehicle to his front; the movement commander must
then take action to determine the cause of the halt.
A disabled vehicle must not be allowed to obstruct traffic. The crew should move the vehicle off the road
immediately, report its status, establish security, and post guides to direct traffic. If possible, the crew repairs
the vehicle and rejoins the rear of the column. Vehicles that drop out of the column should return to their
original positions only when the column has halted. Until then, they move at the rear just ahead of the trail
element, which usually comprises the maintenance team with the M88 recovery vehicle and some type of
security (the XO will handle security if he is not part of the quartering party). If the crew cannot repair the
vehicle, the vehicle is recovered by the trail element.

Actions on contact
If enemy contact occurs during the road march, the platoon executes actions on contact as described in
Chapter 3 of this manual.

Actions at the release point

The platoon moves through the RP without stopping. The platoon leader picks up the assigned guide or
follows the guides signals to the assembly area. Depending on terrain and the equipment available (GPS or
POSNAV), guides and marking materials may be posted at or near exact vehicle locations. (NOTE: Refer to
the discussion of assembly area procedures in Section 2 of this chapter.)

SECTION 2 - ASSEMBLY AREAS

An assembly area is a site at which maneuver units prepare for future operations. A well-planned
assembly area will have the following characteristics:

A location on defensible terrain.

Concealment from enemy ground and air observation.
Good drainage and a surface that will support tracked and wheeled vehicles.
Suitable exits, entrances, and internal roads or trails.
Sufficient space for dispersion of vehicles and equipment.
QUARTERING PARTY ACTIONS
Normally, a quartering party (also known as an advance party) assists the platoon in the occupation of an
assembly area. Established in accordance with company or troop SOP, the quartering party may consist of one
or two soldiers from each platoon or even one tank per platoon. It is led by the company/troop XO or 1SG or
by a senior NCO. The quartering party takes these actions in preparing the assembly area:

Reconnoiter for enemy forces, NBC contamination, condition of the route to the assembly area,

and suitability of the area (covering such factors as drainage, space, and internal routes). If the
area is unsatisfactory, the party contacts the commander and requests permission to find a new
location for the site.

Organize the area based on the commanders guidance. This includes designating and marking
tentative locations for the platoon, trains, and CP vehicles.

Improve and mark entrances, exits, and internal routes.

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Mark and/or remove obstacles (within the partys capabilities).

Mark tentative vehicle locations.
OCCUPATION PROCEDURES
Once the assembly area has been prepared, the quartering party awaits the arrival of the company or
troop, maintaining surveillance and providing security of the area within its capabilities. Quartering party
members guide their elements (including the platoon) from the RP to their locations in the assembly area. SOPs
and prearranged signals and markers (for day and night occupation) should assist the TCs in finding their
positions. The key consideration is to move quickly into position to clear the route for follow-on units.
Once in position, the platoon conducts hasty occupation of a BP as described in Chapter 4 of
this manual. It establishes and maintains security (see the OPSEC discussion in Appendix D) and
coordinates with adjacent units. These actions enable the platoon to defend from the assembly area as
necessary. The platoon can then prepare for future operations by conducting troop-leading procedures and the
priorities of work in accordance the company or troop OPORD. Preparations include the following:

Establish and maintain security (REDCON status).

Conduct resupply, refueling, and rearming operations.

Conduct troop-leading procedures.

Perform maintenance activities on vehicles and communications equipment.
Verify weapon system status; conduct boresighting, muzzle reference system (MRS) updates,
test-firing, and other necessary preparations.
Conduct rehearsals and training for upcoming operations.
Conduct PCCs and PCIs.
Eat, rest, and conduct personal hygiene activities.

Normally, the platoon occupies an assembly area as part of a company team or troop. The team or troop
may be adjacent to or independent of the task force or squadron (see Figures 5-3A and 5-3B). The company or
troop commander assigns a sector of responsibility and weapons orientations for each platoon. If the platoon
occupies an assembly area alone, it establishes a perimeter defense (explained later in this chapter).

Figure 5-3A. Assembly area adjacent to other company teams.

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Figure 5-3B. Company team assembly area independent of the task force.

OCCUPATION BY FORCE
In some cases, a company or troop will occupy an assembly area without first sending out a quartering
party. During this occupation by force, the platoon leader orders a hasty occupation of a BP at the platoons
designated location. He establishes local security, directs adjacent unit coordination, begins troop-leading
procedures, and establishes priorities of work.

SECTION 3 - ACTIONS AT A CONTACT POINT

Actions at a contact point entail the meeting of friendly ground forces. It may occur in, but is not limited
to, the following situations:

Advancing forces reaching an objective area previously secured by air assault or airborne forces.
Units conducting coordination for a relief in place.
Cross-attached units moving to join their new organization.
A tank platoon moving forward during a follow and support mission with dismounted infantry or
scouts.

A unit moving to assist an encircled force.

Platoons conduct actions at a contact point independently or as part of a larger force. Within a larger unit,
the tank platoon may lead the linkup force. The linkup consists of three phases; the following actions are
critical to the execution of a speedy, safe operation:

Phase 1 - Far recognition signal.

During this phase, the two units should establish

communications before they reach direct fire range. The lead element of the linkup force should
monitor the radio frequency of the other friendly force.

Phase 2 - Coordination and movement to the linkup point. The forces coordinate the
following information:

Known enemy situation.

Type and number of friendly vehicles.
Disposition of stationary forces (if either unit is stationary).
Routes to the linkup point.

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Fire control measures.

Near recognition signal.
Finalized location for the linkup point.
Any special coordination, such as maneuver instructions or requests for medical support.

Phase 3 - Linkup. The units enforce strict fire control measures to help prevent fratricide. If

both units are moving, the controlling headquarters designates a location in the formation for the
subordinate unit. If one unit is stationary, the moving unit moves through the linkup point to a
predetermined location.

SECTION 4 - CONVOY ESCORT

This mission requires the tank platoon to provide the convoy with security and close-in protection from
direct fire while on the move. The platoon is well suited for this role because of its vehicles mobility,
firepower, and armor protection against mines and direct and indirect fires. Depending on a variety of factors
(size of the convoy, escort assets available, METT-TC factors), the platoon may perform convoy escort either
independently or as part of a larger units convoy security mission.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Battle command is especially critical because of the task organization of the convoy escort mission. The
relationship between the platoon and the convoy commander must provide for unity of command and effort if
combat operations are required during the course of the mission. In most cases, the tank platoon will execute
the escort mission under control of the security force commander, who is usually OPCON or attached to the
convoy commander. At times, however, the platoon will be OPCON or attached directly to the convoy
commander. This occurs when the platoon is providing security for tactical operations centers (TOC) or when it
is operating independently with a small convoy.
The convoy commander should issue a complete OPORD to all vehicle commanders in the convoy prior
to execution of the mission. This is vital because the convoy may itself be task organized from a variety of
units and because some vehicles may not have tactical radios. The order should follow the standard fiveparagraph OPORD format, but special emphasis should be placed on the following subjects:

Route of march (with a strip map provided for each vehicle commander).
Order of march.
Actions at halts.
Actions in case of vehicle breakdown.
Actions on contact.
Chain of command.
Communications and signal information.
TACTICAL DISPOSITION
During all escort missions, the convoy security commander and tank platoon leader must establish and
maintain security in all directions and throughout the length of the convoy. They can adjust the disposition of
the platoon, either as a unit or dispersed, to fit the security requirements of each particular situation. As noted,
several factors, including convoy size and METT-TC, affect this disposition. Perhaps the key consideration is
whether the platoon is operating as part of larger escort force or is executing the escort mission independently.

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Large-scale escort missions

When sufficient escort assets are available, the convoy commander will usually organize the convoy into
three distinct elements: advance guard, close-in protective group, and rear guard. Figure 5-4 shows a convoy in
which the tank platoon is part of a company team-size escort force.
The tank platoon will normally be task organized to operate within the close-in protective group. This
element provides immediate, close-in protection for the vehicle column, with escort vehicles positioned either
within the column or on the flanks. The convoy commanders vehicle is located within this group.
The advance guard reconnoiters and proofs the convoy route. It searches for signs of enemy activity, such
as ambushes and obstacles. Within its capabilities, it attempts to clear the route and provides the convoy
commander with early warning before the arrival of the vehicle column. In some cases, an individual tank
platoon vehicle, a section, or the entire platoon may be designated as part of the advance guard. The platoon
leader may also be required to attach a tank with a mine plow or mine roller to this element.
The rear guard follows the convoy. It provides security in the area behind the main body of the vehicle
column, often moving with medical and recovery assets. Again, an individual vehicle, a section, or the entire
tank platoon may be part of this element.
NOTE:

The convoy commander may also designate the tank platoon as part of a reserve (reaction) force for
additional firepower in the event of enemy contact. The reserve will either move with the convoy or
be located at a staging area close enough to provide immediate interdiction against the enemy.

When the platoon is deployed as a unit during a large-scale escort operation, it can provide forward, flank,
or rear close-in security. In such situations, it executes tactical movement based on the factors of METT-TC.
Figures 5-5A through 5-5C show the platoon using various formations while performing escort duties as a unit.

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Figure 5-4. Tank platoon as part of a larger escort force.

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Figure 5-5A. Platoon performing forward security for a convoy.

Figure 5-5B. Platoon performing flank security for a convoy.

Figure 5-5C. Platoon performing rear security for a convoy.

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Independent escort operations

When the tank platoon executes a convoy escort mission independently, the convoy commander and
platoon leader will disperse the tanks throughout the convoy formation to provide forward, flank, and rear
security. Whenever possible, wingman tanks should maintain visual contact with their leaders. Tanks equipped
with mine plows or mine rollers (and engineer assets, if available) should be located near the front to respond to
obstacles. At times, these assets may be required to move ahead of the convoy, acting as the reconnaissance
element or moving with scouts to proof the convoy route. Figure 5-6 illustrates this kind of escort operation.

Figure 5-6. Platoon performing convoy escort independently.

In some independent escort missions, variations in terrain along the route may require the platoon to
operate using a modified traveling overwatch technique. Figure 5-7 illustrates such a situation. It shows one
section leading the convoy while the other trails the convoy. Dispersion between vehicles in each section is
sufficient to provide flank security. Depending on the terrain, the trail section may not be able to overwatch the
movement of the lead section.

Figure 5-7. Platoon escort using modified traveling overwatch.

ACTIONS ON CONTACT
As the convoy moves toward its new location, the enemy may attempt to harass or destroy it. This
contact will usually occur in the form of an ambush, often with the use of a hastily prepared obstacle. The
safety of the convoy then rests on the speed and effectiveness with which escort elements can execute
appropriate actions on contact.
Based on the factors of METT-TC, portions of the convoy security force, such as the tank platoon or a
tank section, may be designated as a reaction force. The reaction force performs its escort duties, conducts
tactical movement, or occupies an assembly area as required until enemy contact occurs; it then is given a
reaction mission by the convoy commander.

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Actions at an ambush
An ambush is one of the most effective ways to interdict a convoy. Conversely, reaction to an ambush
must be immediate, overwhelming, and decisive. Actions on contact must be planned for and rehearsed so they
can be executed as a drill by all escort and convoy elements, with care taken to avoid fratricide.
In almost all situations, the platoon will take several specific, instantaneous actions when it must react to
an ambush. These steps, illustrated in Figures 5-8A and 5-8B, include the following:

As soon as they acquire an enemy force, the escort vehicles action toward the enemy (see Figure

5-8A). They seek covered positions between the convoy and the enemy and suppress the enemy
with the highest possible volume of fire permitted by the ROE. Contact reports are sent to higher
headquarters as quickly as possible.

The convoy commander retains control of the convoy vehicles and continues to move them along
the route at the highest possible speed (see Figure 5-8A).

Convoy vehicles, if they are armed, may return fire only if the escort has not positioned itself
between the convoy and the enemy force.

The platoon leader or the convoy commander may request that any damaged or disabled vehicles
be abandoned and pushed off the route (see Figure 5-8B).

The escort leader (in the example included here, this is the tank platoon leader) uses SPOTREPs

to keep the convoy security commander informed. If necessary, the escort leader or the convoy
security commander can then request support from the reaction force; he can also call for and
adjust indirect fires.

Figure 5-8A. Convoy escort actions toward ambush.

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Figure 5-8B. Convoy continues to move.

Once the convoy is clear of the kill zone, the escort element executes one of the following COAs based on
the composition of the escort and reaction forces, the commanders intent, and the strength of the enemy force:

Continue to suppress the enemy as combat reaction forces move to support (see Figure 5-9A).
Assault the enemy (see Figure 5-9B).
Break contact and move out of the kill zone (see Figure 5-9C).
In most situations, tanks will continue to suppress the enemy or execute an assault. Contact should be
broken only with the approval of the tank platoons higher commander.

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Figure 5-9A. Escort suppresses the ambush to facilitate

attack by the reaction force.

Figure 5-9B. Escort assaults the ambush force.

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Figure 5-9C. Escort breaks contact.

Actions at an obstacle
Obstacles are a major threat to convoys. Obstacles can be used to harass the convoy by delaying it; if the
terrain is favorable, the obstacle may be able to stop the convoy altogether. In addition, obstacles may canalize
or stop the convoy to set up an enemy ambush.
The purpose of the route reconnaissance ahead of a convoy is to identify obstacles and either breach them
or find bypasses. In some cases, however, the enemy or its obstacles may avoid detection by the reconnaissance
element. If this happens, the convoy must take actions to reduce or bypass the obstacle.
When an obstacle is identified, the convoy escort faces two problems: reducing or bypassing the obstacle
and maintaining protection for the convoy. Security becomes critical, and actions at the obstacle must be
accomplished very quickly. The convoy commander must assume that the obstacle is overwatched and covered
by the enemy. To reduce the time the convoy is halted and thus to reduce its vulnerability, the following actions
should occur when the convoy escort encounters a point-type obstacle:

The lead element identifies the obstacle and directs the convoy to make a short halt and establish

security. The convoy escort overwatches the obstacle (see Figure 5-10) and requests that the
breach force move forward.

The convoy escort maintains 360-degree security of the convoy and provides overwatch as the
breach force reconnoiters the obstacle in search of a bypass.

Once all reconnaissance is complete, the convoy commander determines which of the following
COAs he will take:

Bypass the obstacle.

Breach the obstacle with the assets on hand.
Breach the obstacle with reinforcing assets.

The convoy security commander relays a SPOTREP higher and requests support by combat

reaction forces, engineer assets (if they are not part of the convoy), and/or aerial reconnaissance
elements.

Artillery units are alerted to be prepared to provide fire support.

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Figure 5-10. Convoy escort overwatches an obstacle.

Tanks equipped with mine plows are ideal for breaching most obstacles encountered during convoy escort
missions. If the convoy escort is required to breach limited obstacles using plow tanks, the platoon leader must
maintain the security of the convoy, ensuring that adequate support forces are in place to overwatch the breach
operation.

ACTIONS DURING HALTS

During a short halt, the convoy escort remains at REDCON-1 regardless of what actions the convoy
vehicles are taking. (NOTE: Refer to Appendix D of this manual for more information on REDCON levels.)
If the halt is for any reason other than an obstacle, the following actions should be taken:

The convoy commander signals the short halt and transmits the order via tactical radio. All vehicles in
the convoy assume a herringbone formation.

If possible, escort vehicles are positioned up to 100 meters beyond the convoy vehicles, which
are just clear of the route (see Figure 5-11A). Escort vehicles remain at REDCON-1, but
establish local security based on the factors of METT-TC.

When the order is given to move out, convoy vehicles reestablish the movement formation,
leaving space for escort vehicles (see Figure 5-11B).

Once the convoy is in column, local security elements (if used) return to their vehicles, and the
escort vehicles rejoin the column (see Figure 5-11C).

When all elements are in column, the convoy resumes movement.

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Figure 5-11A. Convoy assumes herringbone formation.

Figure 5-11B. Convoy moves back into column formation.

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Figure 5-11C. Convoy escort vehicles rejoin column.

SECTION 5 - PASSAGE OF LINES

The tank platoon participates in a passage of lines, in which one unit moves through the stationary
positions of another, as part of a larger force. If it is part of the stationary force, the platoon occupies defensive
positions and assists the passing unit. If it is part of a passing unit, the platoon executes tactical movement
through the stationary unit. A passage may be forward or rearward, depending on whether the passing unit is
moving toward (forward) or away from (rearward) an enemy unit or area of operations.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Units are highly vulnerable during a passage of lines. Vehicles may be concentrated, and fires may be
masked. The passing unit may not be able to maneuver and react to enemy contact.
Detailed reconnaissance and coordination are critical in overcoming these potential problems and
ensuring the passage of lines is conducted quickly and smoothly. The commander normally conducts all
necessary reconnaissance and coordination for the passage. At times, he may designate the XO, 1SG, or a
platoon leader to conduct liaison duties for reconnaissance and coordination. The following items of
information are coordinated (an asterisk indicates items that should be confirmed by reconnaissance):

Unit designation and composition, including type and number of passing vehicles.
Passing unit arrival time(s).
Location of attack positions or assembly areas. *
Current enemy situation.
Stationary units mission and plan (to include OP, patrol, and obstacle locations). *
Location of contact points, passage points, and passage lanes.

(NOTE: The use of

GPS/POSNAV waypoints will simplify this process and, as a result, speed the passage.) *

Guide requirements.
Order of march.

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Anticipated and possible actions on enemy contact.

Supporting direct and indirect fires, including location of the restrictive fire line (RFL). *
NBC conditions.
Available CS and CSS assets and their locations. *
Communications information (to include frequencies, digital data, and near and far recognition
signals).

Chain of command, including location of the battle handover line (BHL).

Additional procedures for the passage.
CONDUCTING A PASSAGE OF LINES
Forward passage of lines
For a forward passage, the passing unit first moves to an assembly area or an attack position behind the
stationary unit. Designated liaison personnel move forward to link up with guides and confirm coordination
information with the stationary unit. Guides then lead the passing elements through the passage lane.
As the passing unit, the tank platoon conducts tactical movement to maximize its battle space within the
limitations of the passage lane. Radio traffic is kept to a minimum. Disabled vehicles are bypassed. The
platoon holds its fire until it passes the RFL. Once clear of passage lane restrictions, the platoon conducts
tactical movement in accordance with its orders.

Rearward passage of lines

Because of the increased chance of fratricide during a rearward passage, coordination of recognition
signals and direct fire restrictions is critical. The passing unit contacts the stationary unit while it is still beyond
direct fire range and conducts coordination as discussed previously. RFLs and near recognition signals are
emphasized.
As the passing unit, the tank platoon then continues tactical movement toward the passage lane. Gun
tubes are oriented on the enemy, and the platoon is responsible for its own security until it passes the RFL. If
guides are provided by the stationary unit, the passing unit may conduct a short halt to link up and coordinate
with them. The platoon moves quickly through the passage lane to a designated location behind the stationary
unit.

ASSISTING A PASSAGE OF LINES

As noted, the tank platoon provides this assistance while it is in stationary defensive positions. This can
occur after the platoon has consolidated on an objective or has occupied a BP. Coordinating instructions may
be in the form of a company or troop OPORD or a FRAGO issued over the radio. The platoon leader may or
may not have coordinated directly with the passing unit.
The platoon leader ensures that the platoon understands the points of coordination listed previously in this
section. If the platoon is to provide guides to assist the passing unit, he selects the personnel and briefs them on
the points of coordination. The guides are responsible for linking up with and guiding the passing unit through
the passage lane and for closing obstacles as necessary.
Control of direct fires is a critical role for the element that is assisting the passage of lines. In a forward
passage, the stationary unit engages known enemy targets until the passing unit moves past the RFL (sometimes

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designated as the BHL). During a rearward passage, the passing unit contacts the stationary unit by radio at a
point beyond the direct fire range of weapon systems. The stationary unit then holds all fires until the passing
unit reaches the RFL.

SECTION 6 - BREACHING OPERATIONS

Obstacle breaching entails the employment of a combination of TTP and equipment to project combat
power to the far side of an obstacle. The platoon leader must understand the challenges presented by various
types of obstacles and the capabilities and limitations of the assets the platoon and its parent unit can employ to
defeat them. He must further understand the basic tenets of breaching operations and roles the platoon may be
tasked to play in a breach. FM 3-34.1 (FM 90-13-1) contains a more detailed discussion of breaching
operations and enemy obstacle employment.

TYPES OF OBSTACLES
Obstacles are any obstructions that stop, delay, divert, or restrict movement. They are usually covered by
observation and enhanced by direct or indirect fires. This discussion examines the two categories of obstacles.

Existing obstacles
These are already present on the battlefield and are not emplaced through military effort. They fall into
two major classifications:

Natural obstacles, which include these types:

Ravines, gullies, gaps, or ditches over 3 meters wide.
Streams, rivers, or canals over 1 meter deep.
Mountains or hills with a slope in excess of 60 percent (30 degrees).
Lakes, swamps and marshes over 1 meter deep.
Tree stumps and large rocks over 18 inches high.
Forests or jungles with trees 8 inches or more in diameter and with less than 4 meters of space
between trees on a slope.

Man-made obstacles, which include built-up areas such as towns, cities, or railroad
embankments.

Reinforcing obstacles
Placed on the battlefield through military effort, these are designed to slow, stop, or canalize the enemy.
Whenever possible, both friendly and enemy forces will enhance the effectiveness of their reinforcing obstacles
by tying them in with existing obstacles. The following discussion focuses on several types of reinforcing
obstacles.
Minefields. The minefield is the most common reinforcing obstacle the platoon will encounter on the
battlefield. It is easier and quicker to emplace than other obstacles and can be very effective in destroying
vehicles. The minefield may be emplaced in several ways: by hand, by air or artillery delivery using
scatterable mines, or by mechanical means (the Volcano system). It can be used separately or in conjunction
with other obstacles; refer to Figure 5-12 for possible minefield locations.

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Figure 5-12. Potential minefield locations.

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Figure 5-12. Potential minefield locations (continued).

Antitank ditch. The antitank ditch, illustrated in Figure 5-13, may be reinforced with wire and/or mines to
make it more complex and more difficult for the attacker to overcome. In addition, soil from the ditch can be
built up into a berm on the emplacing unit side.

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Figure 5-13. Antitank ditch.

Road craters. These can be rapidly emplaced and are especially effective where restricted terrain on the sides
of a road or trail prevents a bypass (refer to Figure 5-14). Craters are at least 1.5 meters in depth and 6 meters
in diameter and are usually supplemented with mines and/or wire.

Figure 5-14. Road craters.

Abatis. An abatis provides an effective barrier against vehicle movement. Trees are felled either by sawing or
by use of explosives; the cut is made at least 1.5 meters above the ground, with the main trunks crisscrossed and
pointed toward the enemy at approximately a 45-degree angle. The abatis is usually about 75 meters in depth
and ideally is located on trails where there is no bypass; the trunk of each tree should remain attached to the
stump to form an obstacle on the flanks of the abatis (see Figure 5-15). Abatises are usually mined or boobytrapped.

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Figure 5-15. Abatis.

Log crib. A log crib is a framework of tree trunks or beams filled with dirt and rock (see Figure 5-16). It is
used to block roads or paths in wooded and mountainous terrain.

Figure 5-16. Log crib.

Wire obstacles. These provide an effective and flexible antipersonnel barrier; they are frequently employed
on dismounted avenues of approach in the form of tanglefoot, double- or triple-strand concertina, and fourstrand fences. Employed in depth or in conjunction with mines, wire obstacles are also very effective against
tanks and similar vehicles (see Figure 5-17). A single wire obstacle, however, will have little effect on armored
vehicles; the sprocket of M1-series tanks is designed to cut wire.

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Figure 5-17. Wire obstacle in depth.

Tank wall and tank berm. These obstacles are constructed of dirt and rock to slow or canalize enemy tanks.
They can also create belly shots for the defender while the attacker is unable to engage (see Figure 5-18).

Figure 5-18. Belly shot created by a tank berm.

BREACHING PROCEDURES
Breaching operations entail the coordinated efforts of three task organized elements: the support force,
the breach force, and the assault force. The discussion in this section covers the actions and responsibilities of
these elements as well as the tank platoons role in the operation.

SOSRA steps
The following actions, known by the abbreviation SOSRA, occur during a breaching operation:

Sufficient support elements are employed to suppress enemy elements that are overwatching the
obstacle. The support force uses direct and indirect fires to accomplish its mission.

The support force requests immediate or preplanned smoke to obscure the enemy and prevent
observation of the breach operation.

The breach force must organize in such a manner as to secure the reduction area to prevent the
enemy from interfering with the obstacle reduction.

The breach force takes actions to reduce the obstacle and allow follow-on forces to assault
enemy forces beyond the obstacle after the lane is proofed and marked.

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Breaching organization
The commander in charge of the breaching operation will designate support, breach, and assault forces.
He may task the tank platoon to serve in any of these elements, as detailed in the following discussion.
Support force. This element usually leads movement of the breach elements. After identifying the obstacle,
it moves to covered and concealed areas and establishes support by fire positions. The support force leader
sends a voice or digital SPOTREP to the commander. This report must describe the location and complexity of
the obstacle, the composition of enemy forces that are overwatching the obstacle, and the location of possible
bypasses. The commander decides whether to maneuver to a bypass or to breach the obstacle. (NOTE: He
must keep in mind that a bypass may lead to an enemy kill zone.)
In either case, the support force suppresses any enemy elements that are overwatching the obstacle to
allow the breach force to breach or bypass the obstacle. The support force should be in position to request
suppressive artillery fires and smoke for obscuration. As the breach and assault forces execute their missions,
the support force lifts or shifts supporting fires. Because the enemy is likely to engage the support force with
artillery, the support force must be prepared to move to alternate positions while maintaining suppressive fires.
Breach force. The breach force receives a voice or digital SPOTREP identifying the location of the obstacle
or bypass. It then must organize internally to fulfill these responsibilities:

Provide local security for the breach site as necessary.

Conduct the actual breach. The breach force creates, proofs, and marks a lane through the
obstacle or secures the bypass.

Move through the lane to provide local security for the assault force on the far side of the
obstacle. In some instances, the breach force may move to hull-down firing positions that allow
it to suppress enemy elements overwatching the obstacle. At other times, it may assault the
enemy, with suppressive fires provided by the support force.

Breaching methods. The tank platoon can create a lane by itself if it is equipped with the assets
required to breach the type of obstacle encountered. If the platoon does not have this capability, it may be
required to provide close-in protection for attached engineers with breaching assets. Three breaching methods
are available to the platoon:

Mechanical breaching, usually with mine plows or mine rakes.

Explosive breaching, employing such means as the mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC), M173
line charge, or 1/4-pound blocks of TNT.

Manual breaching, with soldiers probing by hand or using such items as grappling hooks,
shovels, picks, axes, and chain saws. Manual breaching is the least preferred method for the tank
platoon.

NOTE:

In extreme cases, the commander may order the platoon to force through an obstacle. This technique
requires the breach force to move in column formation through the obstacle location. If available, a
disabled vehicle can be pushed ahead of the lead breach vehicle in an attempt to detonate mines.

Creating and proofing the lane. The mine plow is the breaching device most commonly employed
by the tank platoon. The battalion or company commander may allocate one to three plows per platoon. When
properly equipped and supported, the platoon can create up to two lanes through an obstacle.
Plow tanks lead the breach force. Immediately following them are vehicles that proof the lane; these are
usually tanks equipped with mine rollers. This process ensures that the lane is clear. (NOTE: If the location
and/or dimensions of the obstacle are unknown, the platoon leader may choose to lead with tanks equipped with
mine rollers to identify the beginning of the obstacle.)

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If the platoon is allocated one plow, the PSGs wingman normally serves as the breach tank. The PSG
follows immediately behind to proof the lane and provide overwatch. The platoon leaders section follows the
PSG.
If the platoon has two or more plows, it can create multiple lanes, usually 75 to 100 meters apart. The
wingman tanks are normally equipped with the plows, with the section leaders tanks following to proof the
lanes and provide overwatch (see Figure 5-19).

Figure 5-19. Plow tanks create multiple lanes

while the section leaders tanks provide overwatch.
Marking the lane. After the lane is created and proofed, it can then be marked to ensure safe
movement by vehicles and personnel; this is critical for follow-on forces that may not know the exact location
of the cleared lane. Distinctive markers must show where the lane begins and ends. A visible line down the
center is effective. Another technique is to mark both sides of the breached lane. Figure 5-20 shows a sample
marking method. To minimize the necessary breaching time, the proofing vehicle may simultaneously mark the
lane. Unit SOPs will dictate marking methods and materials, which commonly include the following:

Cleared lane mechanical marking system (CLAMMS).

Pathfinder system.
Engineer stakes with tape.
Guides.
Chem lights.
Expended shell casings.

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Figure 5-20. Sample technique for obstacle lane marking.

Completing the breach. Throughout the operation, the platoon leader provides continuous updates of
the breach forces progress to higher headquarters and other elements involved in the breach. He also
coordinates with the support force for suppressive fires.
After marking is complete, the platoon leader uses voice and digital systems to report the location of the
lane and the method of marking to expedite the movement of the assault force. Digital overlays enable units to
move quickly to the breach lanes using the POSNAV or GPS. (NOTE: The assault force will often move
behind the breach force and closely follow the breach vehicles through the new lane.)
Assault force. While the breach is in progress, the assault force assists the support force or follows the
breach force while maintaining cover and dispersion. Once a lane is cleared through the obstacle, the assault
force moves through the breach. It secures the far side of the obstacle by physical occupation and/or continues
the attack in accordance with the commanders intent.
Tank units, including the tank platoon, are ideally suited for assault force operations against mobile
enemy defenses in open terrain. Tanks also work well with mechanized infantry as an assault force attacking
dug-in enemy positions in close terrain.

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SECTION 7 - FOLLOW AND SUPPORT

The tank platoon conducts follow and support missions when the enemy situation is extremely fluid or
unknown. Normally, it executes the mission in support of dismounted infantry or scout platoons. On rare
occasions, the platoon will follow and support other tank platoons or mechanized forces.
During the follow phase of the mission, the platoon conducts tactical movement or occupies hasty BPs
while the lead (supported) element moves. There is no requirement to overwatch the movement of the lead
element. In fact, this could be counterproductive; for example, the noise of a tank platoon that is following too
closely could alert the enemy to the presence of the supported scout platoon or dismounted infantry. The tank
platoon does, however, maintain a high degree of situational understanding. It maintains communications with
the lead element, either by transmitting on a higher net or by monitoring the supported units net.
When the lead element makes contact with an enemy force it cannot destroy or bypass, it requests the
support of the tank platoon to destroy or suppress the enemy. Based on the request, the platoon conducts linkup
and coordination, then executes an offensive COA as discussed in Chapter 3 of this manual. Appendix C
contains additional information on light/heavy operations involving the tank platoon and dismounted (light)
infantry.

SECTION 8 - PERIMETER DEFENSE

The purpose of the perimeter defense is to protect the force or hold key terrain when the force is not tied
in with adjacent units. It is generally conducted in the same manner as a defense from a BP (hasty or deliberate)
except that it orients on a full 360-degree sector, normally through use of the coil formation. (NOTE: For
information on the coil formation, refer to the discussion of tactical movement in Chapter 3 of this manual.)
Common situations for the use of the perimeter defense include the following:

Defense of assembly areas.

Defense of specific installations, sites, or equipment (such as a TOC, downed aircraft, tactical
bridge, or roadblock).

Defense of key terrain (such as a bridge, hilltop, pickup zone, or landing zone).
When a unit has been isolated or bypassed by the enemy.
As part of a larger forces perimeter defense; examples include the defense of lodgment areas,
airfields, or assembly areas.

The tank platoon will normally execute a perimeter defense while attached to company- or battalion-size
dismounted infantry units. The platoon may also establish a perimeter defense when it is operating alone and
requires 360-degree security, such as during screen missions or while occupying platoon hide positions.
Considerations for the execution of a perimeter defense include the following:

One section or the entire platoon orients on the most likely mounted avenues of approach.
A section or the entire platoon may occupy an assembly area within the perimeter as a reserve or
reaction force. Missions of this force include the following:

Moving to BPs that block potential areas of enemy penetration.

Conducting counterattacks to repel or destroy an enemy penetration.
Moving to BPs that add firepower to a portion of the defense.

To avoid disrupting other fighting positions, the platoon must carefully coordinate, reconnoiter,
and conduct rehearsals on mounted movement routes to positions within the perimeter.

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Tanks must never fire over the heads of unprotected personnel. The concussion of the main gun
as well as discarded sabot petals can endanger these troops.

Close coordination with dismounted infantry is critical. The tank platoon must know the
location and routes of dismounted OPs and patrols to help prevent fratricide. Additionally, the
platoon must rely on dismounted infantry to provide security against enemy infiltration of the
perimeter as well as close-in protection from dismounted enemy attacks.

SECTION 9 - SCREEN
The screen is a common security mission for cavalry troops and company teams. Cavalry troops conduct
stationary or moving flank screens. Company teams usually establish screen lines (for counterreconnaissance
purposes) in front of a task force as part of a defense. Purposes of the screen include the following:

Provide early warning of enemy approach.

Provide real-time information, reaction time, and maneuver space to the protected force.
Impede and harass the enemy.
Facilitate counterreconnaissance operations, allowing the screening force, within its capability,
to destroy enemy reconnaissance elements.

During stationary screens, the tank platoon will normally occupy a hide position or a hasty defensive
position in depth behind OPs. The OPs are provided by scout or mechanized infantry platoons. When the OPs
identify the enemy, the commander issues FRAGOs for the tank platoon to conduct tactical movement and
occupy a hasty defensive position or an attack by fire position; the platoon also may conduct a hasty attack to
destroy the enemy. At times, the tank platoon may occupy a hasty BP as part of the screen line, acquiring and
killing the enemy forward of the position. During the conduct of a stationary screen, the tank platoon may be
required to break contact or conduct a withdrawal and then execute a passage of lines. These tasks are
discussed in other sections of this chapter.
In a moving flank screen (platoons normally execute this as a follow and support operation, discussed
earlier in this chapter), the tank platoon conducts tactical movement to the rear of scout platoons. It may
periodically occupy hasty BPs. When the scouts identify enemy elements, the commander issues a FRAGO for
the tank platoon to occupy a hasty defensive position or attack by fire position or to conduct a hasty attack to
destroy the enemy.
It is critical that the tank platoon leader keep these considerations in mind during all screen operations:

OPSEC requirements. During screen missions, the platoon may be required to operate apart
from other units.

Location and identification of friendly forces. The platoon leader should know all patrol

routes and OP locations within the platoons battle space. The platoon should maintain voice
and digital (if available) communications with the OPs.

Engagement criteria. To reduce the potential for fratricide, engagement criteria should be as

specific as possible when friendly units operate to the front and flanks of the tank platoon as it
executes a screen mission.

SECTION 10 - DELAY
A delay operation is a continuous series of defensive actions over successive positions in depth. The
purpose is to trade the enemy space for time while retaining freedom of action. Units involved in a delay

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maximize the use of terrain and obstacles, maintaining contact with the enemy but avoiding decisive
engagement. In some instances, local counterattacks are used to assist units during disengagement or to take
advantage of battlefield opportunities.
The tank platoon conducts the delay as part of a company team. In some cases, it will occupy either a
hasty or deliberate BP; it will then disengage and occupy successive BPs in depth as part of the delaying force.
The platoon may also be required to conduct local counterattacks or to support the movement of other platoons
during the delay. The considerations involved in planning and executing a delay at platoon level are the same
as for offensive operations (refer to Chapter 3 of this manual) and defensive operations (refer to Chapter 4).

SECTION 11 - RELIEF IN PLACE

A relief in place occurs when one unit assumes the mission of another unit. It may be accomplished
during either offensive or defensive operations, preferably during periods of limited visibility. There are two
methods by which to conduct a relief in place:

Simultaneous. All elements are relieved simultaneously.

Sequential. The relief takes place one element at a time (by individual vehicle or by section).
A relief in place requires detailed planning, coordination, and reconnaissance before the operation is
executed and precise movement and effective communications once execution begins. OPSEC is critical
throughout the operation.

COORDINATION AND RECONNAISSANCE

When time is available and the situation permits, the incoming platoon leader coordinates with the inplace platoon leader and conducts a reconnaissance to confirm details of the relief. The two leaders should
coordinate and exchange the following information:

The enemy situation and other pertinent intelligence.

The platoons maneuver and fire support plans.
The location of weapons and fighting positions.
Sketch cards and fire plans (including grid locations for input into digital systems).
Details of the relief, to include the sequence, the use of recognition signals and guides, and the
time of change of responsibility for the area.

Procedures for transferring excess ammunition, POL, wire lines, and other materiel to the
incoming unit.

Command and signal information.

Reconnaissance of relief positions is the same as for any BP. The incoming platoon leader should obtain
information on the following:

The engagement area, to include decision points, trigger lines, TRPs, obstacles, and the break
point.

Primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions.

Routes to and within the BP.
Hide positions.
Location of guides.

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RELIEF PROCEDURES
After reconnaissance and coordination are complete, the platoon leaders continue with their troop-leading
procedures and prepare to execute the relief. Initially, the relieving unit moves to an assembly area behind the
unit to be relieved. Final coordination is conducted, and information is exchanged between the two units.
The relieving unit links up with guides or finalizes linkup procedures. Individual vehicles then relieve
forward positions using one of three techniques:

The relieving vehicles occupy primary positions after the relieved unit has moved to alternate
positions. Once OPs are in place, the relieved unit can withdraw.

The relieving vehicles occupy alternate positions while the relieved unit remains in primary

positions. Once OPs are in place, the relieved unit withdraws. The platoon leader then orders
the relieving unit to occupy primary positions as necessary.

The relieving unit occupies a hide position while the relieved unit occupies hide, primary, or
alternate positions. Once OPs are in place, the relieved unit withdraws.

SECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS

As noted, OPSEC is critical in preventing enemy reconnaissance and intelligence assets from identifying
the weaknesses and vulnerabilities that occur during the relief. Net discipline is the key to an effective, and
secure, relief operation. Before beginning the relief, the relieving unit changes to the outgoing units frequency,
and the two units operate on the same net throughout the relief. The incoming unit observes radio listening
silence while the outgoing unit maintains normal radio traffic.
By monitoring the same frequency and maintaining digital links, leaders at all levels have the ability to
contact other units involved in the relief to warn of emergency situations, such as enemy contact. Because of
the proximity of the relieved and relieving elements, however, leaders must remember that the net will be
crowded, with many stations and digital links competing for limited availability of air time.
Once the relief is complete, there are two methods for returning to separate unit frequencies. One
technique is to have the incoming unit switch back to its original frequency. The other is to have the outgoing
unit switch to an alternate frequency. The latter technique offers several advantages:

The relieving unit establishes voice and digital communications and is prepared to defend
immediately upon the exit of the relieved unit.

The relieving unit never loses the digital link (if applicable) as it assumes the new mission. Once

the relief is complete, the relieved unit simply logs off the digital net and switches to an alternate
FM frequency; it can then reestablish a digital link after leaving the relief site.

Maintaining radio traffic on the same frequency before, during, and after the operation will help
deceive the enemy as to whether a relief has occurred.

SECTION 12 - WITHDRAWAL
The purpose of this retrograde operation is to free a force in contact with the enemy so it can execute a
new mission. Conducting a withdrawal at platoon level is identical to disengagement (see the discussion in
Chapter 4 of this manual). The withdrawal may be conducted under pressure (with direct or indirect fire enemy
contact) or with no pressure.

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CHAPTER 6

Combat Support
The tank platoon must take full advantage of available CS assets to accomplish its mission and to reduce
its vulnerability on the battlefield. CS may be provided by mortars, FA, combat engineers, ADA, and aviation
assets. These assets are not organic to the tank platoon, but they may be available to the platoon through its
parent battalion, company, or cavalry troop. The platoon leader must understand the capabilities and limitations
of each CS asset.

CONTENTS
Section 1.
Section 2.
Section 3.
Section 4.
Section 5.

Fire Support .......................................................................................

Army Aviation ....................................................................................
Combat Engineers .............................................................................
Air Defense .........................................................................................
Air Support .........................................................................................

Page
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6-17
6-20
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SECTION 1 - FIRE SUPPORT

Mortars and FA are the primary means of indirect fire support available to tank platoons. In addition to
understanding the capabilities and limitations of these assets, platoon leaders and their TCs must know what fire
request channels to use to request fires. They must also understand how to work with the FIST at company
team/troop level to plan and coordinate indirect fires. FM 3-09.30 (FM 6-30) explains how to call for and
adjust fires.

MORTAR SUPPORT
Mortars afford indirect fire support that is immediately responsive to the tank platoons needs. A 120-mm
mortar platoon of six tubes is organic to armor and mechanized infantry battalions. A 120-mm mortar section is
organic to the armored cavalry troop (two tubes) and divisional cavalry troop (two tubes).

Capabilities
With a maximum effective range of 7,200 meters, 120-mm mortars can provide a heavy volume of
accurate, sustained fires. They are ideal weapons for attacking a variety of targets, including the following:

Infantry in the open.

Targets on reverse slopes.
Targets in narrow ravines or trenches.
Targets in forests, towns, and other areas that are difficult to strike with low-angle fires.

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In addition to these highly flexible targeting options, mortars have the following capabilities and
advantages:

They offer fast response time.

They are effective against low-density targets.
Mortar rounds afford highly destructive target effects.
Limitations
Mortars are limited in the following ways:

Their maximum range is limited in comparison to the indirect fire support capability of FA
elements.

They cannot be used against targets inside their minimum effective range (770 meters from the
mortar tube position).

Only limited types of ammunition are available.

Mortar elements carry limited amounts of ammunition.
Their fire direction center (FDC) and tubes are not linked to the TACFIRE system.
Employment considerations
Mortars can be extremely effective when used for the purposes outlined in the following discussion.
Destruction. High explosive (HE) rounds, mounted with variable-timed (VT) fuzes, can be used to destroy or
disperse dismounted infantry and vehicles that are in the open. HE mortar rounds have the capability to destroy
or disable some armored vehicles.
Suppression.
positions.

HE rounds can be used to force the enemy to button up or move to less advantageous

Smoke. Mortar smoke builds up more rapidly than artillery smoke. White phosphorus (WP) rounds are used
for obscuration and screening. See Appendix E of this manual for detailed information on the use of smoke.
Illumination. Illumination rounds are used to light an area or enemy position during periods of limited
visibility. Illumination can increase the effectiveness of the tank platoons image intensification devices
(passive sights). This helps the platoon in gathering information, adjusting artillery fire, and engaging enemy
targets. Ground-burst illumination can also be used to mark enemy positions and to provide a thermal TRP for
control of fires.
Units must be careful, however, not to illuminate friendly positions. Also, because U.S. night-vision
devices are superior to those of most potential adversaries, illuminating the battlefield may be unnecessary or
even counterproductive.

FIELD ARTILLERY SUPPORT

Tank platoon leaders must fully understand how to use artillery support to their best advantage. It is often
their primary means of impeding and disrupting enemy formations and suppressing enemy positions. FA can
provide immediate, responsive, accurate fires with a wide variety of munitions.

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FA support is normally provided by an artillery battalion in direct support (DS) of a committed maneuver
brigade. Each ground squadron in the armored cavalry regiment (ACR) has its own organic howitzer battery to
provide dedicated indirect fire support. The platoon generally receives FA support through its attached
company or troop FIST.

Capabilities
In support of the tank platoon, FA elements can accomplish the following tasks:

They can be employed to provide immediate suppression on unplanned targets.

Through careful positioning and timely displacement, they can provide continuous fire support
on planned targets in all weather conditions and types of terrain.

They allow commanders and platoon leaders to shift and mass fires rapidly.
They offer a variety of conventional shell and fuze combinations.
They can provide obscuration smoke to conceal movement.
They can fire battlefield illumination rounds as necessary.
Limitations
FA support has the following limitations:

It has only limited capability against moving targets.

It has limited capability to destroy point targets without considerable ammunition expenditure.
Because of its firing signature, it is highly vulnerable to detection by enemy target acquisition
systems.

Employment considerations for FA munitions

FA elements employ several types of munitions. These can be tailored for the engagement of different
types of targets, as well as for other missions such as smoke and illumination. The following discussion
outlines uses of FA munitions.
High explosive. HE munitions are used against personnel, field fortifications, and vehicles.
White phosphorus. WP is used for obscuration, screening, and burning.
Illumination. Employment of FA illumination rounds is similar to that for mortar rounds. Refer to the
discussion of mortar employment earlier in this section.
Cannon-launched guided projectiles (Copperhead). These rounds are employed against high-priority
point targets.
Improved conventional munitions and dual-purpose improved conventional munitions.
Improved conventional munitions (ICM) are designed for antipersonnel (AP) use. DPICM are employed against
personnel and light armored vehicles in the open. The danger to friendly troops in areas where AP munitions are fired
must be considered. The dud rate of ICM makes maneuver in the area of an ICM field hazardous.
Scatterable mines. These include area denial munitions (ADAM) for use against personnel and remote
antiarmor mines (RAAM) for use against armored vehicles. A mission involving scatterable mines requires the

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support of FA assets up to battery-size; it must be planned and requested with significantly more lead time than
is needed for other FA-delivered munitions.

FIRE SUPPORT TEAM

The FIST is attached to companies or troops for combat operations. It may be pushed forward with a
security force in support of operations when on-target designation is required for special munitions
engagements. The FIST, however, is a valuable resource because of its command and control link with the
artillery; it should not be exposed to direct fire except when absolutely necessary.

Support considerations
FISTs are organized, equipped, and trained to provide the following personnel and support to the
company or troop:

A fire support advisor and coordinator.

A communications link to all available indirect fire support assets.
On-the-spot support for infantry companies (ten-man team) or for armor companies and cavalry
troops (four-man team).

Communications
The armor or mechanized infantry FIST normally monitors the following radio nets:

Attached unit command net (battalion, company team, or troop).

Battalion mortar fire direction net.
DS battalion fire direction net (digital).
Battalion fire support net (voice).
The armored cavalry troop FIST normally monitors these radio nets:

Troop command net.

Troop fire support net.
Supporting artillery fire direction net (digital and voice).
Squadron fire support net.
The FIST serves as the net control station (NCS) on the troop fire support net, while the fire support
element (FSE) serves as the NCS on the maneuver battalion fire support net. The FIST relays calls for fire to
supporting artillery on a digital net (TACFIRE) or sends the fire mission to the mortar platoon or section. The
command net allows the FIST to monitor operations and links the FIST to the commander and platoon leaders
for planning and coordination.

FIST vehicle
The FIST usually rides in and operates from the M981, known as the FIST-V. Refer to Figure 6-1 for an
illustration.

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Figure 6-1. Fire support team vehicle.

FIRE REQUEST CHANNELS

In a tank company, all requests for indirect fire support are normally sent through the FIST on the
company or troop command net. The commander approves the request using a prearranged method (oral
approval or silence). The FIST selects the best available fire support asset to engage the target. Adjustments of
the fire mission normally are also sent to the FIST, which then relays the message to the artillery unit on a
digital fire direction net or to the battalion mortars on the fire support net. In cavalry troops, the FIST may pass
the fire mission to the troop mortars; all adjustments are sent directly to the mortars.
Besides specific requests sent to the FIST, the platoon can obtain fire support in several other ways:

Calls for fire can result from SPOTREPs sent on the company or troop command net; the
company FIST eavesdrops on the net and requests fires on targets of opportunity and on targets
approved by the commander.

Requests for fire can be tagged onto preformatted SPOTREPs and contact reports sent via
IVIS or FBCB2. The TC presses the button for request fire, immediate suppression, or
immediate smoke when sending an IVIS or FBCB2 report (see Figures 6-2 and 6-3).

Requests for fire support can be entered directly into the TACFIRE system using IVIS or

FBCB2. Using the digital system, the platoon leader can exit a communications net and link into
the TACFIRE system. Once the request is complete, the platoon leader exits the TACFIRE
system and reenters the units net. Unit SOP will dictate the use of this TACFIRE capability; see
FKSM 17-15-3 for details.

Figure 6-2. IVIS SPOTREP (immediate suppression request).

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Figure 6-3. FBCB2 SPOTREP (immediate suppression request).

FIRE DIRECTION AND CONTROL PROCEDURES

Initial call for fire
The standard call for fire consists of three basic transmissions, which in turn comprise six elements:

Observer identification and warning order (first transmission).

Target location (second transmission).
Target description, method of engagement, and method of fire and control (third transmission).
Observer identification and warning order (first transmission). Observer identification tells the FDC
who is calling. It also clears the net for the duration of the call. The warning order tells the FDC the type of
mission and the method of locating the target. The types of indirect fire missions are the following:

Adjust fire. This is used when the observer is uncertain of the exact target location. The
observer says, ADJUST FIRE.

Fire for effect. The observer should always attempt first-round fire for effect if he is sure his

target location is correct. He should also be sure the rounds of the first volley will have the
desired effect on the target so little or no adjustment will be required. The observer announces,
FIRE FOR EFFECT. (NOTE: On IVIS- or FBCB2-equipped vehicles, properly updated
POSNAV data and an accurate lase to the target provide extremely accurate target designation
capability. This enables observers to call FIRE FOR EFFECT on the first transmission.)

Suppression. The word SUPPRESS is used to quickly bring fire on a preplanned target. This
is a simplified call for fire and is sent in one transmission. Example: G24 THIS IS G59
SUPPRESS AF2401 OVER. Target description is not announced.

Immediate suppression. This is used to bring fire quickly on a planned target or a target of
opportunity that is firing at a friendly unit or aircraft. As an example, the observer says, G24
THIS IS G57 IMMEDIATE SUPPRESSION AF2402 OVER. Target description is not
announced.

Immediate smoke. This is used to place smoke quickly on a planned target or a target of
opportunity that is firing at a friendly unit. Sample transmission: G24 THIS IS G54
IMMEDIATE SMOKE AF2405 OVER.

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Target location (second transmission). Following the type of mission, the method of target location is
announced; this prepares the FDC to receive the data sent by the observer and apply it to locate the target. The
three methods for locating targets are grid, polar plot, and shift from a known point. The polar and shift
methods are announced to the FDC. If the observer does not specify either polar or shift, the FDC knows the
grid method is being used; the word grid is not announced. Example: H24 THIS IS H67 FIRE FOR
EFFECT POLAR OVER.
Grid method. In the grid method, the target location normally consists of a two-letter grid zone
identifier with six digits (example: AB180739). The direction from the observer to the target (in mils, if
possible) must be given to the FDC after the call for fire, but before the first adjusting rounds are shot.
Polar plot method. This method requires that the observer and the FDC know the observers exact
location. The observer determines the direction (to the nearest 10 mils) of the observer-target (OT) line and the
distance (to the nearest 100 meters) from his position to the target (see Figure 6-4).

Figure 6-4. Polar plot method of target location

Shift from a known point method. This method can be used if the observer and the FDC have a
common known point (see Figure 6-5). Normally, this point is an artillery target. To locate the target, the
observer must first determine the direction to the known point to the nearest 10 mils. If the observer has no
compass, he can determine the direction by using a map and protractor or by using his binocular reticle pattern
and a known direction to the known point. He then determines direction to the target using the RALS rule
(right add, left subtract).

Figure 6-5. Shift from a known point method

using direction (in mils).

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The observer then determines the lateral and range shifts (see Figure 6-6). Lateral shifts are left or right from
the known point to the OT line and are given to the nearest 10 meters. Range shifts are given as ADD (when
the target is beyond the known point) or DROP (when the target is closer than the known point). Range shifts
are given to the nearest 100 meters. FM 3-09.30 (FM 6-30) explains in detail how to determine lateral and
range shifts.

Figure 6-6. Lateral and range shifts from a known point.

Target description, method of engagement, and method of fire and control (third
transmission). The observer includes these elements in his call for fire using the guidelines discussed in the
following paragraphs.
Target description. The observer describes the target to the FDC; see Figure 6-7 for examples. The
FDC then determines the type and amount of ammunition needed. The target description should be brief but
accurate. This is the last required element in the call for fire.

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Figure 6-7. Target description.

Method of engagement. The observer tells how he wants to attack the target (including type of
ammunition, fuze, and distance from friendly troops). The FDC may change the ammunition type and fuze
based on availability or other constraints. If the target is within 600 meters of friendly troops, the observer
announces DANGER CLOSE to supporting mortars and artillery.
Method of fire and control. The observer states who will give the command for fire to begin. If the
observer wants to control the time of firing, he will say, AT MY COMMAND. The FDC will tell the
observer when the unit is ready to fire. At the proper time, the observer will say, FIRE. If the observer does
not say, AT MY COMMAND, the FDC will fire as soon as the platoon or battery is ready.

Adjusting indirect fire

Once the call for fire has been made, the observers next concern is to get the fire on the target. If he can
locate the target accurately, he will request fire for effect in his initial call for fire. When the observer cannot
accurately locate the target for any reason (such as deceptive terrain, lack of identifiable terrain features, or poor
visibility), he must execute an adjustment to get the fire on target. Normally, one artillery piece or mortar is
used in adjustment.
The observer must first pick an adjusting point. For a destruction mission (precision fire), the target is the
adjusting point. For an area target (area fire), the observer must pick a well-defined adjusting point at the center

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of the area or close to it. The observer must spot the first adjusting round and each successive round and send
range and deviation corrections, as required, back to the FDC until fire hits the target. The observer spots by
relating the burst or group of bursts to the adjusting point. For a further discussion of adjusting mortar and
artillery fire, see FM 3-09.30 (FM 6-30).
Deviation spotting. As applied to deviation (left or right), spotting involves measuring the horizontal
angle (in mils) between the burst and the adjusting point (see Figure 6-8). A burst to the right (or left) of
the target is spotted as (number) MILS RIGHT (LEFT).
An angle-measuring device or technique, such as the mil scale on military binoculars or the hand-andfingers method, is required to determine deviation. The reticle in binoculars is shown in Figure 6-9. The
horizontal scale, divided into 10-mil increments, is used for measuring horizontal angles. The vertical scales, in
5-mil increments in the center and on the left side of the reticle, are used for measuring vertical angles. The
scale on the right, if present, is no longer used. The hand-and-fingers technique may be used as shown in
Figure 6-10.

Figure 6-8. Deviation spotting.

Figure 6-9. Mil scale in binocular reticle.

Figure 6-10. Use of hand-and-fingers method to determine deviation.

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A burst on the OT line is spotted as ON LINE. Deviation to the left or right should be measured to the
nearest 5 mils for area targets, with measurements taken from the center of the burst. Deviation for a
destruction mission (precision fire) is estimated to the nearest mil. Figure 6-11 shows the adjusting point at the
center of the binoculars horizontal scale.

Figure 6-11. Deviation spotting with binoculars.

Deviation correction. Once he determines the observed deviation (in mils), the observer must convert it into
a deviation correction (in meters). Deviation correction is the distance in meters the burst must be moved to be
on line between observer and target. It is sent, with the range correction, to the FDC for the next adjusting
round or when calling for fire for effect.
The first step in determining deviation correction is to calculate the OT factor, the distance from the
observer to the target in kilometers. The observer calculates the distance to the target in meters and divides by
1,000; see Figure 6-12 for examples of this process. The precise correction is determined by multiplying the
observed deviation by the OT factor; it is expressed to the nearest 10 meters (see Figure 6-13).

Figure 6-12. Determining the OT factor.

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Figure 6-13. Converting mil deviation to deviation correction.

The observers goal in making the correction is to move the adjusting rounds close enough to the OT line
so that range spotting can be made accurately. Minor deviation corrections (10 to 20 meters) are necessary in
adjustment of precision fire. In adjustment of area fire, however, small deviation corrections (20 meters or less)
should be ignored except when such a small change is necessary to determine a definite range spotting.
Range spotting. Range spotting is the second type of adjustment required to get fire on the target (see Figure
6-14). Any range spotting other than DOUBTFUL or LOST is definite. Usually, an adjusting rounds
burst that is on or near the OT line will give a definite range spotting.

Figure 6-14. Range spotting.

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The observer can sometimes make a definite range spotting even when the burst is not on or near the OT
line. He uses his knowledge of the terrain or wind and observes debris scattered by the explosion. If the
observer is not sure (DOUBTFUL), the correction he sends to the FDC should be for deviation (LEFT or
RIGHT) only. He does this to bring the burst on line so he can get a definite range spotting (OVER,
SHORT, or TARGET).
Range correction. The observer gives range corrections so that, with each successive correction, the adjusting
round intentionally lands over or short of the adjusting point, closing on the target.
Bracketing. In the bracketing technique, fire for effect is called for when a range correction would bring
the next round within 50 meters of the adjusting point. See Figure 6-15. (NOTE: This technique is also called
successive bracketing, as opposed to the faster and less involved technique of hasty bracketing, which is
covered later in this discussion.)

Figure 6-15. Bracketing.

Bracketing is an effective technique in that it is sure to bring fire on the target. Time is important,
especially when targets are moving or may move to seek cover when they find fire coming their way. Accurate
initial location data allow the adjustment to be made more quickly and make the requested fire more effective.
To shorten adjustment time, the observer should try to bracket the target quickly (in the first two or three
adjusting rounds), then adjust on the target using as few subsequent rounds as possible.
Hasty bracketing. Experience has shown that effectiveness on the target decreases as the number of
rounds used in adjustment increases. An alternative to successive bracketing is hasty bracketing. While
successive bracketing mathematically ensures that the fire-for-effect rounds will strike within 50 meters of the
adjusting point, it is a relatively slow and unresponsive technique. Therefore, if the nature of the target dictates
that effective fires are needed faster than successive bracketing can provide them, hasty bracketing should be
used.

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The success of hasty bracketing depends on a thorough terrain analysis that gives the observer an accurate
initial target location. The observer obtains a bracket on his first correction in a manner similar to that used for
successive bracketing. Once the observer has this initial bracket, he uses it as a yardstick to determine his
subsequent correction. He then sends the correction to the FDC so it can adjust the rounds to the target and
employ fire for effect (see Figure 6-16).
Hasty bracketing improves as the observer gains experience and judgment. Every observer must strive to
improve his abilities and increase his responsiveness on the battlefield.

Figure 6-16. Hasty bracketing.

Creeping. The creeping method of adjustment is used in DANGER CLOSE situations. The initial
round is fired beyond the target. Adjusting rounds are moved closer to the target, 50 meters or less at a time,
until the target is engaged (see Figure 6-17). This method is slow and tends to use more ammunition than other
adjustments; therefore, it should be used only when soldier safety is a major concern.

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Figure 6-17. Creeping method of adjustment.

Refinement and surveillance

The observer notes the results of the fire for effect and then takes whatever action is necessary to
complete the mission. Figure 6-18 illustrates various alternatives available to the observer after fire-for-effect
rounds have been fired.

Figure 6-18. Observers actions after fire for effect.

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TANK PLATOON FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

The fire support plan is developed along with the scheme of maneuver, which it supports and
complements. It discusses the use of all available indirect and direct fires. The goal is to destroy as
many enemy elements as possible and to suppress any others to keep them from firing on friendly forces.
The company commander and FSO plan indirect fires; however, the platoon leader may plan and request
more targets if needed.
After receiving the company offensive fire plan, the platoon leader checks it to ensure that targets
are planned on all known or suspected enemy positions in front of, on, behind, and to the flanks of the
objective. The company defensive fire plan should list planned targets in front of, on, behind, and to the
flanks of BPs; likely areas for these targets include observed choke points, avenues of approach,
obstacles, and likely support by fire positions. If more targets are necessary for either the offensive or
defensive plan, the platoon leader coordinates them with the commander and the FIST.

SECTION 2 - ARMY AVIATION

Army aviation assets are important participants on todays battlefield. Their flexibility enables them to
perform a variety of roles: reconnaissance, security, attack, transportation, and resupply. Army aviation is a
divisional asset that may be attached or placed OPCON to brigades, but rarely to lower-level units.

AIR CAVALRY
Air cavalry, found in division and regimental cavalry units, is organized, equipped, and trained to
conduct reconnaissance and security missions. The primary aircraft in air cavalry units is the OH-58D.
This helicopter provides substantial limited-visibility and all-weather acquisition capability. The aircraft
features a stabilized mast-mounted sight (MMS) with a low-light TV camera, TIS, and laser range
finder/designator. It can acquire armored vehicle targets at night at ranges up to 10 kilometers. It can be
armed with a wide assortment of weapons and thus can be configured for a variety of threat situations
(see Figure 6-19).

Figure 6-19. OH-58D armed helicopter.

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ATTACK HELICOPTERS
Attack helicopter units operate either as separate elements within a division or as part of the air cavalry.
Attack helicopter companies are maneuver units and are normally integrated into the ground scheme of
maneuver. When working with ground maneuver units, the attack helicopter unit may be placed OPCON to the
ground force. Normally, it is OPCON to a maneuver brigade or regiment; on rare occasions, it can be OPCON
to a battalion or squadron.
Aeroscouts usually arrive before attack aircraft, establish communications with ground forces, and
coordinate the situation and mission with the commander. The aeroscouts identify targets, choose general BPs,
and control attack helicopter fires.
The attack helicopter is primarily employed as an antiarmor weapon system. Figure 6-20 shows two
types of attack aircraft in the Armys inventory, the AH-64 Apache and the AH-1 Cobra. (NOTE: The Army
is scheduled to field a new helicopter, the RAH-66 Comanche, which will feature both attack and
reconnaissance capabilities.)

Figure 6-20. Army attack helicopters.

SECTION 3 - COMBAT ENGINEERS

Brigade/regiment and battalion/squadron commanders decide how best to employ their engineer assets:
as a distinct unit, attached to their subordinate elements, or in DS of the subordinate elements. In fast-moving
offensive operations, one technique is to place engineers OPCON to the lead company team or troop to support
breaching operations. In the defense, commanders generally keep engineer units intact to construct major
obstacles and execute survivability operations, designating the priority of work to be accomplished. Engineers
are trained to fight as infantry as a secondary mission; however, they are employed as infantry only if absolutely
necessary.

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CAPABILITIES
The combat engineer platoon is organized, trained, and equipped to conduct mobility, countermobility,
and survivability missions in support of ground operations. The higher unit commander determines the
engineers specific tasks and responsibilities in these three roles.

Organization and equipment

Organization. The combat engineer platoon consists of three squads mounted in M113s (see Figure 6-21).
Each squad has a demolition set, chain saw, and two mine detectors. The platoon headquarters is authorized
one M9 ACE, which is highly mobile, armored, and amphibious (see Figure 6-22).

Figure 6-21. Combat engineer platoon organization.

Figure 6-22. M9 armored combat earthmover.

Equipment. The platoon may also be supplemented with equipment from the engineer company, including the
items covered in the following discussion.
Armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) or Wolverine. The AVLB uses an M48 or M60 tank
chassis to transport, launch, and retrieve a 60-foot bridge. The bridge is capable of supporting military load class
(MLC) 70 tracked vehicles across a 15-meter gap (see Figure 6-23). The Wolverine, which will replace the AVLB, is
based on an M1 chassis. It will be able to support MLC 70 traffic across gaps of up to 24 meters.

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MICLIC launcher. The MICLIC system employs a rope-like demolition charge to create lanes for
combat vehicles during minefield breaching operations. The charge, containing nearly a ton of composition C4
explosive, can clear a lane up to 100 meters long and 14 meters wide. The MICLIC launcher can be mounted
either on a towed trailer or on an M60A1 chassis (this vehicle is called the armored vehicle launched MICLIC,
or AVLM). It fires a 5-inch rocket motor that tows the MICLIC over the target minefield (see Figure 6-24).
The system, designed for deployment in virtually all types of terrain and weather conditions, can be reloaded
with a new charge and rocket motor in about 30 minutes.

Figure 6-23. Armored vehicle launched bridge.

Figure 6-24. Mine-clearing line charge system.

Operational considerations
In mobility operations, the engineer platoon can provide the following support:

Obstacle reduction. The engineers can reduce or negate the effects of obstacles, thereby
improving their supported units maneuver capability.

Route construction. The engineers can construct, improve, and maintain roads, bridges, and
fords.

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In a countermobility role, engineers can assist with obstacle construction to obstruct the enemys scheme
of maneuver. They can reinforce terrain and existing obstacles to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the enemy force.
Engineers can improve survivability by constructing dug-in positions and overhead protection to reduce
the effectiveness of enemy weapons.

ENGINEER SUPPORT TO THE TANK PLATOON

Combat engineers normally support the company team as a platoon under the direction of the company
team commander. During planning for mobility, countermobility, and survivability work, the engineers can
advise the commander on construction time and materials needed; the company normally must order much of
the material through battalion supply channels.
The tank platoon leader frequently will be tasked to provide security while the engineer platoon conducts
its missions. To speed up the construction process, the engineers may need the help of armor crewmen.
Additional details on engineer support and employment are in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of this manual.

SECTION 4 - AIR DEFENSE

Air defense assets are scarce; maneuver units cannot always count on receiving dedicated air defense
protection. As a result, the tank platoon must be able to protect itself from enemy air attacks during all combat
operations. Air defense measures include actions to avoid enemy air attack, actions to limit the damage if an
attack occurs, and (as necessary) actions required to fight back.

AIR DEFENSE WARNINGS

Local air defense warnings are used to indicate the air threat. They are used in conjunction with the
weapon control status (discussed in the active air defense portion of this section) to provide early warning of
and planned responses to enemy aircraft. There are three local air defense warning levels:

DYNAMITE. Aircraft are inbound or attacking locally now.

LOOKOUT. Aircraft are in the area of interest but are not threatening. They may be inbound,
but there is time to react.

SNOWMAN. There are no aircraft posing a threat at this time.

NOTE:

Air defense warnings of RED, YELLOW, and WHITE are established at levels higher than division.
These roughly parallel the local warning levels, but they cover a larger area of operations, such as a
theater.

PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE

Passive air defense is the tank platoons first line of defense against enemy air attack. It includes all
measures, other than active defense, taken to minimize the effects of hostile air action. There are two types of
passive air defense: attack avoidance and damage-limiting measures.

Attack avoidance
If an enemy pilot cannot find friendly elements, he cannot attack them. The platoon should use
concealment, camouflage, deception, communications security, and any other necessary action to prevent
enemy detection. Refer to the discussion of OPSEC in Appendix D of this manual.

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Whenever possible, static positions must provide effective overhead concealment. When concealment is
not available, vehicles must be camouflaged to blend into the natural surroundings. Track marks leading into
the position must be obliterated. All shiny objects that could reflect light and attract attention must be covered.

Damage-limiting measures
Dispersion. Dispersion is one of the most effective ways to reduce the effects of enemy air attack. It is
essential when a unit is occupying static positions such as assembly areas or is preparing to cross a water
obstacle or pass through a breached obstacle. When the platoon is on the move and air guards identify an
enemy air attack, vehicles disperse quickly, move to covered and concealed positions if possible, and stop (a
stationary vehicle is more difficult to see than a moving vehicle). Refer to the discussion of the react to air
attack battle drill in Chapter 3 of this manual. An early warning system that includes both visual and audible
signals can help to limit damage by enabling the platoon to begin dispersion at the earliest possible moment.
Cover. Another damage-limiting measure is the use of natural or man-made cover to reduce the effects of
enemy munitions. Folds in the earth, depressions, buildings, and sandbagged positions can provide this
protection.

ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE

Although passive measures are the first line of defense against air attack, the tank platoon must be
prepared to engage enemy aircraft. The decision to fight back against an air threat is based on the situation and
the capabilities of organic weapon systems. All platoon members must understand that they can defend against
a direct attack but cannot engage aircraft that are not attacking them unless the weapon control status allows it.

Weapon control status

The weapon control status describes the relative degree of control in effect for air defense fires. It applies
to all weapon systems. The platoon leader receives the status from the company or troop commander. The
three control statuses are the following:

WEAPONS FREE. Crews can fire at any air target not positively identified as friendly. This is
the least restrictive weapon control status.

WEAPONS TIGHT. Crews can fire only at air targets positively identified as hostile according
to the prevailing hostile criteria.

WEAPONS HOLD. Crews are prohibited from firing except in self-defense or in response to a
formal order. This is the most restrictive control status.

Platoon air defense fires

When it must fight back, the platoon can use the tanks main gun and machine guns against attacking
aircraft.
Machine gun fires. Engaging aircraft with volume fire is the key to effective use of the machine guns.
These fires must be coordinated to be effective. Delivered on the platoon leaders command, they are directed
at an aim point; gunners do not attempt to track the target with machine guns. Figures 6-25 and 6-26 illustrate
guidelines and procedures for selecting machine gun aim points. These rules are simple and logical; everyone
in the platoon must learn and retain them.
Main gun fires. Several types of main gun ammunition are effective against helicopters, including MPAT,
HEAT, and armor-piercing discarding sabot (APDS) rounds. The main gun aim point is always center of mass.
NOTE:

Refer to the battle drill for reaction to air attack in Chapter 3 of this manual. For further information
on MPAT ammunition, refer to FM 3-20.12 (FM 17-12-1-1).

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Figure 6-25. Machine gun aim points against helicopters.

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FM 3-20.15

Figure 6-26. Machine gun aim points against

high-performance aircraft.

AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY SYSTEMS

The mission of the ADA is to protect friendly forces and selected geo-political assets from aerial attack,
missile attack, and surveillance. The air defense commander employs several types of systems, at various
operational levels, to provide low- to high-altitude air defense coverage.

Corps level and higher

At corps level and higher, the primary ADA systems are the Avenger and the Patriot (see Figure 6-27).

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Figure 6-27. Air defense systems at corps level and above.

Tactical level (division and below)

At the tactical level, low- to medium-altitude air defense is accomplished by the air defense battalion
organic to the division. The battalion or squadron uses the systems described in the following paragraphs to
complement and support the maneuver force.
Stinger. This is the primary air defense weapon system for the battalion or squadron, employing short-range,
shoulder-fired, heat-seeking guided missiles (see Figure 6-28). The Stinger is designed to counter high-speed,
low-level ground attack aircraft. It is also a lethal weapon against helicopters, observation and transport
aircraft, and UAVs. The missile has a range in excess of 5 kilometers.
The Stinger can be employed as a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS). The two-man Stinger
team, consisting of an operator and a crew chief, is transported in a HMMWV or in the Bradley Stinger fighting
vehicle (BSFV) or Bradley Linebacker vehicle. (NOTE: The BSFV and Bradley Linebacker are discussed
later in this section.)

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FM 3-20.15

Figure 6-28. Stinger air defense system.

Bradley Stinger fighting vehicle. The BSFV, which replaces the Vulcan air defense system, provides the
air defender with armor protection and gives him the ability to maneuver with the supported force and position
the Stinger system forward on the battlefield (see Figure 6-29). The Stinger team must dismount to fire the
missiles.
The BSFV carries a basic load of six Stinger missiles as its primary air defense weapon; the Bradleys 25-mm
chain gun can be used to augment the Stinger and cover dead space to a range of 2,000 meters. The vehicle also
carries five TOW missiles. Future versions of the BSFV will include the Stinger vehicle-mounted launcher
(SVML) in place of the TOW system. The SVML will provide the vehicle with fire-on-the-move capability.

Figure 6-29. Bradley Stinger fighting vehicle.

Bradley Linebacker. This vehicle replaces the BSFVs TOW system with four ready-to-fire Stinger
missiles, housed in the SVML. The Bradley Linebacker, with its ability to shoot on the move, is designed
specifically to provide air defense on the battlefield.

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SECTION 5 - AIR SUPPORT

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
Close air support (CAS), provided by the Air Force, can be employed to destroy large enemy armor
formations. CAS strikes can be either preplanned (at brigade, battalion, or squadron level) or requested on an
immediate-need basis through the battalion forward air controller (FAC). The FAC on the ground or in the air
acts as a link between the ground element and the CAS aircraft.
Army air cavalry is best equipped to coordinate with Air Force assets in joint air attack team (JAAT) and
attack helicopter operations. The air cavalry can see the battlefield and the target better than ground forces can,
and it has the radio equipment needed to talk to Air Force aircraft. The attack aircraft organic to air cavalry
units can assist CAS aircraft in suppressing the enemy ADA threat.

MARKING FRIENDLY POSITIONS

Whenever possible, friendly positions should be marked during close air strikes, especially when friendly
troops are within 300 meters of the target. Resources for marking positions include the following:

Smoke. The smoke grenade is the most commonly used marker, but it has limitations. Wind

may cause smoke to drift above trees, and some colors can blend with the background. Violet or
white smoke shows up well against most background colors.

Flares. Rocket or 40-mm flares are useful for attracting attention at night; they can sometimes
be employed effectively during the day.

Mirrors and signal panels. Signal mirrors are probably the best ground-to-air devices for
attracting attention. If the sun is shining and the operator is skillful, pilots can see a mirror flash
miles away. VS-17 signal panels are also good visual references for pilots.

Lights. Pocket-size, battery-powered strobe lights produce brilliant white or blue flashes at

about 1 1/2-second intervals. The flash is visible at night for 1 to 3 miles. Vehicle lights, such
as an unshielded red taillight, are visible to a pilot for several miles at night. Chemical glow
lights can also be used to mark friendly positions. One technique that can be used at night is to
tie an infrared (IR) or green chem light on a 10-foot string. When aircraft are in the area, a
crewman can swing the light in a circular motion to mark the location.

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CHAPTER 7

Combat Service Support

CSS elements arm, fuel, fix, feed, clothe, and provide transportation and personnel for the platoon. The
platoon leader is responsible for supervising CSS within the platoon. The PSG is the CSS operator for the
platoon, as the 1SG is for the company and troop. The PSG advises the platoon leader of logistical requirements
during preparation for combat operations. He also keeps the platoon leader informed of the platoons status.
During combat operations, the PSG coordinates directly with the 1SG, informing him of the platoons supply,
maintenance, and personnel requirements and problems. The PSG is assisted by the other TCs and the gunners
on the platoon leaders and PSGs vehicles.
CONTENTS
Section 1.
Section 2.
Section 3.
Section 4.
Section 5.
Section 6.

Organization .........................................................................................
Supply Operations ...............................................................................
Maintenance Operations .....................................................................
Personnel Operations .........................................................................
Medical Treatment and Evacuation ....................................................
Prisoners ..............................................................................................

Page
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7-1
7-9
7-13
7-14
7-17

SECTION 1 - ORGANIZATION
The platoon has no organic CSS assets. The PSG coordinates directly with his supporting 1SG for all
CSS. The PSG is also the primary recipient of all maintenance, supply, and personnel reports within the
platoon. He is assisted by the TCs, but it is his responsibility to keep the platoon leader informed of the current
status of the platoon.
Most routine CSS functions are accomplished by SOP. These procedures and services include the following:

Accountability, maintenance, and safeguarding of the units assigned equipment.

Reporting of the status of personnel, equipment, and classes of supply.
Requests for resupply.
Turn-in of equipment for repair.
Evacuation of personnel (WIA, KIA, EPW).
Evacuation of equipment and vehicles for replacement and/or repair.

SECTION 2 - SUPPLY OPERATIONS

Each platoon has a large amount of equipment and requires frequent resupply to accomplish its mission.
All leaders must make periodic checks to ensure that the platoons equipment, especially high-use items, is
accounted for and ready to use. They must anticipate supply expenditures and request resupply before an
operation begins.
The company or troop delivers supplies to the platoon. Priorities for delivery are established by the
company/troop commander. The PSG distributes supplies within the platoon.

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BASIC AND COMBAT LOADS

Basic load
For supply classes other than ammunition, the basic load covers supplies kept by units for use when
combat is initiated. The quantity of each item of supply in a basic load is based on the number of days the unit
may have to sustain itself in combat without resupply.
For ammunition (Class V), the basic load is the quantity of ammunition required to be on hand to meet
combat needs until resupply can be accomplished. The basic ammunition load is specified by the theater army
and is expressed in rounds, units, or units of weight, as appropriate.

Combat load
The combat load is the quantity of supplies, in all classes, that the platoon must have on hand to sustain
operations in combat for a prescribed number of days. The platoons parent unit must be capable of moving the
combat load, using organic transportation assets, into combat in a single delivery. Like the basic load, the
platoons combat load is specified by higher headquarters.

CLASSES OF SUPPLY
Class I
This class includes subsistence items (rations, water, and ice) as well as gratuitous issue of items related
to health, morale, and welfare.
Each vehicle maintains a supply of rations, usually a three- to five-day stock, in the form of meals, readyto-eat (MRE). Hot meals are brought forward whenever possible, if only to supplement MREs. All meals should
be eaten in shifts, and they should never be served at one centralized location. The platoon leader and PSG must
make sure not only that the platoon is fed, but also that their soldiers eat nutritious meals to maintain the energy
levels required in combat. During continuous or cold-weather operations, soldiers will eat more than three
meals per day. This extra allowance must be planned for and requested.
Potable water should be replenished daily, either by refilling from the water trailer or by rotating 5-gallon
cans with the 1SG or supply sergeant. Each combat vehicle should maintain a minimum of 10 gallons of potable
water, more during operations in arid climates or in MOPP gear. The platoon should also maintain a minimum
amount of nonpotable water for vehicle and equipment maintenance; one technique is to recycle water
previously used for personal hygiene.

Class II
This class includes items of equipment, other than principal items, that are prescribed in authorization and
allowance tables. Among these items, which are requested through the supply sergeant, are individual tools and
tool sets, individual equipment and clothing items, chem lights, batteries, engineer tape, tentage, and
housekeeping supplies.

Class III and Class V

Class III comprises all types of POL products. Class V is ammunition, to include small arms, artillery and
tank rounds, mines and demolitions, fuzes, missiles, and bombs. Rearming and refueling usually occur daily or at
the conclusion of major operations; for optimum security, they should be executed simultaneously under the cover
of limited visibility. The two techniques of refueling and rearming, tailgate and service station resupply, are covered
later in this section.

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The platoon leader must control redistribution of fuel and ammunition when these supplies cannot be
delivered or when only limited quantities are available. The PSG continually monitors the platoons supply
status through logistical reports and, on digitally equipped vehicles, automated SITREPs. Refer to FKSM
17-15-3 for report formats. The PSG notifies the platoon leader before a specific vehicle or the platoon as a
whole is critically short of these major classes of supply. He should take steps to ensure ammunition is equally
distributed throughout the platoon before the start of any tactical operation, after direct fire contact with the
enemy, and during consolidation on an objective.
In planning for refueling operations, the platoon leader should balance the range and fuel capacity of his
vehicles against the requirements of future operations. The platoon must top off vehicles whenever the tactical
situation permits. When time is limited, however, the platoon leader must choose between topping off vehicles
that need the most fuel first or giving limited amounts to each vehicle. Vehicle crews must maintain a stock of
oil, grease, and hydraulic fluid, replenishing these POL products every time they refuel.

Class IV
This class includes construction and barrier materials used by the platoon to construct OPs and obstacles
and to improve fighting positions. Barrier materials include lumber, sandbags, concertina or barbed wire, and
pickets. Based on unit SOP, some Class IV materials may be part of the tank load plan; other materials are
requested through the company or troop headquarters.

Class VI
This class covers personal demand items. Tobacco products, candy, and toiletry articles are normally sold
through the exchange system during peacetime or for units not in a combat environment. In a combat
environment, these items are sent with Class I as health and comfort packs.

Class VII
This class includes major end items. These are major pieces of equipment, assembled and ready for
intended use, such as combat vehicles, missile launchers, artillery pieces, and major weapon systems. Major end
items that are destroyed are reported immediately by means of logistical reports (see FKSM 17-15-3 for report
formats). The items will be replaced by the parent unit as they are reported and as available.

Class VIII
This class includes medical supplies, which are provided through the battalion or squadron medical
platoon and ordered through the medical team supporting the platoon, company, or troop. Included are
individual medical supplies such as first-aid dressings, refills for first-aid kits, water purification tablets, and
foot powder.

Class IX
This class comprises repair parts carried by the maintenance team. These basic load supplies are part of
the PLL. PLL items carried by the platoon usually include spare track, road wheels, assorted bolts, machine gun
parts, and light bulbs. Class IX supplies are requisitioned through the company or troop maintenance section.

METHODS OF RESUPPLY
The tank platoon uses three methods in conducting supply operations: pre-positioning, routine resupply,
and emergency resupply. The method to be used is determined after an analysis of the factors of METT-TC.

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Pre-positioning
Pre-positioning of supplies, also known as prestock resupply, may be required in some defensive
operations. Normally, only Class V items will be prestocked, but Class I and Class III supplies may be included
in some situations. Prestock operations are fairly rare in the offense and generally are limited to refueling.
Operational considerations. The location and amount of a prestock must be carefully planned and then
verified through reconnaissance and rehearsals. Each TC must be informed of prestock locations. The following
considerations influence selection of prestock sites and execution of the resupply operation:

Availability of overhead cover for the prestock location.

Cover and concealment for the location and routes that vehicles will take to reach it.
Security procedures required to safeguard the resupply operation.
Procedures for protecting friendly personnel and vehicles in the event prestock ammunition is
ignited.

Prestock in the defense. There are several techniques for accomplishing prestock resupply in the defense.
Normally, Class V (ammunition) is positioned next to or within a vehicles fighting position. This enables the
tank crew to resupply during an engagement without displacing. Another technique is to locate Class V supplies
en route to or within a successive BP. Use of this method requires consideration of security procedures to
safeguard the prestock. Resupply of Class III (specifically fuel) is usually accomplished behind a units current
BP or en route to a successive BP. When the platoon must conduct this type of resupply in the defense, the
platoon leader directs the PSG to rotate vehicles or sections through prestock positions based on the enemy
situation and shortages within the platoon.
Prestock in the offense. As noted, pre-positioning of supplies in the offense is normally limited to refueling.
The ROM technique is planned and organized at battalion or higher level to sustain vehicles during long movements.
The goal of the ROM is to ensure that vehicles are topped off prior to possible contact with the enemy. Security for
ROM sites is normally maintained using battalion assets. If enough fuel-hauling vehicles are available, individual
vehicles, sections, platoons, or companies/troops proceed directly to their specified fuel vehicle and either top off or
receive an amount of fuel specified in the OPORD. If the number of fuelers is limited, vehicles either assume a
herringbone formation or occupy hasty defensive positions until they can top off.
Destruction or removal of supplies. In all prestock operations, the unit must have a plan for the destruction or
removal of supplies to prevent their capture by the enemy. The plan should include information about the location of
and routes to the prestock sites.

Routine resupply
These operations include regular resupply of items in Classes I, III, V, and IX and of any other items
requested by the company or troop. Routine resupply is planned at battalion level and normally takes place at
every opportunity. The LOGPAC comprises company/troop and battalion/squadron assets that transport
supplies to the company or troop (see Figure 7-1).

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FM 3-20.15

Figure 7-1. Example company or troop LOGPAC.

The company or troop supply sergeant assembles his LOGPAC in the battalion/squadron field trains area
under the supervision of the support platoon leader. Replacements and hospital returnees travel to
company/troop locations on LOGPAC vehicles as required.
Once the LOGPAC is prepared for movement, the supply sergeant moves the vehicles forward from the
field trains as part of the battalion/squadron resupply convoy to the logistic release point (LRP). The 1SG or his
representative meets the LOGPAC and guides it to the company or troop resupply point. The company or troop
then executes tailgate or service station resupply; refer to the discussion of these resupply techniques later in
this section.

Emergency resupply
Emergency resupply, normally involving Class III and Class V, is executed when the platoon has such an
urgent need for resupply that it cannot wait for the routine LOGPAC. Emergency resupply procedures start with
immediate redistribution of ammunition in individual vehicles, followed by cross-leveling of ammunition
within the platoon. It is better to have four tanks with 20 rounds of ammunition each than two tanks with
40 rounds and two others with none.

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Once requested through the commander or 1SG, emergency supplies are brought forward by the
battalion/squadron support platoon. Based on the enemy situation, the tank platoon may have to conduct
resupply while in contact with the enemy. Two techniques are used to resupply units in contact:

Limited supplies are brought forward to the closest concealed position, where the tailgate
technique of resupply is used.

Individual vehicles or sections disengage and move to a resupply point, obtain their supplies, and
then return to the fight. This is a version of the service station technique.

NOTE:

Refer to the following discussion of the tailgate and service station resupply techniques.

TECHNIQUES OF RESUPPLY
The tactical situation will dictate which technique of resupply the platoon will use: tailgate, service
station, a variation of one type, or a combination of both types. The situation will also dictate when to resupply.
Generally, the platoon should attempt to avoid resupply during the execution of offensive operations; resupply
should be done during mission transition. Resupply is unavoidable during defensive missions of long duration.

Tailgate resupply
In the tailgate technique, fuel and ammunition are brought to individual tanks by the PSG or another
responsible individual who is assisting him (see Figure 7-2). This method is used when routes leading to vehicle
positions are available and the unit is not under direct enemy observation and fire. It is time-consuming, but it is
useful in maintaining stealth during defensive missions because tanks do not have to move. If necessary,
supplies can be hand-carried to vehicle positions to further minimize signatures.

Service station resupply

In the service station technique, vehicles move to a centrally located point for rearming and refueling,
either by section or as an entire platoon (see Figure 7-3). Service station resupply is inherently faster than the
tailgate method; because vehicles must move and concentrate, however, it can create security problems. During
defensive missions, the platoon must be careful not to compromise the location of fighting positions.

Variations and combinations

The platoon leader can vary the specifics of the two basic techniques, or he can use them in combination.
During a defensive mission, for example, he may use the tailgate technique for a mounted forward OP and the
service station method for the remainder of the platoon located in hide positions (see Figure 7-4).

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Figure 7-2. Tailgate resupply technique.

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Figure 7-3. Service station resupply technique.

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Figure 7-4. Combination of resupply techniques.

SECTION 3 - MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS

Proper maintenance keeps equipment and materiel in serviceable condition. It includes PMCS, as well as the
functions of inspecting, testing, servicing, repairing, requisitioning, recovering, and evacuating equipment and
materiel whenever necessary. Maintenance tasks are divided into four levels:

Unit maintenance (which includes both operator and organizational maintenance).

Direct support (DS) maintenance.
General support (GS) maintenance.
Depot maintenance.

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Repair and recovery are accomplished as far forward as possible. When equipment cannot be repaired on
site within two hours, it is moved to the rear (but only as far as necessary for repair) to a unit maintenance
collection point (UMCP).
The platoon leader is concerned primarily with supervising operator maintenance. He also must ensure
that scheduled services are performed as part of organizational maintenance and that support is provided for DS
maintenance elements when equipment must be evacuated. (NOTE: Refer to the following discussion for a
more detailed listing of maintenance responsibilities within the platoon.)

LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES
Platoon leader
The platoon leader has ultimate responsibility for the condition and performance of the platoons
equipment and materiel. In that role, his duties include the following:

Ensuring, within the platoons maintenance capabilities, that all platoon vehicles, weapon

systems, and equipment such as night vision devices, mine detectors, and communications
equipment are combat-ready at all times. The platoon leader also ensures that equipment that
cannot be repaired at platoon level is reported to organizational maintenance as soon as possible
using DA Form 2404 or DA Form 5988-E.

Knowing the status of current platoon maintenance activities, including corrective actions for

equipment faults, job orders to DS maintenance elements, and requisition of repair parts. The
platoon leader keeps his commander informed of the platoons maintenance status.

Coordinating with the maintenance officer in planning, directing, and supervising unit
maintenance for the platoon.

Developing and supervising an ongoing maintenance training program.

Ensuring that tank crews have appropriate technical manuals and are trained and supervised to
complete operator maintenance properly.

Ensuring that unit-level PMCS are performed on all assigned equipment in accordance with
appropriate operators manuals.

Ensuring that drivers are trained and licensed to operate platoon vehicles and equipment.
Planning and rehearsing a maintenance evacuation plan for every mission.
Platoon sergeant
The PSG has primary responsibility for most of the platoons maintenance activities. His duties include
the following:

Directing and supervising unit maintenance of platoon equipment, vehicles, and weapon systems.
Helping the platoon leader to comply with his responsibilities and assuming these responsibilities
in his absence.

Coordinating with the 1SG to arrange organizational or DS maintenance.

Supervising and accounting for platoon personnel during maintenance periods.
Ensuring that repair parts are used or stored in a timely fashion as they are received.
Collecting reports of the platoons maintenance status in the field and sending the appropriate
consolidated reports to maintenance personnel.

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Ensuring that vehicles are always topped off with fuel in garrison and that they receive adequate
fuel in the field.

Keeping the platoon leader informed of the platoons maintenance and logistics status.
Tank commanders and platoon leaders gunner
The TCs and the gunner from the platoon leaders tank are the platoons first-line maintenance
supervisors. In large part, the platoons maintenance status, and thus its combat readiness, depends on their
commitment to proper maintenance procedures. Their duties in this area include the following:

Ensuring that the equipment inspection and maintenance worksheet is filled out accurately and
updated in accordance with DA Pam 738-750.

Ensuring that dispatch records are completed accurately and turned in on schedule.
Ensuring that the crew is properly trained in PMCS procedures and that PMCS are performed on
the vehicle in accordance with the appropriate technical manuals.

Ensuring that, as a minimum, the assigned driver for each vehicle is properly trained and
licensed. In preparing for continuous operations, the TC must ensure that all crew members are
trained and licensed as drivers.

Ensuring that repair parts are installed upon receipt or are stored in authorized locations.
Ensuring that all tools and basic issue items (BII) are properly marked, stored, maintained, and
accounted for.

Ensuring that each vehicle is always topped off in garrison and that it receives as much fuel as
possible at every opportunity in the field.

Constantly updating the PSG on the maintenance and logistics status of the vehicle.
LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE
Unit maintenance - operator
Operator maintenance includes proper care, use, and maintenance of assigned vehicles and crew
equipment such as weapons, NBC equipment, and night vision devices. Checks and services prescribed for the
automotive system, weapon systems, and turret are divided into three groups:

Before-operation.
During-operation.
After-operation.
The driver and other crew members perform daily checks and services on their vehicle and equipment, to
include inspecting, servicing, tightening, performing minor lubrication, cleaning, preserving, and adjusting. The
driver and gunner are required to record the results of checks and services, as well as all equipment faults and
deficiencies that they cannot immediately correct, on the equipment inspection and maintenance worksheet (DA
Form 2404 or DA Form 5988-E). The worksheet is the primary means of reporting equipment problems through
the TC to the PSG and platoon leader and ultimately to organizational maintenance personnel.
The M1A2 is equipped with embedded nonintrusive and intrusive diagnostic test capabilities; these
include the built-in test (BIT) and fault isolation test (FIT). These tests enable crews to identify and isolate
many system and component failures prior to the arrival of organizational mechanics. Unit SOP should specify
how to report the results of these tests as well as identify the duties of organizational mechanics.

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SPECIAL NOTE: Detailed vehicle and equipment checks and services are outlined in every operators
manual and should always be conducted as stated in the manual. Although operators must learn to
operate equipment without referring to the manual, maintenance must be performed using the
appropriate technical manualnot from memory!

Unit maintenance - organizational

Organizational maintenance is the responsibility of the unit assigned the equipment. It is performed by the
operators and unit mechanics. Because the tanks design allows rapid modular replacement of parts, many faults can be
corrected, and the vehicle returned to the platoon, with minimum delay.
When the operator identifies a problem that is beyond his level of maintenance capability, he notifies his
chain of command so the problem can be isolated and corrected. The company or troop maintenance team has
trained mechanics who are authorized to perform unit maintenance tasks as prescribed in the technical manuals
for the vehicle. When company, troop, battalion, or squadron maintenance teams are not authorized to make a
particular repair, they will arrange to have it done by DS maintenance assets.
The built-in diagnostic tests on the M1A2 (BIT/FIT) facilitate rapid replacement of defective components
and systems. When the crew isolates a problem using these tests, the organizational mechanic can verify the
fault as soon as he arrives on site and replace the component without further diagnostic testing.

Direct support maintenance

This level is performed by personnel from the DS maintenance company, which normally supports a
brigade or regiment. It consists of repair and/or replacement of parts, assemblies, and components. Maintenance
support teams from DS units are usually located forward with the battalion or squadron field trains. These
support teams may go forward to fix disabled equipment on site, but they are limited in what they can fix and
where they can go.

Depot maintenance
The role of this maintenance level is to provide combat-ready materiel to the Army supply system. Depot
maintenance also provides technical support and backup capabilities for DS and GS maintenance units. In
wartime, the warfighter commander in chief (CINC) assumes control of depot-level maintenance operations in
the theater of operations.

General support maintenance

This level entails operations employing job shops or bays or production lines; it gives units the capability
to task organize to meet special mission requirements. GS-level maintenance assets operate at echelons above
corps (EAC). Based on METT-TC factors and the tactical situation, platoon- or team-size elements may be
moved as far forward as necessary to fulfill support requirements.

RELATED OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Evacuation
Evacuation is necessary when a damaged vehicle cannot be repaired on site within two hours or when
evacuation is the only means (besides friendly destruction) available to prevent capture or destruction by the
enemy. When a vehicle needs to be evacuated, the platoon leader or PSG reports its exact location, the vehicle
type, and the extent of damage, if known, on the company or troop net to personnel designated in the unit SOP.
The crew should remain with the vehicle to assist in evacuation and repair, to provide security, and to return the
repaired vehicle to the platoon as soon as possible.

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A recovery vehicle from the company/troop or battalion/squadron maintenance team will evacuate the
damaged vehicle. It is vital that the crew move the damaged vehicle to a covered position that allows the recovery
vehicle to reach it without exposing the recovery crew to enemy fire. The vehicle is evacuated to an LRP, to the
main supply route (MSR), or to the UMCP as necessary.
The recovery team normally employs an M88A1 recovery vehicle. This vehicle travels with the company
or troop maintenance team under the direction of the 1SG. The location of the maintenance team during
operations is designated in the company/troop OPORD.
If a recovery vehicle is not available or if time is critical, other platoon vehicles can evacuate the damaged
vehicle for short distances. The decision to do this rests with the platoon leader. Towing procedures are outlined
in the operators manual. Self-evacuation by the platoon is a last resort that should be considered only to
prevent losing the damaged vehicle to the enemy.
If the damaged vehicle will be lost for an extended period, the platoon can replace other vehicles
damaged equipment (such as weapons and radios) with properly functioning items from the damaged vehicle.
Damaged equipment can then be repaired or replaced while the vehicle is being repaired.

Destruction
When damaged or inoperable equipment cannot be evacuated and it becomes apparent that enemy capture
is imminent, the equipment must be destroyed. Platoon leaders must ensure crews are trained to destroy their
vehicles rather than allow them to fall into enemy hands. Instructions for destroying equipment are included in
the operators manual for each item.
The platoon leader should get the commanders permission before destroying any equipment. When
communications fail, however, the platoon leader must use his judgment to decide whether or not evacuation is
possible. Every reasonable effort must be made to evacuate secure equipment, classified materials, and all
weapons.

SECTION 4 - PERSONNEL OPERATIONS

PERSONNEL SERVICES
Many of the personnel services required by the platoon are provided automatically by higher-level support
elements; nonetheless, the platoon leader is ultimately responsible for coordinating personnel services and
providing them to his platoon. These services include the following:

Personal needs and comfort items, such as clothing exchange and showers.
Awards and decorations.
Leaves and passes.
Command information.
Mail.
Religious services.
Financial services.
Legal assistance.
Rest and relaxation.
Any other service designed to maintain the health, welfare, and morale of the soldier.

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PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
Personnel management includes classification, assignment, promotions, and reenlistments. Although the
platoon leader requests these actions through the company or troop, they are normally performed by the
battalion or squadron staff or by a division-level organization. The platoon leader must submit accurate strength
reports to ensure that positions in which critical shortages exist, such as TCs and gunners, are filled with
qualified personnel.

SECTION 5 - MEDICAL TREATMENT AND EVACUATION

HEALTH AND HYGIENE
Leaders must emphasize high standards of health and hygiene. Soldiers must shave daily so their
protective masks will seal; bathing and changing clothes regularly are essential in preventing disease. Each
crewman should carry shaving equipment, soap, a towel, and a change of clothing in a waterproof bag inside his
pack.
During cold weather, soldiers must check their hands and feet regularly to prevent such conditions as
frostbite, trench foot, and immersion foot. They must also learn that the effects of windchill on exposed skin are
equal to those of temperatures much lower than the thermometer shows. A moving vehicle will cause a
windchill effect even if the air is calm.
Field sanitation teams are trained in preventive medicine measures (PMM) and in treatment of disease and
nonbattle injuries (DNBI). They may advise the company/troop commander and platoon leaders on the
implementation of unit-level procedures for PMM and DNBI. For additional information, refer to FM 4-25.10
(FM 21-10).

SOLDIERS WOUNDED IN ACTION

Crew responsibilities
It is the TCs responsibility to make sure that WIA crewmen receive immediate first aid and that the
platoon leader or PSG is notified of all casualties. The use of crewmen who are trained as combat lifesavers is
absolutely critical. As a minimum, one member of each tank crew must be a trained combat lifesaver.

Evacuation procedures
If wounded crewmen require evacuation, the platoon leader or PSG takes one of the following steps:

Coordinate with the 1SG or company/troop aidman for ground evacuation.

Coordinate with the company or troop commander for self-evacuation using organic platoon
assets.

Coordinate with the 1SG or company/troop commander for aerial evacuation.

Regardless of the method of evacuation, all TCs must have the necessary CSS graphics available,
including casualty collection points for the company/troop and/or battalion/squadron. Evacuation procedures
must be included in the platoon plan and should be rehearsed as part of mission preparation.
Aerial evacuation, if it is available, is preferred because of its speed. The platoon leader or PSG
coordinates with higher headquarters and then switches to the designated frequency to coordinate directly with
aerial assets for either medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) or casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) services. He must

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FM 3-20.15

pick a relatively flat, open, and covered and concealed position for the aircrafts landing zone. The location
should be given to the aircraft by radio and marked with colored smoke as the aircraft approaches the area. The
tank platoon provides local security of the landing zone until the evacuation is complete.

Actions following evacuation

After evacuation is complete, the PSG compiles and submits witness statements and casualty feeder
reports in accordance with unit SOP (see Figures 7-5A through 7-6B). The platoon leader redistributes crewmen
and, as necessary, directs TCs to take the actions necessary to prepare for operations at reduced manpower
levels. (NOTE: It is extremely difficult, but not impossible, for the platoon to sustain continuous operations
with three-man crews.)

Figure 7-5A. Sample witness statement (front).

Figure 7-5B. Sample witness statement (back).

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Figure 7-6A. Sample casualty feeder report (front).

Figure 7-6B. Sample casualty feeder report (back).

A wounded crewmans individual weapon becomes the responsibility of the TC. Personal effects,
weapons, and equipment are turned in to the company or troop supply sergeant at the earliest opportunity. The
crewmans protective mask stays with him at all times. All sensitive items remain with the vehicle; these
include maps, overlays, and SOPs.

SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION

The company or troop commander will designate a location for collection of KIA personnel. The remains
of each KIA soldier are placed in a body bag or sleeping bag or rolled in a poncho and are evacuated by the
PSG or 1SG. The lower dog tag is removed and retained by the PSG or 1SG. The personal effects of the KIA
soldier remain with the body. The soldiers weapon, equipment, and issue items become the responsibility of
the TC until they can be turned over to the supply sergeant or 1SG.

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As a rule, the bodies of KIA soldiers should not be placed on the same vehicle as wounded soldiers. If the
PSG or 1SG cannot expedite evacuation, however, a vehicle may have to carry dead and wounded personnel
together to its next stop. In the attack, this may be the objective. In the defense, it may be the next BP.

SECTION 6 - PRISONERS
If enemy soldiers want to surrender, it is the tank crews responsibility to take them into custody and
control them until they can be evacuated. EPWs are excellent sources of combat intelligence; however, this
information will be of tactical value only if the prisoners are processed and evacuated to the rear quickly.
The unit SOP or company/troop OPORD should designate specific EPW handling procedures, such as
collection points, responsibilities for safeguarding prisoners, and procedures for movement of prisoners. The
following discussion focuses on considerations that may apply when the platoon must deal with EPWs, captured
equipment and materiel, and civilians.

HANDLING PRISONERS OF WAR

Basic principles and procedures
The basic principles for handling EPWs are covered by the five-S procedures outlined in Figure 7-7:

Search.
Segregate.
Silence.
Speed.
Safeguard.

Figure 7-7. The five-S principles for handling EPWs.

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The first rule that platoon members must keep in mind is that they must never approach an enemy soldier,
even when it appears certain that he wants to surrender. He may have a weapon hidden nearby, or he may be
booby-trapped. The following procedures apply for taking the prisoner into custody:

Gesture for him to come forward, then wait until it is clear that he is honestly surrendering and
not trying to lure friendly troops into an ambush.

Use a thermal sight to locate possible ambushes.

When searching the prisoner, always have another friendly soldier cover him with a weapon.
Do not move between the enemy and the soldier covering him.
As directed by the platoon leader, crewmen take the EPWs to an area designated by the commander. The
prisoners are then evacuated to the rear for interrogation. If an EPW is wounded and cannot be evacuated
through medical channels, the platoon leader notifies the XO or 1SG. The EPW will be escorted to the company
or troop trains, or the 1SG will come forward with guards to evacuate him.

EPW rights and responsibilities

The rights of EPWs have been established by international law, and the United States has agreed to obey
these laws. Once an enemy soldier shows he wants to surrender, he must be treated humanely. It is a courtmartial offense to physically or mentally harm or mistreat an EPW or to needlessly expose him to fire. In
addition, mistreated EPWs or those who receive special favors are not good interrogation subjects.
The senior officer or NCO on the scene is legally responsible for the care of EPWs. If the unit cannot
evacuate a prisoner within a reasonable time, he must be provided with food, water, and medical treatment.

Tagging of EPWs
Before evacuating the EPW, attach a tag to him listing all pertinent information and procedures. Tags may
be obtained through supply channels or made from materials available on the battlefield. An example is
illustrated in Figures 7-8A and 7-8B.

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Figure 7-8A. Sample standardized EPW tag (front).

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Figure 7-8B. Sample standardized EPW tag (back).

CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT

Captured enemy documents (such as maps, orders, records, and photographs) and equipment are excellent
sources of intelligence information. If captured items are not handled properly, however, the information in
them may be lost or delayed until it is useless. These items must be evacuated to the next level of command as
rapidly as possible.
The platoon should tag each captured item (see Figure 7-9 for an example). If the item is found in the
EPWs possession, include the prisoners name on the tag and give the item to the guard. The guard delivers the
item with the EPW to the next higher headquarters.

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Figure 7-9. Sample tag for captured documents and equipment.

CIVILIANS
Civilians who are captured as the result of curfew violations or suspicious activities are treated the same
as EPWs. The platoon evacuates them quickly to higher headquarters using the five-S principles discussed
earlier in this section.

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CHAPTER 8

Urban Operations
The platoon may take part in large-scale urban operations as part of a larger force. This chapter examines
the basic characteristics of urban operations as well as special planning considerations and techniques of
offensive and defensive operations. For more detailed information, refer to FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1).

CONTENTS
Section 1.
Section 2.
Section 3.

Urban Operations Planning Considerations .............................

Offensive Urban Operations .......................................................
Defensive Urban Operations.......................................................

Page
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SECTION 1 - URBAN OPERATIONS PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS
Built-up areas consist mainly of man-made features such as buildings, streets, and subterranean systems.
These features of urban terrain create a variety of tactical problems and possibilities. To ensure that the platoon
can operate effectively in the urban environment, the platoon observation and direct-fire plans must address the
ground-level fight (in streets and on the ground floor of buildings), the aboveground fight (in multistoried
buildings), and the subterranean fight. The following considerations apply:

An important aspect of the urban environment is that built-up areas complicate, confuse, and
degrade command and control.

Streets are usually avenues of approach. Forces moving along a street, however, are often

canalized by buildings and have little space for off-road maneuver. Obstacles on urban streets
thus are usually more effective than those on roads in open terrain since they are more difficult to
bypass.

Buildings offer cover and concealment and severely restrict movement of military elements,

especially armored vehicles. They also severely restrict fire distribution and control, especially
fields of fire. Every street corner and successive block becomes an intervisibility line, requiring
careful overwatch. Thick-walled buildings provide ready-made fortified positions.

Subterranean systems found in some built-up areas can be easily overlooked, but they may prove
critical to the outcome of urban operations. Figure 8-1 illustrates examples of underground
systems, which include subways, sewers, cellars, and utility systems.

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Figure 8-1. Underground systems.

CATEGORIES OF URBAN AREAS

There are six types of urban terrain (see also FM 2-01.3 [FM 34-130] for more information):

Dense, random construction. Dense, random construction is typical of the old inner-city
pattern with narrow, winding streets radiating from a central area in an irregular manner.
Buildings are located close together and frequently close to the edge of a roadway.

Closed-orderly block. This type of city block typically has wider streets that form rectangular

patterns. The buildings frequently form a continuous front along the blocks. Inner-block
courtyards are common.

Dispersed residential area. Normally adjacent to closed-orderly block areas in Europe. The
pattern consists of row houses or single-family dwellings with yards, gardens, trees, and fences.
Street patterns are normally rectangular or curving.

High-rise area. High-rise areas are typical of modern construction in larger cities and towns. It
consists of multi-storied apartments, separated open areas, and single-story buildings. Wide
streets are laid out in rectangular patterns. These areas are often adjacent to industrial or
transportation areas or interspersed with closed-orderly block areas.

Industrial-transportation. Generally located on or along major rail and highway routes in

urban complexes. Older complexes may be located within dense, random construction or closedorderly block areas. New construction normally consists of low, flat-roofed factory and
warehouse buildings. High-rise areas providing worker housing is normally located adjacent to
these areas throughout the orient. Identification of transportation facilities within these areas is
critical. These facilities, especially rail facilities, pose significant obstacles to military
movement.

Permanent or fixed fortifications and other military installations.

Permanent-type
fortifications can be made of earth, wood, rock, brick, concrete, steel-reinforced concrete, or any
combination of the above. Some of the latest variants have been built underground and employ
heavy tank or warship armor, major caliber and other weapons, internal communications, service
facilities, and NBC overpressure systems. This category also includes other military installations
(examples, Camp Lejeune, Fort Huachuca, Travis Air Force Base, and Norfolk Navy Base).

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VEHICLES, WEAPONS, AND MUNITIONS

Numerous factors related to vehicles and their organic weapons and munitions affect the tank platoons
urban operation planning and execution, including the following:

The preferred main gun rounds in the urban environment are HEAT, MPAT (ground mode), and
MPAT-OR (XM908). These all perform much better than sabot rounds against bunkers and
buildings.

HEAT ammunition will open a larger hole in reinforced concrete or masonry structures than
MPAT or MPAT-OR (XM908). Both MPAT and MPAT-OR, however, offer greater
incapacitation capability inside the structure.

HEAT ammunition arms approximately 60 feet from the gun muzzle. It loses most of its
effectiveness against urban targets at ranges of less than 60 feet.

MPAT and MPAT-OR rounds arm approximately 100 feet from the muzzle of the gun. Because

of the shape and metal components of the projectiles, however, this ammunition remains
effective at ranges of less than 100 feet.

Sabot petals, including those on MPAT and MPAT-OR, endanger accompanying infantry
elements. They create a hazard area extending 70 meters on either side of the gun-target line out
to a range of 1 kilometer.

The tanks main gun can depress only to -10 degrees and can elevate only to +20 degrees. This
creates considerable dead space for the crew at the close ranges that are typical in the urban
environment.

The external M2 HB machine gun can elevate to +36 degrees; however, the TC must be
unbuttoned to fire the M2 on the M1A2 or M1A2 SEP.

The M240 coax machine gun can effectively deliver suppressive fires against enemy personnel
and against enemy positions that are behind light cover.

The loaders M240 machine gun can effectively deliver suppressive fire against enemy personnel

and against enemy positions that are behind light cover; however, the loader must be unbuttoned
to operate it. This weapon may be dismounted and used in a ground role if units are equipped
with the M240 dismount kit.

When buttoned up, the tank crew has limited visibility to the sides and rear and no visibility to

the top. Figures 8-2 and 8-3 illustrate the dead space associated with tank operations in an urban
environment.

FM 3-20.12 (FM 17-12-1-1) explains special uses for tank-mounted machine guns in the urban
environment.

Figure 8-2. Tank weapon dead space at street level.

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Figure 8-3. Tank main gun and coax dead space above street level.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The following command and control considerations will affect the platoons urban operations planning
and execution:

Communications problems. The low-level task organization that may take place during urban

operations will require elements to establish additional communications links, which can be
disrupted by buildings and other urban terrain features.

Fire control. Extensive direct fire planning and restrictive fire control measures are an absolute
requirement in urban operations.

Proximity and visibility. Friendly elements often must operate in confined and restrictive areas

during urban operations, and they may not be able to see other nearby friendly forces. These
factors significantly increase the danger of fratricide.

Personnel factors. Urban operations impose significant, and often extreme, physical and
psychological demands on soldiers and leaders.

ROE/ROI and civilians. The ROE and/or ROI may restrict the use of certain weapon systems

and TTP. As an integral part of urban operations, noncombatants create special operational
problems. To deal with these concerns, units operating in urban terrain must know how to
effectively employ linguists and counterintelligence and civil affairs teams.

The slow pace of urban operations. This will usually prevent the platoon from taking full
advantage of the speed and mobility of its tanks.

MANEUVER
Planning and operational considerations
The following factors related to maneuver will affect the platoons urban operations planning and
execution:

The need for detailed centralized planning and decentralized execution. Urban operations
are usually executed as a deliberate attack, demanding extensive intelligence activities and
rehearsals.

Requirements for cooperation.

Urban operations can be successful only when close

cooperation is established between infantry squads and fighting vehicles at the lowest level.

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Formation of combined arms teams at the lowest levels. Whereas task organization normally

is done no lower than platoon level, urban operations may require task organization of squads
and sections. The tank platoon may face a number of unusual organizational options, such as a
tank section or individual tank working with an infantry platoon or squad.

Vulnerability of friendly forces.

Tanks can provide firepower to effectively support

accompanying infantry squads, but they are, in turn, vulnerable to attack from enemy infantry.
The attacking force in urban operations must also guard against local counterattacks.

The role of infantry. Infantry squads are employed extensively during urban operations as part
of the combined arms team. They can be employed against both enemy vehicles and enemy
dismounted elements.

Additionally, the infantry can help the tank platoon by

Locating targets for tanks to engage.

Destroying antitank weapons.
Assaulting enemy positions and clearing buildings with tank support.
Protecting tanks from antitank fires.

Transporting infantry
At times, the tank platoon may be required to transport infantrymen on its tanks (as illustrated in Figure
8-4). This is done only when contact is not expected. If the platoon is moving as part of a larger force and is
tasked to provide security for the move, the lead section or element should not carry infantry.

Figure 8-4. Sample positions for infantry riding on a tank.

Infantry and armor leaders must observe the following procedures, precautions, and considerations when
infantrymen ride on tanks:

Infantry teams should thoroughly practice mounting and dismounting procedures and actions on
contact.

Passengers must always alert the TC before mounting or dismounting. They must follow the
commands of the TC.

Infantry platoons should be broken down into squad-size groups, similar to air assault chalks,

with the infantry platoon leader on the armor platoon leaders vehicle and the infantry PSG on
the armor PSGs vehicle.

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FM 3-20.15

Platoon leaders, PSGs, and team leaders should position themselves near the TCs hatch, using
the external phone (if available) to talk to the TC and relay signals to the unit.

If possible, the lead vehicle should not carry infantrymen. Riders restrict turret movement and
are more likely to be injured or killed on initial contact.

Tank crewmen must remember that the vehicle cannot return fire effectively with infantry on
board.

Whenever possible, passengers mount and dismount over the left front slope of the vehicle. This
ensures that the driver can see the infantrymen and that the infantrymen do not pass in front of
the coax machine gun. Passengers must ensure that they remain behind the vehicles smoke
grenade launchers. This will automatically keep them clear of all weapon systems.

Passengers must always have three points of contact with the vehicle; they must watch for lowhanging objects like tree branches.

All passengers should wear hearing protection.

Infantrymen should not ride with anything more than their battle gear. Rucksacks and B-bags
should be transported by other means.

Infantrymen should scan in all directions. They may be able to spot a target the vehicle crew
does not see.

Passengers should be prepared to take the following actions on contact:

Wait for the vehicle to stop.
At the TCs command, dismount IMMEDIATELY (one fire team on each side). DO NOT
move forward of the turret.
Move at least 5 meters to the sides of the vehicle. DO NOT move behind or forward of the
vehicle.

DO NOT move in front of vehicles unless ordered to do so.

DO NOT dismount a vehicle unless ordered or given permission to do so.
DO NOT dangle arms or legs, equipment, or anything else off the side of a vehicle; they could
get caught in the tracks, causing death, injury, or damage to the equipment or vehicle.

DO NOT carry too many riders on the vehicle.

DO NOT fall asleep when riding. The warm engine may induce drowsiness; a fall could be fatal.
DO NOT smoke when mounted on a vehicle.
DO NOT stand near a moving or turning vehicle at any time. Tanks have a deceptively short
turning radius.

Additional considerations and preparations for transporting infantrymen include the following:

How does armor support the infantry?

Use main-gun fire to reduce obstacles or entrenched positions for the infantry.
Take directions from the infantry ground commander (platoon leader/PSG/squad leader) to
support their fire and maneuver.
Provide reconnaissance by fire for the infantry.
Know and understand how the infantry clears buildings, how they mark cleared buildings,
casualty evacuation plan, signal methods, engagement criteria for tank main gun, front line
trace reporting, ground communication from the tank with the dismounted personnel.

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How does the infantry support the tank?

Provide local flank and rear security for each vehicle.
Provide sensory intelligence for the tank crewmen to help them overcome tank noise and the
lack of ground situational understanding.
Provide reconnaissance and fire direction of enemy positions for main gun attack.

Considerations for dismounted tank security include the following:

Each tank will require a four-man team of dismounted infantry to provide local security to the
flanks and rear for the vehicle.
The security element can ride on the tank, but when the tank stops for more than 5 minutes,
the tank commander should direct the troops to dismount along likely avenues of ATGM
attack.
Tank crewman should rehearse the mounting and dismounting of the security element from
their vehicle, briefing the infantrymen on safety procedures for the vehicle and weapon
systems.
If possible, the security element should have two members attempt to observe from a second
floor window to provide greater situational understanding.
Tank commanders need to rehearse communicating with dismounted soldiers via TA-1 and
DR-8 in the bustle rack.

Vehicle preparation for combat in urban terrain should cover these procedures:
Crewmen should place sandbags on the top of the turret to reduce the effects of RPG fire.
Keep at least one ballistic shield to the Dog House closed (most engagements will be under
boresight range and the battlesight technique will suffice).
Place sandbags around antenna connections and electrical wiring on the turret top.
Place extra coax ammunition inside the turret.
Remove all flammable products from the outside of the vehicle (to include sponson boxes).

INTELLIGENCE
Threats to the U.S. have one common goal: to coerce the U.S. military or a U.S.-led coalition to redeploy
out of the theater of operations. The primary means of accomplishing this goal is for the threat to cause a
politically unacceptable level of casualties to friendly forces. Urban areas provide a casualty-producing and
stress-inducing environment ideally suited for threat operations. Moreover, urban areas provide the threat with
an unmatched degree of cover and concealment from friendly command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and firepower systems.

Types of threats in the urban environment

Active threats to Army forces operating in an urban environment include terrorists, paramilitary forces,
mercenaries, disgruntled civilians, and conventional military units. Further, urban environments may also
expose Army forces to many passive dangers such as psychological illnesses, hazardous materials, and disease
from unsanitary conditions.

Urban threat tactics

While active threats vary widely, many techniques will be common to all. Figure 8-5 provides a set of
threat tactics available to threat forces opposing mission accomplishment in urban areas.

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Figure 8-5. Urban threat tactics.

Use the population to advantage. The populace of a given urban area represents key terrain: the side that
manages it best has a distinct advantage. Future urban battles may see large segments of the populace remain in
place as they did in Budapest and Grozny. Army forces involved in urban stability and support operations will
certainly conduct missions in and amongst the residents of the area.
Threat forces may use the population to provide camouflage, concealment, and deception for their
operations. Guerilla and terrorist elements may look no different from any other member of the community.
Even conventional and paramilitary troops may often have a civilian look. Western military forces adopted
the clean-shaven, close-cut hair standard at the end of the nineteenth century to combat disease and infection,
but twenty-first-century opponents might very well sport beards as well as civilian-looking clothing and other
non-military characteristics. The civil population may also provide cover for threat forces, enhancing their
mobility in proximity to friendly positions.
Threat forces may take advantage of U.S. moral responsibilities and attempt to make the civil population a
burden on the Armys logistical and force protection resources. They may herd refugees into friendly controlled
sectors, steal from U.S.-paid local nationals, and hide among civilians during offensive operations.
The civil population may also serve as an important intelligence source for the threat. Local hires serving
among U.S. soldiers, civilians with access to base camp perimeters, and refugees moving through friendly
controlled sectors may be manipulated by threat forces to provide information on friendly dispositions,
readiness, and intent. In addition, threat SPF and hostile intelligence service (HOIS) assets may move among
well-placed civilian groups.
Win the information war. Threat forces may try to win the information war as much as they may directly
oppose Army operations. Portable video cameras, Internet access, commercial radios, and cellular telephones
are all tools that permit threat forces to tell their story. American atrocities may be staged and broadcast.
Electronic mail may be transmitted to sympathetic groups to help undermine resolve. Internet websites provide
easy worldwide dissemination of threat propaganda and misinformation. Hackers may gain access to U.S. sites
to manipulate information to the threats advantage.
The threat may make skillful use of the news media. Insurgent campaigns, for example, need not be
tactical military successes; they need only make the oppositions campaign appear unpalatable to domestic and

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world support. The media coverage of the battle for Hue, South Vietnam, although only one of hundreds of
different attacks of the Tet Offensive of 1968, affected the will of both the American people and their political
leadership. Although the battle for Hue was a tactical victory for the United States, the North Vietnamese
clearly achieved strategic success by searing the American consciousness with the high costs of urban warfare.
Manipulate key facilities. Threat forces may identify and quickly seize control of critical components of the
urban area to help them shape the battle space to their own ends. Telephone exchanges provide simple and
reliable communications that can be easily secured with off-the-shelf technologies. Sewage treatment plants and
flood control machinery can be used to implement weapons of mass destruction (WMD) strategies or to make
sections of the urban area uninhabitable. Media stations improve the information operations position of the
controlling force significantly. Power generation and transmission sites provide means to control significant
aspects of civilian society over a large area.
Use all dimensions. Upper floors and roofs provide the urban threat with excellent observation points and
BPs above the maximum elevation of many weapons. Shots from upper floors strike armored vehicles in
vulnerable points. Basements also provide firing points below many weapons minimum depressions and strike
at weaker armor. Sewers and subways provide covered and concealed access throughout the area of operations.
The threat will think and operate throughout all dimensions of the urban environment. Conventional
lateral boundaries will often not apply as threat forces control some stories of the same building while friendly
forces control others.
Employ urban-oriented weapons. Whether they are purpose-built or adapted, many weapons may have
greater than normal utility in an urban environment while others may have significant disadvantages. Urban
threat weapons are much like the nature of urbanization and the urban environment: inventive and varied.
Small, man-portable weapons, along with improvised munitions, will dominate the urban environment. Figure
8-6 lists examples of threat weapons favored in urban operations.

Figure 8-6. Favored threat weapons.

Engage the entire enemy force. Threat forces may hug high-tech conventional forces operating in an
urban area to avoid the effects of high-firepower standoff weapon systems. Additionally, they may attempt to
keep all or significant portions of Army forces engaged in continuous operations to increase their susceptibility
to stress-induced illnesses. Urban operations, by their nature, produce an inordinate amount of combat stresscasualties and continuous operations exacerbate this problem. Threat forces that employ this tactic often
maintain a large reserve to minimize the psychological impacts on their own forces.

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Focus attacks on service support and unprotected soldiers. Threat forces may prey on soldiers
poorly trained in basic infantry skills. Ambushes may focus on these type soldiers conducting resupply
operations or moving in poorly guarded convoys. Urban operations are characterized by the isolation of small
groups and navigational challenges, and the threat may use the separation this creates to inflict maximum
casualties even when there is no other direct military benefit from the action.

FIRE SUPPORT
The urban operations environment affects how and when indirect fires are employed. The following
factors may have an impact on planning and execution of indirect fire support:

When taking part in urban operations, the platoon must always keep in the mind that the urban
operations environment creates unique requirements for centrally controlled fires and more
restrictive fire control measures.

An urban operation requires the careful use of VT ammunition to prevent premature arming.
Indirect fire may cause unwanted rubble.
The close proximity of friendly troops to enemy forces and other indirect fire targets requires
careful coordination.

WP ammunition may create unwanted fires or smoke.

Artillery may be used in direct fire mode against point targets.
Fuze delay should be used to ensure rounds penetrate fortifications as required.
VT and ICM rounds are effective for clearing enemy positions, observers, and antennas on
rooftops.

Illumination rounds can be effective in the urban setting; however, employment must be
carefully planned to ensure friendly positions remain in the shadows while enemy positions are
highlighted. Tall buildings may mask the effects of illumination rounds.

Mortars are the most responsive indirect fires available to the platoon in the urban environment.

They are well suited for combat in built-up areas because of their high rate of fire, steep angle of
fall, and short minimum range. In employing mortars, however, the platoon faces difficulties in
target acquisition and the effects of the rounds (rubble).

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Guidelines for providing effective CSS to units fighting in built-up areas include the following:

Provide supplies to units in the required quantities and as close as possible to the location where
those supplies are needed.

Protect supplies and CSS elements from the effects of enemy fires by preventing and/or avoiding
detection and by using effective cover and concealment.

Plan for a higher consumption rate of supplies when operating in an urban environment due to
the slow pace.

Disperse and decentralize CSS elements to develop the most effective support structure based on

requirements for communications, command and control, security, and proximity to the MSR for
resupply.

Position support units as far forward as the tactical situation permits.

Plan the locations of casualty collection points and evacuation sites.

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Plan for the use of carrying parties and litter bearers.

Plan for and use host-country support and civil resources when authorized and practical.
Develop plans for requesting and obtaining special equipment such as ladders and toggle ropes
with grappling hooks.

SECTION 2 - OFFENSIVE URBAN OPERATIONS

Offensive operations in a built-up area are planned and executed based on the factors of METT-TC and
established doctrine. This section focuses on the unique problems and challenges that offensive urban
operations pose for the tank platoon.

HASTY AND DELIBERATE ATTACKS IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT

The platoon may be employed in an urban offensive mission as part of a larger force, usually a company
team and task force. Offensive urban operations take the form of either a hasty or deliberate attack. Both types
of attacks require the friendly force to conduct as much planning, reconnaissance, and coordination as time and
the situation permit.

Hasty attack
Task forces and company teams conduct hasty attacks in a variety of tactical situations:

As a result of meeting engagements.

When unexpected contact occurs and bypass has not been authorized.
When the enemy is in a vulnerable position and can be quickly defeated through immediate
offensive action.

The following special considerations apply for hasty attacks in the urban environment:

In built-up areas, incomplete intelligence and concealment may require the maneuver unit to

move through, rather than around, the unit fixing the enemy in place (the base of fire element).
Control and coordination become important factors in reducing congestion at the edges of the
built-up area.

Once its objective is secured, an urban hasty attack force may have to react to contingency

requirements, either by executing on-order or be-prepared missions or by responding to

FRAGOs.

Deliberate attack
A deliberate attack is a fully integrated operation that employs all available assets against the enemys
defense. It is employed when enemy positions are well prepared, when the built-up area is large or severely
congested, or when the element of surprise has been lost. Deliberate attacks are characterized by precise
planning based on detailed information and reconnaissance and thorough preparations and rehearsals.
Given the nature of urban terrain, the techniques employed in the deliberate attack of a built-up area are
similar to those used in assaulting a strongpoint. The attack avoids the enemys main strength, instead focusing
combat power on the weakest point in the defense. A deliberate attack in a built-up area is usually conducted in
four phases: reconnoiter the objective, isolate the objective, secure a foothold, and clear the built-up area. The
following discussion examines these phases in detail.

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PHASES OF OFFENSIVE URBAN OPERATIONS

Reconnoiter the objective
The reconnaissance phase of urban operations must provide the platoon and other friendly elements with
adequate intelligence to stage a deliberate attack. Communications with friendly elements in or near the urban
area is essential to gain up-to-date information on the objective.

WARNING
Friendly elements may still be operating in the area; therefore, extra caution must
be taken to prevent fratricide.

Move to the objective

Once the objective has been reconnoitered, forces move to the objective by the most expedient, covered,
and concealed route to prevent detection of the force by the enemy.

Isolate the objective

Isolating the objective involves seizing terrain that dominates the area so that the enemy cannot supply or
reinforce his defensive forces. This step may be taken at the same time as securing a foothold. If isolating the
objective is the first step, the subsequent steps should be carried out quickly so that the defender has no time to
react.

Gain a foothold
Gaining a foothold involves seizing an intermediate objective that provides attacking forces with cover
from enemy fire as well as a place at which they can enter the built-up area. When the tank platoon is operating
with the company, the foothold is normally one to two city blocks. As the platoon attacks to gain the foothold,
it should be supported by direct and indirect suppressive fires and by obscuring or screening smoke.

Clear the urban area

In determining the extent to which the urban area must be cleared, the commander of the attacking force
must consider the factors of METT-TC. He may decide to clear only those parts of the area necessary to the
success of his mission if any of the following factors apply.

An objective must be seized quickly.

Enemy resistance is light or fragmented.
Buildings in the area are of light construction with large open areas between them. In this

situation, the commander would clear only those buildings along the approach to his objective or
those necessary to ensure the units security.

On the other hand, the attacking unit may have a mission to systematically clear an area of all enemy
forces. Through detailed analysis, the commander may anticipate that the unit will be opposed by a strong,
organized resistance or will be operating in areas where buildings are close together. The platoons move slowly
through the area, clearing systematically from room to room and building to building. Other maneuver
elements support the clearing elements and are prepared to assume their mission as necessary.

Consolidate and reorganize

Once the objective is secure, the unit must consolidate and reorganize equipment, supplies, and personnel
quickly to prepare for counterattack or continue the mission.

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TASK ORGANIZATION
The task organization of a platoon taking part in an attack during an urban operation may vary according
to the specific nature of the built-up area and the objective. In general, the parent task force and/or company
team will employ an assault force, a support force, and a reserve; in some cases, a security force is also used.
Normally, there is no separate breach force; however, breaching elements may be part of the assault or support
force, depending on the type and location of anticipated obstacles.

Support force
Normally, most mounted elements of the urban unit, such as the tank platoon, are task organized in the
support force. This allows the task force or company team commander to employ the firepower of the fighting
vehicles without compromising their survivability, a distinct danger when heavy forces move into an urban
area. The support force isolates the area of operations and the actual entry point into the urban area, allowing
assault forces to secure a foothold.

Assault force
The assault force is the element that gains a foothold in the urban area and conducts the clearance of
actual objectives in the area. This force is normally a dismounted element task organized with engineers, with
specific augmentation by armored vehicles.

Reserve force
The reserve force normally includes both mounted and dismounted forces. It should be prepared to
conduct any of the following tasks:

Attack from another direction.

Exploit friendly success or enemy weakness.
Secure the rear or flank of friendly forces.
Clear bypassed enemy positions.
Maintain contact with adjacent units.
Conduct support by fire or attack by fire as necessary.
OFFENSIVE TECHNIQUES IN URBAN OPERATIONS
Role of the tank platoon
During the attack of a built-up area, the commander must employ his tanks to take advantage of their
long-range lethality. The tank platoon may provide support by fire while lead elements are seizing a foothold.
The platoon then can provide overwatch or serve as a base of fire for the infantry until the area has been
secured.
The commander will usually position the platoon outside the built-up area, where it will remain for the
duration of the attack to cover high-speed avenues of approach. This is especially true during the isolation
phase. (NOTE: Before providing support for the attack, tanks must be able to maneuver into overwatch or
base-of-fire positions; this will normally require support from organic infantry weapons to suppress enemy
strongpoints and ATGM assets.) Additionally, the tank platoon can conduct the following urban offensive
operations:

Neutralize enemy positions with machine gun fire.

Destroy enemy strongpoints with main gun fire.
Destroy obstacles across streets.
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Force entry of infantry into buildings.

Emplace supporting fires as directed by the infantry.
Establish roadblocks and barricades.
Mutual support
In house-to-house and street fighting, tanks move down the streets protected by the infantry, which clears
the area of enemy ATGM weapons. The armored vehicles in turn support the infantry by firing their main guns
and machine guns from a safe standoff range to destroy enemy positions. Particular attention must be paid to
the layout of the urban area. Streets and alleys provide ready-made firing sectors and killing zones for tanks to
use.
NOTE:

Figure 8-7 illustrates a situation in which two tank platoons are participating in a task force attack in
an urban operations environment.

Figure 8-7. Example task force attack in an urban environment,

with tank platoons in the support and assault forces.

SECTION 3 - DEFENSIVE URBAN OPERATIONS

Like offensive urban operations, defensive urban operations require thorough planning and precise
execution based on METT-TC and established doctrine. This section examines urban operations considerations
that affect the platoon in the defense.

ENEMY FORCES OUTSIDE THE URBAN AREA

While positioned in an urban area as part of a larger force, the platoon may be tasked to defend against an
enemy approaching from outside the area. In general, procedures and considerations are the same as those for
defensive operations in open terrain. For example, the commander designates BPs that take advantage of all
available weapon systems. Objectives are similar as well; these may include preventing the enemy from
isolating the defensive position, conducting reconnaissance of the defensive position, and/or gaining a foothold
in the urban area. This type of urban operation may transition into an in-depth defense of the urban area, as

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described in the following paragraph, if the attacker continues to commit forces to the battle and the defending
force fails to divert or destroy them.

ENEMY FORCES WITHIN THE URBAN AREA

When it faces enemy forces within the urban area, the platoon may be called upon to take part in any of
several types of defensive operations, including defend in sector, defend a strongpoint, and defend a BP.
Procedures and considerations for these defensive operations are generally similar to those used in more
conventional open terrain situations. (NOTE: Refer to FM 3-90.1 [FM 71-1] for detailed information on these
operations.) The commander should designate engagement areas that take advantage of integrated obstacles
and urban terrain features and that can be covered by direct and indirect fires.

DEFENSIVE TECHNIQUES IN URBAN OPERATIONS

Role of the tank platoon
In the defense, tanks provide the urban operations commander with a mobile force that can respond
quickly to enemy threats. They should be located on likely enemy avenues of approach in positions that allow
them to take advantage of their long-range fires. Effective positioning allows the commander to employ the
armored vehicles in a number of ways, such as the following:

On the edge of the city in mutually supporting positions.

On key terrain on the flanks of towns and villages.
In positions from which they can cover barricades and obstacles by fire.
As part of the reserve.

Tanks are normally employed as a platoon. The commander also has the alternative of employing sections
or individual vehicles with infantry platoons and squads; this allows the tanks to take advantage of the close
security provided by the infantry and to provide immediate direct-fire support to the infantry when needed.

Fighting positions and firing positions

Careful selection of fighting positions and firing positions for tanks is an essential component of a
complete and effective defensive plan in built-up areas. Vehicle positions must be selected and developed to
afford the best possible cover, concealment, observation, and fields of fire; at the same time, they must not
restrict the vehicles ability to move when necessary. These considerations apply:

If fields of fire are restricted to the street area, hull-down positions should be used to provide

cover and to enable tanks to fire directly down the streets. From these positions, the tanks are
protected while retaining their ability to rapidly move to alternate positions. Buildings collapsing
from enemy fires are a minimal hazard to tanks and their crews.

Before moving into position to engage the enemy, a tank can occupy a hide position for cover

and concealment. Hide positions may be located inside buildings or underground garages,
adjacent to buildings (using the buildings to mask enemy observation), or in culverts. Refer to
Figure 8-8 for an example of a tank using an urban hide position.

Since the crew will not be able to see the advancing enemy from the hide position, an observer

from the tank or a nearby infantry unit must be concealed in an adjacent building to alert the
crew (see Figure 8-8). When the observer acquires a target, he signals the tank to move to the
firing position and, at the proper time, to fire.

After firing, the tank moves to an alternate position to avoid compromising its location.

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Figure 8-8. Example vehicle hide position in an urban environment.

Employment of infantry squads

Infantry squads are usually employed abreast so that they all can fire toward the expected direction of
attack. In a company team defense, however, the limited number of available infantrymen may require squad
positions to be interspersed with tank positions for mutual support.

Employment of the reserve force

The commanders defensive scheme of maneuver in an urban operation must always include the
employment of a reserve force. This force should be prepared to counterattack to regain key positions, to block
enemy penetrations, to protect the flanks of the friendly force, or to provide a base of fire for disengaging
elements. For combat in built-up areas, the reserve force has these characteristics:

It normally consists of infantry elements.

It must be as mobile as possible.
It may be supported by tanks.
In platoon-level urban operations, the reserve force may be a section or squad.

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APPENDIX A

Digitization
Army digitization is the result of the desire to employ existing and emerging technology to enhance Army
operations from the strategic to the tactical level by providing its soldiers an automated, near real-time
capability for planning, coordinating, monitoring, controlling, and executing operations. At the tactical level,
the Army is capitalizing on this technology by digitizing its vehicles, weapons, and equipment. Digitized
systems enhance operational effectiveness in many ways. Providing the user the ability to take the initiative on
the battlefield and achieve combat superiority over an enemy through increased situational understanding
especially enhances it. Situational understanding is the ability to maintain a constant, clear mental picture of
relevant information and the tactical situation. This picture includes the knowledge of both the friendly and
threat situation and of relevant terrain. (NOTE: Even with the addition of these digital enablers, the basic
combat skills of tankers must be mastered and reinforced in the event digital technology is compromised or
fails. Once the basic skills are mastered, the digital enablers can be exploited to their fullest capabilities.)
As outlined throughout this manual, the tank platoons primary tools on the digitized battlefield are either
the intervehicular information system (IVIS) or the Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2)
system. This appendix focuses on the impact of these systems on various phases of platoon operations and on
the duties and responsibilities of platoon leaders and crewmen employing these systems while conducting
tactical operations. This appendix also provides a brief overview of the structure of the tactical Internet (TI)
and its major subcomponents.
CONTENTS
Page
Section 1.

The Tactical Internet and FBCB2 ....................................................

A-1

Section 2.

Operational Considerations ............................................................

A-4

Section 3.

Capabilities and Limitations ............................................................

A-8

Section 4.

Duties and Responsibilities .............................................................

A-9

Section 5.

Digital Versus FM Operations .........................................................

A-12

SECTION 1 - THE TACTICAL INTERNET AND FBCB2

THE TACTICAL INTERNET
The TI is designed to provide users with near real-time, shared situational understanding. It consists of
tactical radios linked with routers that use commercial protocols to allow digital systems to interoperate in a
dynamic battlefield environment. The TI provides reliable, seamless communications connectivity to deliver
situational understanding and command, control, and intelligence (C2I) data to digital systems.
The TI is comprised of two echelons: the upper TI and the lower TI. Company level and below operate
on the lower TI. The upper TI passes situational understanding and C2I between the command posts at the task
force level and higher.

Army Battle Command System (ABCS)

The ABCS is the integration of situational understanding information and sensor data into a force-level
database with simultaneous display and near real-time access for the commander and staff to see the common

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FM 3-20.15

tactical picture at each echelon. The ABCS employs networks that are interoperable with theater, joint, and
combined command and control systems. The ABCS is a combination of all the Armys tactical command and
control systems (ATCCS).

Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS)

The ATCCS is used for integration and management of information from battalion task force level to
corps level. Commanders utilize the ATCCS to effectively command, control, and sustain military forces in a
theater of operations. The ATCCS is made up of five systems: the maneuver control system (MCS), the
advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS), the all-source analysis system (ASAS), the forward
area air defense command, control, communications, and intelligence system (FAAD C3I), and the combat
service support control system (CSSCS).
The MCS. The MCS is the automated C3I system for the maneuver battlefield functional area (BFA). It
provides tactical commanders and staffs an automated, near real-time capability for planning, coordinating,
monitoring and controlling tactical operations. It provides the commander the ability to graphically visualize
the battlefield. These functions improve the commanders ability to maneuver forces by providing enhanced
and timely information, assisting in the direction and synchronization of subordinate and supporting units, and
aiding in the identification, analysis, comparison, and selection of courses of action.
The ASAS. The ASAS is the automated system for the intelligence BFA. It aids in the decision-making
process by rapidly processing large volumes of combat information and intelligence data from input sources
(soldier/ sensor) and systems (UAV, UGV, FBCB2, SALUTE, and SPOTREP).
The AFATDS. The AFATDS is the automated system for the field artillery BFA. It supports the planning,
coordinating, control, and execution of all cannons, rockets, missiles, mortars, close air support, and naval
surface weapon systems. It is a single, integrated fire support asset manager for the synchronization of all types
of fire support means.
The FAAD C3I. The FAAD C3I is the automated system for the air defense BFA. It provides automated
processing and dissemination of air-tracking data.
The CSSCS. The CSSCS is the automated system for the combat service support BFA. It collects CSS
information from subordinate units and consolidates it for use in the commanders decision-making process.
The CSSCS assists in determining the current and projected capabilities of a force based on the availability of
logistical support.

FORCE XXI BATTLE COMMAND BRIGADE AND BELOW

The FBCB2 is a battle command information system designed for units performing missions at the
tactical level. FBCB2 is a system of computers, global-positioning equipment, and communication systems that
work together to provide unprecedented amounts of real-time information to combat leaders. FBCB2 integrates
with ATCCS to provide complete, seamless battle command capability with increased battlefield awareness. It
provides command and control capabilities relevant to each of the BFAs, increasing the effectiveness of their
capabilities in relation to the mission. Both the lower and upper TIs support FBCB2 communications. (Figure
A-1 shows the FBCB2 system.)

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FM 3-20.15

Figure A-1. FBCB2 computer system.

FBCB2 displays the relevant information regarding the situational understanding environment. This
information shows the user his location, the location of other friendly forces, reported enemy locations, and
known enemy and plotted friendly battlefield obstacles. The warfighter receives data pushed from all the
battlefield systems to maintain real-time battle information. (Figure A-2 shows the FBCB2 tactical display.)

Figure A-2. FBCB2 tactical display.

FBCB2 receives data across the TI via the Internet controller (INC). The INC is a tactical router built into
the SINCGARS. The enhanced position location reporting system (EPLRS) data radio and the SINCGARS
data/voice radio transmit and receive digital information between vehicles. Each FBCB2 derives its own
location via the precision lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR). Utilizing these interfaces, the FBCB2
automatically updates and broadcasts its current location to all other FBCB2 and embedded battle command
(EBC) platforms. EBC platforms, such as selected M1A2s and M2A3s, are not installed with FBCB2 hardware,
but are equipped with software capabilities that allow them to share situational understanding and command and
control information with the FBCB2 platforms. (Figure A-3 shows the tank platoon FBCB2 TI architectural
diagram.)

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FM 3-20.15

Figure A-3. Tank platoon FBCB2 TI architecture diagram.

Digital systems on the battlefield pass messages using the joint variable message format (JVMF). The
JVMF is a Department of Defense standardized message format. It prescribes uniform message formats for all
branches of the armed services.

SECTION 2 - OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

This section focuses on several areas in which IVIS and FBCB2 affect tank platoon operations.

WINGMAN CONCEPT
IVIS and FBCB2 allow tank sections and platoons to maneuver outside their direct line of sight of each
other and still maintain situational understanding and mutual support (see Figures A-4A and A-4B). Even as
they improve command and control within the platoon, however, these digital systems increase the command
and control demands on the individual TC. They require the platoon to make more effective use of the
wingman concept.
The M1A1D, M1A2, or M1A2 SEP platoon must be able to operate as two independent sections. This
capability provides the platoon leader and company/troop commander with the flexibility to maneuver using
sections. (NOTE: Although FBCB2 allows the ability to spread forces over a large area, the platoon leader
must still consider mutual support between sections.)

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FM 3-20.15

Figure A-4A. Tank sections maneuvering separately on

actual terrain outside of their direct line of sight of each other.

Figure A-4B. FBCB2 display of the tank sections

maneuvering separately.

NAVIGATION
The POSNAV system (a built-in navigational system on digitally-equipped tanks that operates through
IVIS and FBCB2) significantly improves navigation for the company team and platoon. This inertial navigation
system allows the unit to maintain greater depth and dispersion. It also enhances the ability of the company
team commander or platoon leader to maneuver his unit on the battlefield.
On the M1A2, the navigation system must be periodically updated to increase accuracy; however, the
POSNAV system on the M1A2 SEP automatically updates itself with a GPS built into the system. This allows
the platoon leader and TCs to use waypoints to orient vehicles during movement. The tank driver can then steer
to these waypoints to maintain orientation and dispersion within the company team or platoon.

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FM 3-20.15

One method of controlling platoon movement is for the platoon leader to preselect checkpoints and add
them to the IVIS or FBCB2 overlay. He then sends the overlay to the remainder of the platoon. Each TC uses
the CID or CDU to designate these checkpoints as waypoints for the driver in accordance with the platoon
leaders guidance, movement orders, and designated movement technique. Once the TC selects a waypoint to
which he wants the driver to steer, the DID will display direction and distance information to that waypoint.
(NOTE: The DID does not display terrain relief. The driver must not become fixed on driving the tank via
the DID only, but should maneuver the tank visually and periodically check the DID to apply course corrections
as needed. Also, the platoon leaders driver, using his DID steer-to capability, can lead the platoon via the
waypoint designated by the platoon leader. The remainder of the tanks will orient on the lead tank and maintain
their position in the formation.) Figure A-5 illustrates this navigational technique.

Figure A-5. Platoon navigation using digital capabilities.

Another method of controlling platoon movement is for the platoon leader to use the compass and
odometer method of navigation (see Figure A-6).
Unless the tank is in contact, the loader should be up in the hatch to assist the driver and provide security.
The TC must ensure that the loader is knowledgeable of tank platoon formations and active in acquiring targets.
This loaders assistance will give the TC more freedom to send and receive digital traffic and monitor the CID
or CDU. As a result, the TC can focus more effectively on the tactical situation and maintain better overall
command of the tank.

A-6

FM 3-20.15

Figure A-6. Platoon navigation using the compass

and odometer method.

INFORMATION SECURITY
The units information security (INFOSEC) measures prevent unauthorized persons or organizations from
gaining valuable information from communications sources. INFOSEC encompasses several categories of
security considerations:

Electronic security (ELSEC).

Communications security (COMSEC).

Operations security (OPSEC).

Physical security.

INFOSEC measures should be as simple and efficient as possible while maintaining effectiveness.
Burdensome procedures reduce the flexibility and usefulness of information assets.

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FM 3-20.15

A critical INFOSEC consideration on the modern battlefield is the security of the units computers and
other digital equipment. Computer-related problems can have a serious negative impact on operational
readiness, disrupting the tactical information flow and thereby endangering the mission. Commanders and
platoon leaders must ensure that company team, troop, and platoon SOPs address methods of protecting their
digital equipment against several potential dangers:

Accidental or intentional introduction of computer viruses.

Manipulation of tactical software.

Interception or outright theft of data from digital sources.

Enemy capture of equipment.

Meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion (MIJI).

SECTION 3 - CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

Digitized equipment has the potential to improve the platoons effectiveness in several areas, including
situational understanding, command and control, intelligence, and navigation. These enhanced capabilities
allow the platoon leader to more effectively synchronize his elements with other units through the employment
of timelier and more accurate information. In turn, digital enhancements assist the platoon leader and other
friendly leaders and commanders in gaining and maintaining the initiative against enemy forces. At the same
time, however, the platoon leader must keep in mind several areas in which digitized equipment imposes
limitations on the platoon and other friendly units. Table A-1 summarizes the limitations and capabilities of the
digitized tank platoon.
Table A-1. Capabilities and limitations of the digitized tank platoon.
CAPABILITIES
Digitized equipment provides these
tactical advantages:
Provides accurate locations of
friendly units with respect to known
enemy locations. This information
reduces the chance of fratricide
and enhances situational
understanding.
Allows platoon leaders to increase
dispersion among the platoon.
Enhances survivability through
enhanced awareness of known
enemy locations.
Enables leaders to receive,
process, and distribute information
(including warning orders,
OPORDs, and FRAGOs) in near
real time.
Greatly improves maneuver
capability on the battlefield through
the use of the POSNAV system.

LIMITATIONS
Digitized equipment has or causes
these tactical limitations:
Units not equipped with the
SINGARS SIP INC radio
(SINCGARS with system
improvement program and Internet
controller) cannot send digital and
voice traffic simultaneously.
Users must physically manipulate
digital controls or visually read
digital information causing a loss of
focus on enemy acquisition and
destruction and situational
understanding.
Users must be aware that the size
of graphics (if too large) could
cause the system to run at a
slower speed or crash.
If the net server is lost, the platoon
will lose situational understanding
until they conduct net join
procedures (EPLRS).

Battle command of the tank platoon is significantly enhanced through the use of FBCB2. It allows the
platoon to

A-8

Maintain friendly situational understanding (Blue SU).

Track actual and templated enemy positions and obstacles (Red SU).

FM 3-20.15

Submit preformatted, standardized reports (SALUTE, SITREP, MEDEVAC, NBC, call-for-fire,

and so forth).

Rapidly disseminate graphic overlays and written FRAGOs.

Maneuver in dispersed formations.

Enhance situational understanding and decrease dependency on graphic control measures.

SECTION 4 - DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

As with all tactical organizations, the effectiveness of the digital unit depends on the synergy of its
subordinate elements (individual tanks and tank sections) as well as its relationship with higher headquarters
and support elements. Together, these components create a broad array of capabilities. Individually, however,
the platoon has a number of vulnerabilities. Effective application of the platoon within the combined arms force
can capitalize on its strengths and enhance the capabilities of its parent unit. This section discusses factors that
affect the platoons organization and its relationship with other elements.

ROLE OF TRAINING
The skills required to operate and maintain the highly technical systems on the M1A1D, M1A2, and
M1A2 SEP are extremely perishable. To ensure combat effectiveness of their units, leaders in both the
company team and platoon must place special emphasis on the training of individual tank crews. Constant
sustainment training is a must in order to remain proficient on the digital systems particular to their vehicle.
A comprehensive training program must include cross training. Even though each crewman has specific
duties and responsibilities, success in battle often depends on his ability to function at any position on the tank.
Every crewman must be proficient in the operation of all tank systems, including the IVIS or FBCB2, CITV,
and SINCGARS. In addition, tank crew members must have a thorough understanding of how to maintain and
service the tank and its component parts to keep the vehicle fully mission capable. (NOTE: Training programs
for digitized units must be coordinated with the training programs of nondigitized units. Digital units must
understand that they need to push situational understanding information to nondigitized units and attachments.)

LEADER AND CREW RESPONSIBILITIES

In general, members of the M1A1D, M1A2, and M1A2 SEP company team and platoon hold the same
functional responsibilities as their counterparts in other tank units. This discussion focuses on responsibilities
specific to the unique capabilities and employment considerations of digitized tanks.

Company team responsibilities

Company team commander. The company team commander plans and coordinates tactical operations for
the team. He uses IVIS or FBCB2 to quickly disseminate information and begin parallel planning. He can
streamline the planning process by preparing and sending IVIS or FBCB2 overlays. The digital systems offer
him a variety of overlays (operations, fire support, obstacle, and other areas) that can reduce the clutter of a
combined overlay.
During offensive operations, the commander receives IVIS or FBCB2 reports from his platoon leaders.
Looking at his display screen, he develops the situation and evaluates COAs. When executing a particular
COA, he monitors the movement of the company team, both visually (limited) and on the display, and makes
sure that combat power is massed at the proper point on the battlefield. The commander can use IVIS or
FBCB2 to quickly establish platoon sectors of fire in overwatch positions or during consolidation.

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FM 3-20.15

In the defense, the company team commander exercises command and control of the company team using
his IVIS or FBCB2 fire plan. He lases to known or suspected enemy positions to create enemy icons on the
IVIS or FBCB2 display. He then uses the grid coordinates generated by this process to initiate calls for fire and
mass indirect fires when the enemy is outside direct-fire range. He uses IVIS- or FBCB2-generated TRPs and
trigger lines to shift and mass the teams fires to destroy the enemy. At the conclusion of tactical operations, the
commander uses IVIS or FBCB2 to gather and consolidate updated logistics status reports from his platoons.
Executive officer. Before the battle, the XO conducts tactical coordination with higher, adjacent, and
supporting units as required or directed. Acting as the company team NCS, he assists in the command and
control of the teams maneuver. He receives tactical IVIS or FBCB2 reports from the platoons, and then
submits consolidated reports via both digital means (IVIS or FBCB2) and FM voice to the task force S3 and/or
commander as required.
The XO performs most of his CSS responsibilities before and after the battle. In coordination with the
1SG, he plans and supervises the teams CSS preparations.
IVIS or FBCB2 also enables the XO to receive, verify, and consolidate other required reports from the
platoons. He can forward the company teams consolidated reports digitally (with FM voice confirmation) to
the task force XO, S3, S4, and/or commander. (NOTE: In the event that the task force TOC does not possess
IVIS or FBCB2 capability, these reports will have to be sent by FM voice.)
If units that are cross attached to the company team lack digital capabilities, the XO must coordinate with
that unit to ensure it remains informed throughout the attachment.
First sergeant. The 1SGs CSS role in the digital company team is to consolidate all of the A/L reports and
send them digitally (with FM confirmation) to the battalion S4/combat trains command post (CTCP). After the
battle, the 1SG consolidates the IVIS or FBCB2 situation rollup reports (covering ammunition, fuel, personnel,
and vehicle status) from the platoon leaders and directs cross leveling, as necessary. He forwards the company
teams consolidated IVIS or FBCB2 situation rollup report to the company team commander, XO, and battalion
S4/CTCP.
Fire support team. IVIS and FBCB2 allow units to send fast, accurate call-for-fire requests with a ten-digit
grid location. It also gives the position of friendly elements, which can decrease the possibility of fratricide
from indirect fires. If the FIST lacks FBCB2 compatibility, the XO can provide periodic position updates to the
FIST on the forward trace of the company team.
Master gunner. The master gunners specific responsibilities include assisting the crews of the M1A1D,
M1A2, and M1A2 SEP platoons in establishing or coordinating boresight lines, plumb and synchronization
berms, and using live-fire screening ranges and zero ranges. During the planning and preparation phases of an
operation, the master gunner may be called upon to help coordinate and execute the CSS operations, to serve as
NCOIC of the CP, and to help the company team commander with his troop-leading procedures. In combat
operations, the master gunner may serve as the gunner on one of the command tanks, as a CSS operator riding
on the APC, or as a section NCOIC in the company teams wheeled vehicles with responsibility for handling
communications with the task force.

Platoon responsibilities
Platoon leader. Platoon leaders in M1A1D, M1A2, and M1A2 SEP units inform the company team
commander and XO on the tactical situation by forwarding IVIS or FBCB2 contact reports and SITREPs. Prior
to contact, they keep FM voice communications to a minimum to facilitate the timely transmission and receipt
of IVIS or FBCB2 reports. The platoon leaders act as forward observers (FO) for the commander and FIST,
using the interface between the POSNAV system and LRF to identify targets and initiate calls for fire. They
transmit digital reports, overlays, and the ammunition and fuel status of their platoons to the commander and
XO as required by unit SOP.

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FM 3-20.15

As applicable (either as directed by unit SOP or at the conclusion of the battle), each platoon leader
receives a situation rollup report from his PSG containing consolidated individual tank logistics reports for the
platoon. The platoon leader reviews the situation rollup report and forwards the platoon report to the 1SG and
XO.
Platoon sergeant. All TCs, including the platoon leader, use the IVIS or FBCB2 to forward SITREPs to the
PSG. The PSG consolidates these reports and forwards an IVIS or FBCB2 situation rollup report to the platoon
leader. He then sends the same report and any other A/L reports to the 1SG, either digitally or via FM voice.
In general, although the PSGs duties will lean more heavily toward CSS activities, he must be prepared
to handle the tactical aspects of digitized operations as well. If the platoon leaders vehicle is destroyed or
disabled and standard IVIS or FBCB2 routing is affected, the PSG must log on as the platoon leader to receive
operations overlays from the company team commander or XO. (NOTE: With custom routing, the
commander or XO can send IVIS or FBCB2 operations overlays to the PSG at any time.)
Tank commander. The TC monitors the IVIS or FBCB2 screen for friendly vehicle position updates, digital
overlay updates, and digital reports. He uses IVIS or FBCB2 to transmit reports as requested by the platoon
leader or PSG. He employs the CITV (along with such nondigitized equipment as binoculars and/or the PVS-7)
to scan his assigned sector and to assist the driver as necessary during limited visibility. The TC also lases to
possible indirect-fire targets and forwards IVIS or FBCB2 call-for-fire requests to the platoon leader as
necessary.
The TC can use waypoints from his digital system to mark his map with key positions that will be critical
to mission accomplishment. Examples include checkpoints, the battalion aid station, and rally points.
Gunner. The gunners duties include many communications tasks that are applicable to digitized operations,
including the following:

Monitoring both digital and radio traffic.

Logging onto nets.

Inputting graphic control measures on digital overlays.

Monitoring digital displays during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.

The gunner also assists the TC in performing other digitized functions. In turn, this allows the TC to
participate directly (on the ground) in such activities as orders drills, leaders reconnaissance, and rehearsals.
These digital-related duties include the following:

Entering graphics into IVIS or FBCB2 overlays.

Sending IVIS or FBCB2 reports.

Building IVIS or FBCB2 sketch and range cards.

Monitoring the CID or CDU during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.

Driver. In the M1A2 and M1A2 SEP tanks, the driver can monitor the DID steer-to indicator and select the
best tactical route using preselected waypoints as designated by the TC. It is the drivers responsibility to
maneuver the tank to the next waypoint, with the loaders assistance but with minimal guidance from the TC.
He uses terrain to conceal the tanks movement at all times.
Loader. The loaders duties include logging into unit radio nets and being an expert in operating and
manipulating the SINCGARS radio and VIC-3 intercom system. Because the loader is ideally positioned to
assist the TC in maintaining battlefield awareness, platoon leaders and TCs should give strong consideration to
assigning their second-most experienced crewman as the loader. (NOTE: The loader may assist the TC in
entering graphics on IVIS or FBCB2 overlays, sending IVIS or FBCB2 reports, and monitoring the CID or
CDU during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.)

A-11

FM 3-20.15

Once an operation is under way, the loader performs a variety of functions when the TC is occupied with
digital traffic on the IVIS or FBCB2 screen or CITV. These duties include the following:

Assisting the driver in keeping the tank in its position in formation.

Assisting in acquiring targets for the gunner.

Acting as the air guard or ATGM guard.

Dismounting for local reconnaissance and security as required.

SECTION 5 - DIGITAL VERSUS FM OPERATIONS

Commanders should not rely on digital communications alone. Presently, digitization does not eliminate
the requirement for maps and FM communications. The decision of when to use digital and/or FM depends on
the situation, unit SOP, and level of unit training. Some message traffic should be sent digitally followed by an
FM alert directing recipients to check their message queues.

DIGITAL TRANSMISSIONS
Uses of digital communications
Digital messaging at the individual, platoon, and company level is recommended as the primary means of
communication for the following purposes:

Transmitting graphics and orders, when the situation allows.

Sending routine reports, such as personnel and logistical status or requests.

Sending contact reports (vehicles not in contact).

Requesting MEDEVAC support.

Sending enemy SPOTREPs when not in contact (FBCB2 creates an enemy icon).

Transmitting planned call-for-fire missions (follow up via FM).

Sending digital NBC-1 reports. (This creates a contaminated area icon across the network.
Follow up with an FM report on the company team or battalion task force command net.)

Some other types of orders and reports that can be sent via FBCB2 include the following:

Fragmentary orders. A digital FRAGO can be used to provide changes to existing OPORDs.
It should include all five paragraphs of the OPORD. Each paragraph should state either "No
Change" or give the new information to ensure that recipients know they have received the
entire FRAGO.

Free-text messages. A free-text message can be used to send an unstructured digital message
to other FBCB2 or ABCS systems (like an e-mail message).

Threaded messages
Certain messages require specific routing for them to be effective. These are called threaded messages.
The exception to this is the personnel status report and the task management message. The routing for these is
SOP driven.
NOTE:

A-12

Users may add to the threaded message addressee list but should not delete from it. These defaults
are dictated by Army doctrine and communication architecture; for example, the size, activity,
location, and time (SALT) report feeds into the ASAS intelligence database for correlation into the
joint common database for higher situational understanding and analysis.

FM 3-20.15

Most threaded messages must follow specific paths for information to reach intended personnel or
communication systems or to feed into the correct databases. For example, the CFF message must be threaded
properly to interface with the AFATDS. The CFF message originator may add as many recipients as desired to
the addressee list; however, if he alters any of the default recipients, the message may not reach AFATDS, and
the fire mission will not be processed. If all addressees are not kept on the thread, orphan fire missions will
occur. An orphan mission is where a mission task order and target number was not received from AFATDS.
The following are threaded messages:

SALT reports.

NBC-1 reports.

Obstacle reports.

Fire support messages.

FM TRANSMISSIONS
FM radio remains the primary means of communication after crossing the LD because it is more
responsive. Multiple stations can monitor the net, and parties can convey emotion during the transmissiona
critical tool in assessing and understanding the battlefield situation. Light discipline in night operations may
dictate the use of FM communications; for example, brigade cavalry troop soldiers may go to blackout light
FBCB2 operations and send SPOTREPs via FM to a vehicle (usually the troop CP, which is stationary and
postured to use the FBCB2 display while maintaining light discipline). The CP can generate and manage
FBCB2 SPOTREPs based on FM SPOTREPs and updates.
FM radio is recommended as the primary means of communication for

Making initial contact report.

Coordinating operations when in contact or moving.

Calling for fire on targets of opportunity.

Making subsequent adjustment of fires on planned and unplanned targets.

Requesting urgent MEDEVAC support.

Transmitting enemy air reports.

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FM 3-20.15

APPENDIX B

Orders and Reports

Orders and reports are the means by which the tank platoon receives and transmits information, from the
earliest notification that an operation will occur through the final phases of execution. They are absolutely
critical to mission success. In a tactical situation, the platoon leader and PSG work with these vital tools on a
daily basis; obviously, they must have precise knowledge of orders formats and reporting procedures. At the
same time, they must ensure that every member of the platoon understands how to receive and respond to the
various types of orders and how to compile and submit accurate, timely reports.

CONTENTS
Section 1.
Section 2.

Orders ..............................................................................................
Reports ............................................................................................

Page
B-1
B-7

SECTION 1 - ORDERS
The tank platoon leader must be familiar with the formats of warning orders, OPORDs, and FRAGOs. He
must be able to convert these into concise, yet thorough, orders for the platoon.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Before the commander issues the OPORD, the platoon leader may receive one or more warning orders.
He analyzes all information in these orders and transmits important details to the platoon as soon as possible.
When the higher headquarters issues a complete five-paragraph OPORD, analysis of the order is a fairly
simple, straightforward process for the platoon leader. Commanders, however, do not always have the time to
issue a full OPORD; instead, they may have to issue a FRAGO.
The tank platoon leader normally issues instructions to his platoon in the OPORD format. He derives
much of the content from the higher order he received during execution of his troop-leading procedures. He
should always plan to issue his own five-paragraph order when time permits. When time is short, he still issues
as complete an order as possible, but he does so using a FRAGO.
Once an operation begins, FRAGOs become the normal method of issuing orders. Digital systems allow
commanders and leaders to supplement oral orders with overlays and a limited text capability; these items can
enhance their subordinates understanding of the FRAGOs.

WARNING ORDERS
During the planning phase of an operation, commanders and leaders use warning orders as a shorthand
method of alerting their units and individual soldiers. The company or troop commander usually sends a series
of warning orders to his platoon leaders. These orders help subordinates to prepare for new missions by
providing directions and guidelines for platoon-level planning and preparation. Each platoon leader
immediately analyzes the information, then issues a warning order of his own to alert the platoon to the
upcoming operation.

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FM 3-20.15

Warning orders generally follow the five-paragraph OPORD format (illustrated in Figure B-2). The key
consideration is that they should be as brief as possible while giving units and soldiers the information they
need to begin preparing for the operation. A company-level warning order normally includes these elements:

Enemy situation.
Higher headquarters mission.
Commanders intent (if available).
Earliest time of movement.
Specific instructions for preliminary actions (including security, reconnaissance, rehearsals,
training, maintenance, resupply, rest, movement, and coordination requirements).

Time and place at which the company or troop OPORD will be issued.
Before he issues his own warning order, the platoon leader should send graphics to the TCs, either by
traditional overlay or using their digital systems (if available). The order is almost always given orally and in
person, but it may be issued by radio or, on digitally equipped tanks, using the free-text message capability of
IVIS or FBCB2. As a minimum, the platoon warning order includes the following information:

Updated enemy situation.

Company and platoon mission statement.
Company or troop commanders intent (if available).
A tentative timeline, including the following:
Earliest time of movement.
Specific instructions for preliminary actions (including security, reconnaissance, rehearsals,
training, maintenance, resupply, rest, movement, and coordination requirements).
Time and location at which the platoon OPORD will be issued.
If he knows other times, events, or details related to the operation, the platoon leader may include the
information in the warning order. Figure B-1 shows an example of a platoon warning order.

"RED, THIS IS RED ONE, WARNING ORDER FOLLOWS, PREPARE TO COPY."

"REFERENCE OPERATIONS ONE OVERLAY: AN ENEMY BMP PLATOON HAS SET UP A HASTY DEFENSE ON
OBJECTIVE DOG. AT 2300 HOURS, THE COMPANY ATTACKS ALONG AXIS THUNDER TO SEIZE OBJECTIVE
DOG. WE WILL LEAD THE COMPANY FORMATION AND SUPPORT BY FIRE ASSAULTS BY BLUE AND
WHITE."
"TIMELINE: WE WILL MOVE FROM THIS LOCATION NOT EARLIER THAN 0845. THE PLATOON OPORD
WILL BE AT THE SAND TABLE VICINITY MY TANK AT 1300. LOGPAC WILL BE ON STATION AT 1600.
CONTINUE PRIORITIES OF WORK AS PREVIOUSLY ORDERED."
"ACKNOWLEDGE, OVER."

Figure B-1. Sample platoon warning order.

OPERATION ORDERS
When time and information are available, the company or troop commander will normally issue a
complete OPORD as part of his troop-leading procedures. The OPORD provides platoon leaders with the
essential information required to conduct the operation and to carry out the commanders intent. The
commander should distribute graphics (traditional and digital) before issuing the OPORD.

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FM 3-20.15

Five-paragraph OPORD format

Whenever possible, the OPORD is issued orally in the five-paragraph format. This helps to ensure that
required information is presented in a logical manner. Although the five-paragraph format is straightforward,
every commander and leader will develop techniques that allow him to make a clearer, more concise OPORD
presentation. The platoon leader should request a copy of his commanders OPORD format to facilitate notetaking. See FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1) for more information concerning company OPORDs. Refer to Figure B-2
for a sample platoon OPORD in the five-paragraph format.

Issuing the platoon OPORD

Issuing the OPORD is, in effect, a type of drill, with contents and delivery procedures covered by SOPs
and other guidelines. The platoon leader must understand, however, that simply reading off the five paragraphs
word for word is usually ineffective. His foremost consideration is effective communication. He must fully
understand all aspects of the operation and know how to describe and discuss them. He must integrate the
friendly and enemy situations and the effects of terrain and weather into the platoon maneuver plan.
To make the order even more understandable, the platoon leader should use visual aids to illustrate key
points. He can take advantage of a number of premade and field-expedient materials, including the following:

The operation map and accompanying overlays.

Terrain models or impromptu sand tables.
Sketches on dry-erase boards, MRE boxes, butcher paper, or the back of a map.
As far as possible, the platoon leader must establish optimum physical conditions that will allow effective
presentation of the OPORD. For example, the site at which the platoon order will be issued should afford
adequate security and minimum distractions. At night, this may require gathering the TCs in one tank or under
a tarp supported by gun tubes. The platoon leader must ensure that the TCs post correct graphics on their
overlays and/or digital displays. TCs should arrive at the OPORD site early to study maps and to post graphics.
Units with digital capability should already have posted the graphics on their vehicle displays before the platoon
leader issues the order.
TASK ORGANIZATION (company or troop).
1. SITUATION
a.

Weather and light data.

(1) Light conditions: BMNT: _____; Sunrise: _____;
Sunset: _____; EENT: _____;
Moonrise: _____; Moonset: _____;
Percent Illumination: _____.
(2) Weather forecast for the operation.
(3) Effects of weather and light conditions on the operation.
(a) Trafficability.
(b) Visibility.
(c) Effect on lasers/thermals.

b.

Terrain.
(1) Obstacles, hills, valleys, road types and conditions, streams, rivers, bridges, built-up areas.
(2) Avenues of approach.
(a) Size unit that can be supported.
(b) Start and end point.
(c) Objective.

Figure B-2. Sample platoon OPORD format.

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FM 3-20.15

(3)
advantage).
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Key terrain (discuss how friendly and/or enemy forces may attempt to use it to their
Observation and fields of fire.
Cover and concealment.
Engagement areas.
Overall effect of terrain on the operation.

c.

Enemy forces.
(1) SALUTE report elements (format for reporting enemy information).
(a) Size (strength of enemy forces).
(b) Activity (recent actions).
(c) Location (current).
(d) Unit (identification of specific enemy elements).
(e) Time.
(f) Equipment (including composition of enemy forces and order of battle).
(2) Other enemy information critical to the upcoming operation, to include the following:
(a) Chemical and nuclear capabilities.
(b) ADA.
(c) Aviation, including helicopters.
(d) Electronic warfare.
(3) Most probable enemy COA.
(4) Most dangerous enemy COA.

d.

Friendly forces (include the following items as applicable).

(1) Mission and intent of higher headquarters (company team/troop and battalion/squadron),
including concept of the operation.
(2) ID/mission of adjacent units (left, right, front, rear).
(3) ID/mission of reserves in higher headquarters.
(4) ID/mission of supporting units with a direct support/reinforcing (DS/R) role to higher
headquarters (field artillery, engineer, ADA).
(5) Which higher headquarters element has priority of fires.
(6) CAS allocated to higher headquarters, including number of sorties available.
Attachments and detachments to the platoon and higher.

e.

2. MISSION. This is the WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY. State essential task(s) to be
accomplished by the entire unit, to include on-order missions. Clearly define the platoons objective.
3. EXECUTION.
Commanders intent. Using the commanders intent as a guideline, the platoon leader may issue his
own intent to define the purpose, method, and end state of the operation. The purpose is the WHY of the
operation. The method tells how the platoon leader visualizes achieving success with respect to the
company/troop mission as a whole and outlines, in general terms, use of combat multipliers. The end state
specifies final disposition of forces and explains how the end state will facilitate future operations.
a. Concept of the operation. This paragraph further explains and expands on the platoon leaders
(and/or commanders) intent, particularly his vision of HOW he will conduct the operation and WHO he will
assign to execute it. The platoon leader uses a concept statement when he feels more detail is necessary to
ensure subordinates will take the appropriate actions in the absence of additional communications or further
orders. The sequence of subparagraphs is as follows:
(1) Scheme of maneuver. This is how the platoon will maneuver to kill the enemy or to
accomplish its mission. It conforms with the commanders intent. In offensive operations, it specifies the
platoons formation, movement technique, routes or avenues of advance, and plans for direct fire and
overwatch. In defensive operations, it specifies the platoon engagement plan, BPs, orientation of weapons,
and the plan for movement to supplementary or successive positions.

Figure B-2. Sample platoon OPORD format (continued).

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FM 3-20.15

(2) Fires.
(a) Purpose for FA and mortar fires (how fires will be used to support the maneuver).
(b) Priority of fires within the platoon and company/troop.
(c) Allocation of FPF.
(d) Preparation starting time and duration of fires.
(e) Triggers (trigger line/point or event).
(f) Description of enemy fires in the area of operations.
(g) Special fire allocation/use (smoke, illumination, CAS).
(h) Restrictions.
(3) Engineer support (obstacles, mines, and fortifications).
(a) Priority of engineer effort (mobility, countermobility, survivability).
(b) Priority of engineer support.
(c) Obstacle overlay.
(d) Obstacle list.
(e) Logistical constraints.
(f) On-order missions.
b. Specific instructions. List specific missions, in battle sequence, for each tank, including
attached elements. Include movement techniques, flank coordination requirements, other details, and beprepared missions.
c. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Time schedule for critical events.
(a) Rehearsals.
(b) Confirmation briefs and backbriefs.
(c) PCCs and PCIs.
(d) First movement.
(e) Arrival of any attachments/detachments.
(f) Boresighting.
(2) Movement instructions.
(3) Passage of lines.
(a) Contact points.
(b) Passage points.
(c) Lanes, to include identification/markings.
(4) Actions at danger areas.
(5) Actions on expected contact.
(6) Rally points.
(7) ROE/ROI.
(8) Intelligence requirements (IR), to include priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
(9) Air defense warning and weapons control status.
(10) MOPP level and operational exposure guidance (OEG).
(11) Any changes regarding battlesight and battlecarry ranges.
(12) Be-prepared tasks or other general information not provided in concept of the operation or specific instructions.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT.
a.

Trains. Location and movement plan of the company/troop trains (initial and subsequent grids).

b.

Material and services.

(1) Supply.
(a) Priorities of supply.
(b) Resupply points and prestock sites.

Figure B-2. Sample platoon OPORD format (continued).

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FM 3-20.15

(c) Ration cycle.

(d) Location of task force trains.
(2) Transportation.
(a) Supply routes.
(b) LRPs.
(c) Priorities established on MSRs.
(3) Services. Handling of KIA personnel.
(4) Maintenance.

c.

d.

e.

(a) Maintenance procedures.

(b) Vehicle evacuation.
(c) Task force UMCP location.
Medical evacuation and treatment.
(1) Location of company/troop medics.
(2) Location of battalion/squadron aid station.
(3) Procedures for treatment and evacuation of WIA personnel.
(4) Aeromedical evacuation information.
(5) Location of ambulance exchange points (AXP).
(6) Handling of contaminated WIA personnel.
Personnel.
(1) Handling and disposition instructions for EPWs.
(2) EPW guard instructions.
(3) Location of EPW collection point.
(4) Instructions for interaction with local civil populace (ROI).
(5) Number of expected replacements.
(6) Cross-leveling procedures.
Miscellaneous.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a.

b.

Command.
(1) Location of commander, XO, TOC, and/or tactical command post (TAC CP).
(2) Succession of command.
Signal.
(1) SOI index and edition in effect.
(a) Key frequencies.
(b) Key call signs.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

(c) Current item number identifier.

KY-57 fill and changeover data.
Listening silence instructions.
Challenge and password.
Special signals, to include use of pyrotechnics.
Code words.
Digital traffic instructions (digital systems only).
Actions to counteract jamming or hot mike situations.

TIME CHECK (for synchronization).

Figure B-2. Sample platoon OPORD format (continued).

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FM 3-20.15

FRAGMENTARY ORDERS
The FRAGO is a brief oral or written order that can serve any of the following purposes:

Implement timely changes to existing orders.

Provide pertinent extracts from more detailed orders.
Provide instructions until a detailed order is developed.
Provide specific instructions to subordinates who do not require a complete order.

There is no specific format for a FRAGO. For simplicity and complete clarity, it normally follows the
five-paragraph OPORD structure; however, it includes only the information required for subordinates to
accomplish their mission. To enhance understanding of voice FRAGOs, digitally equipped units can quickly
develop hasty graphics and transmit digital overlays.
Platoon FRAGOs normally include the following information:

Updated enemy or friendly situation.

Mission. (NOTE: The platoon leader must ensure that platoon tasks and purpose are clearly
stated.)

Scheme of maneuver.
Specific instructions as necessary.
Figure B-3 illustrates a platoon FRAGO transmitted by voice over a secure net.
"RED, THIS IS RED ONE. FRAGO FOLLOWS.
"WHITE IS IN CONTACT AND SUPPRESSING TWO T80s VICINITY NK77368900. BLUE IS MOVING TO
CHECKPOINT 26 TO SUPPRESS THE T80s.
"OUR MISSION IS TO ASSAULT AND DESTROY THE T80s TO ALLOW BRAVO COMPANY TO CONTINUE THE
ATTACK NORTH.
"WE WILL MOVE IN A PLATOON WEDGE THROUGH WAYPOINTS 2 AND 5, GET ON THE FLANK OF THE T80s,
AND ASSAULT FROM EAST TO WEST.
"RED 4, ENSURE THAT BLUE AND WHITE SHIFT FIRES WEST AS WE BEGIN OUR ASSAULT, OVER."

Figure B-3. Sample platoon FRAGO.

SECTION 2 - REPORTS
Reports are the units primary means of providing information for plans and decisions. They must be
accurate, timely, and complete.
Procedures for preparing, transmitting, and safeguarding reports will vary from unit to unit and from
situation to situation. Among the factors influencing tank platoon report procedures are the preferences and
requirements of the chain of command, the tactical environment in which the platoon is operating, available
equipment, terrain, and the electronic warfare situation. Digital systems, for example, enable the transmission
of accurate preformatted reports.
For leaders at all levels, however, two guidelines remain constant throughout the reporting process: the
importance of compiling timely, accurate information and the need to relay that information by the clearest,
quickest, and most secure method possible. The tank platoon leader, along with the PSG and TCs, can save
time, ensure completeness, and reduce confusion by developing and implementing thorough SOPs covering
report procedures. Refer to FKSM 17-15-3 for an extensive sample SOP that includes line-by-line descriptions
of voice and digital report formats used by the platoon. (See Figures B-4 through B-9 for sample reports.)

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FM 3-20.15

BLACK SIX, THIS IS BLUE ONESALT REPORTOVER.

BLUE ONE, THIS IS BLACK SIXSEND ITOVER.
BLACK SIX, THIS IS BLUE ONEREPORT FOLLOWS:
SIZE: ONE BMP.
ACTIVITY: MOVING SOUTH.
LOCATION: GRID CG100456.
TIME: 180640MAY99 ZULU.
CONTINUING TO OBSERVEOVER.
BLUE ONE, THIS IS BLACK SIXROGERCONTINUE OBSERVATIONOUT.

Figure B-4. Sample FM SALT report.

BANDAID, THIS IS BLUE ONEMEDEVAC REQUESTOVER.
BLUE ONE, THIS IS BANDAIDSEND ITOVER.
BANDAID, THIS IS BLUE ONEREPORT FOLLOWS:
LINE 1: AIR EVAC.
LINE 2: CG300587.
LINE 3: TWO CASUALTIES.
LINE 4: ALPHA.
STANDING BYOVER.
BLUE ONE, THIS IS BANDAIDROGEROUT.

Figure B-5. Sample FM MEDEVAC request.

FLASH, FLASH, FLASHBLACK SIX, THIS IS BLUE ONENBC-1 REPORTOVER.
BLUE ONE, THIS IS BLACK SIXSEND ITOVER.
BLACK SIX, THIS IS BLUE ONEREPORT FOLLOWS:
LINE ALPHA: UNKNOWN.
LINE BRAVO: MASKETCHA.
LINE CHARLIE: MAGNETIC, 2650 MILS.
LINE DELTA: 180800MAY99 ZULU.
LINE ECHO: 180802MAY99 ZULU.
LINE FOXTROT: CG522030, ESTIMATED.
LINE GOLF: ARTILLERY.
LINE HOTEL: AIR BURST.
LINE INDIA: 36.
LINE SIERRA: 180810MAY ZULU.
CONTINUING TO MONITOROVER.
BLUE ONE, THIS IS BLACK SIXROGEROUT.

Figure B-6. Sample FM NBC-1 report.

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FM 3-20.15

REDLEG, THIS IS BLUE ONEFIRE FOR EFFECTOVER.

BLUE ONE, THIS IS REDLEGFIRE FOR EFFECTOUT.
GRID CG003604OVER.
GRID CG003604OUT.
TWO BMPs STATIONARY IN THE OPEN, DPICM IN EFFECTOVER.
TWO BMPs STATIONARY IN THE OPEN, DPICM IN EFFECTOUT.
SHOTOVER.
SHOTOUT.
SPLASHOVER.
SPLASHOUT.
REDLEG, THIS IS BLUE ONETARGET DESTROYEDEND OF MISSIONOVER.
BLUE ONE, THIS IS REDLEGEND OF MISSIONOUT.

Figure B-7. Sample FM call-for-fire.

BLACK SIX, THIS IS BLUE ONESITREPOVER.
BLUE ONE, THIS IS BLACK SIXSEND ITOVER.
BLACK SIX, THIS IS BLUE ONEREPORT FOLLOWS:
LINE 1: 181217MAY99 ZULU.
LINE 2: OBSERVING FOUR ENEMY SOLDIERS.
LINE 3: CP 28.
LINE 4: FOUR.
LINE 5: NONE.
LINE 6: GREEN.
LINE 7: CLASS THREE AMBERCLASS FIVE GREEN.
LINE 8: CONTINUING MISSION.
OVER.
BLUE ONE, THIS IS BLACK SIXROGEROUT.

Figure B-8. Sample FM SITREP.

BLACK SIX, THIS IS BLUE ONECONTACTTROOPS, EASTOUT.

Figure B-9. Sample FM contact report.

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FM 3-20.15

APPENDIX C

Light/Heavy Operations
Tank units, including the platoon, almost never fight alone. Open terrain such as desert, plains, and flat
countryside is conducive to the employment of massed armor formations. In such terrain, mechanized infantry
supports the forward movement of the armor units by providing local security, retaining key terrain, clearing
dug-in enemy positions, and enhancing direct fires with organic small arms and antitank fires. On the other
hand, restricted terrain (such as built-up areas, forests, and jungles) increases the vulnerability of armor units.
In close terrain, it is more advantageous for tanks to take a supporting role in the forward movement of the
infantry. Armor provides close-in direct fire support against hard and soft targets that could slow the infantrys
advance.
This appendix examines in detail how the tank platoon is employed to support the advance of dismounted
infantry. Regardless of terrain, infantry and armor units fight as part of a combined arms team to maximize
their respective capabilities and minimize their limitations. Leaders of both tank (heavy) and infantry (light)
forces must understand the TTP employed by their operational counterparts. The principles of offense, defense,
and movement discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are applicable.
Tanks support the infantry in these ways:

By leading movement.
By using firepower, mobility, and the ability to protect the infantry to quickly develop the
situation on contact.

By leading the assault to provide protection for following infantry when enemy antitank
capability is limited.

By destroying enemy armored vehicles, especially tanks.

Infantry supports tanks in these ways:

By clearing or breaching obstacles and marking lanes, especially in minefields, to allow tanks to
exploit their speed and mobility.

By destroying, suppressing, or neutralizing antitank weapons or by destroying bunkers.

By following the tank assault closely to protect the rear and flanks of the tanks from hand-held
HEAT weapons, to clear the objective, or to reduce bypassed enemy forces.

By securing or clearing choke points such as towns, forests, stream crossings, or narrow defiles.
By providing close security at night or in restricted terrain.
By conducting reconnaissance to support the tank units maneuver.

CONTENTS
Section 1.
Section 2.
Section 3.

Task Organization ...........................................................................

Liaison Activities ............................................................................
Operational Considerations ...........................................................

Page
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C-3
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SECTION 1 - TASK ORGANIZATION

When an armor unit is task organized to support infantry, the mix of units is referred to as light/heavy.
For example, light battalion/heavy platoon refers to a light infantry battalion supported by a tank platoon; this is
the most common type of light/heavy task organization. Light company/heavy section refers to a light infantry
company supported by a tank or MGS platoon. (NOTE: Conversely, a heavy/light operation is one in which
the controlling headquarters is a heavy unit, either armor or mechanized infantry, with light infantry in support.)

ROLE OF THE TANK PLATOON

When the tank platoon is task organized to support a light infantry battalion task force, the controlling
commander will determine the role of the platoon based on METT-TC factors. The platoon may perform one of
several functions, including the following:

As the primary maneuver element (main effort).

In a DS role when infantry is the primary maneuver element.
As part of the task force reserve, often with a reactive role in an antiarmor defense (AAD)
mission.

NOTE:

In some situations, the armor platoon also may be used as a separate special platoon, or it may be
attached to one of the infantry companies in a DS role.

The platoon is the lowest level at which the armor leader must be trained to interact with a controlling
headquarters. The platoon leader must act as the armor force advisor to the battalion commander. He must rely
on the infantry staff for immediate CS and CSS. (NOTE: If the platoons parent company or troop is in the
vicinity, he may be able to coordinate some assistance through the company/troop commander or XO; however,
this support may not be available.)
It is important that the tank platoon leader understand the infantry unit he supports; this generally will be a
light infantry, air assault, or airborne battalion. Characteristics of these battalions vary by the composition and
mission of the forces involved, as outlined in the following discussion.

INFANTRY ORGANIZATIONS
Light infantry battalion
This is the most austere conventional combat battalion. The light infantry battalion has only three rifle
companies and a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC). Of the three types of infantry units described
in this section, the organization of the light infantry battalion differs most from that of the armor battalion.
There are also differences among this battalion and the air assault and airborne battalions, the greatest
being the organization of support and logistics. The light infantry battalion has no trucks larger than its 27
cargo HMMWVs. There is only one mechanic in the entire battalion; repairs are handled at brigade level. The
battalion has only 18 long-range radios. It has limited antiarmor capability: four HMMWV-mounted TOW
systems in one platoon at battalion level and six Dragon (Javelin) launchers at company level.
Infantry leaders must understand the tactical doctrine for employing a heavy company team (as prescribed
in FM 3-90.1 [FM 71-1]), a tank platoon (refer to FM 3-20.15 [FM 17-15]), and a mechanized infantry platoon
(refer to FM 3-21.7 [FM 7-7] and FM 3-21.71 [FM 7-7J]). To effectively employ any armored vehicle, leaders
must know the specific capabilities and limitations of the vehicle and its weapon systems. For example, M1series tanks provide rapid mobility as well as excellent protection and lethal, accurate direct fires. These tanks
are most effective in open terrain with extended fields of fire.

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FM 3-20.15

Air assault battalion and airborne battalion

The air assault battalion and airborne battalion are similarly organized, with three rifle companies, an
antiarmor company (with five AT platoons of four vehicles each), and a headquarters company. Tactical
movement for both is usually accomplished by a combination of air insertion and foot marches. A major
difference is in the number and types of wheeled vehicles available in each type of battalion.
The air assault battalion has six 5-ton cargo trucks and 45 HMMWVs. There is a mess section and a 17person maintenance platoon. Communications are served by 29 long-range radios. In the line companies, a
Javelin- or Dragon-equipped section within the company headquarters provides AT capability.
Once inserted, the airborne battalion performs tactically much like a light infantry battalion; walking is
the principal means of transportation. The battalion does have 10 2-1/2-ton trucks and 36 cargo HMMWVs,
allowing it to execute nontactical movement by truck. It has a mess section and a 16-member maintenance
platoon. The airborne battalion has 30 long-range radios. Its rifle squads also have antiarmor capability.

SECTION 2 - LIAISON ACTIVITIES

Light/heavy operations demand effective coordination between the tank platoon and the infantry unit it is
supporting. The following discussion covers several important areas on which light/heavy liaison activities
should focus.

TANK PLATOON CONSIDERATIONS

The tank platoon leaders first responsibility is to have a thorough tactical and technical knowledge of his
tanks systems and its logistical needs; he must understand precisely the vehicles capabilities as well as its
limitations (see Chapter 1 of this manual). Based on these factors, he then works with the infantry commander and
S3 to formulate plans to support the infantry. They maximize use of the tanks capabilities for lethal firepower,
enhanced target acquisition (including night sights), and effective armor protection. The most common
limitations they must overcome are the tanks relative lack of mobility and the need for close-in security in
restricted terrain situations and urban operations and stability and support environments.

INFANTRY CONSIDERATIONS
Besides understanding the capabilities and limitations of his tanks, the armor platoon leader must
appreciate the tactical assets and liabilities of the infantry. He must realize that infantry elements move much
more slowly than tanks over certain types of terrain. At the same time, he will learn that infantry can use terrain
very effectively to gain a positional advantage over the enemy and that terrain has a direct impact on
survivability for the infantryman.
The tank platoon leader must ensure that the controlling infantry headquarters understands that
considerations for positioning and control of the tanks crew-served direct fire weapon systems are the same as
those for the infantrys crew-served and AT weapons. In addition, he must be able to anticipate the effects of
his weapon systems on both friendly and enemy forces. As an example, he must remember that SABOT
ammunition cannot be fired over the heads or flanks of unprotected infantry because of the danger created by
the concussion of the main gun and the discarding SABOT petals of tank rounds.

ROLE OF TRAINING
Finally, light/heavy liaison activities must emphasize the importance of combined arms training. Armor
and infantry elements must train together, or they will not be able to execute combined arms operations
smoothly in combat. Ideally, this training is conducted prior to deployment. To enhance coordination and
execution, however, light/heavy forces must take advantage of every training opportunity that arises.

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FM 3-20.15

An important aspect of training is teaching leaders of light and heavy elements how to work together and
how their forces can support each other. For example, leaders must know how to communicate by digital,
radio, phone, and visual means. Other areas of the training include the following:

Infantrymen help heavy forces by finding and breaching or marking antitank obstacles. They
detect and destroy or suppress enemy antitank weapons. The infantry may also designate targets
for armored vehicles and protect them in close terrain.

Heavy forces, including the tank platoon, lead infantrymen in open terrain and provide them with

a protected, fast-moving assault weapon system. Tanks can suppress and destroy enemy
weapons, bunkers, and tanks by fire and maneuver. They can also transport infantrymen when
the enemy situation permits.

SECTION 3 - OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The following considerations apply when the tank platoon operates in support of dismounted infantry.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

As previously discussed, the tank platoon leader becomes the principal advisor to the infantry battalion
commander regarding the employment of his tanks. They may consolidate the platoon to provide a larger
antiarmor force; in some instances, the platoon or a section may be placed OPCON to support a company.
(NOTE: A section should normally be OPCON to a company for only a limited time to accomplish a specific
direct fire support mission. In longer-duration operations, the logistical demands of the armor section would
overwhelm the separate infantry companys CSS capabilities.)
The tank platoon leader and PSG maintain communications with the controlling infantry battalion
headquarters. When attached at lower levels, the platoon leader or PSG gains and maintains contact with the
company commander and talks to other platoon leaders on the company net. Individual tanks and dismounted
infantry communicate with each other using one of these techniques:

FBCB2 (digital). The TI provides situational understanding at company/troop level and above.
Leaders are responsible for ensuring proper connectivity of digital assets, which enhance their
ability to send and receive OPORDs and FRAGOs, friendly graphics, locations of adjacent units,
and known and templated threat locations.

FM radio. The infantry platoon leader uses his SOI information and contacts supporting tanks
on the tank platoon frequency. This is a fast, reliable method of communications that does not
require any additional assets.

Wire. Tank crewmen can route WD-1 wire from the VIC-1 through the loaders hatch or vision

block and attach it to a field phone on the back of the tank. (NOTE: The field phone must be
rigged inside a protective container, such as an ammo can, which is then welded, bolted, or
otherwise affixed to the tank.)

Hand-held radios.

Infantry squad radios or other short-range hand-held radios can be

distributed during the linkup to provide a reliable means of communications between infantry
and supporting TCs. These radios allow the infantry to use terrain more effectively in providing
close-in protection for the tank; infantrymen can watch for enemy elements while limiting
exposure to enemy fires directed against the tank.

Visual signals. Visual signals, as prescribed by SOP or coordinated during linkup, can facilitate
simple communications.

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FM 3-20.15

INTELLIGENCE
The tank platoon leader must obtain information from the battalion S2 on enemy capabilities, especially
those of antiarmor assets. He should focus not only on direct fire capabilities, but also on the capacity of the
enemys mines, artillery, and mortar fires to disable his vehicles.
Terrain analysis is another area of supreme importance in which the platoon leader must work closely
with the S2. They determine trafficability of the terrain, examining the effects of weather, obstacles, and
limited visibility on the speed and mobility of armored vehicles. Following this detailed analysis, TCs and
section leaders conduct a ground reconnaissance of the area of operations. The reconnaissance confirms the
trafficability of routes and aids in the effective positioning of weapon systems. The terrain analysis and
subsequent reconnaissance also confirm whether the platoon needs to employ ground guides who are
knowledgeable of the terrain and the limitations it will impose on tracked vehicle movement.

MANEUVER
When the light/heavy operation begins, either the tanks or the infantry can lead. The following discussion
of moving with infantry covers a situation in which terrain and other factors of METT-TC clearly favor the use of
infantry in the lead, supported by armor.

Tank platoon employment

When operating with infantry, the tank platoon may execute missions pure, either on its own or as part
of a tank company or cavalry troop. In such a situation, the platoon can perform one of several roles, including
the following:

Execute reserve/reaction force missions.

Attack separate objectives.
Support the advance of infantry with close-in direct fires.
When infantry leads, the platoon can be employed in one of three ways:

It can remain stationary at the battalion or company CP until called forward.

It can follow and support the infantry, staying close enough to provide direct fire support when
requested.

During company-level tactical movement, it can overwatch forward movement of the infantry
from stationary positions.

Movement considerations
Infantrymen conduct tactical movement until they identify an enemy force that halts their progress (see
Figure C-1). They deploy into position, suppress enemy AT weapons with direct and indirect fires, and request
tank support to destroy the enemy. The tanks move forward and link up with the infantry (see Figure C-2). At
the linkup point, the tank platoon or section leader (depending on the size of the supporting armor element)
dismounts and coordinates the following information with the infantry leader:

Enemy disposition.
Friendly disposition.
The tentative maneuver plan.
Any additional tactical information not already covered in the OPORD or maneuver plan,

including the use of guides, control of direct and indirect fires, close-in protection for the tank,
and communications and signal information.

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FM 3-20.15

Figure C-1. Infantry leads while tank platoon remains stationary.

Figure C-2. Tanks move forward to link up with infantry.

The armor leader (either the platoon or section leader) conducts a ground reconnaissance of the route to
the final firing position and finalizes the plan with the infantry leader. He then returns to the platoon or section
and briefs the plan to his platoon or section.
Depending on task organization and terrain factors, the tank platoon or section moves forward to the
firing position, using guides provided by the infantry (see Figure C-3). If the entire platoon is involved, one
section overwatches the movement of the lead section to the firing position. If a single section is used, the trail
vehicle must overwatch the movement of the lead vehicle to the firing position.

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FM 3-20.15

Depending on the amount of suppressive fires received, the firing tank may move to the position buttoned
up, with the ballistic doors closed (M1A2 crews may stow the CITV). This provides better protection for the
crew and helps to prevent damage to the gunners sights. At the same time, however, it degrades the tanks
target acquisition capability and makes it easier for dismounted enemy forces to attack the tank with small arms
or machine gun fires.

Figure C-3. Infantry guides tanks to the firing position.

Engagement considerations
If tank crews cannot immediately identify targets when they reach the firing position, the infantry
designates each target using tracers, mortars, smoke, or grenades fired from the M203 grenade launcher. TCs
open the ballistic doors as necessary to acquire and lase to their targets; tanks then suppress or destroy targets
using main gun or machine gun fire. When targets are destroyed, the infantry signals the tanks to cease fire (see
Figure C-4).

Figure C-4. Tanks destroy enemy targets.

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FM 3-20.15

Safety considerations
Tank and infantry leaders at all levels must be aware of the safety considerations involved in light/heavy
operations. Leader awareness and involvement is particularly important if the infantry unit has had little
training with armored vehicles. All personnel in both the light and heavy units must be aware of these
considerations to prevent unnecessary casualties.
Tank crewmen are often unable to see infantry soldiers operating close to their vehicle. This limitation is
worse during limited visibility and when the hatches are closed; in these conditions, the crew is focused on the
enemy or on potential enemy locations rather than any nearby infantrymen. It is the infantrys responsibility to
stay alert and to maintain a safe position in relation to the vehicle.
Infantry soldiers operating near tanks are exposed to the effects of any fires the enemy directs against the
vehicles. This is true whether the infantry and vehicles are moving or stationary. Proximity also severely
degrades the infantrys to avoid detection by the enemy. It therefore becomes the responsibility of infantry
leaders to maintain sufficient distance to avoid the effects of fires directed against the tanks, even when they are
required to provide security or close support.
There are additional considerations when infantry is operating near vehicles with reactive armor, which
basically explodes on impact of a chemical warhead to prevent penetration of the tanks armor. In this
explosion, however, the armor plating can disintegrate into projectiles capable of killing unprotected
infantrymen within 35 meters of the vehicle.
Tanks fire high-velocity, armor-piercing, discarding SABOT rounds that pose hazards to infantry.
Dismounted soldiers should be at 70 meters to the left or right of the line of fire and/or at least 1,000 meters to
the front of a firing tank. Any infantry within this danger area MUST have overhead cover and protection (a
berm or tree) from the rear.
The exhaust from an M1-series tank may reach more than 1,700 degrees F. Dismounted soldiers
following behind the tank must position themselves either to the side of the exhaust grill or, if they are directly
behind the vehicle, at a safe distance away.
Infantrymen may ride on tanks if conditions allow, but they must be aware of the serious safety concerns
involved. Refer to FM 3-21.8 (FM 7-8) for more information.

Considerations when tanks lead

Certain situations may require that tanks lead the infantry; this is, however, the least preferred method
of light/heavy employment. Tanks must move very slowly when they lead infantrymen (approximately 2 1/2
miles per hour). This hinders their ability to use speed as a survivability tool.
In addition, restricted terrain severely limits the mobility of the tank platoon. It further increases the
platoons vulnerability by limiting visibility for tank crews. Without the aid of infantrymen serving as guides
and providing security, tanks have a much greater chance of becoming stuck in close terrain or of being the
target of enemy fires. In these situations, the infantry must provide close-in protection and early warning
against dismounted and mounted threats. The infantrys antitank assets should stay close enough to overwatch
the tanks during tactical movement. Tank crews maintain constant communications with the infantry so they do
not outrun the ground force.
When tanks lead, the infantry maintains a standoff distance to prevent injury from the splash and
ricochet of enemy AT weapons and small arms fire aimed at the tanks. Additionally, the light/heavy force can
expect tanks to attract the attention of mortar and artillery gunners. The enemy will use indirect fires to strip
away supporting infantry and to force tank crews to button up, further reducing their ability to acquire
targets. All armor and infantry leaders must plan actions to counter the effects of these fires.

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FM 3-20.15

FIRE SUPPORT
The use and control of indirect and direct fires are critical to the effective employment of armor with
infantry.

Indirect fires
Indirect fires are used to suppress enemy AT weapons and dismounted infantry in the area of operations.
The tank platoon uses its optics to detect targets and its communications systems to initiate calls for fire in
support of infantry. In addition, the noise of mortar and artillery fires, combined with the use of smoke, helps to
conceal the movement of tanks moving forward, adding the element of surprise to the operation.

Direct fires
One of the primary assets that tanks offer in working with infantry is their ability to provide accurate,
lethal direct fires from a mobile, survivable platform. The weapon systems on each tank in the Army inventory
offer unique capabilities and limitations that must be considered in relation to infantry support; these
characteristics are covered later in this discussion.
Target acquisition. The target acquisition capabilities of the tank exceed the capabilities of all systems in
the infantry battalion. The thermal sight provides a significant capability for observation and reconnaissance. It
can also be used during the day to identify heat sources (personnel and vehicles), even through light vegetation.
Infantry units can take advantage of the tanks laser range finder to enhance their capabilities in establishing fire
control measures (such as trigger lines and TRPs) and in determining exact locations on the battlefield.
Machine guns. The TCs caliber .50 machine gun is effective against both personnel and materiel. The 7.62mm coax machine gun is an effective AP weapon. These machine guns provide a high volume of supporting
fires for the infantry.
Main gun. Although the capabilities of the main gun vary depending on the vehicle, this remains the best
antitank weapon on the battlefield. The main gun is extremely accurate and lethal at ranges up to 2,500 meters.
Tanks with stabilized main guns can fire effectively even when moving at high speeds cross-country.
All current tanks fire SABOT and HEAT rounds. These have great penetrating power against armored
vehicles, but may not have the destructive capability necessary to destroy prepared fighting positions or
penetrate walls in built-up areas. Availability of other rounds varies by tank. WP is an effective antipersonnel,
antimateriel, and antibunker weapon because of the splash of phosphorus on the target. Additionally, the
round is effective in marking targets for CAS. High explosive obstacle reducing tracer (HE-OR-T) rounds (the
XM908) have enough destructive power to destroy most prepared positions and to create large holes in walls.
The canister is an antipersonnel round that is extremely effective for area suppression.
Tank capabilities. The Armys tanks have the following firepower capabilities and limitations:

M1. The M1 carries 55 rounds and fires all main gun ammunition discussed previously. The TC can
fire the M2 caliber .50 machine gun while buttoned up, although he is exposed during reloading.
Limitations of this vehicle are that it consumes fuel at a high rate and has only limited mobility in
terrain that does not support heavy tracked vehicles.

M1A1 and M1A2. Both vehicles are limited in ammunition storage capacity (40 rounds in the

M1A1, 42 in the M1A2). They can fire SABOT, HEAT, and MPAT ammunition, as well as the
HE-OR-T and canister rounds. On the M1A1, the TC can fire the M2 caliber .50 without
exposing himself. The M1A2 TC must expose himself to fire the M2. Both vehicles consume
fuel at a high rate, and their mobility is limited in terrain that does not support heavy tracked
vehicles.

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FM 3-20.15

MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY

Although the mobility and survivability of the tank are well known, these capabilities suffer significantly
when tanks are employed by themselves in close terrain. This discussion lists techniques the tank platoon can
use to operate more safely and effectively under these conditions.
The following factors can help to enhance the tank platoons mobility in restricted terrain:

Information from the S2. As previously discussed, the S2 must provide mobility information
to the platoon leader.

Ground reconnaissance.

The platoon leader should use ground reconnaissance by a

knowledgeable member of the platoon (preferably a section leader or TC) to confirm or deny the
S2s estimate.

Ground guides. In restricted terrain, the use of ground guides is critical in leading tanks to their

firing positions, especially during periods of limited visibility. The ground guide can be either
an infantryman or the section leader who conducted the reconnaissance.

Knowledge of vehicle capabilities. The tank has an awesome ability to bull or force through

walls, small trees (up to 12 inches in diameter), wire obstacles, and other hasty barricades such
as cars or trucks blocking a road or trail. The addition of a mine plow or mine roller enhances
the tanks breaching capability, but also hinders movement in rough terrain.

Engineer support. Engineers can enhance tank mobility by spanning unfordable rivers or gaps,
reducing obstacles, and cutting down larger trees to construct hasty tank trails.

The survivability of the Armys tanks differs by system. They offer varying degrees of protection against
small arms fire, time-fuzed artillery, and AT weapons. The tank platoon can enhance the survivability of the
various systems using these techniques:

Terrain driving. The old maxim still holds true: What can be seen can be hit; what can be hit
can be killed. Every potential enemy has the ability to employ weapons that can disable or
destroy any tank. Terrain driving techniques, discussed in Chapter 3 of this manual, are still
extremely important for the tank platoon.

Overwatch. Wingman tanks or sections scan not only their sector of fire, but also the area
around moving vehicles. This enables overwatch vehicles to fire their coax machine guns to
protect the moving vehicles if they are attacked by dismounted forces.

Moving into the attack by fire position buttoned up. When tanks move into an attack by fire

position to engage a prepared enemy position, they will face intense small arms, artillery, mortar,
sniper, or AT fires. In addition to the factors listed previously, the survivability of the crew
depends on its ability to take full advantage of the armor protection of the vehicle.

Suppression. Suppression of enemy AT assets and dismounted infantry forces by artillery and
close infantry support is critical.

Having individual weapons ready. Crew members must be ready to use their M4 carbine,
M16A2, and/or 9-mm personal weapons, as well as grenades, to repulse close-in dismounted
attacks.

AIR DEFENSE
The tank platoon leader must be familiar with the air defense considerations applicable to light/heavy
operations, including ADA capabilities and employment considerations. Refer to the discussion in Chapter 6 of
this manual.

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FM 3-20.15

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

When attached to infantry, the tank platoon must prepare to operate under austere conditions. The key to
effective logistics support in this situation is to maintain a constant flow of reports updating the platoons
supply status and requirements.
In an infantry task force, the tank platoon leader and PSG will do much of their logistical coordination
directly through the battalion staff. They coordinate reporting procedures within the platoon and notify the staff
when classes of supply fall below the levels of 80 percent (identified by the code word AMBER), 70 percent
(RED), and 60 percent (BLACK). When a class of supply falls below 70 percent, the platoon leader or PSG
requests resupply.
Fuel, ammunition, recovery, and maintenance are the primary concerns of the attached platoon. Other
logistical needs are usually handled through the normal CSS functions of the battalion. These considerations
apply:

Fuel. Fuel conservation must be a priority at all times. Engines should be shut down whenever

possible. REDCON status should be used to help regulate engine start-up requirements and to
assist in operational preparations. The tank platoon can normally support infantry operations for
24 hours before refueling.

Ammunition. The tank platoons ammunition requirements present a unique challenge for the

infantry battalion. The type of rounds requested should be based on the S2s analysis to fit the
needs for direct fire support of the light/heavy mission. A basic load of ammunition should be
on hand to provide for emergency resupply during periods of heavy contact.

Recovery and maintenance. When a tank is disabled, the platoon should first attempt self-

recovery. If this is not possible, the crew makes the necessary coordination to secure the vehicle
until recovery and maintenance personnel reach it. Infantry personnel can be employed to
provide local security during recovery operations or to protect the vehicle as the attack
progresses. Recovery and maintenance assets may be part of the infantry battalions attached
slice within the brigade forward support battalion, or they may be on call from the tank platoons
parent company or troop headquarters.

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FM 3-20.15

APPENDIX D

Continuous Operations
US forces execute continuous operations to maintain constant pressure on the enemy without regard to
visibility, terrain, and weather conditions. The ability to effectively sustain this pressure is often a key to
success on the battlefield. It is also the most difficult challenge that Army units face, placing enormous stress
on soldiers, vehicles, and equipment alike. Continuous operations demand that units conduct planning,
preparation, and execution activities around the clock, at the same time maintaining OPSEC.
Numerous factors, which will vary with each situation, influence the actions and requirements of friendly
forces during continuous operations. The tempo will range from slow to fast. Some units may remain in
constant enemy contact, or under the threat of contact, for several days. Other units will operate in low-threat
areas with only a remote possibility of contact. Throughout the area of operations, the enemy will, at any given
moment, be attempting to acquire intelligence information and gain a tactical advantage.
Tank platoon leaders must understand the demands of continuous operations under all possible
conditions. They then must provide their soldiers with the training and leadership they will need to meet the
challenges of the battlefield.

CONTENTS
Section 1.
Section 2.
Section 3.

Planning and Preparation ..............................................................

Operations Security .......................................................................
Limited Visibility Operations .........................................................

Page
D-1
D-3
D-6

SECTION 1 - PLANNING AND PREPARATION

Time management is the key to success in continuous operations. During the planning and preparation
phases of an operation, the commander dictates priorities of work, rest, and security. (NOTE: OPSEC is
discussed in Section 2 of this appendix.) In conjunction with REDCON levels, these priorities enable the
platoon leader to develop his internal platoon timeline. He then uses troop-leading procedures (discussed in
Chapter 2) to outline time requirements and disseminate them to the platoon.

REDCON LEVELS
REDCON levels allow quick responses to changing situations and ensure completion of necessary work
and rest plans. The commander uses the REDCON status as a standardized way to adjust the units readiness to
move and fight (see Figure D-1).

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FM 3-20.15

REDCON-1. Full alert; unit ready to move and fight.

NBC alarms and hot loop equipment stowed; OPs pulled in.
All personnel alert and mounted on vehicles; weapons manned.
Engines started.
Platoon is ready to move immediately.

NOTE: A variant of REDCON-1 is REDCON-1(-); the same conditions apply except that the vehicles are not started in
REDCON-1(-).
REDCON-2. Full alert; unit ready to fight.

Equipment stowed (except hot loop and NBC alarms).

Precombat checks complete.
All personnel alert and mounted in vehicles; weapons manned. (NOTE: Depending on the tactical situation and
orders from the commander, dismounted OPs may remain in place.)
All (100 percent) digital and FM communications links operational.
Status reports submitted in accordance with company SOP.
Platoon is ready to move within 15 minutes of notification.

REDCON-3. Reduced alert.

Fifty percent of the platoon executes work and rest plans.

Remainder of the platoon executes security plan. Based on the commanders guidance and the enemy situation,
some personnel executing the security plan may execute portions of the work plan.
Platoon is ready to move within 30 minutes of notification.

REDCON-4. Minimum alert.

OPs manned; one man per platoon designated to monitor radio and man turret weapons.
Digital and FM links with company and other platoons maintained.
Platoon is ready to move within one hour of notification.

Figure D-1. REDCON levels.

WORK PLAN
The work plan enables TCs and crewmen to focus their efforts in preparing vehicles, equipment, and
themselves for operations. Activities designated in the timeline include, but are not limited to, the following:

Reconnaissance, as required and within capabilities.

Orders at crew and platoon level.
Crew- and platoon-level training and rehearsals.
Vehicle maintenance.
Vehicle preparation (camouflage, stowage, boresighting, communications checks).
Individual soldier preparation (training, orders, rehearsals).
Resupply (Classes I, III, and V).
Preparation of fighting positions.
Obstacle emplacement.
Crew- and platoon-level PCCs and PCIs.

REST PLAN
The rest plan allows some soldiers to sleep while other crewmen conduct priorities of work and maintain
security. To be effective in sustained combat, a soldier should get a minimum of 4 to 6 hours of uninterrupted
sleep every 24 hours. Less than 4 hours of sleep can significantly degrade combat performance.

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FM 3-20.15

Planning and decision-making are among the skills that suffer most dramatically when soldiers cannot get
enough sleep. The platoon SOP must provide for an adequate division of duties to allow leaders to get sleep.
This may require the platoon leader, PSG, and one or both of the other TCs to share duties. When soldiers are
tired, confirmation briefings and backbriefs become critical whenever orders are issued, even for the simplest
task.
Whenever possible, the tank platoon leader should coordinate with the commander to use infantrymen to
assist with security. This coordination may enable the platoon leader to rest more soldiers for longer periods of
time as the infantry mans OPs and conducts dismounted patrols to augment the security of the platoon.

SECTION 2 - OPERATIONS SECURITY

OPSEC entails all measures taken to deny the enemy information about the actions and intentions of
friendly forces. OPSEC measures consist of countersurveillance, INFOSEC, signal security, and physical
security.

COUNTERSURVEILLANCE
Maneuver units use countersurveillance measures to protect against surprise, observation, and infiltration.
The following considerations and procedures will assist the tank platoon in executing countersurveillance
operations:

Enforce noise and light discipline. Follow these procedures:

Turn off the circuit breaker for the brake lights.
Dim or cover all sources of light in the turret. Use a passive night observation device (NOD)
to check vehicles for light leaks before operations begin.
Move only when necessary.
Use headsets or the combat vehicle crewman (CVC) helmet to monitor the radio; do not use
the radios external speakers.
Do not slam hatches.
Use short-count procedures to start engines simultaneously.
Use terrain to mask resupply and maintenance areas.
Use hand-and-arm signals and digital communications whenever possible.
Do not allow smoking outdoors at night.

Use camouflage to best advantage. Follow these procedures:

Place vegetation on vehicles to break up their profile.
Drape camouflage nets over gun tubes and turrets.
Park vehicles in natural concealment, such as shadows.
Cover all headlights and optics whenever possible.
Consider the effects of dust and exhaust smoke when moving.
Minimize track, tire, and foot trails that could be detected from the air or from enemy
positions.
Drive vehicles in previously made tracks when possible.
In heavily used areas such as CPs and trains, ensure that vehicles travel on existing tracks or
roadways.

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FM 3-20.15

Maintain effective concealment. Follow these procedures:

Disperse vehicles and personnel under foliage or inside structures whenever possible.
Conceal vehicles and personnel behind objects that block the thermal line of sight of enemy
devices.
Ensure vehicles in hide positions protect against aerial observation by minimizing or
eliminating their thermal signatures.

Use challenge and password.

INFORMATION SECURITY
INFOSEC entails the protection of all materials, both classified and unclassified, that may be of
intelligence value to the enemy. Refer to the discussion in Appendix A of this manual. The following
procedures will assist the platoon in maintaining INFOSEC:

Ensure that soldiers do not put critical information in the mail. This includes unit identification,
location, and capabilities; the commanders name; and information on combat losses or morale.

Before leaving an area, police it to make sure items of intelligence value are not left behind.
SIGNAL SECURITY
The discussion of communications in Chapter 2 of this manual outlines considerations and procedures for
establishing and maintaining signal security. Refer to the discussion of INFOSEC in Appendix A.

PHYSICAL SECURITY
Physical security is the protection of materiel and equipment. (NOTE: Physical security is also an
important component of INFOSEC, as discussed in Appendix A of this manual.) The following considerations
and procedures can help the platoon maintain physical security:

When stationary, employ antiintrusion devices, such as the platoon early warning system
(PEWS), trip flares, and concertina wire.

Maintain the prescribed REDCON status. The platoon should assume REDCON-2 each morning
and evening to ensure that all crewmen are ready for action and to allow them to adjust to the
changing light conditions. As a minimum, the platoon goes to REDCON-2 from 30 minutes
before BMNT until 30 minutes after BMNT and again for a similar period at EENT.

Do not allow foreign nationals and unauthorized observers in or near the units area or positions
during operations. In accordance with ROE/ROI and the company or troop commanders intent,
establish procedures for handling civilian intruders.

Employ OPs to maintain surveillance on avenues of approach into the platoons battle space.
OBSERVATION POSTS
OPs are especially important in maintaining the platoons OPSEC and enhancing its battle space. They
help to protect the platoon when long-range observation from current positions is not possible; this can occur
when the platoon is in a hide position or when close terrain offers concealed avenues of approach to the
platoons position. OPs can be employed either mounted or dismounted.

Selection of the OP site

Before deploying an OP, the platoon leader analyzes the terrain in his sector; he also coordinates with
adjacent platoons to discover ways to enhance his own battle space and eliminate gaps in battle space between

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FM 3-20.15

units. Next, he decides on the type of OP necessary to observe the avenue of approach based on requirements
for early warning and platoon security. The platoon leader must consider the platoons reaction time based on
the REDCON status. An OP should have the following characteristics:

Clear observation of the assigned area or sector. Ideally, the fields of observation of adjacent
OPs and/or units will overlap to ensure full coverage of the sector.

Effective cover and concealment. Positions with natural cover and concealment help to reduce
the OPs vulnerability to enemy observation and attack.

Covered and concealed routes to and from the OP. Soldiers must be able to enter and leave
their OPs without being seen by the enemy.

A location that will not attract enemy attention. OPs should not be in sites that would
logically be the target of enemy observation or that would serve as artillery TRPs.

A location that does not skyline observers. Avoid hilltops. Position OPs farther down the
slope of the hill.

A location that is within range of platoon small arms fire. This enables the platoon to cover
the OP if withdrawal becomes necessary.

Mounted OPs
Mounted OPs are used when the platoon has access to hull-down or turret-down positions that afford
unobstructed surveillance of mounted avenues of approach in the platoon sector. They allow the platoon leader
to take advantage of his vehicles capabilities: magnified thermal and daylight optics, sophisticated
communications, lethal weapon systems, and enhanced survivability.
The CITV on the M1A2 is especially valuable in the mounted OP. The M1A2 can occupy a turret-down
position and use the CITV to scan the designated sector without moving its turret. All other types of vehicles
must occupy turret-down or hull-down positions that allow them to move their turrets when scanning the sector.
A common mounted OP technique is to position one vehicle to observe an engagement area or obstacle
while the remainder of the platoon occupies hide positions. Even when the mounted OP has clear fields of
observation, it is advisable to dismount one or two members of the crew to provide close-in local security for
the vehicle. The dismounted crewmen occupy positions far enough away that sounds from the vehicle do not
prevent them from hearing an approaching enemy. Another method of enhancing local security is to coordinate
with infantry elements. The infantry can conduct patrols and occupy dismounted OPs in accordance with the
company or troop commanders OPSEC plan.

Dismounted OPs
Dismounted OPs provide local security along dismounted avenues of approach whenever the platoon
must halt and occupy vehicle positions from which the terrain impedes observation or early warning of enemy
activities. They also augment or replace mounted OPs based on the commanders OPSEC plan. The tank
platoon uses the following steps to occupy, man, and improve a dismounted OP:

The platoon leader or PSG determines the need for the OP and identifies the location based on
the physical characteristics outlined previously in this section.

The platoon leader or PSG assembles OP personnel at his vehicle. (NOTE: OP personnel are
designated in the unit SOP, but are normally the loaders from wingman tanks. In two-man OPs,
one crewman observes the sector while the other provides local security. Some short-duration
OPs may consist of one crewman providing local security for individual vehicles in close
terrain.)

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FM 3-20.15

The platoon leader or PSG briefs the OP personnel to ensure that they are trained in reporting
procedures and individual camouflage techniques and that they have the proper equipment as
designated in the unit SOP. Equipment will normally include the following:
Individual weapons and M4 rifle.
Communications equipment (such as wire, flag set, flashlight, and/or radio).
Seasonal uniform with load-bearing equipment (LBE) and appropriate MOPP gear.
Binoculars and NODs.
Paper and pen/pencil for making a sector sketch.
Map with overlay.

The platoon leader or PSG leads OP personnel to the OP site and briefs them on the following
information:

When and how to report.

When and how to withdraw. The withdrawal criteria should be specific; examples include
withdrawal when an NBC attack is detected, when an enemy tank section crosses a phase line,
or when enemy dismounted infantrymen approach to within 300 meters of the OP.
Challenge and password.
When they will be replaced. As a general rule, OP personnel should be replaced every 2
hours. During cold weather, this rotation may be done more frequently.

Once in place, OP personnel take these steps to improve the position:

Establish communications.
Camouflage the position and routes into and out of it.
Prepare a sector sketch based on the platoon fire plan (see Chapter 4 of this manual).
Dig in to provide protection from indirect and direct fires. A good rule of thumb is to dig
when dismounted infantry dig. If possible, emplace hasty obstacles for additional protection.

SECTION 3 - LIMITED VISIBILITY OPERATIONS

Units conduct limited visibility operations for various reasons, such as to achieve surprise against the
enemy or gain a position of advantage by means of stealth. Darkness obviously has the most dramatic effect on
the ability of soldiers to see the battlefield. There are, however, other conditions that restrict visibility; the most
common are the following:

Dust, smoke, and other obscuration factors caused by weapon firing and movement of soldiers
and equipment

Weather conditions, including rain, snow, fog, and blowing sand and dust.
If it is to use its superior technology and basic combat skills to sustain continuous operations and destroy
the enemy, the tank platoon must train to fight effectively in all types of visibility conditions. The platoon must
first master the execution of tasks under optimum visibility conditions and then continue its training in
progressively more difficult situations.

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FM 3-20.15

EQUIPMENT
The tank platoon is equipped with the following types of equipment for use in limited visibility
conditions:

Drivers night-vision viewer. This sight is either passive (the VVS-2) or thermal (the drivers
thermal viewer [DTV]). It enhances the drivers ability to move the tank and enables him to
assist in target acquisition and to observe rounds in darkness or other limited visibility
conditions.

PVS-7. This passive-vision device enables the TC to observe from his opened hatch to control
movement and provide close-in security. There are normally two PVS-7s per tank.

Gunners primary sight and commanders extension. This integrated thermal sight gives the
gunner and TC the capability to see and engage targets under almost any visibility condition.

CITV. This is a fully integrated, full-target engagement sight on the M1A2. It provides the TC
with a redundant target acquisition and surveillance capability equivalent to that of the gunners
primary sight and the TIS. The CITV extends the TCs field of view, giving him 360-degree
observation capability independent of the gunners primary sight.

Table D-1 lists the comparative characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of passive and thermal sights.
Table D-1. Comparison of passive and thermal sights.
PASSIVE SIGHTS

THERMAL SIGHTS

1.

Limited by the amount of available

light.

1.

Not affected by light conditions.

2.

Can be washed out by bright

flashes of light.

2. Not affected by flashes of light.

3.

Narrow field of view.

3.

Choice of narrow or wide field of

view.

4.

Poor depth perception.

4.

Poor depth perception.

5.

Excellent capability for identifying

sources of light (including IR).

5.

Unable to detect sources of light.

6.

Adverse weather conditions (heavy

rain, dense fog, sandstorms, snow)
limit the range of the sight and may
render it useless.

6.

Adverse weather conditions limit the

range of the sight. On the other
hand, target acquisition capability
of the sight may exceed the
capability of the LRF to receive a
return and compute an automatic
ballistic solution.

NAVIGATION
The platoon leader uses the GPS and/or POSNAV (if available), terrain association, and the compass and
odometer method to navigate in limited visibility conditions. When they are fired to create a ground-burst
effect, artillery or mortar illumination rounds can be helpful in confirming locations. Refer to Chapter 2 of this
manual for a detailed discussion of navigation techniques.

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FM 3-20.15

VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION
The problem of vehicle identification is compounded in limited visibility conditions. TCs must be able to
distinguish vehicles of their platoon and company/troop and of other friendly elements from those of the enemy.
Most unit SOPs cover vehicle marking and identification procedures. In addition, the platoon can use the
following techniques to enhance command and control and to help prevent fratricide:

Attach color-coded lights or chemical lights to the rear of the turret or the hull.
Replace the brake light cover with color-coded plastic. Cover the headlights.
Use luminous or thermal tape to outline vehicles or to make battle boards.
Use radio and digital systems (if available) to provide the platoon with frequent updates of
friendly unit locations.

TACTICAL MOVEMENT AND ATTACKS

The fundamentals for executing tactical movement and attacks discussed elsewhere in this manual are
applicable during periods of limited visibility. The following paragraphs cover additional considerations for the
planning, preparation, and execution of these operations when visibility is restricted.

Planning
During the planning phase, the platoon leader must pay particular attention to routes, formations, and
navigational aids. He must conduct a thorough route reconnaissance to identify locations where the platoon
could become misoriented. The route reconnaissance must also focus on finding rough or restricted terrain that
will be even more difficult to negotiate with limited visibility. Such terrain may require a change in formation
or movement technique or employment of dismounted ground guides.

Preparation
In the preparation phase, the platoon leader conducts rehearsals in as many types of adverse conditions as
possible to prepare the platoon for potential command and control problems. He must stress light discipline.
During PCCs and PCIs, the platoon leader or PSG views each tank using a passive sight to ensure that sources
of light have been dimmed or covered so they are not visible to the enemy. During confirmation briefs and
rehearsals, the platoon leader must ensure that all personnel understand the platoons projected actions during
each phase of the operation. One technique is to designate waypoints or phase lines as trigger points for platoon
actions.

Execution
During the execution phase, TCs use the PVS-7 and the CITV (if available) to assist their drivers with
navigation and to enhance situational understanding. The platoon leader must assume that the enemy possesses
the same limited visibility observation capabilities as friendly units. Use of terrain to mask movement and
deployment remains critical since limited visibility may create a false sense of protection from observation.
During movement, the distance between platoon vehicles is reduced to allow vehicles to observe each other and
to decrease the time necessary to react to enemy contact.
When the platoon encounters enemy elements, an effective technique is to have the vehicle that makes
contact fire a steady burst of machine gun fire in the direction of the enemy to orient the rest of the platoon.
The platoon must adhere strictly to applicable control measures, especially those covering the employment of
direct fires.

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FM 3-20.15

LIMITED VISIBILITY DEFENSE

The defensive fundamentals covered previously are applicable in limited visibility situations; additional
considerations for planning, preparation, and execution of the defense in limited visibility are covered in the
following paragraphs.

Planning
In the planning phase, the commander, the platoon leader, and the TCs conduct a thorough
reconnaissance, usually during daylight hours, to mark positions and routes. They must keep in mind that
obscurants that limit visibility may also degrade the effectiveness of their thermal sights and laser range finders.
This may force them to designate engagement areas that are closer than anticipated to the units BPs. In
marking their positions, they use materials that will facilitate occupation either in daylight or under limited
visibility conditions.

Preparation
During the preparation phase, the platoon leader ensures that decision points, TRPs, and artillery targets
are thermalized to allow for positive identification during limited visibility. Used with a sector sketch during
direct fire engagements, thermalized TRPs also help TCs to more accurately estimate the range to their targets
when smoke or other factors inhibit the use of the LRF. Ideally, rehearsals of occupation and displacement are
conducted in limited visibility conditions; the same applies to preparation and occupation of fighting positions
and to any necessary repositioning.
OPSEC is strictly enforced during all phases of defensive preparation. OPs are critical in providing
security and early warning of enemy activities. The platoon leader emplaces mounted OPs to take advantage of
the capabilities of his vehicles thermal sights in scanning the engagement area and the platoons assigned
sector. Dismounted OPs provide local security and augment mounted OPs with shorter-range observation and
the ability to listen for approaching enemy elements.

Execution
As the platoon enters the execution phase, the platoon leader must ensure that all crewmen thoroughly
understand the occupation and displacement criteria and that TCs strictly enforce all fire control measures. TCs
use sketch cards and the CITV (if available) to estimate target range when visibility factors prevent use of the
LRF.

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FM 3-20.15

APPENDIX E

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Smoke Operations

Because many potential adversaries have the capability to employ nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons, the tank platoon must prepare to fight in an NBC environment. Collecting, processing, and
disseminating needed NBC hazard information are also vital functions. To survive and remain effective on the
integrated battlefield, the tank platoon must be proficient in the three fundamentals of NBC defense:
contamination avoidance, NBC protection, and decontamination.
Additional-duty NBC personnel should be designated by the platoon SOP for operations in an NBC
environment. Selected crews should be designated and trained as chemical agent detection teams and
radiological survey and monitoring teams.
Smoke has a variety of uses on the battlefield; it is employed extensively by enemy and friendly elements
in both offensive and defensive operations. The effectiveness of smoke depends on the type that is used and the
weather at the time it is employed. The tank platoons success on the battlefield may depend on how well
crewmen understand the effects of smoke on enemy and friendly acquisition systems in various weather
conditions.

CONTENTS
Section 1.
Section 2.
Section 3.
Section 4.
Section 5.

Contamination Avoidance ...............................................................

NBC Protection .................................................................................
Decontamination ...............................................................................
Movement in an NBC Environment .................................................
Smoke Operations ............................................................................

Page
E-1
E-3
E-13
E-16
E-16

SECTION 1 - CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE

Avoidance is the most important fundamental element of NBC defense because the best way to survive is
to avoid being the object of a chemical or nuclear attack. Avoiding contaminated areas minimizes the risk of
additional casualties; it also prevents the degradation of combat power that results when a unit must operate in
MOPP level 3 or 4 for extended periods of time. In addition, the unit is not required to spend the time and
resources needed for decontamination.

GENERAL AVOIDANCE MEASURES

Contamination avoidance measures include the following:

Using passive avoidance techniques.

Locating contaminated areas.
Identifying NBC agents.
Warning other members of the platoon as well as other units.
Reporting NBC threats to higher headquarters.

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FM 3-20.15

Passive avoidance measures can decrease the possibility of NBC attack or reduce the effects of an attack
already under way. Effective use of concealment, dispersion, prepared positions, OPSEC, and signal security
reduces the chances of being acquired as a target. The tank platoon should continually analyze its vulnerability
to chemical or nuclear attack and take appropriate protective measures.
Attacks and contamination must be detected quickly and reported to adjacent units and headquarters
elements. The tank platoon must have an effective method of quickly giving the alarm in the event of an NBC
attack. Alarms can be passed by radio, audible signals, or hand-and-arm signals. The unit SOP should specify
criteria and automatic procedures for employing detection teams and submitting the required NBC reports
following an NBC attack or when contamination is encountered.
Whenever possible, all movement routes and future positions should be reconnoitered for NBC
contamination. Quartering party personnel should be prepared to conduct monitoring operations; if they detect
contaminated areas, they identify, report, and mark them. The quartering party can then evaluate the location
and type of hazard (nuclear radiation or chemical/biological agent) to determine the best plan for bypassing,
crossing, or operating in the contaminated area. Based on the situation, the platoon leader and company
commander must be able to implement protective measures specified in the SOP to minimize personnel losses
and limit the spread of contamination.

DEFENSIVE ACTIONS BEFORE AN ATTACK

Biological defense
The key protective measure against a biological attack is maintaining a high order of health, personal
hygiene, and sanitation discipline. Biological attacks are difficult to detect. If an attack occurs, the chances of
survival are better if crew members are healthy and physically fit and maintain good personal hygiene. Keeping
the body clean helps to prevent ingestion of biological agents. Small cuts or scratches should be covered and
kept germ-free by means of soap, water, and first-aid measures. Since insects may carry biological agents,
soldiers should prevent insect bites by keeping clothes buttoned and skin covered.

Nuclear defense
The best defense against a nuclear attack is to dig in. Unit defensive positions, which range from
individual foxholes to full-scale improved fighting positions, should be prepared whenever the tactical situation
permits. Personnel should keep their individual weapons, equipment, clothing, and other issue items in their
vehicles. Inside the vehicle, equipment and any loose items must be secured because the blast wave can turn
unsecured objects into lethal missiles. Supplies, explosives, and flammable materials should be dispersed and
protected.
Reverse slopes of hills and mountains give some nuclear protection. The initial radiation and the heat and
light from the fireball of a nuclear blast tend to be absorbed by hills and mountains. The use of gullies, ravines,
ditches, natural depressions, fallen trees, and caves can also reduce nuclear casualties.

Chemical defense
General guidelines. Make sure all personnel have their protective masks available, and make sure each
mask fits and functions properly. All personnel should wear the proper protective clothing in accordance with
the MOPP level designated by the commander. Inform everyone to remain alert and to be constantly aware of
the chemical threat. Protect all equipment and supplies from liquid chemical contamination by keeping them
organized and covered.
Automatic alarm system. The automatic alarm system is the primary means of detecting an upwind
chemical attack. The system provides two essential elements of survival: detection of a toxic agent cloud and
early warning to troops in the monitored position.

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The platoon leader decides where to place the chemical alarm. In stationary operations, he first
determines the wind direction, then places available detector units upwind of the nearest position to be
protected. The detector unit should be no more than 400 meters upwind from the alarm unit. The optimum
distance is 150 meters. Operation of the alarm can be affected by blowing sand or dust, rain, sleet, snow,
tropical conditions, and temperatures below 40 degrees Fahrenheit (4.5 degrees Celsius).
Space the available detector units approximately 300 meters apart, and make sure each detector unit is
connected to each alarm unit by telephone cable (WD-1). Position the alarm units near radiotelephone
communications; this makes it easy to alert the unit to an attack.

SECTION 2 - NBC PROTECTION

Soldiers on the integrated battlefield face a combination of nuclear, biological, chemical, and
conventional attacks. If the tank platoon cannot avoid an NBC hazard, it must be prepared to protect personnel
and equipment from the effects of exposure. The type and degree of protection required will be based on the
units mission and the hazard. Note that the line between contamination avoidance and protection is not
distinct. Many actions contribute to both areas of NBC defense.

SOPs AND MOPP LEVELS

The key to effective protection in an NBC environment is the tank platoons proficiency in automatically
and correctly implementing NBC defense SOPs. Individual and unit protection against chemical attack or
contamination hinges on effective use of the MOPP and on individual proficiency in basic NBC skills. The five
levels of MOPP, illustrated in Figure E-1, should be listed in the SOP.

Figure E-1. MOPP levels.

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DEFENSIVE ACTIONS DURING AND AFTER AN ATTACK

Biological defense
After a biological attack, crewmen must assume that all surfaces have been exposed to germs. Do not eat
food or drink water that may be contaminated. Eat or drink only food or water that has been stored in sealed
containers; consume it only after washing and cleaning the outside of the container. All water must be boiled
for at least 15 minutes.
NOTE:

Refer to the battle drill for reaction to a chemical/biological attack in Chapter 3 of this manual.

Nuclear defense
Defense during a nuclear attack. This discussion focuses on defensive measures the platoon must be
prepared to take to protect tank crewmen, whether they are in their vehicle or have dismounted.
Mounted defensive actions. If time permits, the platoon should take the following actions:

Position each vehicle behind the best available cover with the front of the vehicle toward the
blast.

Point the gun away from the blast.

Lock the brakes.
Secure loose equipment inside the vehicle to prevent injuries and equipment damage.
Secure all exterior components that could be damaged by the blast (such as water cans, duffel
bags, and antennas) inside the vehicle.

Turn off all radios as well as turret and master power.

Close and lock all hatches, including ballistic shields.
Take actions to protect the head and eyes. As necessary, wear helmets and eye protection
whenever possible.

NOTE:

Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a discussion of the battle drill for reaction to a nuclear attack.

Dismounted defensive actions. Never run for cover! Immediately drop flat on the ground (face
down) or to the bottom of a foxhole, facing away from the fireball. Cover as much exposed skin as possible.
Keep eyes tightly closed. Remain down until the blast wave has passed and debris has stopped falling. Stay
calm, check for injury, check weapons and equipment for damage, and prepare to continue the mission.
Defense after a nuclear attack. Once the attack has ended, forward an NBC-1 nuclear report, organize
survivors, secure and organize equipment, repair and reinforce the BP, assist casualties, improve protection
against possible fallout, and begin continuous monitoring. If the radiation dose rate reaches a hazardous level
after fallout has ended, be prepared to move, on order, to a less hazardous area.
General guidelines. When operating in or crossing radiologically contaminated areas, vehicles should
be closed tightly. Crewmen cover their faces with a handkerchief or cloth; cargoes should be covered by tarps
or tenting. Mission permitting, vehicles should keep their speed down to prevent dust and should maintain
adequate following distance to stay out of the dust raised by preceding vehicles. After the unit exits a
contaminated area, personnel, equipment, and cargo should be checked for contamination and decontaminated,
if necessary. Dose rates should be monitored closely to ensure compliance with the applicable OEG. Radiation
exposure status (RES) should be updated, if appropriate.

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Fallout warning. The first person to detect the arrival of fallout is usually a member of the radiological
survey and monitoring team. As soon as the recorded dose rate reaches 1 centigray per hour (cGy/hr or rad per
hour) or higher, issue a fallout warning. All personnel hearing the warning relay it to others. If the mission
allows, soldiers should get into a shelter with overhead cover and stay there until given an ALL CLEAR
signal or until otherwise directed to move. If the mission does not allow the unit to take cover, decontamination
becomes more important and, in many cases, more difficult.
Supervision of radiological monitoring. Designate a point in the platoon area where readings will
be taken, and note the grid coordinates of that point. Check the monitor operator to make sure that he takes
readings at least once each hour from this point, that he zeroes the radiacmeter before taking each reading, and
that he uses the device properly. Have the operator monitor continuously if any of the following conditions
occur:

A reading of 1 cGy/hr or more is obtained.

A fallout warning is received.
A nuclear burst is seen, heard, or reported.
An order to monitor is received.
The unit begins to move.
Ensure that the operator immediately reports all readings showing the presence of radiation, as well as the
time of these readings. Use this information and the location of the readings to prepare an NBC-4 report.
Continue these operations until monitoring shows a dose rate of less than 1 cGy/hr or until directed to stop.
Supervision of tactical dosimetry. The tank platoon is normally issued two dosimeters. Select two
soldiers, one from the vehicle of each section leader, to wear them. Before the operation begins, check all
dosimeters; any that do not read zero should be turned in for recharging. If a charger is not available, note the
original reading on the dosimeter and adjust subsequent readings accordingly. Make sure dosimeter readings
are reported accurately. Collect readings at least once daily. Average these readings, round to the nearest 10,
and report this average to higher headquarters.

Chemical defense
Defense during a chemical attack. Give the alarm. Have all unmasked soldiers put on their protective
masks and other MOPP gear. All personnel should move inside their tanks; in most cases, they should place
their hatches in the closed position to protect against gross contamination. Direct the crews of vehicles that are
equipped with NBC overpressurization to turn the system on. Use M256 chemical agent detector kits to
determine the type of agent, and forward an NBC-1 chemical report. Continue the mission.
NOTE:

Tactical and safety considerations (such as observation of the terrain, enemy disposition, and the
amount of gross contamination that may be spread inside the vehicle) may outweigh the need to keep
the tanks hatches closed. Depending on the tactical situation and unit SOP, platoon members may
be required to keep their hatches in the open or open-protected position.

NOTE:

Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a discussion of the battle drill for reaction to a
chemical/biological attack.

Defense after a chemical attack. As directed by unit SOPs, forward follow-up NBC-1 chemical reports,
treat casualties, perform immediate decontamination as required, and mark the contaminated area.

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ALARMS AND SIGNALS

When an NBC attack is recognized, everyone must receive the warning and assume the appropriate
MOPP level (see Figure E-1). Soldiers in immediate danger need warnings they can see or hear. The alarm or
signal must be simple and unmistakable if it is to produce a quick and correct reaction. Units that are not
immediately affected need the information as well, either to prepare for the hazard or to change plans. If an
NBC hazard is located, the contaminated area should be marked. The NBC warning and reporting system
(NBCWRS) and standardized contamination markers contribute to orderly warning procedures.

Vocal alarms
To give a vocal alarm for any chemical or biological hazard or attack, the person detecting the hazard
stops breathing, masks, and shouts GAS! as loudly as possible. Everyone hearing this alarm must
immediately mask, repeat the alarm, and take cover from agent contamination and fragmentation of munitions.
It may also be necessary to pass the alarm over the radio or telephone. Visual signals must supplement vocal
alarms.

Automatic alarms
If an M8 automatic chemical agent alarm sounds or flashes, the first person to hear or see it stops
breathing, masks, and yells GAS! This alarm is relayed throughout the unit by vocal and visual signals and
radio.

Nonvocal alarms
One person yelling GAS! to warn unit personnel may be drowned out by the sounds of the battlefield;
therefore, sound signals by means other than voice may be required. These signals must produce noise that is
louder than, and not easily confused with, other sounds of combat. The unit SOP should specify nonvocal
alarms for NBC hazards. Following are some suggestions:

Rapid and continuous beating together of any two metal objects to produce a loud noise. Sample
SOP entry: The audible warning of a chemical attack is rapid and continuous beating of metal
on metal.

A succession of short blasts on a vehicle horn or other suitable device. Sample SOP entry: While in
convoy, five short blasts on a vehicle horn is the audible signal for a chemical attack.

An intermittent warbling siren sound. Sample SOP entry: The audible alarm for impending
chemical attack is the sounding of the installation siren as follows: 10 seconds on, 5 seconds off;
sequence repeated for 2 minutes.

Visual signals
Visual signals may replace sound alarms when the sound may be lost amid battlefield noises or when the
situation does not permit the use of sound signals. The standard hand-and-arm signal for an NBC hazard is
illustrated in Figure E-2. Signaling is done by extending both arms horizontally to the sides with the fists closed
and facing up, then rapidly moving the fists to the head and back to the horizontal position. This is repeated
until other elements react. Colored smoke or flares may also be designated as visual signals for an NBC hazard,
but these must be specified in unit SOPs.

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Figure E-2. Hand-and-arm signal for NBC hazard.

SYMPTOMS AND TREATMENT OF NBC CASUALTIES

Soldiers must be able to recognize NBC-related symptoms and conduct self-aid and buddy-aid. The basic
steps of first aid apply in any combat environment.

Biological agent casualties

Casualties resulting from live biological agents or toxins require medical treatment as quickly as possible.
One indication of a live biological agent attack is large numbers of soldiers developing an unexplained illness
over a short period of time. Soldiers showing symptoms of disease must be isolated to prevent infection from
spreading to others.
A wide variety of toxins is available to potential adversaries for use on the modern battlefield. These can
be dispensed alone or with other carriers or agents. Symptoms associated with some toxins mimic those of
other types of illness or of exposure to chemical agents. Toxin symptoms may include any of the following:

Dizziness, mental confusion, or double or blurred vision.

Formation of rashes or blisters.
Coughing.
Fever, aching muscles, and fatigue.
Difficulty in swallowing.
Nausea, vomiting, and/or diarrhea.
Bleeding from body openings or blood in urine, stool, or sputum (spit).
Shock.

These symptoms may appear within minutes after the toxin attack, or they may be delayed several hours.
Appropriate self-aid and buddy-aid measures vary, depending on the agent. Soldiers should first mask to
prevent inhaling or ingesting additional agents; then they should remove agents from exposed skin, either by
washing with soap and water or by using the M258A1/M291 kit. Soldiers use buddy-aid procedures to help
each other clean exposed skin, to observe each other for early symptoms of toxic exposure, and to request
medical assistance.

Nuclear casualties
Blast injuries. These can range from minor cuts and broken bones to severe lacerations and critical damage
to vital organs. The first-aid treatment will be the same as that used for conventional combat casualties
suffering similar injuries.

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Thermal radiation injuries. The intense heat generated by a nuclear detonation can cause burn injuries. As
with other types of burns, there are three degrees of injury:

First-degree burns should heal without special treatment, and there will be no scar formation.
Second-degree burns resemble a severe sunburn with blistering; they should be treated as a burn
to prevent infection.

In third-degree burns, the full thickness of the skin is destroyed; the victim should be treated as a
burn casualty and evacuated.

Chemical agent casualties

Chemical agents fall into four major categories: nerve, blister, blood, and choking. Their primary routes
of attack upon the body are through the respiratory system and the skin. These agents create an especially
dangerous situation because they can kill or incapacitate quickly. The first, and most important, step in dealing
with them effectively is to recognize symptoms so proper treatment can be administered.
Nerve agents. Nerve agent poisoning can lead to a quick death; for this reason, quick recognition of its
symptoms is crucial. Immediate self-aid or buddy-aid is needed if most or all symptoms appear.
Poisoning symptoms. Early symptoms usually appear in the following progression:

Runny nose.
Redness and tearing of the eyes.
Sudden headache.
Excessive flow of saliva (drooling).
Tightness in the chest, leading to breathing difficulty.
Impaired vision.
Muscular twitching in the area of exposed or contaminated skin.
Stomach cramps.
Nausea.

Severe nerve agent poisoning is likely when any of the early symptoms are accompanied by all or most of
the following symptoms:

Strange or confused behavior.

Gurgling sounds when breathing.
Severely pinpointed pupils.
Loss of bladder and/or bowel control.
Vomiting.
Convulsions.
Breathing that becomes extremely labored or stops.

Self-aid procedures. No effective drug exists to remedy the effects of nerve agents on vision. If
soldiers experience any of the other mild symptoms of nerve agent poisoning, they must perform the following
self-aid measures, which are covered in more detail in FM 4-25.11 (FM 21-11):
Step 1. Immediately put on the protective mask.
Step 2. Remove a Mark I nerve agent autoinjector kit (NAAK) from the protective mask carrier
(see Figure E-3).

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FM 3-20.15

Step 3. Inject one thigh with the first injector from the kit (atropine in the small autoinjector).
Hold the injector against the thigh for at least 10 seconds. Remove the injector.
Step 4. Immediately inject the thigh with the second injector (pralidoxime chloride in the large
injector). Hold the injector against the thigh for at least 10 seconds.
Step 5. Remove the injector and place each injector needle through the jacket pocket flap of the
overgarment, bending each needle to form a hook.
Step 6. Massage the injection area, if time permits and the overgarment suit is not contaminated.
Step 7. If symptoms persist or recur, wait 10 to 15 minutes and repeat both injections. Repeat a
third time if needed. Allow 10 to 15 minutes between each set of injections. Do not
administer more than three NAAK sets. Medical support personnel must authorize the
administration of more than three sets.

Figure E-3. Nerve agent autoinjector kit (NAAK).

Buddy-aid procedures. If a soldier experiences severe symptoms from nerve agent poisoning and is
unable to administer self-aid, another soldier must perform the following buddy-aid measures, which are
covered in more detail in FM 4-25.11 (FM 21-11):
Step 1. Mask the casualty.
Step 2. Using the victims NAAK, administer three sets immediately and in rapid succession in the
thigh muscle of either leg. Do not wait between injections.
Step 3. Administer the back-pressure armlift method of artificial respiration if the casualtys
breathing is labored or has stopped.
Step 4. Hook the expended autoinjectors to the casualtys overgarment jacket pocket flap.
Step 5. If necessary to stabilize the casualtys heart rate, administer the convulsive antidote nerve
agent (CANA) injection Diazepam, commonly known as 2 ml Valium (see Figure E-4).
Use the following procedure:

Tear open the protective plastic packet and remove the injector.

Grasp the injector with the needle (black) end extending beyond the thumb and two
fingers (index plus next finger).

With the other hand, pull the safety cap off the injector base to arm the injector.
(CAUTION: Do not touch the black portion, which is the injector needle. You could
accidentally inject yourself.)

Place the black end of the injector against the casualtys injection site.

Push the injector into the muscle with firm, even pressure until it functions.

Hold the injector in place for at least 10 seconds.

Push the needle of each used injector (one at a time) through one of the pocket flaps of
the casualtys protective overgarment and, being careful not to tear protective gloves
or clothing, bend each needle to form a hook.
Step 6. Obtain immediate medical attention for the victim.
NOTE:

This information is covered in task 031-503-1013, Decontaminate Yourself and Individual

Equipment Using Chemical Decontamination Kits.

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Figure E-4. Convulsive antidote nerve agent (CANA) injector.

Blister agents. Casualties resulting from blister agents may not be noticeable immediately. Symptoms may
take several hours or days to appear. They include the following:

Redness or inflammation of the eyes.

Temporary blindness or, with severe poisoning, permanent blindness.
Itching, burning, or reddening of the skin.
Welts or, in an advanced state, blisters on the skin.
Hoarseness.
Coughing.
Difficult or labored breathing.
Stomach pain.
Nausea.
Vomiting.
Diarrhea.
If a blister agent comes in contact with skin or eyes, remove it immediately. To remove an agent from the
eyes, flush repeatedly with plain water. Decontaminate the skin using the M258A1/M291 kit. If severe blisters
form, seek medical attention as soon as possible.
Blood agents. A seemingly mild case of blood agent poisoning can progress to death within 10 minutes.
Symptoms include the following:

Rapid or shallow respiration (panting).

Headache.
Dizziness or giddiness.
Red or pink color change in light-colored skin.
Convulsions.
Coma.
There is no self-aid or buddy-aid treatment for blood agent poisoning. Victims must receive immediate
medical attention.
Choking agents. These agents produce casualties by means of inhaled vapors. They damage blood vessels
in the lung walls, causing body fluid to slowly fill the lung cavity. Ordinary field concentrations do not cause
death, but prolonged exposure to high concentrations of the vapor, coupled with neglect or delay in masking,
can be fatal. Maximum damage will occur between 12 and 24 hours after exposure. In most cases, the excess
fluid in the lungs will absorb back into the body. Slow recovery will begin approximately 48 hours after
exposure.

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During and immediately after exposure, choking agent symptoms may include the following:

Coughing.
Choking.
Tightness in the chest.
Nausea.
Headache.
Tearing of the eyes.
Following the early symptoms, a symptom-free period of 2 to 24 hours is likely. This will be followed by
these signs of fluid collecting in the lungs:

Rapid, shallow breathing.

Painful coughing.
Blue lips and fingernails.
In severe cases, clammy skin and rapid heartbeat.
No self-aid or buddy-aid treatment exists for choking agent symptoms. If only minimum amounts were
inhaled, the soldier may continue with normal duties. If definite symptoms occur, the soldier should keep warm
and seek immediate medical attention and rapid evacuation to an aid station.

MARKING CONTAMINATED AREAS

Contamination must be marked so unsuspecting personnel will not be exposed to it. When platoon
monitoring teams detect or suspect an NBC hazard, they mark all likely entry points into the area and report the
contamination to higher headquarters. The only exception to this policy is if marking the area would help the
enemy. If this exception is made by the commander, the hazard must still be reported to protect friendly units.

Types of markers
U.S. forces use NATO standard markers (illustrated in Figure E-5) to make it easier for allies to recognize
the hazards. These markers are in the standard NBC marking set. The colors and inscriptions on a marker
indicate the type of hazard. Additional information is written on the front of the sign.

Marking procedures
Markers face away from the contamination. For example, if markers are placed on the edge of a
contaminated area to mark a radiological hot spot, they face away from the point of the highest contamination
reading. Markers are placed along roads and trails and at other likely points of entry. When time and mission
permit, additional markers should be emplaced. The distance between signs varies. In open terrain, they can be
placed 25 to 100 meters apart; in hilly or wooded areas, they should be placed more frequently. An observer
should be able to stand in front of a marker and see the markers to the left and right of it.
Units discovering a marked contaminated area do not have to conduct elaborate, time-consuming surveys.
They simply check the extent of contamination and use the information to adjust their plans, if necessary. If the
size of the hazard has changed, they relocate the signs. If the hazard is gone, they remove the signs. Changes
are reported to higher headquarters.

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Figure E-5. NBC marking devices.

UNMASKING PROCEDURES
Soldiers should unmask as soon as possible except when a live biological or toxin attack is expected. Use
the following procedures to determine if unmasking is safe.

Unmasking with M256/M256A1 kit

If an M256/M256A1 detector kit is available, use it to supplement the unmasking procedures. The kit
does not detect all agents; therefore, proper unmasking procedures, which take approximately 15 minutes, must
still be used. If all tests with the kit (including a check for liquid contamination using M8 detector paper) have
been performed and the results are negative, use the following procedures:

The senior person should select one or two soldiers to start the unmasking procedures. If
possible, they move to a shady place; bright, direct sunlight can cause pupils in the eyes to
constrict, giving a false symptom.

The selected soldiers unmask for 5 minutes, then clear and reseal their masks.
Observe the soldiers for 10 minutes. If no symptoms appear, request permission from higher
headquarters to signal ALL CLEAR.

Watch all soldiers for possible delayed symptoms. Always have first-aid treatment immediately
available in case it is needed.

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Unmasking without M256/M256A1 kit

If an M256/M256A1 kit is not available, the unmasking procedures take approximately 35 minutes.
When a reasonable amount of time has passed after the attack, find a shady area. Use M8 paper to check the
area for possible liquid contamination. Conduct unmasking using these procedures:

The senior person selects one or two soldiers. They take a deep breath and break their mask
seals, keeping their eyes wide open.

After 15 seconds, the soldiers clear and reseal their masks. Observe them for 10 minutes.
If no symptoms appear, the same soldiers break the seals, take two or three breaths, and clear and
reseal their masks. Observe them for 10 minutes.

If no symptoms appear, the same soldiers unmask for 5 minutes, then remask.
If no symptoms appear in 10 minutes, request permission from higher headquarters to signal
ALL CLEAR. Continue to observe all soldiers in case delayed symptoms develop.

ALL-CLEAR SIGNAL
Units pass the all-clear signal by word of mouth through their chain of command. Leaders initiate the
signal after testing for contamination proves negative. The commander designates the specific all-clear signal
and includes it in the unit SOP or the OPORD. If required, standard sound signals may be used, such as a
continuous, sustained blast on a siren, vehicle horn, or similar device. When ALL CLEAR is announced on
the radio, the receiving unit must authenticate the transmission before complying.

WARNING AND REPORTING SYSTEMS

The NBCWRS is a rapid means of sending reports of an NBC attack. These reports inform other affected
units of clean areas and possible contamination. They are also used to provide this information up and down the
chain of command and to adjacent units.
Each report has a specific purpose and uses standard codes to shorten and simplify the reporting process.
For a detailed outlined of the formats and letter codes for the standard NBC reports, refer to FKSM 17-15-3.

SECTION 3 - DECONTAMINATION
During continuous operations in areas of nuclear or chemical contamination, decontamination is essential
in preventing casualties and severe combat degradation. The tank platoon gains maximum benefit from the
available time and decontamination resources by observing these considerations:

The platoon should execute decontamination as soon as possible and as far forward as possible.
Decontamination should be conducted only to the extent that is necessary to ensure the platoons
safety and operational readiness.

Decontamination priorities with regard to unit safety and mission accomplishment should be
strictly observed.

These principles are consistent with doctrine that places the burden of decontamination at battalion or
company level. For this reason, the tank platoon must develop a thorough SOP covering decontamination
methods and priorities, using all available assets to the maximum extent possible.
Refer to FM 3-11.5 (FM 3-5) for a more detailed examination of NBC decontamination procedures.

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IMMEDIATE DECONTAMINATION
Immediate decontamination is a basic soldier survival skill. Any contact between chemical or toxic
agents and bare skin should be treated as an emergency. Some agents can kill if they remain on the skin for
longer than a minute.

Skin decontamination kit

The best technique for removing or neutralizing these agents is to use the M258A1/M291 skin
decontamination kit. Leaders must ensure that their soldiers are trained to execute this technique automatically,
without waiting for orders.

Personal wipedown
Personal wipedown should begin within 15 minutes of contamination. The wipedown removes or
neutralizes contamination on the hood, mask, gloves, and personal weapon. For chemical and biological
contamination, soldiers use packets from the M280 decontamination kit. For radiological contamination,
soldiers wipe the contamination off with a cloth or simply flush or shake it away.

Operators spraydown
Operators spraydown of equipment should begin immediately after completion of personal wipedown.
The spraydown removes or neutralizes contamination on the surfaces operators must touch frequently to
perform their mission. For chemical and biological contamination, operators can use on-board decontamination
apparatuses like the M11/M13. For radiological contamination, they brush or scrape the contamination away
with whatever is at hand or flush it with water and wipe it away.

OPERATIONAL DECONTAMINATION
Operational decontamination allows a force to continue fighting and sustain momentum after being
contaminated. It limits the hazard of transferring contamination by removing most of the gross contamination
on equipment and nearly all the contamination on individual soldiers.
Operational decontamination speeds the weathering process and allows clean areas (people, equipment,
and terrain) to stay clean. When they complete the decontamination process, soldiers who have removed
sources of vapor contamination from their clothing and equipment can use hazard-free areas to unmask
temporarily and eat, drink, and rest.
Operational decontamination is accomplished using assets of the parent unit. It makes use of two
decontamination techniques:

Vehicle washdown.
MOPP gear exchange.
These procedures can be performed separately from each other; both are best performed at crew level.
Uncontaminated vehicles and personnel should not go through either technique.

Vehicle washdown
Vehicle washdown is conducted as far forward as possible and is performed by the battalion decontamination
specialist with assistance from the company or troop decontamination team. It is most effective if started within one
hour after contamination. There are two steps in vehicle washdown:
Step 1. Button up the vehicle and secure equipment.
Step 2. Wash down the vehicle and equipment with hot, soapy water for two to three minutes.

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Because speed is important, do not check vehicles for contamination after vehicle washdown. Remove
only gross contamination.

MOPP gear exchange

There are eight steps in a MOPP gear exchange:
Step 1. Decontaminate gear and set it aside.
Step 2. Decontaminate hood and gloves, and roll up hood.
Step 3. Remove overgarment.
Step 4. Remove overboots and gloves.
Step 5. Put on new overgarment.
Step 6. Put on new overboots and gloves.
Step 7. Secure hood.
Step 8. Secure gear.
MOPP gear exchange is best performed using the buddy system. Both soldiers perform Step 1. Steps 2
through 7 are performed first by one soldier, then by the other. Both soldiers perform Step 8. The company or
troop assists the platoon by bringing replacement overgarments and decontaminants to the exchange site.

THOROUGH DECONTAMINATION
Thorough decontamination operations restore the combat power of maneuver units by removing nearly all
contamination from soldiers and individual equipment. Executed promptly and correctly, these detailed procedures reduce the danger of contamination exposure to negligible risk levels. Just as important, they allow
soldiers to operate equipment safely for extended periods at reduced MOPP levels.

Procedures
Contaminated units conduct detailed troop decontamination (DTD) for their crewmen under the
supervision of the chemical unit. When detailed equipment decontamination (DED) operations are required, the
chemical unit usually selects a site, sets it up, and performs detailed procedures with assistance from the
contaminated unit.
After completing thorough decontamination, the unit moves into an adjacent assembly area for
reconstitution. Support elements from the brigade, division, or corps support area replenish combat stocks, refit
equipment, and replace personnel and equipment. The newly reconstituted unit leaves the assembly area fully
operational and fit to return to battle. A small risk from residual contamination remains, so periodic
contamination checks must be made following this operation.

Limitations and alternatives

Thorough decontamination is usually conducted as part of an extensive reconstitution effort in brigade,
division, and corps support areas; support sites at lower levels cannot provide the quantities of decontamination
resources (such as water, decontaminants, and time) required for such an extensive process. In some cases, a
contaminated unit can conduct a thorough decontamination operation with organic assets, but armor units
usually must depend on support from a chemical unit.
Thorough decontamination does the most complete job of getting rid of contamination and related
hazards, but as noted, it requires large quantities of valuable resources that may not be immediately available.
In addition, under a variety of tactical or operational conditions, it will be impossible to execute such a major
effort. The next best solution is to decontaminate only to the extent necessary to sustain the force and allow it
to continue the mission. This entails using a combination of immediate and operational decontamination
procedures.

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SECTION 4 - MOVEMENT IN AN NBC ENVIRONMENT

As with other combat elements, one of the basic tactical requirements for the tank platoon is to be able to
move through and operate in a contaminated area. To do so safely, the platoon should follow the procedures
outlined in this section.

CROSSING A CHEMICALLY OR BIOLOGICALLY CONTAMINATED AREA

Upon identifying a contaminated area, each tank crew makes preparations to cross. While one section
provides security, the other section, positioned in a covered and concealed location, removes all externally
stowed equipment. Crews mount and test M8A1 alarms and M9 paper. They adopt MOPP level 4 or prepare
the vehicles overpressure system (if it is available and METT-TC factors permit). Once the sections
preparations are complete, it moves into an overwatch position; the other section moves to a covered and
concealed position and follows the same procedures.
When both sections have been prepared, they use standard tactical movement techniques (such as
bounding overwatch) to cross the contaminated area. During this movement, the crews continuously monitor
the M8A1 and the M9 paper.
Drivers and TCs take precautions to avoid low ground, overhanging branches, and brushy areas as much
as possible. While the platoon is in the contaminated area, all personnel observe each other for signs of
chemical poisoning.
Once the platoon has successfully crossed the contaminated area, it makes a temporarily halt. During the
halt, detection teams monitor for the presence of chemical agents. Each crew in turn executes operational
decontamination of its vehicle and, with higher headquarters approval, initiates unmasking procedures. Once
these procedures are complete, the platoon continues its mission.

CROSSING A RADIOLOGICALLY CONTAMINATED AREA

The procedures involved in crossing a radiologically contaminated area are similar to those for a
chemically or biologically contaminated area, with the following additional considerations:

Vehicle preparation. Crews may store external equipment in the turret or cover it with a tarp.

This prevents contaminated dust particles from accumulating on the equipment. Place wet
sandbags or other materials on the turret floor to increase the amount of radiation shielding.
When available, turn on the turret overpressure system to protect the crew compartment from
contaminated dust.

Movement. Vehicles should limit their speed to minimize dust. In addition, they must maintain
the correct dust interval.

Monitoring. Ensure IM-93 dosimeters are zeroed. Conduct continuous monitoring and report
the results of dosimeter and radiacmeter surveys to higher headquarters and adjacent units.

Decontamination. During decontamination, each crewman should cover his nose and mouth
with a handkerchief or cloth to avoid breathing contaminated dust particles.

SECTION 5 - SMOKE OPERATIONS

One of the key features of the modern battlefield is the extensive use of smoke. Effectively employed,
smoke is a combat multiplier. It can be used for identification, signaling, obscuration, deception, or screening.
At the same time, employment of smoke must be carefully planned and coordinated to prevent interference with
friendly units.

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As it prepares for an operation, the tank platoon should plan to take advantage of smoke from all available
sources. Mission accomplishment, however, should never depend on smoke for success; the platoon must
develop alternative plans in case smoke delivery systems are not available.

USES OF SMOKE
Smoke has four general uses on the battlefield, as described in the following discussion.

Identification and signaling

Smoke is used to identify (mark) targets, supply and evacuation points, and friendly positions during CAS
operations. As a means of prearranged battlefield communications, it can be employed to initiate such
operations as displacement.

Obscuration
Smoke can be fired on enemy positions to degrade the vision of gunners and known or suspected OPs,
preventing them from seeing or tracking targets and thereby reducing their effectiveness. Employed against an
attacking force, nonthermal smoke can cause confusion and disorientation by degrading the enemys command
and control capabilities; at the same time, friendly units retain the ability to engage the enemy using thermal
sights and range bands. In addition, enemy vehicles become silhouetted as they emerge from the smoke. If
smoke employment is planned and executed correctly, this will occur as the enemy reaches the trigger line.
Figure E-6 illustrates this use of smoke.

Figure E-6. Using smoke to confuse the enemy

and silhouette his vehicles.

Deception
Smoke can mislead the enemy regarding friendly intentions. For example, it can be employed on several
avenues of approach at once to deceive the enemy as to the direction of the main attack. In the defense, smoke
may be fired at a remote location for the sole purpose of attracting attention and confusing the enemy.

Screening
Smoke is used in friendly areas of operation or in areas between friendly and enemy forces to degrade enemy
ground and aerial observation and to defeat or degrade enemy acquisition systems. Screening smoke helps to conceal
the platoon as it displaces from a BP or as it conducts tactical movement approaching enemy positions. Smoke can
also be employed to conceal a platoon as it conducts a bypass, breach, or assault mission. Figures E-7 through E-9
illustrate uses of screening smoke.

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Figure E-7. Using screening smoke to conceal displacement.

Figure E-8. Using screening smoke to conceal a bypass.

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Figure E-9. Using screening smoke to conceal

a breaching operation.

SOURCES OF SMOKE
There are a number of sources of smoke on the battlefield, including the residual effects of burning
vehicles, equipment, and storage facilities. Depending on availability, the tank platoon can employ the
following smoke delivery systems during tactical operations.

Mortars
Mortar support, provided by the battalion task force mortar platoon or cavalry troop mortar section, is the
most rapid and responsive means of indirect smoke delivery. The tank platoon leader coordinates the planning
and execution of mortar smoke missions with the commander and the company or troop FIST. Mortars use WP
rounds, which can degrade the effectiveness of thermal sights.

Field artillery
FA can place smoke on distant targets. Artillery-delivered smoke is not as responsive as mortar smoke
support and may not be available if it is not planned and coordinated well in advance. Artillery smoke is made
up of hexachloroethane (HC) and has less effect on thermal sights than does WP smoke.

Smoke pots
These produce a large volume of white or grayish-white smoke that lasts for extended periods. The
smoke has minimal effect on thermal sights. This is the only system that floats on water and that can be
delivered by hand or vehicle. The tank platoon will normally employ smoke pots to screen displacement or
breaching operations.

Hand-held smoke grenades

These can produce white or colored smoke. White smoke grenades are most often used to screen
individual vehicles. Colored smoke grenades are primarily used to signal displacement and other critical events
or to identify (mark) friendly unit positions and breach and evacuation locations. Smoke from hand-held
grenades has minimal effect on thermal sights.

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Vehicle smoke grenade launchers

Grenade launchers, which can produce a limited amount of smoke, are used as a self-defense measure to
screen or conceal the vehicle from enemy antitank gunners. They can also be used to screen individual vehicle
displacement. Smoke from vehicle-launched grenades can degrade thermal sights.

Vehicle engine exhaust smoke system

The VEESS injects diesel fuel into the engine exhaust to produce smoke. It serves primarily as a selfdefense measure for individual vehicles, but a tank crew can also employ it to screen other friendly vehicles if
wind conditions and the direction of vehicle movement allow. This system consumes fuel at the rate of 1 gallon
per minute of operation.

CAUTION
VEESS will be used only when the vehicle is burning diesel fuel. Use of VEESS when burning
any other type of fuel will cause a fire hazard.

White phosphorus rounds

If available, WP rounds from the tank main gun can be employed as a marking device for CAS, as a
means of marking TRP locations to control direct fires, and as a means of igniting a fire. Most basic loads do
not include WP rounds. WP smoke degrades thermal sights.

Tactical smoke generators

These wheel- or track-mounted devices are available through the division chemical company. Their use is
prescribed at brigade or battalion level. This type of smoke normally does not affect thermal sights.

TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN SMOKE OPERATIONS

Weather
The effectiveness of smoke in tactical situations (including the time required to build the cloud and cloud
duration) depends in large measure on the weather. Wind direction, wind speed, humidity, and cloud cover are
important considerations. If the wind is strong or blowing in the wrong direction, it may be impossible to
establish an effective smoke screen. Smoke clouds build up faster and last longer the higher the humidity and
the greater the cloud cover. The best time to use smoke is when the ground is cooler than the air.

Factors in selecting the type of smoke employed

Certain types of smoke will degrade visual, infrared, and thermal sights. Enemy capabilities and the
desired effect of the smoke (such as screening or obscuration) will dictate what type is requested. (NOTE:
Even types of smoke that do not affect thermal sights may prevent the tanks laser range finder from computing
an accurate ballistic solution. Under such conditions, crewmen must rely on such techniques as range bands,
range estimation, and battlesighting.)

Navigation
Navigational aids such as POSNAV, GPS, and thermal sights assist individual vehicles during movement
through smoke, while IVIS and other digital systems help the platoon leader to maintain situational
understanding and control of the platoon. The platoon leader also decreases the interval between vehicles to
further enhance control of the platoon.

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Maneuver
Offense. A defending enemy may employ smoke to confuse and disorient the attacker. Whenever the platoon
is traveling through smoke, whether it is of friendly or enemy origin, the platoon leader must remember that his
tanks will be silhouetted as they emerge from the smoke. The critical consideration is for all vehicles to emerge
at the same time. The navigational tools discussed previously enable the platoon leader to maintain command
and control during movement and to ensure that the platoon is postured, as it exits the smoke, to mass fires
against previously unidentified enemy vehicles.
During an assault, friendly smoke should be shifted in advance of the arrival of the assault element. The
use of multispectral smoke for obscuration must be carefully planned. The duration of the effects of the smoke
should be controlled based on the capability of enemy and friendly units to acquire and engage targets through
the smoke and on the ability of friendly units to maintain situational understanding during movement.
Defense. An attacking enemy may employ smoke on the tank platoons positions or in the platoons
engagement area. As noted, this may not only blind thermal sights but also prevent laser range finders from
accurately computing ballistic data. One solution is to occupy alternate BPs that conform to the commanders
intent but that are not obscured by smoke (see Figure E-10).
If multispectral smoke does not disable thermal sights, the TC can use sector sketches with grid lines,
range bands, and TRPs to estimate the target range in the absence of a laser-computed range. On the M1A2, the
choke sight of the CITV enables the TC to estimate and input ranges for a ballistic solution.

Figure E-10. Tank platoon occupying an alternate battle position

that is not obscured by enemy smoke.

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APPENDIX F

Stability Operations and Support Operations

Stability operations apply military power to influence the political environment, to facilitate diplomacy, or
to interrupt or prevent specific illegal activities. These operations cover a broad spectrum. At one end are
development and assistance activities aimed at enhancing a governments willingness and ability to care for its
people. At the other are coercive military operations; these involve the application of limited, carefully
prescribed force, or the threat of force, to achieve specific objectives.
U.S. military forces conduct support operations to assist designated groups by providing essential supplies
and services in the face of adverse conditions, usually those created by man-made or natural disasters. Mission
success in support operations, which are normally characterized by the lack of an active opponent, is measured
in terms of the ability to relieve suffering and to help civil authorities respond to crises. Primary goals of these
operations are to meet the immediate needs of the supported groups and to transfer responsibility quickly and
efficiently to appropriate civilian authorities.

CONTENTS
Page
Section 1.

General Considerations .................................................................

F-1

Section 2.

Stability Operations ........................................................................

F-2

Section 3.

Support Operations ........................................................................

F-13

Section 4.

Examples of Stability Operations and Support Operations ........

F-17

SECTION 1 - GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The tank platoon has unique capabilities that make it an important asset to Army units executing missions
as part of stability operations and support operations. The platoon may be called upon to perform a variety of
missions in a wide range of political, military, and geographical environments and in both combat and
noncombat situations. These operations will almost always be decentralized and can require the tank platoon
leader to make immediate decisions that may have strategic or operational consequences. The distinction
between these roles and situations will not always be clear, presenting unique challenges for the platoon, its
leaders, and its crewmen.
NOTE:

U.S. Army policy normally does not allow a unit to modify its warfighting mission essential task list
(METL) unless and until the unit is selected for stability operations and support operations. Only
then should a unit train for specific mission-related tasks. Chief among these are operations with
very restrictive ROE/ROI and orientation on the area, its culture, and the nature of the conflict.

Peacetime
In peacetime, a variety of measures are employed to achieve national objectives; these include political,
economic, and informational measures, as well as military actions short of combat operations or active support
of warring parties. Within this environment, U.S. forces may conduct training exercises to demonstrate national
resolve; conduct peacekeeping operations; participate in nation-building activities; conduct disaster relief and
humanitarian assistance; provide security assistance to friends and allies; or execute shows of force.
Confrontations and tensions may escalate during peacetime to reach a point of transition into a state of conflict.

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Conflict
Conflict can encompass numerous types of situations, including the following:

Clashes or crises over boundary disputes and land and water territorial claims.
Situations in which opposing political factions engage in military actions to gain control of
political leadership within a nation.

Armed clashes between nations or between organized parties within a nation to achieve limited
political or military objectives.

While regular military forces are sometimes involved, the use of irregular forces frequently predominates
in conflict actions. Conflict is often protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and limited in
weaponry and level of violence. In this state, military response to a threat is exercised indirectly, usually in
support of other elements of national power. Limited objectives, however, may be achieved by the short,
focused, and direct application of military force. Conflict approaches the threshold of a state of war as the
number of nations and/or troops, the frequency of battles, and the level of violence increase over an extended
time.
Stability operations and support operations involving tank platoons occur most often in the state of
peacetime. Refer to Section 4 of this appendix for examples of stability and support situations in which the tank
platoon may participate.

SECTION 2 - STABILITY OPERATIONS

Stability operations are conducted outside the United States and U.S. territories to promote and protect
U.S. national interests by influencing political, civil, and military environments and by disrupting specific
illegal activities. These goals are accomplished by supporting diplomatic initiatives, improving military-tomilitary relations, and by deterring or resolving conflict. Their overarching purpose is to promote and sustain
regional and global stability. Stability operations encompass a range of actions that shape the strategic
environment and respond to developing crises. The military activities that support stability operations are
diverse, continuous, and often long term in nature.

CHARACTERISTICS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

Stability operations are normally executed in the context of the geographic combatant commanders
theater strategy. Commanders employ military forces to complement and reinforce the other elements of
national power as part of their theater engagement plan (TEP).
Stability operations may include both developmental and coercive actions. Developmental actions
enhance a host-nation governments willingness and ability to care for its people. Coercive actions apply
carefully prescribed limited force or threat of force to change the environment of the area of operations (AO).
Military forces conduct stability operations to accomplish one or more of the following activities:

Protect national interests (as defined by the National Command Authority).

Promote peace/deter aggression.
Satisfy treaty obligations or enforce agreements and policies.
Reassure allies, friendly governments, and agencies.
Encourage a weak or faltering government.
Maintain or restore order.

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Protect life and property.

Demonstrate resolve.
Prevent, deter, or respond to terrorism.
Reduce the threat of conventional arms and WMD to regional security.
Eliminate or contain subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
THE ARMYS ROLE IN STABILITY OPERATIONS
Army forces are particularly well suited for stability operations because they are trained, equipped, and
organized to control land, populations, and situations for extended periods of time. The depth and breadth of
Army force capabilities provide the commander vital options to meet theater operational requirements. This
routinely includes conducting peace operations (PO), military-to-military contacts, humanitarian demining
operations, and multinational training exercises or exchanges.
Stability operations are inherently complex and place greater demands at the small-unit level. Junior
leaders are required to develop engagement skills while maintaining warfighting skills. Capable, trained,
disciplined, high-quality leaders, soldiers, and teams are especially critical to success. Soldiers and units at
every level must be flexible and adaptive. Often stability operations require the mental and physical agility to
shift from noncombat to combat operations and back again.
Stability operations conducted by Army forces complement and are complemented by offensive,
defensive, and support operations. Stability operations help restore law and order during support operations in
unstable areas. Offensive and defensive operations may be necessary to defeat adversaries intent on preventing
the success of a stability operation. Shows of force often precede offensive and defensive operations in
attempts to deter aggression and provide opportunities for diplomatic and economic solutions. The ability of
Army forces to stabilize a crisis is directly related to its ability to attack and defend.
Army forces may conduct stability operations before hostilities, in crisis situations, during hostilities, and
after hostilities. Before hostilities begin, stability operations focus on deterring or preempting conflict. In a
crisis situation, a stability operation may resolve a potential conflict or prevent escalation. During hostilities, it
can help keep armed conflict from spreading and assist and encourage committed partners. Following
hostilities, it can provide a secure environment for civil authorities to work in to regain control.

Peacetime military engagement (PME)

PME activities are stability operations designed to have a positive impact on the regional security
environment and preclude conflict. The objectives of peacetime military engagements are to open
communication, increase interoperability, increase regional military professionalism, educate a host-nations
forces on the role of the military in a democracy, and increase regional stability. Examples of peacetime
engagement activities include multinational training exercises, individual training and observers, medical and
engineer projects and exercises, and staff information exchanges.

Rapid response and preclusion

Rapidly responding in the early stages of an imminent or on-going crisis is a critical component of
stability operations. For example, rapidly responding to a smaller-scale contingency (SSC) can defuse a crisis
situation and restore regional stability. The deployed force must be capable of conducting decisive offensive
and defensive operations to achieve successful preclusion.

Presence and deterrence

Presence promotes a secure environment in which diplomatic and economic programs designed to
eliminate root causes of instability may flourish. It can take the form of forward basing, forward deploying, or
pre-positioning assets in an AO.

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Deterrence for both smaller regional conflicts and MTWs is the sustainable presence of strong, capable
ground forces. If deterrence fails, or if required, Army forces must be ready to transition to decisive combat
operations. Effective deterrent forces should ideally be capable of conducting decisive operations immediately.

TYPES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

Peace operations
Peace operations encompass three general areas: diplomatic activities (peacemaking and peace building),
traditional peacekeeping, and threatened or actual forceful military operations (peace enforcement). The tank
platoon may participate in peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations.
Peacekeeping operations. A peacekeeping force facilitates truce negotiations and political settlement of
disputes. In doing so, it must assure each side in the dispute that other parties are not taking advantage of
settlement terms to their own benefit. Peacekeeping differs from internal security in that the force does not act
in support of a government. Rather, the peacekeeping force must remain entirely neutral; if it loses a reputation
for impartiality, its usefulness within the peacekeeping mission is destroyed.
Peace enforcement. Several unique characteristics distinguish peace enforcement activities from wartime
operations and from other stability operations. The purpose of peace enforcement is to maintain or restore
peace under conditions broadly defined at the international level. It may entail combat, armed intervention, or
physical threat of armed intervention. Under provisions of an international agreement, the brigade and its
subordinate elements, including the tank platoon, may be called upon to use coercive military power to compel
compliance with international sanctions or resolutions.

Operations in support of diplomatic efforts

Forces may conduct operations in support of diplomatic efforts to establish peace and order before,
during, and after a conflict. These operations include preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building.
Military support of diplomatic activities improves the chances for success by lending credibility to diplomatic
actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political settlements.
Preventive diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy is diplomatic action taken in advance of a predictable crisis to
prevent or limit violence. Army forces are not normally directly involved in preventive diplomacy but may
support a state department effort by providing transportation and communications assets. In some cases,
military forces may conduct a preventive deployment or show of force as part of the overall effort to deter
conflict.
Peacemaking. Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful
settlement that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves the issue that led to the conflict. It includes military
actions that support the diplomatic process. Army forces participate in these operations primarily by
performing military-to-military contacts, exercises, peacetime deployments, and security assistance.
Peace building. Peace building consists of post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic
that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.
Military actions that support peace building are designed to identify, restore, and support structures that
strengthen and solidify peace. Typical peace building activities include restoring civil authority, rebuilding
physical infrastructure, providing structures and training for schools and hospitals, and helping reestablish
commerce.

Foreign internal defense

Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any action
programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and
insurgency. The main objective is to promote stability by helping a host nation establish and maintain
institutions and facilities responsive to its peoples needs.

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Army forces in foreign internal defense normally advise and assist host-nation forces conducting
operations to increase their capabilities. When conducting foreign internal defense, all Army forces provide
indirect or direct support (not involving combat operations), or conduct combat operations to support a host
nations efforts.

Security assistance
Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles,
military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in
furtherance of national policies and objectives.
Army forces support security assistance efforts through military training teams (MTT), maintenance
support personnel and training, and related activities.

Humanitarian and civic action

Humanitarian and civic action programs consist of assistance provided in conjunction with military
operations and exercises. They are planned activities. Humanitarian and civic actions are limited to the
following categories:

Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.

Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
Support to insurgencies
This type of support includes assistance provided by U.S. forces to help a friendly nation or group that is
attempting to combat insurgent elements or to stage an insurgency itself. Special Forces normally conduct this
type of stability action.

Combating terrorism
In all types of stability operations, antiterrorism and counterterrorism activities are a continuous
requirement in protecting installations, units, and individuals from the threat of terrorism. Antiterrorism focuses
on defensive measures. Counterterrorism encompasses a full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and
respond to terrorism. Refer to JCS Publication 3-07.2 for more information on these activities.

Support to counterdrug operations

U.S. military forces may be tasked for a variety of counterdrug activities, which are always conducted in
conjunction with another government agency. These activities include destroying illicit drugs and disrupting or
interdicting drug manufacturing, cultivation, processing, and smuggling operations. Counterdrug support may
take the form of advisory personnel, mobile training teams, offshore training activities, and assistance in
logistics, communications, and intelligence.

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO)

NEOs are primarily conducted to evacuate U.S. citizens whose lives are in danger, although they may also
include natives of the host nation and third-country aliens friendly to the United States. NEOs involve swift
insertion and temporary occupation of an objective, followed by a planned withdrawal. Leaders use only the
amount of force required for self-defense and protection of evacuees.

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Arms control
The tank platoon may work with another nations military to conduct arms control or nation assistance
activities. These types of support usually entail short-term, high-impact operations.

Show of force
Forces deployed abroad lend credibility to a nations promises and commitments. In support of this
principle, show-of-force operations are meant to reassure a friendly nation or ally through a display of credible
military force directed at potential adversaries. These operations may also be conducted to influence foreign
governments or political-military organizations to respect U.S. interests.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

Planning, preparing, executing, and assessing stability operations is fundamentally identical to the process
used for offensive, defensive, and support operations. However, the following six considerations help Army
forces develop tailored concepts and schemes for stability operations.

Leverage interagency, joint, and multinational cooperation

Unit of effort is fundamental to success in stability operations. Achieving unity of effort requires constant
coordination with all involved agencies. Commanders must adapt to situations where there may not be a clear
delineation of authority and responsibility. This is especially important in stability operations since the military
is often the supporting rather than the supported agency.

Enhance the capabilities and legitimacy of the host nation

Army forces must demonstrate the proper respect for the host nations government, police, and military
forces. The host nations military and police forces must be integrated as much as possible with all aspects of
planning, preparing, executing, and assessing every operation.
When host-nation capabilities are inadequate for the task, Army forces focus on enhancing those
capabilities through training, advice, and assistance. Commanders make maximum use of host-nation forces
and personnel as lead for all possible activities. These include offensive and defensive operations, protection of
the civilian populace, security of critical facilities and installations, intelligence and counterintelligence tasks,
new construction and reconstruction, psychological operations, police duties, and civil affairs.

Understand the potential for unintended consequences of individual and

small-unit actions
Individual and small-unit actions can have consequences disproportionate to the level of command or
amount of force involved. In some cases, tactical operations and individual actions can have strategic impact.
Recognizing and avoiding these potential problems requires trained, disciplines, and knowledgeable leaders and
soldiers at every level. Every soldier must be aware of the operational and strategic context of the mission.
Additionally, each soldier must understand the potential military, political, and legal consequences of the
actions they take or fail to take. Dissemination of this information throughout the force minimizes any possible
confusion regarding desired objectives.

Display the capability to use force without threatening

Army forces conducting stability operations must be capable of limited combat operations for selfdefense. The intent is to demonstrate strength and resolve without provoking an unintended response. To be
effective, shows of force in stability operations cannot be perceived as attempts to goad or bully an opponent
into an attack.

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Units can display preparedness by routinely conducting demanding combat training in the area of
operations. Training should include challenging soldiers to react to situations involving weapons use, levels of
force, and rules of engagement.

Act decisively to prevent escalation

Army forces must always be prepared to act with speed and determination when carrying out assigned
tasks. Opponents of stability may perceive hesitation to act decisively as weakness. Units and individuals must
pursue military objectives energetically and apply military power forcefully. By doing so, Army forces assure
friend and foe alike that they not only can protect themselves and the people and facilities under their charge but
also achieve stability objectives.

Apply force selectively and discriminately

Commanders must make sure their units apply force consistent with and adequate to assigned objectives
and employ combat power selectively in accordance with assigned missions and prescribed legal and policy
limitations. Commanders use the rules of engagement to guide the tactical application of combat power. The
commander on the ground is best qualified to estimate the correct degree of force that must be used, consistent
with the ROE.

ROLE OF THE TANK PLATOON

As noted, the tank platoon has unique capabilities that make it an important asset to U.S. and combined
forces executing missions in stability operations and support operations. Whether it is operating organic to the
company or task organized to a light or heavy force, the platoon may be called upon to support a wide range of
operations in various political and geographical environments. Examples of these operations are included in
Section 4 of this appendix.

Using the platoons capabilities

Because of the resources necessary to deploy, operate, and sustain armored forces, tank platoons are
usually used to execute stability and support activities that take maximum advantage of their inherent
capabilities of firepower, maneuver, shock effect, and survivability. They execute move, attack, and defend
missions using procedures similar to those described throughout this manual.
On the other hand, the factors of METT-TC and the operational considerations prevalent in stability
operations and support operations may modify the conditions for successful mission accomplishment. This
means the tank platoon occasionally may be assigned operations that are normally handled by specially trained
and equipped elements. For example, the platoon could be tasked for crowd and riot control if a shortage of
military police exists.
Several problems arise when armored forces are used in this type of role. To perform with complete
effectiveness and efficiency, crewmen should receive special equipment and training before executing such
operations. In addition, dismounted missions effectively negate the tank platoons inherent advantages
(lethality, mobility, and survivability).

Training for stability operations and support operations

Disciplined, well-trained, combat-ready leaders and crewmen can adapt to the specialized demands of
stability operations and support operations. To achieve this degree of readiness, however, the platoon must be
thoroughly trained before deployment on such factors as the operational environment, the ROE and ROI, force
protection, and individual soldier responsibilities. A discussion of these operational considerations is included
later in this section. The training must be updated continuously after deployment.

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Leader requirements
Flexibility and situational understanding are paramount requirements, especially for the tank platoon
leader. The platoons role and/or objectives in stability operations and support operations will not always be
clear. The platoon leader will sometimes be called upon to make on-the-spot decisions that could have an
immediate, dramatic effect on the strategic or operational situation. In this uniquely tense setting, leaders who
disregard the will of belligerent parties and the lethality of these groups weapons compromise the success of
their mission and risk the lives of their soldiers.

PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Although stability operations and support operations can take place in any part of the world, they are most
likely to occur in third world countries, where social, political, economic, and psychological factors contribute
to political instability. Each country or region is unique, with its own history, culture, goals, and problems.
U.S. forces deployed to these areas can be subject to rapid and dramatic changes in situations and missions.
The tank platoon leader must understand this environment; he must plan for rapid changes in the situation or
mission and constantly be prepared to adapt to them. In addition, the platoon must be prepared to operate in any
type of terrain and climate.
The following paragraphs examine several important considerations that will influence planning and
preparation for stability operations and support operations. For a more detailed discussion of these subjects,
refer to FM 3-07.3 (FM 100-23).

Environment
NOTE:

The term environment in the following discussion is not equivalent to the states of the operational
environment (peace, conflict, war) examined earlier in this appendix. As an operational
consideration, the environment refers to the cultural, political, and military context in which stability
operations and support operations take place, as well as to terrain and weather in the area of
operations.

Stability operations and support operations can take place in any part of the world. To deal effectively
with the diverse situations they may face, U.S. forces must undergo orientation training on the complex
conditions and factors at work in a specific region. Each soldier must understand the political and economic
situation, as well as the cultures, climates, and terrain of the region. He should understand the military
situation, especially the doctrine, tactics, and equipment that are employed by belligerent, guerrilla, and terrorist
forces. Orientation training should also clarify the following environmental factors as well as the planning and
operational considerations discussed in the remainder of this section.
Tempo. Although extreme tension may underlie stability operations and support operations, the tempo of
these operations is generally slow. Nonetheless, the speed of military action can vary widely, from fast, violent
tactical movement by a reaction force for the purpose of relieving encircled friendly forces to the deliberate
occupation of stationary defensive positions to provide overwatch at traffic control points.
Throughout stability operations and support operations, the enemy can be expected to execute both overt
and covert operations to test friendly reaction times and security procedures. Units that are predictable or that
lack sound OPSEC leave themselves susceptible to attack. For the tank platoon, the key to a secure
environment is not only to maintain the highest possible level of OPSEC, but also to vary the techniques by
which security procedures are executed.
Role of U.S. forces. All crewmen should be aware of the role U.S. forces will play in the overall mission.
This is especially vital when Americans are part of a combined force that requires constant interaction and
coordination with the soldiers of foreign nations. In all cases, the commanders intent and his projected end
state should be simplified and presented in a way that gives soldiers the guidance they need to accomplish the
mission.

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FM 3-20.15

Peacekeeping versus peace enforcement. Training for stability operations and support operations
should also focus on the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peacekeeping is a highly
visible activity; protection of armored forces is all the more difficult because they cannot use cover and
concealment in all situations. Peace enforcement operations are more likely to involve the use of force, cover
and concealment, and the tactical considerations of OPSEC. Leaders at every level must understand the role of
U.S. forces based on the commanders intent. If this role is not clear, they must seek clarification.

Intelligence
Intelligence is crucial during the planning, preparation, and execution of stability operations and support
operations. The threats faced by military forces in these operations are more ambiguous than those in other
situations because combatants, guerrillas, and terrorists can easily blend with the civilian population. Before
forces are committed, intelligence must be collected, processed, and focused to support all planning, training,
and operational requirements. (NOTE: See FM 3-07 [FM 100-20] for additional information.)

Decentralized operations
Although stability operations and support operations are normally centrally planned, execution often takes
the form of small-scale, decentralized actions conducted over extended distances. Responsibility for making
decisions on the ground will fall to junior leaders. Effective command guidance and a thorough understanding
of the applicable ROE and/or ROI (refer to the following discussions) are critical at each operational level.

Rules of engagement
ROE are politically imposed restrictions on military operations. The ROE are directed by higher military
authorities based on the political and tactical situations and the level of threat. For example, these restrictions
may require that the forces involved limit their use of firepower to a certain geographical area or that they limit
the duration of their operations. Refer to Figure F-1 for an example of ROE for one possible situation.
While ROE must be considered during the planning and execution of all operations, understanding,
adjusting for, and properly executing ROE are especially important to success in stability operations and
support operations. The units TTP will require adjustment based on each particular situations ROE.
The restrictions change whenever the political and military situations change; this means ROE must be
explained to friendly soldiers continuously.
ROE provide the authority for the soldiers right to self-defense. Each soldier must understand the
ROE and be prepared to execute them properly in every possible confrontation. In addition, ROE
violations can have operational, strategic, and political consequences that may affect national security; the
enemy can be expected to exploit such violations.

Rules of interaction/graduated response

ROI and graduated response embody the human dimension of stability operations and support operations;
they lay the foundation for successful relationships with the myriad of factions and individuals that play critical
roles in these operations. ROI encompass an array of interpersonal communication skills, such as persuasion
and negotiation. Graduated response deals with the process of applying greater levels of force to a situation in
response to the changes in that situation. These are tools the individual soldier will need to deal with the
nontraditional threats that are prevalent in stability and support operations, including political friction,
unfamiliar cultures, and conflicting ideologies. In turn, ROI enhance the soldiers survivability in such
situations. Refer to Figure F-2 for an example of a graduated response card.
ROI are based on the applicable ROE for a particular operation; they must be tailored to the specific
regions, cultures, and/or populations affected by the operation. Like ROE, the ROI can be effective only if they
are thoroughly rehearsed and understood by every soldier in the unit.

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FM 3-20.15

Figure F-1. Example rules of engagement.

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FM 3-20.15

Figure F-2. Example graduated response card.

Force protection
Because of the influence of local politics and news media in stability operations and support operations,
precautions and operations required to minimize casualties and collateral damage become a particularly
important operational consideration during these operations. At the same time, however, force protection must
be a constant priority. Armored forces are commonly deployed in a force protection role.
In attempting to limit the level and scope of violence used in stability operations and support operations,
leaders must avoid making tactically unsound decisions or exposing the force to unnecessary risks. On the
other hand, an overpowering use of force, correctly employed and surgically applied, can reduce subsequent
violence or prevent a response from the opposing force. These considerations must be covered in the ROE and
the OPORD from the battalion or brigade.
OPSEC, tempered by restrictions in the ROE and ROI, is an important tool for the platoon leader in
accomplishing his force protection goals. Security procedures should encompass the full range of antiterrorist
activities for every soldier and leader. Examples include proper RTP; strict noise, light, and litter discipline;
proper wear of the uniform; display of the proper demeanor for the situation; as well as effective use of cover
and concealment, obstacles, OPs and early warning devices, the protection afforded by armor vehicles, and safe
locations for eating and resting.

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FM 3-20.15

A final consideration in force protection is hygiene. Many stability operations and support operations
take place in underdeveloped nations; proper field sanitation and personal hygiene are mandatory if soldiers are
to stay healthy.

Task organization
Because of the unique requirements of stability operations and support operations, the tank platoon may
be task organized to operate with a variety of units. As noted, this may include an armor or mechanized
company team or a light infantry company or battalion. In addition, the platoon may operate with other
elements with linguists, counterintelligence teams, and civil affairs teams.

CSS considerations
The operational environment that the platoon faces during stability operations and support operations may
be very austere, creating special CSS considerations. These factors include, but are not limited to, the
following:

Reliance on local procurement of certain items.

Shortages of various critical items, including repair parts, Class IV supplies (barrier materials),
and lubricants.

Special Class V supply requirements, such as pepper spray.

Reliance on bottled water.
Media considerations
The presence of the media is a reality that confronts everyone involved in stability operations and support
operations. All leaders and soldiers are subject to instantaneous worldwide scrutiny as a result of the growth of
news coverage via international television and radio broadcasts and the Internet. They must realize that
operations that run counter to official U.S. policy may damage the nations interests and international standing.
Tank platoon crewmen must learn how to deal effectively with broadcast and print reporters and
photographers. Training should cover any information restrictions imposed on the media. Soldiers must also
gain an understanding of which subjects they are authorized to discuss and which ones they must refer to higher
authorities, such as their chain of command or the public affairs office (PAO). PAOs usually issue daily
guidance dealing with these subjects.

Operations with outside agencies

U.S. Army units may conduct certain stability operations and support operations in coordination with a
variety of outside organizations. These include other U.S. armed services or government agencies as well as
international organizations, including private volunteer organizations (PVO) (such as Doctors Without
Borders), nongovernmental organizations (NGO) (such as the Red Cross), and UN military forces or agencies.

Soldiers responsibilities
U.S. soldiers may have extensive contact with host-nation civilians during stability operations and support
operations. As a result, their personal conduct has a significant impact on the opinions, and thus the support, of
the local population. As noted, soldiers must understand that misconduct by U.S. forces (even those deployed
for only a short time) can damage rapport that took years to develop. U.S. soldiers must treat local civilians and
military personnel as personal and professional equals, affording them the appropriate customs and courtesies.
Every soldier must be updated continuously on changes to operational considerations (such as
environment, ROE/ROI, media, and force protection). Such changes can have immediate impact on his
freedom to react to a given situation. Keeping the soldier informed of changes enhances his situational

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FM 3-20.15

understanding and his ability to adapt to changing conditions. Leaders must disseminate this information
quickly and accurately.
Every individual is an intelligence-collecting instrument. The collection of information is a continuous
process, and all information must be reported. Intelligence is provided by many sources, including friendly
forces, enemy elements, and the local populace. From the friendly standpoint, each soldier must be familiar
with the local PIR and other applicable intelligence requirements. At the same time, enemy soldiers will be
continuously seeking intelligence on U.S. actions, often blending easily into the civilian population. U.S.
soldiers must be aware of this and use OPSEC procedures at all times.
To emphasize soldier responsibilities, leaders conduct PCCs and PCIs that focus on each soldiers
knowledge of the environment and application of the ROE. These checks and inspections should also identify
possible OPSEC violations and deficiencies that could place the soldier and his equipment at risk. Leaders
should stress that terrorists and thieves may attempt to infiltrate positions or mount vehicles either to steal
equipment and supplies or to cause harm to U.S. forces or facilities.
To enhance civilian cooperation and support, the tank platoon leader is responsible for obtaining a key
word and phrase card from the S2 to assist in translation of key English phrases into the language of the host
nation. These phrases should apply specifically to the area of operations.

SECTION 3 - SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Domestic support operations are always conducted in support of local, state, and federal civil authorities.
Overseas support operations are almost always conducted in support of and in concert with other agencies; these
may be American or international organizations of either governmental or private affiliation.
Support operations may be independent operations. Conversely, they may complement offensive,
defensive, or stability operations. Refer to FM 3-0 (FM 100-5) for a more detailed examination of these
operations.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Support operations involve Army forces providing essential supplies, capabilities, and services to help
civil authorities deal with situations beyond their control. Army forces may provide relief or assistance directly.
However, Army force activities in support operations most often involve setting the conditions that enable civil
authorities or NGOs to provide required support directly to the affected population.

CATEGORIES OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Domestic support operations (DSO)
Domestic support operations are those activities and measures taken by DOD to foster mutual assistance
and support between DOD and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the
application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national
security emergencies or major disasters.
The operations focus on the condition of all types of natural and man-made properties, with the goal of
helping to protect and/or restore these properties as requested. Typically, environmental operations are
conducted in response to such events as forest and grassland fires, hazardous material releases, floods, and
earthquakes.

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FM 3-20.15

Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA)

Humanitarian assistance operations are people-oriented operations, focusing on the well-being of
supported populations; they provide critical supplies to designated groups at the request of local, state, federal,
or international agencies.
FHA is conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disaster or other endemic
conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or loss of
property. FHA is limited in scope and duration and focuses exclusively on prompt aid to resolve an immediate
crisis.

THE ARMYS ROLE IN SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The Army is not specifically organized, trained, or equipped for support operations. Instead, Army
elements and forces, tailored for warfighting, are rapidly adapted to dominate a crisis or disaster situation. In
support operations, Army forces apply decisive military capabilities to set the conditions for the supported civil
authorities to achieve success. In most situations, Army forces involved in support operations, both DSO and
FHA, will execute combinations of multiple overlapping activities.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Planning and executing support operations are fundamentally similar to planning, preparing, executing,
and assessing offensive, defensive, and stability operations. However, while each support operation is unique,
the following four broad considerations can help forces develop mission-specific concepts and schemes for
executing support operations.

Provide essential support to the largest number of people

Commanders will be required to allocate finite resources to achieve the greatest good. Additionally,
commanders require an accurate assessment of what needs to be done to effectively employ military power.
They must determine how and where to apply limited assets to benefit the most people in the most efficient
way.

Coordinate actions with other agencies

Domestic support operations are typically joint and interagency, and FHA operations are usually
multinational as well. Achieving unity of effort and efficient use of resources requires constant coordination.

Hand over the support mission to civilian agencies as soon as feasible

Army support operations are almost always designed to help government and NGOs accomplish their
missions. The following considerations determine handover feasibility:

Condition of supported population and governments.

Competing mission requirements.
Domestic and international political environment.
Specified and implied commitment levels: time, resources, forces.
Maturity of the support effort.
Establish measures of effectiveness
A critical aspect of mission handover is to have objective standards for measuring progress.

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FM 3-20.15

TYPES OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Support operations generally fall into the following eight categories. Of those, only relief operations
apply to both DSO and FHA equally. Support operations may be independent actions, or they may complement
offensive, defensive, and stability operations.

Relief operations
The actions Army forces execute during relief operations can be characterized as either humanitarian
relief, which focuses on the well being of supported populations, or disaster relief, which focuses on recovery of
critical infrastructure after a natural or man-made disaster. Most relief operations combine both types of
actions.
Characteristics of relief operations. Characteristics of relief operations include the following:

Humanitarian relief focuses on life-saving measures to alleviate the immediate needs of a

population in crisis. It often includes the provision of medical support, food, water, medicines,
clothing, blankets, shelter, and heating/cooking fuel. In some cases, it involves transportation
support to move affected people from a disaster area.

Disaster relief encompasses those actions taken to restore or recreate the minimum infrastructure

to allow effective humanitarian relief to be accomplished and set the conditions for longer-term
recovery. This includes establishing and maintaining the minimum safe working conditions,
minus security measures necessary to protect relief workers and the affected population from
additional harm. Disaster relief may involve repairing or demolishing damaged structures,
restoring or building bridges, roads and airfields, and removing debris from critical routes and
relief sites.

Phases of relief operations.

conducted in three broad phases:

Although each operation is unique, support operations are generally

Response.
Recovery.
Restoration.
Army elements can expect to be most heavily committed during the response phase. They will be
progressively less involved during the recovery phase, with only very limited activity, if any, during the
restoration phase.
Response phase. In the response phase, commanders focus on life-sustaining functions that are
required by those in the disaster area. The following functions dominate the following response operations:

Search and rescue.

Emergency flood control.
Hazard identification.
Food distribution.
Water production, purification, and distribution.
Temporary shelter construction and administration.
Transportation support.
Fire fighting.
Medical support.
Power generation.
Communications support.

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FM 3-20.15

Recovery phase. Recovery phase operations begin the process of returning the community
infrastructure and related services to a status that meets the immediate needs of the population. Typical
recovery operations include the following:

Continuation of response operations as needed.

Damage assessment.
Power distribution.
Water and sanitation services.
Debris removal.
Restoration phase. Restoration is a long-term process that returns the community to normal
predisaster conditions. Restoration activities do not generally involve large numbers of military forces. When
they are involved, Army elements generally work with affected communities in the transfer of responsibility to
other agencies as military support forces redeploy.

Support to consequence management

Consequence managementthose services and activities essential to mitigating damage, loss, hardship, or
suffering resulting from disasters or catastrophes, either man-made or naturalis primarily a state and local
responsibility. Military forces may be employed in support of the lead agency after an event to save lives, to
prevent human suffering, and to mitigate property loss.

Support to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

Military operations that assist civil authorities in protecting U.S. territory, population, and infrastructure
against hostile attacks involving WMD are similar to other consequence management situations. However, they
also include operations that are designed to deter and mitigate the effects of such an attack both inside and
outside the United States.

Domestic preparedness
Domestic preparedness includes training, exercises, expert assistance, and response.

Support to crisis management

Crisis management includes measures to resolve a hostile situation and to investigate a criminal case for
prosecution under federal laws. Army forces provide military capabilities that support the achievement of the
first objective of defusing or resolving a crisis situation.

Protection of critical assets

The purpose of this program, which is to identify critical assets and to assure their integrity, availability,
survivability, and capability to support vital DOD missions across the full spectrum of military operations.

Support to civil law enforcement

Support to domestic civil law enforcement generally involves activities related to counterterrorism,
counterdrug, or civil disturbance operations. Army support may involve providing resources, training, or direct
support.
Support to counterterrorism. Military units in support of the lead agency may operate to eliminate
identified threats. Assistance may be provided in the areas of transportation, equipment, training, and
personnel. When terrorists pose an imminent threat to U.S. territory, its people, and critical assets, the U.S.

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FM 3-20.15

military may be used to support operations to counter these threats, using ground, air, space, special operations,
or maritime forces.
Support to counterdrug operations. Army forces support to domestic counterdrug operations is very
limited and will usually be in a support role only.
Civil disturbance operations. The Army assists civil authorities in restoring law and order when local and
state law enforcement agencies are unable to quell civil disturbances. Federal Army forces assist in restoring
law and order when the magnitude of a disturbance exceeds the capabilities of local and state law enforcement
agencies, including the National Guard. Army participation is to apply the minimum force necessary to restore
order to the point where civilian authorities no longer require military assistance.

Community assistance
Community assistance is a broad range of activities Army personnel and organizations participate in that
provide support and maintain a strong connection between the military and civilian communities.

SECTION 4 - EXAMPLES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS AND

SUPPORT OPERATIONS
The following discussion and accompanying figures examine several situations the tank platoon may face
during stability operations and support operations. The list is not all-inclusive; assessment of METT-TC factors
and the operational considerations applicable in the area of operations may identify additional mission
requirements.
The platoon leader must keep in mind that the relatively simple situations illustrated here cannot
adequately portray the ever-changing, often confusing conditions of the stability operations and support
operations. As noted, flexibility is a key to success (and survival) under such conditions. To the extent
possible, the platoon leader should attempt to shape the role or mission to match the platoons unique
characteristics and capabilities.
NOTE:

Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for a discussion of urban operations. As noted, these operations
often provide the operational framework for stability operations and support operations.

ESTABLISH A BATTLE POSITION

The platoon establishes a BP or conducts a relief in place at a platoon BP as part of a company perimeter
or strongpoint defense (the circled A in Figure F-3). See Chapter 4 for detailed information on defensive
operations. Dismounted infantry should be integrated with the tank platoon. Coordination with dismounted
patrols and OPs outside the perimeter is critical for situational understanding. Signs, in the local language,
should be posted as necessary within the engagement area to identify movement restrictions on the local
populace.

CONDUCT RESERVE OPERATIONS

As part of the battalion or company reserve, the tank platoon occupies an assembly area or sets up a
perimeter defense (the circled B in Figure F-3). Potential missions include linkup with and relief of encircled
friendly forces (the circled B1); linkup and movement to secure an objective in an operation to rescue a
downed helicopter or stranded vehicle (the circled B2); and tactical movement to destroy enemy forces
attacking a convoy (the circled B3). In all three scenarios, the platoon conducts tactical movement and
operations in contact. Tasks such as linkup, support by fire, attack by fire, assault, hasty attack, and
consolidation and reorganization are also critical to the reserve mission. For more information on these
operations, refer to Chapters 3 and 5.

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FM 3-20.15

Figure F-3. Battle position and reserve/reaction force missions.

OVERWATCH A TRAFFIC CONTROL POINT

The tank platoon (or section) overwatches an infantry or MP traffic control point (the circled C in
Figure F-4). In turn, the overwatch element must ensure its own local security; it usually does this by
coordinating with dismounted infantry for OPs and dismounted patrols from the company. Overwatch is
covered in Chapter 3, occupation of a defensive position in Chapter 4. Also see Figures F-5 and F-6 for
manning of light and heavy traffic checkpoints.

DEFEND A CHOKE POINT

The tank platoon (supported by infantry) occupies a perimeter defense to protect traffic and facilitate
movement through a choke point along the MSR (the circled D in Figure F-4). Infantry is integrated into the
perimeter defense to augment the platoons firepower and to provide early warning and OPSEC for the defense
by means of dismounted patrols and OPs. For detailed information on defensive operations, see Chapter 4.

OVERWATCH A BLOCKADE/ROADBLOCK
The tank platoon (or section) overwatches a blockade or roadblock, either a manned position or a
reinforcing obstacle covered by fires only (the circled E in Figure F-4). It coordinates with dismounted
infantry from the company for local security (OPs and dismounted patrols). Positions are improved using
procedures for deliberate occupation of a BP (see Chapter 4). Also see Figures F-7A and F-7B for
examples of tank platoon roadblocks set up and a list of equipment needed to conduct the operation.

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CONDUCT CONVOY ESCORT

The tank platoon conducts convoy escort duties (the circled F in Figure F-4) using procedures covered
in Chapter 5.

CONDUCT PROOFING/BREACHING OPERATIONS

The tank platoon (or section) overwatches breaching operations along the MSR or provides
overwatch to engineer elements as they clear the route (the circled G in Figure F-4). In doing so, the
platoon conducts tactical movement as outlined in Chapter 3 of this manual.
Based on METT-TC factors, the tank platoon may use tactical movement techniques to provide
overwatch for the proofing vehicle, which can be a tank (equipped with a mine roller, if available) or an
engineer vehicle. If mines are detected, the platoon continues to overwatch the breaching unit until all
mines have been detected and neutralized. If the obstacle is not within the breaching units capability,
engineers are called forward. At all times, overwatch vehicles should take notice of anything that is out
of the ordinary, such as new construction, repairs to damaged buildings, plants or trees that seem new or
out of place, and freshly dug earth. These conditions may indicate the presence of newly emplaced or
command-detonated mines. At no time will tanks conduct breaching or proofing operations.

Figure F-4. Traffic control point, choke point, blockade,

convoy escort, and route proofing missions.

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Figure F-5. Tank section manning a light traffic checkpoint.

Figure F-6. Tank platoon manning a heavy traffic checkpoint.

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Figure F-7A. Tank platoon roadblock.

Figure F-7B. Equipment list for roadblocks and checkpoints.

CONDUCT CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS

During cordon and search operations, the tank platoon occupies overwatch and/or hasty defensive
positions to isolate a search area (see Figure F-8). Close coordination and communication with the search team
are critical, as is employment of OPs and patrols to maintain surveillance of dead space and gaps in the
cordoned area.
The tank platoon (or section) must be prepared to take immediate action if the search team or OPs identify
enemy elements. Enemy contact may require the platoon to execute tactical movement and linkup; it would
then coordinate with other units to destroy the enemy using techniques discussed in Chapter 3 of this manual.
Additionally, the tank platoon may support the infantry by conducting vehicle and personnel searches as
part of the search operation. Refer to FM 3-20.98 (FM 17-98), Appendix E, for a detailed discussion on vehicle
and personnel search procedures.

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Figure F-8. Cordon and search operations.

CONDUCT OPERATIONS WITH INFANTRY

The tank platoon (or section) overwatches and/or follows and supports dismounted infantry in built-up
areas or close terrain (see Figures F-9A and F-9B). Procedures for operating with infantry are discussed in
Chapter 5 (the section covering follow and support operations) and Chapter 6 (urban operations).

Figure F-9A. Tank section overwatches infantry movement.

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Figure F-9B. Tanks move forward (bounding overwatch)

with infantry set.

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APPENDIX G

Environmental Protection
Protection of natural resources has become an ever-increasing concern. It is the responsibility of all unit
leaders to decrease, and if possible eliminate, damage to the environment when conducting all types of
operations. This appendix focuses on measures the tank platoon must understand and implement to accomplish
this objective.

CONTENTS
Page
Section 1.

Environmental Risk Management Process ..................................

G-1

Section 2.

Environmental Risk Assessment Worksheet ...............................

G-2

SECTION 1 - ENVIRONMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

Environmental risk management parallels safety risk management and is based on the same philosophy
and principles. (NOTE: Refer to the discussion of safety risk management in Appendix H of this manual.)
The environmental risk assessment and management process consists of the six steps outlined in the following
paragraphs.

STEP 1 - IDENTIFY HAZARDS

The platoon leader must identify potential sources of environmental degradation during his analysis of
METT-TC factors. These environmental hazards are conditions with the potential for polluting air, soil, or
water and/or destroying cultural or historical structures, sites, or artifacts.

STEP 2 - ASSESS THE HAZARDS

The tank platoon leader can use the environmental risk assessment worksheet shown in Figure G-1 to
analyze the potential severity of environmental degradation for each training activity. The worksheet allows
him to quantify the risk to the environment as extremely high, high, medium, or low. The risk impact value is
an indicator of these levels of severity.

STEP 3 - MAKE ENVIRONMENTAL RISK DECISIONS

Based on the results of the risk assessment, the platoon leader makes decisions and develops measures to
reduce significant environmental risks. Risk decisions are made at a level of command that corresponds to the
degree of risk.

STEP 4 - BRIEF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

Leaders should brief all responsible individuals and agencies (to include the installation environmental
office, if applicable) on the proposed operational and training plans and on pertinent high-risk environmental
factors.

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FM 3-20.15

STEP 5 - IMPLEMENT CONTROLS

The platoon leader and his subordinate leaders implement environmental protection measures at all stages
of operational planning, preparation, and execution. They integrate these measures into plans, orders, SOPs,
training performance standards, and rehearsals.

STEP 6 - SUPERVISE
The platoon leader must enforce environmental protection standards during supervision of all training
activities.

SECTION 2 - ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT

WORKSHEET
To use the environmental risk assessment worksheet (see Figure G-1) for a specific operation or training
event, the tank platoon leader and subordinate leaders first determine the impact level for each of five
operational factors. These activities, listed in the top part of the worksheet, are movement of heavy vehicles and
equipment; movement of personnel and light vehicles and equipment; assembly area activities; field
maintenance activities; and garrison maintenance activities. The risk impact is assigned a value from 0 (lowest
risk) to 5 (highest risk) for each activity.
The second part of the worksheet allows leaders to assess the risk impact of the platoons activities in
seven critical areas of environmental concern. The leaders determine which of the five operational activities
will affect each critical area and enter the corresponding risk impact value. For example, the platoon leader
determines that movement of heavy vehicles (which he has assigned a risk value of 5), light movement (a
value of 2), and assembly area activities (a value of 4) will affect air pollution during the platoons upcoming
training exercise. He enters those values in the appropriate columns, then adds them together for a total risk
impact value of 11 for air pollution. He repeats this process for the other environmental areas of concern.
The total of the risk impact values for the seven environmental areas is the overall risk impact value for
the operation or exercise. As noted, the overall point total serves as an indicator of risk impact in four
categories: low, medium, high, and extremely high. The worksheet summarizes the environmental damage risk
for these categories.
The worksheet also lists the level at which environmental protection decisions are made for each risk
impact category. As with other types of risk assessment, such decisions must be made, and appropriate controls
implemented, at the proper level of command. The decision-maker (whether it is the platoon leader, a
subordinate leader, or a higher commander) uses the risk impact values as a guide in ensuring that the
environment in the operational area is protected and preserved.

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Environmental Risk Assessment Worksheet

Environmental area:

Rating:

Unit operations:

Risk impact:

Movement of heavy vehicles/systems

Movement of personnel & light vehicles/systems
Assembly area activities
Field maintenance of equipment
Garrison maintenance of equipment

5
5
5
5
5

4
4
4
4
4

3
3
3
3
3

2
2
2
2
2

1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0

Risk impact value

Garrison maintenance of
equipment

Field maintenance of
equipment

Assembly area activities

Movement of personnel
and light vehicles/systems

Movement of heavy
vehicles/systems

Overall Environmental Risk Assessment Form

Air pollution
Archeological/historical sites
Hazardous material/waste
Noise pollution
Threatened/endangered species
Water pollution
Wetland protection
OVERALL RISK IMPACT VALUE

Risk Impact Value Categories

Category

Range
(points)

Environmental
Damage Risk

Decision-maker

Low

0-58

Little or none

Appropriate level

Medium

59-117

Minor

Appropriate level

High

118-149

Significant

Division commander

Extremely High

150-175

Severe

MACOM commander

Figure G-1. Environmental risk assessment worksheet.

G-3

FM 3-20.15

APPENDIX H

Risk Management
Risk is the chance of injury or death for individuals and damage to or loss of vehicles and equipment.
Risks, and/or the potential for risks, are always present in every combat and training situation the tank platoon
faces. Risk management must take place at all levels of the chain of command during each phase of every
operation; it is an integral part of all tactical planning. The tank platoon leader, his NCOs, and all other platoon
soldiers must know how to use risk management, coupled with fratricide reduction measures, to ensure that the
mission is executed in the safest possible environment within mission constraints.
The primary objective of risk management is to help units protect their combat power through accident
prevention, enabling them to win the battle quickly and decisively, with minimum losses. This appendix
outlines the process that leaders can use to identify hazards and implement a plan to address each identified
hazard. It also includes a detailed discussion of the responsibilities of the platoons leaders and individual
soldiers in implementing a sound risk management program. For additional information on risk management,
refer to FM 3-100.14 (FM 100-14).

CONTENTS
Page
Section 1.

Risk Management Procedures ....................................................

H-1

Section 2.

Implementation Responsibilities ................................................

H-5

SECTION 1 - RISK MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

This section outlines the five steps of risk management. Leaders of the tank platoon must always
remember that the effectiveness of the process depends on situational understanding. They should never
approach risk management with one size fits all solutions to the hazards the platoon will face. Rather, in
performing the steps, they must keep in mind the essential tactical and operational factors that make each
situation unique.
There are two types of hazards: tactical and accident. Tactical hazards deal with hazards imposed upon
us by the enemy (such as ATGM positions or untemplated enemy positions on our flanks). Accident hazards
are those hazards imposed upon us due to terrain, weather, or mission requirements (such as traveling an
unimproved road at night in a snow storm).

STEP 1 - IDENTIFY HAZARDS

A hazard is a source of danger. It is any existing or potential condition that could entail injury, illness, or
death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment and property; or some other sort of mission degradation.
Tactical and training operations pose many types of hazards.
The tank platoon leader must identify the hazards associated with all aspects and phases of the platoons
mission, paying particular attention to the factors of METT-TC. Risk management must never be an
afterthought; leaders must begin the process during their troop-leading procedures and continue it throughout
the operation.
Figure H-1 lists possible sources of risk that the tank platoon might face during a typical tactical
operation. The list is organized according to the factors of METT-TC.

H-1

FM 3-20.15

SOURCES OF BATTLEFIELD RISK

MISSION
Duration of the operation.
Complexity/clarity of the plan. (Is the plan well developed and easily understood?)
Proximity and number of maneuvering units.

ENEMY
Knowledge of the enemy situation.
Enemy capabilities.
Availability of time and resources to conduct reconnaissance.

TERRAIN AND WEATHER

Visibility conditions, including light, dust, fog, and smoke.

Precipitation and its effect on mobility.
Extreme heat or cold.
Additional natural hazards (broken ground, steep inclines, water obstacles).

TROOPS

Equipment status.
Experience the units conducting the operation have working together.
Danger areas associated with the platoons weapon systems.
Soldier/leader proficiency.
Soldier/leader rest situation.
Degree of acclimatization to environment.
Impact of new leaders and/or crew members.

TIME AVAILABLE
Time available for troop-leading procedures and rehearsals by subordinates.
Time available for PCCs/PCIs.

CIVILIAN CONSIDERATIONS
Applicable ROE and/or ROI.
Potential stability and/or support operations involving contact with civilians (such
as NEOs, refugee or disaster assistance, or counterterrorism).
Potential for media contact/inquiries.

Figure H-1. Examples of potential hazards.

STEP 2 - ASSESS HAZARD TO DETERMINE RISKS

Hazard assessment is the process of determining the direct impact of each hazard on an operation (in the
form of hazardous incidents). Use the following steps:

Determine which hazards can be eliminated or avoided.

Assess each hazard that cannot be eliminated or avoided to determine the probability that the
hazard can occur.

Assess the severity of hazards that cannot be eliminated or avoided. Severity, defined as the result
or outcome of a hazardous incident, is expressed by the degree of injury or illness (including
death), loss of or damage to equipment or property, environmental damage, or other missionimpairing factors (such as unfavorable publicity or loss of combat power).

Taking into account both the probability and severity of a hazard, determine the associated risk
level (extremely high, high, moderate, and low). Figure H-2 summarizes the four risk levels.

Based on the factors of hazard assessment (probability, severity, and risk level, as well as the

operational factors unique to the situation), complete the risk management worksheet. Refer to
Figure H-3 for an outline of the risk assessment matrix used to determine the level of risk.
Figure H-4 shows an example of a risk management worksheet that can be used in lieu of the risk
assessment matrix.

H-2

FM 3-20.15

LEVELS OF RISK
Extremely High

Someone will die or suffer permanent disability.

High

More often than not, someone will suffer an

injury that requires less than 3 months to heal.

Moderate

More often than not, someone will require first

aid or minor medical treatment.

Low
(Worst Case)

Someone is likely to need first aid or minor

medical treatment.

Figure H-2. Risk levels and impact on mission execution.

RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX

Probability
Severity

Frequent

Likely

Occasional

Seldom

Unlikely

Catastrophic

Critical

Marginal

Negligible

E - Extremely High Risk

H - High Risk

M - Moderate Risk
L - Low Risk

Figure H-3. Risk assessment matrix.

H-3

FM 3-20.15

Figure H-4. Example risk management worksheet.

STEP 3 - DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS

Developing controls
After assessing each hazard, develop one or more controls that will either eliminate the hazard or reduce
the risk (probability and/or severity) of potential hazardous incidents. When developing controls, consider the
reason for the hazard, not just the hazard by itself.

Making risk decisions

A key element in the process of making a risk decision is determining whether accepting the risk is
justified or, conversely, is unnecessary. The decision-maker (the tank platoon leader, if applicable) must
compare and balance the risk against mission expectations. He alone decides if the controls are sufficient and
acceptable and whether to accept the resulting residual risk. If he determines the risk is unnecessary, he directs
the development of additional controls or alternative controls; as another option, he can modify, change, or
reject the selected COA for the operation.

STEP 4 - IMPLEMENT CONTROLS

Controls are the procedures and considerations the unit uses to eliminate hazards or reduce their risk.
Implementing controls is the most important part of the risk management process; this is the chain of
commands contribution to the safety of the unit. Implementing controls includes coordination and

H-4

FM 3-20.15

communication with appropriate superior, adjacent, and subordinate units and with individuals executing the
mission. The tank platoon leader must ensure that specific controls are integrated into operational plans
(OPLAN), OPORDs, SOPs, and rehearsals. The critical check for this step is to ensure that controls are
converted into clear, simple execution orders understood by all levels.
If the leaders have conducted a thoughtful risk assessment, the controls will be easy to implement,
enforce, and follow. Examples of risk management controls include the following:

Thoroughly brief all aspects of the mission, including related hazards and controls.

Use buddy teams.

Conduct thorough PCCs and PCIs.

Allow adequate time for rehearsals at all levels.
Drink plenty of water, eat well, and get as much sleep as possible (at least 4 hours in any 24-hour
period).
Enforce speed limits, use of seat belts, and driver safety.
Establish recognizable visual signals and markers to distinguish maneuvering units.
Enforce the use of ground guides in assembly areas and on dangerous terrain.
Establish marked and protected sleeping areas in assembly areas.
Limit single-vehicle movement.
Establish SOPs for the integration of new personnel.

STEP 5 - SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE

During mission execution, it is imperative for leaders to ensure that risk management controls are
properly understood and executed. Leaders must continuously evaluate the units effectiveness in managing
risks to gain insight into areas that need improvement.

Supervision
Leadership and unit discipline are the keys to ensuring that effective risk management controls are
implemented. All leaders are responsible for supervising mission rehearsals and execution to ensure standards
and controls are enforced. In particular, NCOs must enforce established safety policies as well as controls
developed for a specific operation or task. Techniques include spot checks, inspections, SITREPs, confirmation
briefs, buddy checks, and close supervision.
During mission execution, leaders must continuously monitor risk management controls, both to
determine whether they are effective and to modify them as necessary. Leaders must also anticipate, identify,
and assess new hazards. They ensure that imminent danger issues are addressed on the spot and that ongoing
planning and execution reflect changes in hazard conditions.

Evaluation
Whenever possible, the risk management process should also include an after-action review (AAR) to
assess unit performance in identifying risks and preventing hazardous situations. Leaders should then
incorporate lessons learned from the process into unit SOPs and plans for future missions.

SECTION 2 - IMPLEMENTATION RESPONSIBILITIES

Leaders and individuals at all levels are responsible and accountable for managing risk. They must ensure
that hazards and associated risks are identified and controlled during planning, preparation, and execution of

H-5

FM 3-20.15

operations. The tank platoon leader and his senior NCOs must look at both tactical risks and accident risks.
The same risk management process is used to manage both types. The platoon leader alone determines how and
where he is willing to take tactical risks. With the assistance of his PSG, NCOs, and individual soldiers, the
platoon leader manages accident risks.
Sometimes, despite the need to advise higher headquarters of a risk taken or about to be assumed, the risk
management process may break down. Such a failure can be the result of several factors; most often, it can be
attributed to the following:

The risk denial syndrome in which leaders do not want to know about the risk.
A soldier who believes that the risk decision is part of his job and does not want to bother his
platoon leader or section leader.

Outright failure to recognize a hazard or the level of risk involved.

Overconfidence on the part of an individual or the unit in the capability to avoid or recover from
a hazardous incident.

Subordinates not fully understanding the higher commanders guidance regarding risk decisions.
The tank platoon leader gives the platoon direction, sets priorities, and establishes the command climate
(values, attitudes, and beliefs). Successful preservation of combat power requires him to embed risk
management into individual behavior. To fulfill this commitment, the platoon leader must exercise creative
leadership, innovative planning, and careful management. Most important, he must demonstrate support for the
risk management process. The tank platoon leader and others in the platoon chain of command can establish a
command climate favorable to risk management integration by taking the following actions:

Demonstrate consistent and sustained risk management behavior through leading by example
and by stressing active participation throughout the risk management process.

Provide adequate resources for risk management. Every leader is responsible for obtaining the
assets necessary to mitigate risk and for providing them to subordinate leaders.

Understand their own and their soldiers limitations, as well as their units capabilities.
Allow subordinates to make mistakes and learn from them.
Prevent a zero defects mindset from creeping into the platoons culture.
Demonstrate full confidence in subordinates mastery of their trade and their ability to execute a
chosen COA.

Keep subordinates informed.

Listen to subordinates.
For the platoon leader, his subordinate leaders, and individual soldiers alike, responsibilities in managing
risk include the following:

Make informed risk decisions; establish and then clearly communicate risk decision criteria and
guidance.

Establish clear, feasible risk management policies and goals.

Train the risk management process. Ensure that subordinates understand the who, what,
when, where, and why of managing risk and how these factors apply to their situation and
assigned responsibilities.

Accurately evaluate the platoons effectiveness, as well as subordinates execution of risk

controls during the mission.

Inform higher headquarters when risk levels exceed established limits.

H-6

FM 3-20.15

APPENDIX I

Fratricide Prevention
Fratricide is defined as the employment of friendly weapons that results in the unforeseen and
unintentional death or injury of friendly personnel or damage to friendly equipment. Fratricide prevention is the
commanders responsibility. He is assisted by all leaders across all operating systems in accomplishing this
mission. This appendix focuses on actions the tank platoon leader and his subordinate leaders can take with
current resources to reduce the risk of fratricide.
SPECIAL NOTE: Prior to all missions, commanders must ensure that their units conduct detailed
planning and rehearsals emphasizing fratricide prevention.
In any tactical situation, situational understanding on the part of all crewmen, particularly the platoon
leader, is critical not only to mission success but also to survival. It is critical that leaders know where other
friendly elements are operating. With this knowledge, they must anticipate dangerous conditions and take steps
to either avoid or mitigate them. The platoon leader must always be vigilant of changes and developments in the
situation that may place his elements in danger. When he perceives a potential fratricide situation, he must
personally use the higher net to coordinate directly with the friendly element involved.

CONTENTS
Section 1.
Section 2.
Section 3.
Section 4.
Section 5.
Section 6.

The Role of Training .......................................................................

Effects of Fratricide ........................................................................
Causes of Fratricide .......................................................................
Fratricide Risk Assessment ..........................................................
Fratricide Prevention Principles and Procedures ........................
Stopping a Friendly Fire Incident ..................................................

Page
I-1
I-2
I-2
I-3
I-5
I-7

SECTION 1 - THE ROLE OF TRAINING

The underlying principle of fratricide prevention is simple: Leaders who know where their soldiers are,
and where they want them to fire, can keep those soldiers alive to kill the enemy. At the same time, leaders must
avoid at all costs any reluctance to employ, integrate, and synchronize all required operating systems at the
critical time and place. They must avoid becoming tentative out of fear of fratricide; rather, they strive to
eliminate fratricide risk through tough, realistic, combined arms training in which each soldier and unit achieves
the established standard.
Training allows units and soldiers to make mistakes, with the goal of reducing or eliminating the risk of
errors occurring in combat. A key role of the tank platoon training program is to teach crews what targets to
engage and when to engage them. Just as important, crews must learn and practice restraint in what and when to
engage; for example, every TC must know that he must confirm the target as hostile before issuing and
executing any fire command.
Eliminating the risk of fratricide is no less critical as a training standard than are other mission
requirements. All leaders must know all aspects of the applicable training standard, including fratricide
prevention, and then ensure that their soldiers train to that standard.

I-1

FM 3-20.15

SECTION 2 - EFFECTS OF FRATRICIDE

Fratricide results in unacceptable losses and increases the risk of mission failure; it almost always affects
the units ability to survive and function. Units experiencing fratricide suffer these consequences:

Loss of confidence in the units leadership.

Increasing self-doubt among leaders.
Hesitancy in the employment of supporting combat systems.
Oversupervision of units.
Hesitancy in the conduct of night operations.
Loss of aggressiveness in maneuver (fire and movement).
Loss of initiative.
Disrupted operations.
General degradation of unit cohesiveness, morale, and combat power.

SECTION 3 - CAUSES OF FRATRICIDE

The following paragraphs discuss the primary causes of fratricide. Leaders must identify any of the
factors that may affect their units and then strive to eliminate or correct them.

FAILURES IN THE DIRECT FIRE CONTROL PLAN

These occur when units do not develop effective fire control plans, particularly in the offense. Units may
fail to designate target engagement areas or adhere to target priorities, or they may position their weapons
incorrectly. Under such conditions, fire discipline often breaks down upon contact.
The tank platoon can use a number of techniques and procedures to help prevent such incidents. An
example is staking in vehicle and individual positions in the defense, using pickets to indicate the left and
right limits of each position. An area of particular concern is the additional planning that must go into
operations requiring close coordination between the platoon and infantry squads. For example, because of the
danger posed by discarding petals, sabot rounds should be fired over friendly infantry elements only in extreme
emergencies.

LAND NAVIGATION FAILURES

Units often stray out of assigned sectors, report wrong locations, and become disoriented. Much less
frequently, they employ fire support weapons from the wrong locations. In either type of situation, units that
unexpectedly encounter an errant unit may fire their weapons at the friendly force.

FAILURES IN COMBAT IDENTIFICATION

TCs and gunners cannot accurately identify thermal or optical signatures near the maximum range of their
systems. In limited visibility, units within that range may mistake one another for the enemy.

INADEQUATE CONTROL MEASURES

Units may fail to disseminate the minimum necessary maneuver fire control measures and fire support
coordination measures; they may also fail to tie control measures to recognizable terrain or events. As the battle

I-2

FM 3-20.15

develops, the plan then cannot address obvious branches and sequels as they occur. When this happens,
synchronization fails.

FAILURES IN REPORTING AND COMMUNICATIONS

Units at all levels may fail to generate timely, accurate, and complete reports as locations and tactical
situations change. This distorts the tactical picture available at each level and can lead to erroneous clearance
of supporting fires.

WEAPONS ERRORS
Lapses in individual discipline can result in fratricide. These incidents include charge errors, accidental
discharges, mistakes with explosives and hand grenades, and use of incorrect gun data.

BATTLEFIELD HAZARDS
A variety of explosive devices and materiel may create danger on the battlefield: unexploded ordnance;
unmarked or unrecorded minefields, including scatterable mines; booby traps. Failure to mark, record, remove,
or otherwise anticipate these threats will lead to casualties.

SECTION 4 - FRATRICIDE RISK ASSESSMENT

Figures I-1 and I-2 show how to evaluate fratricide risk in the context of mission requirements. The
tables depict the probability and severity of the risk and the related considerations for each factor. Leaders
should assess the potential risk in each area and apply their choices to the risk assessment matrix (shown in
Figure I-3) to determine the level of risk. This level of risk is then applied to the level of risk table (shown in
Figure I-4) to determine the level of risk for the operation.
The resulting level is used only as a guide, however. The leaders final assessment must be based both on
observable risk factors and on his feel for the intangible factors affecting the operation. The assessment of
each factor will determine whether the risk matches one of these extremes or lies somewhere between them as a
medium risk.
Leaders use the steps listed in the following discussion when conducting the fratricide risk assessment.

STEP 1 - IDENTIFY HAZARDS

Hazards fall into one of the following categories:

Tacticalrelating to the threat.

Accidentrelating to friendly forces, terrain and weather conditions, and status of equipment
and personnel.

STEP 2 - ASSESS THE HAZARDS

Use the information provided in Figures I-1 through I-4 to determine the following:

Probabilitylikelihood of hazard occurring.

Severityresult of hazard occurring.
Levelsdegree of hazard occurring.

I-3

FM 3-20.15

STEP 3 - DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS

Leaders develop controls and operational criteria in the following areas:

Control types:
Educationaltrain soldiers to reduce/avoid hazard.
Physicaldo something to remove the hazard.
Graphicalindicate hazards using phase lines on the applicable overlay.
Avoidancechoose another COA to avoid hazards.

Criteria:
Acceptablewill it reduce or remove the hazard?
Feasiblecan we do it?
Suitabledoes it fit the context of the missing hazard?

STEP 4 - IMPLEMENT CONTROLS

Controls are the procedures and considerations the unit uses to eliminate hazards or reduce their risk.
Implementing controls is the most important part of the risk management process; this is the chain of
commands contribution to the safety of the unit. Implementing controls includes coordination and
communication with appropriate superior, adjacent, and subordinate units and with individuals executing the
mission. The tank platoon leader must ensure that specific controls are integrated into operational plans
(OPLAN), OPORDs, SOPs, and rehearsals. The critical check for this step is to ensure that controls are
converted into clear, simple execution orders understood by all levels.

STEP 5 - SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE

During mission execution, it is imperative for leaders to ensure that risk management controls are
properly understood and executed and to refine the controls as necessary. Leaders must continuously evaluate
the units effectiveness in managing risks to gain insight into areas that need improvement.

PROBABILITY
Frequent

Occurs very often. Expected to occur several

times during the mission.

Likely

Expected to occur during a specific mission or

operation.

Occasional

May occur, but not often.

Seldom

Remotely possible, but not expected to occur.

Unlikely

Not impossible, but may assume will not occur.

Figure I-1. Fratricide risk assessmentprobability factor.

SEVERITY
Catastrophic

Death or permanent disability.

Critical

Permanent partial disability, temporary total

disability exceeding 3 months.

Marginal

Lost day due to injury or illness not exceeding

3 months.

Negligible

First aid or minor medical treatment.

Figure I-2. Fratricide risk assessmentseverity factor.

I-4

FM 3-20.15

RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX

Probability
Frequent

Likely

Occasional

Seldom

Unlikely

Catastrophic

Critical

Marginal

Negligible

Severity

E - Extremely High Risk

H - High Risk

M - Moderate Risk
L - Low Risk

Figure I-3. Fratricide risk assessmentrisk assessment matrix.

LEVELS OF RISK
Extremely High

Someone will die or suffer permanent disability.

High

More often than not, someone will suffer an

injury that requires less than 3 months to heal.

Moderate

More often than not, someone will require first

aid or minor medical treatment.

Low
(Worst Case)

Someone is likely to need first aid or minor

medical treatment.

Figure I-4. Fratricide risk assessmentlevels of risk.

SECTION 5 - FRATRICIDE PREVENTION PRINCIPLES AND

PROCEDURES
SPECIAL NOTE: In many situations, the primary cause of fratricide is the lack of positive target
identification. To prevent fratricide incidents, commanders and leaders at all levels must
ensure positive target identification before they issue commands to fire. In addition, all units
must accurately report their locations during combat operations, and all TOCs and CPs must
carefully track the location of all subordinate elements in relation to all friendly forces.
The measures outlined in this section, including those listed in the special note above, provide the platoon
with a guide to actions it can take to reduce and/or prevent fratricide risk. These guidelines are not directive in
nature, nor are they intended to restrict initiative by the tank platoons leaders and crewmen. Rather,
commanders and leaders must learn to apply them as appropriate based on the specific situation and METT-TC
factors.

PRINCIPLES OF FRATRICIDE PREVENTION

At the heart of fratricide reduction and prevention are the five key principles covered in the following
discussion.

I-5

FM 3-20.15

Identify and assess potential fratricide risks

Identify risks and conduct a risk assessment while developing the estimate of the situation. Explain these
risks thoroughly in the OPORD and/or applicable FRAGOs.

Maintain situational understanding

Focus on such areas as current intelligence; unit locations/dispositions; denial areas (minefields/
scatterable mines); contaminated areas, such as ICM and NBC; SITREPs; and METT-TC factors.

Ensure positive target identification

Review vehicle and weapons ID cards. Become familiar with the characteristics of potential friendly and
enemy vehicles, including their silhouettes and thermal signatures. Know at what ranges and under what
conditions positive identification of various vehicles and weapons is possible. (NOTE: Refer to the special
note at the start of this section.)

Maintain effective fire control

Ensure that fire commands are accurate, concise, and clearly stated. Make it mandatory for crewmen to
ask for clarification of any portion of the fire command that they do not completely understand. Stress the
importance of the chain of command in the fire control process; ensure that crewmen get in the habit of
obtaining target confirmation and permission to fire from their leaders before engaging targets they assume are
enemy elements.

Establish an effective command climate

Enforce fratricide prevention measures at all times, placing special emphasis on the use of doctrinally
sound TTP. Ensure that leaders maintain constant supervision in the execution of orders and in the performance
of all tasks and missions to standard.

FRATRICIDE PREVENTION MEASURES

Commanders, leaders, and crewmen should adhere to the following guidelines, considerations, and
procedures in ensuring fratricide reduction and prevention:

Recognize the signs of battlefield stress. Maintain unit cohesion by taking quick, effective action
to alleviate stress.

Conduct individual, leader, and collective (unit) training covering fratricide awareness, target
identification and recognition, and fire discipline.

Develop a simple, decisive plan.

Give complete and concise mission orders.
To simplify mission orders, use SOPs that are consistent with doctrine. Periodically review and
update SOPs as needed.

Strive to provide maximum planning time for leaders and subordinates.

Use common language/vocabulary and doctrinally correct standard terminology and control
measures, such as fire support coordination line (FSCL), zone of engagement, and RFL.

Ensure that thorough coordination is conducted at all levels.

Plan for and establish effective communications.
Plan for collocation of CPs whenever it is appropriate to the mission, such as during a passage of
lines.

I-6

FM 3-20.15

Designate and employ liaison officers (LO) as appropriate.

Make sure ROE and ROI are clear.
Conduct rehearsals whenever the situation allows the platoon adequate time to do so.
Be in the right place at the right time. Use position location/navigation devices (GPS and
POSNAV); know your location and the locations of adjacent units (left, right, leading, and
follow-on); and synchronize tactical movement. If the platoon or any element becomes lost or
misoriented, leaders must know how to contact higher headquarters immediately for instructions
and assistance.

Include a discussion of fratricide incidents in all AARs.

SECTION 6 - STOPPING A FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

This section covers actions that leaders and crewmen must be prepared to take when they encounter a
friendly fire incident. The tank platoon may become involved in such a situation in one of several ways:

As the victim of the fire.

As the firing element.
As an observer intervening in an attack of one friendly element on another.
ACTIONS AS THE VICTIM OF FRIENDLY FIRE
The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level in the event the platoon, section, or
individual tank falls victim to friendly fires:

React to contact until you recognize friendly fire.

Cease fire.
Take immediate actions to protect soldiers and vehicles.
Use a visual recognition signal directing the firing unit to cease fire.
Report the following on the next higher unit net:
Announce that the unit or vehicle is receiving friendly fire.
Request medical assistance as needed.
Give the location and direction of the firing vehicles.
Warn the higher unit not to return fire if the firing unit is positively identified as friendly.

ACTIONS AS THE FIRING ELEMENT

The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level when the platoon, section, or individual
vehicle has engaged friendly forces:

Cease fire.
Report the following on the next higher net:
Identification of the engaged friendly force (if the unit is unidentified, report the number and
types of vehicles).
The location of the incident.

I-7

FM 3-20.15

Direction and distance to the engaged force.

The type of fire.
The target effects.

ACTIONS AS AN OBSERVER OF FRIENDLY FIRE

The following are recommended actions at crew and leader level in the event the platoon, section, or
individual vehicle observes a friendly fire incident:

Seek cover and protect all crewmen and vehicles.

Use a visual recognition signal to direct the firing unit to cease fire.
Report the following on the next higher net:
Identification of the engaged friendly force (if the unit is unidentified, report number and
types of vehicles).
The location of the incident.
Direction and distance to the victim and the firing unit.
The type of fire.
The target effects.

Provide assistance as needed (when safe to do so).

LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES
In all situations involving the risk of fratricide and friendly fire, leaders must be prepared to take
immediate actions to prevent casualties as well as equipment damage or destruction. Recommended actions in
fratricide situations include the following:

Identify the incident and order the parties involved to cease fire.
Conduct an in-stride risk assessment.
Identify and implement controls to prevent the incident from recurring.

I-8

FM 3-20.15

Glossary
A
AA
AAD
AAR
ABCS
ABF
ACE
ACR
ADA
ADAM
AFATDS
A/L
ammo
AO
AP
APC
APDS
ARTEP
ASAS
ASLT POS
AT
ATCCS
ATGM
ATK POS
attn
AVLB
AVLM
AXP

avenue of approach; assembly area

antiarmor defense
after-action review
Army battle command system
attack by fire (position)
armored combat earthmover
armored cavalry regiment
air defense artillery
area denial munitions
advanced field artillery tactical data system
administrative/logistics
ammunition
area of operations
antipersonnel
armored personnel carrier
armor-piercing, discarding-sabot (ammunition)
Army training and evaluation program
all-source analysis system
assault position
antitank
Army tactical command and control system
antitank guided missile
attack position
attention
armored vehicle launched bridge
armored vehicle launched MICLIC
ambulance exchange point
B

BFA
BHL
BII
BIT
BMNT
BMP
BOS
BP
BSFV

battlefield functional area

battle handover line
basic issue item(s)
built-in test
beginning of morning nautical twilight
Soviet vehicle
battlefield operating system
battle position
Bradley Stinger (missile) fighting vehicle
C

C2I
C3I

command, control, and intelligence

command, control, communications, and intelligence

Glossary-1

FM 3-20.15

C4ISR
reconnaissance
CANA
CAS
CASEVAC
cdr
CDU
CFF
CFV
cGy/hr
CID
CINC
CITV
CLAMMS
cm
CO
co/tm
COA
COMSEC
COS
CP
CS
CSS
CSSCS
CTCP
CVC

command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and

convulsive antidote nerve agent
close air support
casualty evacuation
commander
commanders display unit
call for fire
(Bradley) cavalry fighting vehicle
centigray(s) per hour
commanders integrated display
commander in chief
commanders independent thermal viewer
cleared lane mechanical marking system
centimeter(s)
commanding officer
company team
course of action
communications security
center of sector
command post
combat support
combat service support
combat service support control system
combat trains command post
combat vehicle crewman
D

DA
DED
DID
DNBI
DOA
DOD
DPICM
DS
DSN
DSO
DS/R
DTD
DTV

Department of the Army

detailed equipment decontamination
drivers integrated display
disease and nonbattle injuries
direction of attack
Department of Defense
dual-purpose improve conventional munitions
direct support
defense switched network
domestic support operations
direct support reinforcing
detailed troop decontamination
drivers thermal viewer
E

EA
EBC
EENT
ELSEC

Glossary-2

engagement area
embedded battle command
end of evening nautical twilight
electronic security

FM 3-20.15

EN
EPLRS
EPW
evac

enemy
enhanced position location reporting system
enemy prisoner of war
evacuation
F

1SG
FA
FAAD C3I
FAC
FBCB2
FDC
FHA
FIST
FIST-V
FIT
FKSM
FM
FO
FPF
FRAGO
FSCL
FSE
FSO
ft

first sergeant
field artillery
forward area air defense command, control, communications, and intelligence system
forward air controller
Force XXI battle command brigade and below (system)
fire direction center
foreign humanitarian assistance
fire support team
fire support team vehicle
fault isolation test
Fort Knox Supplemental Material
frequency modulation (radio); field manual
forward observer
final protective fires
fragmentary order
fire support coordination line
fire support element
fire support officer
feet (foot)
G

GIRS
GPS
GPSE
GS

grid index reference system

global positioning system
gunners primary sight extension
general support
H

HC
HE
HEAT
HE-OR-T
HHC
HMMWV
HOIS
HQ

hexachloroethane
high explosive
high explosive antitank (ammunition)
high explosive obstacle reduction tracer (ammunition)
headquarters and headquarters company
high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
hostile intelligence service
headquarters
IJK

ICM
ID
in

improved conventional munitions

identification
inch(es)

Glossary-3

FM 3-20.15

INC
INFOSEC
IPB
IR
IVIS

Internet controller
information security
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
intelligence requirement(s); infrared
intervehicular information system

JAAT
JVMF

joint air attack team

joint variable message format

KIA
km

killed in action
kilometer(s)
L

LBE
LD
LO
LOA
LOGPAC
LOM
LRF
LRP
LT
LTC

load-bearing equipment
line of departure
liaison officer
limit of advance
logistics package
line of movement
laser range finder
logistic release point
lieutenant (U.S. Army)
lieutenant colonel (U.S. Army)
M

m
MACOM
maint
MANPADS
MCS
MDMP
MEDEVAC
METL
METT-TC
MICLIC
MIJI
MLC
mm
MMS
MOPP
MOS
MPAT
MPAT-OR
MRE
MSR
MTP
MTT

Glossary-4

meter(s)
major command (U.S. Army)
maintenance
man-portable air defense system
maneuver control system
military decision-making process
medical evacuation
mission essential task list
mission, enemy, terrain (and weather), troops, time available, and civilian considerations
(factors taken into account in situational awareness and in the mission analysis process)
mine-clearing line charge
meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference
military load class
millimeter(s)
mast-mounted sight
mission-oriented protective posture
military occupational specialty
multipurpose antitank (ammunition)
multipurpose antitank obstacle reduction (ammunition)
meals, ready to eat
main supply route
mission training plan
military training teams

FM 3-20.15

MTW

major theater war

N

NAAK
NATO
NBC
NBCWRS
NCO
NCOIC
NCS
NEO
NGO
NLT
NOD

nerve agent autoinjector kit

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
nuclear, biological, chemical
NBC warning and reporting system
noncommissioned officer
noncommissioned officer in charge
net control station
noncombatant evacuation operation
nongovernmental organization
not later than
night observation device
O

obj
OCOKA
OEG
OP
OPCON
OPLAN
OPORD
OPSEC
OT

objective
observation and fields of fire; cover and concealment; obstacles; key terrain; and avenues of
approach (considerations in evaluating terrain as part of METT-T analysis)
operational exposure guidance
observation post
operational control
operational plan
operation order
operations security
observer-target
P

PAO
PC
PCC
PCI
PEWS
PH
PIR
PK
PL
PLGR
PLL
plt
PMCS
PME
PMM
PO
POL

public affairs office; public affairs officer

personnel carrier (enemy vehicle)
precombat check
precombat inspection
platoon early warning system
probability of hit
priority intelligence requirements
probability of kill
phase line; platoon leader
precision lightweight GPS receiver (Plugger)
prescribed load list
platoon
preventive maintenance checks and services
peacetime military engagement
preventive medicine measures
peace operations
petroleum, oils, and lubricants

Glossary-5

FM 3-20.15

POSNAV
PP
PSG
PVO
PVS

position navigation (system)

passage point (abbreviation on overlays)
platoon sergeant
private volunteer organization
power visualization system
R

RAAM
RALS
REDCON
RES
RFL
ROE
ROI
ROM
RP
rte
RTO
RTP

remote antiarmor mine(s)

right add, left subtract (target direction guideline)
readiness condition
radiation exposure status
restrictive fire line
rules of engagement
rules of interaction
refuel on the move
release point
route
radiotelephone operator
radiotelephone procedure
S

S1
S2
S3
S3-Air
S4
SALT
SALUTE
SBF
SEP
SFC
SGT
SINCGARS
SIP
SITREP
SM
SOI
SOP
SOSRA
SP
SPOTREP
SSC
SSG
STP

Glossary-6

personnel staff officer (U.S. Army)

intelligence staff officer (U.S. Army)
operations and training staff officer (U.S. Army)
air operations staff officer (U.S. Army)
logistics staff officer (U.S. Army)
size, activity, location, and time
size, activity, location, unit identification, time, and equipment (format for reporting enemy
information)
support by fire (position)
system enhancement program
sergeant first class (U.S. Army)
sergeant (U.S. Army)
single channel ground/airborne radio system
system improvement program
situation report
soldiers manual
signal operation instructions
standing operating procedure
suppression, obscuration, security, reduction, and assault (actions executed during breaching
operations)
start point
spot report
small-scale contingency
staff sergeant (U.S. Army)
soldiers training publication

FM 3-20.15

SU
SVML

situational understanding
Stinger (missile) vehicle-mounted launcher
T

TAC CP
TACFIRE
TC
TEP
TF
TI
TIRS
TIS
TOC
TOW
TRP
TSOP
TTP

tactical command post

tactical fire direction system
tank commander
theater engagement plan
task force
tactical Internet
terrain index reference system
thermal imaging system
tactical operations center
tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (missile)
target reference point
tactical standing operating procedure
tactics, techniques, and procedures
U

UAV
UGV
UMCP
UN
U.S.
USAARMC

unmanned aerial vehicle

unmanned ground vehicle
unit maintenance collection point
United Nations
United States (of America)
U.S. Army Armor Center
VWX

VEESS
VT
VVS

vehicle engine exhaust smoke system

variable-timed
vehicle visualization system

WIA
WMD
WP

wounded in action
weapons of mass destruction
white phosphorus

XO

executive officer

Glossary-7

FM 3-20.15

Bibliography
SOURCES USED
These sources are quoted or paraphrased in this publication. (NOTE: The first publication number listed for
each field manual is current based on the revised Army hierarchy and numbering system. The second number
is the one assigned to the publication in the former numbering system.)
Army Publications
ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP

Mission Training Plan for the Tank Platoon. 25 September 1996.

FM 3.21.71

FM 7-7J

Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley). 7 May 1993.

FM 3-21.8

FM 7-8

Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. 22 April 1992.

FM 3-20.12

FM 17-12-1-1
FM 17-12-1-2

Tank Gunnery (Abrams), Volume 1. 5 May 1998.

Tank Gunnery (Abrams), Volume 2. 5 May 1998.

FM 3-20.97

FM 17-97

Regimental Armored Cavalry Troop. 9 September 1994.

FM 3-20.98

FM 17-98

Scout Platoon. 10 April 1999.

FM 3-90.1

FM 71-1

Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team. 26 January 1998.

Command Publications
The following command publications, published by the U.S. Army Armor Center and School as Fort Knox
Supplementary Material (FKSM), cannot be obtained through Armywide resupply channels. Determine
availability by contacting the following address:
Commander
USAARMC
ATTN: ATZK-IMO-RA-P
Fort Knox, KY 40121-5000
FKSM 17-15-3

Tank Platoon SOP. April 1996.

FKSM 17-15-4

Tank Platoon Leaders Notebook. June 1996.

FKSM 17-16D

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the M1A2 Tank Platoon and
Company. January 1999.

DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These sources are quoted or paraphrased in this publication.
Army Forms
DA Form 581

Request for Issue and Turn-in of Ammunition. August 1989.

DA Form 1155

Witness Statement on Individual. June 1966.

DA Form 1156

Casualty Feeder Report. June 1966.

DA Form 1594

Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officers Log. November 1962.

DA Form 1971-R

Radiological Data Sheet Monitoring and Point Technique.

September 1994.

Bibliography-1

FM 3-20.15

DA Form 2028

Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

February 1974.

DA Form 2404

Equipment Inspection Maintenance Worksheet. April 1979.

DA Form 2408-18

Equipment Inspection List. November 1991

DA Form 2765

Request for Issue or Turn-in. April 1976.

DA Form 2765-1

Request for Issue or Turn-in. April 1976.

DA Form 5368-R

Quick Fire Plan (LRA). December 1984.

DA Form 5988-E

Equipment Inspection Maintenance Worksheet. March 1991.

Department of Defense Forms

DD Form 551

Record of Interment (LRA). August 1984.

DD Form 1077

Collecting Point Register of Deceased Personnel (LRA). July 1984.

DD Form 1380

US Field Medical Card (LRA). December 1991.

READINGS RECOMMENDED
These readings contain relevant supplemental information. (NOTE: The first publication number listed for
each field manual is current based on the revised Army hierarchy and numbering system. The second number
is the one assigned to the publication in the former numbering system.)
Army Publications
ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP

Mission Training Plan for the Tank Platoon. 25 September 1996.

ARTEP 17-487-30-MTP

Mission Training Plan for the Regimental Armored Cavalry Troop.

3 September 1991.

ARTEP 71-1-MTP

Mission Training Plan for the Tank and Mechanized Infantry

Company and Company Team. 28 April 1999.

DA Pam 738-750

Functional Users Manual for the Army Maintenance Management

System. 1 August 1994.

FM 3-04.112

FM 1-112

Attack Helicopter Operations. 2 April 1997.

FM 3-04.114

FM 1-114

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Regimental Aviation

Squadron. 20 February 1991.

FM 3-04.116

FM 1-116

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Air

Cavalry/Reconnaissance Troop. 20 February 1991.

FM 3-11.3

FM 3-3

Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance.

16 November 1992.

FM 3-11.33

FM 3-3-1

Nuclear Contamination Avoidance. 9 September 1994.

FM 3-11.4

FM 3-4

NBC Protection. 29 May 1992.

FM 3-11.5

FM 3-5

NBC Decontamination. 17 November 1993.

FM 3-11.19

FM 3-19

NBC Reconnaissance. 19 November 1993.

FM 3-11.50

FM 3-50

Smoke Operations. 4 December 1990.

FM 3-11

FM 3-100

Chemical Operations, Principles, and Fundamentals. 8 May 1996.

FM 3-11.100

FM 3-101

Chemical Staffs and Units. 19 November 1993.

Bibliography-2

FM 3-20.15

FM 3-34.33

FM 5-33

Terrain Analysis. 11 July 1990.

FM 3-34.36

FM 5-36

Route Reconnaissance and Classification. 10 May 1985.

FM 3-34

FM 5-100

Engineer Operations. 27 February 1996.

FM 3-34.101

FM 5-101

Mobility. 23 January 1985.

FM 3-34.102

FM 5-102

Countermobility. 14 March 1985.

FM 3-34.103

FM 5-103

Survivability. 10 June 1985.

FM 3-34.114

FM 5-114

Engineer Operations Short of War. 13 July 1992.

FM 3-34.250

FM 5-250

Explosives and Demolitions. 30 July 1998.

FM 3-09

FM 6-20

Fire Support in the AirLand Battle. 17 May 1988.

FM 3-09.42

FM 6-20-50

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade

Operations (Light). 5 January 1990.

FM 3-09.30

FM 6-30

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire. 16 July 1991.

FM 3-21.10

FM 7-10

The Infantry Rifle Company. 14 December 1990.

FM 3-21.20

FM 7-20

The Infantry Battalion. 6 April 1992.

FM 3-21.30

FM 7-30

The Infantry Brigade. 3 October 1995.

FM 3-21.90

FM 7-90

Tactical Employment of Mortars. 9 October 1992.

FM 3-21.91

FM 7-91

Tactical Employment of Antiarmor Platoons, Companies, and

Battalions. 30 September 1987.

FM 3-21.92

FM 7-92

The Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad (Airborne, Air

Assault, Light Infantry). 23 December 1992.

FM 3-21.98

FM 7-98

Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict. 19 October 1992.

FM 4-02.42

FM 8-42

Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support

Operations. 27 October 1997.

FM 4-02.55

FM 8-55

Planning for Health Service Support. 9 September 1994.

FM 1-0

FM 12-6

Personnel Doctrine. 9 September 1994.

FM 1-06

FM 14-100

Financial Management Operations. 7 May 1997.

FM 1-05

FM 16-1

Religious Support. 26 May 1995.

FM 3-20.18

FM 17-18

Light Armor Operations. 8 March 1994.

FM 3-19.40

FM 19-40

Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons.

27 February 1976.

FM 3-24.22

FM 20-22

Vehicle Recovery Operations. 18 September 1990.

FM 3-24.32

FM 20-32

Mine/Countermine Operations. 29 May 1998.

FM 4-25.10

FM 21-10

Field Hygiene and Sanitation. 21 June 2000.

FM 4-25.12

FM 21-10-1

Unit Field Sanitation Team. 11 October 1989.

FM 4-25.11

FM 21-11

First Aid for Soldiers. 27 October 1988.

FM 3-25.60

FM 21-60

Visual Signals. 30 September 1987.

FM 3-25.70

FM 21-76

Survival. 5 June 1992.

FM 6-22

FM 22-100

Military Leadership. 31 August 1999.

Bibliography-3

FM 3-20.15

FM 26-2

Management of Stress in Army Operations. 29 August 1986.

FM 3-05.9

FM 31-20

Doctrine for Special Forces Operations. 20 April 1990

FM 3-97.12

FM 31-70

Basic Cold Weather Manual. 12 April 1968.

FM 3-05.30

FM 33-1

Psychological Operations. 18 February 1993.

FM 2-0

FM 34-1

Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. 27 September 1994.

FM 2-00.21

FM 34-2-1

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance and

Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance.
19 June 1991.

FM 2-33.4

FM 34-3

Intelligence Analysis. 15 March 1990.

FM 2-01.3

FM 34-130

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994.

FM 3-57

FM 41-10

Civil Affairs Operations. 11 January 1993.

FM 3-01.18

FM 44-18

Air Defense Artillery Employment: Stinger. 30 September 1981.

FM 3-01.8

FM 44-8

Combined Arms for Air Defense. 1 June 1999.

FM 3-01.18

FM 44-18-1

Stinger Team Operations. 31 December 1984.

FM 3-01.64

FM 44-64

SHORAD Battalion and Battery Operations. 5 June 1997.

FM 3-01

FM 44-100

US Army Air and Missile Defense Operations. 15 June 2000.

FM 4-01.9

FM 55-9

Unit Air Movement Planning. 5 April 1993.

FM 3-21.38

FM 57-38

Pathfinder Operations. 9 April 1993.

FM 4-93.25

FM 63-2-1

Division Support Command: Light Infantry, Airborne, and Air

Assault Divisions. 16 November 1992.

FM 3-90.2

FM 71-2

The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force.

27 September 1988.

FM 3-90.3

FM 71-3

The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Brigade. 8 January 1996.

FM 3-100.71

FM 71-100

Division Operations. 28 August 1996.

FM 3-90.123

FM 71-123

Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored

Brigade, Battalion Task Force, and Company Team.
30 September 1992.

FM 3-58

FM 90-2

Battlefield Deception. 3 October 1988.

FM 3-97.3

FM 90-3

Desert Operations. 24 August 1993.

FM 3-97.4

FM 90-4

Air Assault Operations. 16 March 1987.

FM 3-97.6

FM 90-6

Mountain Operations. 30 June 1980.

FM 3-07.11

FM 90-8

Counterguerrilla Operations. 29 August 1986.

FM 3-06

FM 90-10(HTF)

Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). 15 August 1979.

FM 3-06.11

FM 90-10-1

An Infantrymans Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas. 12 May 1993.

FM 3-97.13

FM 90-13

River Crossing Operations. 26 January 1998.

FM 3-34.2

FM 90-13-1

Combined Arms Breaching Operations. 28 February 1991.

FM 90-14

Rear Battle. 10 June 1985.

FM 90-22

Multiservice Night and Adverse Weather Combat Operations.

31 January 1991.

FM 3-97.22

Bibliography-4

FM 3-20.15

FM 3-18.11

FM 90-26

Airborne Operations. 18 December 1990.

FM 3-0

FM 100-5

Operations. 14 June 2001.

FM 4-0

FM 100-10

Combat Service Support. 3 October l995.

FM 3-100.1

FM 100-15

Corps Operations. 29 October 1996.

FM 3-07.7

FM 100-19

Domestic Support Operations. 1 July 1993.

FM 100-20

Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict. 5 December 1990.

FM 3-07.3

FM 100-23

Peace Operations. 30 December 1994.

FM 3-05

FM 100-25

Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces. 1 August 1999.

FM 3-17

FM 100-27

US Army/US Air Force Doctrine for Joint Airborne and Tactical

Airlift Operations. 31 January 1985.

FM 100-37

Terrorism Counteraction. 24 July 1987.

FM 6-99

FM 101-5

Staff Organization and Operations. 31 May 1997.

FM 6-99.1

FM 101-5-1

Operational Terms and Graphics. 30 September 1997.

TB MED 524

Occupational and Environmental Health: Control of Hazards to

Health from Laser Radiation. 20 June 1985.

Joint and Multiservice Publications

Joint Publication 3-07.2

Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.

17 March 1998.

Joint Publication 3-07.3

Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations.

12 February 1999.

Bibliography-5

FM 3-20.15

Index
A
abbreviated troop-leading procedures, 2-10 and 2-11. see also troop-leading procedures
actions on contact, 3-5, 3-14 thru 3-33. see also battle drills; tank platoon tactical tasks
actions at an ambush, 5-14 thru 5-17
during convoy escort, 5-9, 5-13 thru 5-18
during passage of lines, 5-21
during tactical road march, 5-2, 5-7
example (contact with an inferior force), 3-17 thru 3-20
example (contact with an unacticipated superior force), 3-20 thru 3-22
steps of actions on contact, 3-14 thru 3-16
adjustment of indirect fires, 6-9 thru 6-15
advance party. see quartering party
aim points, 3-30 and 3-31, 6-21 thru 6-23
air assault battalion, C-2 and C-3. see also infantry
air attack. see air defense; battle drills
air cavalry, 6-16 and 6-17, 6-26
air defense, 6-20 thru 6-25. see also aim points; air defense artillery (ADA); close air support (CAS)
active air defense measures, 3-30, 6-21 thru 6-23
air defense warning levels, 6-20
Bradley Stinger fighting vehicle (BSFV) and Bradley Linebacker, 6-25
in defensive planning/preparation, 4-8, 4-19
in light/heavy operations, C-10
in offensive planning/preparation, 3-4, 3-6
machine gun fires, 3-30 and 3-31
passive air defense measures, 3-30, 6-20 and 6-21
react to air attack drill, 3-30 thru 3-32
role of digital systems, A-2
Stinger missile, 6-24 and 6-25
use of tank platoon weapons, 6-21 thru 6-23
weapon control status levels, 6-21
air defense artillery (ADA), 3-4, 4-8, 6-1, 6-23 thru 6-25, 6-26, C-10. see also air defense; battlefield
operating systems (BOS)
air support. see close air support (CAS)
airborne battalion, C-2 and C-3. see also infantry
alarms, E-2 and E-3, E-6 and E-7, E-16. see also nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
operations/conditions
alternate bounding technique. see overwatch
ambush. see convoy escort operations
ammunition (Class V supply), 2-5, 7-2 and 7-3. see also supply operations
basic load, 7-2
emergency resupply, 7-5 and 7-6, C-11
field artillery, 6-3 and 6-4, 7-2
in air defense, 6-21

Index-1

FM 3-20.15

in continuous operations, D-2

in defensive operations, 2-47, 2-57, 4-5, 4-8, 4-21
in fire command, 2-40 and 2-41
in light/heavy operations, C-8, C-9, C-11
in relief in place, 5-33
in stability operations and support operations, F-12
in urban operations, 8-3, 8-9, 8-10
methods/techniques of resupply, 7-3 thru 7-9
mortars, 6-1 and 6-2
pre-positioning (resupply), 2-47, 4-8, 4-19, 4-21, 7-4
safety (with dismounted elements), C-3, C-8
armored cavalry troop, 1-1, 1-3
Army Battle Command System (ABCS), A-1 and A-2. see also command and control; digital
systems/communications
Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS), A-2. see also command and control; digital
systems/communications
assault, 2-20, 3-16, 3-37 and 3-38, 5-15 and 5-16, 5-27, 5-28, 8-13, E-17. see also actions on contact; platoon
tactical tasks
assembly area, 2-7, 2-17, 2-25, 5-6 thru 5-8, 5-20, 5-21, 5-31, 5-34. see also quartering party; tactical road
march
characteristics, 5-6
in convoy escort, 5-13
in environmental protection, G-2
in passage of lines, 5-20 and 5-21
in relief in place, 5-34
in risk management, H-5
in tactical road march, 5-6
occupation by force, 5-9
occupation procedures, 5-7 and 5-8
perimeter defense, 5-31
attack, 1-1, 1-3, 2-20, 2-41, 2-43, 3-2, 8-4, 8-11 thru 8-14, C-8. see also actions on contact; attack by fire
(ABF); counterattack; hasty attack; offensive operations
attack by fire (ABF), 2-4, 2-20, 3-16, 3-34 thru 3-36, 4-9, 4-23, 5-32, 8-13, C-10, F-17. see also actions on
contact; graphic control measures
attack helicopters, 6-16, 6-26
aviation assets (Army), 6-1, 6-16 and 6-17, 6-26. see also air defense; close air support (CAS)
aerial medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)/casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), 7-14 and 7-15
air cavalry, 6-16 and 6-17
attack helicopters, 6-17

B
backbriefs, 2-8, 2-53. see also rehearsals; troop-leading procedures
basic load, 4-8, 7-2, 7-3. see also ammunition; supply operations
battle command, 2-1 thru 2-58, 5-9. see also command and control
battle drills, 3-3, 3-4, 3-14, 3-15, 3-21, 3-22 thru 3-32
action drill (with enemy contact), 3-27 thru 3-29
action drill (without enemy contact), 3-25 thru 3-27

Index-2

FM 3-20.15

battle drill rehearsal, 2-9

change of formation drill, 3-23 and 3-24
contact drill, 3-24 and 3-25
react to air attack drill, 3-6, 3-30 thru 3-32, 6-21
react to chemical/biological attack drill, 3-33, E-4, E-5
react to indirect fire drill, 3-29 and 3-30
react to nuclear attack drill, 3-32, E-4
role in fire distribution/control, 2-28
battle handover line (BHL), 5-21, 5-22. see also restrictive fire line (RFL)
battle position (BP), 2-4, 2-21, 2-52, 4-2, 4-4, 6-16, 6-17. see also defensive operations; fighting positions;
firing positions; graphic control measures
deliberate occupation, 4-10 thru 4-14, 5-33
displacement, 4-21 thru 4-23
effects of smoke, E-21
hasty occupation, 3-40, 4-9 and 4-10, 5-7, 5-8, 5-33
helicopter BPs, 6-16
improvement (supply materials), 7-3
improvement (survivability), 4-18
in assembly areas, 5-7
in defensive operations, 4-1, 4-4, 4-9 thru 4-14, 4-17, 4-23
in delay operations, 5-33
in fire support planning, 6-16
in follow and support operations, 5-31
in perimeter defense, 5-31
in relief in place, 5-33
in screen operations, 5-32
in stability operations and support operations, F-17 and F-18
in urban operations, 8-14, 8-15
levels of preparation (reconnoiter, prepare, occupy), 4-9
pre-positioning of supplies, 7-4
primary, 4-4
reconnaissance of the BP, 4-10 and 4-11
subsequent, 4-4, 4-11, 4-12, 4-17, 4-18, 4-21
supplementary, 4-4, 4-11, 4-17, 4-21, 4-22
battle space, 2-13 thru 2-15, 3-3, 3-13. see also command and control; situational understanding
battlefield operating systems. see operating systems
battlefield visualization, 2-12, 2-13. see also battle space; command and control
biological operations/conditions. see nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) operations
bounding overwatch. see overwatch; tactical movement
breaching operations, 3-16, 5-22 thru 5-30. see also combat engineers; obstacles
assault force, 5-27, 5-28, 5-30
breach force, 5-27, 5-28 thru 5-30
breaching methods, 5-28
bypassing obstacles, 5-17, 5-28
creating a lane, 5-28 and 5-29
engineer support, 6-17
in convoy escort operations, 5-17 and 5-18
in light/heavy operations, C-1, C-4, C-10
in offensive operations, 3-4, 3-6
in stability operations and support operations, F-19
in-stride breach (tank platoon tactical task), 3-40 and 3-41

Index-3

FM 3-20.15

marking materials and techniques, 5-29 and 5-30

planning considerations, 3-4
SOSRA procedures, 3-41, 5-27
support force, 5-27, 5-28
types of obstacles, 3-4, 5-22 thru 5-27
use of mine plow/mine roller tanks, 5-10, 5-13, 5-28 and 5-29, F-19
use of smoke, E-17, E-19
break point, 4-12, 5-33
bypass, 3-38 thru 3-40, 5-17, E-17 and E-18. see also actions on contact; obstacles; tank platoon tactical tasks

C
call for fire, 4-5, 4-6, 4-17, 4-18, 4-20, 4-22, 6-4, 6-7, 6-6 thru 6-15, A-12, A-13, B-9. see also field artillery
(FA); fire distribution and control; indirect fire support; mortars
adjusting indirect fires, 6-9 thru 6-15
initial call for fire, 6-6 thru 6-9, B-9
refinement and surveillance of fires, 6-15
use of digital systems, A-9, A-12
camouflage, 2-10, 4-12, 6-20, D-2, D-3
cavalry. see armored cavalry troop
chemical operations/conditions. see nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) operations
civilians, 2-6, 7-21, 8-4, 8-7. see also enemy prisoners of war (EPW); mission, enemy, terrain (and weather),
troops, time available, and civilian considerations (factors of METT-TC); stability operations and support
operations; urban operations
in stability operations and support operations, F-12, F-14
in urban operations, 8-8
classes of supply, 7-2 and 7-3. see also supply operations
close air support (CAS), 6-26, E-17, E-20. see also aviation assets (Army)
coil formation, 3-11 and 3-12, 5-31. see also formations; perimeter defense
cold weather injuries, 7-14
column. see formations; march columns
combat engineers, 6-17 thru 6-20. see also breaching operations; obstacles
armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB), 6-18 and 6-19
capabilities, 6-18 thru 6-20
countermobility operations, 6-20
in convoy escort operations, 5-13
in defensive operations, 2-47, 4-12, 4-17, 6-17
in light/heavy operations, C-10
in offensive operations, 6-17
M9 armored combat earthmover (ACE), 2-47, 6-18
mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC), 6-19
mobility operations, 6-19
organization, 6-18
support for the tank platoon, 6-20
survivability operations, 6-20
Wolverine (bridge), 6-18

Index-4

FM 3-20.15

combat service support (CSS), 1-1, 2-1, 2-16, 3-4, 3-6, 4-18, 5-20, 7-1 thru 7-21, 8-10 and 8-11, A-2, C-2,
C-11, F-12. see also enemy prisoners of war (EPW); killed in action (KIA) personnel; maintenance
operations; medical services; personnel operations; supply operations; wounded in action (WIA) personnel
combat support (CS), 1-1, 2-1, 4-16, 5-20, 6-1 thru 6-26, C-2. see also air defense; aviation assets (Army);
call for fire; close air support (CAS); combat engineers; field artillery (FA); indirect fire support; mortars
command and control, 2-1 thru 2-58. see also battle command; digital systems/communications; fire
distribution and control; operating systems; situational understanding; troop-leading procedures
in convoy escort operations, 5-9
in defensive operations, 4-3 thru 4-5
in light/heavy operations, C-4
in limited visibility, D-8
in offensive operations, 3-2, 3-5
in urban operations, 8-1, 8-4, 8-7, 8-10
role in fratricide prevention, I-6
role of communications, 2-24 thru 2-27
role of digital systems, A-1 thru A-4
role of smoke (disruption of command and control), E-17
troop-leading procedures, 2-1 thru 2-11
combat, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
system, 8-7. see also command and control; communications; intelligence; reconnaissance
commanders integrated thermal viewer (CITV), 3-29, 3-30, 3-32, D-7, D-8, D-9, E-21
commanders intent, 2-3, 2-6, 4-8
communications, 1-4, 2-1, 2-24 thru 2-27. see also digital systems/communications; Force XXI battle
command brigade and below (FBCB2) system; intervehicular information system (IVIS); messenger;
operations security (OPSEC); pyrotechnics; signals and signaling; single channel ground/airborne radio
system (SINCGARS); sound signals; visual signals; wire communications
as part of readiness condition (REDCON), D-2
call for fire, 6-6 thru 6-9
communications checks/inspections, 2-10, D-2
communications security (COMSEC), 2-25, 6-20, A-7
comparison of digital and FM communications, A-12 and A-13
digital traffic, 2-25 and 2-26
during actions at a contact point (linkup), 5-8
during breaching operations, 5-28, 5-30
during consolidation and reorganization, 3-41 and 3-42, 4-25
during continuous operations, D-2, D-3, D-6
during follow and support operations, 5-31
during light/heavy operations, C-4 and C-5
during passage of lines, 5-21
during relief in place, 5-33 and 5-34
during urban operations, 8-4, 8-10
equipment maintenance, 7-10
in fratricide/friendly fire situation, I-6
in passage of lines, 5-21
means of, 2-24 thru 2-26
net control, 2-26 and 2-27
radio nets (platoon; company/troop), 2-26
radiotelephone procedures (RTP), 2-27
rehearsal (radio/digital systems), 2-10
role in fratricide prevention, I-3
signal operations instructions (SOI), 2-25, 4-16
techniques of effective communications, 2-27

Index-5

FM 3-20.15

use of smoke, E-17

with fire support team (FIST), 6-4
company team, 1-1, A-9 and A-10, B-2. see also tank platoon
confirmation brief, 2-8, H-5. see also rehearsals
consolidation, 3-3, 3-5, 3-41, 4-25, 8-12, E-17. see also reorganization
contact, 2-26, 2-56, 3-14 and 3-15, 3-22, 3-24, 3-25, 5-33. see also actions on contact; battle drills; enemy
forces/enemy analysis
contact point, 2-18, 5-8 and 5-9, 5-20. see also coordination; liaison
contact report, 2-43, 3-24, A-12, A-13, B-9
contamination. see nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) operations
continuous operations, 7-14, 7-15, 8-9, D-1 thru D-9. see also limited visibility; operations security (OPSEC)
control measures, 1-7, 2-13, 2-15, 2-23, 2-17 thru 2-21, 2-29, 2-42, 4-10, 4-11, 5-2 thru 5-4, I-2 and I-3. see
also graphic control measures
convoy escort operations, 5-9 thru 5-20
actions at an ambush, 5-14 thru 5-17
actions at an obstacle, 5-17 and 5-18
actions during halts, 5-9, 5-18 thru 5-20
actions on contact, 5-9, 5-13 thru 5-18
command and control, 5-9
in stability operations and support operations, F-19
tactical disposition, 5-9 thru 5-13
coordination, 2-2, 2-5, 2-6, 2-7, 2-8, 2-14, 2-17, 2-18, 2-29, 2-40, 2-55, A-13
in assembly area, 5-8
in continuous operations, D-3
in defensive operations, 4-11, 4-16 and 4-17
in fire distribution and control, 2-29
in follow and support operations, 5-31
in fratricide prevention, I-6
in light/heavy operations, C-3
in offensive operations, 3-5
in orders, B-2
in passage of lines, 5-20 and 5-21
in perimeter defense, 5-31
in relief in place, 5-33, 5-34
in stability operations and support operations, F-6, F-12, F-14, F-21
in urban operations, 8-10
linkup (actions at a contact point), 5-8 and 5-9
role of digital systems, A-1, A-2
with adjacent units, 4-16, 5-7
with infantry, 5-31, 5-32, C-3, C-11
within the tank platoon, 4-16 and 4-17
counterattack, 4-2, 4-9, 4-23 and 4-24, 4-25, 5-31, 5-33. see also defensive operations; offensive operations
counterattack by fire, 4-23 and 4-24
counterattack by fire and movement, 4-24
defense against, 3-41, 8-5
countermobility. see combat engineers; mobility and survivability; obstacles

Index-6

FM 3-20.15

counterreconnaissance, 5-32
countersurveillance, D-3 and D-4
counterterrorism, F-16 and F-17. see also stability operations and support operations
course of action (COA), 2-1, 2-4, 3-3, 3-14 thru 3-17, 3-30, 3-41, 4-6, 5-31. see also actions on contact; tank
platoon tactical tasks
cover and concealment, 2-4, 6-3, 6-4, 7-4, 8-1, 8-7, D-4, D-6, E-1, F-11. see also camouflage; terrain
crew responsibilities, 1-1 and 1-2, 1-4 thru 1-6, A-9 thru A-12
company team responsibilities, A-9 and A-10
driver, 1-5, 7-11, A-6, A-11
gunner, 1-5, 7-11, A-11
in combat service support (CSS), 7-1
in digital operations, A-9 thru A-12
in fratricide/friendly fire situation, I-7 and I-8
in handling of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), 7-17
in light/heavy operations, C-4
in maintenance operations, 7-10 and 7-11
in medical services, 7-14
in risk management, H-5 and H-6
in stability operations and support operations, F-12 and F-13
loader, 1-6, A-6, A-11 and A-12
platoon leader, 1-4 and 1-5, 7-10, A-10 and A-11, H-6
platoon sergeant (PSG), 1-5, 7-1, 7-10 and 7-11, A-11
tank commander (TC), 1-5, 7-11, A-6, A-11
critical points, 5-3, 5-4. see also control measures; graphic control measures

D
danger areas, 2-4, 2-14, 2-21, 3-7, 3-40
dead space, 2-14, 2-29, 2-48, 2-50 thru 2-52, 3-7, 3-13, 4-11, 4-12, 4-16, 4-25, 8-3, 8-4
decision-making. see command and control; leadership; troop-leading procedures
decision point (artillery), 4-3, 4-5, 4-11, 5-33, D-9
decontamination. see nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) operations
defensive operations, 2-7, 2-43 thru 2-58, 3-16, 4-1 thru 4-25. see also battle position (BP); consolidation;
fighting position; firing position; operating systems; reorganization
area defense, 4-2
characteristics, 4-1 and 4-2
consolidation and reorganization, 4-25
coordination, 4-16 and 4-17
counterattack, 2-20, 4-1, 4-2, 4-9, 4-23 and 4-24
deliberate occupation of a BP, 4-10 thru 4-14, 4-17
delay, 5-32 and 5-33
disengagement, 4-4 and 4-5, 4-21
displacement, 4-1, 4-5, 4-17, 4-19, 4-21 thru 4-23, D-9
engagement area, 2-4, 2-7, 2-14, 2-29, 2-43 and 2-44, 4-1, 4-3, 4-6, 4-7, 4-9, 4-11, 4-12, 4-14 and 4-15,
4-20, 5-33, E-21
engagement criteria, 4-10, 4-11
engineer support, 6-17
execution, 2-56 thru 2-59, 4-19 thru 4-25
fire control, 2-28. see also fire distribution and control

Index-7

FM 3-20.15

fire plan/planning, 2-43 thru 2-46, 4-6, 4-12 thru 4-14, 4-16
firing patterns, 2-30 and 2-31. see also fire distribution and control
fundamentals, 4-1 and 4-2
hasty occupation of a BP (hasty defense), 3-40, 3-41, 4-9 and 4-10, 4-17, 5-7, 5-8
hide position. see firing positions
in limited visibility, 4-16, D-9
in urban operations, 8-14 thru 8-16
levels of preparation, 4-9
missions and tasks (platoon/company), 4-2
mobile defense, 4-2
NBC defensive measures, E-2 and E-3, E-4 and E-5
perimeter defense, 4-19, 5-7, 5-31 and 5-32, F-17, F-18
planning, 2-43 thru 2-46, 4-3 thru 4-8, D-9
preparation, 2-46 thru 2-56, 4-1, 4-8 thru 4-19, D-9
pre-positioning (prestock resupply), 7-4
priorities of work, 4-12 and 4-13
reconnaissance, 2-43 and 2-44, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-6, 4-9, 4-10 and 4-11, 4-17
use of smoke, E-21
withdrawal, 5-34
delay, 1-3, 5-32 and 5-33
deliberate attack (in urban operations), 8-11
deliberate occupation of a battle position (BP). see battle position (BP); defensive operations
destruction
equipment, 7-13
supplies, 7-4
digital systems/communications, 2-25, 2-26, 5-3, 5-21, 5-30, 5-34, 6-5, A-1 thru A-13, D-3, D-20. see also
Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) system; intervehicular information systems (IVIS)
capabilities and limitations, A-8 and A-9
comparison with FM communications, A-12 and A-13
crew responsibilities, A-9 thru A-12
digital reporting, B-7
training, A-9
direct fires. see fire commands; fire distribution and control; fire patterns; fire plan/planning
disengagement, 4-3, 4-4 and 4-5, 4-9, 4-10, 4-11, 4-21, 5-33, 5-34. see also defensive operations;
displacement; withdrawal
displacement, 4-2, 4-17, 4-21 thru 4-23, E-17 and E-18. see also defensive operations; disengagement;
withdrawal
drills, 2-1. see also battle drills
driver. see crew responsibilities
duties. see crew responsibilities

E
electronic warfare, 3-15
emergency resupply. see supply operations
enemy (threat) forces and enemy analysis, 2-4. see also contact; battle drills; enemy prisoners of war (EPW)
captured documents/equipment, 7-20
contact situations, 3-14 and 3-15

Index-8

FM 3-20.15

in actions on contact, 3-15 and 3-16

in defensive operations, 4-14, D-9
in light/heavy operations, C-5
in offensive operations, 2-41, 3-3 and 3-4, 3-6
in orders, B-2, B-4, B-7
in overlays, 2-16
in screen operations, 5-42
in urban operations, 8-7 thru 8-10, 8-14 and 8-15
use of smoke, E-21
enemy prisoners of war (EPW), 3-41 and 3-42, 4-25, 7-17 thru 7-20, 7-21. see also civilians; enemy (threat)
forces and enemy analysis; evacuation
civilians, 7-21
handling procedures (five-S principles), 7-17 and 7-18
rights and responsibilities, 7-18
tagging procedures, 7-18 thru 7-20
engagement area. see defensive operations
engagement criteria, 5-32, 8-6
engineers. see combat engineers
environment (natural)
environmental protection, G-1 thru G-3
environmental assistance (in natural disasters), F-13. see also stability operations and support
operations
environment (operational), F-1, F-2, F-7, F-8 and F-9, F-12, F-13, F-14. see also stability operations and
support operations
evacuation, 1-5, 3-6, 7-14 thru 7-15. see also destruction of equipment; maintenance; medical services
aerial medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)/casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), 7-14 and 7-15
captured documents and equipment, 7-20 and 7-21
enemy prisoners of war (EPW), 7-1, 7-17 thru 7-20
friendly equipment, 3-6, 7-1, 7-10, 7-11 and 7-12, C-11
in light/heavy operations, C-11
in urban operations, 8-10
killed in action (KIA) personnel, 7-1, 7-16 and 7-17
rehearsals, 3-6
wounded in action (WIA) personnel, 7-1, 7-14 and 7-15
evaluating the situation (during actions on contact), 3-15 and 3-16
execution. see also actions on contact; consolidation; defensive operations; reorganization; tactical
movement; tank platoon tactical tasks
in defensive operations, 2-56 thru 2-58, 4-19 thru 4-25
in continuous operations, D-8, D-9
in offensive operations, 2-42 and 2-43, 3-6 thru 3-42
exploitation, 3-2, 8-13. see also offensive operations

F
field artillery (FA), 2-22, 6-1, 6-2 thru 6-5. see also ammunition; call for fire; fire support team (FIST);
indirect fire support
capabilities and limitations, 6-3
decision point, 4-3, 4-5, 4-11, 5-33, C-9
employment considerations (munitions), 6-3 and 6-4

Index-9

FM 3-20.15

in defensive operations, 4-1, 4-6, 4-9, 4-12

in offensive operations, 3-3, 3-5, 3-12
in urban operations, 8-10
role of digital systems, A-2
smoke capabilities, 6-3, E-19
fighting position. see also battle position (BP); firing position
alternate, 4-3 and 4-4, 4-11, 4-18, 5-33, 8-15
in continuous operations, D-2
in defensive operations, 4-3 and 4-4, 4-16, 4-17, 8-15, 8-16
in limited visibility, D-9
in relief in place, 5-33
in urban operations, 8-15 and 8-16
primary, 4-3 and 4-4, 4-11, 4-18, 4-19, 5-33
supplementary, 4-3 and 4-4, 4-18, 4-21, 5-33
supply materials (for improvement of positions), 7-3
final protective fires (FPF), 2-52, 4-12
fire and movement, 2-41, 3-33, 4-24, 8-6
fire commands, 2-38, 2-39 thru 2-41, 4-20. see also fire distribution and control
elements of, 2-39 thru 2-41
examples of, 2-41
role in fratricide prevention, I-1, I-6
fire distribution and control, 2-28 thru 2-58, 4-15 and 4-16. see also call for fire; fire commands; fire
patterns; fire plan/planning; firing positions; firing techniques; sketch card; target reference point (TRP)
control, 2-38 thru 2-41
distribution, 2-30 thru 2-38
engagement priorities, 2-43, 2-57
fire control measures, 4-10, 4-11, 5-8
fire direction center (FDC), 6-6 thru 6-11
fire request channels, 6-5 and 6-6
focusing fires, 2-28 and 2-29
for indirect fires, 6-9
fundamentals, 4-15 and 4-16
in call for fire, 6-9
in defensive operations, 2-43 thru 2-58, 4-9, 4-15 and 4-16
in light/heavy operations, C-5
in limited visibility, D-9
in linkup, 5-9
in offensive operations, 2-41 thru 2-43, 3-5
in passage of lines, 5-21
in urban operations, 8-1, 8-4, 8-10
principles, 4-15 and 4-16
rehearsal, 2-55 and 2-56
role in fratricide prevention, I-2, I-6
role of standing operating procedures (SOP), 2-29
sketch cards, 2-47 thru 2-52
use of target reference points (TRP), 2-28, 2-29, 4-10
fire patterns. see also fire distribution and control
cross fire pattern, 2-30 and 2-31, 2-33, 2-35, 2-37
depth fire pattern, 2-31, 2-36
frontal fire pattern, 2-30, 2-34, 2-35
in fire commands, 2-40
in defensive operations, 4-10, 4-11, 4-20

Index-10

FM 3-20.15

fire plan/planning, 2-8, 2-25, 2-29, 2-38 and 2-39, 2-41 and 2-42, 2-43 thru 2-46, 2-53 thru 2-55, 4-12, 4-16,
5-33. see also defensive operations; fire support; indirect fire support; sketch card
fire request channels, 6-5 and 6-6
fire support, 2-16, 6-1 thru 6-16. see also battlefield operating systems (BOS); call for fire; field artillery
(FA); fire distribution and control; indirect fire support; mortars
calling for and adjusting indirect fire, 6-6 thru 6-15, A-13
fire request channels, 6-5 and 6-6
fire support planning, 6-16
in convoy escort, 5-17
in defensive operations, 4-5 and 4-6, 4-17
in light/heavy operations, C-9
in offensive operations, 3-2, 3-3, 3-5, 3-12
in relief in place, 5-33
in urban operations, 8-10
role of digital systems, A-2, A-13
tactical fire (TACFIRE) system, 6-2, 6-4, 6-5
use of fires to assist navigation, 2-22
fire support team (FIST), 2-2, 2-21, 2-48, 3-42, 4-3, 4-5, 4-6, 4-17, 6-1, 6-3, 6-4 and 6-5, 6-16, A-10, E-19.
see also field artillery (FA); indirect fire support; mortars
firing position. see also battle position (BP); fighting position
alternating fire, 2-32, 2-37
engineer support, 4-7, 4-12, 4-17, 4-18, 6-20
firing techniques, 2-32 thru 2-38
hide, 2-44, 4-8, 4-17, 4-19, 5-31, 5-32, 5-33, 5-34, D-4, D-5
hull-down, 2-44, 4-4, 4-8, 4-11 and 4-12, 4-17, 4-20
improvement (dug-in positions), 4-7 and 4-8, 4-18
in attack by fire, 3-34
in defensive operations, 2-44, 2-47, 4-4, 4-7 and 4-8, 4-18, 4-20
in fire command, 2-40
in fire distribution and control, 2-44
in light/heavy operations, C-6 and C-7, C-10
in relief in place, 5-33, 5-34
observed fire, 2-32, 2-38
occupation, 4-20
simultaneous fire, 2-32, 2-33 thru 2-36
supply materials (for improvement of positions), 7-3
turret-down, 2-44, 4-8, 4-11, 4-17, 4-19, 4-20
flag signals. see visual signals
FM radio, A-13, B-8 and B-9, C-4. see also communications
follow and support operations, 5-8, 5-31, 5-32, F-23. see also infantry
food and water (Class I supply), 7-2, 7-4. see also supply operations
in NBC operations, E-4
in stability operations and support operations, F-12
Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) system, 1-4, 1-5, 2-6, 2-11, 2-12, 2-25, A-1, A-2
thru A-4, B-2, C-4. see also communications; digital systems/communications
capabilities and equipment, A-2 thru A-4
crew responsibilities, A-9 thru A-12
digital overlays, 2-16 and 2-17
fire plan, 2-55, A-11
fire requests, 6-5 and 6-6

Index-11

FM 3-20.15

in defensive operations, 4-16, 4-20

navigation, A-5 thru A-7
sketch cards, 2-47, 2-52, A-11
training, A-9
use in wingman concept, A-4 and A-5
formations, 2-4, 2-31, 2-42, 3-5, 3-7, 3-9 thru 3-12, 5-1, 5-2 5-10, 5-13. see also tactical movement
change of formation drill, 3-24
coil, 3-11 and 3-12, 5-31. see also perimeter defense
column, 3-9, 5-18 and 5-19
echelon (left and right), 3-10
herringbone, 3-11 and 3-12, 5-18 and 5-19
in convoy escort operations, 5-10, 5-13, 5-18 and 5-19
in tactical road march, 5-1
line, 3-11
staggered column, 3-9
vee, 3-11
wedge, 3-10
fragmentary order (FRAGO), 2-2, 2-11, 3-16, 3-17, 3-25, 4-1, 4-3, 8-11, A-8 and A-9, B-1, B-7. see also
orders
fratricide, 3-24, 4-16, 4-23, 5-9, 5-21, 8-4, 8-12, I-1 thru I-8
causes and effects, I-2 and I-3
preventive measures, I-5 and I-6
risk identification/assessment, I-3 thru I-5
stopping friendly fire, I-7 and I-8
training, I-1, I-3
fuel (Class III supply), 1-4, 7-2 and 7-3, 7-11. see also supply operations
in light/heavy operations, C-11
in relief in place, 5-33
in tactical road march, 5-5
methods/techniques of resupply, 7-3 thru 7-9
pre-positioning (prestock resupply), 7-4

G
gaps. see dead space
global positioning systems (GPS), 1-4, 2-11, 2-23, 2-44, 4-3, 4-17, 4-20, 5-6, 5-30, A-5, D-7, E-20, I-6.
see also navigation; position navigation (POSNAV) systems
graphic control measures, 1-5, 2-17 thru 2-21, 2-34, 4-6, 5-3, A-9. see also control measures (NOTE: Many
of the following control measures are listed separately in this index.)
assault position (ASLT POS), 2-20
assembly area (AA), 2-17, 5-6 thru 5-8, 5-20, 5-21
attack by fire (ABF) position, 2-20
attack position (ATK POS), 2-18, 5-2
axis of advance, 2-19
battle position (BP), 2-21
boundary, 2-17
checkpoint, 2-18
contact point, 2-18, 5-8 and 5-9
direction of attack (DOA), 2-20
objective (OBJ), 2-19
passage lane, 2-19, 5-20, 5-21
passage point (PP), 2-19

Index-12

FM 3-20.15

phase line (PL), 2-17

route (RTE), 2-18
support by fire (SBF) position, 2-20
target reference point (TRP), 2-21
grid index reference system (GIRS), 2-24
guides, 5-4, 5-6, 5-8, 5-20, 5-21, 5-33, C-5, C-6, C-7, C-8, C-10, H-5
gunner. see crew responsibilities

H
halts, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-5 and 5-6. see also tactical road march
in convoy escort operations, 5-17, 5-18 thru 5-20
in passage of lines, 5-21
scheduled, 5-1, 5-5
unscheduled, 5-2, 5-5 and 5-6
hand-and-arm signals. see visual signals
hasty attack, 4-2, 4-24, 5-32, F-17. see also attack; defensive operations; offensive operations
hasty defense (during offensive operations), 3-11, 3-16, 3-34, 3-36, 3-40, 3-41. see also defensive operations
hasty occupation of a battle position (BP). see battle position (BP)
helicopters, 6-16 and 6-17, 6-21. see also aim points; air defense; aviation assets (Army); evacuation
herringbone formation, 3-11 and 3-12. see also formations
hide position, 4-19, 5-33, 5-34, 8-15 and 8-16. see also firing position
high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), 1-3
hot loop, 2-25. see also wire communications
hull-down position. see firing position
human aspect of operations. see also operating systems
in defensive operations, 4-8, 4-19
in offensive operations, 3-5, 3-6
hygiene, 7-14, E-2, F-12

I
Illumination rounds, 2-22, 3-3, 6-2, 6-3, 8-10, D-7. see also ammunition; field artillery (FA); mortars
indirect fire support, 2-41, 2-56, 3-3, 3-5, 4-6, 4-12, 4-14, 4-15, 4-16, 5-20, 6-1 thru 6-16, C-9. see also call
for fire; field artillery (FA); fire support; fire support team (FIST); mortars
ammunition, 6-2, 6-3 and 6-4
calling for and adjusting indirect fire, 6-6 thru 6-15
capabilities and limitations, 6-1 and 6-2, 6-3
field artillery (FA), 6-2 thru 6-16
in breaching operations, 5-22, 5-27
in light/heavy operations, C-2
in offensive operations, 3-3, 3-5, 3-12, 3-14, 3-15, 3-36, 3-39, 3-40
in urban operations, 8-10
mortars, 6-1 and 6-2
react to indirect fire drill, 3-29 and 3-30

Index-13

FM 3-20.15

infantry, 1-1, C-1 thru C-11. see also light/heavy operations

airborne and air assault battalions, C-3
engineers fighting as infantry, 6-17
fire support, 6-4
in breaching operations, 5-31
in continuous operations, D-3, D-5, D-6
in follow and support operations, 5-31, F-22
in light/heavy operations, C-1 thru C-11
in linkup operations, 5-8
in perimeter defense, 5-31 and 5-32
in screen operations, 5-32
in stability operations and support operations, F-12, F-22 and F-23
in urban operations, 8-4, 8-5 thru 8-7, 8-14, 8-15, 8-16, F-22
liaison with heavy elements, C-3 and C-4
light infantry battalion, C-2
mechanized, 1-1, F-12
safety considerations, C-8
task organization, C-1 and C-2
training for light/heavy operations, C-3 and C-4
transporting infantry on tanks, 8-5 thru 8-7
infiltration, 5-2. see also tactical road march
information security (INFOSEC), A-7 and A-8, D-3, D-4. see also operations security (OPSEC)
inspections, 2-5, 2-8, 2-10, 3-6, 5-4, 5-7, D-2, D-8, F-13, H-5
intelligence. see also operating systems
in defensive operations, 4-6, 4-17
in fratricide prevention, I-5
in light/heavy operations, C-5
in offensive operations, 3-3 and 3-4, 3-6
in stability operations and support operations, F-9, F-13
in urban operations, 8-4, 8-6, 8-7 thru 8-10
information from enemy prisoners of war (EPWs)/captured material and equipment, 7-17 thru 7-21
role of digital systems, A-2
intent (commanders/leaders), 1-5, 2-2, 2-3, 2-6, 2-7, 2-12, 2-17, 2-19, 2-46
in breaching operations, 5-30
in convoy escort, 5-15
in defensive operations, 4-2, 4-3, 4-6, 4-8
in offensive operations, 3-2, 3-3, 3-15, 3-16, 3-17, 3-41
in operation order (OPORD), B-4
in warning orders, B-2
intervehicular information system (IVIS), 1-4, 1-5, 2-6, 2-11, 2-12, 2-25 and 2-26, A-1, A-4, B-2. see also
communications; digital systems/communications
crew responsibilities, A-9 thru A-12
fire plan, 2-55, A-11
fire requests, 6-5
in defensive operations, 4-20
in offensive operations, 3-3
orders (warning orders, OPORDs, FRAGOs), A-8
overlays, 2-16 thru 2-17, A-9, A-10, A-11
sketch cards, 2-49 thru 2-52, A-11
training, A-9
use in navigation, A-5 thru A-7, E-20
use in wingman concept, A-4 and A-5

Index-14

FM 3-20.15

K
key terrain, 2-5, 2-48, 3-13, 4-23, 5-31. see also terrain
keyhole firing position, 2-44 and 2-45. see also fire distribution and control; firing position
killed in action (KIA) personnel, 3-42, 7-16 and 7-17. see also evacuation

L
leadership, 2-1, 2-11 and 2-12. see also command and control; crew responsibilities
in fratricide prevention, I-8
in risk management, H-5 and H-6
in stability operations and support operations, F-8
qualities and characteristics, 2-11 and 2-12
troop-leading procedures, 2-1 thru 2-11
liaison (with infantry), C-3 and C-4. see also coordination; follow and support operations; infantry
light/heavy operations, C-1 thru C-11. see also infantry; operations
light infantry. see infantry
limited visibility, D-6 thru D-9
equipment, D-7
in defensive operations, 2-47, 4-16, D-9
in offensive operations, D-8
in light/heavy operations, C-5, C-8, C-10
in relief in place, 5-33
in tactical road march, 5-2, 5-4
in urban operations, 8-3
navigation, 2-21, D-7
night vision devices, 7-10, 7-11, D-7, D-8
vehicle identification, D-8
linkup. see also coordination
digital communications term, 2-25 and 2-26
in light/heavy operations (including follow and support), 5-31, C-4, C-5
in passage of lines, 5-21
in relief in place, 5-34
in stability operations and support operations, F-17, F-21
tactical linkup (at contact point), 5-8 and 5-9, 5-31
loader. see crew responsibilities
local security. see operations security (OPSEC)
logistics. see ammunition; combat service support (CSS); fuel; maintenance operations; medical services;
supply operations
logistics package (LOGPAC), 2-5, 7-4 and 7-5. see also supply operations

M
maintenance operations, 3-4, 3-6, 3-32 3-42, 4-12, 7-1, 7-9 thru 7-13. see also evacuation; destruction
before-operation maintenance checks, 2-10, 7-11
crew responsibilities (platoon leader, platoon sergeant, tank commander, gunner, driver, loader), 1-5
and 1-6, 7-10 and 7-11
depot level, 7-9, 7-12

Index-15

FM 3-20.15

direct support (DS) level, 7-9, 7-10, 7-12

general support (GS) level, 7-9, 7-12
in armored cavalry troop, 1-3
in assembly area, 5-7
in continuous operations, D-2, D-3
in environmental protection, G-2
in light/heavy operations, C-11
in offensive planning, 3-4
in orders, B-2
in stability operations and support operations, F-12
in tactical road march, 5-5
in tank company, 1-3
operator level, 7-9, 7-10
organizational level, 7-9, 7-10
preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), 3-6, 7-9, 7-10, 7-11
supplies (repair parts), 7-3, 7-10, 7-11
tank maintenance requirements, 1-4
training, 7-10
unit (operator and organizational levels), 7-11 and 7-12
unit maintenance collection point (UMCP), 7-10, 7-13
vehicle diagnostic tests (BIT/FIT), 7-11, 7-12
maneuver. see also operating systems
in defensive operations, 4-3 thru 4-5, E-21
in light/heavy operations, C-5 thru C-8
in offensive operations, 3-3, 3-5, E-21
in relief in place, 5-33
in smoke operations, D-21
maps, 2-11, 2-15 thru 2-17, 2-53, 4-6, 4-17, 5-3 and 5-4, 7-16, B-3. see also Force XXI battle command
brigade and below (FBCB2) system; graphic control measures; intervehicular information system (IVIS);
overlays
march columns. see also tactical road march
close, 5-2
infiltration, 5-2
open, 5-2
marking techniques/materials
in defensive operations, 4-3, 4-9, 4-10, 4-11, 4-16, 4-17
for battle positions (BPs), 4-11, 4-12
for friendly positions (in air operations), 6-26
for nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) contamination, E-6, E-11 and E-12
for obstacles, 5-29 and 5-30
for targets and target reference points (TRP), 4-3, 4-9, 4-10, 4-11, 4-17
for targets in close air support (CAS), B-10
smoke, 6-26, E-17
mechanized infantry company, 1-3
medical services, 3-42, 7-14 thru 7-17. see also evacuation; nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) operations
aerial medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)/casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), 3-3, 3-6, 3-42, 7-14
and 7-15, A-9, A-12, A-13, B-8
combat lifesavers, 7-14
evacuation procedures, 7-14 and 7-15
for enemy prisoners of war (EPW), 7-18
health and hygiene, 7-14, F-12
in fratricide/friendly fire situation, I-4, I-5, I-7

Index-16

FM 3-20.15

in offensive planning, 3-4, 3-42

in tank company, 1-3
in urban operations, 8-10 and 8-11
killed in action (KIA) personnel, 7-16 and 7-17
NBC casualties (symptoms and treatment), 3-33, E-4, E-5, E-7 thru E-11
reports, 7-15 and 7-16
supplies, 7-3
wounded in action (WIA) personnel, 7-14 thru 7-16, 7-18
messenger (in communications), 2-25
mine plow/mine roller, 5-10, 5-13, 5-18, 5-28 and 5-29, C-10, F-19. see also breaching operations; mines and
minefields; obstacles
mines and minefields, 3-27, 5-22 thru 5-24, 6-3, 6-4, 6-19, 7-2, 8-9, C-1, C-5, C-10, F-19, I-3, I-5. see also
breaching operations; obstacles; scatterable mines
mission analysis, 2-2 thru 2-6, 2-11
mission, enemy, terrain (and weather), troops, time available, and civilian considerations (factors of
METT-TC), 2-3 thru 2-6, 2-7, 2-11, 2-12, 2-38, 3-23, 4-7, 4-10, 4-14, 4-20, 4-24. see also enemy
forces/enemy analysis; obstacles; terrain; troop-leading procedures; weather
in battle drill execution, 3-23
in convoy escort, 5-9, 5-10, 5-13, 5-18
in fratricide prevention, I-5
in light/heavy operations, C-2, C-5
in fratricide prevention, I-5
in maintenance operations, 7-11
in NBC operations, E-16
in resupply operations, 7-3
in risk management, H-1 and H-2
in stability operations and support operations, F-7, F-17, F-19
in troop-leading procedures/mission analysis, 2-3 thru 2-6
in urban operations, 8-11, 8-12, 8-14
mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP), 2-10, 3-33, 4-17, E-2, E-3, E-5, E-6, E-15, E-16. see also
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) operations
mission statement, 2-6. see also troop-leading procedures
missions (platoon), 1-1, 2-6. see also tank platoon; tank platoon tactical tasks
mobility and survivability. see also breaching operations; combat engineers; obstacles; operating systems
engineer support, 6-18, 6-19 and 6-20
in defensive operations, 4-6 thru 4-8, 4-18, 6-17
in light/heavy operations, C-10
in offensive operations, 3-4, 3-6, 6-17
in stability operations and support operations, F-7
mortars, 6-1 and 6-2, 6-5. see also ammunition; call for fire; fire support team (FIST); indirect fire support
capabilities and limitations, 6-1 and 6-2
employment considerations, 6-2
in armored cavalry troop, 1-3
in defensive operations, 4-6, 4-9, 4-17
in urban operations, 8-9 and 8-10
smoke capability, 4-6, 6-2, E-19
movement. see formations; navigation; overwatch; tactical movement; tactical road march
effect on battle space, 2-14
formations, 3-9 thru 3-12

Index-17

FM 3-20.15

in defensive operations, 4-21, 4-22, 4-23, 4-24

in environmental protection, G-2
in light/heavy operations, C-5 thru C-8
in an NBC environment, E-16
in offensive operations, 3-3, 3-5, 3-6 thru 3-13
in orders, B-2
in urban operations, 8-1
movement to contact, 2-41, 3-2
movement out of defensive positions, 2-58
movement to a contact point, 5-8
tactical road march, 5-1 thru 5-6
techniques, 2-42, 3-7 and 3-8, 3-33

N
navigation, 1-4, 2-11, 2-21 thru 2-24, 3-1, 3-3, 3-16, 4-3, C-7. see also graphic control measures; maps;
overlays
compass and odometer method, 2-21 and 2-22, A-6 and A-7, D-7
global positioning systems (GPS), 1-4, 2-23, 4-3, 4-11, 4-20, 5-20, 5-30, A-3, A-5, D-7
in limited visibility, 2-21, D-7
in smoke operations, E-20, E-21
inertial/position navigation (POSNAV) systems, 1-4, 2-23, 4-3, 5-20, 5-30, A-5, D-7
role in fratricide prevention, I-2, I-6
role of digital systems, A-5 thru A-7
shift from a known point, 2-23 and 2-24
strip map, 5-3 and 5-4
terrain association, 2-21, 2-23, D-7
using fires to assist in navigation, 2-22
night vision devices. see limited visibility
noise and light discipline, D-3. see also operations security (OPSEC)
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) operations/conditions, 3-4, 3-15,E-1 thru E-21
alarms and signals, D-2, E-2 and E-3, E-6 and E-7
all-clear signal, E-5, E-12, E-13
battle drill (react to a chemical/biological attack), 3-33
battle drill (react to a nuclear attack), 3-32
biological casualties (symptoms and treatment), E-4, E-7
biological defense, 3-33, E-2, E-4
chemical agents, E-8 thru E-11
chemical casualties (symptoms and treatment), E-5, E-8 thru E-11
chemical defense, 3-33, E-2 and E-3, E-5
contamination avoidance, E-1 thru E-3
decontamination operations, 3-33, E-4, E-5, E-13 thru E-15, E-16
equipment maintenance, 7-11
fallout warning, E-5
immediate decontamination, E-14
in assembly area, 5-6
in passage of lines, 5-21
in tactical road march, 5-5
marking contamination, E-6, E-11 and E-12
masking criteria, 3-29
medical treatment, E-4, E-5, E-7 thru E-11
mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear exchange, E-15
mission-oriented protective posture MOPP levels, E-2, E-3, E-5, E-15, E-16
movement in contaminated areas, E-16

Index-18

FM 3-20.15

NBC personnel/duties, E-1

NBC protection, E-3 thru E-13
NBC reports/reporting procedures, 3-32, 3-33, A-9, A-12, A-13, B-8, E-2, E-4, E-5, E-6, E-13
NBC standing operating procedures (SOP), E-3, E-5, E-6, E-13
NBC warning and reporting system (NBCWRS), E-6, E-13
nuclear casualties (symptoms and treatment), E-4, E-7 and E-8
nuclear defense, 3-32, E-2, E-4 and E-5
operational decontamination, E-14 and E-15
radiological monitoring and dosimetry, 3-32, E-4 and E-5, E-16
thorough decontamination, E-15
unmasking procedures, 3-33, E-12 and E-13, E-16

O
observation posts (OP), 2-4, 2-25, 2-48, 4-1, 4-6, 4-10, 4-12, 4-16, 4-20, 4-25, 5-20, 5-34, 7-2, D-4 thru D-6
dismounted, 5-32, D-5 and D-6
in continuous operations, D-2, D-3, D-4 thru D-6, D-9
in limited visibility, D-9
in stability operations and support operations, F-11
mounted, D-5
selecting an OP site, D-4 and D-5
obscuration, E-17. see also limited visibility; smoke and smoke operations
observation and fields of fire; cover and concealment; obstacles; key terrain; and avenues of approach
(factors of OCOKA), 2-4 and 2-5, 2-7, 2-21, 3-4, 4-10. see also mission, enemy, terrain (and weather),
troops, time available, and civilian considerations (factors of METT-TC); terrain; troop-leading
procedures
obstacles, 1-4, 2-4, 2-16, 2-48, 3-4, 3-6, 3-40 and 3-41, 4-1, 4-6 and 4-7, 5-22 thru 5-30, 6-16, 6-17, 6-19, 6-20,
8-1, 8-2, 8-6, 8-13, 8-15. see also breaching operations; combat engineers; observation and fields of fire;
cover and concealment; obstacles; key terrain; and avenues of approach (factors of OCOKA)
abatis, 5-25 and 5-26
antitank ditch, 5-24 and 5-25
assault force, 5-30
breach force, 5-28 thru 5-30
breaching methods, 5-28
breaching operations, 3-4, 3-40 and 3-41, 5-27 thru 5-30
bypassing obstacles, 2-4, 5-17, 5-28
emplacement guidelines, 4-6
engineer support, 6-17, 6-19, 6-20
existing obstacles (man-made, natural), 2-4, 3-4, 4-6, 5-22
in assembly area, 5-6
in battle drills, 3-25
in continuous operations, D-2
in convoy escort operations, 5-10, 5-13, 5-17 and 5-18
in defensive operations, 2-48, 4-1, 4-6 and 4-7, 4-12, 4-14, 4-16, 4-18, 4-25
in delay operations, 5-33
in fire support planning, 6-16
in light/heavy operations, B-1, B-4
in offensive operations, 3-4, 3-6, 3-7, 3-15, 3-25, 3-40 and 3-41
in passage of lines, 5-20
in protection of observation post (OP), D-6
in relief in place, 5-33
in stability operations and support operations, F-11, F-19
in tactical road march, 5-5
in urban operations, 8-1, 8-6, 8-13, 8-15

Index-19

FM 3-20.15

log crib, 5-26

man-made obstacles, 5-22
mines and minefields, 5-22 thru 5-24
natural obstacles, 5-22
purposes, 4-6
reinforcing obstacles, 3-4, 5-22 thru 5-27
reporting, A-13
road craters, 5-25
supply materials (for construction), 7-2
support force, 5-28
suppression, obscuration, security, and reduction, and assault (SOSRA) procedures, 3-41, 5-27
survivability considerations, 4-7 and 4-8, 6-17
tank berm/tank wall, 5-27
wire obstacles, 5-26 and 5-27, 7-2
occupation of a battle position (BP), 4-9 thru 4-14
deliberate, 4-10 thru 4-14, 5-33
hasty occupation (hasty defense), 3-40, 4-9 and 4-10, 5-7, 5-8, 5-33
in limited visibility, D-9
occupation of firing position, 4-3, 4-4, 4-10, 4-11, 4-20, 4-21
offensive operations, 3-1 thru 3-42. see also assault; attack; attack by fire (ABF); battle drills; counterattack;
operating systems
actions on contact, 3-14 thru 3-33
battle drills, 3-22 thru 3-32
consolidation and reorganization, 3-41 thru 3-42
counterattack, 4-23 and 4-24
engagement priorities, 2-43
engineer support, 6-17
execution, 2-41, 2-42 and 2-43, 3-6 thru 3-42
fire control, 2-41thru 2-43. see also fire distribution and control
fire plan/planning, 2-41 and 2-42
forms of offense, 3-2
fundamentals and characteristics of offensive operations, 3-1 and 3-2
in limited visibility, D-8
in urban operations, 8-11 thru 8-14
moving engagements, 3-43
operating systems, 3-2, 3-3 thru 3-6
planning, 3-3 thru 3-5, D-8
preparation, 3-5 and 3-6, D-8
pre-positioning (prestock resupply), 7-4
purposes of offensive operations, 3-1
tactical movement, 3-6 thru 3-13
tank platoon tactical tasks, 3-33 thru 3-41
tempo and synchronization, 3-1
use of smoke, E-21
operating systems, 3-2. see also defensive operations; offensive operations; planning; preparation
air defense, 3-4, 3-6, 4-8, 4-19, C-10
combat service support (CSS), 3-4, 3-6, 4-8, 4-19, 8-10 and 8-11, C-11
command and control, 3-5, 3-6, 4-3 thru 4-5, 4-13 thru 4-21, 8-4, C-4
fire support, 3-3, 3-6, 4-5 and 4-6, 4-17, 8-10, C-9
human aspect of operations, 3-5, 3-6, 4-8, 4-19
in defensive planning , 4-3 thru 4-8
in defensive preparation, 4-8 thru 4-18
in light/heavy operations, C-4 thru C-11
in offensive planning, 3-3 thru 3-5

Index-20

FM 3-20.15

in offensive preparation, 3-5 and 3-6

in urban operations, 8-4 thru 8-11
intelligence, 3-3 and 3-4, 3-6, 4-6, 4-17, 8-7 thru 8-10, C-5
maneuver, 3-3, 3-6, 4-3 thru 4-5, 8-4 thru 8-7, C-5 thru C-8
mobility and survivability, 3-4, 3-6, 4-6 thru 4-8, 4-18, C-10
operation order (OPORD), 2-2, 2-5, 2-7, A-8, B-1 thru B-8. see also orders
in defensive operations, 4-1, 4-3, 4-8, 4-9, 4-11, 4-16, 4-18, 4-19
in NBC operations, E-13
in offensive operations, 3-3, 3-4, 3-6, 3-14, 3-16, 3-17, 3-24, 3-30
in stability operations and support operations, F-11
operational graphics. see graphics control measures; overlays
operations
actions on contact, 3-14 thru 3-33
continuous operations, 2-1, D-1 thru D-9
defensive operations, 4-1 thru 4-25
light/heavy operations, C-1 thru B-11
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) operations, E-1 thru E-16
offensive operations, 3-1 thru 3-42
operation order (OPORD), B-1 thru B-8
smoke operations, E-16 thru E-21
stability operations and support operations, F-1 thru F-23
tank platoon tactical tasks, 3-33 thru 3-41
tactical operations (miscellaneous), 5-1 thru 5-34
urban operations, 8-1 thru 8-16
operations security (OPSEC), C-4 thru C-10. see also observation post (OP); readiness condition (REDCON)
levels; reconnaissance
challenge and password, C-4, C-6
communications security, 2-25, 6-20
countersurveillance, C-3 and C-4
in air defense, 6-20
in assembly areas, 5-7
in breaching operations, 5-28
in consolidation and reorganization, 3-41, 4-25
in continuous operations, D-1, D-2, D-3 thru D-6, D-9
in convoy escort operations, 5-9 thru 5-13, 5-18
in defensive operations, 4-1, 4-3, 4-6, 4-12, 4-17, 4-19, 4-25, 4-32, D-9
in fire distribution and control, 2-29
in limited visibility, D-9
in maintenance operations, 7-12
in medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), 7-15
in NBC operations, E-2
in offensive operations, 3-1, 3-41
in orders, B-2, B-3
in perimeter defense, 5-32
in relief in place, 5-34
in resupply operations, 7-2, 7-4, 7-6
in screen operations, 5-32
in stability operations and support operations, F-8, F-9, F-11, F-13
in tactical road march, 5-5
in urban operations, 8-7, 8-10
information security, A-7, A-8, D-3, D-4
physical security, D-4
signal security, D-3, D-4, E-2

Index-21

FM 3-20.15

use of observation posts (OP), D-4 thru D-6

with infantry (light/heavy operations), C-1, C-3, C-8, C-11
orders, 2-1 and 2-2, B-1 thru B-7. see also overlays; troop-leading procedures
crew orders (in troop-leading procedures), 2-8
fragmentary order (FRAGO), 2-2, 2-11, A-8, A-9, B-1, B-7
in continuous operations, D-2
in convoy escort operations, 5-9
in defensive operations, 4-1, 4-3, 4-8, 4-9
in fratricide prevention, I-5, I-6
in offensive operations, 3-3, 3-6, 3-14, 3-33
in passage of lines, 5-21
in screen operations, 5-32
in tactical road march, 5-3
in vehicle recovery operations, 7-13
issuing the order, B-3
operation order (OPORD), 2-2 thru 2-4, 2-7, A-8, A-11, B-1 thru B-6
role of digital systems, A-8
warning order (WO), 2-6 and 2-7, A-8, B-1 and B-2
overlays, 1-5, 2-15 thru 2-17, 2-53, 5-3, 7-16, B-3. see also Force XXI battle command brigade and below
(FBCB2) system; graphic control measures; intervehicular information system (IVIS); maps; navigation;
orders
digital, 1-5, 2-16 and 2-17, 5-3, 5-39, A-9, B-1, B-2, B-7
obstacle overlay, B-5
traditional (handwritten), 1-5, 2-16, 5-3, B-2, B-3
overwatch, 3-7, 3-8, 3-12 and 3-13, 4-5, 5-10, 5-21, 5-22. see also actions on contact; support by fire (SBF)
bounding overwatch (alternate/successive bounds), 3-7, 3-16, 4-22, E-16, F-23
in displacement, 4-22
in light/heavy operations, B-5, B-6, B-8, B-10
in METT-TC analysis, 2-4
in NBC operations, E-16
in stability operations and support operations, F-8, F-18 and F-19, F-22, F-23
of battle space, 2-14
on the move, 3-13
overwatch/support by fire (tank platoon tactical task), 3-36 and 3-37
search techniques and locations, 3-12 and 3-13
stationary, 3-12
traveling overwatch, 3-7, 5-13

P
passage of lines, 5-20 thru 5-22
assisting a passage of lines, 5-21 and 5-22
coordination, 5-20 and 5-21
forward passage, 5-20, 5-21
in screen operations, 5-32
passage lane/passage point, 2-19, 5-20, 5-21
rearward passage, 5-20, 5-21
perimeter defense, 3-11, 4-19, 5-7, 5-31 and 5-32, F-17 and F-18. see also defensive operations
personnel operations, 2-29, 7-1. see also crew responsibilities
personnel management, 7-14
personnel services, 7-13
redistribution (of platoon crewmen), 7-15

Index-22

FM 3-20.15

petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL). see fuel; supply operations

planning, 2-7, 3-3 thru 3-5, 4-3 thru 4-8. see also command and control; operating systems; preparation;
troop-leading procedures
fire support planning, 6-16
in continuous operations, D-1 thru D-3
in defensive operations, 2-43 thru 2-46, 4-3 thru 4-8, D-9
in fratricide prevention, I-6
in limited visibility, D-8, D-9
in offensive operations, 2-38 and 2-39, 3-3 thru 3-5
in urban operations, 8-1 thru 8-11, 8-14
role of digital systems, A-1, A-2
warning orders, B-1
platoon. see tank platoon
platoon fire plan. see defensive operations; fire plan/planning
platoon leader, 1-1, 1-4 and 1-5. see also crew responsibilities; leadership
role in maintenance operations, 7-10
role in risk management, H-6
troop-leading procedures, 2-2 thru 2-11
platoon sergeant (PSG), 1-1, 1-5. see also crew responsibilities; leadership
role in maintenance operations, 7-10 and 7-11
role in supply operations, 7-1, 7-3
position navigation (POSNAV) systems, 1-4, 2-23, 4-3, 4-11, 4-17, 4-20, 5-6, 5-20, 5-30, A-5, A-8, D-7,
E-20, I-6. see also global positioning systems (GPS); navigation
precombat checks (PCC). see inspections
precombat inspection (PCI). see inspections
preparation. see also operating systems; planning
in continuous operations, D-1 thru D-3
in defensive operations, 4-1, 4-8 thru 4-18, D-9
in limited visibility, D-8, D-9
in offensive operations, 3-5 and 3-6, D-8
in tactical road march, 5-1
of a battle position (BP), 4-9
pre-positioning. see supply operations
prestock. see supply operations
preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS). see maintenance operations
priorities of work
in continuous operations, D-2
in defensive operations, 4-12, 4-14, 4-18
prisoners. see enemy prisoners of war (EPW); evacuation
pursuit, 3-2. see also offensive operations
pyrotechnics (in communications), 2-25

Q
quartering party, 2-7, 5-2, 5-6 and 5-7, C-2. see also assembly area

Index-23

FM 3-20.15

R
radiation/radiological contamination. see nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) operations
radio nets. see communications
radios, 2-25, 2-26, 5-34, A-3, C-4, E-2, E-3, E-4, E-6, E-13. see also communications; single channel
ground/airborne radio system (SINCGARS)
radiotelephone procedures (RTP), 2-25, 2-26, 2-27. see communications
readiness condition (REDCON) levels, 2-6, 4-6, 4-12, 4-19, 4-20, 5-7, 5-18, C-11, D-1 and D-2, D-4. see also
operations security (OPSEC)
recognition signals (far; near). see also communications; operations security (OPSEC); signals
in actions at a contact point (linkup), 5-8, 5-9
in friendly fire incident, F-7
in passage of lines, 5-21
in relief in place, 5-33
reconnaissance, 1-3, 2-2, 2-12, 2-15
for passage of lines, 5-20 and 5-21
helicopter support, 6-16
in assembly areas, 5-6
in continuous operations, D-2
in convoy escort operations, 5-10, 5-12, 5-17
in defensive operations, 2-43 and 2-44, 2-46, 4-3, 4-6, 4-9, 4-10 and 4-11, 4-12, 4-17
in light/heavy operations, C-1, C-5, C-6, C-10
in limited visibility, D-8
in NBC operations, C-2
in offensive operations, 2-41, 3-6
in orders, B-2
in passage of lines, 5-20
in perimeter defense, 5-31
in relief in place, 5-33
in supply operations, 7-4
in tactical road march, 5-5
in troop-leading procedures, 2-5, 2-6, 2-7, 2-11
in urban operations, 8-6, 8-12
of a battle position (BP), 4-9, 4-10 and 4-11
reconnaissance by fire, 3-40. see actions on contact; reconnaissance; tank platoon tactical tasks
recovery operations/vehicles. see evacuation
refuel on the move (ROM). see supply operations
rehearsals, 2-7, 2-8 thru 2-10
in assembly areas, 5-7
in continuous operations, D-2
in defensive operations, 4-2, 4-3, 4-5, 4-12, 4-15, 4-17
in fratricide prevention, I-1, I-6
in limited visibility, D-8, D-9
in offensive operations, 3-3, 3-5, 3-6, 3-14, 3-16, 3-17
in orders, B-2
in perimeter defense, 5-31
in risk management, H-5
in tactical road march, 5-5
in urban operations, 8-4
types, 2-8 and 2-9

Index-24

FM 3-20.15

relief in place, 5-33 thru 5-34

communications, 5-34
coordination and reconnaissance, 5-8, 5-33
in stability operations and support operations, F-17
security, 5-34
sequential, 5-33
simultaneous, 5-33
techniques, 5-34
with linkup, 5-8
reorganization, 3-3, 3-5, 3-41 and 3-42, 4-25, 8-12, F-17. see also consolidation
reports and reporting procedures, 1-5, 2-26, 2-27, 3-5, 3-14 and 3-15, 4-21, 7-15 and 7-16, A-9, A-11, A-12,
A-13, B-1, B-7 thru B-9, E-2, E-6, E-13, I-3. see also communications; Force XXI battle command
brigade and below (FBCB2) system; intervehicular information system (IVIS)
rest and rest plan, 2-5, 5-7, 7-13, B-2, D-2 and D-3, H-5
restrictive fire line (RFL), 5-21 and 5-22, I-6
resupply. see supply operations
risk management
environment risk, G-1 and G-2
fratricide risk assessment, I-3 thru I-5, I-8
levels of risk, H-2 and H-3, H-6, I-5
operational risk, H-1 thru H-6
road march. see tactical road march
roadblock/checkpoint, F-18 thru F-21. see also stability operations and support operations; traffic control
rules of engagement (ROE)/rules of interaction (ROI), 3-3, 3-5, 4-16, 5-14, D-4, F-1, F-7, F-9 thru F-11,
F-12, I -6

S
safety, C-8, E-5, E-13
scatterable mines, 5-22, 6-3 and 6-4. see also mine and minefields; obstacles
scheme of maneuver, 2-15, 2-17
in defensive operations, 4-3, 4-6, 4-8, 4-20, 4-21
in offensive operations, 2-42, 3-3, 3-5, 3-6, 3-14, 3-16, 3-33
in orders, B-7
in troop-leading procedures, 2-7
screen operations, 4-2, 5-32
moving, 5-32
stationary, 5-32
use of smoke, E-17 thru E-17
with perimeter defense, 5-31
sector of fire, 2-29, 3-34, 4-3 and 4-4, 4-11, 4-12, 4-18, 4-20
sector of observation, 5-5
sector sketch, 2-47 thru 2-52, 4-11 and 4-12, 4-16, E-21. see also fire plan/planning; sketch card
security. see operations security (OPSEC)

Index-25

FM 3-20.15

shift from a known point. see also call for fire; navigation
in fire support (target location), 2-24, 6-7 and 6-8
in navigation, 2-23 and 2-24
sights. see also commanders integrated thermal viewer (CITV)
comparison of passive and thermal sights, D-7
effects of smoke, E-19 and E-20, E-21
in limited visibility, D-7, D-9
in overwatch mission, 3-12
passive, D-7
thermal, 2-31, D-7, E-17, E-19 thru E-21
signal operation instructions (SOI). see communications
signal security. see operations security (OPSEC)
signals and signaling. see also alarms; communications
at a contact point (linkup), 5-8 and 5-9
in light/heavy operations, C-4
in NBC operations, E-2, E-6 and E-7
in offensive operations, 3-5
in operation order (OPORD), B-6
in passage of lines, 5-21
in relief in place, 5-33
in tactical road march, 5-4, 5-5
pyrotechnics, 2-25
sound signals, 2-25, E-2, E-6
smoke, E-6, E-17
visual signals, 2-25, 5-4, E-6 and E-7
single channel ground/airborne radio system (SINCGARS), 1-4, 2-25, A-3, A-8, A-9, A-11
situation report (SITREP), 2-26, 3-17, 3-42, 4-21, 7-2, A-9, B-9, H-5, I-5
situational understanding, 1-4, 1-5, 2-11, 2-12 thru 2-15, 5-3, 5-31, A-2, A-3, A-8, A-9, A-12, E-21, I-5.
see also battle space; command and control
sketch card. see also sector sketch
in deliberate occupation of a battle position (BP), 4-12
in relief in place, 5-33
traditional (handwritten), 2-47 thru 2-49
using the Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) system, 2-52, A-11
using the intervehicular information system (IVIS), 2-49 thru 2-52, A-11
verification, 2-52
sleep plan, 2-5. see also rest and rest plan
smoke and smoke operations, E-1, E-16 thru E-21
call for fire, 6-6
effects of weather, 2-5, E-20
field artillery (FA) rounds, 2-22, 6-3, E-19
in breaching operations, 5-27, 5-28
in bypass operations, 3-39 and 3-40
in continuous operations, D-6
in defensive operations, 2-58, 4-5, 4-6, 4-21 and 4-22, E-17, E-21
in displacement, 4-21 and 4-22, E-17
in light/heavy operations, C-7, C-9
in offensive operations, 3-3, 3-39, E-21
in navigation, 2-22

Index-26

FM 3-20.15

in NBC signaling, E-6

marking contaminated areas, E-6
marking friendly positions (air support), 6-26, E-17
mortar rounds, 2-22, 4-6, 6-2, E-19
navigation through smoke, E-20, E-21
sources of smoke, E-19 and E-20
tactical considerations, E-20 thru E-21
uses of smoke, E-16 thru E-19
vehicle engine exhaust smoke system (VEESS), 2-58
sound signals, 2-25, E-2, E-6. see also alarms; signals and signaling
spot report (SPOTREP), 2-26, 2-43, 2-58, 3-6, 3-15, 3-29, 3-30, 3-31, 4-21, 5-14, 5-17, 5-28, 6-5, A-2, A-12
stability operations and support operations, 8-8, F-1 thru F-23. see also operations security (OPSEC); urban
operations
Army missions, F-3 and F-4, F-14
characteristics of stability operations, F-2 and F-3
characteristics of support operations, F-13
conflict (operational environment), F-2
examples, F-17 thru F-23
force protection, F-11, F-12
graduated response, F-9, F-11
operational considerations (general), F-1 and F-2
operational considerations (stability operations), F-6 and F-7, F-8 thru F-13
operational considerations (support operations), F-14
peacetime (operational environment), F-2
role of media, F-11, F-12
role of the tank platoon, F-7 and F-8, F-17 thru F-23
rules of engagement (ROE)/rules of interaction (ROI), F-1, F-9 and F-10, F-12, F-13
stability operations, F-2 thru F-13
support operations, F-13 thru F-17
training, F-7, F-9
types of stability operations, F-4 thru F-6
types/categories of support operations, F-13 and F-14, F-15 thru F-17
standing operating procedures (SOP), 2-1, 2-10, 2-11, 2-25, 5-6 and 5-7
in actions on contact, 3-14
in combat service support (CSS), 7-1
in communications, 2-25
in consolidation and reorganization, 3-42, 4-25
in equipment evacuation, 7-12
in fire distribution and control, 2-29, 2-30, 2-39, 2-40, 2-41
in fire requests, 6-5
in fratricide prevention, I-6
in handling/evacuation of enemy prisoners of war (EPW), 7-17
in maintenance operations, 7-11, 7-12
in medical services, 7-16
in offensive fire planning, 2-41, 2-42, 3-3
in NBC operations, 3-32, 3-33, E-1, E-2, E-5, E-6, E-13
in reporting, B-7
in risk management, H-5
in tactical road march, 5-1, 5-5
in vehicle identification, D-8
SOP rehearsal, 2-9
Stinger (air defense missile system), 6-24 and 6-25

Index-27

FM 3-20.15

strip map, 5-3 and 5-4. see also maps; navigation

successive bounding technique. see overwatch
supply operations, 2-10, 7-1 thru 7-9. see also ammunition; fuel; maintenance operations
basic load, 7-2
classes of supply, 7-2 and 7-3
combat load, 7-2
destruction/evacuation of supplies, 7-5
emergency resupply, 7-3, 7-5 and 7-6, C-11
helicopter support, 6-16
in assembly areas, 5-7
in continuous operations, D-2, D-3
in defensive operations, 4-8, 4-18, 4-21, 7-4, 7-6
in light/heavy operations, C-11
in offensive operations, 3-6, 3-42, 7-4, 7-6
in orders, B-2
in stability operations and support operations, F-12
in tactical road march, 5-5
in urban operations, 8-10 and 8-11
logistics package (LOGPAC), 7-4 and 7-5
mess operations (food/water), 7-2
pre-positioning/prestock, 4-8, 4-19, 4-213, 7-3 and 7-4
refuel on the move (ROM), 5-5, 7-4
resupply methods, 7-3 thru 7-6
resupply techniques, 7-6 thru 7-9
routine resupply, 7-3, 7-4 and 7-5
service station resupply technique, 7-3, 7-6, 7-8
tailgate resupply technique, 7-2, 7-6 and 7-7
support by fire (SBF), 2-4, 2-20, 3-16, 3-33, 3-36 and 3-37, 4-6, 6-16, 8-13, F-17. see also actions on contact;
graphic control measures; overwatch; tank platoon tactical tasks
support operations, F-13 thru F-17. see also stability operations and support operations
survivability. see mobility and survivability

T
tactical fire direction system (TACFIRE), 6-2, 6-4, 6-5. see also field artillery (FA); fire support; indirect
fire support
tactical Internet (TI), A-1, C-4. see also digital systems/communications; Force XXI battle command brigade
and below (FBCB2) system
tactical movement, 2-14, 3-6 thru 3-13. see also convoy escort operations; formations; navigation;
overwatch; tactical road march
bounding overwatch technique, 2-28, 3-7 and 3-8, 4-22, F-23
formations, 3-9 thru 3-12
in actions on contact, 3-15
in assault, 3-37
in contaminated areas, E-16
in convoy escort, 5-10, 5-13, 5-18
in counterattack, 4-24
in defensive operations, 4-2, 4-22, 4-23, 4-24
in follow and support operations, 5-31
in fratricide prevention, I-6
in light/heavy operations, C-5 thru C-7
in limited visibility, D-8

Index-28

FM 3-20.15

in NBC operations, E-16

in offensive operations, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-6 thru 3-13, 3-37
in passage of lines, 5-20, 5-21
in screen operations, 5-32
in stability operations and support operations, F-8, F-17, F-19, F-21
movement techniques, 3-7 and 3-8
traveling technique, 3-7
traveling overwatch technique, 3-7, 5-13
use of smoke, E-17
use of terrain, 3-7
tactical road march, 5-1 thru 5-6. see also actions on contact; assembly area; navigation; quartering party;
tactical movement
actions at the release point (RP), 5-6
composition (road march elements), 5-2
control measures, 5-2 thru 5-4
disabled vehicles, 5-5 and 5-6
halts, 5-1, 5-2, 5-5 and 5-6
in stability operations and support operations, F-19
march columns, 5-2 and 5-3, 5-4
march speed, 5-5
movement to the start point (SP), 5-4 and 5-5
traffic control, 5-4
use of guides, 5-4, 5-6
weapons orientation, 5-5
tactical tasks. see tank platoon tactical tasks
tank capabilities and limitations, 1-4, C-4, C-9
as transportation for infantry, 8-5 thru 8-7
firepower characteristics, C-9
in light/heavy operations, C-4, C-9
tank commander (TC), 1-1, 1-5, 2-39, 7-11
tank company, 1-1, 1-3
tank platoon. see also command and control; crew responsibilities; infantry; tank capabilities and limitations;
tank platoon tactical tasks
assisting in a passage of lines, 5-21 and 5-22
capabilities and limitations, 1-3 and 1-4
combat service support (CSS) organization, 7-1
engineer support, 6-20
fire plan development, 2-53 thru 2-55, 4-12 and 4-13
fire support planning, 6-16
missions/tasks, 1-1, 3-16, F-17 thru F-23
operating with infantry (light/heavy operations), C-1 thru C-11
operating with infantry (urban operations), 8-5 thru 8-17, 8-14, 8-15 and 8-16
organization, 1-1 and 1-2
radio nets and net control, 2-26 and 2-27
role in defensive operations, 4-2
role in offensive operations, 3-2
role in stability operations and support operations, F-7 and F-8, F-17 thru F-23
role in urban operations, 8-13 and 8-14, 8-15
tank platoon tactical tasks, 3-33 thru 3-41. see also actions on contact; defensive operations; offensive
operations; stability operations and support operations
assault, 2-20, 3-37 thru 3-38, 5-15 and 5-16, 5-27
attack by fire (ABF), 2-4, 2-20, 3-34 thru 3-36, 5-32

Index-29

FM 3-20.15

battle drills, 3-22 thru 3-33

breach (in-stride), 3-40 and 3-41. see also breaching operations
bypass, 3-39 and 3-40, 5-17, 5-28
destroy an inferior force, 3-33 and 3-34
hasty occupation of a platoon battle position (BP) (hasty defense), 3-40
overwatch/support by fire, 3-36 and 3-37
reconnaissance by fire, 3-40
role in actions on contact (examples), 3-17 thru 3-22
role in stability operations and support operations (examples), F-17 thru F-23
tank section, 1-1, 1-2, 1-4, 1-5, 2-18, 3-7, 3-38, 4-5, 5-13, 8-5. see also tank platoon
target identification, I-5, I-6. see also fratricide
target location. see also call for fire; fire command; target reference point (TRP)
in call for fire, 6-6 thru 6-8
in fire command, 2-40
target reference point (TRP), 2-11, 2-28, 2-29, 2-30, 2-40, 2-41, 2-42, 2-44, 2-46, 2-48, 2-50 thru 2-52, 2-55,
3-3, 3-34, 3-40, 4-9 and 4-10, 4-11, 4-12, 4-18, 5-33, 6-2, D-9, E-21. see also fire support team (FIST);
graphic control measures; indirect fire support
techniques of movement, 3-7 and 3-8. see also tactical movement
terrain, 1-1, 1-4, 2-4 and 2-5, 3-3 and 3-4, 3-7, 4-1, 4-2, 4-6, 4-9, 4-10, 4-11, 4-15, 4-23. see also mission,
enemy, terrain (and weather), troops, and time available (factors of METT-T); navigation; observation and
fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (factors of OCOKA)
effect on battle space, 2-14
engineer support, 6-19, 6-20
in battle drills, 3-25
in breaching operations, 5-25, 5-26, 5-30
in continuous operations, D-3, D-4
in convoy escort operations, 5-13, 5-17
in defensive operations, 4-2, 4-6
in delay operations, 5-33
in fire command (terrain feature), 2-40
in fire planning, 2-42, 2-46
in light/heavy operations, C-1, C-3, C-5, C-6, C-10
in limited visibility, D-8
in NBC operations, E-5
in offensive planning, 3-4
in overwatch, 3-13
in perimeter defense, 5-31
in observation post (OP) emplacement, D-4, D-5
in stability operations and support operations, F-8, F-22
in tactical movement, 3-7
in tactical road march, 5-3, 5-6
in urban operations, 8-1 and 8-2, 8-11
terrain model rehearsal, 2-9
terrain index reference system (TIRS), 2-24
terrorism, F-5, F-16 and F-17. see also stability operations and support operations; urban operations
threat. see enemy forces and enemy analysis
time management, 2-2, 2-5, 4-3, 4-8, 4-14, D-1
timeline, 2-6 and 2-7, 4-14

Index-30

FM 3-20.15

traffic control, 5-4, F-18 thru F-21. see also tactical movement; tactical road march
training, 1-1, 2-1, 2-5, 5-7, A-9, B-2, C-3 and C-4, D-2 F-1, F-7, H-6, I-1, I-3. see also rehearsals
traveling. see tactical movement
traveling overwatch. see overwatch; tactical movement
trigger line/trigger point, 2-50, 4-9, 4-11, 4-12, 4-20, 5-33, D-8, E-17
troop-leading procedures, 1-5, 2-1 thru 2-11, 2-17, 3-1, 4-8, 5-7 and 5-8. see also command and control;
inspections; leadership; mission analysis; orders; rehearsals
abbreviated troop-leading procedures, 2-10 and 2-11
in defensive operations, 4-8
in offensive operations, 3-1, 3-3, 3-5, 3-6
in orders, B-2
in relief in place, 5-34
steps of, 2-2 thru 2-10
turret-down position. see firing position

U
unit maintenance collection point (UMCP). see maintenance
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), 3-30, 6-24, A-2
urban operations, 8-1 thru 8-16. see also infantry; stability operations and support operations
categories of urban areas, 8-2
command and control, 8-4
defensive operations, 8-14 thru 8-16
intelligence, 8-7 thru 8-10
offensive operations, 8-11 thru 8-14
planning considerations, 8-1 thru 8-11
role of infantry, 8-5 thru 8-7
subterranean systems, 8-1 and 8-2
threat (enemy) tactics, 8-7 thru 8-10
vehicles, weapons, ammunition, and equipment, 8-3 and 8-4, 8-9

V
vehicle capabilities and limitations. see tank capabilities and limitations
vehicle identification
in limited visibility, D-8
role in fratricide prevention, I-1, I-5
vehicle recovery, 5-6, 7-10, 7-12 and 7-13. see also evacuation; maintenance operations
visual communications/signals, 1-4, 1-5, E-6, H-5. see also communications
flags, 2-25
hand-and-arm signals, 2-25, 5-4, D-3, E-2, E-6
in battle drill execution, 3-23, 3-24, 3-25
in light/heavy operations, C-4
in NBC operations, E-2, E-6
in tactical road march, 5-4
smoke, E-6, E-17
vocal alarms/signals, E-6. see also communications

Index-31

FM 3-20.15

W
warning order (WO), 2-2 and 2-3, 2-6 and 2-7, 3-3, 4-1, 4-3, 4-5, 4-8, A-8, B-1 and B-2. see also orders
water. see food and water (Class I supply)
weapon planning range, 2-45 and 2-46
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 8-9, F-3, F-16
weather, 1-4, 2-4 and 2-5, 5-2, 7-2, 7-14, C-5, D-6, E-20, F-8. see also mission, enemy, terrain (and weather),
troops, time available, and civilian considerations (factors of METT-TC); weather
wingman concept, 1-2, 2-28, 3-22, A-4 and A-5
wire communications, 2-25, 5-33, C-4. see also communications
withdrawal, 4-2, 5-32, 5-34, C-5, C-6. see also disengagement
work plan, D-2
wounded in action (WIA) personnel, 3-42, 7-14 thru 7-16. see also evacuation; medical services

Index-32

FM 3-20.15 (FM 17-15)

1 NOVEMBER 2001

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army
0133005

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in
accordance with the initial distribution number 111029, requirements for
FM 3-20.15.

PIN: 079435-000