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This paper employs possible worlds semantics to develop a systematic framework for studying
the syntax and the semantics of imagination sentences. Following Hintikka's treatment of
prepositional attitudes like knowledge and perception, the propositional construction "a imagines that p " is taken as the basic form to which other sentences (such as "a imagines b", "a
imagines an F", "a imagines b as an F") are reduced through quantifiers ranging over 'world
lines', i.e., functions picking out individuals from the relevant possible worlds or scenes. This
intensional analysis is compared and contrasted with Barwise and Perry's situation semantics. It
is also suggested that the logic of imagination helps us to understand some peculiarities of
fictional discourse. For example, acts of imagination can be directed towards fictional entities
(e.g. Donald Duck, Anna Karenina) as well as real ones. Further, fictional texts, like novels, can
be thought of as occurring within the scope of an imagination operator, relative to the author or
the reader. The author of a fictional text T can be viewed as performing an illocutionary act of
recommendation of the form: Let us imagine that T!
ABSTRACT
210
2.
a imagines that p,
where "a" is an individual name and " p " is a declarative sentence, are taken
to be the basic expressions for the logic of imagination. Other similar attitudes include knowledge, belief, and perception:
K a p 'a knows that p'
B a p 'a believes that p'
S a p 'a sees that p'
Let us write I a p for the statement (1).
Hintikka's general strategy is to view statements of the form
(2)
a (p's that p
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(3)
Al^
I a (ADB) D (I a ADI a B)
I a (A AB) = (I a A AlaB)
I a T, if T is a tautology
While (11) and (12) seem quite natural, (13) is clearly problematic. Is it really
true to say of each agent a that he or she imagines that Bacon is Shakespeare
or Bacon is not Shakespeare? Perhaps our agent a has not ever even heard
about these two remarkable historical characters. How could they then play
any role in his or her imagination?
These questions are related to the famous problem of'logical omniscience'
in epistemic logic: K a T holds for every tautology T. Hintikka (1975) and
Rantala (1982) have shown how to avoid this undesirable consequence of (3).
Thus, Rantala's technique of impossible worlds could be adapted to the logic
of I a , so that we get rid of (13).
The problem of logical omniscience is one of the motivations for the
situation semantics that Barwise and Perry have developed as an alternative to
212
the possible worlds semantics of propositional attitudes (see Barwise 1981;
Barwise and Perry 1981). Barwise's basic idea is to analyse perception sentences with embedded 'naked infinitives' like "Esa saw Ingmar run". Let
NI(p) be the naked infinitive form of sentence p. For example. NI(p) is
"Ingmar run", when p is "Ingmar runs". Then Barwise's suggestion is as
follows:
"a sees NI(p)" is true in world w if there is a scene s in w such that a
sees s and s supports the truth of p.
a sees NI(p) D p.
In Hintikka's approach, seeing is an intensional operator S a which is followed by a description of the propositional content of a's perception. Therefore,
the force of Sap is something like "a seems to see that p" or "It appears
visually to a that p", so that the principle
(6)
SaPDp.
is not valid. For this reason, Hintikka's system is able to treat phenomena
related to the intentionality of perception - such as visual illusions and
hallucinations (cf. Niiniluoto 1979, 1982). Moreover, if we allow perspectival
quantification over events, then the Hintikka-type analysis can also give an
adequate treatment of the extensional naked infinitive perception reports.
(Cf. Niiniluoto 1982; Saarinen 1983; Vlach 1983; and Higginbotham 1983.)
Barwise's strategy (4) does not work for imagination sentences. If there
were naked infinitive imagination reports in English (such as "John imagined
Mary run"), then an analysis along the lines of (4) would lead to the undesirable result
(7)
a imagines NI(p) D p.
Iap D p.
(4)
213
214
It is natural to assume that the complete alternatives in the classes.4 w 5 and
/4 j -corresponding to the examples of seeing Ingmarand imagining Ingmar,
respectively - are described in the same conceptual framework (cf. Casey
1977:134). Moreover, there is no reason to regard thesealternativesascomplete
possible worlds where each fact is determined (i.e., each descriptive sentence is
either true or false). For example, it is entirely irrelevant to my imagination
about Ingmar's dance whether Ronald Reagan is the President of the United
States or not. We may thus assume that these alternatives are what Hintikka
(1975,1983) calls small worlds or what Barwise calls situation-types. Condition
(3) can then be replaced by the requirement
W
4.
It was noted above that imagination should not satisfy the success condition
(14)
I a ADA.
If I imagine that I am Francis Bacon, it does not follow that I am Francis Bacon.
Indeed, one might even suggest an an//-5MccejJcondition for I a :
(15)
IaADA.
(9)
215
Peter ashewasthedayheleft. What iscommonbetweenPeterasanimageandthe
centaur as an image is that they are two aspects of Nothingness." (Sartre
1972:210-211).
(16)
IaAD0PhA.
IaAD0A
IaADIa~A.
5.
Let us go back to the example where Esa imagines that Ingmar is dancing with a
blond girl. Then a well-defined physical individual, Ingmar, enters Esa's
imaginary worlds. This can be expressed by HinUkka'sphysicalquantifier(Ex)
as follows
(ExJIg^ (x = Ingmar & x dances).
Here the variable x ranges over 'physical world-lines', i.e., functions that pick
out from each imaginary world the same, 'physically cross-identified' indivi-
However, on closer analysis it seems that this passage is not intended to support
principle (15) at all. We may agree with Sartre that his image of Peter in Berlin is
not 'given' to him in the same way ashisperceptionsandmemoriesof Peter-and
this image is probably wrong. But, it seems to me, it would be too much to claim
that this imagemust be wrong: it may happenafterallthatPeterinfactiswalking
in the Kurfurstendamm when his friend Jean-Paul is imagining that he is doing
so. Therefore, (15) as a general principle should be rejected.
It is certainly possible to imagine situations and courses of events which are
physically impossible. This is shown both by surrealist novels and films and by
science Fiction, which play with effects that arisefrom violationsof natural laws.
If OP"1 is the operator of physicalpossibility, then the following principle is not
valid:
216
(Hx)Sa(x=b)
(Hx)(x=b&Sa(3yXy=x)).
Here (10) says that something visually appears to a and a identifies it as b. For
example, "Macbeth sees the ghost of Duncan" has the form (10). A visual
illusion, where aseesb asc, can beexpressed as follows:
(12)
(SxXx=b&Sa(x=c)).
(3x)Ia(x=b)
(14)
(HxXx=b&Ia(HyXx=y))
(15)
(3x)(x=b&Ia(x=c))
(3x)IaF(x)
(17)
(Hx)(x=b&IaF(x))
dual. On the other hand, the personal identity of the blond girl is unspecific- in
onepossibleworldshecouldbeMarilynMonroe.inanotherDorisDay.etc.The
function that picks out from each alternative the blond girl in that world is a
'perspectival world-line'-it cross-identifies thosegirlswhoplaythesamerolein
Esa's field of imagination as the dancing partner of Ingmar. (Similarly,
perspectival world-lines in the case of perception identify the individuals who
play the same role in the perceiver's visual space.) If (Hx) is the perspectival
quantifier which ranges over perspectival world-lines, then we can write
217
where F(x) is a formula with x as a free variable.
To illustrate the expressive power of these formulas, let us first consider
Sartre's favourite example, where he imagines that Peter is walking on the
streets of Berlin. According to Sartre, perceiving Peter and imagining Peter
are two different ways in which our consciousness can be related or directed
to the same object:
a imagines of b that he is an F
a imagines of b something
or
(14)** **a is imagining about b
The term " b " in formulas (14) and (17) is outside the scope of the operator I a ,
and its occurence is therefore referentially transparent. It also follows from
these formulas that (Hx)(x=b), i.e., b exists in the actual world.
The analogy with the logic of perception is not complete, however, since
the cross-identification between the actual world and the imaginary worlds
need not take place through causality. This is a crucially important feature of
imagination - a point that Sartre emphasizes in his example discussed above.
If I imagine Ingmar as Ingmar, i.e., as a person with his familiar appearance, then my act is of course causally related to my earlier perceptions and
memories about him, but not necessarily to his present existence. Further,
imagination is 'free' in the sense that I can also imagine what some existing
person whom I have never even seen looks like. What is more, I can imagine
Ingmar as someone else. This situation is expressed by formula (15) when
bA;, which thus can be read by
(15)
*a imagines b as c.
Here " c " occurs within the scope of I a , and hence in a referentially opaque
position.
Assume, for example, that I am following Ingmar's lecture, and I amuse
218
*a imagines b.
(16)
*a imagines an F.
Here 'b' occurs in a referentially opaque position. Unlike (14) and (15),
formulas (13) and (16) do not entail that b exists. They thus cover two kinds of
cases: imagining a thing or person which also has real existence (Ingmar,
Marilyn, a horse, etc.), and imagining something 'purely imaginary' or
fictitious (the present king of France, Anna Karenina, a unicorn, etc.).
Formulas (13) - (17) illustrate different meanings that the direct object
construction "a imagines b" may have. It is important to note their common
feature: they are all defined in terms of the operator I a which takes propositional that-clauses. Hence, what Casey (1976) calls imaging is a special case of
imagining-that}
6.
Sartre points out that "cases may be cited in which I produce an image of an
object which has no real existence outside of myself. But, he adds, the
chimera does not exist even "as an image" (Sartre 1972:5). On the other hand,
Brentano would say that an imagined unicorn - towards which our act of
imagining is "directed" - had "intentional inexistence." In his analysis of a
"naive hallucination", where Macbeth sees a dagger before him and believes
what he sees, Smith (1983) comes to the conclusion that Macbeth's perception has "no object". More precisely, he rejects the alternatives that the
objects of naive hallucinations could be existent objects, nonexistent objects,
objects in possible worlds, sense-data, intentional objects, or objects that
exist only insofar as they are perceived.
myself by imagining that he is Alfred Tarski. To do this, I need not have any
picture of Tarski in my mind - 1 just stretch my imagination to think that the
lecturer who looks like Ingmar is Tarski. Then it is true to say that I
non-sensuously imagine Ingmar as Tarski. There is no causal connection
between Ingmar and my perspectival world-line in this case.
On the other hand, suppose I sensuously imagine a doll as Marilyn Monroe. In this case, there is a causal connection between my earlier perceptions
and memories of Marilyn and my image of Marilyn, but not between the doll
and rrjy image. There is also an interesting overlap of my fields of perception
and imagination: when I see the doll as a doll, but imagine that it is Marilyn,
we have the following situation
219
7.
since (18) entails that Anna Karenina exists in the actual world.
We also stumble on the problem of 'intentional identity' (cf. Saarinen
1979): if you and I are both imagining something about Donald Duck, in
what sense are our acts directed toward the same object? As Donald does not
exist in the actual world, this cannot be formalized by
(19)
220
(20)
221
University of Helsinki
Dept. of Philosophy
Unioninkalu 40 B
00170 Helsinki 17
Finland
NOTES
This paper is a revised version of a paper which appeared under the title "Remarks on the Logic
of Imagination" in G. Holmstr5m and A.J.I. Jones (eds.): Action, Logic, and Social Theory(=
Ada Philosophica Fennica vol. 38 (1985), pp. 183-202.
1. For my first attempt to develop a logic of imagination, see Niiniluoto (1983).
2. It seems to me clear that imagining-how is also reducible to imagining-that. For example, to
imagine how it feels to dance with Marilyn Monroe, I imagine that I dance with Marilyn - with
feelings.
3. Fora treatment of hallucinations within Hintikka's logic of perception, see Niiniluoto (1979).
Smith's distinction between "naive", "neutral", and "hip" hallucination would require that the
belief operator B a is combined with S a . If this is done (cf. Niiniluoto 1979), then we can express
the difference between the terms "the dagger now here sensuously before me" and "the dagger
specify the class ,4 w j of his imaginary worlds. Through his work, he thus
"projects" - as Wolterstorff (1980) says - a class of possible worlds. It hardly
ever holds, however, that Aw T is simply the class Mod(T) of the models of T:
the author a narrows down the class Mod(T) with a set of contextual
presuppositions P a (cf. Lewis, 1978), which contains at least factual assumptions about the world and semantical conventions about the language of the
text T. The class of possible worlds projected by the author a is then
Mod(T&P a ). Everything that is true in this class, i.e., follows logically from
T&P a , is true in the fiction T. Everything that is false in this class is false in the
fiction T. It follows that there is a class of sentences true in some elements of
M(T&P a ) and false in others. These sentences are indetermined in the fiction
T.
A different class of possible worlds Mod(T&P^) is projected by a reader b
who reads the text T with his own presuppositions P^, where P^ and P a may
be more or less similar to each other. In reading about the fictional characters
that a made public through T, the reader b may then usehis own imagination
and produce a more or less vivid private image of the fictional world described by T. In this way, each reader of a literary work of art will have an active
role in 'constituting' for himself the imaginary world that this work speaks
about.
The communication between the author a and the readers b of a fictional
text T is made possible primarily by the shared presuppositions in P a and P^
which help the reader to understand the intended meaning of the author.
Through the public character of the text T, the author and the readers are able
to think about the same fictional objects. But, as the presuppositions P a may
be partly unconscious to the author a, an interpreter b may claim, as it often
happens, that he understands the text T better than its author.
222
actually now here sensuously before me" (cf. Smith 1983:108).
4. Searle rejects the view that "fiction contains different illocutionary acts from nonfiction"
(such as 'telling a story'), since this would commit us to the claim that "words do not have their
normal meanings in works of fiction" (Searle 1979: 64). This is a mistake, since ordinary words
may have the same meanings in two different illocutionary acts, e.g., in assertions and questions.
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