HEGEL: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED ‘THE GUIDES FOR THE PERPLEXED SERIES DAVID JAMES [Alex Thorason, Adorno A Guide forthe Perplexed Claire Colebrook, Deleuze: Guide or the Perplexed Benjamin Hutchens Levinas: A Guide forthe Perplexed Gary Cox, Sartre: A Guide for the Perplexed Mark Addis, Wiitgenstein: A Guide forthe Perplexed Matheson Russel, Huser Guide forthe Perplexed Erie Matthews, Merleau-Pont A Guide forthe Perplexed Chris Lawa, Gadamer: A Guide fr the Perplexed Gary Ketnp, Quine: A Gide forthe Perplexed Clare Catliste, Kierkeguar: A Guide forthe Perplexed XN& ee BUSELEL CONTINUUM International Publishing Group ‘The Tow aling Maiden Lane 1a Road Suite 704 London SELTNX New Yore NY 1038 (© Davi James 2007 Alleighs resored. No pas ofthis polation maybe reproduced or ‘eanami.ed in ay orm ob thy meus elecconi or mechan inelodng photoconying reoring or any information sore or ‘stam, whoa peor permision mrtg fro he publishes Brhish Library Cataloging n-Picttion Data A catalogue eae for this Book is aval rom te Brisk Library SBR: 0-8364.8536-7 (hardback) rebe2e485308 (68264-65575 (paperback) ‘7a0eD5H85373 Liar of Congress Cataloging Pubication Data Ses, Davi, 66— rege: gue forthe perpleed / David mes pcm sans, Seosa64ss366 ISBN. 10; 08264-8536-7 ISBNIS: TBODELSSITS ISBN 08968 8537-5 1. Hegel, Georg Wisin Fridrch 770-1831. [Tile Bae 2007 193 dea? s05025608 ‘Typetet by Servs Fiimseting 4, Manchester ants ans bound im rest Bran oy ‘Clomiel Pros id, Howes Wise lea CONTENTS Introduetion Hgets Philosophy of Subjetve Spirit 1, Kant and Ficht on Seli-Consciousness 2 Seif-Conseiousnes a the Truth of Consciousness 53, The Universal SeléConsciousness of Spirit ‘Objective Spirit The Philosophy of Right, 1 Right as Objectiied Will 2. Absiruct Right 3, The Moral Sandpoint 4. Gul Society 5. Euhicl Life 6, The Philosophy of History Art and Religion 1. The Religious Funeton of Art 2. The Ethical Function of Art 3. Christianity and the Problem of Positivity” 44 Hege’s Account of Fath 5. Faith and the Enightenmeat 6, Hegel’ Csitique of Religious Representational Thought Philosophy: The Metaphysics of Freedom I. Logic or Speculative Philosophy 2, Hegels Cate of Spinaza’s Theory of Substance 3, Hegel's Dialectical Method 4. The idea 3 3 35 2 3 8 95 1a ms na ua 220 126 1SConclusion Notes Father Reading ‘Selected Bibliography Indes 40 M3 133 155, 159 INTRODUCTION A itictve Feature of the pilosopy of G. W.F Hegel (1770-1831) is the way in which it forms a system, For Hegel, philosophy, as {knowledge ofthe truth, can in fact only be expounded ‘as Science or as tem’! Tae sience of the Ha or the Absolut, that iy Hepes ‘own philosophy, s therefore ‘essentially assem, since what is con ‘rte true i 0 only i its inward self unfolding and in taking and holding tet together in nity, Le, astray’ Hegel even claims ‘hat the history of philosophy is to be understood as w series of systems each of which is grounded ona particular principle? This historical process in the course of which one philosophical system replaces another, culminates in Hepes ow philosophical system, ax ‘outlined in his Encyclopaedia of the Pilosophical Sciences, becanse fs combines al air principles within itself, thus overcoming the limited standpoint adopted by previous philosophical systems, each ‘of mich is grounded on one principe tothe exclusion of others gel’ understanding of his own philosopy as the most com- prehensive ofall philosophical systems implies that his philosophy forms totality ofintereonnected moments, whose truth depends on their being compreheaded ss moments ofthis totality. This under- standing of philosophy as 2 system gives rise to a problem for Anyone seeking to offer a short introduction to Hegel's thought, ‘nce the necessity of focusing on certain aspects of his pilosephi= caleystem atthe expense of others appears to run counter this con- texption of philosophy, together with its object, truth as a totality fof interconnected moments, I other words, given the systematic ‘natucof Hegel’ philosophy, ashortintreductiontohisthoughécan lt bes provide ony a partial account of his pilosophical project. It ‘would therefore help we could identify a single theme that runs{broughout Heget’s philosophical system, which consists ofa ogi, 4 philosophy of nature, aad a philosopiy of spirit for this theme ‘might provide the key to understanding both the internal dynamic governing the development of this system andthe principle which Serves to unify its various moments. Fortunately, i is possibie to ‘identify sucha theme, namely freedom, ‘There are historical reasons 38 to why the concept of freedom became central to Hegel’ thought. To begin with, in 1789, the French Revolution broke out, an event which Heyl, together with his fellow seminarians atthe University of Tubingen, the philoso pher FW. J Schelling (1775-1888) and the poet Fredrick Halderlin (1770-1843), clearly welcomed.‘ Hegel also appears to have retained his view ofthe Revolution asa necessary and thus highly signiBicant historical event later in life There for example, a sory relating ‘how, on & tip to Dresden in 1820, a time of deep polieal reaction jn Germany, he unexpectedly ordered a bottle of the finest cham- [apne so a fo toast the anniversary of the storming ofthe Basile, ‘he event which marked the begining ofthe French Revolution.® Inthe ease of French Revolution, Hogel seems to think that there is im fact an especially close relation between historical event and philosophical theory; orn aletter from 1814, he suggest, with ef- rence 1 his own 1807 Phenomenology of Spr, thatthe French Republic was based on an inadequate conception of freedom that ‘originated in the Enlightenment and therefore had to pass out of ‘own destructive actuality” over into another land, the land of ‘self conscious spirit. Hegel is here referring to the way in which the ‘account ofthe phsse ofthe Revolution known as the Terror tate {ives inthe Phenomenology of Spirits followed by an account ofthe ‘moral world-view as exemplified in the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant (17241804), whose critical philosophy provided ‘the main impetus forthe development of German Idealism, wich ‘calminated in Hepes philosophical system Since a we shal 68, ‘Kant idea of mora autonomy constitutes for Hegel nother highly {important stage in human history in so fara it involves the pro- sresive realization of freedom, we must assume that German phil ‘sophy is meant to complete the world historical process of whic the French Revotution is also an essential stage ‘By taking the concept of freedom as my guiding thread, intend to show that Hegel atempts to complete the proces that takes on a ‘new impetus with the events ofthe Fiezch Revolution and is then realized in German philosophy by flly incorporating the idea of ‘moral aufonomy into his philosophical system. As we shall see, Hegel thnks tat the significance ofthe concept of freedom should not thetefore be limited to the domain ofetics but must instead be ‘extended to include religion and even logc. Moreover, as Hege!s ‘laim thatthe French Revolution’s conception of freedom is inade~ ‘quate already suggests, his philosophy represents en attempt 10 ‘offer an adequate theory offcdom Which identifies what the later enventialy is "The approach that [adopt wil, however, lead me to concentrate ‘on certain areas of Hegel's thought, such as his social and politica ‘Philosophy, at the expense of others, most notably his philosophy of ‘ature. My neglect of Hepel’s philosophy of natare ean nevertheless to some extent be justified on the grounds that, in relation to the issue of Geedom, nature is subordinate to spirit for Hegel, who maker a distinction between avs of nature and lnws of Fredo that ‘erives ftom modsen natural law theory” While the concept of freedom will be seen to provide the key to understanding the intr nal éynamic governing Hegel’ system as & whole, together with ‘many details ofthe areas of his thought that Ido cover, sso hope toshow that his theory of subjective spirit, objective spirit, and, t0 ‘lesser extent, his theory of absolut piritcan be understood iniso- lation from hie speclatve log, even though Hegel sometimes suge ‘ests that the latter underpins the other pars of his philosophical system. In this respect, we ean toa certain depre avoid thinking of Hogels philosophy as forming a system inthe strong sense that one prt of iteannot be understood in isolation fom its other parts‘CHAPTER + HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT 1. KANT AND FICHTE ON SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. representations relatos to his dim thatthe unity of appereeption mist be considered to be a necessary condition of experienc, that ‘something tht must be presupposed inorder to explain the pos sibilty of experience for this claim is based on the idea tha in fonder to be conscious of the uppeurances oF representations that make up experience in general, the subject of the later must be| capable of ascribing these representations to itself In other words, | the subject of experience mast be inthe postion to think of these representations as being is representations, because otherwise the Tin is philosophy of opine, Hegel employs two ey concepts, consciousness and self-consciousness, both of which are of great importance in lation to hisaccount of freedom, They also have an ‘essential role to play in the Wansiion from one form of spnt to nother. Thisis Because Hegel’ account of freedom and his account ‘of the tanition mentioned above both involve the idea of ovr-| ‘coming the apposition between the subject and object of knowledge, ‘an opposition waich is typical of consciousness but is, to some’ exten, already overcome atthe evel of self consciousness. In onde Yo understand Hegel’ theory of consciousness and_sell- consciousness, we fist need to Look atthe conception of sel-con- sciousness tht is present in the thought of Kant and J. G. Fichte (7621814 togeter withthe sincuon dt they make beeen itand consciousness. inhi Critique of Pure Reason, Kant sess to Veniify the cond ‘ions ofthe possibilty of experienc in general, amongst which he includes seléconsciousness, of the transcendental unity of apper- ‘ception, as he cll it. When he speaks of experience, Kant means ‘he general experience io which all our particular experiences belong and he identifies these particular experionss with our ‘Rpresetatins is quston would Five fo meng Yor and Wee ‘oud wo, tcf be any puns for kent then a8 ep- Teena However in ation to the rumen that he Subj of eanenoe mut be he poston te serbe peso foto isl, Rant nro ance reeset bat eb thing to esplin the porsbiy of he pneral expres to hich Tour particle expedences ving, anno sour onscoaes OF parular slated epresaations Ts scond equa! tha the whole manifold of epesel- aon ot justi ones iste rupedastelonging to org onoousess Theoret dts rom theft hat be general ‘Spence whose poo Kant is empting to explain rage pneed xpeneace of which cach pete expense ora di net moment The subject f such a general expences here fore be undesond as stint oe that semais the sme thoughout lhe fot exeenoes mich our au moment of ths erceal expense Consucaty the sbjet in eon canoe Be thought of ws thence by-product ofthe eilestion ofthe sage ‘prosenatonof whe ts consi mst stead De tout take the unl of contoaset isl publ y seaining ent fal dhoughoal lis particular experinoee. [the eet fo itogce suk &eIPISenUG BEC ORI TO) epi th post of tng oval experience sso poids thea pets or ii atenp wo expla he tial are sf slfconsouses as os Kant egies at bork th pssiby ‘various perceptions’ Kant deines a peteption as an appearance ‘combined with consciousness? He also describes perceptions as a {ype of representation, namely a representation with consious- ess? In other words, a perception i a representation which we are conscious of perceiving, The fact that Kant understands the pe ‘eaptions that constitute our particular conscious experiences to Be ‘of identifying various representations as Being my representions ‘and the possibilty of single organized experince presuppose the tunity of scl-cansciousness, Fiche claims, n the following passage from his Science of Knowledge (Wissenschafislhre), that the unity cof seifconseiousness must be presupposed if Tacx to recognize Various aetions as being my actions:Teannot take a step, move hand or foot, without n intelectual [IPP intuition omy seifconsciousnessin these acts; oly so do Low that /do it, only so do [distinguish my action, and mye therein, from the object of action before me. Whosoever ascries an acti ity to himself, appeals to this intuition. The source of le iscon- ‘tained therein, and without t there i death In other words, selconssiousnes is for Fcht, as iti for Kant, a presupposition of aay form of empirical consciousness since it must bbe thought to accompany each and every representation which the st asthe ground of singe ngs experince, ibs 0 ite ‘The impossibility of recognizing any representation as my own ‘without prespposiag the unity ofthe subject impli another more fundamental act than that of consciousness, an act which Fichte deseribesas the most primordial act ofthe subjec’sinceit precedes And conditions all other acts of consciousness* This act, in which the self or ‘(das Ze makes itself ito its own objec, i idenisied ‘by Fcite withthe concept of the sel! fr through thinking itt, ‘the self fist comes to exist forts. ‘Tie way in which the self i identcal with the act through which it constitutes itself lads Fichte to claim thatthe self posts itself, bby which he means that its existonce is immediately given through the act of thinking itself, s0 that: “To posit oneself and to Be ar, a8 applied to the self, perfecly identical.” Tn other words, the thought of myself and the fact of my existence are inextricably linked, since he former implies the latter, even thong I may, by ‘contrast, exist without thinking of myself I therefore become ‘certain of the fact that I exist as soon as I make myselt ito the ‘object of my thought ‘The identity of the subject and object of thought which Fete attempts to explain by means ofthe idea of an actin which the self positsitself means that theact in question it not directed towards an) ‘object which remains extemal tothe subject and must therefore be ‘thought to exis independently ofthe later. The subjet of the act and its object are instead identieal, and inthis respect Fiche’ ideo ofthe st’ positing itself can be sen as an attempt to maintain & firm distinction between se-consciousness, in which subject and ‘object are identical, and the consciousness of objects that ae other than the subject which sconscous of thers. We al shorly se that eoexe paxosorny oF eupycoTwE SAT “Hegel views the identity of subject and objet, which for Fchte dis: tinguishes sel-consciousness fom other forms of consciousness as ‘a necesery stage in the overcoming of the opposition between ‘ubjact and object to which consciousness gives Tse. Fichte's understanding of selfconsciousness as an sct of sf positing implies moreover, thar the object of which oneis conscious ‘sa product of the subject’ own activity and this in tum suggests 2 link Between self-consciousness and the idea of freedom a5 se determination In other words sl-conseiousness involves an avare~ ‘ess on the partof th subject of is own unconditioned activity; and inthis respect it must again be thought to difer from forms of con- sciousness in which the object of consciousnes isnot identical with ‘the subject chat is constious of it, so that the independence of the ‘yoo limits the subject activity. "The idea that ther isan esontial link between self-consciousaess «and freedoms as we salle, one that Hegelis keen to develop Kant also suggests link between seFconsciousnes end the idea of self determination when he associates th activity of the thinking subject ‘with an unconditioned form of activity by making a firm distinction ‘tween the recepiity of intuition and the spontaneity ofthe under standing. Ishallnow sy something more about this distinction, snes ‘helps to explain the unifying function that Hegel attributes to the self and the opposition between slf-consciousness and consciousness fof whic he speaks. For Kant there ae oso base forms of intuition, space snd time, ‘through which a manifold of sensory representations are given ws. ‘These dscreie representations (eg. the representation of x existing stacertain point in space and time) can be brought togesber to form fa Single unified representation only through sn act of synthesis “This act of synthesis is performed by the understanding, which cempioys certain pure (i, nonempitical) concepts or categories 35 ‘Kant calls them. The categories constitute the rules according 10 ‘which a manifold of diserete representations aze to be unified into {single organized whole, For Kant, they are infact laws, becouse, ‘unlike rules in general they provide not only the conditions accord ing to which a certain manifold ean be posited in uniform fashion’ bul also the conditions according to which the manifold must be 30 posited.* In other words, the categories constitute the conditions| ‘hich make experience in general possible, in the sense that experi fence in general, ay well as any particular experiences occurring‘within it, mast be organized in accordance with them so as to ean- stiute a unified experience, as opposed to a confused manifold of discrete representations that do not appear to stand in a law governed eelation to cach other. Whi the manifold of representations is given through intuition, ‘which. as purely sensory may amount to nothing more than the way {nwhich the subject is afeted by these representations thus making ‘the subject relation to theminto a purely reeptive one, Kant thinks ‘thatthe combination of the manifold performed by the categories must be viewed as an at of spontaneity which as ‘an act ofthe sl sctvty of the subject. cannot be executed sae by the subject ‘sel’? Ths elaim tatns on the idea that sine the categories fst make experience possible, they cannot themselves be derived from the latter: they are instead laws thatthe understanding goes to the ‘manifold of representations given through the pure forms of nth ition Ge. space and tine). ‘The role that Kant thus assigns the categories has important implications with respect to his aecount ofthe unity of appercep- tion: for he holds the categories to be in an important sense condi tions of solEconsciousness itself, eventhough the subject, though its employment ofthe categories, brings about the singe organized ‘experience to which each ofits particular experiences belongs. For in so doing, the subject brings about self, snes tis only by uniting 4 given manifold of representations within 4 single consciousness that it becomes possible forthe subject to think of itself as remain ‘ng identical throughout the series of representations of which its conscious; whereasin the case of tho subjetsact of ascribing single ‘representations to itself, it could conceivably have as diverse asl it has representations of which itis constious, The fact thet the subject must employ the categories in order to unite the given maa fold of representations ina single consciousness and to be able 10 {think of ise as that which emeins identical teoughost its various ‘experiences means that she categories are just as much conditions of sclfconsciousness a they are canditions of experience ia general, ‘Kant therefore claims thatthe analytic unity of apperception (ie the selfidentity ofthe 'T) is posible only under the presupposition of ‘certain ynthetic unity (Le the unity achieved by means ofthe eat- gories) ‘Although, like Kent, Fichte thinks that selconsciowsness is ‘condition of experience in goneral, we have seen that he tends to view the selfs act of thinking itself as proving the conditions of ‘unity upon which the possibility of consciousness depends, whereas Tor Kant the categories of the understanding are also required, “Hegel appenrs to follow Fiche rater than Kant when heclsims that ‘the 'T is ‘pure being-foratel, in which everything particular is ‘negated and sublated — consciousness a6 ubimate, simple, and ‘pure Fortis suggests that the“ alone fonction as the universal ‘within whieh all its particular determinations are unified; determi- ratins which may be taken to inchide the subject’ sensations, desires and inclngtion, as well a its representations of external ‘bjecs, Hegel implies, moreover, that al such particular determina tions are not merely contained but also unified within the T when tne states that I know everything as being mine in such a way that _sasp every objet asa member inthe system of what I myself any. ‘The fact that Hegel tales the ‘to perform the unifying function that Kant assigns the categories is also suggested by his deseription of the Tas ‘the simple category’? “logs adoption ofthe model of sel.consciousness found in the ‘works of Kant and Fichteis evident from the following definition of Subjectivity that he gives: pure form, the abslure unity of the sl Consciousness with isl, in which the selfconsciousness, as “I” = STi totally inward and abstract dependent upon ise — Le che ‘pure cert of ssl, a distinct fom truth’ For tis definition ff subyetvty captures some of the essential features ofthe mode! of selfconsciousness developed by Kant and Fichte. To begin with, subjeedivity, as pure form, ishere considered in abstraction from any Of the determinate Features that serve to distngvish one particular “Trot another particular‘, Tiss refloston of the way in which ‘Kant and Fiche discus sel-consciousnes in terms ofits unifying funetion and inthe cate of Fits, 2so in terms ofthe set through which the self post itself, since this unifying fanetion and act of self pontng must be understond as common to each and every self ‘consciousness. Second, te term T= "captures the way ia which ‘the subject remains cif. identical throughout the various experiences ‘that make up the more general experience of which itis the condi- tion. Tair, when Hegel speaks ofthe Tas being certain of itself he ‘canbe seen to ave in mind the way in which the posits tse, in the sense that its act of thinking itself necessarily involves the thought of its own exstonce, so thatthe T's certancy of itself does not appear to depend on anything other than its own activity (etsct of thinking ise). This se-certainy is, however, a one-sided, and thus inadequate, form of knowledge for Heget because, as we shal se, the‘, 2s merely sel-idetical, lacks the moment of con- sciousness. We hmve already touched upon the reason why Hegel ‘thinks that tbe type of sefcerainty thatthe self-conscious subject has of itsel” must be supplemented by the moment of consciousness for while both Kant and Fichte understand selonsciousness as being & condition of all conscious experience, experience for them involves sother element in adsition to the subject’ sele-actvity, ‘namely intuition. I Kant’ case, this is because sensible intuition i the medi ‘through which objects are given us, Consequently, he act of aseib- ing various epresentations to myself and unifying them intoasingle ‘organized experience by means of the categories requires that such representations are first given in inet sense atleast, which is subject to the determinations of time, while other typos of representation, such asthe representations of objects extemal to myself, must also bbe given in outer sense, which i structured according tothe three ak for rocognition, namely the master-slave relation. Force save Js forced to limit his own activity in accordance with the demands ‘of hismaste, and he thus learns toactin conformity with demands ‘that do not necessarily accord with the promptings of his own par- ticular wl, Hegel strettes the necessity of such discipline when he calls the subjugation ofthe slave's slishness the beginning of true ‘numan freedom, with the trembling of the singularity of the wall andthe habitof obeying being necessary moments in the formation ‘of every human being. so that no one becomes free and rational ‘without having experienced the discipline which breaks the partic. ‘lat individual's sli ® ‘Theide tha recognizing others as being ofthe same genera ype 1s oneself involves limiting one's own activity in relation to them allows us to reconcile the negation of ones particular individality, ‘ich appears to imply an identity with other, withthe demand to ‘ecept and respect the particularity of both onesell and others, uss required by the idea that each individual possesses an absolute inde- pendence in relation to others For, according to Fichte the act of ‘elllimiation, which leaves open fr othors a spbercin which to exer cise hei eficacy, makes individuality possible: Ase himseif puts it,‘Heost:A UDE FORTHE PERPLEXED °T posit myself as an individual in opposition to another particular Individual, insofar as I ascribe to myself «sphere for my trom from which Teaclude the other and ascribes sphee tothe other rom hich I exclude mse In other words, its only through exesis- ing fee choice and parsuing ther own private ends that individuals ‘come to distinguish thomsolves from others in way that goes beyond their simply exhibiting certain natural differences which, i their mere givenness, cannot be regarded as 8 result of their own activity. ‘The possibilty of exercising tre choice and effectively pursing ‘one's own ends ultimately depends, however, on the agreement of cach and every rational being to limit its own activity and tas allow others a sphere in whic to exercise their efficacy. Wheres in the absence of such agreement based on mutual recognition, each indi vidual could not, with any certainty, aerbe to him or herself & sphere of stiviy in which to exercise is or er elicacy for any Jonge than the time in hich he or she is able to secure this sphere ‘by means of physical fore or because no one ese es yet la claim {oiit The recognition of others as being of the sate general ype a3 ‘oneself is therefore a concition of individuality. I we understand Hegel conception of universal sel-consciousnss| asin effect a restatement of Fiche position a the end of his dedue- tion of right, the tension tht might be thought to exist between the {deaf onesientity with others andthe idea that eachindividual sl ‘consciousness retains an absolute independence in relation to others ual must be convinced through the use of his or her own reason of | the truth of the religious teachings which are the souree of one’s various duties ‘Kant believes that natural religion und revealed religion are not necessarily incompatibie with each other, since a revealed religion ‘an be shown to bein accordance with natural religion ‘itis socon- ‘stituted that human beings could and ought 1o have arrived at on their own through the mere use of thet reason’ In other words the ‘teachings ofa revealed religion may infact accord with natural rei- tion, even though itis beter for individuals to fist discover the truths of natural religion, so that they might judge the teachings of| revealed tligion inthe light of them. In tis respect, the relation of| revealed religion to netural religion is analogous to the relation between postive law and natural law, which in Kant’s and Hege!s time was taken 10 include the normative foundations of law ia ‘general insofar as insight into these normative foundations was to provide the standard by mcans of which positive lavs were to be Judged. For Kant, itis morality that proves the normative foune Satons for any revealed eigon that may justifiably claim tobe in ‘harmony with reason as a selPlegislatng faculty. He thinks more- cove, thatthe teachings of Jesus area eae in point, since many of them correspond to genuine duties 0 which the moral subject may frety subject st. ‘Inthe light of Kant’ distinction between natural and reveals religion, we may take Hege!s point to be that Jesus ociginlly intended to tech 2 natural form of religion, that i a reign into which individuals could gan rational insight and thus recognize the ‘moral demands thtit makes on them a being ones that they ought tomake their own by developing the disposition to actin accordance with them, rather than tei simply following commands that have the character of legal statutes. The fet that Jesus was forced 10 aceommodatehis teachings tothe prevaling copditions and sptitof the age meant, however, that all moral duties came to derive their authority fom his owa person and not fom the fact that hey were sn themselves duties ‘This invites the question as to whether the Christian reigion right be purged ofits positty by once again making morality into itsessenoe as enus originally intended. On the whole, Hegel appears tobebighly soptcal regarding such possibilty in The Posity of ‘the Civitan Religion: oe in his easly work he stresses the vasious ‘ways in which, roughout it history, the Christan religion has tended to take on positive form. He claims infact, that whereas Judaism commanded ony actions the Chistian Church even com ‘mands feelings, repatance, pious fervour, Yet the ea of com ‘manag feclngsisa contradiction i terms snc feelings cannot be produced st will and Hegel therefore angus that twas impossible forthe Christian Church to produce anything morein this way than “legality anda mechanical virtue and pity Het views on the postity of the Cristian religion invite the ‘dea that it serves es the epitome ofan objet which i its mere given- ‘ess, confronts the individual as something alien that nevertheless dominates him.” Yet he later came to call the Christian religion the religion of truth and freedom” This apparent changs in attitude towards the Christan religion seems ll the more remarkable given the act tha, in The Pasty ofthe Christian Religion, Hegel compars the untcedom of the Cristian religion unfavourably with the Political Feadom enjoyed bythe chiens of the Gresk esate and the Romaa Republic. For Hegel the izes of the Greek sitysate tnd the Roman Republi were fic bocase they “obeyed la aid down by thenseiey obeyed men whom they had themselves ‘ppoinied to fe’ and waged war on which they had thomseles Setided”” Ta shor, the items of the Oreck cty-ate and the Roman Republic ete re becaus they performed act of elles Intion rather than merely obeying positive commands. Consequeny, {he Grek or Roman cizen oul deny himself with he tate and ‘war ready tosacrifce his on ifeonis behalf because was is ow York and that which ave meaning to hse Hegelelaims, moreover thatthe Greek aod Roman religions were selon for ie people becouse they had a nteralrolo pay nrelatin tothe sate which formed the end of the indus zens activity, as when te gods vere taken to bestow gts ital to politcal if such a wséom and "Soguenes, when hy Were consulted wit regard o Whether pro- owed undertaking would rm ou well or badly. “The ciuzns act of etn he tat as is own highest end was made more diffe, however. by certain developments the 100k lc isthe Roman work, namely th ceding of politi power toa patcular poop of popl (ie the arstocrey) and then oa snge Indidual le. the Roman Empcon,topsher with an increase in ‘wealth nd luxury Thi resulted in «conn in which the eins fe Empire ween longer able to rcognzs he sats the product ‘oftheir om ati and came to have fs them the pur isin tmetal function of protecting own persons and proper) Just as pola frexiom wen together with religion fora fre people ths {oss of poltical freedom became associated with scion that reflected this los: one that worships © transcendent Go placed Beyond the boundaries of human power, a God tovards hich human beings stand in a merely passive elation, and to which they ‘ewig coe allegation. Moreover, dew 2 longer had he ‘meaning that had when one wilingly sacrificed one's own ie for an fend Ge he sat) wath which one ful seated onesie The eo foring belt in peoaal immorialty therefore became nocesary, snd human being thas came to seek ad expet huppitess ia beeen, not oncasth ‘AS we sw inthe previous chapter, the kind of privaism which ‘Hegel asofates withthe Christan sligon in The Postiiy of he Christan Religion, along, with the loss of politcal freedom in the ‘ease of direct political participation, arc features of the moder ‘state as presentod in his philosophy of right. This suggests that Hegel ‘i not come to think of the Christan religion asthe religion of ‘ruth and freedom because itcould serve a pubic eigon that was ‘essentially bound up with the political freedom and politieal acti lity of the members of the modern state. In what sense, then, does Hlgel understand the Christian religion to be the religion of truth and freedom? "The short answer to this question is that Hegel came to develop ‘an account ofthe Christan religion which he believed shows that i sccords with the principle of subjective freedom because thesubject- ive aspect of faith forms an essential element of the Chistian reli tion, thus making the ater compatible with the right of the subject {experience the satisfaction ofits putiularity and to enti itself with the objects ofits concer, However, 25 we shall se below, Hegel also thinks thatthe subjetve aspect of faith needs to be supe ‘mented by a determinate content, he truth of which can be emon- strated by means of a philosophy’ of religion. In other words, the ‘content of the Christan faith mut be shown to be compas with the right of individuals to have an insight into what they hold to be 00d or true; for it's the possibility of guining rational insight into ‘this content that allows the positivity, which stil characterizes the Cristian eigion as a revealed religion, tobe fly overcome. In onder to understand why Hegel ater eam to eal the Christian religion the religion of truth and freedom, we therefore ned to turn tohis account of the esental nature of Christian faith and its sub- jective dimension in particular, which concerns the right of the "ubjet to experience the satisfaction ofits particularity and oiden- ‘ify itself withthe objets ofits concern. Hegel's critics of sub- jeetvist conception of fit for being one-sided wil then lead us to consider the content of ith, which constitutes its objective Gimension, and Heget'sattempt to explain the possiblity of guning ‘ational sight nto the content of the Christian religion. “4. HEGEL'S ACCOUNT OF FATT A good example of « subjetvist conception of the essence of tli ious faith is to be found in the thought of Soren Kierkegaard, (1813-1855), whois often taken to be one of Hegels earliest citiesKierkegaard makes the following uncompromising, statement ‘concerning Christian faith in particular: “Christianity is spct spirits inwardness inwardness is subjectivity, subjectivity is essea- lly passion, and a ifs maximum an infinite, personally interestod passion for one's eternal happiness Christian fai i here fst identified with inwardness, a8 opposed to any features of the ‘Christian religion, such a its doctrines andthe institutions of tae ‘Church, which a understood to posses an authority that makes them independent of the individual believer’ personal response (0 ‘the teachings of this historical religion. Inwardnes is then ident fied with a esting, passion; andthe essentially subjective nature of| feeling means that Kierkegaard’s description of the passionate inerest in one's eternal happiness a purely personal one isto the point. One impliestion of this subjectvist conception of faith i that although I might seek 10 communicate such 1 feeling of religious conviction to others, who may well beable to understand ina formal ‘sense what I mean, these others may not themselves experience the ‘very same feling tat I experience. For Kiekegaad, since passion is the esental thing in religious faith, and such passion cxanot be expressed in objective terms itis wholly inappropriate to attempt to ‘communicate one's personal relgionsexperences in thesame way a5 ‘one seks to communicate a fact abovt the world short, reli= ious faith is essentially a matter of inwardness. Inhis eetares onthe philosopty of religion, Heys claims that an appeal to one’s own felngs ‘breaks off the commonality between, ‘us wheres inthe case of thought or the concept “we meet one ‘another on the sol af the universal, of rationality Given the con- rection that Hegel elsewhere makes between rationality and autor ‘omy, this asessment ofthe limits of feling may posto suggest ‘purely negative attitude on his par othe kind of subjctivstcon- ception of fulth that Kierkepaaré adopts, a conception of faith ‘which stresses is ultimate incommunicabity. We shall shorty se ‘however, that Hegel holds a feeling of religious conviction to be an essential moment of faith and that he secks to provide vital ink between it and reason in the cate of the Christin religion. We should therefore be cautious about taking Hegel’ account of the imitations of feeling to constitute an outight rejection of the kind of religious subjectvism which we find in Kierkegaard’ account of ‘theessence of faith In what follows, we shal son fact that cis kind AT WO RELCION of rligioussubjectivism i inspite ofits onesidedves, an expres sion ofthe principle of subjective freedom, which for Hegel isa dis tinetve feature of the modern world, Hegel encountered such a subjectvist conception of the essence ‘of faith in his own time in the thought of Fredrice Heinrich Jacobi (743-1819), and in this respect Kierkegaard can be viewed 3s belonging to a well-ostablished tradition. Hegel's attitude to such religious subjetivism is in Tact @ complex one; for although be thinks that it captures an esenta aspect of genuine Christin faith, he also views ita ving rise to significant problem with regard 19 the content of faith. As far a the positive dimension to Hegel's account ofthe subjective aspect of faiths concerned, this relates to the way in which the subjet experiences the satisfaction of its par- sicuarity because, as this speei individual, he or she Tels person~ ally conviaced of the truth of the object of faith Hegel ie nevertheless critical of the kind of religious subjectivsm \which he associates with Jacobi on account ofits failure co establish ‘4 meaningful link between such inerontly subjective features as a feeling of conviction and the doctrines which serve to distinguish Christianity from other historical religions. For instance, 10 use Kierkegaars characterization of Christianity as an example, there does not appear to be an obvious ink between a passionate interest Jnone's ternal happiness andthe Christian religion in particular as ‘opposed to aay of the other historical religions that hold out the ‘promise of eternal happiness. This problem is one that Hegel himself "aises in connection with Jacobi idea of an ‘immealiate knowing” which ‘asserts that God and the true ean enly be known immedi- alely’® We therefore ned to look brely at Hegel’ atiude to this form of knowing i so far a it can be viewed usa religous form of| ‘acobis reduction of our knowledge of God to faith or immedi- ate knowing rests for Hegel, on the mistaken idee that thinking is alas a finite activity which is incapable of grasping the infinite; or Thinking is hore understood to always involve a cognition which ‘proceeds seqjtentilly from one conditioned item to another, with tach conditioned item itself being conditioned, or mediated, by something ese In other words, thought is restricted to scking (0 Siscaver the causal connections which determine the relations of Finite entities to each other thus fails to grasp the truth of that ‘which les outside this set of causal relations and constitutes iseoeL: A IDE FoR ME PERPLEXED ‘condition. Consequently, every conten is for ths type of thinking ‘only a particular, dependent, ad fre one, whereas Cod, oF what {infinite and tru, lies outside the mechanism of a connection of this kind to which cognition is supposed to be restricted’ "In other ‘words, God is otto be undersod a one enity within the world ‘among others; the concept of Cod instead expresses a content that is of an entirely diferent kind fom any nite en. Yet immediate ‘knowing’ attempt to comprehend God without turning the ster into one faite entity among others ends up reducing God t0 some~ thing wholly indeterminate, as we shall now see Tin is account of immediate knowing, Hegel clearly has in mind Jacobi claim that reaon is oaly able to uncover new conditions for ‘what is conditioned, with these new conditions in turn being con ‘ioned by Further conditions, whereas God lies outside the mechan- fm which determines the relations of finite entities to each other. ‘Tacobi then argues that our representations of the conditioned must ‘retuppose the representation of the unconditioned, which isthe condition ofthe posibilty of the existence ofthe temporal world or ture, nthe sense thatthe latter, as a complex of conditioned things, ‘ut be grounded in something supernatural which les outside it ‘According to Jacobi, we are therefore as certain ofthe existence of the unconditioned as We are ofthe existence of the extemal world, However, since reason ean direetly encounter only the complex of conditioned beings that constitutes nature, fom whic reason ultim= ately derives all its concept, the unconditioned cannot be appre- hended by us except asa given fact, which nds expresion in the ‘words it end this is what al tongues procaim as God. * Jacobi claim that the unconditioned is expres in the words it {sand the way in which he identifies this'itis' with God, leads Hegel tw argue that since it extends only to the assertion ‘that God isnot what God is), the immediate knowing of God expres limits the ‘object of religion to Godin general tothe indeterminate supersen- sible. Hegols main eitism of Jacob's conception of God ean ‘thorefore be seen to rest onthe idea that by identifying God withthe statement its, Jobi fils to specify any determinate Feanures that sight serve to distinguish the God which forms the object of Christian faith rom other conesptions of God, such asthe abstract fone which the symbole form of art unsuccessfully attempts to express in sensory form. The simple assertion ofthe fact that God exists doesnot, i short, provide ws witha determinate representa ART 1D RELIGION tion of God. In the following passage, Hegel, by contrast, seeks to sstinguish genuine Christian faith from the faith of immediate ‘knowing, which restits the content of religion to God in general: ‘The Christian faith implies an authority that belongs to the ‘church, while, on the contrary, the faith of this philosophising ‘standpoint just the authority of one's own subjective revelation. Moreover, the Christian faith is an objective content that is inwardly ich, a system of doctrine and cognition: wheres the ‘content ofthis [philosophical] faith is inwardly so indeterminate that it may petbaps admit that content too ~ but equally may ‘embrace within it the belief thatthe Dalai-Lama, the bull. the ape, 2, is God, ort may forts own pat, este itself to God {in gonera tothe highest esence'*” Tn this passage, Hegel stress the importance of the doctrinal content that serves to distinguish the Christian religion from other Iistorical religions so as to make a clear distinction betwen trae faith and the faith of immediate knowing, which in hs view fils to provide a determinate representation of God. The reference to sub- jective revelation suggests, moreover, that Hegel thinks of immedi- ste knowing as involving a subjetivist conception of Tuth that feduces the latter toa matter of fecling. Indeed, be elsewhere states that the immediate knowiedge, o rather convition, that God exis makes feline into the ground of our knowledge of God's being * ‘This appears to accord wit Jacob's own view of the matter; for even though he speaks ofan intuition of eas, which makes us certain ofthe actuality and tuth of certain supersensiole objects, he claims {hat this intuition is piven us i Telings of rapture, and that itis based on the authority of the feeling of the spiit* Since the subjective certainty that God exists fais to provide fa determinate representation of God, Hegel argues thet feeling is ‘a mere form, indeterminate on its own account and capable fof holding any content whatever” In the absence of w deter- rminate representation of God, which is, moreover, held to ‘possess an authority that makes it independent ofthe believer Subjective state of belief, the individual’ feelings and convic- tions come to decide what isto count as religious truth; yet, a ‘Hegel points out, this turns knowledge of God into a matter of caprice.