Professional Documents
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13
Game Theory
and Competitive
Strategy
Prepared by:
Fernando & Yvonn
Quijano
Copyright 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Microeconomics Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 7e.
CHAPTER 13 OUTLINE
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13.1
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13.1
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13.1
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13.1
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13.2
DOMINANT STRATEGIES
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13.2
DOMINANT STRATEGIES
equilibrium in dominant strategies
Outcome of a game in which each firm is
doing the best it can regardless of what its
competitors are doing.
Unfortunately, not every game has a dominant strategy for each player. To
see this, lets change our advertising example slightly.
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13.3
Dominant Strategies: Im doing the best I can no matter what you do.
Youre doing the best you can no matter what I do.
Nash Equilibrium:
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13.3
Figure 13.1
Beach Location Game
You (Y) and a competitor (C) plan to sell soft drinks on a beach.
If sunbathers are spread evenly across the beach and will walk to the closest vendor, the two of you
will locate next to each other at the center of the beach. This is the only Nash equilibrium.
If your competitor located at point A, you would want to move until you were just to the left, where you
could capture three-fourths of all sales.
But your competitor would then want to move back to the center, and you would do the same.
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13.3
*Maximin Strategies
The concept of a Nash equilibrium relies heavily on individual
rationality. Each players choice of strategy depends not only on its
own rationality, but also on the rationality of its opponent. This can be
a limitation.
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13.3
Maximin Strategies
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13.3
*Mixed Strategies
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13.3
*Mixed Strategies
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13.4
REPEATED GAMES
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13.4
REPEATED GAMES
Tit-for-Tat Strategy
tit-for-tat strategy Repeated-game
strategy in which a player responds in
kind to an opponents previous play,
cooperating with cooperative
opponents and retaliating against
uncooperative ones.
Infinitely Repeated Game
Suppose the game is infinitely repeated. In other words, my
competitor and I repeatedly set prices month after month, forever.
With infinite repetition of the game, the expected gains from
cooperation will outweigh those from undercutting.
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13.4
REPEATED GAMES
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13.4
REPEATED GAMES
Tit-for-Tat in Practice
Since most of us do not expect to live forever, the unraveling argument
would seem to make the tit-for-tat strategy of little value, leaving us stuck
in the prisoners dilemma. In practice, however, tit-for-tat can sometimes
work and cooperation can prevail.
There are two primary reasons.
Most managers dont know how long they will be competing with their
rivals, and this also serves to make cooperative behavior a good
strategy.
My competitor might have some doubt about the extent of my
rationality.
In a repeated game, the prisoners dilemma can have a cooperative
outcome.
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13.4
REPEATED GAMES
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13.4
REPEATED GAMES
Pan Am, which was dissatisfied with its small share of the U.S.
market, dropped its fares. American, United, and TWA, afraid
of losing their own shares of the market, quickly dropped their
fares to match Pan Am. The price-cutting continued, and
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forPrentice
consumers,
the plan was
soon dead.
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Inc. Publishing as
Hall Microeconomics
Pindyck/Rubinfeld,
7e.
13.5
SEQUENTIAL GAMES
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13.5
SEQUENTIAL GAMES
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13.5
SEQUENTIAL GAMES
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13.6
Empty Threats
Suppose Firm 1 produces personal computers that can
be used both as word processors and to do other tasks.
Firm 2 produces only dedicated word processors.
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13.6
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13.6
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13.6
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13.6
Bargaining Strategy
Our discussion of commitment and credibility also applies to bargaining
problems. The outcome of a bargaining situation can depend on the
ability of either side to take an action that alters its relative bargaining
position.
Consider two firms that are each planning to introduce one of two
products which are complementary goods.
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13.6
Bargaining Strategy
Suppose that Firms 1 and 2 are also bargaining over a second issue
whether to join a research consortium that a third firm is trying to form
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13.6
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13.7
ENTRY DETERRENCE
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13.7
ENTRY DETERRENCE
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13.7
ENTRY DETERRENCE
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13.7
ENTRY DETERRENCE
In the early 1970s, DuPont and National Lead each accounted for about a third
of U.S. titanium dioxide sales; another seven firms produced the remainder.
DuPont was considering whether to expand capacity. The industry was
changing, and those changes might enable DuPont to capture more of the
market and dominate the industry
Three factors had to be considered:
Future demand was expected to grow substantially.
New environmental regulations would be imposed.
The prices of raw materials used to make titanium dioxide were rising.
The new regulations and the higher input prices would have a major effect
on production cost and give DuPont a cost advantage, both because its
production technology was less sensitive to the change in input prices and
because its plants were in areas that made disposal of corrosive wastes
much less difficult than for other producers.
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13.7
ENTRY DETERRENCE
DuPont anticipated that other producers would have to shut down part of their
capacity.
Competitors would in effect have to reenter the market by building new plants.
Could DuPont deter them from taking this step?
DuPont considered the following strategy: invest nearly $400 million in increased
production capacity to try to capture 64 percent of the market by 1985.
The idea was to deter competitors from investing. Scale economies and
movement down the learning curve would give DuPont a cost advantage.
By 1975, things began to go awry.
Because demand grew by much less than expected, there was excess capacity
industrywide.
Because the environmental regulations were only weakly enforced, competitors
did not have to shut down capacity as expected.
DuPonts strategy led to antitrust action by the Federal Trade Commission in
1978.
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13.7
ENTRY DETERRENCE
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*13.8
AUCTIONS
Auction Formats
English (or oral) auction Auction in which a
seller actively solicits progressively higher bids from
a group of potential buyers.
Dutch auction Auction in which a seller begins
by offering an item at a relatively high price, then
reduces it by fixed amounts until the item is sold.
sealed-bid auction Auction in which all bids are
made simultaneously in sealed envelopes, the
winning bidder being the individual who has
submitted the highest bid.
first-price auction Auction in which the sales
price is equal to the highest bid.
second-price auction Auction in which the sales
price is equal to the second-highest bid.
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13.8
AUCTIONS
Private-Value Auctions
Whatever the auction format, each bidder must choose his or her bidding
strategy.
For an open English auction, this strategy is a choice of a price at
which to stop bidding.
For a Dutch auction, the strategy is the price at which the individual
expects to make his or her only bid.
For a sealed-bid auction, the strategy is the choice of bid to place in
a sealed envelope.
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*13.8
13.8
AUCTIONS
Common-Value Auctions
Suppose that you and four other people participate in an oral auction
to purchase a large jar of pennies, which will go to the winning bidder
at a price equal to the highest bid.
Once you have estimated the number of pennies in the jar, what is
your optimal bidding strategy?
The Winners Curse
winners curse Situation in which the winner
of a common-value auction is worse off as a
consequence of overestimating the value of the
item and thereby overbidding.
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13.8
AUCTIONS
Here are some useful tips for choosing the best auction format.
1. In a private-value auction, you should encourage as many bidders as
possible.
2. In a common-value auction, you should (a) use an open rather than a
sealed-bid auction because, as a general rule, an English (open) commonvalue auction will generate greater expected revenue than a sealed-bid
auction; and (b) reveal information about the true value of the object being
auctioned.
3. In a private-value auction, set a minimum bid equal to or even somewhat
higher than the value to you of keeping the good for future sale.
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*13.8
13.8
AUCTIONS
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*13.8
13.8
AUCTIONS
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